Petition for Writ of Certiorari — George Ferrer Sanchez, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefSep 15, 2021
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NO:
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 2020
GEORGE FERRER SANCHEZ,
Petitioner,
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Timothy Cone
Counsel for Petitioner Sanchez
1615 New Hampshire Avenue N.W.
4" floor (North)
Washington, D.C. 20009
Tel. (202) 862-4333
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Across all federal circuits, the courts of appeals have held that, as part of a plea agreement
with the government, a criminal defendant can waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence.
A number of federal judges have dissented from this view, stating that the right of appeal cannot be
waived in a plea agreement. A number of State Supreme Courts agree that the right of appeal is nonwaivable. Petitioner, whose appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
was dismissed based on the appeal waiver in his plea agreement, urges this Court to hold that appeal
waivers in plea agreements are not enforceable.
INTERESTED PARTIES
There are no parties to the proceeding other than those named in the caption of the case.
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .......... 0.0. neces 1
INTERESTED PARTIES ......... 20.0... ccc cece een n tence en tenes il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....... 0.0... ccc cc teen eee teens IV
PETITION. ... 0... eee ee eee teen e tence eee e nnn eee eeee 1
OPINION BELOW .......... 0... ccc ce eee eee ene b ene n nent ene ene es 2
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. ......... 20... cc ccc eee een ene eens 2
CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS INVOLVED................... 000005 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ...... 20.0... 0c ccc eee e eee ee nen nee 3
1. Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings.................. 022 cee eee 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ....... 0.0... eee eee eee nee 7
l. Appeal waivers should be unenforceable ........... 20.0... cee eee ee ee 7
A. Appeals waivers “are inherently unknowing and
unintelligent.” 2.0... eee eee eee eens 7
B. Appeal waivers are a use of federal prosecutors’
bargaining power that undermines judicial integrity.................. 9
2. Sanchez’ appeal was challenging significant sentencing errors.............. 1]
CONCLUSION. ..... 0... eee ee teen ene ent n ence nee e eens 15
APPENDIX... 0... ccc cece en eee nen ene n cence nee e eens 25
Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
United States v. Sanchez, _ Fed. Appx. __ (11" Cir. February 19, 2021)
(unpublished) .......... 0... cece eee nee e eee e eee e eens A-1
Order of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
denying rehearing sentence... 1... 0... cece eee nen nee A-5
iil
Judgment imposing sentence ....... 20.0... ccc eee e ene neeas A-6
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Class v. United States, U.S. __, 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018)... ee ce eee 7
Cradler v. United States, 891 F.3d 659 (6™ Cir. 2018)... 0... ccc cee eee cee ee 11
Garza v. Idaho, U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 738 (2019) ... 2... eee .5, 7,12
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) 0... cee eee ne eee 9,10
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969)... cc eee eee 5
People v. Batista, 167 A.D. 3d 69, 86 N.Y.S. 3d 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d 2018) ...... 13
People v. Bisono, _N.Y.3d__, 2020 NY Slip Op. 7484 (N.Y. 2020)........... 13-14
People v. Harrison, 386 Mich. 269, 191 N.W. 2d 371 (Mich. 1971)............0..... 6
People v. Thomas, 34 N.Y. 3d 545 (N.Y. 2019) 2.0... cc ee nee 12
Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956)... 0. cette ences 10
Rosales-Mireles v. United States, U.S.__, 139 S.Ct. 1897 (2018). ............ 10, 11
Spann v. State, 704 N.W. 2d 486 (Minn. 2005)... 0.0.0... eens 12
State v. Ethington, 121 Ariz. 572,592 P.2d 768 (Ariz. 1979)... 0.0.0... cee ee 12
United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292 (11" Cir. 2006). .............000 eee e eee 8
United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11" Cir. 1993) 2.0.0... eee 12
United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162 (4™ Cir. 2005)... 0... 0c ccc eee ee eee 10
United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2006) ......... 0.00.02. eee eee 11
United States v. Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432 (5" Cir. 1990) .....0 0.0.0. cee eee eee 11
iv
United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294 (11" Cir. 2005)............0004 10, 12
United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983). 0... ce eee teens 9
United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166 (11" Cir. 1999) ..........0. 00.00 eee eee 8
In re Sealed Case, 702 F.3d 59 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 2... ccc nee 12
United States v. Lutchman, 910 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2018)... 0... cece ce eee 8
United States v. Medina-Carraso, 815 F.3d 457 (9" Cir. 2015)..............00 000. 6,8
United States v. Mezzanatto 513 U.S. 196 (1995) 2.0... ce wees 11
United States v. Mutschler, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (W. D. Wash. 2016) .............. 6
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)... 0. eee tenes 10
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) 2.0... cee eee nee 9-10
United States v. Schulte, 436 F.3d 849 (8" Cir. 2006) ......... 0. ccc cee eee 12
United States v. Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532 (4™ Cir. 2012) 2... 0... cece eee ee ee eee 6
Statutes and other authorities:
18 U.S.C. § 3742 2. ee nee ene nee n eee ene neees 2
28 U.S.C. § 12541) occ ce eter eet e nent b ene nns 2
28 US.C. § 1291. cc eee eben eben teen eee ee eee 2
Sentencing Guidelines, Ch. 1, Part A, Intro.3 2.0.0... eee ee eee 11
U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 775 2.0.0... cece cence een neees 8
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, to All Federal
Prosecutors (Oct. 14,2014) 2.0.0... ce eee eee nee n eee 9
Brief of the United States in Opposition to Certiorari in Mearing v. United States,
2018 WL 6382980 (Dec. 4, 2018) 2.0... eect cece eee en ees 12
Brief of the United States in Opposition in Jean v. United States, No. 20-7958 (Aug.
25, 2021). ee nee ene n teen e ene e een nee
Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 Colum. L.
Rev. 324 (2006) ... 0... ec cee nen ene nent e ee ee ne nee
Kevin Bennardo, Post-Sentencing Appellate Waivers, 48 U. of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform 347 (2015) 2.0... ce eee ene e enn n eee nes
Aliza Hochman Bloom, Sentence Appeal Waivers Should Not Be Enforced in the
Event of Superseding Supreme Court Law: The Durham Rule as Applied to Appeal
Waivers, 18 Florida Coastal L. R. 113 (2016) .......0. 0.0.0.0... eee eee
Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 Hastings Const. L. Q. 127
Le)
Vi
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 2020
No:
GEORGE FERRER SANCHEZ,
Petitioner
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
George Ferrer Sanchez respectfully petitions the Supreme Court of the United States for a
writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, rendered and entered in case No. 20-10484 in that court on February 19, 2021, in United
States v. Sanchez. A-1. This judgment affirmed the judgment of the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida. A-6. On April 19, 2021, the Eleventh Circuit denied Sanchez’
petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. A-5.
OPINION BELOW
A copy of the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, United
States v. Sanchez, 847 Fed. Appx 825 (11" Cir. Feb. 19, 2021) (unpublished) is contained in the
Appendix. A-1. This decision affirmed the judgment and commitment of the district court. A-6.
A copy of the order of the Eleventh Circuit denying Sanchez’ petition for rehearing and rehearing
en banc is also contained in the Appendix. A-5.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) and PART III of the RULES
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. The Court of Appeals’ decision was entered on
February 19, 2021, and its order denying rehearing and rehearing en banc was entered on April 19,
2021. This petition is timely filed pursuant to SUP. Cr. R. 13.1 and this Court’s March 19, 2020
Covid Order Regarding Filing Deadlines (rescinded, in part, July 19, 2021). The District Court had
jurisdiction because petitioner was charged with violating federal criminal laws. The Court of
Appeals had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, which provide that
courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction for all final decisions of United States district courts.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS INVOLVED
U.S. Const. Amend. V:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.
Sup. Ct. R. 10(a):
[When deciding whether to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari] the
Court considers [whether a decision by] a United States court of
appeals . . . call[s] for an exercise of this Court’s supervisory power.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings.
The three-count Indictment charged a Hobbs Act conspiracy (Count 1), an alien smuggling
conspiracy (Count 2), and a money laundering conspiracy (Count 3). DE12. Ina plea agreement,
Sanchez agreed to plead guilty to the third count of the three-count Indictment (money laundering
conspiracy), and the government agreed to dismiss the remaining two counts. DE301:1.
Sanchez’s written plea agreement contained an appeal waiver, which provided:
[I]n exchange for the undertakings made by the United States in this
plea agreement, the defendant hereby waives all rights conferred by
[28 U.S.C. §] 1291 and [18 U.S.C. §] 3742 to appeal any sentence
imposed, including any restitution order, or to appeal the manner in
which the sentence was imposed, unless the sentence exceeds the
maximum permitted by statute or is the result of an upward departure
and/or an upward variance from the advisory guideline range that the
Court establishes at sentencing. ...
DE30:5-6. In addition, the plea agreement provided that if government appealed the defendant’s
sentence, the defendant would be released from his appeal waiver. DE30:5. Additionally, the plea
agreement provided that Sanchez waived any right to appeal the forfeiture, or any restitution order.
DE30:5.
At Sanchez’ plea colloquy, the district court determined that Sanchez was aware of his appeal
waiver (though the district court remarked, with regard to the appeal waiver: “you guys write that
in the plea agreement all the time, and the Eleventh Circuit hears appeals.” DE68:16-18 (quoted in
United States v. Sanchez, 847 Fed. Appx. 825, 828 (11" Cir. Feb. 19, 2021) (unpublished) (A-2)).
At sentencing, the district court overruled defense objections to its application of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, and imposed a sentence of 108 months. DE69:34. The district court
subsequently granted the government’s request for $5.4 million in forfeiture, and ordered forfeiture
of two Florida homes. DE58. The government later sought $1.2 million in restitution. Sanchez
moved to dismiss this restitution demand, arguing that it was not based on the offense of conviction,
and, in a paperless order entered after a hearing, the district court granted Sanchez’ motion to dismiss
the restitution demand. DE120.
On appeal, Sanchez challenged the district court’s sentencing and forfeiture rulings. In
response, the government moved to dismiss this appeal, based on Sanchez’ appeal waiver in his plea
agreement. Sanchez opposed dismissal of his appeal, arguing that the district court did not
adequately explain the appeal waiver at the plea colloquy, and, alternatively, that appeal waivers
should be unenforceable. The Eleventh Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss
Sanchez’ appeal. Sanchez, 2021 WL 650935 at * 4.
Sanchez filed a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, again arguing that the district
court did not adequately explain the appeal waiver, and, alternatively, again urging the Eleventh
Circuit to hold en banc that appeal waivers are unenforceable. The Eleventh Circuit denied Sanchez’
petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc. A-S.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. Appeal waivers should be unenforceable.
Sanchez acknowledges that waivers of appeals of sentencing errors in plea agreements have
long been held enforceable in all Circuits. But, when Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure was amended to require district courts to ensure at the plea colloquy that a defendant
understood that he was waiving the right to appeal the sentence, the Advisory Committee pointedly
took “no position on the underlying validity of such waivers.” Advisory Committee Notes to 1999
Amendments to Rule 11. To date, this Court has not directly addressed this question. In Garza v.
Idaho, _US. _,, 139 S.Ct. 738, 745 (2019), this Court held that defense counsel was
constitutionally deficient in failing to file a notice of appeal even when the defendant had agreed to
an appeal waiver, but did not address whether such waivers are valid and enforceable — the parties
had not raised this issue. Sanchez submits that appeal waivers should be unenforceable.
A. Appeals waivers “are inherently unknowing and
unintelligent.”
Due Process requires a guilty plea to be “voluntary and knowing.” McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969). But, at the time a plea agreement is entered into, the future
occurrence of a sentencing error is unknowable. As a dissenting opinion forcefully argued, a
defendant entering into a plea agreement is therefore not capable of waiving an appeal of a future
sentencing error “knowingly and voluntarily”:
... [G]iving up the right to trial, to confront witnesses at trial, and to
preserve the privilege against self-incrimination are all known trial
rights that necessarily are forfeited by the very act of pleading guilty
instead of proceeding to trial. The defendant consequently knows
precisely what he or she is giving up in exchange for the benefits of
the guilty plea at the very moment the plea is entered—a trial and the
constitutional rights that accompany it.
Sentencing, however, does not occur contemporaneously with the
plea and waiver. It is a future event, and the mistakes from which one
might have reason to appeal have not yet occurred at the time a
defendant waives the right to appeal or collaterally attack the plea or
sentencing proceedings. A defendant cannot know what he or she has
given up by waiving the right to appeal until after the judge and
counsel have reviewed a yet-to-be-prepared presentence investigation
report, after the judge has considered other information not known to
the defendant at the time of the plea, and after the judge has actually
imposed sentence. By then it is too late, no matter how
disproportionate the sentence or how egregious the procedural or
substantive errors committed by the sentencing judge or the
defendant's own counsel. It is hard to see how a defendant at the plea
hearing can ever knowingly and intelligently—that is, with “a full
awareness of both the nature of the right [s] being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it,” Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 422, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L-Ed.2d 410 (1986) — waive the
right to appeal or collaterally attack a sentence that has not yet been
imposed. Such prospective waivers in anticipation of unknown future
events are inherently unknowing and unintelligent.
United States v. Medina-Carraso, 815 F.3d 457, 464 (9" Cir. 2015) (Friedman, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).' Accord United States v. Mutschler, 152 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1338-41 (W. D. Wash.
2016) (declining to accept a plea agreement that contained an appeal waiver because such waivers
are “inherently unknowing”); People v. Harrison, 386 Mich. 269, 275, 191 N.W. 2d 371, 374 (Mich.
1971) (invalidating appeal waivers as “constitutionally obnoxious’).
The Fourth Circuit concluded that appeal waivers “are valuable precisely because they cover
unforeseen circumstances and thus add certainty to the criminal proceeding.” United States v.
Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 538 (4" Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). This view is mistaken. Parties to
'Footnote 3 of Judge Friedman’s dissent cites to numerous opinions and law review
commentaries, from 1992 to 2015, which, like his dissent, take the view that appeal waivers should
not be enforced. Medina-Carrasco, 815 F.3d at 463, n. 3 (Friedman, J., dissenting)
6
a plea agreement are able to have a “meeting of the minds” with respect foreseeable events, but they
are unable to know, and therefore unable to meaningfully agree on, “unforeseen circumstances,” such
as a district court’s future possible sentencing errors in calculating the term of incarceration, the
amount of restitution, or the amount of forfeiture. Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal,
23 Hastings Const. L. Q. 127, 203 (1995) (prospective sentencing errors cannot be a valid basis for
knowing and voluntary waivers). This Court has implicitly recognized the incapacity of parties to
agree on a future possible error when it held, in Class v. United States, _ US. ,1388.Ct. 798, 805
(2018), that a defendant’s agreement to give up his right to appeal his conviction did not waive his
right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute underlying the conviction. Accord Aliza
Hochman Bloom, Sentence Appeal Waivers Should Not Be Enforced in the Event of Superseding
Supreme Court Law: The Durham Rule as Applied to Appeal Waivers, 18 Florida Coastal L. R. 1 13,
125 (2016) (when intervening Supreme Court decisions unexpectedly modify the applicable law, an
appeal waiver “cannot be described as ‘knowing’ or “voluntary.””).
As noted above, in Garza v. Idaho, this Court held that defense counsel was constitutionally
deficient in failing to file a notice of appeal, even though a defendant agreed to an appeal waiver.
139 S.Ct. at 745. Garza explained that, when filing a notice of appeal, defense counsel is not able
to competently determine whether any valid appellate issues exist, since appellate claims are “likely
to be ill defined or unknown at this stage.” Id.
Similarly, at the plea colloquy stage, because the defense is not a position to challenge the
punishment that will ultimately be imposed, the defense is not a position to forego a sentencing
appeal “knowingly and voluntarily.”
Like other circuits, the Eleventh Circuit has taken a transactional approach to the validity of
appeal waivers, viewing such waivers as “another chip the defendant can bring to the bargaining
table and trade for additional concessions from the government.” United States v. Bascomb, 451
F.3d 1292, 1294 (11" Cir. 2006) (citations omitted); United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1 166, 1169
(11 Cir. 1999) (“While it may appear unjust to allow criminal defendants to bargain away
meritorious appeals, such is the necessary consequence of a system in which the right to appeal may
be freely traded.”).
But this transactional approach to the validity of appeal waivers obscures much, if not all,
of the underlying reality. Because of the government’s “great advantage in bargaining power... [i]t
is illusory to suggest that a defendant has any real bargaining power in this context, any free and
deliberate choice.” Medina-Carrasco, 806 F.3d at 1211, n. 4 (Friedman, J., dissenting). In United
States v. Lutchman,, after finding that the government gave up nothing in return for a defendant’s
appeal waiver, the Second Circuit declined to enforce this appeal waiver, because it was
“unsupported by consideration.” 910 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2018).
The government demonstrated its “great advantage in bargaining power” when it obtained
appeal waivers from defendants in exchange for concessions that later had to be ruled “off-thetable.” The government had used its plea bargaining power to withhold sentence reductions for
“acceptance of responsibility” unless a defendant agreed to waive his right to appeal — until the
Sentencing Commission issued a guideline to prohibit this practice. U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 775
(Nov. 1, 2013) (resolving Circuit conflict and providing that “acceptance of responsibility” sentence
reduction recommendations could not be exchanged for a defendant’s appeal waiver). Until the
Justice Department itself stepped in, prosecutors were extending appeal waivers to foreclose possible
future claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. See Memorandum from James M.
Cole, Deputy Attorney General, to All Federal Prosecutors (Oct. 14, 2014) (instructing all federal
prosecutors to cease seeking waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and to cease
enforcing those waivers in previous plea agreements). Very recently, in a brief to this Court, the
government took the view that despite caselaw holding that an appeal waiver in a plea agreement
cannot waive the issue whether a defendant’s conduct fell within the statute of conviction, such a
waiver “would properly preclude review” of this issue. Brief of the United States in Opposition in
Jean v. United States, No. 20-7958 (Aug. 25, 2021).
The present case illustrates that a defendant does not “freely” trade an appeal waiver.
Sanchez’ plea agreement waived an appeal of “any restitution order.” DE30:5. Ten months later,
the government filed a motion, seeking $1.2 million in restitution. DE106. Sanchez opposed this
restitution demand. After a restitution hearing, the district court dismissed the government’s
demand. DE120. The government did not appeal this ruling, which suggests that its $1.2 million
restitution request had little merit. Yet, had the district court ordered Sanchez to pay $1.2 million
in restitution, Sanchez’ appeal waiver would have foreclosed him from seeking appellate review of
this order. This abandonment of the right to appeal cannot be viewed as having been “freely
traded”: Sanchez could not have “freely” waived an appeal of a future order to pay $1.2 million in
restitution when no demand for $1.2 million in restitution had been made.
B. Appeal waivers are a use of federal prosecutors’
bargaining power that undermines judicial
integrity.
This Court has supervisory powers “to preserve judicial integrity” in federal court
proceedings. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (citing McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943)); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 n. 8 (1980) (“we agree [with
the dissent that] the supervisory power serves the ‘twofold’ purpose of deterring illegality and
protecting judicial integrity.”) (quoting id. at 744 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). This supervisory power
includes the power to address, as here, abuse of process by federal law enforcement. Rea v. United
States, 350 U.S. 214, 216-17 (1956) (the propriety of a federal law enforcement agency’s conduct
presented a question “concerning our supervisory powers of federal law enforcement agencies”)
(citing McNabb, 318 U.S. 332); Amy Coney Barrett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court,
106 Colum. L. Rev. 324, 330 (2006) (“In still other instances, courts use the term ‘supervisory
authority’ to refer to the power of a federal court to supervise law enforcement officials.’’).
Sanchez urges this Court to exercise its supervisory powers to hold that appeal waivers are
unenforceable in the federal courts. When federal prosecutors extract appeal waivers from
defendants, they use their bargaining power in a way that undermines the integrity of the federal
courts.
Two circuits hold that “[a]n appeal waiver includes the waiver of the right fo appeal difficult
or debatable issues or even blatant error.” United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296
(11" Cir. 2005) (emphasis added); accord United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 171 (4" Cir. 2005)
(citing Grinard-Henry). But evasion of difficult or debatable issues, or of blatant error, undermines
the legitimacy of the judicial Branch. Left uncorrected, “plain” errors —i.e., undebatable errors —are
errors that “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993).
In Rosales-Mireles v. United States, U.S.__,139S.Ct. 1897, 1908 (2018), this Court held
that a district court’s “plain error” miscalculation of the sentencing Guidelines range seriously affects
10
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Rosales-Mireles’ reasoning
supports Petitioner’s view here:
In broad strokes, the public legitimacy of our justice system relies on
procedures that are “neutral, accurate, consistent, trustworthy, and
fair,” and that “provide opportunities for error correction.” Bowers
& Robinson, Perceptions of Fairness and Justice: The Shared Aims
and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47
Wake Forest L. Rev. 211, 215-16 (2012). . . . “[W]hat reasonable
citizen wouldn’t bear a rightly diminished view of the judicial process
and its integrity if courts refused to correct obvious errors of their
own devise that threaten to require individuals to linger longer in
federal prison than the law demands?” United States v. Sabillon-
Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1333-34 (10" Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.).
Rosales-Mireles, 139 S.Ct. at 1908.
Appellate review is also essential to the systematic development of the law. See United
States v. Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432, 1436 (5™ Cir. 1990) (after the adoption of the sentencing
guidelines “appellate courts now have a more active role to play to insure adherence to the
guidelines’ policies of uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.”) (citing Sentencing Guidelines,
Ch. 1, Part A, Intro. 3). Appellate review thus fosters the “legitimation of the criminal justice system
in the eyes of the public.” Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 Hastings Const. L. Q. at 163,
213; see id. at 503. As this Court has noted, waivers should be unenforceable when they
“irreparably discredit the federal courts.” United States v. Mezzanatto 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995)
(citation and bracketed material omitted). Appeal waivers are this type of waiver.
No doubt mindful that appeal waivers, taken to their logical extreme, would undermine the
legitimacy of the criminal justice system, appellate courts created exceptions to appeal waivers,
based on “notions of due process,” or to avoid a “miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Caruthers,
458 F.3d 459, 471-72 (6th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases), abrogated on other grounds by Cradler v.
11
United States, 891 F.3d 659, 671 (6 Cir. 2018). The Eleventh Circuit, for example, does not
enforce an appeal waiver if the sentence imposed exceeded the statutory maximum, reasoning that
“there are certain fundamental and immutable legal landmarks within which the district court must
operate regardless of the existence of sentence appeal waivers.” United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d
1343, 1350 n. 18 (11" Cir. 1993).
But these court-created exceptions to appeal waivers do not preserve appeals of erroneous
orders of restitution, which appeal waivers make per se unreviewable in many circuits. See In re
Sealed Case, 702 F.3d 59, 64-65 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). Nor, the government claims,
would these court-created exceptions apply to orders of forfeiture, since forfeiture is “not subject to
any prescribed statutory maximum.” Brief of the United States in Opposition to Certiorari in
Mearing v. United States, 2018 WL 6382980, * 20 (Dec. 4, 2018) (citing United States v. Schulte,
436 F.3d 849, 851 (8" Cir. 2006)).
More fundamentally, abnegation of “difficult or debatable issues or even blatant error,”
Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d at 1296, discredits the Judicial Branch. Cf. State v. Ethington, 121 Ariz.
572, 573-74, 592 P.2d 768, 769 (Ariz. 1979) (“We hold that the right to appeal is not negotiable in
plea bargaining, and that as a matter of public policy a defendant will be permitted to bring a timely
appeal from a conviction notwithstanding an agreement not to appeal.”); Spann v. State, 704 N.W.
2d 486, 494 (Minn. 2005) (“We therefore conclude that allowing a defendant to waive his right of
appeal after trial conviction and sentencing is inconsistent with the court’s role as an objective
supervisor whose purpose includes maintaining the integrity of the judicial system.”).
Appeal waivers are said to conserve appellate resources, and to foster the “finality of criminal
judgments.” Garza v. Idaho, 139 S.Ct. at 755-56 (Thomas, J., dissenting). But this is questionable.
12
Appeal waivers result in a significant amount of litigation. See People v. Thomas, 34 N.Y. 3d 545,
598-99 (N.Y. 2019) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (noting that appeal waivers “produced — not avoided
— vast amounts of additional effort in trial courts and litigation in appellate courts as they struggle
to establish and determine, respectively, the validity of such waivers,” and stating that these waivers
should be unenforceable).
In this case, the district court noted that, in its experience, even in cases where appeal waivers
are addressed at the plea colloquy, “somehow they still get appealed.” (cited at A-2, Sanchez, 2021
WL 650935 at * 2). The district court added: “What I think counsel is saying, [counsel for the
government], is you guys write that in the plea agreement all the time, and the Eleventh Circuit hears
appeals.” Jd. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit found that these comments by the district court had
no effect on Sanchez’ understanding of his appeal waiver, and therefore rejected Sanchez’ argument
that these comments impaired his correct understanding of the appeal waiver. A- 4. This Petition
does not challenge this aspect of the Court of Appeals’ ruling. Nonetheless, the district court’s
impression that the Eleventh Circuit still “somehow . . hears appeals” despite an appeal waiver in
a plea agreement confirms that appeal waivers do not predictably contribute to the finality of
criminal judgments. See People v. Batista, 167 A.D. 3d 69, 86 N.Y.S. 3d 492, 499, 502 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2d 2018) (Sheinkman, J., concurring) (finding that appeal waiver colloquy “serve[] only as a
pathway to future litigation,” and noting that, over the past five years, in at least 380 published cases
state-wide the Appellate Division “has held an appeal waiver to be invalid”); Kevin Bennardo, Post-
Sentencing Appellate Waivers, 48 U. of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 347, 383 (2015) (noting
that “enforcement of a valid appellate waiver often consumes a considerable amount of appellate
resources,” and proposing that, to save resources, these waivers only be permitted after sentencing);
13
see also People v. Bisono, _N.Y.3d __, 2020 NY Slip Op. 7484, p. 4 and Appendix (N.Y. 2020)
(Garcia, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (noting that New York State appellate courts
invalidated 90 appeal waivers in the past year).
2. Sanchez’ appeal was challenging significant sentencing errors.
The prejudice of a rule that enforces a defendant’s waiver of appellate review of possible
future sentencing errors becomes most concrete when a defendant, on appeal, raises meritorious
challenges to his sentence. In the Initial Brief he filed in the Eleventh Circuit, Sanchez identified
several significant sentencing errors.
First, Sanchez challenged an 18-level Guidelines sentence enhancement for his moneylaundering conviction. This enhancement was based on a finding that the “loss amount” was $5.4
million. DE69:34. The record indicates that $5.4 million was the amount an alien had agreed to pay
for being smuggled into the United States. But there is no evidence that this $5.4 million was ever
laundered. Based on the record, Sanchez should only have been subject to a 14-level enhancement,
on account of $702,700 in funds he received and laundered.
Second, over defense objection, Sanchez received a 2-level enhancement for “sophisticated
laundering.” DE69:17. The Sentencing Guideline criteria for “sophisticated laundering” include
setting up fictitious entities, shell corporations, offshore financial accounts, or “layering”
transactions. But the district court relied on the existence of 15 checks. DE69:18. As defense
counsel objected at sentencing, these checks made the money easily traceably -- the fifteen checks
were direct evidence of money laundering. DE69:18. The record contains no evidence of
“sophisticated laundering.”
14
Third, over defense objection, Sanchez received a 4-level enhancement for being “an
organizer or leader.” DE69:20. But the facts that the district court cited in support of this finding
were related to his alien smuggling, not to money laundering. DE69:20. Yet money laundering, not
alien smuggling, was the offense of conviction.
Finally, Sanchez was ordered to forfeit substitute property in the amount of $5.4 million,
based on a finding that Sanchez used “a portion of the $5.4 million in [alien] smuggling funds” to
acquire two homes. DES8.2 (emphasis added). Again, the offense of conviction in this case was not
alien smuggling, but money laundering. The evidence did not identify a nexus between money
laundering and the two homes the district court ordered forfeited.
But, by dismissing Sanchez’ appeal, the Eleventh Circuit left all these significant issues
unaddressed.
CONCLUSION
George Ferrer Sanchez respectfully requests that this Court grant a writ of certiorari to the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
By: V >
Timothy Cone
Counsel for Petitioner
Washington, D.C.
September, 2021
15
APPENDIX
Decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, United States v. Fabian Perpall, 847
Fed. Appx. 825 (11" Cir. May 18, 2021)... 0... ccc eee eee eeen nes A-1
Order of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denying petition for rehearing and
rehearing en bane . 1... eee etn t eee eee n eee ene ene nes A-5
Judgment imposing sentence .... 0... 0... ccc cece cee cece cence eee nes A-6
16
United States v. Sanchez, --- Fed. Appx. ---- (2021)
2021 WL 650935
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
This case was not selected for
publication in West's Federal Reporter.
See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1
generally governing citation of judicial
decisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007.
See also U.S. Ct. of App. 11th Cir. Rule 36-2.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
UNITED STATES of
America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
George SANCHEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 20-10484
|
Non-Argument Calendar
|
FILED February 19, 2021
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-20085-MGC-1,
Attorneys and Law Firms
Emily Rose Stone, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney's
Office, Miami, FL, Miami, FL, Andrea G. Hoffman, U.S.
Attorney Service - Southern District of Florida, U.S. Attorney
Service - SFL, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Timothy Cone, Timothy Cone, Esq., Washington, DC, for
Defendant-Appellant
George Ferrer Sanchez, Pro Se
Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
Opinion
PER CURIAM:
*1 George Sanchez pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to one count of conspiracy to commit money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B), (h).
He was sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment and was
required to forfeit all property involved in, or traceable
to, the conspiracy, including certain real properties. He
now seeks to appeal his sentence and the forfeiture order.
The government moved to dismiss the appeal pursuant to
the sentence-appeal waiver in the plea agreement. Sanchez
opposes the motion, arguing that the waiver is not enforceable
because the district court failed to address the terms of
the waiver specifically before accepting Sanchez's plea and
“downplayed the significance” of the waiver.! After review,
we conclude that the appeal waiver is valid. Therefore, we
grant the government's motion and dismiss this appeal.
We enforce appeal waivers that are made knowingly and
voluntarily. See United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292,
1294 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d
1343, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate that a waiver
was made knowingly and voluntarily, the government must
show that either (1) the district court specifically questioned
the defendant about the waiver during the plea colloquy;
or (2) the record makes clear that the defendant otherwise
understood the full significance of the waiver. Bushert, 997
F.2d at 1351.
Sanchez's written plea agreement contained the following
appeal waiver:
[1]n exchange for the undertakings made by the United
States in this plea agreement, the defendant hereby waives
all rights conferred by [28 U.S.C. §] 1291 and [18 U.S.C.
§] 3742 to appeal any sentence imposed, including any
restitution order, or to appeal the manner in which the
sentence was imposed, unless the sentence exceeds the
maximum permitted by statute or is the result of an upward
departure and/or an upward variance from the advisory
guideline range that the Court establishes at sentencing...
[I]f the United States appeals the defendant's sentence ...,
the defendant shall be released from the above waiver of
his right to appeal his sentence...
By signing this agreement, the defendant acknowledges
that the defendant has discussed the appeal waiver set forth
in this agreement with the defendant's attorney.
Additionally, the plea agreement provided that Sanchez
“waive[d] any right to appeal the forfeiture.” Sanchez and his
counsel signed the agreement.
During the plea colloquy, in relation to the sentence-appeal
waiver, the district court explained that
*2 under certain circumstances you may be able to appeal
your sentence and [in] other circumstances the United
States may be able to appeal the sentence.
WESTLAW © 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. :
United States v. Sanchez, --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2021)
So as an example, if I were to sentence you to higher than
the advisory guideline range, you may be able to appeal
the sentence. If I sentence you to lower than the advisory
guideline range, the United States may be able to appeal
the sentence. Do you understand that?
Sanchez confirmed that he understood. The district court
then asked the government to explain the terms of the plea
agreement for the record. The government reviewed various
terms of the plea agreement, including that the agreement
contained “an appellate waiver which memorializes the
conditions under which the defendant can appeal his sentence,
and that the defendant has waived his right to appeal his
sentence under most circumstances.” The court then asked
Sanchez whether the terms the government reviewed were
“[his] understanding of the plea agreement in this case,” and
Sanchez responded “Yes, your Honor.” After explaining the
other rights Sanchez would be giving up by pleading guilty,
confirming that he was pleading guilty of his own free will,
and establishing a factual basis for the plea, the district court
accepted Sanchez's plea, finding that it was knowing and
voluntary.
The government then asked the court “if we could stop,”
because it “want[ed] to confirm that the defendant understood
that there was an appellate waiver contained within [the
agreement].” The following colloquy then occurred:
The Court: I will say it, but somehow they still get
appealed.
Sir, do you understand that by pleading guilty in this case
you are giving up your right to appeal except as required
by law?
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I think you did ask the
question. Mr. Sanchez understands that he can appeal under
limited circumstances, that if the court goes above the
statutory maximum or goes above the applicable guideline
range at the time of sentencing.
[The Government]: I don't—one second, your Honor. I
don't believe—
The Court: What I think counsel is saying, [counsel for the
government], is you guys write that in the plea agreement
all the time, and the Eleventh Circuit hears appeals.
[Defense Counsel]: Judge, even with a waiver we are
considered ineffective if we don't file it when the client
requests it. [Government]: I understand, you Honor. I think
that my office is trying to do a better job of making
clearer on the record that there is, in fact, an appellate
waiver contained within these plea agreements and that
the defendant understands that he is foregoing his right to
appeal under most circumstances.
The Court: I understand. Sir, do you understand that under
most circumstances you are giving up your right to appeal
the sentence in this case?
The Defendant: I am sorry, could you please repeat?
The Court, Sir, do you understand that as counsel said in
exchange for your plea of guilty in this case, you are giving
up your right to appeal the sentence in this matter?
The Defendant: Yes, Your Honor.
Sanchez argues that the appeal waiver is invalid because
the district court failed to address the terms of the
waiver specifically before accepting Sanchez's plea—
instead addressing the waiver after accepting the pleaA—and
“downplayed” the significance of the waiver. We disagree.
*3 Here, when considered as a whole, the record
demonstrates that Sanchez understood the full significance
of the waiver. First, the terms of the appeal waiver were
clearly set forth in the plea agreement, and the plea
agreement provided that by signing the agreement, Sanchez
“acknowledge[d] that [he] ha[d] discussed the appeal waiver
set forth in this agreement with [his] attorney.”
Second, any confusion caused at the change-of-plea hearing
by the district court's explanation that “under certain
circumstances” Sanchez might be able to appeal,” was
immediately eliminated by the government's subsequent
explanation that the plea agreement contained “an appellate
waiver which memorializes the conditions under which the
defendant can appeal his sentence, and that the defendant
has waived his right to appeal his sentence under most
circumstances.” Furthermore, Sanchez confirmed that the
government's explanation was also his understanding of the
terms of the plea agreement. Moreover, unlike in Bushert,
Sanchez's counsel confirmed that Sanchez understood “that
he can appeal under limited circumstances, that if the
court goes above the statutory maximum or goes above the
applicable guideline range at the time of sentencing.”* And,
prior to the end of the change-of-plea hearing, the district
court expressly inquired as to whether Sanchez understood
that “in exchange for your plea of guilty in this case, you are
WESTLAW © 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
United States v. Sanchez, --- Fed.Appx. ---- (2021)
giving up your right to appeal the sentence in this matter,” and
Sanchez confirmed he understood.”
*4 Sanchez also argues that the appeal waiver is invalid
because the district court “downplayed” the significance
of the waiver based on its discussion in front of Sanchez
that, despite the existence of appeal waivers in many plea
agreements, the Eleventh Circuit hears appeals in many cases.
But an appeal waiver “cannot be vitiated or altered” by a
district court's comments made during court proceedings.
See Bascomb, 451 F.3d at 1297 (11th Cir. 2006); see also
United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir.
1999) (holding that the district court's encouragement of the
defendant to appeal was dicta and “had no effect on the
terms ofa previously approved plea agreement”). Further, any
alleged confusion generated by the district court's comments
was cured by the subsequent explanation to Sanchez that
by pleading guilty, he was waiving his right to appeal his
sentence, which Sanchez unequivocally confirmed that he
understood.
In sum, at no point during the change-of-plea hearing did
Sanchez or his counsel express any objection, hesitation, or
misunderstanding concerning the scope of the appeal waiver.
Rather, the opposite occurred—Sanchez's counsel confirmed
that Sanchez understood the terms of the appeal waiver, and
Sanchez himself twice stated that he understood that the
appeal waiver was part of his plea agreement. Thus, the
record as a whole demonstrates that Sanchez understood the
Footnotes
full significance of the appeal waiver and it was knowing
and voluntary. Therefore, the appeal waiver is valid and
enforceable. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351.
Moreover, none of the exceptions to Sanchez's sentenceappeal waiver apply here. Sanchez's 108-month sentence does
not exceed the statutory maximum of 20 years’ imprisonment
and is at the bottom of the applicable advisory guideline range
of 108 to 135 months’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)
(1)(B) (providing that the statutory maximum for conspiracy
to commit money laundering is 20 years’ imprisonment).
With regard to his challenge to the forfeiture order, it is well
established that criminal forfeiture is part of a defendant's
sentence. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39, 116
S.Ct. 356, 133 L.Ed.2d 271 (1995); United States v, Gilbert,
244 F.3d 888, 924 (11th Cir. 2001) (“It is beyond doubt
that criminal forfeiture is part of a defendant's sentence”).
The forfeiture order is therefore covered by Sanchez's appeal
waiver.
Accordingly, because Sanchez's challenges to his sentence do
not fall within an exception to his appeal waiver, we GRANT
the government's motion to dismiss.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
All Citations
--- Fed.Appx. ----, 2021 WL 650935
1 Sanchez also argues for purposes of preserving the issue for en banc review by this Court or review by the Supreme Court
that appeal waivers are invalid as a matter of law and should be unenforceable. Because this argument is foreclosed by
binding precedent and made for preservation purposes only, we do not address it further. See United States v. Bushert,
997 F.2d 1343, 1350 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that sentence-appeal waivers are enforceable provided they are knowingly
and voluntarily made).
We acknowledge that an examination of the terms of the plea agreement alone is insufficient to demonstrate that the
waiver was knowing and voluntary. Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1352. However, the terms of the agreement may be considered
as part of determining whether in light of the record as a whole it is clear that the defendant understood the full significance
The district court's statement that “under certain circumstances [Sanchez] may be able to appeal [his] sentence,” was
the type of language that we deemed “confusing” in Bushert and rendered Bushert's appeal waiver invalid because it “did
not clearly convey to Bushert that he was giving up his right to appeal under most circumstances.” 997 F.2d at 1352—
2
of the waiver.
3
53 (emphasis in original).
4
In a footnote in his response in opposition to the motion to dismiss, Sanchez takes issue with counsel's statement that
Sanchez could appeal if the district court sentenced him “above the applicable guideline range.” He maintains that the
use of the term “applicable” as opposed to “advisory” guideline range erroneously implied that Sanchez could challenge
whether a particular Guideline was “applicable” (i.e., the calculation of the guidelines range). To the extent that he also
argues that this statement rendered the appeal waiver invalid, we rejected a similar argument in United States v. Boyd,
WESTLAW © 2021 Thornson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3
United States v. Sanchez, --- Fed.Appx. ---~ (2021)
975 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2020) (denying argument that, because the plea agreement did not specify who would calculate
the guideline range, the plea agreement was ambiguous and should not bar defendant's challenges to the calculation
of the range itself).
5 In response to the motion to dismiss, Sanchez makes much of the fact that this latter colloquy occurred after the district
court accepted his plea and is inconsistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N), which provides that
“[b]efore the court accepts a plea of guilty ... the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant
understands ... the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the
sentence.” However, Rule 11 also provides that “[a] variance of this rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial
rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). Here, while the district court varied from Rule 11(b)(1)(N) by squarely addressing the
appeal waiver after accepting the plea (instead of doing so before accepting the plea) the variance was harmless and did
not affect Sanchez's substantial rights as the record demonstrates that Sanchez clearly understood the full significance
of the appeal waiver. See id.; see also United States v. Hernandez-Fraire, 208 F.3d 945, 950 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining,
in the context of a challenge to the validity of a guilty plea itself, that “[g]enerally this circuit will uphold a plea colloquy that
technically violates Rule 11, but adequately addresses the three core concerns’—(1) that the plea is free from coercion;
(2) the defendant understands the nature of the charges; and (3) defendant knows and understands the consequences
of his plea).
End of Document © 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.
Government Works.
WESTLAW © 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4
USCA11 Case: 20-10484 Date Filed: 04/19/2021 Page: 1 of 1
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-10484-BB
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
GEORGE FERRER SANCHEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
ON PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING AND PETITION(S) FOR REHEARING EN BANC
BEFORE: NEWSOM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Petition for Rehearing En Banc is DENIED, no judge in regular active service on the Court
having requested that the Court be polled on rehearing en banc. (FRAP 35) The Petition for
Panel Rehearing is also denied. (FRAP 40)
ORD-46
Case 1:19-cr-20085-MGC Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/24/2020 Page 1 of 6
USDC FLSD 245B (Rev. 09/08) - Judgment in a Criminal Case
Page 1 of 6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Southern District of Florida
Miami Division
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GEORGE FERRER SANCHEZ
JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
Case Number: 19-20085-CR-COOKE
USM Number: 17958-104
Counsel For Defendant: Philip Horowitz, Esq.
Counsel For The United States: Ignacio Vazquez, AUSA
Court Reporter: Jill Wells
The defendant pleaded guilty to count 3 of the Indictment.
The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:
TITLE & SECTION
NATURE OF OFFENSE
OFFENSE
ENDED COUNT
18, U.S.C. 1956(h)
Conspiracy to commit money laundering.
12/2018 3
The defendant is sentenced as provided in the following pages of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant
to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.
All remaining counts are dismissed on the motion of the government.
It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change
of name, residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this
judgment are fully paid. If ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney
of material changes in economic circumstances.
Date of Imposition of Sentence:
1/22/2020
Mero $ Corb,
MARCIA G. COOKE
United States District Judge
January 22, 2020
Case 1:19-cr-20085-MGC Document 56 Entered on FLSD Docket 01/24/2020 Page 2 of 6
USDC FLSD 245B (Rev. 09/08) - Judgment in a Criminal Case Page 2 of 6
DEFENDANT: GEORGE FERRER SANCHEZ
CASE NUMBER: 19-20085-CR-COOKE
IMPRISONMENT
The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a
total term of 108 months.
The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons: Designation to a facility in the
Southern District of Florida.
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.
RETURN
I have executed this judgment as follows:
Defendant delivered on to
at , with a certified copy of this judgment.
UNITED STATES MARSHAL
DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL
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