Amicus Curiae Brief — Joseph A. Kennedy, Petitioner v. Bremerton School District
Supreme Court briefMar 2, 2022
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No. 21-418
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
JOSEPH A. KENNEDY,
Petitioner,
v.
BREMERTON SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
On Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
FOUNDATION FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
DARPANA M. SHETH
Counsel of Record
WILL CREELEY
FOUNDATION FOR
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
EDUCATION
510 Walnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
(215) 717-3473
darpana.sheth@thefire.org
will@thefire.org
GABRIEL WALTERS
FOUNDATION FOR
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
EDUCATION
700 Pennsylvania Ave., SE
Suite 340
Washington, DC 20003
(215) 717-3473
gabe.walters@thefire.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether a public-school employee who says a
brief, quiet prayer by himself while at school
and visible to students is engaged in government speech that lacks any First Amendment
protection.
2. Whether, assuming that such religious expression is private and protected by the Free Speech
and Free Exercise Clauses, the Establishment
Clause nevertheless compels public schools to
prohibit it.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................iv
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....................................1
ARGUMENT ...............................................................4
I.
Academic freedom is “a special concern of
the First Amendment”—and it requires
breathing room. ....................................................4
A. This Court has long recognized the
importance of protecting academic
freedom..............................................................4
B. In Garcetti, this Court recognized its
public-employee speech exception to the
First Amendment can imperil academic
freedom of public university faculty. ...............6
C. Four Circuits have declined to apply
Garcetti’s exception to public-faculty
speech
that
implicates
academic
freedom..............................................................7
II. If the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is allowed to
stand,
amicus
FIRE’s
experience
demonstrates that public university faculty
will be censored...................................................10
iii
A. Restrictions on grade-school speech risk
misapplication to higher education................10
B. Amicus FIRE’s experience demonstrates
that faculty members face punishment
for
controversial
or
challenging
classroom expression, properly protected
by academic freedom. .....................................13
III. Public university faculty must be able to
vindicate their rights by exposing
censorship to public scrutiny. ............................16
A. The
Ninth
Circuit
dangerously
suggested that a vigorous public defense
of First Amendment Rights may justify
discipline. ........................................................17
B. In defending public university faculty,
amicus FIRE relies on public attention to
vindicate speech rights. ..................................22
CONCLUSION ..........................................................31
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases:
Adams v. Trs. of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington,
640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011)................................7, 8
Austin v. Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs.,
No. 1:21cv184-MW/GRJ, 2022 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11733 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2022) .......... 25, 26
Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990) ................................................19
Buchanan v. Alexander,
919 F.3d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 2019) ........................8, 9
Demers v. Austin,
746 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 2014)....................................8
Doe v. Valencia Coll. Bd. of Trs.,
838 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2016)..............................10
Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, (1987) ...............................................11
Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410 (2006) .......................................... 2, 6, 7
Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003) ..................................................7
Hosty v. Carter,
412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005)..................................10
v
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,
991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2021).................... 11, 16, 18
Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,
4 F.4th 910 (9th Cir. 2021) ....................................19
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967) ........................................ passim
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L.,
141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) ...................................... 10, 11
Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp.,
474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007)..................................12
Melynk v. Teaneck Bd. of Educ.,
No. 16-0188, 2016 WL 6892077 (D.N.J. Nov.
22, 2016) ........................................................... 12, 13
Meriwether v. Hartop,
992 F.3d 492, 507 (6th Cir. 2021) ............................9
NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963) ..................................................5
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ.,
391 U.S. 563 (1968) ..................................................8
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978) ..................................................5
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va.,
515 U.S. 819 (1995) ............................................ 5, 22
Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957) ........................................ 2, 5, 16
vi
Ward v. Polite,
667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012)..................................10
Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981) ................................................22
Statutory Provisions:
Iowa Code § 261H.8 ...................................................26
Other Authorities:
A theater professor wasn’t sufficiently outraged
about a list of names on a whiteboard. The
college’s next act: probable termination., FIRE
(Oct. 20, 2021) ........................................................28
Academic freedom at The New School? Not if you
quote an iconic black writer., FIRE (Aug. 7,
2019) .......................................................................30
Adam Steinbaugh, SAVE FERRIS PROF: Before
it suspended tenured professor over profane
syllabus skit, Ferris State praised it., FIRE
(Jan. 20, 2022)........................................................15
After FIRE turns up the heat, Iowa State revises
unconstitutional guidance for instructors to
self-censor, FIRE (Aug. 11, 2021) ..........................27
Brittany Bernstein, A Theater Professor
Suggested Students Should Have Thicker
Skins, So They Demanded He Be Fired, Nat’l
Rev. (Nov. 7, 2021) .................................................29
vii
Catherine Rampell, What Milo Yiannopoulos
and Elizabeth Warren have in common, Wash.
Post (Feb. 9, 2017) .................................................17
Class Action Compl. for Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief, Fla. Rising Together v.
Lee, No. 4:21-cv-00201-AW-MJF (N.D. Fla.
filed May 17, 2021) ................................................23
Colleen Flaherty, N-Word at the New School,
Inside Higher Ed (Aug. 7, 2019) ............................30
Daniel Burnett, A Marshall University professor
criticized unmasked Trump supporters. Then
censorship spread., FIRE (Jan. 13, 2022) ....... 13, 14
Danielle Ivanov, UF professors could testify in
voting rights case if they are unpaid,
spokeswoman says, Gainesville Sun (Oct. 31,
2021) .......................................................................24
Emily Ekins, The State of Free Speech and
Tolerance in America: Attitudes about Free
Speech, Campus Speech, Religious Liberty,
and Tolerance of Political Expression, Cato
Institute (Oct. 31, 2017) .........................................17
Eugene Volokh, Theater Prof Facing Possible
Firing for Not Being Sufficiently Outraged,
Reason (Nov. 9, 2021) ............................................28
Eugene Volokh, Univ. of San Diego Law School
Investigating Professor for Post Critical of
China, Reason (March 20, 2021) ...........................21
Fighting rights violations by going public, FIRE .....23
viii
FIRE calls on Iowa State to reverse
unconstitutional implementation of critical
race theory law, FIRE (July 27, 2021) ...................27
FIRE, Iowa Rep. Mary Lynn Wolfe Comments on
HF802, March 16, 2021, YouTube (July 27,
2021) .......................................................................26
House File (HF) 802 Information, Univ. of Iowa
(July 27, 2021)........................................................26
Iowa House File 802 – Requirements Related to
Racism and Sexism Trainings, Iowa State
Univ. (Aug. 5, 2021) ...............................................27
James Baldwin, The Creative Process, in
Creative America (1962) ........................................29
John Henderson, Protest on the street and in
writing show continued concern at UF over
academic freedom, Gainesville Sun (Nov. 12,
2021) .......................................................................25
Käri Knutson, Sifting and winnowing turns 125:
The tumultuous story of three little words,
Univ. of Wisconsin–Madison News (Sept. 17,
2019) .......................................................................21
Keith E. Whittington, The intellectual freedom
that made public colleges great is under
threat, Wash. Post (Dec. 15, 2021) ........................25
Letter from Aaron Terr, Program Officer, FIRE,
to Dr. W. Kent Fuchs, President, University of
Florida (Nov. 1, 2021) ............................................25
ix
Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do,
Harper’s Weekly (Dec. 20, 1913) ..................... 22, 23
Michael Levenson, Linfield University Fires
Professor Who Spoke Out About Misconduct
Cases, N.Y. Times (May 1, 2021)...........................21
Michael Wines, Florida Bars State Professors
From Testifying in Voting Rights Case, N.Y.
Times (Oct. 29, 2021) .............................................24
Michael Wines, University of Florida Reverses
Course to Allow Professors to Testify Against
State, N.Y. Times (Nov. 5, 2021) ...........................25
Mike Schneider, University of Florida prohibits
professors from testifying, Associated Press
(Oct. 30, 2021) ........................................................24
Neil Vigdor, Georgetown Suspends Lecturer Who
Criticized Vow to Put Black Woman on Court,
N.Y. Times (Jan. 31, 2022) ....................................20
Phillip Sitter, Free speech advocacy group
critiques ISU guidance on divisive concepts
law as too broad — and it's not alone, Ames
Trib. (Aug. 4, 2021) ................................................27
Sabrina Conza, Ferris State cannot punish
professor for comedic — and now viral —
video jokingly referring to students as
‘cocksuckers’ and ‘vectors of disease’, FIRE
(Jan. 17, 2022)........................................................14
x
Sabrina Conza, FIRE demands answers from
Cypress College over cancelled professor, FIRE
(May 14, 2021) .......................................................15
Talia Richman, Collin College again pushes out
professor critical of administration’s handling
of COVID-19, free speech, Dall. Morning News
(Feb. 26, 2021)........................................................20
Talia Richman, Former Collin College professor
who claimed retaliation over tweets resolves
lawsuit with school, Dall. Morning News (Jan.
25, 2022) .................................................................20
University Statement on Academic Freedom and
Free Speech, Univ. of Fla. ......................................24
VICTORY: Professor exonerated for quoting
iconic black writer at The New School, FIRE
(Aug. 16, 2019) .......................................................30
1
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education
(FIRE) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to promoting and protecting civil liberties at our
nation’s institutions of higher education. Since its
founding in 1999, FIRE has successfully defended the
rights of tens of thousands of students and faculty at
colleges and universities nationwide. FIRE believes
that if our educational institutions are to best prepare
students for success in our democracy, the law must
remain unequivocally on the side of robust free-speech
protections for students and faculty.
FIRE has a direct interest in this case because this
Court’s jurisprudence on government-employee
speech impacts the public university faculty FIRE defends. It files this brief to argue that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling threatens public faculty’s rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This case requires the Court to revisit the contested boundary between the expressive rights of public employees and the interests of the government in
efficiency as an employer. While the present matter
concerns an assistant football coach at a public high
school, the Court’s decision here may impact other
public employees involved in education, including
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amicus FIRE affirms that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and that
no person other than amicus or their counsel contributed money
intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief. Counsel for
both parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
2
public university faculty. Because “[o]ur Nation is
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers involved,” matters that implicate the speech of public university faculty require
particular judicial attention and care. Keyishian v.
Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
Academic freedom—the right of university faculty
to speak freely about matters related to scholarship
and teaching—requires vigilant protection. “Teachers
and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate
and die.” Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957). Accordingly, this Court has previously recognized the particular need to account for the academic
freedom rights of public university faculty when addressing the expressive rights of government employees. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, this Court reserved the
question of whether its holding “would apply in the
same manner to a case involving speech related to
scholarship or teaching.” 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
Several circuits have since answered that question
outright in favor of protecting academic freedom. The
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have explicitly declined to
apply Garcetti’s broad rule to the academic expression
of public university faculty. See infra Section I.C.
But here, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling intrudes upon
the expressive rights of government employees by conflating Coach Kennedy’s expressions of faith with the
official performance of his job duties. If allowed to
stand, the Ninth Circuit’s willingness to convert the
3
coach’s prayer into government speech—i.e., speech
that the government could prohibit and punish—
would set a dangerous precedent not only for gradeschool teachers, but even more for professors at our
public institutions of higher education. Because public
university faculty make their living by engaging students and colleagues in discussion, they necessarily
engage in job-related expression that may not communicate the views or bear the endorsement of their
government employer. Allowing punishment for a professor’s momentary asides or brief expressions of personal opinion, for example, would sound the death
knell for academic freedom.
Compounding the threat posed by the decision below, courts often misapply this Court’s rulings involving expression by K–12 teachers—who in the years
since Garcetti have seen their expressive rights curtailed in the classroom—to cases concerning higher
education. See infra Section II.A. And amicus FIRE’s
work demonstrates that university faculty already
face regular discipline and censorship for controversial classroom expression. If allowed to stand, the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling would worsen the problem, giving public universities a freer hand to punish faculty
for the exercise of their academic freedom and expressive rights.
The Ninth Circuit further erred by suggesting that
Coach Kennedy’s “pugilistic” defense of his First
Amendment rights rendered his private expression
more susceptible to misinterpretation as the speech of
his employer, and thus more readily subject to censorship and punishment. Courts must not allow government employers to penalize employees for publicly
4
advocating for their First Amendment rights. In amicus FIRE’s experience defending public university faculty, vindication of rights often relies upon vocal criticism in the court of public opinion. After all, colleges
and universities are loath to publicly defend censorship. This Court must make clear that government
employees, and particularly public university faculty,
do not imperil their First Amendment rights by seeking to vindicate them.
ARGUMENT
I.
Academic freedom is “a special concern of
the First Amendment”—and it requires
breathing room.
While this case concerns an assistant football
coach at a public high school, its resolution requires
the Court to revisit the First Amendment’s protection
of the expressive rights of all government employees—
including public university faculty. In so doing, the
Court must take care to recognize that when faculty
members speak about matters related to scholarship
and teaching, their speech is protected by academic
freedom, “a special concern of the First Amendment.”
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
A. This Court has long recognized the
importance of protecting academic
freedom.
Academic freedom protects the rights of public university faculty members to speak freely about matters
related to scholarship and teaching—and this Court
has recognized the importance of protecting it in decisions dating back more than sixty years. “To impose
5
any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our
colleges and universities,” the Sweezy Court wrote in
1957, “would imperil the future of our Nation.” 354
U.S. at 250. Indeed, “[t]he Nation’s future depends
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to [a] robust exchange of ideas,” and the college classroom is
“peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’” Keyishian, 385
U.S. at 603.
Protecting the rights of scholars and professors to
speak freely ensures the continued vibrancy of “the vital centers for the Nation’s intellectual life, its college
and university campuses.” Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 836 (1995).
This Court has consistently recognized “[o]ur national
commitment to the safeguarding of these freedoms
within university communities.” Regents of the Univ.
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
Preserving this commitment to academic freedom
requires particular judicial care. “Because First
Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive,” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963), the
Court must account for academic freedom when deciding cases that might not immediately seem to implicate it—for example, cases involving assistant high
school football coaches, like here, or deputy district attorneys, like in Garcetti.
6
B. In Garcetti, this Court recognized
its public-employee speech exception to the First Amendment can imperil academic freedom of public
university faculty.
In Garcetti, this Court carved out an exception to
First Amendment protection for public-employee
speech, and recognized that exception can imperil the
academic freedom of public university faculty. 547
U.S. at 425. The plaintiff was a deputy district attorney who alleged that he was terminated for writing a
memorandum concerning inaccuracies in an affidavit
used to obtain a search warrant. Id. at 413–15. The
Court held “when public employees make statements
pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes,
and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” Id. at 421.
The Court’s holding in Garcetti impacts approximately twenty million public employees in the United
States, ranging from desk clerks to microbiologists,
from police officers to agency administrators. See
United States Census Bureau, Annual Survey of Public Employment & Payroll, About, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/apes/about.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2022). But of this varied and sprawling
workforce, the Garcetti Court recognized only one set
of employees that merited careful consideration under
the First Amendment: public college and university
professors. 547 U.S. at 425.
In dissent, Justice Souter warned that Garcetti’s
holding could “imperil First Amendment protection of
academic freedom in public colleges and universities,
7
whose teachers necessarily speak and write ‘pursuant
to . . . official duties.’” Id. at 438 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329
(2003)). Responding to Justice Souter’s concern, the
Garcetti majority explicitly acknowledged that its
holding “may have important ramifications for academic freedom, at least as a constitutional value,” and
thus chose not to “decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to a case
involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”
Id. at 425.
The Court reserved the question of whether Garcetti’s analysis properly applies to public university
faculty, but several circuits have since answered it
outright in favor of protecting academic freedom.
C. Four circuits have declined to apply
Garcetti’s exception to public-faculty speech that implicates academic freedom.
Recognizing the incompatibility of Garcetti’s “official duties” rule with the First Amendment’s protection of academic freedom, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits have held that Garcetti does not apply
to public-faculty speech related to scholarship or
teaching.
In Adams v. Trustees of the University of North
Carolina-Wilmington, the Fourth Circuit held that
“Garcetti would not apply” because the facts concerned “the academic context of a public university.”
640 F.3d 550, 562 (4th Cir. 2011). In Adams, the plaintiff was a professor who alleged he was retaliated
against for the views he expressed in his scholarship
8
and teaching. Id. at 556. The Fourth Circuit explained
that “[a]pplying Garcetti to the academic work of a
public university faculty member under the facts of
this case could place beyond the reach of First Amendment protection many forms of public speech or service a professor engaged in during his employment.”
Id. at 564. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit held that
Garcetti did not apply, and it analyzed the plaintiff’s
speech under Pickering v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 563 (1968). Id.
Similarly, in Demers v. Austin, the Ninth Circuit
held that Garcetti does not apply to speech related to
scholarship or teaching. 746 F.3d 402, 406 (9th Cir.
2014). In Demers, the plaintiff was a professor who alleged retaliation for distributing a “pamphlet and
drafts from an in-progress book.” Id. The Ninth Circuit observed that applying Garcetti to the professor’s
speech “would directly conflict with the important
First Amendment values previously articulated by the
Supreme Court.” Id. at 411. Following the Fourth Circuit’s approach in Adams, the Ninth Circuit held that
“academic employee speech not covered by Garcetti is
protected under the First Amendment, using the analysis established in Pickering.” Id. at 412.
The Fifth Circuit followed suit in Buchanan v. Alexander, recognizing that “[t]he Supreme Court has
established that academic freedom is ‘a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.’”
919 F.3d 847, 852 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Keyishian,
385 U.S. at 603). In Buchanan, the plaintiff was a professor who alleged retaliation after being terminated
for using profanity and making jokes while teaching.
Id. at 851. Like the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the
9
Fifth Circuit applied the Pickering analysis to determine whether the professor’s speech was protected.
Id. at 853.
Most recently, in Meriwether v. Hartop, the Sixth
Circuit declared that “the academic-freedom exception to Garcetti covers all classroom speech related to
matters of public concern, whether that speech is germane to the contents of the lecture or not.” 992 F.3d
492, 507 (6th Cir. 2021). In Meriwether, a public university professor alleged that his discipline for refusing to use a student’s preferred pronouns violated the
First Amendment. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that
the “need for the free exchange of ideas in the college
classroom is unlike that in other public workplace settings,” concluding that “a professor’s in-class speech
to his students is anything but speech by an ordinary
government employee.” Id. at 507. Accordingly, the
Sixth Circuit analyzed the professor’s claim under
Pickering. Id.
Recognizing that academic freedom requires specific judicial protection, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits each concluded that Garcetti was inapplicable to the academic speech of public university
faculty. Although the instant case does not involve
public university faculty, its resolution will implicate
their expressive rights, just as Garcetti did. To
properly account for academic freedom and resolve the
question reserved by the Garcetti majority, this Court
should take the opportunity presented by this case to
follow the circuits’ lead, clarifying that Garcetti does
not apply to speech related to scholarship or teaching
in higher education.
10
II. If the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is allowed to
stand, amicus FIRE’s experience demonstrates that public university faculty will be
censored.
Courts often misapply this Court’s rulings involving expression in the K–12 context to cases arising in
colleges and universities. Amicus FIRE’s work demonstrates that college and university faculty already regularly face discipline for controversial classroom expression. If allowed to stand, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling would worsen the problem, giving public universities greater latitude to censor faculty, or punish them
for exercising their academic freedom and expressive
rights.
A. Restrictions
on
grade-school
speech risk misapplication to
higher education.
Despite this longstanding recognition of the importance of academic freedom in higher education,
some federal circuit courts have misapplied K–12
precedent to First Amendment claims involving
speech in the university setting. See, e.g., Doe v. Valencia Coll. Bd. of Trs., 838 F.3d 1207, 1211–12 (11th
Cir. 2016) (applying K–12 precedents to First Amendment claim involving college student speech); Ward v.
Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (same); Hosty
v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (same).
But recently in Mahanoy Area School District v.
B. L., Justice Alito noted that university students differ from K–12 students for “several reasons,” including their “age, independence, and living arrangements” and therefore “regulation of their speech may
11
raise very different questions” from those presented
by that case, which involved the off-campus speech of
a high-school student. 141 S. Ct. 2038, 2049 n.2 (2021)
(Alito, J., concurring).
The Court should here follow Justice Alito’s note
regarding the differences between the university and
K–12 settings, as the conditions that permit grade
schools leeway to restrict First Amendment expression do not pertain to higher education. As the Ninth
Circuit conceded, grade schools represent a uniquely
coercive setting due to “mandatory attendance requirements, and because of the students’ emulation of
teachers as role models and the children’s susceptibility to peer pressure.” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist.,
991 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Kennedy II”)
(quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84
(1987)).
As this Court noted in Edwards, “[t]he potential
for undue influence is far less significant with regard
to college students who voluntarily enroll in courses.”
482 U.S. at 584 n.5. College students, not subject to
the same coercive pressures as children in grade
schools, do not need protection from their teachers’
ideas—to the contrary, the college classroom is “peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’” Keyishian, 385 U.S.
at 603.
But in the years since this Court decided Garcetti,
grade school teachers have seen their expressive
rights curtailed in the classroom, even for fleeting
comments made under circumstances where there is
no reasonable risk of coercion of susceptible young
minds. The test that the lower courts have fashioned
out of Garcetti in the grade-school setting asks, in
12
essence, whether the speech occured in the classroom
or other under circumstances where teachers are
speaking to students. If yes, the courts have sided
with the school districts over the teachers, no matter
how fleeting their proscribed expression may have
been.
For example, an elementary school student asked
a teacher if she had ever participated in political
demonstrations. The teacher told the students that
while driving past a demonstration against war in
Iraq, she saw someone holding a “honk for peace” sign,
so she honked her horn. Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty.
Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 478 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit held that the school district did not violate her First Amendment rights when it refused to
renew her contract, as her speech occurred in the
classroom. Id. at 478–80. Apparently, grade school
teachers must be prevented from admitting to their
students that they honked for peace.
A teacher of a high school creative writing class led
a discussion of a curriculum-approved essay that described a Dutch holiday tradition of dressing up as
Zwarte Piete, “a black man, who accompanies Santa
Claus.” Melynk v. Teaneck Bd. of Educ., No. 16-0188,
2016 WL 6892077, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2016). The
teacher—herself of Dutch ancestry with family then
living in the Netherlands—mentioned the tradition
persisted to that day and showed students photos
from her phone of her relatives in blackface, inadvertently causing offense. Id. The school initiated an investigation into the teacher’s conduct, and ultimately
placed a letter of reprimand in her file. Id. The court
13
held that the teacher’s expression failed the Garcetti
test because it occurred in the classroom. Id. at *4.
As these examples demonstrate, under Garcetti,
courts too easily misattribute to the school-district
employer the speech of grade-school teachers. The
speech is thus subject to restriction—and the employee to discipline. It would be one thing if these
cases demarcated a bright line between the lack of academic freedom rights for grade school teachers on the
one side and the enjoyment of such rights for university faculty on the other. But amicus FIRE’s experience defending faculty speech, including in the university classroom, demonstrates the risk of allowing
the Ninth Circuit’s decision below to stand.
B. Amicus FIRE’s experience demonstrates that faculty members face
punishment for controversial or
challenging classroom expression,
properly protected by academic
freedom.
Amicus FIRE’s experience over more than twenty
years demonstrates that professors across the country
face discipline from their own colleges and universities for speech the institutions or their constituents
find disagreeable, offensive, or merely uncomfortable.
Recent controversies illustrate the ongoing problem.
In October 2020, Marshall University administrators fired a professor over a comment she made while
students were still entering class.2 While microbiology
2 Daniel Burnett, A Marshall University professor criticized
unmasked Trump supporters. Then censorship spread., FIRE
14
professor Jennifer Mosher waited for students to log
in to her online lecture about COVID-19, one student
made an offhand comment about “thinning the gene
pool.” Mosher replied, “without getting into politics,
all the large gatherings of certain groups of people
holding rallies [. . .] I’m like yeah, let Darwin [. . .] do
its job [. . .] and hopefully they’ll all be dead by the
election. [laughing] I’m sorry, that’s horrible.” Shortly
thereafter, Mosher began her lecture and the class
proceeded without incident. However, someone had
recorded that initial exchange, and the video found its
way to Twitter. Two days later, after public backlash
online, Marshall suspended Mosher pending an investigation. After half of the West Virginia state Senate
signed a letter complaining that Marshall was using
taxpayer dollars to fund “hate speech,” the university
fired her.
In January 2022, Ferris State University placed a
professor on leave over a course introduction that interwove profane television references with syllabus
topics.3 History professor Barry Mehler had taught at
Ferris State for thirty years, and given many an irreverent introductory lecture, at times with administrators in attendance and supportive of his colorful
(Jan. 13, 2022), https://www.thefire.org/a-marshall-universityprofessor-criticized-unmasked-trump-supporters-then-censorship-spread [https://perma.cc/27Y3-MRQP].
3 Sabrina Conza, Ferris State cannot punish professor for comedic — and now viral — video jokingly referring to students as
‘cocksuckers’ and ‘vectors of disease’, FIRE (Jan. 17, 2022),
https://www.thefire.org/ferris-state-cannot-punish-professor-forcomedic-and-now-viral-video-jokingly-referring-to-students-ascocksuckers-and-vectors-of-disease
[https://perma.cc/9G57NJVE].
15
rhetoric.4 Nevertheless, after an out-of-context video
clip—that included Mehler calling students “vectors of
disease” with reference to school policies addressing
the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic—made its way
online, the university removed the professor from the
classroom for the remainder of the school year. To justify Mehler’s removal, the administration cited a university policy requiring “all students and employees to
conduct themselves with dignity and respect.”5
In April 2021, Cypress Community College cancelled Faryha Salim’s online communications class,
simply for arguing against lionizing the police in response to a student’s “persuasive presentation” assignment in a communications class.6 Online backlash
to a video recording of the exchange prompted Cypress
to publicly announce Salim’s involuntary leave of absence. The college cited public safety concerns, but its
failure to explain how cancelling Salim’s online class
made its community safer suggests it had capitulated
to a heckler’s veto.
4 Adam Steinbaugh, SAVE FERRIS PROF: Before it suspended tenured professor over profane syllabus skit, Ferris State
praised it, FIRE (Jan. 20, 2022), https://www.thefire.org/beforeit-suspended-professor-over-profane-syllabus-skit-ferris-statepraised-it [https://perma.cc/MA8W-SSWE].
5 Ferris State Univ., Employee Dignity/Harassment/Discrimination, Sec. 8-701, https://www.ferris.edu/administration/president/DiversityOffice/employee.htm
[https://perma.cc/NYB77L67] (last visited Feb. 28, 2022).
6 Sabrina Conza, FIRE demands answers from Cypress College
over
cancelled
professor,
FIRE
(May 14, 2021),
https://www.thefire.org/fire-demands-answers-from-cypress-college-over-cancelled-professor [https://perma.cc/9G8Z-YM6J].
16
As the above cases demonstrate, professors, like
Kennedy, cannot escape observation by the public. See
Kennedy II, 991 F.3d at 1010 (“Kennedy further
acknowledged that, as a football coach, he was ‘constantly being observed by others.’”). Some may react
negatively to speech that is offensive, vituperative,
provocative, or pedagogically challenging. Even so,
the academic freedom necessary for a thriving system
of higher education requires that faculty be free to engage in pedagogy as they see fit. As this Court correctly recognized, “[s]cholarship cannot flourish in an
atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.” Sweezy, 354
U.S. at 250.
III. Public university faculty must be able to
vindicate their rights by exposing censorship to public scrutiny.
In dismissing Coach Kennedy’s First Amendment
claims, the Ninth Circuit panel relied, in part, on Kennedy’s efforts to plead his case in the court of public
opinion. The panel concluded that Kennedy’s “pugilistic” public defense of his expression, and the ensuing
public interest he generated, justified the Bremerton
School District’s decision to discipline him, holding
that failing to do so would have been interpreted by
observers as an institutional endorsement of his
speech. Kennedy II, 991 F.3d at 1017.
The Ninth Circuit’s rationale sends a dangerous
message to government employees whose First
Amendment rights are violated: Either suffer in silence, or risk discipline by daring to cast sunlight on
censorship. Government employees—including the
public university faculty that amicus FIRE defends—
rely on public support to expose illiberal institutional
17
censorship and to vindicate their rights. If allowed to
stand, the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning will render that
public support a liability, allowing administrators to
argue that censorship was necessary to avoid public
confusion about institutional endorsement of faculty
speech.
A. The Ninth Circuit dangerously
suggested that a vigorous public
defense of First Amendment rights
may justify discipline.
Censorship is newsworthy. When fellow citizens
face punishment for the apparent exercise of their
First Amendment rights, the public wants to know
more.7 Indeed, public scrutiny is a powerful antidote
to rights violations that might otherwise have gone
undetected and unanswered. Troublingly, however,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision effectively punished
Coach Kennedy for the public’s interest in his ordeal.
7 As one commentator observed: “What’s the best way to make
sure a message gets heard? Try to muzzle it.” Catherine Rampell,
What Milo Yiannopoulos and Elizabeth Warren have in common,
Wash. Post (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/what-milo-yiannopoulos-and-elizabeth-warren-havein-common/2017/02/09/ee5da942-ef0e-11e6-96626eedf1627882_story.html [https://perma.cc/4FEN-QNP5]. Generally speaking, Americans do not like censorship, trusting instead in the free exchange of ideas. See, e.g., Emily Ekins, The
State of Free Speech and Tolerance in America: Attitudes about
Free Speech, Campus Speech, Religious Liberty, and Tolerance of
Political Expression, Cato Institute (Oct. 31, 2017),
https://www.cato.org/survey-reports/state-free-speech-toleranceamerica [https://perma.cc/9JZJ-XTE5 ] (“Americans provide a
strong endorsement of free speech with 67% who agree that ‘free
speech ensures the truth will ultimately win out.’”).
18
The Ninth Circuit found that Kennedy spoke as a
government employee, and not a citizen, in his postgame prayer. Kennedy II, 991 F.3d at 1016. Even assuming arguendo that Kennedy had spoken as a private citizen, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
school district’s decision to treat him differently from
other members of the general public was adequately
justified by its compelling interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 1016–19. Due in
significant part to the widespread attention Kennedy’s expression had attracted, the Ninth Circuit
found “no doubt” that his expression would be misinterpreted as bearing the school’s imprimatur. Id. at
1019.
In other words, the Ninth Circuit held Kennedy’s
efforts to garner public attention against him. In the
panel’s telling, Kennedy wasn’t standing up for his
First Amendment rights; rather, he was engaging in
“pugilistic efforts to generate publicity in order to gain
approval” of his speech. Id. at 1017. Kennedy wasn’t
appealing to the court of public opinion; he “engaged
in a media blitz.” Id. Because Kennedy “actively
sought support from the community” when attempting to vindicate his contested right to engage in a brief
expression of faith, the Ninth Circuit found that the
school district had all the more justification to take
action. Id. at 1019. Had it not censored Kennedy, “an
objective observer could reach no other conclusion”
than that the school district actually “endorsed” his
beliefs. Id.
By suggesting that a vigorous defense of First
Amendment rights justifies a proportional administrative response, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis
19
encourages heavy-handed censorship as a prophylactic measure: Censorship is warranted, lest an outside
observer conclude that the speech has the institution’s
approval. It also discourages those censored from
fighting back, as the more attention those threatened
with censorship draw to their efforts to continue
speaking, the greater the justification for institutional
censorship to avoid the appearance of endorsement.
Not only does the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning punish
government employees who seek to marshal support
for their expressive rights, it suggests that public institutions that decline to censor may be at risk of liability. But this Court noted three decades ago that
“[t]he proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated.” Bd. of
Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S.
226, 250 (1990). The panel’s ruling thus has our
longstanding national commitment to freedom of expression exactly backwards. As Circuit Judge Ryan D.
Nelson asked, in dissenting from the denial of Kennedy’s petition for rehearing en banc: “[W]ould we
ever pejoratively refer to members of various civil
rights movements as ‘pugilistic’ when they publicly,
peacefully, and vocally tried to vindicate their
rights? Absolutely not.” Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch.
Dist., 4 F.4th 910, 953 n.10 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Kennedy
I”) (R. Nelson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing
en banc).
The Ninth Circuit’s misguided emphasis on Coach
Kennedy’s “pugilistic” defense of his rights and the accompanying public attention is part of its Establishment Clause analysis. But if allowed to stand, it is unlikely to stay cabined to matters involving religious
20
expression. Amicus FIRE knows too well that colleges
and universities regularly field demands to censor faculty members after their expression draws public attention—and regularly acquiesce. In the past year
alone, academics have faced investigations and discipline for criticizing President Biden’s criteria for a
forthcoming Supreme Court nomination;8 criticizing
their institution’s response to COVID-19 and former
Vice President Mike Pence’s debate performance;9
criticizing their institution’s response to allegations of
8 Neil Vigdor, Georgetown Suspends Lecturer Who Criticized
Vow to Put Black Woman on Court, N.Y. Times (Jan. 31, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/31/us/ilya-shapirogeorgetown-biden-scotus.html [https://perma.cc/JJ7P-YBUL].
9 Talia Richman, Collin College again pushes out professor critical of administration’s handling of COVID-19, free speech, Dall.
Morning News (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.dallasnews.com/
news/education/2021/02/26/collin-college-again-pushes-out-professor-critical-of-administrations-handling-of-covid-19-freespeech [https://perma.cc/KD2D-PNWM]; see also Talia Richman,
Former Collin College professor who claimed retaliation over
tweets resolves lawsuit with school, Dall. Morning News (Jan. 25,
2022), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/education/2022/01/25/
former-collin-college-professor-who-claimed-retaliation-overtweets-resolves-lawsuit-with-school
[https://perma.cc/2GS4QAUP] (“A former Collin College professor – who lost her job after tweeting messages critical of the school’s COVID-19 protocols
and of then-Vice President Mike Pence – resolved her lawsuit
with the school Tuesday. Lora Burnett, who taught history, accepted the school’s $70,000 offer to end the dispute.”).
21
sexual abuse and anti-Semitism;10 and criticizing the
Chinese government.11
These faculty members—representing just a small
sample of recent faculty speech controversies—faced
repercussions because their speech garnered public
attention. In each instance, the precipitating speech
was protected by either the First Amendment or institutional promises of free expression.
But if, following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, colleges
and universities may in the future cite unwanted public attention as a justification for punishing faculty
speakers—positing censorship as a necessary measure to avoid misunderstandings about institutional
endorsement of faculty expression—then academic
freedom will be a dead letter. Neither faculty nor students can meaningfully engage in “that continual and
fearless sifting and winnowing by which alone the
truth can be found,”12 in the University of Wisconsin’s
famously apt phrasing, if the fear of mistaken
10 Michael Levenson, Linfield University Fires Professor Who
Spoke Out About Misconduct Cases, N.Y. Times (May 1, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/01/us/Linfield-university-professor-fired.html [https://perma.cc/E2GZ-YKB6].
11 Eugene Volokh, Univ. of San Diego Law School Investigating Professor for Post Critical of China, Reason (March 20, 2021),
https://reason.com/volokh/2021/03/20/univ-of-san-diego-lawschool-investigating-professor-for-post-critical-of-china
[https://perma.cc/7SKN-C8YA].
12 See Käri Knutson, Sifting and winnowing turns 125: The
tumultuous story of three little words, Univ. of Wisconsin–Madison News (Sept. 17, 2019), https://news.wisc.edu/sifting-and-winnowing-turns-125 [https://perma.cc/A6PN-ZWJH].
22
institutional attribution is allowed to justify censorship of challenging, dissenting, or simply unpopular
faculty speech.13 As this Court has warned, the “danger” posed by “the chilling of individual thought and
expression” is “especially real in the University setting, where the State acts against a background and
tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835.
Just as troublingly, by rendering public attention
secured by the vigorous defense of one’s rights a justification for censorship, the Ninth Circuit’s decision denies to the faculty members amicus FIRE defends
their most effective means of combating censorship.
B. In defending public university faculty, amicus FIRE relies on public
attention to vindicate speech rights.
Since 1999, amicus FIRE has successfully vindicated the expressive rights of faculty at institutions
nationwide by relying on the truth of Justice
Brandeis’s classic observation: Sunlight is “the best of
disinfectants.”14 In FIRE’s experience, the power of
13 Such a fear would be unfounded, too. Just as allowing a religious student organization to use public campus facilities on
equal footing with secular groups does not violate the Establishment Clause because “an open forum in a public university does
not confer any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or
practices,” Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981), neither
does the speech of public university faculty as private citizens
reasonably bear the presumption of institutional endorsement.
14 Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, Harper’s
Weekly (Dec. 20, 1913),
https://www.thefire.org/presentation/
23
public opinion is just as reliable a guarantor of faculty
rights as the judiciary, and arguably more so.15
A recent controversy at the University of Florida
offers an illustration of the immense value of public
attention for faculty seeking to remedy a violation of
First Amendment freedoms. On May 17, 2021, voting
rights advocates filed a lawsuit against various Florida state election officials to block implementation of
Senate Bill 90, a statute imposing new restrictions on
voting in the state.16 The plaintiffs’ lawyers sought to
hire three University of Florida political science professors as expert witnesses. Pursuant to the university’s policy, all three faculty members filed disclosure
forms with the institution concerning their planned
participation in the lawsuit. But upon review, and despite having previously allowed one of the professors
to testify in two voting rights lawsuits against Florida
wp-content/uploads/2021/08/31120554/1913_12_20_What
_Publicity_Ca.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH7A-5NK7].
15 Fighting rights violations by going public, FIRE,
https://www.thefire.org/resources/submit-a-case/frequentlyasked-questions-about-case-submissions/fighting-rights-violations-by-going-public/ [https://perma.cc/FSK2-QWL8] (“But after
successfully defending campus rights for more than two decades,
we have found that telling the story of how rights are being violated is usually the most effective way to encourage an institution to comply with its legal and moral obligation to protect student and faculty rights.”).
16 Class Action Compl. for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief,
Fla. Rising Together v. Lee, No. 4:21-cv-00201-AW-MJF (N.D.
Fla. filed May 17, 2021), available at https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/FRT%20v.%20Lee%20%20Complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL3S-892Z].
24
in 2018, the university denied the faculty members’
requests.
On October 29, 2021, The New York Times reported that the University of Florida was prohibiting
three professors from testifying in a voting rights lawsuit brought against the state.17 The denial quickly
generated intense public interest and media attention.18 On October 30, 2021, the university issued a
statement in response, arguing that it had not violated the First Amendment rights of the professors.19
In a subsequent statement, a university spokesperson
said that “if the professors wish to do so pro bono on
their own time without using university resources,
they would be free to do so.”20
17 Michael Wines, Florida Bars State Professors From Testifying in Voting Rights Case, N.Y. Times (Oct. 29, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/29/us/florida-professors-voting-rights-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/F4FV-4HFN].
18 See, e.g., Mike Schneider, University of Florida prohibits
professors from testifying, Associated Press (Oct. 30, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/lawsuits-florida-ron-desantis-votingrights-university-of-floridaf3b88f128a3175586fdc21b56a0a7132
[https://perma.cc/A97KZUHP].
19 University Statement on Academic Freedom and Free
Speech,
Univ.
of
Fla.,
http://statements.ufl.edu/statements/2021/october/university-statement-on-academic-freedomand-free-speech.html [https://perma.cc/ZP83-RFW4].
20 Danielle Ivanov, UF professors could testify in voting rights
case if they are unpaid, spokeswoman says, Gainesville Sun
(Oct. 31, 2021), https://www.gainesville.com/story/news/education/campus/2021/10/31/university-of-florida-spokeswomanthree-professors-could-testify-if-unpaid/6223947001.
25
On November 1, FIRE wrote to the University of
Florida, explaining that prohibiting professors from
testifying in lawsuits as citizens speaking on matters
of public concern violates the First Amendment.21
Days later, following “blistering criticism”22 and a “national outcry,”23 the university reversed course,
“[a]cceding to a storm of protest” and announcing it
would allow the professors to testify—regardless of
whether they received compensation.24
A subsequent First Amendment lawsuit filed by
the professors against the University of Florida has
resulted in a preliminary injunction barring the university from enforcing its revised conflict-of-interests
policy against faculty seeking to provide expert testimony or consulting in litigation involving the State of
Florida. Austin v. Univ. of Fla. Bd. of Trs.,
21 Letter from Aaron Terr, Program Officer, FIRE, to Dr. W.
Kent Fuchs, President, University of Florida (Nov. 1, 2021),
available at https://www.thefire.org/fire-letter-to-the-universityof-florida-november-1-2021 [https://perma.cc/T8H3-FGLQ].
22 John Henderson, Protest on the street and in writing show
continued concern at UF over academic freedom, Gainesville Sun
(Nov. 12, 2021), https://www.gainesville.com/story/news/2021/11
/12/university-florida-protest-professors-write-fuchs-over-freespeech-concerns/8589858002 [https://perma.cc/3YXC-47DK].
23 Keith E. Whittington, The intellectual freedom that made
public colleges great is under threat, Wash. Post (Dec. 15, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/12/15/academicfreedom-crt-public-universities [https://perma.cc/7GQF-VBAW].
24 Michael Wines, University of Florida Reverses Course to Allow Professors to Testify Against State, N.Y. Times (Nov. 5, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/05/us/voting-rights-floridaprofessors-testify.html [https://perma.cc/HYG7-Z9LZ].
26
No. 1:21cv184-MW/GRJ, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11733 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 21, 2022). But the immediate
impact of the public scrutiny placed on the university’s initial decision is undeniable. For faculty facing
rights violations, public attention is invaluable.
Further examples abound.
As of July 1, 2021, Iowa state law required the
state’s public institutions of higher education to ensure that “any mandatory staff or student training
provided by an employee of the institution or by a contractor hired by the institution does not teach, advocate, act upon, or promote specific defined concepts,”
including, for example, the notion that “the United
States of America and the state of Iowa are fundamentally or systemically racist or sexist.” Iowa Code
§ 261H.8. Both as written and as indicated by state
lawmakers during legislative debate,25 the law does
not implicate classroom instruction.
While the University of Iowa made clear to faculty
that the law has “zero impact within the classroom as
academic instruction is specifically exempted from the
legislation,”26 Iowa State University incorrectly told
25 FIRE, Iowa Rep. Mary Lynn Wolfe Comments on HF802,
March 16, 2021, YouTube (July 27, 2021), https://www.youtube
.com/watch?v=py3aWX_gC08&t=53s (explaining that bill “just
affects diversity training” in higher education, and only reaches
what teachers are “allowed to teach and curriculum” in K–12
classes).
26 House File (HF) 802 Information, Univ. of Iowa (July 27,
2021), https://diversity.uiowa.edu/house-file-hf-802-information
[https://perma.cc/7AJE-62MU].
27
its faculty that the law required the university to police regular class instruction, including discussions,
course materials, and invited speakers.27 After faculty
voiced concern, FIRE wrote Iowa State and issued a
press release, explaining the threat to academic freedom and the First Amendment rights presented by
Iowa State’s erroneous warning to its faculty.28 Only
after the ensuing public scrutiny29 did Iowa State reverse course and revise its guidance to better account
for faculty rights.30
In September 2021, a visiting artist at Coastal
Carolina University was working with two students of
color after class when one student expressed that she
27 Iowa House File 802 – Requirements Related to Racism and
Sexism
Trainings,
Iowa
State
Univ.
(Aug. 5, 2021),
https://www.provost.iastate.edu/policies/iowa-house-file-802--requirements-related-to-racism-and-sexism-trainings
[https://perma.cc/M8AL-E7EP].
28 FIRE calls on Iowa State to reverse unconstitutional implementation of critical race theory law, FIRE (July 27, 2021),
https://www.thefire.org/fire-calls-on-iowa-state-to-reverse-unconstitutional-implementation-of-critical-race-theory-law
[https://perma.cc/792H-ALNT].
29 See, e.g., Phillip Sitter, Free speech advocacy group critiques
ISU guidance on divisive concepts law as too broad — and it's not
alone, Ames Trib. (Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.amestrib.com
/story/news/education/2021/08/04/iowa-state-university-criticalrace-theory-foundation-individual-rights-education-critiquesisu/5415113001 [https://perma.cc/D5PD-VGWX].
30 After FIRE turns up the heat, Iowa State revises unconstitutional guidance for instructors to self-censor, FIRE
(Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.thefire.org/after-fire-turns-up-theheat-iowa-state-revises-unconstitutional-guidance-for-instructors-to-self-censor [https://perma.cc/B6D9-4F94].
28
felt isolated and would like to get to know other nonwhite students in the department. The instructor and
students wrote names of other students of color on the
classroom whiteboard while brainstorming ideas. Students who later entered the classroom and saw the
names protested what they interpreted to be the singling-out of non-white students.
After both a theater department committee and
the visiting artist issued apologies over email, professor Steven Earnest suggested in reply that the protesting students were being overly sensitive.31 Following student protests, Earnest was suspended. After
FIRE alerted the media to Earnest’s discipline,32
31 The professor wrote: “Sorry but I dont [sic] think its [sic] a
big deal. Im [sic] just sad people get their feelings hurt so easily.
And they are going into Theatre?” Eugene Volokh, Theater Prof
Facing Possible Firing for Not Being Sufficiently Outraged, Reason (Nov. 9, 2021), https://reason.com/volokh/2021/11/09/theaterprof-facing-possible-firing-for-not-being-sufficiently-outraged
[https://perma.cc/M7RX-F5RR] (quoting FIRE’s letter).
32 A theater professor wasn’t sufficiently outraged about a list
of names on a whiteboard. The college’s next act: probable termination., FIRE (Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.thefire.org/a-theaterprofessor-wasnt-sufficiently-outraged-about-a-list-of-names-ona-whiteboard-the-colleges-next-act-probable-termination
[https://perma.cc/4R83-XYMX].
29
garnering national attention,33 the university reversed course.34
In 2017, Laurie Sheck, a professor at The New
School, was charged with racial discrimination after
quoting James Baldwin during a graduate seminar
discussion of his 1962 essay “The Creative Process.”
Sheck noted how the title of an Oscar-nominated 2016
documentary based on Baldwin’s writings, “I Am Not
Your Negro,” intentionally altered its quoted source,
Baldwin’s use of a racial slur as a guest on “The Dick
Cavett Show.” She asked her students what this
change may reveal about Americans’ ability to reckon
with what Baldwin identified in his essay as “the
darker forces of history.”35
Months later, The New School notified Sheck that
she was under investigation for allegedly violating the
institution’s discrimination policy in her classroom
discussion, but provided her with no further details.
After The New School failed to substantively respond
to a letter from FIRE voicing concern about the investigation’s violation of the academic freedom promised
Sheck in institutional policy, FIRE issued a press release calling on the university to end the
33 See, e.g., Brittany Bernstein, A Theater Professor Suggested
Students Should Have Thicker Skins, So They Demanded He Be
Fired, Nat’l Rev. (Nov. 7, 2021), https://www.nationalreview.com/news/a-theatre-professor-suggested-students-shouldhave-thicker-skins-so-they-demanded-he-be-fired
[https://perma.cc/V849-MQQ6].
34 FIRE, supra note 32.
35 James Baldwin, The Creative Process, in Creative America
(1962).
30
investigation.36 Days later—and only after public
scrutiny37—it finally did so.38
These controversies represent just a small sample
of amicus FIRE’s reliance on the power of public attention to vindicate faculty rights. To ensure that sunlight remains the best of disinfectants, this Court
must reject the Ninth Circuit’s flawed reasoning and
make clear that a “pugilistic” defense of faculty rights
may not justify censorship and punishment. This
Court must make clear that faculty do not imperil
their First Amendment rights by seeking to vindicate
them.
36 Academic freedom at The New School? Not if you quote an
iconic
black
writer.,
FIRE
(Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.thefire.org/academic-freedom-at-the-new-schoolnot-if-you-quote-an-iconic-black-writer [https://perma.cc/UJ9C6DWR].
37 See, e.g., Colleen Flaherty, N-Word at the New School, Inside Higher Ed (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/08/07/another-professor-under-fire-using-nword-class-while-discussing-james-baldwin
[https://perma.cc/CAY4-AYFA].
38 VICTORY: Professor exonerated for quoting iconic black
writer
at
The
New
School,
FIRE (Aug. 16, 2019),
https://www.thefire.org/victory-professor-exonerated-for-quoting-iconic-black-writer-at-the-new-school
[https://perma.cc/BJ5S-S8Z5].
31
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, this Court should reverse.
March 2, 2022
Respectfully submitted,
DARPANA M. SHETH
Counsel of Record
WILL CREELEY
FOUNDATION FOR
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
EDUCATION
510 Walnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
(215) 717-3473
darpana.sheth@thefire.org
will@thefire.org
GABRIEL WALTERS
FOUNDATION FOR
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN
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