Petition for Writ of Certiorari — John L. Roseman, Sr., Petitioner v. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, et al.

Supreme Court briefOct 4, 2021

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

JOHN L. ROSEMAN, Sr.

Petitioner

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE,

AEROSPACE AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT

WORKERS OF AMERICA (“UAW INT’L”); UAW

LOCAL 140 (“Local 140”); UAW LOCAL 1700 (“Local

1700”); and FCA US LLC (“FCA”)

Respondents

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals For The Sixth

Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

John L. Roseman, Sr.

In pro se

24823 Cobblestone Court

Farmington Hills, MI 48336

313-815-0119

Received

OCT j 2 2021

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether, in contravention to collateral estoppel

doctrine, courts below relitigated, inter alia, issues of:

(1) whether pro se litigant Roseman was disabled at the

time of employer FCA’s November 21, 2018 termination

of his employment; (2) whether FCA’s November 21,

2018 termination of Roseman was legitimate; and (3)

whether Roseman’s continued absence, in the purview of

applicable laws,.adequately buttressed by medical

advice when FCA terminated him on or about November

21, 2018 - such that this Supreme Court should exercise

its supervisory role to correct error.

Whether federal ruling below is contrary to

Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms

because district court below ruled that image depicting

Roseman, the Petitioner in this writ, in possession of a

firearm was sufficient grounds for his employer to,

among other things, terminate him?

Whether, in the aggregate, proceedings of federal

courts below upheld “less stringent standards” tradition

pertaining to pro se litigants? Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.

520 (1971).

Whether, particularly given the rulings of

Michigan judges, Roseman showed a strong likelihood of

success on the merits of his claims such that injunctive

relief Roseman sought was meritorious but erroneously

denied?

Whether, in contemplations of all pertinent and

reasonably available facts, it may be found: that, in this

case the outcomes of the proceedings of federal courts

below are of adequate importance to persons not party

to this case; and, that, rendered outcomes are so far out

of bounds that this Supreme Court should exercise its

supervisory role?

LIST OF PARTIES AND RELATED CASES

[ X ] All parties appear in the caption of the case

on the cover page.

RELATED CASES

John L. Roseman v. FCA US LLC, Michigan

Department of Civil Rights, Equal Opportunity

Employment Commission (EEOC), Agencies

Charge No. 471-2018-04269. Judgment entered

September 17, 2018. (App. PA Pages 427,428.)

This charge (Id.) was also amended on August

13, 2018 to include more evidence and amend the

charge to include discrimination claims base on

retaliation and race.

iii

•

John L. Roseman v. UAWInfl, Michigan

Department of Civil Rights, EEOC, Agencies

Charge No. 471-2018-04259. Judgment entered

September 18, 2018. (App. PA Pages 424,425)

This charge (Id.) was also amended on August

13, 2018 to include more evidence and amend the

charge to include discrimination claims base on

retaliation and race.

•

John L. Roseman v. FCA US LLC, Appeal No. 19002020-25866, Case No. 13785026, Michigan

Compensation Appellate Commission. Judgment

entered February 15, 2019. (App. PA Pages 41213.)

•

John L. Roseman v. FCA US LLC, Case No.

13785025, Michigan Administrative Hearing

System (“MAHS”), Unemployment Insurance

Agency (“UIA”), ALJ Wheaton. Judgment entered

March 8, 2019. (App. PA Pages 397-411)

•

John L. Roseman v. FCA US LLC, Case No.

13365780, MAHS, UIA, ALJ Bondar. Judgment

entered April 4, 2019. (App. Pa Pages 416-423)

•

John L. Roseman v. UAWInti; UAWLocal 140;

UAW Local 1700; and FCA US LLC, No. 18-cv13042, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District

of Michigan Southeastern Division. Judgment

entered November 17, 2020.

•

John L. Roseman v. UAW Inti; UAW Local 140;

UAW Local 1700; and FCA US LLC, No. 20-2151

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit. Judgment entered July 14, 2021.

•

John L. Roseman v. FCA US LLC, SSN: XXX-XX7583 Case 1, DOI’s: 7/26/2018Workers

Compensation Agency (“WCA”). Judgment is

pending.

[X]

OPINIONS BELOW

For cases from federal courts:

The July 14, 2021 opinion of the three-judge U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is not

published. The text of the decision is set out in

the Appendix to the petition, infra at App. PA

Pages 80-111.

The opinion of the U. S. district court appears at

Appendix to the petition, infra App. PA Pages

115-155.

The opinions of the highest court to review the

merits appear at Appendix PA to the petition at

PA 80-111; PA Pages 397-411; and PA Pages 416423, and are unpublished.

TABLE OF AUTORITIES CITED

23 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice

& Procedure § 5310 (2d ed. Apr. 2021 update)

Allen u. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94. 101 S.Ct. 411. 66 L.Ed.2d

308 (1980)................................................................................

Brandon v. McPherren, 111 Okl. 292, 58 P.2d 871, 872....

Conley v. Gibson.............................. .........................................

Del Costello v. Teamsters.....................................................

Farmer v. ARA Servs. Inc., 660 F.2d 1096, 1107 (6th Cir.

1981)............................................................................... :........

Fengling Liu, 664 F.3d 367...:.................................................

Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. Of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th

Cir)

Haines v. Kerner, 404, U.S 519, 520-21 (1972).............

Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991)

John Roseman u. FCA US LLC, Docket No. 19-004202, Case

No. 13785025, Decision Date: April 4, 2019......................... xiii

Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 868 F.Supp. 1226 (D.

Colo. 1994)........................... .'...................................................... 59

Keith v. Cnty. of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 2013)21

Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 485 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir.

2007)........................................................................................ 20, 21

Macintosh v. Clous et al. 1: 21-cv-00309 U.S. W.D. Mich

Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803)......................

Miller........................................................................................... 58, 61

Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995)..........

Miller v. Currie Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 377 (6thCir. 1995) 58

Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 377 (6thCir. 1995)

vii

N.A.A.C.P., Detroit Branch v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n,

821 F.2d 328, 330 (6th Cir. 1987)......................................... 22

Norton v. Shelby........................................................................... 55

Ostevoll v. Ostevoll, 2000 WL 1611123 (S.D. Ohio))............. 61

Puckett v. Cox, 456 F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA)......... 59

Richardson v. Communications Workers of Am., 443 F.2d 974,

982 (8th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1973)

Smith v. Rock-Tenn Services, Inc., 813 F.3d 298, 310-11 (6th

Cir. 2016)...................................................

Thomas...........................................................

58, 62

Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985)

v. xiii, xiv

VanDeventer v. Michigan Nat’l Bank, 172 Mich App 456, 463;

432 NW2d 338 (1988)....................................................

Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 858 (6th Cir. 1976.)

Statutes

§ 301 LMRA

§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)

§ 703 of the Civil Rights Act, 81

28 U.S.C. §1254(1)

29 USC 215(a)(3) (Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA))

42 U.S. Code

Americans with Disabilities Act

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 42 U.S.C.§

12101

viii

LMRA.

MIOSHA Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act, 1974

P.A. 154 as Amended

25, 92

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)§ 7,8(a)(1)

Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act

(“LMRA”), 29U.S.C. § 185

section 703 of the Civil Rights Act, 81

Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

Title VII

U.S. Code § 706 (1)

U.S. Code §556 (d)

U.S. Code §557 (a)

U.S. Code 556 (d)

22, 76

Other Authorities

9 Wash. U.J.L. & Pol’y 379 (2002)

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (U.S.C. § 12101)

(ADA)

B. FELDACKER, LABOR GUIDE TO LABOR LAW supra

note I, at 383(2d ed. 1983)

Murray, Apportionment Section 301Duty of Fair

Representation Action @ pages 746-747

25 .

Rules

E.D. Mich.L.R. 7.1(f)(1)

E.D. Mich.L.R. 7.1(f)(2)

E.D. of MI LR 7.1(f)(2); Fed.R. App. P. 34(a))

FCA. Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence

L.R. 7.1(f)(2)

Rule 8(f) FRCP

Constitutional Provisions

Second Amendment

Seventh Amendment

Sixth Amendment

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

LIST OF PARTIES AND RELATED CASES

iii

RELATED CASES

111

OPINIONS BELOW.............................................................. vi

INDEX OF APPENDICES................................................... xi

JURISDICTION................................... ................................. 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED............................................................................. 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............................................. 6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT......................... 74

CONCLUSION........................................................................ 74

INDEX OF APPENDICES

Appendix PA

Mandate, U.S. 6th Cir. COA, Case No. 20-2151

Page - 79

Appendix PA

Order, U.S. 6ch Cir. COA, Doc. 19-2, Case No. 20-2151,

Appendix PA Pages 80-111

Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 112

Judgment, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 108

Op. and Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 107

155

R&R, District Ct., R. ECF No. 102

PA Pages 156-245

Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 86

Pagesll2-113

Page 114

Pages 115-

App.

Pages 250-253

Stipulated Order, U.S. District Ct.,- R. ECF No. 97 ....Pages 246-249

Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 84

Pages 254-259

Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 81

Pages 260-267

Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 72

Pages 268-292

Scheduling Order, U. S. District Ct. R. ECF No. 70 ... Pages 331-332

Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 67

Pages 328-330

Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 66

Pages 293-327

Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 57

Pages 333-335

Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 56

Pages 366-340

Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 53

Pages 341-344

R&R, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 52

Pages 345-353

Notice of Determination of Motion without oral argument, U.S.

District Ct., R. ECF No. 37

Pages 354-355

R&R, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 31

xii

..Pages 356-488

Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 17

Pages 389-391

Order, U.S. District Ct., R. ECF No. 12

Pages 392-394

Acknowledgement & Notice of Hearing, Workers’ Compensation

Agency (WCA)

Pages 395-396

Proof of Service, per UIA / ALJ Bondar, John Roseman v. FCA US

LLC

397-398

Order, Michigan Administrative Hearing System (“MAHS”), ALJ

Nancy L. Bondar, John Roseman v. FCA US LLC, Docket No. 19004202, Case No. 13785025, Decision Date: April 4, 2019

................................................................... Pages 397-411

Proof of Service, per MI UIA/ALJ Wheaton, John Roseman v FCA

US LLC

Pages 414-415

Order, MAHS, ALJ, Winston A. Wheaton, John Roseman v. FCA

US LLC, Docket No. 19-003241, Case No. 13365780, Decision Date:

March 8, 2019

App. PA Pages 416-423

Dismissal and Notice of Rights, U.S. Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC), John L. Roseman, Sr. v UAW

International, EEOC Charge No. 471-2018-04259

Pages 424, 425.

xiii

Dismissal and Notice of Rights, EEOC, John L. Roseman, Sr. u.

FCA US LLC, EEOC Charge No. 471-2018-04269

Pages 426, 427.

xiv

JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

issued its opinion on July 14, 2021. See App. PA Pages

80-111. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

provides in relevant part:

“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security

of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear

Arms, shall not be infringed.”

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

provides in relevant part:

“No person . . . shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law.”;

“No person shall... be subject for the same offense to be

twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...” whereof

guarantee against double jeopardy is embodied.

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

provides in relevant part:

“ Iii all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right to a speedy and public trial... to be confronted

with the witnesses against him ...”

The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

provides in relevant part:

“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy

shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury

shall be preserved ...”

U.S. Code § 556 (d) provides in relevant part:

“Any oral or documentary evidence may be received...

[i]n rule making or determining claims for money or

benefits ... an agency may, when a party will not be

prejudiced thereby, adopt procedures for the submission

of all or part of the evidence in written form.”

U.S. Code § 706 (1) provides in relevant part:

“compel agency action unlawfully withheld or

unreasonably delayed and hold unlawful and set aside

agency action findings, and conclusions found to be

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in

accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right,

power,.or immunity ...”

U.S. Code §556 (d) which provides in relevant

part:

(“Except as otherwise provided by statute, the proponent

of a rule or order has the burden of proof... [a] party is

entitled to present his case or defense by oral or

documentary evidence ... as may be required for a full

and true disclosure of the facts. [i]n rule making or

determining claims for money ... an agency may when a

party will not be prejudiced thereby adopt procedures

for the submission of all or part of the evidence in

written form.”) See also U.S. Code §557 (a).

Civil Rights Act of 1964 which in relevant part

prohibits discrimination in employment.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 42

U.S.C.§ 12101 which in relevant part makes it unlawful

for an employer to “discriminate against a qualified

individual On the basis of a disability” and pursuant to a

request for accommodation, provides “employers have a

duty to locate [a] suitable position Kleiber v Honda of

Am. Mfg., 485 F.3d 862, 870 (6th Cir. 2007.)

Labor and Management Relations Act Section

301, “a judicially developed concept implied from the

NLRA . . ..[i]n Del Costello v. Teamsters,21 the

Supreme Court characterized these two claims as

’inextricably interdependent. The Court held that to

prevail against either his union or employer, the

employee must prove that the union breached its

duty and that the employer violated. the collective

bargaining agreement.”. Murray, Apportionment

Section 301Duty of Fair Representation Action @ pages

746-747

National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)§ 7,8(a)(1)

which holds that employees have the right to unionize,

to join together to advance their interest as employees,

and to refrain from such activity and that it is unlawful

for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce

employees in the exercise of their rights.

29 USC 215(a)(3) (Fair Labor Standards Act

(FLSA)) MIOSHA Michigan Occupational Safety and

Health Act, 1974 P.A. 154 as Amended which relevant

part provides that “[f|urnish to each employee

employment and a place of employment which is free

from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to

cause death or serious physical harm to the employee”.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This dispute, a ‘Hybrid Action’ under Section 301

of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29

U.S.C. § 185, arises out of pro se Petitioner John L.

Roseman, Sr’s (“Roseman”), (the undersigned)

employment with respondent FCA US LLC (“FCA”) and

his membership in unions which at relevant times

entered into agreements covering employment terms

and conditions (the “CBA’s”), namely: parent union

respondent UAW Int’l; respondent UAW Local 140

(“Local 140”); and respondent UAW Local 1700(“Local

1700”). Pursuant to Charge(s) of Discrimination, and

upon receipt of, from U.S. Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), Notice(s) of Suit

Rights (App. PA Pages 424-427), Roseman timely filed

suit on September 28, 2018 against FCA et al. putting

forth claims of inter alia, breach of the duty of fair

representation; unlawful bias, intentional infliction of

emotional distress (“IIED”); civil conspiracy; negligent

retention; negligent supervision; constructive discharge;

wrongful discharge; false imprisonment; libel; and

pursuant to 42 U.S. Code, Section 1983, infringement

perpetrated by FCA, as a person, acting under the color

of law. Roseman’s employment with FCA commenced in

1998, he worked at two of FCA’s assembly plants:

Warren Truck Assembly Plant (“WTAP”) (1998-2018)

and Sterling Heights Assembly Plant (“SHAP”) (2018).

District court states: “Roseman also contends that

this is not the first time Chrysler has failed to take

corrective action regarding one of its coworkers, as he

was harassed by another employee Darlene Ark [“Ark”],

for over a year beginning in 2015.” (District judge Order

R. ECF No. 72, PageID.1429; App. PA Page 274)

In about July of 2015 Roseman applied for a

promotion to a position FCA calls “Team Leader” (“TL”).

FCA combined two of its “teams” in WTAP’s paint shop.

Two persons formally holding TL positions for the

respective teams declined offers to become TL of the new

team, later informing Roseman that they believed it to

be too much work for one TL. Another person

contemporaneously applied for subject TL position was

awarded* the position, but soon thereafter quit, also

complaining to Roseman about it being too much work.

TL position was then offered to Roseman, who accepted

the promotion. At about the same time, Roseman was

also asked by FCA human resource staff persons to work

on a temporary charity fundraising assignment:

Roseman accepted this assignment which was a full

time position that lasted until about December of 2015

when he*returned to TL position. This is about the time

Roseman began having issues with a coworker, Ark.

The undersigned found coworker Ark’s animus and

corresponding behavior towards him at about this time

to be extreme, severe, pervasive and without precedence

in the context of his nearly fifteen years of employment

at WTAP. Fearing for his personal safety, fearing the

risk Ark’s behavior posed to his employment and not

wanting Ark’s behavior towards him to put him in a

position wherein he may feel forced to do something he

did not want to do, on or about December 21, 2015,

Roseman sought to avail himself of FCA’s protective

protocols and apparatuses by composing a written

complaint about coworker Ark’s behavior towards him,

proffering said complaint to: Local 140 union steward

Kalu Jones and then to FCA labor relations supervisor

Jo’Lena Brown (“Brown”). On or about December 21,

2015, Roseman, endeavoring to establish evidence of his

appeal to FCA and the UAW for mitigating responses,

Roseman caused sealed copy of complaint about Ark to

be mailed via United State Postal Service to his home

address: said sealed letter has been proffered as

evidence in this case (Pi’s Am. Compl. R. ECF No. 40,

PageID.608 1J62 and ECF No 40-1 PageID.661.) FCA

acknowledged it was in receipt of Roseman’s 2015

complaint about Ark, however, it remains undisputed,

neither FCA nor Local 140 demonstrates it responded to

Roseman’s December 21, 2015 complaint. Roseman

avers that Ark therefore continued the challenged

conduct complained of, regularly sabotaging his work,

preventing him from doing his job, maliciously

exploiting the fact that the newly formed single team

Roseman’s TL position obligated him to was separated,

in that it consisted of four distinct, partitioned work

areas. Roseman simply could not be in two places at one

time. He avers that Ark’s challenged conduct was

unrelenting in the months following 2015 complaint

subjecting him to harassments, threats, and coercion

having the effect of preventing and thwarting his work;

all this Ark did presumably because of sex-based animus

and to cause Roseman to quit his job which he did in

January of 2018, transferring to SHAP suffering a

reduction in pay. See e.g., Appellant Opening Br. Case:

20-2151 Document: 11 Page: 6-12; see also email PI. [‘s]

Am. Compl. ECF No. 40-1 PagelD.651-653. Court

states:

“Roseman also points to no evidence

rebutting

the

magistrate

conclusion,

based

judge’s

Roseman’s

own

deposition testimony, that he expressed his

satisfaction with the handling of his

complaints about Ark by the Unions and

FCA.” District judge’s Op. and Order R.

EOF No. 107 PagelD. 2794 and herein App.

PA @ Page 136.

“On December 1, 2016, attorney Sandra

Hanshaw Burink sent a demand letter to

FGA,

on Roseman’s behalf, requesting

further investigation of Ark’s behavior.

FCA retained outside counsel, Deborah

Brouwer

(“Brouwer”),

investigate

Roseman’s complaints. Brouwer did not

recommend any further discipline as a

result of her investigation, and Roseman

indicated he was satisfied with FCA’s

actions.” (citations omitted) ( R&R R. ECF

No 102, PageID.2879 and herein App. PA

Page 163.

But at PI. [‘s] Dep., FCA asked Roseman if he

transferred to SHAP in because of Ark related incidents:

Roseman replied in the affirmative explaining that

incidents involving, among others FCA supervisors

Herbert Wright (“Wright”), Thom Thornton

(“Thornton”), Richard Henderson (“Henderson”), Brown;

and coworker Ark continued to render work

environment hostile and intolerable insomuch that

Roseman quit the TL position at WTAP he was

promoted to in 2015 transferring to Sterling Height

Assembly Plant where Roseman received comparatively

less pay.

At PI. [‘s] Dep.:

FCA Queried, “ • • All right. ■ At some point you went

over to SHAP?”

Roseman answered “Correct” FCA Queried, “And why did you request the move to a

different plant? - • - What are those reasons?”

Roseman answered: “I would generally

categorize it as hostility, hostile work

environment issues I'd had at that plant. 11

- - Those issues were with a lot of people,

actually. And I don't think -- none of which

have not been named in this action and this

case. And the particulars of the people and

the incidents have pretty much been voiced

through

the

complaint

and

other

documents that I've given” See PL f‘s] Dep.

R. ECF No. 87-2, PageID.2326 @ pages 3540.

Roseman declares as may be clearly inferred from

his deposition testimony (Id.) and Am. Compl. that he

was at NOT at any time satisfied with neither defendant

FCA’s nor Local 140’s handling of his. 2015/2016

complaints of incidents involving Ark et al. occurring at

WTAP.

“FCA retained outside counsel, Brouwer, to

investigate Roseman’s complaints. Brouwer

did not recommend any further discipline

as a result of her investigation, and

. Roseman indicated he was satisfied with

FCA’s actions.” (citations omitted) R&R R.

ECF 102 PageID.2879 and herein App. PA

Page 163.)

Courts’ below judgment concerning WTAP

incidents are arguably entirely founded on conjecture

and misconstrued deposition response presumably deem

a valid waiver without setting forth the governing laws

or properly stating the rules applying to valid waivers.

Disputed “satisfied” evidence defendants rely upon is

arguably far from conclusive, is arguably incongruent

with all other pertinent facts and evidence on record (R.

ECF No. 87-2, PageID.2329). Furthermore, at Pl.[‘s]

Dep. (Id.), Roseman understood FCA to be inquiring as

to whether he desired at meeting with Brouwer to take

additional employment actions against coworker Ark

specifically at that time or thereafter. Roseman was

simply stating that he neither at the time of Brouwer

meeting nor at the time of deposition, (Id.) sought of

FCA additional or more severe disciplinary employment

actions to be taken against Ark. Understandably FCA

having in this case proposed additional sanctions

against coworkers to settle claims in this action, its

questions (Id.) regarding acceptable punishment for Ark

might have been misunderstood by Roseman.

FCA Queried: “All right. ■ So you disagree

with the way it was handled with Ms.

Ark?”

Roseman Answered: “Correct.”

FCA Queried: “For the other people, the

names you provided - Kalu Jones, Herb

Wright, Chris Kabecki, and Jo'Lena Brown

-- -did you have any issues with them

specifically

other

than just

that

you

disagreed with how the Ms. Ark situation

was handled?”

Roseman answered “Yeah. I would say that

fairly sums it up.” (PL [‘s] Dep. R. ECF No.,

PageID.2327, page 40 @ HHl-10.)

Moreover, Roseman indicated at PL [(s] Dep. (Id.)

that he was summarily dissatisfied with, disapproved of

and disagreed with defendants FCA’s and Local 140’s

handling of incidents involving Ark and others. (Id.)

Roseman informed the Local 140 and FCA that he

would quit his position as TL at FCA’s Warren Truck

Assembly Plant due to hostile work environment citing

that he suffered from related mental duress and

emotional distress. Contemporaneously, Roseman

applied with FCA for a transfer of departments and

subsequently requested to be transferred to SHAP.

Consistent with the aforementioned Roseman quit TL

position in 2018, and transferred to SHAP, suffering a

demotion and reduced pay.

10.

Roseman informed FCA and Local 140 that he

was sickened due to stress related to actual incidents

occurring at work involving FCA supervisors, Local 140

chief steward and coworker Ark advising both FCA and

Local 140 of his failed attempts to reach an Employee

Assistance Program (EAP) representative to avail .

himself of FCA provided treatment for mental health

issues: Roseman’s brother Ronald bearing witness to

Roseman’s mental state during this time. See emails PI.

[‘s] Am. Compl. R. ECF No 40-1 PageID.654;

PagelD.647-48. Notably, here (Id.) FCA and Local 140

seemed to ignore Roseman’s mental health issues and

did not help him get the treatment he sought. In direct

relationship to the foregoing, Roseman believes that he

suffered a post-traumatic stress disorder that was

triggered around the time he encountered what he

believed to be a similarly pugilistic and violent coworker

(Amond) at about the time he transferred to SHAP. (See

e.g., Appellant’s Opening Br. U.S. 6th Cir. COA Case: 202151 Document: 11, Page: 6-13 til’s 1-13.) “Plaintiff

believes that he has legitimate reasons for preferring

not to return to work as FCA proposed and Michigan

Court appears to agree. See (ECF No. 82: Exhibit A.

(ECF No. 92, PagelD.2669).” R&R R. ECF No. 102,

PagelD.2898, and herein App. PA Page 207)

11.

On or about November 8, 2018 FCA et al. was in

receipt of a doctor’s letter dated November 6, 2018 from

Roseman’s family doctor and primary care physician Dr. Rima Abbas, MD (“Dr. Abbas”) - recommending that

Roseman not return to work in the facility wherein his

current mental health issued developed: see (T.R.O.

Hr’g Transcript R. ECF No. 32 filed 11/19/18

PageID.448 @ f 10-2). Roseman contends ALJs’

Wheaton’s and Bondar’s rulings infer FCA failed, in

opposition to applicable law, accommodate Roseman’s

disability (see ALJ Wheaton ruling App. PA @ Pages

416-423 and ALJ Bondar ruling App. PA 397-411).

Furthermore, Roseman contends that said discharge is:

inter alia, (1) in breach of operative CBA’s; (2) motivated

by unlawful discriminatory animus; (3) violates

requisite “interactive process” pursuant to (ADA) See

Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., 485 F.3d 862, 868 (6th

Cir. 2007). Roseman contends that FCA has not shown

that it made a good faith effort to “identify the precise

limitations resulting from the disability and potential

reasonable accommodations that could overcome those

limitations.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871. “Although

mandatory, failure to engage in the interactive process

is only an independent violation of the ADA if the

plaintiff establishes prima facie showing that he

proposed a reasonable accommodation.” Rorrer, 743 F.3d

atl041 (emphasis added); see also Keith u. Cnty. of

Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 2013)

(“individualized inquiry” is “threshold matter,”

discussed prior to the “otherwise qualified” element of a

prima facie case). “[T]he interactive process is

mandatory, and both parties have a duty to participate

in good faith.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 871 (emphasis

added). “If this process fails to lead to reasonable

accommodation of the disabled employee’s limitations

responsibility will lie with the party that caused the

breakdown.” (Id.). Moreover, Roseman contends that

courts below relitigated precise issues relating to

defendant FCA’s termination of him, said issues being

determined prior to federal courts’ below judgments in

valid proceedings of Michigan administrative law judges

- thereby contradicting well-established law, collateral

estoppel doctrine and the Fifth Amendment guarantees

against double jeopardy from which said doctrine

derives. See N.A.A.C.P., Detroit Branch v. Detroit Police

Officers Ass'n, 821 F.2d 328. 330 (6th Cir. 1987).

12.

On or about July 27, 2018 Roseman called FCA to

report illness related absence - events occurring at work

in the factum.

13.

On or about July 30, 2018, FCA’s third-party

administrator Sedgwick contacted Roseman by email

and phone with claim details (claim no. 301806618800001; date of injury: 07/26/2018) informing that

pursuant to entitlement to benefits under Worker’s

Compensation Law, “[i]t is our intent to facilitate the

delivery of these benefits ...”

14.

Pursuant to worker’s compensation claim (Id.),

On or about August 10, 2018 Roseman received a notice

of dispute from FCA, its reason cited: “injury not related

to work”. Roseman, on or about August 27, 2018,

submitted to Worker’s Compensation Agency (WCA) an

application for mediation or hearing on subject claim.

Resulting Department of Licensing and Regulatory

Affairs, WCA action, John L. Roseman v. FCA US LLC,

SSN: XXX-XX-7583, Case No. 1, is at the time of this

writing is pending.

15.

On or about August 1, 2018, Roseman filed

charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) against FCA US LLC

and UAW Inti: charges Nos. 471-2018-04268, and 4712018-04259 respectively. Said EEOC charges were

amended on August 13, 2018 to include charges

discrimination based on retaliation and race.

16.

In directly related case (App. PA Pages 416-423),

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) Winston A. Wheaton

(“Wheaton”) presiding, decision date: February 11,

2019, ruling makes findings, determinations, and

judgments pertaining to, inter alia, issues of FCA’s

discharge of Roseman as it related to his disability,

whether Roseman voluntarily quit, and Roseman’s

ability to perform “his last job” with defendant-employer

FCA. Here, ALJ Wheaton found that:

Roseman

was

separated

from

the

Employer in November 2018. Prior to that

time,

his

physician,

Dr.

Abbas,

recommended that he not return to work to

the facility where he had worked due to his

associated anxiety. ... Because of anxiety

associated

with

the

plant,

where

[Roseman] worked for the Employer [FCA],

he is not able to work at that plant.”

ALJ Winston also reasoned and concluded that:

Roseman “testified that at all times he has been able to

perform manufacturing work - just not at the plant

where he last worked. ... I have been given no reason to

challenge Claimant’s [Roseman’s] veracity. I accept his

testimony as true.” See ALJ Winston ruling App. PA @

page 438. Parties to this case (Id.) had the right to

request rehearing/reopening and had to do so before

April 8, 2019. Notably, FCA did not appeal this ruling

(Id.).

17.

In another directly related case (App. PA Pages

399-411) ALJ judge Nancy L. Bondar presiding, decision

date April 4, 2019, ruling makes determinations and

judgments pertaining to inter alia, issues of FCA’s

discharge of Roseman, whether Roseman voluntarily

quit, and if Roseman’s separation was involuntary,

whether FCA met its burden to establish misconduct

sufficient to warrant its termination of Roseman’s

employment and if Roseman left work involuntarily for

medical reasons. See Order (Id.) pursuant to ALJ

Bondar ruling, App. PA @ Pages 399-411 and also @ R.

ECF No. 82, PagelD.2224-2231.

18.

In related hearing (Id.) occurring on or about

April 02, 2019, participants: Roseman; FCA through its

representative Ellen Wolff (“Wolff’), and FCA witness

Aaron Kopitz were sworn in.

19.

Parties litigated matter (Id.) presenting oral

arguments and FCA also produced a witness who

proffered testimony in support of FCA’s positions. FCA

also proffered the following argument Wolf through its

attorney Ellen which the undersigned transcribed from

a recording of hearing.

"Uh. Yes. I want to make a brief argument

if I may. - - The employer would argue that

the Claimant has not, uh established either

good cause for not reporting to work or for

quitting his job as indicated on the notice of

this hearing. However, I would argue that

the more reasonable interpretation of the

law would be under 29 (1) (b) discharge.

Uh. The Claimant has not provided any

relevant [sic] or proffered evidence that he

was not able to report to work as require

after the end of his approved medical leave

of absence despite the clear instructions.

On the notice of this hearing the Claimant

did not provide the document which he

alleges that he was not told to report to

work and as such w.e do not believe he has

established good cause for his absence.

Therefore, the employer was appropriate in

the decision to discharge. We would ask for

redetermination of this matter be affirmed

and

the

Claimant

disqualified

from

receiving benefits. Thank you."

20.

FCA had the opportunity to appeal Michigan Ct.

judgement (App. PA @ Pages 399-411; R.ECF No. 82,

PagelD.2224-2231.), having to do. so before May 6, 2019

(Id.) but declined to do so, thus judgment became final.

21.

In this Order (Id.), pursuant to Michigan ALJ

Nancy Bondar adjudicating matters relevant and

directly related to this instant case found pursuant to

FCA’s termination of Roseman’s employment on or

about November 21, 2018, that: (1) Roseman had notleft

work voluntarily; and (2) that Plaintiff was on approved

leave prior to said discharge and FCA did not

demonstrate a number of absences from work that were

so excessive as to constitute misconduct within the

meaning of applicable law and that “employer [FCA] did

not carry its burden of proof’.

“The Administrative Judge Order’ to which

Roseman refers arose in connection with

his application for unemployment benefits.

(ECF No. 82, PagelD.224-2231.) FCA had

argued in that matter that Roseman left

work

voluntarily,

and

was

therefore

disqualified from receiving benefits under

Section 29(a)(1) of Michigan’s Employment

Security Act, MCL § 421.29(a)(1). Roseman

is correct that the matter was adjudicated

in his favor, however ALJ’s ruling was

based on the fact that ‘[n]o documents were

admitted into evidence,

and that the

‘burden of proof never shifted to [Roseman]

to provide a legitimate explanation for any

absences from work.’” (R&R R. ECF 102,

PageID.2898 and herein PA @ page 209)

22.

Here, this Court should find palpable error, the

above summed up as incognizable conjecture because

explanation is consistent with but not deducible as

reasonable inference from known facts or conditions

which would support proper application of governing

laws required to make a judgment relating to issue of

collateral estoppel raised by Roseman’s pro se pleadings.

Here, Roseman argues, court fails to demonstrate how

“no documents” issue (Id.) renders “ALJ’s” ruling (Id.)

invalid. Furthermore, while there may have been “no

documents” admitted, Roseman did indeed present oral

arguments at subject MAHS hearing wherein he made

attestations declaring, inter alia, that he had in fact

secured a statement from his physician, Dr. Abbas, that

continuing in his current job would be harmful to his

mental health. Court was, as the following

demonstrates, aware such a medical statement was

proffered to FCA prior to FCA’s November 21, 2018

termination of Roseman:

"All right. Well, I do have -I believe I know what

you're referring to, which is you had filed a reply

brief and exhibit, I think it's D to the reply brief,

is‘a very short couple-sentence letter from a Dr.

Rima Abbas. [w]hich simply says, '[i]t is not

recommended that he returns to the facility

where he was working, which caused his current

mental health issues to develop.’ So I --I am

familiar with that, but, frankly, that doesn't give

me much insight into --into, number one, the

reasons why that recommendation is being made

or why -what harm is believed to -to be likely to

happen if you do return" (T.R.O. Hr’g Transcript:

R. ECF No. 32 filed 11/19/18 PageID.448 @ 11025). See also, R. ECF No. 20 PageID.357.

23.

To be actually litigated, a question must be put

into issue by the pleadings, submitted to the trier of fact,

and determined by the trier. VanDeventer v. Michigan

Nafl Bank, 172 Mich App 456, 463; 432 NW2d 338

(1988).

24.

This Court should thus find that FCA has in bad

faith maintained frivolous defenses in this instant

action and should sanction FCA’s.

A. Roseman Has Not at Any Time Been Employed by

FCA as a Supervisor or Manager.

25.

Federal courts below are mistaken, Roseman was

never a supervisor or manager of Ark, Amond or any

FCA employee during employment with FCA nor has his

duties with FCA ever been to supervise or manage any

aspect of FCA’s operations. Therefore, any and all

rulings of courts’ founded upon Roseman being a

manager, supervisor, or relating to a “managementstyle” should by Supreme Court be found invalid.

Moreover, Roseman’s testimony explained that the

challenged conduct complained of relating to coworker

Amond consisted of far more than the text messages

decisions below were based on (T.R.O.: Hr’g Tr. R. ECF

No. 32 PagelD. 453-457) “[t]hat’s like the tip of the

iceberg. . . he’s [Amond] is preventing me from doing my

job”).

26.

In 2015 FCA promoted Roseman to a TL.

Pursuant to promotion, FCA proffered Roseman a

document with the heading, “Position Title - New Team

Leader Roles & Responsibilities”: none of the roles or

responsibilities include making rules; directing FCA

employees; or supervising FCA employees. While the

term “Team Leader” may perhaps be a misnomer

because conceivably one might, from said terminology

infer position to be one of a manager or supervisor as

defined by Black’s Law Dictionary (herein cited). As TL

Roseman was obligated to perform a variety of

operations supporting initiatives such as: stocking

production materials; relaying safety communications;

relieving persons from duty stations for, inter alia,

restroom breaks; filling in to do any production job on

team if manpower issues dictated.

27.

Rhetoric of Amond’s text messages: “I guess we

got a new [team leader] for this week[,] it comes with

new rules and micro management” (PI. [‘s] Am. Compl.

R. ECF No. 40-1 PageID.665), should arguably not take

precedence over relevant law or pursuant to a proper

legal analysis, establish Roseman to be a FCA

manager/supervisor.

28.

District Court rulings used the term

“management” in ten (10) instances to characterize

Roseman’s relationship with coworkers (R&R, R. ECF

No. 102, PageID’s.2882, 2887, 2890, 2892, 2895, 2903,

2904, 2906, 2911: App. PA Pages 156-245 ) and to

describe the nature of his work/duties: here, court seems

intent upon coloring Roseman as a supervisor/manager

presumably to be specious, dishonest, to distort facts,

divert proper legal analysis and ultimately render

unprincipled outcomes. Court states: “Roseman’s IIED

claims fails to clear this high bar. He complaints that

after Amond was openly critical of his management style

and decisions...” R&R, R. ECF No. 102, PageID.2904.

and herein App. PA @ Page 220. Accordingly, the 6th

Circuit appeals court also characterizes Roseman as

FCA management. 6th Cir. Case No. 20-2151, Doc. 19-2,

Pages 3,8, and herein App. PA Pages 86,87. District

judge Lawson not only erroneously characterizes

Roseman as an FCA manager in his Op. and Order R.

ECF 107, PagelD 2967, but also: in three instances

erroneously founds rulings on guise that Local 1700

union steward Keith Hall (“Hall”) was at relevant times

a FCA “supervisor” (Id. @ PagelD.2967,2973) to which

Roseman was subordinate and likewise court ruled

based on false notion that Local 1700 “UAW [Int’l]”

committeeman, Michael Spencer (“Spencer”), is a FCA

“supervisor” to Roseman. (Id. @ PageID2974.)

29.

Roseman contends Amond ventured to organized

a work stoppage and production slow down, (PI [c$] Am.

Compl. R. ECF No. 40, PagelD.601

26,27). That,

Roseman was in opposition to Amond’s strike efforts in

that Roseman elected to work as instructed to by FCA

supervisors. Contemporaneously, FCA expressed its

dissatisfaction with Roseman and his assigned teams'

production output stressing said output was causing

cascading plantwide stoppage. (Id. ^[27-28.)

30.

A manager is defined as “[o]ne who has charge of

a corporation and control of its business . . . and who is

vested with a certain amount of discretion and

independent judgment. Brandon v. McPherren, 177 Okl.

292, 58 P.2d 871, 872. [a] person chosen or appointed to

manage, direct. .

Black’s Law Dictionary Fifth

Edition (1979). Roseman averred, coworker Amond

prevented him from doing work assignments; none of

said assignments included being to Amond or any of

FCA’s chattel, a manager. Court states: “According to

Roseman, Amond criticized Roseman’s decision to follow

management’s orders to allocate additional manpower to

the line that Roseman and Amond were working on.

Roseman alleges that Amond ‘intimidated and

prevented Roseman from performing his .duty’ because

Amond would not allow other employees to work in his

space.” (citations omitted). (R&R R. ECF No 102

PageID.2882.) But, Roseman’s contention is that

Amond, in this referenced instance (Id.) prevented him

from completing right side masking operation per FCA

directives. Amond expelled Roseman from duty station.

(See TRO Hr’g R. ECF No. 32 PageID.455): “he [Amond]

would not allow me to help him [complete masking

operation] as they [FCA supervisors Jana Hines

(“Hines”) et al.] told me to do. . . . They [Hines et al.] said

you got to help [perform masking operation] because

these two-tone [units] are backing up. It is going to shut

down production in the whole plant. Help him [Amond]

out.” (Id.).

B. Judge Lawson - in final judgment only misconstrues Local 1700 representatives Roseman

accuses of wrongful acts to be FCA supervisors

then grants Local 1700 et al. summary judgment.

31.

The identities, roles, titles, and affiliations of

union representatives Eddie Smith (“Smith”), Spencer

and Hall are - prior to Lawson’s final judgment (Op. &

Order R. EOF No. 107), well established fact issues

distinguished with particularity. See generally, R&R, R.

EOF No. 66, PagelD.1351-1360 and herein infra App.

PA Page 293. In relation to said facts, this Court should

therefore find Lawson’s Op. & Order R. (R. ECF No.

107) palpably erroneous, specious, and suspicious

having in contradiction to district court’s prior

determinations of fact issues (Id.) misstates in final

judgment, that Spencer and Hall are

“supervisor[s]’7management when they are in this case,

union/Labor representatives.

32.

In four instances Lawson supports final ruling on

Roseman’s claims against Local 1700 et al., by

incorrectly attributing employment actions taken by

Local 1700 union steward Hall as having been the

actions of a FCA supervisor. Judge Lawson’s ruling

dismissing Roseman’s claims against defendants Local

1700 et al. should arguably be found invalid, being

founded on patently false notions that union

representatives are FCA supervisors? Lawson

construed:

“Roseman met with his supervisor again

at 1:00 a.m., who explained that he had

spoken with Amond about the impropriety

of his texts and statement to Roseman,

warning Amond that his behavior was

inappropriate

and

could

termination.

The

supervisor

result

also

commented to

Roseman

that

told

Amond, ‘John’s an OLD HEAD. However,

the supervisor told Roseman that Amond

would not be disciplined.” (Op. & Order R.

EOF No. 107, PagelD.2967-68); “In his

third objection, Roseman insists that his

supervisor’s description of him as an ‘Old

Head’ ... indication of age-related animus.”

(emphasis added). See Op.& Order R. EOF

No. 107 PagelD. 2973.

33.

Lawson, who articulates in his Op. & Order (Id.)

exhaustive arguments decrying the inadequacy of

Roseman’s pro se pleadings, fails, after two years, onemonth and nineteen days of presiding over this case, to

accurately assimilate important fact issue and

distinguish in final ruling, Hall as defendant Local

1700’s union steward and not Roseman’s supervisor.

Here Roseman would argue that the honesty,

impartiality, and integrity of the court is severely

questionable.

34.

As with Hall, Lawson misconstrues Spencer to be

an FCA supervisor, stating: “In his fifth and sixth

objections, Roseman disputes the factual account of the

‘election flyers incident,’ contending that he never was

told to remove the flyers by his supervisor, and that he

did remove them after the HR meeting on March 8,

2018, where FCA’s Labor Relations representative told

him to do so.” (emphasis added) Op. & Order R. EOF

No. 107 PagelD. 2974) It is Local 1700Vand Spencer’s

account in dispute here (Id.). See Spencer Aff. R. EOF

No. 90-16 PagelD.2574 @ f 4, Id. PageID.2575-2576 @

111 H-12.

35.

The record demonstrates Lawson did in fact know

that it was not a FCA supervisor Roseman alleged called

him an “old head”. Court states:

“Later in his shift, the plaintiff was summoned to

a conference room with and UAW representative

Keith Hall. ... Roseman was then summoned to

the union office, where, he alleges, Hall described

him as an “old head.”

ECF No. 1, PageID.12.”

(emphasis added). See Lawson’s. Order R. ECF

No. 72, PagelD. 1432-33, and herein PA @ Page

276)

36.

Roseman thus contends court fails to conduct

proceedings with integrity insomuch that, in an

objective contemplation of all relevant facts, the publics’

confidence in this court is undoubtedly discouraged; that

Op. & Order (R. ECF No 107) is intended to harass,

humiliate and punish Roseman for bringing this suit,

and interposed to unjustly foreclose appellate review.

37.

Regarding “dispute [ed” “communications” Court

states - without citing governing law:

“In his seventh and eight objections, Roseman

disputes the magistrate judge’s recital of follow

up communications with union representatives

[Smith] and [Spencer] after the March 8, 2018 HR

meeting

about

the

election

flyers

incident.

Roseman insists that Smith never told him that

‘this was the best the union would be able to do’

about the outcome of the meeting being a verbal

warning, and Spencer never told him that the

matter

was

representation.

immaterial

between

‘resolved’

But

aspects

the

those

plaintiff

based

any

disputes

over

the - communications

and

his

union

representatives do not implicate any error in the

magistrate judge’s finding that the record does

not demonstrate any arbitrary or irrational

refusal by the union to pursue further any

grievance claimed by the plaintiff about his

working conditions.” Id. at PageID.2981.

38.

Court deems communications concerning

grievance request “immaterial”, but also founds its

rulings on disputed accounts of Local 1700, that

Roseman was told “this was the best the union would be

able to do”. Roseman would expect Supreme Court to

find tradition in opposition to courts conclusion that

communications (Id.) are “immaterial” because "If the

union decides not to process the grievance, the employee

should be promptly informed of the union's decision and

the reasons for that decision." B. FELDACKER, LABOR

GUIDE TO LABOR LAW supra note I, at 383(2d ed.

1983). See also Farmer v. AHA Servs. Inc., 660 F.2d

1096, 1107 (6th Cir. 1981) (the union participated in the

breach of collective bargaining agreement...);

Richardson v. Communications Workers of Am., 443

F.2d 974, 982 (8th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 818

(1973) (the union... wrongfully inducing the employer to

discharge the grievant and acting in bad faith in

refusing to process the Appellant’s grievance).

C. Trampled Settlement Privilege?

“Roseman also argues that the district

court erred by considering certain ‘private

settlement communications between’ him

and FCA. Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence precludes, among other things,

“conduct or a statement made during

compromise negotiations about the claim”

to “prove or disprove the validity or amount

disputed

claim.”

But

the

communication that Roseman cites in his

brief—the November 9, 2018, email that

FCA sent asking him to return to work and

informing him that Amond would be

transferred to a different department—was

made neither in the course of compromise

negotiations,

nor

reaching

compromise.

with

the

intent

See,

e.g.,

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice & Procedure § 5310 (2d ed.

Apr.

2021 update).

The district court

therefore did not abuse its discretion by

considering the November 9, 2018, email in

the proceedings below.” 6th Cir. COA ruling,

Case No. 20-2151, Doc.19-2 Page: 11.

39.

On or about July 28, 2018, Hines declared that

Amond could not be removed from team: this decision is

reversed approximately one hundred and four days (104)

later on or about November 9, 2018; approximately one

day after telephone conference parties to this lawsuit

had with magistrate judge who, in said conference

attempted to engendered settlement between

adversaries FCA et al. and Roseman. See R. T.R.O Hr’g

Tr. ECF'32 PagelD. 447:

(Magistrate: “We had a phone call, just for

the record, late last week in which I

encourage parties to . . .possible resolutions

of this matter” . . .Ms. Van Dyke: “We did

make an offer to the plaintiff, but he

rejected it”).

40.

FCA, on November 9, 2018, in exchange for a

cessation of Roseman’s claims, through its counsel,

Katherine Van Dyke proffered “offer” - arguably illusory

in that “offer” would not likely be enforced by court - to

remove Amond from Roseman’s department, stipulating

that court be notified of agreement, informing court that

pending hearing scheduled for November 13, 2018 would

not be necessary.

41.

Alternatively, Roseman would argue, FCA’s

November 9, 2018 eleventh-hour decision to remove

Amond from his work group comports to an inference

that on or about concerning his complaint on or about

July 26, 2018, that, Amond’s conduct was indeed severe

enough to warrant his removal from “team”; that, FCA

and Local 1700 failed to respond reasonably; and that,

FCA negligently retained Amond causing Roseman’s

injuries, damages and losses complained of in this action

and that Roseman is entitled to relief. (R. PI [‘s] Am.

Compl. ECF No. 40, Count VII). “Yes John I [Hines] did

say that... Keith [Hall] said let me handle him

[Amond]. I couldn’t even remove him [Amond] off the

team.” (Pl. [‘s] Am. Compl. R. ECF 40-1, PageID.675.)

“[Ms. Van Dyke/FCA] Just briefly, your Honor, a couple

of points. One, the text messages from Jana Hines

accurately depict the conversation ....” (TRO Hr’g Tr. R.

ECF No. 32, PageID460 H 23-25 and Id. PagelD 461 at

11.)

“FCA even offered to return Roseman to his

old position with the assurance that Amond

would be transferred to a different position

so the two would not be working together.”

(R&R R. 102, PagelD.2897; App. PA Page

205)

Roseman replied, stating: ‘Thank you, but

sorry, I can’t do that.’ It is undisputed that

to date Roseman has not returned to work

at FCA in any position.” Op. & Order R.

EOF No. 107 Page ID 2968 and herein also

at App. PA Page 123.

“Roseman was placed on medical leave.

About three months later, on October 30,

2018, Dr. Neil S. Talon, M.D. completed an

independent medical examination (‘IME’) of

Roseman to assess his ability to return to

work.

Dr. Talon concluded that Roseman

could return to work

Dr. Talon did note

that Roseman’s ‘problem with the other

coworker’ was ‘more of a legal or human

resource

issue.

Consequently,

November 1, 2018, FCA sent Roseman a

letter instructing him to return to work by

November 21, 2018.

Roseman took issue

with Dr. Talon’s assessment,

principally

because he ‘would have been going right

back to work with Amond in the same work

area.’ But FCA was willing to address that

concern; on November 9, 2018 FCA sent

Roseman an email stating. ‘The plant

would like you to return to work to your

same job - same department and position.

They will be moving Mr. Amond to [a]

different department, so that you will not

have to work with him.’ Roseman simply

responded, ‘Thank you, but sorry, I can’t do

that.’ ... Thus, Roseman did not return to

work.

Roseman continued to refuse this

offer.

Because of his refusal to return to

work,

December

terminated

Roseman’s

2018,

FCA

employment.”

(citations omitted) R&R R. ECF No. 102,

PageID.2884)

42.

FCA was, prior to “offer”, in receipt of letter from

Dr. Abbas, recommending that Roseman not return to

SHAP facility, which explains Roseman’s response to

FCA’s “offer”.

43.

Magistrate.obliged to settlement fix he advocated

for and engendered to bring “resolutions to this matter”,

based rulings favoring defendants, on Roseman’s

response to FCA’s “good job” “offer” (Order R. ECF No.

81, PageID.2217)

D. Oral arguments: due process, equal protection

under the law, due process, right to trial by jury

“Having reviewed the pleadings and other papers

on file, the Court finds that the facts and legal

issues are adequately presented in the parties’

brief and on the record, and it declines to order a

hearing at this time.” ' (R&R, R. ECF No. 102

PageID.2877.)

44.

On or about 12/03/2018 Roseman received a

Notice of Determination of Motion Without Oral

Argument (ECF No. 37) on motions which were filed

prior to said notice. Magistrate stating motions would be

determined by himself “without oral argument”

Pursuant to E. D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). Citing Fed R. App.

P. 34(a), homogenized panel: judges Suton, Chief Judge

Siler and Roger - all appointed to the 6th Circuit in the

same year, 2001, by “tort-reform” advocate President

George W. Bush - “unanimously agrees that oral

argument is not needed.”

45.

Roseman made nine requests to district court and

two request to appeals court to present oral arguments

(District Ct., ECFs No.’s: 65, 72, 77, 78, 80, 92, 93, 94, 95

and Appeals Ct., Doc. No.’s 11, 15). Courts declined

, 54

request to present oral arguments. Thus, Roseman

argues: to any extent rules courts relied upon to decline

oral arguments in this case are inherently - or

misappropriated to be - artifice of usurpation of

constitutional rights to, inter alia, to equal protection

under the law, due process, and trial by jury; said rules

should be found “repugnant to the constitution” and

“void” (E.D. of MI LR 7.1(f)(2>; Fed.R. App. P. 34(a)).

Marbury v Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803). See also,

Norton v. Shelby (“An unconstitutional act is not a law;

in confers no rights; it imposes no duties; if affords no

protection; it creates no office; it is in legal

contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never

been passed.”). See also U.S. Code 556 (d) which states

in relevant part:

(“Except as otherwise provided by statute, the

proponent of a rule or order has the burden of

proof ... [a] party is entitled to present his case

or defense by oral or documentary evidence ... as

may be required for a full and true disclosure of

the facts. [i]n rule making or determining claims

for money ... an agency may when a party will

not be prejudiced thereby adopt procedures for

the submission of all or part of the evidence in

written form.”) (emphasis added).

L.R. 7.1(f)(2) states: “[t]he court will hold a hearing

on all other motions unless the judge orders

submission and determination without hearing”.

Interpreting E.D. Mich.L.R. 7.1(f)(2) (Id.) using .

the ordinary meaning of words, Roseman contends rule

was not properly applied in that court would have

necessarily provided notice in advance of motion

submissions to parties. In other words, it seems the rule

is constructed so that parties are informed prior to

submission of motions, that determination of said

submissions will be without a hearing. Moreover,

demonstrating the vital nature of hearings to fairness

and due process, E.D. Mich.L.R. 7.1(f)(1) addressing civil

cases state that a person would have to be in custody for

there not to be a hearing held on a motion. Such was not

the case here, and arguably, court had no legitimate

reason for not holding hearings FCA and union

defendants’ motions for summary judgment [R. ECF

Nos. 87, 89, 90, 91] and Roseman’s motions for summary

judgment [R. ECF. Nos. 77,78]

47.

The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

provides in relevant part: “[i]n Suits at common law,

where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty

dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . .

48.

In the aggregate, Roseman contends that in

consideration of all facts which may be reasonably

assimilated, an objective observer would conclude that

substantive justice was not facilitated, that the courts

below were rigged to produce unlawful and unprincipled

outcomes because, inter alia, "whether harassment was

so severe and pervasive as to constitute a hostile work

environment [is] 'quintessential^ a question of fact'

that’ that a jury should decide.” Smith v. Rock-Tenn

Services, Inc., 813 F.3d 298, 310-11 (6th Cir. 2016).

Moreover, “[w]hen a federal court reviews

the sufficiency of a complaint, before the

reception of any evidence ... its task is

necessarily a limited one. The issue is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail

but whether the plaintiff is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.

Indeed, it may appear on the face of the

pleadings that a recovery is very remote

and unlikely but that is not the test.”

(emphasis added): Quoting Miller v. Currie

Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 377 (6thCir. 1995).

E. PL [*s] Objections: Pro Se Plead; Miller and

Thomas Standard

49.

Citing Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir.

1995) and Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 142 (1985)

appeals court ruled that Roseman “forfeited further

review” of claims stating “Although Roseman filed

timely objections, the district court correctly noted

that his objections relating to his claims for

IIED(Claim 9), negligent retention of an unfit employee

(Claim 10), libel (Claim 11), and infringement of his

Second Amendment rights (Claim 13)consisted

‘mainly of unelaborated, expressions

Case No. 20-2151 Doc. 19-2, Page: 5.)

(6th Cir COA

50.

“[P]ro se pleadings are construed liberally and pro

se litigants are granted greater latitude in hearings and

trials.” (Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 868

F.Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994); see also Puckett v. Cox, 456

F. 2d 233 (1972) (6th Cir. USCA) It was held that a pro

se complaint requires a less stringent reading than one

drafted by a lawyer per Justice Black in Conley v.

Gibson. “The Federal Rules rejects the approach that

pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by

counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the

principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a

proper decision on the merits.” According to Rule 8(f)

FRCP and the state court rule which holds that all

pleadings shall be construed to do substantive justice.

See also Haines v. Kerner, 404, U.S 519, 520-21 (1972);

Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

“Pleadings filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a more

liberal reading than would be afforded to formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers. Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d

434, 437 (6th Cir. 2008).”

51.

Moreover, “All of the allegations contained in the

complaint are accepted as true, and the complaint is

construed liberally in favor of plaintiff.” Westlake v.

Lucas, 537 F.2d 857. 858 (6th Cir. 1976.)

52.

Roseman drafted all his pleadings in this case

without the assistance of counsel including his

objections (R. ECF No. 103) to magistrate R&R (R. ECF

No. 102); there has been no undisclosed ghostwriting (In

re Fengling Liu, 664 F.3d 367; see also Ostevoll v.

Ostevoll, 2000 WL 1611123 (S.D. Ohio)).

53.

However, in Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 377 (6thCir.

1995) objections, deemed deficient, consisted of formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers. If arguendo, Roseman’s

objections were on par with Miller’s, pro se litigant

Roseman is “entitled to a more liberal reading” and

conceivably not an onerous or unduly rigorous

construction. Moreover, Roseman would contend that it

is simply untrue that his objections (R. ECF 103) were

not specific or particular. Roseman hereby contends that

his objections were in the context of this case adequate

in preserving all of his claims for further review.

Thomas, a homicide case, wherein, according to ruling

petitioner failed altogether to file objections after

receiving an extension and on appeal provided no

explanation for her failure to object; arguably, Thomas

is not meaningfully compatible.

F. Collateral Estoppel

54.

There being no legally cognizable theory by which

FCA can assert that in this case, it relitigated precise

issues previously adjudicated by ALJs’ Wheaton and

Bondar, Roseman thus contends that FCA in bad faith,

maintained frivolous defenses in this case

unconscionably exasperating his damages and

hardships.

“Based on his refusal to return to work on

December

2018

FCA

terminated

Roseman’s employment.” Per November 17,

2020 decision by district court. Op. & Order

R. ECF No. 107 Page ID 2968 and herein at

App. PA Page 124.

“Roseman

contends

“constructively

that

discharged”

was

when

refused to return to work under conditions

that he believed were intolerable. But for

employer’s

action

‘[t]o

constitute

constructive discharge, the employer must

deliberately

create

intolerable

working

conditions., as perceived by a reasonable

person, with the intentions of forcing the

employee to quit and the employee must

actually quit’ Nothing like that has been

shown here, where the plaintiff merely

attempted to dictate arbitrary changes to

his work assignment as conditions for his

return and FCA declined to grant his

requests, instead offering to allow a return

to work under the same conditions, at the

same

place,

while

transferring

problematic co-worker elsewhere.

Roseman also has cited no legal authority

supporting his apparent position that his

employment

was

“constructively

terminated” by FCA’s mere refusal to

accede to an arbitrary demand for a change

in work assignment.” Citation omitted

[emphasis added]. Id. @ PageID.2977 and

herein Appi PA @ Page 144.

55.

In the interest of protecting the public and the

integrity of the court, Roseman would recommend for

judge Lawson that which he deemed “appropriate” and

befitting to Roseman in this case (Id. @ R. ECF. 107,

PageID.2972 and herein App. PA @ page 133); and

would expect Supreme Court to address this aspect of

ruling (Id.) as it may unduly influence similar cases. See

Macintosh v. Clous et al. 1: 21-cv-00309 U.S. W.D. Mich.

56.

FCA acknowledged that Roseman complained of

racial discrimination prior to commencing this lawsuit

(R.ECF No. 39 PageID.590); but appeal court’s ruling

states:

“While Roseman alleged that he engaged in

protected activity by complaining of racial

discrimination following the campaign flyer

incident in March 2018, Roseman made no

clear

mention

unlawful

race

discrimination prior to commencing this

lawsuit.”

(6th Cir. Case No. 20-2151 Doc.

19-2 Page 9.)

57.

To be clear, Roseman believes that the genesis of

the flyer incident had its roots in racial discrimination,

partially because union steward Eddie Smith implied to

Roseman in brief discussion prior to escorting Roseman

to meeting with FCA labor relations representatives

that the complaint came from hypocritical white

person(s) who “probably” have homes full of guns (Pl.[‘s]

Dep. R. ECF No. 87-2, PageID.2347 at page 118 1(14,15)

Roseman accepted Smith’s said inferences to be based in

fact; generally that if there were actual complaints

about campaign bulletin that said complaints were

made by white persons and that racial bias being the

motivation. Indeed, Roseman promptly raised that

issue of racial bias with FCA labor relations

representatives Cynthia Johnson, and Corey Scott,

arguing to labor representatives that FCA’s actions

against him advanced on the currency of racial bias,

protesting also at this time that FCA’s harassment of

Roseman about the photo infringed upon his Second

Amendment rights. (Id. PageID.2331, pages 53-55.)

58.

Here, principally, Smith introduces racial bias

premise to Roseman, and when meeting with FCA labor

relations representatives Scott and Johnson commenced,

in a haste Roseman vigorously protested disciplinary

actions that stemmed from racial bias, violated his

Second Amendment rights and were otherwise

irrational and unfounded pointing to among other things

his exemplary work record. See therefore how one might

plausibly infer, that Local 1700 willfully and

intentionally created a hostile work environment, the

expected and intended result being Roseman’s

separation from his employer FCA.

“Finally, Roseman challenges the district

court’s denial of his motion for TRO or

preliminary injunction.

For the reasons

already discussed, Roseman cannot show a

strong likelihood of success on the merits of

the claims that he has preserved for

appellate review, which is generally a

prerequisite for obtaining injunctive relief.

See Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. Of Med. Exam’rs,

225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir) (explaining that

“a finding that there is simply no likelihood

of success on the merits is usually fatal”).”

59.

Here (Id.), Roseman would argue that: “success”

“show[s] a strong likelihood of success”. Indeed,

speaking of ALJ Bondar’s ruling magistrate

acknowledged “Roseman is correct that, the matter was

adjudicated in his favor” (Magistrate’s R&R R. ECF 102,

PageID.2898 and herein App. PA @ page209.)

“But even taking Roseman’s termination

into account, Defendants are entitled to

summary judgment. ... FCA has presented

legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for

terminating Roseman, and he proffered no

evidence that those reasons were pretext . .

(Magistrate R&R R. ECF No 102,

PageID.2897.)

60.

Arguably, ALJs’ Bondar and Winston’s ruling

establish a lawful foundation and evidence sufficient to

infer pretext in that Wheaton found veracity in

Roseman’s testimony regarding his disability and

Bondar determined that November 21, 2018 discharge

could not be attributed to the absence-based misconduct

FCA alleged.

61.

In the context of civil litigation, a four-part test

has been used in determining whether collateral

estoppel precludes re-litigation of an issue. Under the

doctrine of collateral estoppel, "once a court has decided

an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that

decision may preclude re-litigation of the issue in a suit

on a different cause of action involving a party to the

first case." Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90. 94. 101 S.Ct.

411. 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980). See Bies v. Bagley, 519 F.3d

324, 332 (6th Cir. 2008)

62.

Not particularly borne out of the collective

bargaining agreement, FCA had a duty to Roseman to

“[fjurnish to each employee employment and a place of

employment which is free from recognized hazards that

are causing or are likely to cause death or serious

physical harm to the employee” but Roseman contends,

ignored its own mandate “[n]o one should have to work

like this”. (MIOSHA Michigan Occupational Safety and

Health Act, 1974 P.A. 154 as Amended). Allegations

being that union-defendants (Local 140, Local 1700)

conspired with FCA to intentionally subject plaintiff to

known workplace hazards, this, inter alia, is arguably a

separate actionable common law tort for which unions

may be found liable in this case. See Appellant Reply

Br. 6th Cir. COA Case No. 20-2151 Doc.17 Page 13-14

11.

Smoke & Mirrors, Trap Doors, Bait & Switch

“[T]he

Court

cautioned

him

[Roseman]...that in continuing to pursue

the case he risked losing a good'job that he

had for many years, and that he should

seriously consider accepting FCA’s offer... I

[Magistrate judge Grand] recognize that

you have been with FCA for a very long

time. That speaks very well to your - - you

know

your

dedication

and

your

perseverance and things like that, I don’t

want to see that...become tarnished or

taken. ... consider further FCA’s offer.

Again, I really encourage you to do so. ...

Roseman did not accept FCA’s offer, and

this

Court’s recommendation that his

motion for temporary restraining order be

denied was upheld over his objections.”

(emphasis added) District Ct. Order R. ECF

No. 81, PageID.2217, and herein PA at

Pages 265-67.

63.

Roseman contends: evidentiary record supports

an objective conclusion that courts below willfully and

intentionally infringed upon his right to life, a fair trial,

and due process unlawfully “take[ing]” from Roseman;

imposing damages to reputation, health, and defrauding

him of consideration connected to labor he traded with

employer FCA pursuant to (CBA’s); that, courts below

unjustly penalized Roseman, subjecting him to drudge of

exhaustive re-litigation of previously decided issues,

imposing upon him injustice and cruelty because, inter

alia, Roseman refused FCA’s “offer”; that, unlike the

rulings of ALJs’ Wheaton and Bondar, federal courts

below appear to dismiss Dr. Abbas’s prognosis,

harassing, chiding and ridiculing Roseman for declining

FCA’s illusory “offer”; that, Lawson specifically and

particularly infringed upon Roseman’s Second

Amendment rights to keep and bear arms, advocating

for and sanctioning all of the employment actions taken

against Roseman.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Petitioner expects Supreme Court will find the

foregoing lucid, and adequate in putting forth merit for

review, demonstrating obvious and momentous

implications case has for: employed persons; unionrepresented persons; citizens per Second Amendment

right to keep and bear arms; pro se litigants; Americans

with disabilities, and stare decisis.

CONCLUSION

In the aggregate, it is not surprising that the courts

below have in this case shown FCA and its hired “hit”man Amond deference because courts below cannot, in

the opinion of the undersigned, be distinguished from

such persons who either hire out or avail themselves to

be hired to effectuate the immoral.

Rein in the folly of the courts below, declare

Petitioner’s entitlement to recovery under all of his

claims put forth in this action, and sanction FCA for

putting forth its frivolous defenses in this case is the

earnest pleas and key expectations of the undersigned.

Prepared and submitted by:

John L. Roseman, Sr.

Respectfully Submitted,

Date: October 3, 2021

/s/ John L. Roseman. Sr.

John L. Roseman, in pro se

24823 Cobblestone Court

Farmington Hills, MI 48336

(313) 815-0119

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.