Amicus Curiae Brief — Joseph A. Kennedy, Petitioner v. Bremerton School District
Supreme Court briefMar 31, 2022
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No. 21-418
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------JOSEPH A. KENNEDY,
Petitioner,
v.
BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF OF BREMERTON COMMUNITY
MEMBERS—BHS FOOTBALL TEAM ALUMNUS,
PARENTS, COMMUNITY LEADERS, AND
EDUCATORS—AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------ANDREW D. LEVY
Counsel of Record
ANTHONY J. MAY
LAUREN A. DIMARTINO
BROWN, GOLDSTEIN & LEVY, LLP
120 E. Baltimore Street,
Suite 2500
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Tel: (410) 962-1030
Fax: (410) 385-0869
adl@browngold.com
amay@browngold.com
ldimartino@browngold.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
================================================================================================================
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Authorities .............................................
ii
Interest of Amici Curiae ......................................
1
Summary of the Argument ..................................
5
Argument .............................................................
9
I.
The Bremerton High School Football Field
Is the Stage Where the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses Meet ......................
9
A. Petitioner’s Soliloquy Placed His Own
Free Exercise Rights Above Those of
the Community ....................................
9
B. Petitioner’s Prayer Crossed the Line to
Coerce and Indoctrinate an Audience
of Impressionable Youth ...................... 14
C. Petitioner’s Self-Interest Demoted
Community Members and Students
from Stars to Understudies ................. 19
II.
Petitioner’s Efforts to Steal the Spotlight
Created the Very Divisiveness Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Counsels
Against ....................................................... 23
Conclusion............................................................ 30
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756 (1973) .................................................27
Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578 (1987) .................................................12
Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962) .................................................29
Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992) ......................................... passim
Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602 (1971) .................................................28
Locke v. Davey,
540 U.S. 712 (2004) ...................................................5
Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................ 22, 23, 27-28
People of State of Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of
Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cnty., Ill.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948) ......................... 13, 18, 23, 24, 30
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925) .................................................12
Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158 (1944) .................................................12
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290 (2000) ................................... 6, 9, 17, 31
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) ...................................................9
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Van Orden v. Perry,
545 U.S. 677 (2005) .................................................29
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943) ...................................................8
Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985) ............................................... 6, 16
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y.,
397 U.S. 664 (1970) ............................................. 9, 29
Welsh v. United States,
398 U.S. 333 (1970) .................................................11
CONSTITUTION
U.S. Const. amend. I .....................................................6
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Chris Tucker, Satanists’ presence riles up
crowd at Bremerton football game, Kitsap
Daily News (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.
kitsapdailynews.com/news/satanists-presenceriles-up-crowd-at-bremerton-football-game/ ..........26
Christine Clarridge, Crowd prays with coach as
he defies school district, Seattle Times (Oct.
16, 2015), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle
news/education/scores-join-coach-in-postgameprayer/ .....................................................................25
James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments (1785) ....................20
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Jennifer Chamberlin, My Turn: Schools without
pressure to pray, Kitsap Sun (Oct. 21, 2015),
https://archive.kitsapsun.com/opinion/my-tur-schools-without-pressure-to-pray-ep-1283814315354461301.html/ .....................................................27
Judge Thomas B. Griffith, The Degradation of
Civic Charity, 134 Harv. L. Rev. F. 119 (2020)........28
Peter O’Cain, Football coach won’t be fired;
can’t participate in post-game prayers, Kitsap
Daily News (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.
kitsapdailynews.com/news/football-coach-wontbe-fired-cant-participate-in-post-game-prayers/ ......25
Samuel L. Perry, American Religion in the Era
of Increasing Polarization, Ann. R. of Soc.,
Vol. 48 (Forthcoming July 2022) .............................28
Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the
Analysis of the Ego (1922).......................................19
1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici—a group of eight parents, athletes, community leaders, and taxpayers in Bremerton—write to
provide context about how Petitioner placed his rights
above their own, in a public forum, at the heart of their
community. Each Friday evening in the fall, these individuals gathered under the bright lights of the
Bremerton High School football field to champion their
beloved team, echo the fight songs of their cheerleaders, applaud the marching band’s half-time performance, and support the youth who make up their
community’s future. Though not the reigning state
champions, the Bremerton football team was a symbol
of the comradery that once lived in their small city, a
community united in their differences. Where Bremerton High School is the arena, its football field is the
stage.
Amici understand that a community is an ensemble cast; not a one man show. It is a troupe of folks from
all walks of life, brought together by their own unique
faiths and beliefs. When Petitioner chose to center his
own rights at mid-field of this once-celebrated community gathering, amici’s community united quickly became a community divided.
1
The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Consistent with Rule 37.6, no counsel for a party authored this brief
in whole or in part, and no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund its preparation or submission.
2
Football Player (“F.P.”)2 played on Bremerton
High’s team and “[f ]or four years [he] knelt for [Petitioner] in solidarity as he prayed so there would be no
objection to [him] playing football.”3 He shares the
story of his senior year homecoming game that Petitioner turned into a media circus: “I felt attention was
shifted from our football team and focused towards
Kennedy’s prayer circle. To this day, I don’t remember
who we played or if we even won[,] . . . all I remember
is the aftermath of that game.” F.P. recalls the sound of
the horn ending the game and, before the two teams
had the opportunity to shake hands, over 500 people
“storm[ing] the football field . . . from both sides, hopping the fences and rushing to the field to be close to
Kennedy before he started his prayer. . . . [He] felt so
uncomfortable and unsafe.” Petitioner’s group prayers
did not only deprive F.P. of his free exercise rights, but
of his love for football, lasting friendships with his
teammates, and the respect he otherwise earned from
his coaches.
Retired public servant Jane Rebelowski spent
years interacting with the Bremerton community as a
public inspector and as an organizer. She watched as
her usually quiet street behind the high school filled
with outsiders in 2015, bringing turmoil to her
2
For reasons made clear below, see infra Sections I.C, II, F.P.
wishes to remain anonymous.
3
The quoted statements by amici were supplied to undersigned counsel for preparation of this brief and are contained in
interviews and statements provided by amici, on file with amici’s
counsel of record.
3
community and to the school her grandson attended.
She has lived—and paid taxes—in Bremerton for over
twenty years and is devastated that the Bremerton
School District (“the District”) has had to divert its already-scarce resources to fight something that she believes was so clearly in violation of the law.
Paul Peterson is an engineer that worked alongside Petitioner in the shipyard for nearly fifteen years.
Despite their good relationship, Mr. Peterson felt “compelled to speak out as a parent of children who attended the Bremerton public schools in the past, as a
grandparent whose grandchildren may attend in the
future, and as a concerned member and resident of the
community.” Mr. Peterson attended countless Bremerton High football games, singing the fight song along
with his children in the marching band and cheering
for his son that played football under Petitioner’s
watch. In his perspective, when parents enroll their
children in Bremerton public schools, they “entrust the
care, education, mentoring, and nurturing of [them] to
the employees of the public schools,” but Petitioner—
“a man of high integrity” co-opted by outside interests—broke that trust.
As a Bremerton High School employee and former
“band mom,” newly-elected community leader Jennifer Chamberlin spent many Friday nights collecting tickets at the stadium gates and watching students
pour into the stands of her hometown’s field, unaware
that their once safe city would soon become embroiled
in controversy: “[My child] just wanted to be in marching band and have a normal year, but it did not shape
4
out to be that.” Ms. Chamberlin’s story sheds light on
the vitriol and hate suffered by anyone who spoke out
in favor of the District.
Amber Kost, a high school teacher whose son was
to enter Bremerton High School the year following Petitioner’s actions, described how she has “tried very
hard to keep [her] teaching career and [her] connections with” her chosen belief system “separate for fear
of retribution.” She is an organizer of two social support organizations: the Kitsap Atheists and Agnostics
and Kitsap County Skeptics. “It has been grating to see
[Kennedy] openly promoting Christianity . . . when I
don’t feel I have the same rights.”4
Rabbi Sarah Newmark—a former educator—
was the leader of the local synagogue when the facts of
this case unfolded. She explains how Petitioner’s religiously-motivated political stance infringed on community members’ right to free exercise: “I always
thought America was where we escaped from forced
prayer.” She discussed how Petitioner’s actions exacerbated the “othering” her Jewish congregants had experienced in Bremerton.
Wife of a retired U.S. Navy Chief, Gayla HightBreach moved her family back to Bremerton twelve
years ago because it was a diverse and accepting community where she wanted to raise her four kids. With
a child attending Bremerton High School at the time,
4
Amici submit this brief in their capacities as private citizens. A mention of an Amicus’s employer does not constitute the
employer’s endorsement of the brief or any portion of its content.
5
she had a front row seat to Petitioner’s “predatory” actions, and she was “appalled” by his efforts to convert
high-school football into a religiously political platform. With her grandchild soon entering the District,
Ms. Hight-Breach feels that she has too great a stake
in the outcome of this case to sit idly by.
Janice McLemore is a 45-year resident of
Bremerton, lifelong Methodist and minister’s wife, and
mother of two who believes that part of being a Christian is respecting who people are and what they believe, not forcing one’s religion on others. Her 35 years
as a teacher and experience in Bremerton schools informs her opinion that the District did the right thing
to “look after their students.”
This community has stood by and watched as Petitioner’s misguided ventures caused a rift in the once
common ground upon which they stood. Still, they remain united in a shared interest to present their perspectives to the Court—despite the considerable risk
of harassment for doing so—so that it may better understand how Petitioner’s purported First Amendment
rights have stripped them of their own.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Amici understand that the District’s actions
gracefully balanced the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719–20
(2004). Together, the First Amendment is not just
about one man’s right to practice his beliefs; rather, it
6
is the protection of a community—and society as a
whole—to be free from the forced adaptation of one
man’s personal views. The notion that “Congress shall
make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of religion, or “respecting an establishment” of the same is
designed to afford all citizens—not one man—the right
to believe and practice as they deem fit. U.S. Const.
amend. I.
Bremerton School District’s actions to protect the
community’s interests were born from the concern that
Petitioner’s prayer—with a team of football players at
the 50-yard line or in the school’s locker room—would
be viewed as an endorsement of Petitioner’s private behavior. This was a valid concern: “The school’s name is
[ ] written in large print across the field and on banners
and flags. The crowd . . . include[d] many who display
the school colors and insignia on their school T-shirts,
jackets, or hats and who may also be waving signs displaying the school name.” Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000). In such a situation,
“[r]egardless of the listener’s support for, or objection
to” the prayer, a reasonable observer would “unquestionably perceive the inevitable [ ] prayer as stamped
with her school’s seal of approval.” Id. at 308; see also
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 78 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t also seems likely that the message
actually conveyed to objective observers . . . is approval
of the child who selects prayer over other alternatives. . . .”). Petitioner, shrouded in blue and white with
a “Knights” emblem on his chest, standing on the
school’s logo for all to see, carelessly infringed on the
7
impressionable minds of Bremerton’s youth for his own
gain. In doing so, he stole from their parents the right
to raise their children in a way that comports with
their own belief systems.
Amici’s accounts make clear that Petitioner’s
claim that his prayer was a private act is one far removed from the story’s true setting. As a player, F.P.
“always thought [Petitioner’s] purpose on the team was
to offer religious support [to the team] before and after
games.” Indeed, Petitioner was in his role as an employee of the District at all times that his prayers occurred. F.P. explains that the Bremerton coaches did
not go home immediately after the games ended, and
the players were not free to leave at that point. After
the final whistle, Petitioner would “hold up a helmet to
rally students to mid-field,” and players were directed
to attend “the coach’s prayer thing” at midfield, then
proceed to the locker room as a team before they could
go home. Until every player left, Petitioner was liable
to ensuring all team members’ rights were respected.
It was on this public stage, surrounded by players that
“always . . . did as [they] were told,” that Petitioner
carefully chose to pray. To the public, there was no obvious distinction between leading a team in prayer and
private conduct. And to the players, there was no obvious choice. As F.P. explains, participation in Petitioner’s prayer was “expected.”
By seizing the field for his own private speech, Petitioner and his cortège infringed upon the free exercise rights of the Bremerton Community, creating
outcasts of anyone who did not give him their
8
unwavering support. Amici address this Court out of
concern for their own personal freedom of conscience
and for their youths’ right to choose their own path
without fear of being ostracized. Because Bremerton is
a proud Navy town, it is the home of “families moving
in and out from all over the world, it is a community of
all different faiths.” But despite differences in beliefs,
Amici are representative of a community that is united
in celebrating their youth and protecting their right to
experience the joy of being young and curious as they
develop their sense of self. That right is squandered
when public-school mentors, like Petitioner, impose
their own faith onto students. Indeed, our uniquely
American system “secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes [but] must also
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster
such concepts. [These are] complementary components
of the broader concept of individual freedom of mind.”
W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
The very divisiveness that Petitioner has created
in this once tranquil community is precisely what the
First Amendment was designed to prevent. By diverting the focus from the football players, cheerleaders,
and band members to himself, Petitioner cast himself
as the lead actor in a play that was never meant to be
about him. Fueled by the current political landscape,
Petitioner’s actions have shifted limited public resources and attention from the students of Bremerton
to his own agenda. But the First Amendment does not
protect a cast of one; it protects the company of all.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
9
ARGUMENT
I.
The Bremerton High School Football Field
Is the Stage Where the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses Meet.
The public setting in which Petitioner chose to
pray is a forum prohibited by the First Amendment.
“The constitutional command will not permit the District ‘to exact religious conformity from a student as
the price’ of joining her classmates at a varsity football
game.” Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312. As this Court has recognized, there is “room for play in the joints” between
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause that “permit[s] religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.” Walz v. Tax
Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). In this
case, the District’s actions were not only appropriate,
but they were necessary to protect the free exercise
rights of the community members who were forced to
view—or participate in—Petitioner’s performance.
A. Petitioner’s Soliloquy Placed His Own
Free Exercise Rights Above Those of
the Community.
Amici’s stories vindicate the District’s decision to
prevent Petitioner from using the public-school stage
as a scene to infringe on the free exercise rights of the
community members. The First Amendment does not
protect the rights of one person at the peril of a community. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (“While the Free Exercise
10
Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny
the rights of free exercise to anyone, it has never meant
that a majority could use the machinery of the State to
practice its beliefs.”).
For example, it is the historical context of the Jewish people’s oppression that illustrates why Rabbi
Newmark felt that Petitioner’s prayer in the center of
the football field infringed on her and her congregants’
free exercise rights:
Because of the long history of being forced to
“convert or die” in the Jewish faith, the type
of proselytizing Kennedy engaged in was especially triggering for us. Jews tend to recoil
from Christian prayer in the public sphere
partly because when we refrain from taking
part, we fear an antisemitic backlash. In fact,
many of us refuse to wear our sacred Magen
David (מָ גֵן דָּ וִ ד, “Shield of David”) because it no
longer feels safe to do so.
When Rabbi Newmark sees group-led prayer in public
spaces, she deeply fears it could result in the forced
compliance of Bremerton’s Jewish community members and takes exception with what she views as
“Christians acting as though they have a corner on the
religious market.” Petitioner’s spectacle was also provocative to amici of faith because it trivialized the importance of prayer and its sacred relationship with
God.
Members of the Christian faith were similarly dismayed by Petitioner’s actions. The Kitsap Interfaith
Network—of which Rabbi Newmark was a member at
11
the time of Petitioner’s actions—includes spiritual
leaders from, among other faith groups, Methodist
Churches, the Church of Latter-Day Saints, the Episcopalian Church, and the Unitarian Church, as well as
a local mosque. Many of the Christian clergy in
Bremerton disagreed with Kennedy’s actions and believed it could lead to their own marginalization. According to Ms. McLemore, the Methodist faith, in
accordance with Matthew 6:6 of the Bible, requires
non-demonstrative prayer. Pressuring students to pray
publicly on the field violated their own belief that
Christians should not perform “acts of righteousness”
in public, and should not pray “like the hypocrites, for
they love to pray standing [ ] and on the street corners
to be seen by men.”
Petitioner’s conduct “also disadvantage[d] adherents of religions that do not worship a Supreme Being.”
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 357–58 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring). For example, although F.P. understood that prayer was part of some of his teammates’ lives, it was not a part of his. Yet he was forced
to sit with his discomfort and kneel in prayer before
and after every game.
Similarly, non-religious amici parents are concerned about the “slippery slope”—or “mudslide”—that
may occur if this Court were to allow Petitioner to lead
prayer on the 50-yard line. Ms. Chamberlin discussed
how the forced viewing of open prayer was disrespectful of her child’s freedom to develop their own faith.
Like many others, her child was a member of the band
and required to attend every football game. For Ms.
12
Hight-Breach, despite baptizing her children in the
Lutheran church to honor her grandmother, she did
not intend to raise her children in a religious way. But
as high school students during Petitioner’s prayer services, they were subject to the pressure of his actions.
“Everyone should be respected for their beliefs and our
children need to be protected from proselytizing.” Indeed, Petitioner’s prayer encroached on their right, as
parents, to direct their child’s religious upbringing. See
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535–36 (1925).
“It is cardinal with [this Court] that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder.” Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (citation omitted). Amici trusted Bremerton
schools to provide their children with critical-thinking
skills, not to “indoctrinate [their] children into any religion or religious practice.” Cf. Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987) (“Families entrust public
schools with the education of their children, but condition their trust on the understanding that [they] will
not purposely be used to advance religious views that
may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and
his or her family.”). While acknowledging Petitioner’s
rights, Mr. Peterson was disturbed that Petitioner’s
personal religious practice “neglected concern for the
belief or non-belief ” of students and their parents. As
a parent of students in the District, he said that he and
“[m]any [other] parents would be uncomfortable with
the knowledge someone was leading their children in
13
prayers or proselytizing their children into a religion,”
particularly because this “team activity” was occurring
“without the consent or knowledge of the parents of the
students.”
The educators among amici understand how to respect the due process and free exercise rights of students and their families while maintaining their own
religious beliefs. Ms. McLemore’s lifelong “goal has
been to see God in all people and to share the love of
God with others,” but she understands that praying
out loud “is not to be done with students in public
schools supported by taxpayers.” Cf. People of State of
Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71,
Champaign Cnty., Ill., 333 U.S. 203, 217 (1948). She
would “take moments of prayer all the time” in the hall
or at her desk, but “it did not need to be out loud when
students were there.” She explained that colleagues
also chose to say grace before meals, but in appropriate
ways that went unnoticed by students. Ms. Kost similarly recognizes the influence she has as an educator:
As a teacher now in a full-time, contracted position, I recognize the kind of power that I
have over students. . . . I am careful never to
impose my non-religious beliefs on students
and I’m careful to make sure non-religious
students don’t degrade or diminish the faith
of religious ones. It is precisely my influence
over my students as a teacher that make me
extra careful.
14
B. Petitioner’s Prayer Crossed the Line to
Coerce and Indoctrinate an Audience
of Impressionable Youth.
Amici support the District’s decision to strike a
balance between Petitioner’s personal religious rights
and the rights of the Bremerton community to ensure
students are free in their own religious exercise. As
Paul Peterson described:
I believe that the Bremerton School District did right by Mr. Kennedy to offer a private opportunity for private reflection in
prayer, outside of the leadership position for
which he was being fiscally compensated. It
has always been the stated goal of the school
district to ensure a safe and welcoming place
for all students, and I believe that their action
reflected their commitment to these principles, toward the betterment of the Bremerton
community as a whole.
Likewise, F.P.’s story highlights the Establishment
Clause’s goal of protecting the free exercise rights of
youth. “[T]here are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in . . . public schools.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 592 (1992) (citations omitted). Prayer associated
with public-school activity “carr[ies] a particular risk
of indirect coercion,” and F.P.’s narrative is emblematic
of “the inspiration for the Establishment Clause, the
lesson that in the hands of government what might
begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may
15
end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce.” Id. at 591–
92.
I always listened and did as I was told. I
wanted to play football and treated [Petitioner’s] prayer time as any other order from
a coach such as to exercise, attend study hall,
or execute a play. In respect[,] I always took a
knee but never bowed my head. For four years
I knelt for [Petitioner] in solidarity as he
prayed so there would be no objection to me
playing football.
F.P. described his experience in the days following
the chaos that unfolded after Petitioner’s homecoming
game prayer demonstration: “I felt overwhelmed, I
missed a day of school and football practice the following week. I was punished, not allowed to play a quarter
in the next game despite being a starter on all sides of
the ball.” Looking back, F.P. does not “think of [his]
time on the Bremerton High Football as a fond experience.” F.P. abided by Petitioner’s prayer decree because
F.P. “was a leader, not a person to argue with authority[.]” Cf. Lee, 505 U.S. at 590 (“[S]chool officials[’] . . .
effort to monitor prayer will be perceived by the students as inducing a participation they might otherwise
reject.”). F.P.’s story demonstrates how Petitioner’s
public pressure, however “subtle and indirect” as Petitioner may claim, “can be as real as any overt compulsion” for an adolescent. Id. at 593.
As F.P. confirms, there was no freedom of choice for
the team members: “The only time a choice was given
on the matter of praying with . . . Kennedy at the end
16
of football games was at a team meeting Thursday the
day before the game where the media attended and
fans stormed the field.” Prior to that conversation, the
“prayer circle . . . was something that was expected.”
Petitioner even relied on students to recruit others:
“Kennedy . . . encouraged players on our team to ask
the other teams’ coaches and players to join us [in
prayer].”
Like F.P., many students on the team had devoted
significant time, energy, and money over the course of
their lives to play varsity football, and they intended
to use the sport as a launching pad for a college scholarship. See also Lee, 505 U.S. at 594–95 (“Attendance
may not be required by official decree, yet it is apparent that a student is not free to absent herself . . . for
absence would require forfeiture of those intangible
benefits which have motivated the student through
youth and all her high school years.”). F.P. believed he
had to make a choice between maintaining his rank as
a starting player and keeping alive his chances of college recruitment or bowing out of prayer. Indeed, when
religious adherence becomes “relevant to a person’s
standing in the . . . community,” like F.P., “the religious
liberty protected by” the First Amendment “is infringed.” Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
The parents and educators among amici share
F.P.’s concerns for their own children and grandchildren. “To assert that high school students do not feel
immense social pressure, or have a truly genuine desire, to be involved in the extracurricular event that is
17
American high school football is ‘formalistic in the extreme.’ ” Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 311 (citing Lee, 505 U.S.
at 595); see also id. at 312 (“For many [students], the
choice between attending these games and avoiding
personally offensive religious rituals is in no practical
sense an easy one. The Constitution, moreover, demands that the school may not force this difficult
choice upon these students.”). They, too, understand
that when students are in uniform, either in a huddle
in the locker room or with hundreds of community
members watching from the sidelines, they cannot be
expected to opt out of Petitioner’s worship. As Mr. Peterson explained:
Mr. Kennedy’s post-game prayers, replete
with Christian religious overtones, were delivered by a leader, mentor, and coach to whom
the children looked to for advice, training, and
counsel. . . . [A]s a parent I believe that these
prayers would be viewed by the students as
coercive in nature, regardless of whether they
were explicitly coerced to participate, as any
players who chose not to attend would be
looked upon by their teammates (and potentially by the coaches themselves) as non-team
players.
Ms. Kost verified that “[n]on-religious students felt
compelled to join in prayer on the field after games. . . .
This is simply wrong. No student should feel pressured
or coerced to join in worship with a team. . . . [I]t
should never be the goal of educators to promote conformity of belief.”
18
Several amici explained that while, perhaps, an
adult would have been more comfortable declining to
participate in the highly public team prayer, students
who are “easily susceptible to shame,” would not. See
Lee, 550 U.S. at 593. Ms. McLemore understands from
her 35 years of teaching that
young people want to respect the adults in
their lives and follow their examples. They
also want to be accepted by their peers. When
an adult pushes a student to do something,
such as praying in front of a grandstand of
people on their school football field while in
school uniforms, it shames and embarrasses
those who do not want to participate
In the end, F.P. was persecuted for mustering the
courage not to conform. The coaches were unfriendly
towards him and only “tolerated [him] because [he]
was a good player and had the respect of [his] team.”
“When a person is required to submit to some religious
rite or instruction or is deprived or threatened with
deprivation of his freedom for resisting such unconstitutional requirement[,] [w]e may then set him free or
enjoin his prosecution.” McCollum, 333 U.S. at 232
(Jackson, J., concurring). A ruling in Petitioner’s favor
would enjoin the prosecution of F.P. for his refusal to
“perform a compulsory ritual which offended his convictions.” Id. As Mr. Peterson stated:
The students of our public schools should be
made to feel safe as individuals, without any
fear of coercion or rejection within the greater
societal groups to which they belong. I believe
19
that Mr. Kennedy’s practice of post-game
prayer neglected concern for the belief or nonbelief of all students. . . . People of many
faiths, and no faith at all, live in the Bremerton community and send their children to the
Bremerton public schools; the schools must be
welcoming and inclusive to all.
Six years later, F.P. remains traumatized and believes additional players have declined to come forward with their stories because, like him, “they would
rather forget about that time of their life.” “Coach Kennedy has crippled [his] love for the sport of football.”
Petitioner’s conduct has also deprived F.P. of the lifelong friendships team sports are designed to encourage: “My relationship with [my former] teammate[s]
. . . is forever fractured[.] [W]hatever sense of legacy,
love, pride, and enjoyment we felt playing together is
left behind in Joe K. and his tireless tirade to prove he
is right in continuing to pray among children.”
C. Petitioner’s Self-Interest Demoted Community Members and Students from
Stars to Understudies.
A significant concern of all amici is that Petitioner’s
evangelizing—and this Court’s possible endorsement
of it—relegates many community members to an underclass. Cf. Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the
Analysis of the Ego 51 (1922) (“[A] religion, even if it
calls itself the religion of love, must be hard and unloving to those who do not belong to it.”). James Madison—in drafting the First Amendment—understood
20
that coercive state support of religion “degrades from
the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in
Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.” James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments (1785); see also Lee, 505
U.S. at 622 (Souter, J., concurring) (“Madison saw that
. . . an official endorsement of religion can impair religious liberty.”).
This sense of “otherness” parallels the religious
persecution enshrined in our nation’s history. Rabbi
Newmark recalls one emblematic incident of being a
religious minority that “paints the backdrop of why her
community is more sensitive” to the risks of othering
created by Petitioner:
A congregant told me that he took his kids to
a local family antique auction. They were
greeted by a huge Nazi banner behind the
auction stand and realized the items being
sold were Nazi and Confederate memorabilia. . . . His twelve-year old shared what
happened in our [religion class]. I then suspended the lesson that was planned for that
day to have a discussion about antisemitism.
I was shocked to learn that all the students
had experienced antisemitism in Bremerton.
Students in elementary and middle school
had pennies thrown at them while walking
down the hall, others said they had been
yelled at in school for “killing Jesus,” and were
called overt slurs. Even a kindergarten student said she had a friend in class tell her that
21
his mom said he couldn’t play with her because she was Jewish.
This experience is why Rabbi Newmark finds it
“alarming that this case has been accepted by the Supreme Court,” because she is “concerned that we’re
headed backwards on the progress that has been made
on the boundaries between church and state[.]” From
her perspective, “if a Jewish student were to choose not
to participate in prayer, with the current political climate, he could be attacked.” There is a long history of
Jewish parents in America instructing their children
to participate in Christian prayer in publicly-funded
settings—because declining to participate creates the
risk of being cast as a second-class citizen or ostracized
by the majority. Moreover, with the existence of social
media, “there is now so many more ways to ostracize a
child.”
Because of students’ susceptibility to peer pressure, there is a likelihood of being “othered” if they decline to participate in the activity of a majority, chilling
their free exercise rights. Ms. Kost and other members
of her social support groups also had concerns about
the ostracization of their own children if they spoke out
against Petitioner’s group prayer:
As a matter of course, I was extremely
worried that if I were seen on television or on
the internet, that my likeness would be connected with my son who was entering Bremerton High School the next year, and he would
subsequently be bullied the way that [other]
member’s children and other atheist students
22
at Bremerton High School were bullied. The
vitriol seen on [comments on] the Kitsap Sun
Facebook page as well as their website was
frightening.
Indeed, “the thought of . . . threats being communicated to [her] son or him being danger was unbearable.
[She] did not feel that [she] could adequately defend
[her] strong belief in the separation of church and state
as long as [her] job or [her] son were in danger.” See
Lee, 550 U.S. at 597–98 (“We know too that sometimes
to endure social isolation or even anger may be the
price of conscience or nonconformity.”). As Mr. Peterson
shared, “The biggest nightmare for a parent” is that his
children will be treated as an outcast—a risk that ran
high because of Petitioner’s conduct.
Had the District allowed Petitioner’s actions to
continue, it would reinforce the fears of amici because
it would have “sen[t] a message to nonadherents that
they [were] outsiders, not full members of the political
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688
(1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). The fears of amici
were indeed reasonable.
When Ms. Chamberlin took a public stance in support of the District—her employer—she became “a social pariah.” The situation “forced [her] to come out as
atheist,” something she hadn’t previously done because she was afraid of being ostracized, and resulted
in “one of the most difficult times in her life[.]” Her son
23
also suffered and was “constantly having to defend” his
mother from classmates and community members. The
District’s disapproval of Petitioner’s conduct while accommodating his personal beliefs was a message to
amici that they, too, were valued members of the community. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
Amici believe that “school football games should
be an opportunity to come together,” but Petitioner’s
group-led prayer instead cultivated “a feeling of separatism” that “sharpen[ed] the consciousness of religious differences at least among some of the children
committed to [his] care.” McCollum, 333 U.S. at 228.
The feelings of “othering” that Petitioner’s actions fostered “are precisely the consequences against which
the Constitution was directed when it prohibited the
Government . . . from becoming embroiled, however innocently, in the destructive religious conflicts of which
the history of even this country records some dark
pages.” Id.; see also id. at n.19 (acknowledging that the
“divergent views” expressed by a variety of amici religious organizations “suggest[ed] that the movement
ha[d] been a divisive . . . influence in the community”).
II.
Petitioner’s Efforts to Steal the Spotlight
Created the Very Divisiveness Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence Counsels Against.
A fundamental role of the Establishment Clause
is to protect communities from the divisive conflicts Petitioner created. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 216–17 (holding that because the public school was “[d]esigned to
24
serve as the most powerful agency for promoting cohesion among a heterogeneous democratic people, the
public school must keep scrupulously free from entanglement in the strife of sects”). Petitioner usurped
Bremerton schools from its community peace-keeping
function. See also id. at 231 (“In no activity of the State
is it more vital to keep out divisive forces than in its
schools[.]”).
Prior to the fall of 2015, Amici admit they “didn’t
feel the polarization that much of the country was experiencing.” Ms. Hight-Breach returned to Bremerton
in 2010 for that reason. Ms. Chamberlin explained that
despite having left her hometown of Bremerton in high
school, she “moved back there as soon as she could”
because it was a community where she “felt safe,
everyone got along, and people accepted everyone’s differences.” That changed when the “Joe Kennedy situation” arose.
Petitioner’s “grandstanding” invited media attention and “outsiders”—people with no interest in the
school district and who were only interested in the division and fear broiling in the community sparked by
Petitioner’s flame. Amici maintain that “most people in
Bremerton understood that the school district did the
right thing.” As Ms. Rebelowski explained, it was clear
to the community that the issue was not about Bremerton High School, but rather a political group that had
“found their perfect poster boy” to bring a case to this
Court. The divisiveness was indeed exacerbated by political interest groups “pumping money into the issue.”
25
Compare Peter O’Cain, Football coach won’t be fired;
can’t participate in post-game prayers, Kitsap Daily
News (Sept. 18, 2015) (quoting Petitioner as stating
that he “was unaware of the amount of legislation [and
Supreme court precedent] regarding student athletics
and religion” and that he would “never want to jeopardize that”)5 with Christine Clarridge, Crowd prays
with coach as he defies school district, Seattle Times
(Oct. 16, 2015) (“Kennedy initially agreed to stop his
postgame prayers, but earlier this week said he
changed his mind after the Texas-based Liberty Institute took up his cause.”).6 Mr. Peterson feels that the
First Liberty Institute is using his former colleague
and has ridden on the coat tails of the 2015 high school
football season to take Petitioner “on a national media
blitz” for the past seven years.
Ms. Rebelowski said that once “Joe started campaigning,” people from outside of Bremerton began
parking in front of her house, waving signs and prayer
flags supporting Petitioner, and erupting the town in
chaos.
Politicians and organizations started fundraising in Kennedy’s name the minute this all
started. First Liberty started a “Support Joe”
Facebook page with one fundraising post after
the next. I wonder where all this money is going. Politicians that don’t even represent this
5
https://www.kitsapdailynews.com/news/football-coach-wontbe-fired-cant-participate-in-post-game-prayers/.
6
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/scoresjoin-coach-in-postgame-prayer/.
26
community came to grandstand about supporting Kennedy just to get more votes in
their own—more religious—districts. Satanists came in to make a point, too. It’s unsettling how quickly it all became so divisive.
And there was just no need for it, he was able
to pray without involving students in the middle of our public football field.
Ms. Hight-Breach similarly recalls that she had
planned to attend the homecoming game in fall of
2015, but when she pulled into the parking lot she saw
“a complete circus.” The Satanists—in from Seattle—
were on one side of the fence; on the other, students
were yelling, throwing rocks and water bottles, and
screaming “F*ck you, Jesus Loves you.” Fearing the inevitable escalation, she returned to the safety of her
home.
During the homecoming game, “the school district
office was ‘phone bombed’ by supporters of school
prayer, thus tying up all the phone lines.”7 Those
fielding calls were called the “spawn of Satan.” Ms.
Chamberlin, who, like many people, spoke out about
the divisiveness online, was falsely accused of being
responsible for Petitioner’s firing. She decided to
write a letter to the editor of the local paper in support
of the District because she saw “something [was] bubbling” that “detracted from the compassionate and
7
Chris Tucker, Satanists’ presence riles up crowd at Bremerton football game, Kitsap Daily News (Oct. 30, 2015) https://www.
kitsapdailynews.com/news/satanists-presence-riles-up-crowd-atbremerton-football-game/.
27
community building culture surrounding Bremerton
High School.”8 Soon thereafter she began receiving
threatening letters, public attacks, and escalating
online harassment, including comments like “I’ll pray
for your house to burn down. I’ll pray for the brakes to
be cut on your car” and “atheists should be rounded up
and killed.” She received a letter on Ku Klux Klan letterhead from a self-described “God fearing white supremacist” warning her to stop her activism: “[B]e very
careful of the trail of horsesh*t you are treading on because it is very . . . dangerous. One might give very
strong thought to abandon such bullsh*t.” As she recalls, “Within a couple weeks, everyone knew my name.
It was a lot, and very scary.” Ms. Kost stated that the
fear of similar violence resulted in suppression of
voices from Bremerton’s non-theist advocacy groups.
The broader polarization in the country continues
to fuel the divisiveness in Bremerton sparked by Petitioner’s actions. As this Court has observed, “the potential for seriously divisive political consequences . . . is
certainly a ‘warning signal’ not to be ignored.” Comm.
for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 798 (1973) (citation omitted). Thirty years ago,
this Court believed that the “ ‘fears and political problems’ that gave rise to the Religion Clauses in the 18th
century [were] of far less concern,” Lynch, 465 U.S. at
8
Jennifer Chamberlin, My Turn: Schools without pressure
to pray, Kitsap Sun (Oct. 21, 2015), https://archive.kitsapsun.com/
opinion/my-turn—schools-without-pressure-to-pray-ep-1283814315354461301.html/.
28
686 (citation omitted), but such “fears and political
problems” have returned.
“[T]oday, as many have noted, our nation is more
polarized than it has been at any time since the Civil
War.” Judge Thomas B. Griffith, The Degradation of
Civic Charity, 134 Harv. L. Rev. F. 119, 121 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Religion is a central
component of the polarity. Samuel L. Perry, American
Religion in the Era of Increasing Polarization, Ann.
Rev. of Soc., Vol. 48 (Forthcoming July 2022). While
“[o]rdinarily political debate and division . . . are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, . . . political division along
religious lines was one of the principal evils against
which the First Amendment was intended to protect.”
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
Rabbi Newmark is concerned that given this increased polarization—and a national rise of antisemitism—a decision favoring Petitioner could embolden
hate groups that have traditionally targeted her faith:
“Anytime the rights of someone of a minority religion
feel compromised, when their First Amendment rights
are chipped way, it gives power to those who are looking for ways to promote hateful agendas. I think a ruling in favor of Kennedy would make antisemitism in
this nation worse.” She rightfully fears for her congregants’ safety:
We know what happens when people who are
hate-filled are given oxygen, the flame gets
bigger. Even though the act in this case seems
29
small, if Kennedy is allowed to infringe on the
rights of our community, those that revel in
decreasing our rights will feel empowered to
ask for more—to push the limit further. Hate
is very contagious. Anything that promotes
one religion over another—instead of promoting tolerance and understanding of boundaries—gives fuel to this very ugly time in our
country.
See also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703 (2005)
(Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (plurality opinion) (“And, in today’s world, in a Nation of so many
different religious and comparable nonreligious fundamental beliefs, a more contemporary state effort to
focus attention [on prayer] is certainly likely to prove
divisive[.]”).
“When the government puts its imprimatur on a
particular religion, it conveys a message of exclusion
to all those who do not adhere to the favored beliefs.”
Lee, 505 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Only
‘[a]nguish, hardship and bitter strife’ result ‘when zealous religious groups struggl[e] with one another to
obtain the Government’s stamp of approval.’ ” (Quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962))). Such a
struggle can “strain a political system to the breaking
point.” Walz, 397 U.S. at 694. Indeed, amici now fear
“the can of worms” that would be opened by a ruling in
Kennedy’s favor, and do not believe Bremerton “can afford” to deal with further political division as a result
of such a ruling.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
30
CONCLUSION
“Our constitutional system” is designed so that
“unities among our people [are] stronger than our diversities.” McCollum, 333 U.S. at 231. In his self-proclaimed search for personal spiritual enlightenment,
Petitioner disregarded the rights of his fellow community members in favor of his own. In the words of one
of the players Petitioner was paid to lead: “Kennedy
has used the Bremerton Knights Football for seven
years to push his own religious agenda and lie to the
American Public that he did so privately . . . and [for]
four years I knelt for him in solidarity as he prayed so
there would be no objection to me playing football.” A
ruling in Petitioner’s favor would send a message to
community members that their rights are secondary to
his, and it would condone the mistreatment of those
who do not conform with Petitioner’s personal views.
This is the very result that the First Amendment was
designed to prevent. Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (“[I]f citizens
are subjected to state-sponsored religious exercises,
the State disavows its own duty to guard and respect
that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief which is
the mark of a free people.”). Members of the Bremerton
community respectfully ask that this Court affirm the
Ruling of the Ninth Circuit and uphold that “the delivery of a [postgame] prayer has the improper effect of
31
coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship.” Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 312.
Respectfully submitted,
ANDREW D. LEVY
Counsel of Record
ANTHONY J. MAY
LAUREN A. DIMARTINO
BROWN, GOLDSTEIN & LEVY, LLP
120 E. Baltimore Street,
Suite 2500
Baltimore, Maryland 21202
Tel: (410) 962-1030
Fax: (410) 385-0869
adl@browngold.com
amay@browngold.com
ldimartino@browngold.com
Counsel for Amici Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.