Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Benjamin Caleb Trott, Petitioner v. Maryland

APPENDIX

i

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendix A Opinion in the Court of Appeals of

Maryland

(April 23, 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 1

Appendix B Corrected Order in the Court of

Appeals of Maryland

(October 30, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 30

Appendix C Certification Pursuant to Maryland

Rule 8-304 in the Court of Special

Appeals of Maryland

(October 6, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 34

Appendix D Official Transcript of Proceeding

Excerpt in the Circuit Court for Anne

Arundel County, Maryland

(October 29, 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 41

App. 1

APPENDIX A

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

Case No.: C-02-CR-19-001378

Argued: February 1, 2021

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

[Filed: April 23, 2021]

Misc. No. 9

September Term, 2020

_______________________________________

BENJAMIN CALEB TROTT

)

)

v.

)

)

STATE OF MARYLAND

)

_______________________________________)

Barbera, C.J.

McDonald

Watts

Hotten

Getty

Booth

Biran,

JJ.

Opinion by Booth, J.

Filed: April 23, 2021

App. 2

It is not uncommon that the Fourth Amendment

puts into tension two fundamental pillars of good

government: the right of the people to be free from

unreasonable government intrusion and the

government’s interest in protecting the people from

dangerous criminal activity. For decades, Maryland has

recognized a compelling public interest in controlling

and preventing drunk driving.1 Although significant

efforts to combat drunk driving have reduced fatalities

in recent years, 167 people in Maryland died in

alcohol-impaired driving incidents in 2019, accounting

for about one-third of the total traffic deaths in the

State.2

In this case, we are asked to navigate the tension

between law enforcement’s ability to investigate an

anonymous 911 tip that reported drunk driving and the

parameters of the Fourth Amendment. In response to

an anonymous 911 call placed close to 11:30 p.m. on a

Friday night that provided the specific location and

license plate of a vehicle driven by a possibly

intoxicated driver, within minutes of the call, the

responding police officer located the vehicle in a

parking lot of a liquor store, and knocked on the

window of the running car to investigate. The driver,

1

See Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 504 (1984) (“The magnitude of

the problem created by intoxicated motorists cannot be

exaggerated.”).

2

Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,

Traffic Safety Facts Research Note: Overview of Motor Vehicle

Crashes in 2019, at 13 (2020), https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/

Api/Public/ViewPublication/813060 [https://perma.cc/AL5KHKTG].

App. 3

Benjamin Caleb Trott, rolled down his window, smelled

of alcohol, and admitted to having had multiple drinks.

Mr. Trott also stated that his driver’s license was

suspended and revoked. After Mr. Trott was unable to

successfully complete a field sobriety test, the police

arrested him.

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr.

Trott entered a plea of not guilty on an agreed

statement of facts to one count of driving while

impaired. The Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County

found Mr. Trott guilty and sentenced him to a

three-year term of incarceration, with three years

suspended, and a three-year term of supervised

probation.

Mr. Trott noted a timely appeal. After the parties

submitted briefs, the Court of Special Appeals filed a

certification pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304,

requesting that this Court determine whether the

circuit court erred in denying Mr. Trott’s motion to

suppress.3 We granted certiorari to consider the

3

The question presented in the Court of Special Appeals

certification was:

Did the circuit court err in finding that a police officer had

reasonable suspicion to engage in an encounter with

appellant based upon the police dispatcher’s information

conveyed to him over his police radio, following a 911 call,

stating “intoxicated driver at 5823 Deale Churchton Road,”

and indicating further facts limited to the color of the

vehicle, Maryland tag number, Maryland registration

number, and that the vehicle was in a parking lot?

App. 4

parameters of the Fourth Amendment in the context of

a 911 call reporting drunk driving. For the reasons

explained below, we hold that, under the totality of the

facts presented in this case, the police had reasonable

suspicion to conduct a brief investigatory detention of

Mr. Trott, and this stop did not violate the Fourth

Amendment. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of the

motion to suppress.

I.

Factual and Procedural Background

After entering a plea of not guilty, Mr. Trott filed a

motion to suppress, arguing that Corporal Michael

Cooper lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion to

justify the stop because it was based solely on a

dispatcher’s account of an anonymous tip, and that the

totality of the circumstances as alleged did not support

the investigative stop. Corporal Cooper of the Anne

Arundel Police Department was the sole witness at the

suppression hearing. The relevant facts elicited at the

hearing are not in dispute.

A. The Suppression Hearing

At the suppression hearing, Corporal Cooper

testified to the following facts. Around 11:30 p.m. on

the night of Friday, December 4, 2015, Corporal Cooper

received a report from a dispatcher of an intoxicated

driver at a specific location in Anne Arundel County.

The tip provided the color of the vehicle and the license

In our order granting certification, pursuant to Maryland Rule

8-304(c)(2), we modified the question of law to state: “Did the

circuit court err in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress?”

App. 5

plate number. Corporal Cooper arrived at the address

within two to eight minutes. When he arrived at the

location, accompanied by another officer, he observed

a silver Honda CR-V parked in front of Captain Kidd’s

liquor store, with the same Maryland license plate

number that was provided to him by the dispatcher.

Mr. Trott was in the driver’s seat and his girlfriend was

seated in the front passenger seat. The car was parked,

the keys were in the ignition, and the engine was

running. Corporal Cooper pulled into the parking lot

and parked his cruiser approximately ten to fifteen feet

behind the vehicle, at which time he activated his

emergency lights, but not his siren. Both officers

approached the car, one to the passenger’s side and one

to the driver’s side.

Corporal Cooper knocked on the driver’s side

window and asked Mr. Trott to roll down his window.

Mr. Trott did not immediately do so because he

appeared to be unfamiliar with the window controls.

After Corporal Cooper asked Mr. Trott for his license

and registration, Mr. Trott admitted that his license

was suspended, and his driver’s license was revoked.

During the conversation, Corporal Cooper could smell

a “strong odor” of alcohol on Mr. Trott’s breath. Mr.

Trott acknowledged that he had consumed two beers

and a shot, explaining that he was more sober than his

girlfriend, who was also in the car. Corporal Cooper

asked Mr. Trott to step out of the vehicle. After an

unsuccessful field sobriety test, Mr. Trott was arrested.

Following Corporal Cooper’s testimony and

arguments of counsel, the circuit court orally delivered

its ruling denying Mr. Trott’s motion to suppress,

App. 6

stating “[w]ell, viewing what you gentlemen have

submitted in writing and your arguments along with

the testimony of Officer Cooper, I find that the

circumstances were sufficient to support the stop

conducted by Officer Cooper and therefore the [m]otion

is denied.”

B. Additional Proceedings

After the circuit court denied Mr. Trott’s motion to

suppress, he entered a plea of not guilty on an agreed

statement of facts to one count of driving while

impaired. The circuit court convicted Mr. Trott of

driving while impaired by alcohol, and sentenced him

to a three-year term of incarceration, with three years

suspended, and three years of supervised probation.

Mr. Trott timely appealed the circuit court’s

decision to the Court of Special Appeals. The sole issue

presented to the intermediate appellate court was

whether the circuit court erred in denying Mr. Trott’s

motion to suppress. After considering the issue on

brief, the Court of Special Appeals filed a certification

pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304. In its certification,

the intermediate appellate court observed that this

case presents “an important question of public policy”

balancing the interests of individual privacy protected

by the Fourth Amendment and against the inherent

danger to the public arising from driving while

intoxicated, in the context of an anonymous 911 call

reporting such alleged behavior. We granted the

certification, pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304(c)(3),

and issued a writ of certiorari that included the entire

action.

App. 7

II.

Standard of Review

Our review of a circuit court’s denial of a motion to

suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment is

limited to the information contained in the record of

the suppression hearing. Pacheco v. State, 465 Md. 311,

319 (2019). We review the facts found by the circuit

court in the light most favorable to the prevailing

party, in this case, the State. Id. We accept the circuit

court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly

erroneous, but we review de novo the court’s

application of the law to its findings of fact.” Id.

(citation and internal quotations omitted). When a

party raises a constitutional challenge to a search or

seizure, we undertake an “independent constitutional

evaluation by reviewing the relevant law and applying

it to the unique facts and circumstances of the case.”

Grant v. State, 449 Md. 1, 14–15 (2016) (quoting State

v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 144 (2002)).

III.

Discussion

The Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution4 protects “against unreasonable searches

4

The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches

and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall

App. 8

and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV “The exclusion

of evidence obtained in violation of these provisions is

an essential part of the Fourth Amendment

protections.” Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139, 149 (2006);

see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56 (1961). In

determining whether a search or seizure is

lawful,“[t]he touchstone of our analysis under the

Fourth Amendment is always the ‘reasonableness in all

the circumstances of the particular governmental

invasion of a citizen’s personal security.’” Pennsylvania

v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108–09 (1977) (quoting Terry

v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). Recognizing that the

constitutional gauge for purposes of Fourth

Amendment analysis is “reasonableness,” we have

explained that “‘[w]hat is reasonable depends upon all

of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure

and the nature of the search or seizure itself.’” Lewis v.

State, 470 Md. 1, 18 (2020) (quoting United States v.

Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985)).

“Whether a particular warrantless action on the part of

the police is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment

depends on a balance between the public interest and

the individual’s right to personal security free from

arbitrary interference by law officers.” Pacheco, 465

Md. at 321 (internal quotations omitted).

In analyzing the reasonableness of warrantless

encounters between the police and members of the

public, we have generally compartmentalized these

issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

App. 9

interactions into three categories based upon the level

of intrusiveness of the police-citizen contact: an arrest;

an investigatory stop; and a consensual encounter. See

Swift, 393 Md. at 149–51. An arrest—the first and

most intrusive category—“requires probable cause to

believe that a person has committed or is committing

a crime.” Id. (citations omitted). This case involves the

application of the intermediate tier, known as the Terry

stop,5 or investigatory stop, which is less intrusive than

a more formal custodial arrest, and correspondingly,

requires a less demanding level of suspicion than

probable cause.6 See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.

1, 7 (1989). To satisfy the Fourth Amendment, a Terry

stop “must be supported by reasonable suspicion that

a person has committed or is about to commit a crime

and permits an officer to stop and briefly detain an

individual.” Swift, 393 Md. at 150 (citing Berkemer v.

McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)); Ferris v. State, 355

5

The intermediate level of police-citizen encounter commonly

referred to as “Terry stop,” derives its name from the seminal “stop

and frisk” case of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

6

“The least intrusive police-citizen contact, a consensual

encounter, involves no restraint of liberty and elicits an

individual’s voluntary cooperation with non-coercive police

contact.” Swift v. State, 393 Md. 139, 151 (2006). In its

supplemental brief filed with this Court, the State concedes that,

under the circumstances presented in this case—where the officers

parked the cruiser ten to fifteen feet behind Mr. Trott’s parked car

and activated the emergency lights—Mr. Trott was seized when

Corporal Cooper approached his car and asked him to roll down his

window. Given the State’s concession that Mr. Trott was “seized”

within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the encounter was

not consensual and is governed by the reasonable suspicion

standard applicable to a Terry stop.

App. 10

Md. 356, 374 n.5 (1999). Generally, an officer has

reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop when there is “‘a

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the

particular person stopped of criminal activity.’”

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014)

(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18

(1981)); see also Sizer v. State, 456 Md. 350, 364 (2017)

(explaining that “[r]easonable suspicion exists

somewhere between unparticularized suspicions and

probable cause”).

“There is no standardized litmus test that governs

the ‘reasonable suspicion’ standard,” and we have

recognized that “any effort to compose one would

undoubtedly be futile.” Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272,

286 (2000) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.

690, 695 (1996) (explaining that it would be impossible

to articulate, with precision, what “reasonable

suspicion” means)). The futility in attempting to create

such a standard arises from the “myriad factual

situations that arise.” Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417. Like

probable cause, the standard for “reasonable suspicion”

is intentionally fluid because it “is not readily, or even

usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Sokolow,

490 U.S. at 7 (citation and internal quotations omitted).

Distilled to its essence, we consider the “totality of the

circumstances—the whole picture—” to determine

whether “the detaining officers . . . have a

particularized and objective basis for suspecting the

particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Cortez,

449 U.S. at 417–18. The reasonable suspicion standard

“is a common sense, nontechnical conception that

considers factual and practical aspects of daily life and

how reasonable and prudent people act.” Cartnail, 359

App. 11

Md. at 286 (citing Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695–96). In

Sizer, we explained that “[t]he reasonable suspicion

standard does not allow a law enforcement official to

simply assert that innocent conduct was suspicious to

him or her. Rather, the officer must explain how the

observed conduct, when viewed in the context of all of

the other circumstances known to the officer, was

indicative of criminal activity.” 456 Md. at 365

(internal citations and quotations omitted) (cleaned

up). Although reasonable suspicion “requires some

minimal level of objective justification for making the

stop that amounts to something more than an ‘inchoate

and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, it does not

require proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the

evidence.” Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 (cleaned up).

Accordingly, we have stated that a stop may be upheld

based on “a series of acts which could appear naturally

innocent if viewed separately” but that “collectively

warrant further investigation[.]” Cartnail, 359 Md. at

290 (citation omitted); see also United States v. Arvizu,

534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (“A determination that

reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the

possibility of innocent conduct.”).

On the undisputed facts presented at the

suppression hearing, we must determine whether

Corporal Cooper had reasonable suspicion necessary to

effect a stop of Mr. Trott outside Captain Kidd’s liquor

store after receiving the information relayed by the 911

caller, under the totality of the circumstances known to

the officer at the time of the stop.

Mr. Trott argues that the officers did not have a

legal basis to stop and detain him and that the

App. 12

anonymous call cannot support a finding of reasonable

suspicion under the facts of this case. He contends that

the 911 caller simply referred to an “intoxicated

driver,” without: any reference as to timing; describing

any driving behavior; or providing any basis of personal

knowledge. What is missing from the call, he claims, is

sufficient indicia of reliability and the caller’s basis of

knowledge, given that reasonable suspicion requires

that a tip be reliable in its assertion of ongoing criminal

activity, and not simply its tendency to identify a

specific person. Mr. Trott asserts that under the

Supreme Court’s jurisprudence and in particular,

Navarette, 572 U.S. 393, the mere reference to an

“intoxicated driver” is a “conclusory allegation,” which

is insufficient to satisfy the reasonable suspicion

standard applicable to a lawful investigatory stop for

Fourth Amendment purposes. Mr. Trott contends that

the Supreme Court’s rationale in Florida v. J.L., 529

U.S. 266, 271 (2000) controls, because “[a]ll the police

had to go on in this case was a bare report of an

unknown, unaccountable informant who neither

explained how he knew about the [intoxicated driver]

nor supplied any basis for belief he had inside

information about the [driver].”

The State argues that Corporal Cooper had

reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Trott because the tip,

as relayed by the dispatcher, included specific

information to identify the vehicle, as well as the

vehicle’s precise location, along with the allegation that

the driver was intoxicated. According to the State, the

Supreme Court’s reasoning in Navarette—combined

with the minimally intrusive nature of the stop of Mr.

Trott and the significant imminent danger to the public

App. 13

created by the alleged criminal activity—lead to the

conclusion that the stop satisfied the reasonableness

requirements of the Fourth Amendment.

Despite the opposing outcomes advanced by Mr.

Trott and the State, they agree on one point—that our

analysis requires an examination of the Supreme

Court’s jurisprudence concerning anonymous calls

alleging criminal behavior that form the basis for an

investigatory stop.

A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence---Anonymous

Tips Providing Reasonable Suspicion for

Investigatory Stop

We start with the premise that reasonable suspicion

need not be founded on information observed first-hand

by law enforcement and may be “based on information

from anonymous tips.” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has “firmly rejected the

argument ‘that reasonable cause for an investigative

stop can only be based on [an] officer’s personal

observation, rather than on information supplied by

another person.’” Id. (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407

U.S. 143, 147 (1972)) (cleaned up). In determining

whether an anonymous tip is sufficient to provide the

requisite reasonable suspicion necessary for an

investigatory stop, we consider both the “quantity and

quality[,]” or degree of reliability of information

disclosed in an anonymous tip, “giving the anonymous

tip the weight it deserved in light of its indicia of

reliability as established through independent police

work.” Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990). “[I]f

a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more

information will be required to establish the requisite

App. 14

quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip

were more reliable.” Id.

In White, the Supreme Court considered whether an

anonymous tip, corroborated by independent police

work, was sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion to

make an investigatory stop. 496 U.S. at 326–27. The

tipster told the police that a woman would be leaving

an apartment at a particular time, driving to a

particular motel in a brown Plymouth station wagon

with a broken taillight, and would be transporting

cocaine. Id. at 327. Based upon the information

provided by the tipster, the police officers stopped the

station wagon as it neared the motel and found cocaine

in the vehicle. Id. at 331. The Court held that the

officers’ corroboration of certain details made the

anonymous tip sufficiently reliable to create reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity and that the investigative

stop therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Id.

Although the Court observed that the anonymous

tip provided “virtually nothing from which one might

conclude that the caller is either honest or his

information is reliable[]” and gave “no indication of the

basis for the caller’s prediction regarding . . . criminal

activities[,]” the Court ultimately found the tip

sufficiently reliable for purposes of establishing

reasonable suspicion because “the anonymous tip had

been sufficiently corroborated to furnish reasonable

suspicion that respondent was engaged in criminal

activity[.]” Id. at 329, 331 (citation omitted) (cleaned

up). According to the Court, police were able to verify

the suspect’s sex, the vehicle described in the tip, the

App. 15

time of the suspect’s departure from the building, and

her apparent destination. Id. at 331. The Court found

the tipster’s ability to predict “future behavior” of

particular import, observing that “[b]ecause only a

small number of people are generally privy to an

individual’s itinerary, it is reasonable for police to

believe that a person with access to such information is

likely to also have access to reliable information about

that individual’s illegal activities.” Id. at 332.

In Florida v. J.L., by contrast, the Supreme Court

determined that no reasonable suspicion arose from an

anonymous call to a police department that a young

black male standing at a particular bus stop and

wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. 529 U.S. at

268. At some point, two officers arrived at the scene,

observed three black males “just hanging out[,]” one of

whom, J.L., was wearing a plaid shirt. Id. One of the

officers approached J.L., frisked him, and recovered a

gun from his pocket. Id. The question presented to the

Court was whether “an anonymous tip that a person is

carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a

police officer’s stop and frisk of that person.” Id. The

Supreme Court held that the search was invalid under

the Fourth Amendment. Id.

The Supreme Court began its discussion by

observing that the police officers’ suspicion that J.L.

was carrying a gun arose “solely from a call made from

an unknown location by an unknown caller[]” and not

from any observations of their own. Id. at 270. Citing

Alabama v. White as an example, the J.L. Court

acknowledged that there are situations “in which an

anonymous tip, suitably corroborated, exhibits

App. 16

‘sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable

suspicion to make the investigatory stop.’” Id. (quoting

White, 496 U.S. at 327). The Court contrasted the facts

in White from the facts before it, noting that the

anonymous call concerning J.L. “provided no predictive

information and therefore left the police without means

to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility.” Id. at

271. By failing to provide both predictive information

or an explanation concerning “how [the tipster] knew

about the gun[,]” there could be no “basis for believing

[the tipster] had inside information about J.L.” Id. And

although the Court observed the tip accurately

described the “subject’s readily observable location and

appearance” such details are only reliable in a “limited

sense[]” because they do “not show that the tipster has

knowledge of concealed criminal activity.” Id. at 272.

According to the Court, “[t]he reasonable suspicion here

at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion

of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a

determinate person.” Id. (citation omitted).

In rendering its decision, the Supreme Court

rejected a per se exception for anonymous tips

regarding firearms, recognizing the danger that guns

may pose, but concluding that such an exception would

encompass too many situations, such as any allegation

of drug dealing. Id. at 272–73. At the same time, the

Court declined to shut the door altogether on whether

there are “circumstances under which the danger

alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to

justify a search even without a showing of reliability.”

Id. at 273. By way of example, the Court noted “a

report of a person carrying a bomb” may not need the

same “indicia of reliability” demanded “for a report of

App. 17

a person carrying a firearm” before law enforcement

can conduct a Terry stop and frisk. Id. at 273–74.

In Navarette v. California, the Supreme Court

considered whether an officer had reasonable suspicion

to make an investigatory stop in the context of an

anonymous 911 call reporting a suspected drunk

driver. 572 U.S. 393. Applying a “totality of the

circumstances” approach, the Supreme Court held that

the tip from the anonymous 911 caller was sufficiently

reliable to support a Terry stop. Id. at 404. In that case,

the police department received an anonymous 911 call

claiming that a particular truck had run the caller off

the road. Id. at 395. The caller provided the license

plate number, make, and model of the truck, and

identified the road and the direction the truck was

traveling. Id. The officers responded and saw the

alleged truck on the road and followed it for about five

minutes without noticing any dangerous or erratic

driving behavior. Id. Nonetheless, the officers stopped

the truck. Id. During the stop, they smelled marijuana,

so they conducted a search that resulted in the

discovery of 30 pounds of marijuana. Id. The Supreme

Court found the stop to be supported by reasonable

suspicion, even though the officers had not been able to

corroborate any illegal activity (such as dangerous

driving) during their five-minute observation of the

truck. Id. at 404.

After discussing both the White and J.L. cases, the

Supreme Court determined that, even assuming the

911 call was anonymous, “the call bore adequate indicia

of reliability for the officer to credit the caller’s

account” and “[t]he officer was therefore justified in

App. 18

proceeding from the premise that the truck had, in fact,

caused the caller’s car to be dangerously diverted from

the highway.” Id. at 398–99. In concluding that the call

was reliable, the Court focused on three factors. First,

the Court commented on the fact that the caller had

eyewitness knowledge of the alleged criminal behavior.

Id. at 399. Specifically, the Court pointed out that the

caller claimed to have been run off the road, “which

necessarily implie[d] that the informant knows the

other car was driven dangerously.” Id. at 399. Second,

the Court pointed out the contemporaneous nature of

the call, observing that the “timeline of events suggests

that the caller reported the incident soon after she was

run off the road.” Id. The Court stated that this “sort of

contemporaneous report has long been treated as

especially reliable.” Id. The final factor weighing in

favor of the tip’s veracity was “the caller’s use of the

911 emergency system.” Id. at 400. The Court observed

that the 911 emergency system not only relays a

caller’s cell phone number and approximate

geographical location to 911 dispatchers, thereby

providing “some safeguards against . . . false reports[,]”

but may also record 911 calls, which provides victims

of false reports “an opportunity to identify the false

tipster’s voice and subject him to prosecution” under

applicable state laws. Id. at 400–01.

After determining that the anonymous tip was

sufficiently reliable, the Supreme Court proceeded to

the second part of the analysis under Terry—whether,

at the time of the stop, the officer had a reasonable

belief that the criminal activity was ongoing—

explaining that “[e]ven a reliable tip will justify an

investigative stop only if it creates reasonable suspicion

App. 19

that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’” Id. at 401

(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). The Court explained

that it must “therefore determine whether the 911

caller’s report of being run off the roadway created

reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime such as drunk

driving as opposed to an isolated episode of past

recklessness.” Id.

Focusing on the nature of the specific type of

criminal activity, the Supreme Court concluded that

the nature of the driver’s conduct—running another car

off the highway—bore “too great a resemblance to

paradigmatic manifestations of drunk driving to be

dismissed as an isolated example of recklessness.” Id.

at 403. The Court stated that “[w]e cannot say that the

officer acted unreasonably under these circumstances

in stopping a driver whose alleged conduct was a

significant indicator of drunk driving.” Id. The Court

reasoned that because the specific allegation of

dangerous driving created “reasonable suspicion of

drunk driving[,]” law enforcement was not required to

“personally observe suspicious driving[]” prior to

executing a stop, as “[o]nce reasonable suspicion of

drunk driving arises, ‘the reasonableness of the officer’s

decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the

availability of less intrusive investigatory techniques.’”

Id. at 403–04 (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 11) (cleaned

up). The Court observed that this is particularly true in

the context of drunk driving, where “allowing a drunk

driver a second chance for dangerous conduct could

have disastrous consequences.” Id. at 404.

App. 20

B. Anonymous 911 Call and the Investigatory

Stop of Mr. Trott

We must determine whether, under the totality of

the circumstances, the stop here comported with the

reasonable suspicion requirement of the Fourth

Amendment. Our analysis requires that we consider

whether the anonymous tip provided sufficient indicia

of reliability, and whether the police officers had a

particularized and objective basis for suspecting

ongoing criminal activity at the time of the stop. Mr.

Trott argues that the anonymous tip does not meet the

reliability threshold described in Navarette because

there is: (1) no basis for either imputing “eyewitness

knowledge” to the tipster or concluding the anonymous

tip was reported at the time the tipster witnessed

unlawful activity; (2) no concrete allegation of criminal

activity set forth in the tip; (3) no predictive

information set forth in the tip; and (4) no evidence

that the system through which the tip was reported

decreased the likelihood of false tips. Even if this Court

were to find the tip reliable, Mr. Trott argues there is

no basis for finding reasonable suspicion, as the

allegation of intoxicated driving was conclusory, and

Corporal Cooper failed to observe anything indicative

of criminal activity. According to Mr. Trott, his

presence outside a liquor store at the time of the stop

“does not add in any way to the totality of

circumstances[.]”

Unsurprisingly, the State contends Corporal Cooper

had the reasonable suspicion necessary to effect a stop

of Mr. Trott. According to the State, a tip reporting

drunk driving is different than tips reporting other

App. 21

crimes because drunk driving presents an “imminent

threat to public safety.” The State asserts that, while

anonymous tipsters may generally need to provide

more particularized descriptions of unlawful activity,

a specific allegation of drunk driving without a detailed

description of the reason an anonymous tipster believes

the driver is intoxicated should be sufficient to justify

a seizure given the “exigent circumstances” presented

by drunk driving. In light of the foregoing, the State

contends Corporal Cooper had reasonable suspicion to

stop Mr. Trott outside the liquor store because the

tipster provided a specific allegation of intoxicated

driving that was sufficiently descriptive to ensure

police would only stop the subject of the tip, and

Corporal Cooper was able to timely identify the

reported vehicle outside a liquor store. The lawfulness

of the seizure, the State asserts, finds further support

in precedent establishing the diminished expectation of

privacy that a motorist enjoys in his or her vehicle, as

well as the minimal intrusion associated with stopping

an already parked vehicle.7

We conclude that the anonymous tip in this case

provided sufficient indicia of reliability and that, under

the totality of the circumstances, the police officers had

a particularized and objective basis for suspecting

ongoing criminal activity.

7

The State has argued that, even if we were to find that Corporal

Cooper’s stop lacked reasonable suspicion, the stop was justified

under the community caretaking exception. Given our holding

that, under the totality of the circumstances presented in this case,

the officers had reasonable suspicion to effectuate the stop under

the Fourth Amendment, we shall not address the community

caretaking exception.

App. 22

We start our Fourth Amendment analysis with an

examination of whether the 911 call bore sufficient

indicia of reliability to form the basis for the stop. To be

sure, unlike the caller in Navarette, the caller here did

not allege that he or she was run off the road.

Admittedly, this is a close case and on its own, such a

“bare bones,” conclusory allegation would not suffice to

support a stop. However, as noted above, our

determination of whether an officer has the reasonable

suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop is

a highly fact-intensive inquiry, and we consider the

totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the

time of the stop. Our consideration of all of the factors

described below lead us to conclude that the officer had

reasonable suspicion.

First, we note that, although conclusory, an

allegation that a person is intoxicated is “the kind of

shorthand statement of fact that lay witnesses have

always been permitted to testify to in court.” State v.

Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 119 (Kan. 2003) (citation and

internal quotations omitted); see also State v. Amelio,

962 A.2d 498, 502 (N.J. 2008) (explaining that “the

signs of drunkenness are matters of common

knowledge and experience”). But the tip did not simply

allege drunk driving. The tip was contemporaneous to

the reported behavior and provided detailed and

specific information. The 911 dispatcher provided the

officer with the color of the vehicle, the Maryland

license plate number and the registration number.

There is no question that the dispatch described the

motor vehicle with sufficient particularity such that

Corporal Cooper could be certain that the vehicle he

stopped was the same one identified by the caller. We

App. 23

note that other courts have found detailed descriptions

of vehicles, including full license plate numbers and

locations, to be helpful corroborating details. See, e.g.,

Commonwealth v. Depiero, 25 N.E.3d 896, 900 (Mass.

App. Ct. 2015). Additionally, Corporal Cooper arrived

at the location provided by the dispatcher within two to

eight minutes after receiving the call. The fact that the

car was located exactly where it was reported to be

within minutes of the call lends credence to the notion

that the caller reported an ongoing crime as it

happened. This “sort of contemporaneous report

has long been treated as especially reliable” as

“‘substantial contemporaneity of event and statement

negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious

misrepresentation.’” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 399–400

(quoting Fed. R. Evid. 803(1) advisory committee

notes); see also Md. Rule 5-803(b)(1) (providing that “[a]

statement describing or explaining an event or

condition made while the declarant was perceiving the

event or condition, or immediately thereafter[]” is “not

excluded by the hearsay rule[]”); Booth v. State, 306

Md. 313, 324 (1986) (observing that “the ‘present sense

impression’ exception to the hearsay rule rests upon a

firm foundation of trustworthiness[]”).

The caller’s use of the 911 emergency system to

report intoxicated driving also bears favorably on the

tip’s veracity. As the Supreme Court observed in

Navarette, “911 calls can be recorded” and the Federal

Communications Commission (“FCC”) not only requires

cellular carriers to relay caller phone numbers to 911

dispatchers but also requires carriers “to identify [a]

caller’s geographic location with increasing specificity.”

Id. at 400–01 (citations omitted). These features that

App. 24

are designed to better identify 911 callers, coupled with

the State criminalizing knowingly false reports of

criminal activity, see Maryland Code, Criminal Law

§ 9-503,8 would make “a reasonable officer . . . conclude

that a false tipster would think twice before using” 911

to report a phony tip. Id. at 401.

Having determined that the anonymous call was

reliable, we also conclude that “the observed conduct,

when viewed in the context of all the other

circumstances known to the officer, was indicative of

criminal activity.” Sizer, 456 Md. at 365 (citations

omitted). Within minutes of receiving the dispatcher’s

call relaying an anonymous tip alleging that an

intoxicated driver was operating a particular vehicle at

a specific location, law enforcement located the exact

vehicle at the precise location identified in the tip.

When law enforcement made contact with the vehicle,

it was nearly 11:30 p.m., the vehicle was parked

outside a liquor store, the keys were in the ignition,

and the car was running. The 911 call, taken with the

officer’s observation of the running vehicle parked at a

liquor store at 11:30 at night, creates a reasonably

objective belief that the driver of the vehicle may be

8

Maryland Code, Criminal Law § 9-503 provides:

(a) A person may not make, or cause to be made, a

statement or report that the person knows to be false as a

whole or in material part to an official or unit of the State

or of a county, municipal corporation, or other political

subdivision of the State that a crime has been committed

or that a condition imminently dangerous to public safety

or health exists, with the intent that the official or unit

investigate, consider, or take action in connection with

that statement or report.

App. 25

consuming alcohol. In other words, the nature of the

business and the lateness of the hour were certainly

among the totality of the circumstances available to

Corporal Cooper when he undertook his investigation.

While it is true that these details, when viewed in

isolation, may suggest innocent activity, “[a]

determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need

not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” Arvizu,

534 U.S. at 277. Here, the anonymous tip, coupled with

the circumstances surrounding the stop, was sufficient

to “warrant further investigation[.]” Cartnail, 359 Md.

at 290 (citation omitted). Considering the totality of all

of the circumstances available to Corporal Cooper, his

act of approaching the stopped and idling vehicle and

knocking on the window to investigate, was reasonable.

In reaching our conclusion that the investigatory

stop in this case was reasonable, other factors inform

our decision. Specifically, in determining the validity of

the stop, it is not unreasonable to consider both the

level of the intrusiveness occasioned by the stop, as

well as the risk of harm resulting from a failure to

detain the driver.9 In considering the level of

9

Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Navarette, Chief Justice

Roberts noted in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in Virginia

v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978 (2009), that the “majority of courts

examining the question [had] upheld investigative stops of

allegedly drunk or erratic drivers, even when the police did not

personally witness any traffic violations before conducting the

stops.” See Harris, 558 U.S. 978, n.2 (citing United States v. Wheat,

278 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2001); People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810 (Cal.

2006); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714 (Haw. 2004); State v.

Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001); State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d

115 (Kan. 2003); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212 (Del. 2004);

App. 26

intrusiveness, the nature of the seizure involved a

stopped vehicle and a minimal intrusion. The

automobile was parked and running, and the encounter

was brief—it only lasted long enough for Corporal

Cooper to knock on the window and ask Mr. Trott a few

questions. As the Supreme Court has recognized, “the

brevity of the invasion of the individual’s Fourth

Amendment interests is an important factor in

determining whether the seizure is so minimally

intrusive as to be justifiable on reasonable suspicion.”

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)

(citation omitted). If Corporal Cooper had not smelled

State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359 (N.J. 2003); State v. Scholl, 684

N.W.2d 85 (S.D. 2004); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000);

State v. Rutzinksi, 623 N.W.2d 516 (Wis. 2001)). This view was not

shared by all jurisdictions. See Wheat, 278 F.3d at 729–30

(reviewing cases upholding stops, then noting that some courts

“have reached a different conclusion[]”). When considering an

anonymous tip alleging drunk driving, as part of its reasonable

suspicion analysis, other jurisdictions that upheld the stops

considered not just the reliability of the call, but also the potential

risk to public safety and the minimal intrusion necessitated by the

investigatory stop. See, e.g., Boyea, 765 A.2d at 868 (explaining

that “[i]n determining the validity of a stop, it is not unreasonable

to consider both the risk of harm resulting from a failure to detain

the driver, and the level of intrusiveness occasioned by a

detention[]”); Golotta, 837 A.2d at 368 (observing that from a

constitutional standpoint, the lesser privacy interest in an

automobile and the nature of the intrusion are relevant in

assessing the reasonableness of the police conduct). Although these

cases were decided prior to Navarette, we do not read Navarette as

eliminating a court’s ability to consider the nature of the crime

(and attendant imminent danger to the public), as well as the level

of intrusion (such as knocking on the window of a stopped but

running vehicle parked in a liquor store parking lot), when

undertaking a reasonable suspicion analysis.

App. 27

alcohol on Mr. Trott, the stop would have ended, and

Mr. Trott would have been free to go on his way. Not

only was the stop brief, it was minimally intrusive. In

contrast to the search and seizure of one’s person in

J.L., the intrusion in this case involved an officer

approaching a stopped motor vehicle and knocking on

a window. The Supreme Court has long recognized that

people have a diminished expectation of privacy in

their vehicles. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,

428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (noting that “one’s expectation

of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its

operation are significantly different from the

traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s

residence[]”). This is because a vehicle “has little

capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public

thoroughfares where both its occupants and its

contents are in plain view.” United States v. Knotts, 460

U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (citations omitted); see also People

v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 816 (Cal. 2006) (upholding the

stop of an alleged drunk driver, in part, after

concluding that “the level of intrusion of personal

privacy and inconvenience involved in a brief vehicle

stop is considerably less than the ‘embarrassing police

search’ on a public street condemned by J.L.” and

further observing that “in light of the pervasive

regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public

highways, individuals generally have a reduced

expectation of privacy while driving a vehicle on public

thoroughfares”) (internal citations omitted); State v.

Crawford, 275 Kan. 492, 497 (Kan. 2003) (upholding an

investigatory stop based upon a reckless driving

complaint, in part, on the observation that “brief

investigatory stops of motor vehicles based upon

reasonable suspicion are substantially less intrusive

App. 28

than other forms of seizures under the Fourth

Amendment and are perceived as relatively minimal

intrusions upon the Fourth Amendment freedoms[]”).

Indeed, in Lewis, we recently distinguished between

the “heightened expectation of privacy enjoyed in one’s

person[]” versus the “diminished expectation of privacy

one enjoys in his or her vehicle.” 470 Md. at 26.

Additionally, in determining that the investigatory

stop was reasonable under the circumstances, we also

consider the gravity of the risk of public harm. Unlike

crimes involving possessory offenses, such as carrying

an illegal gun or possessing drugs, the crime of drunk

driving poses a significant and potentially imminent

public danger. As Chief Justice Roberts observed, “[t]he

imminence of the danger posed by drunk drivers

exceeds that at issue in other types of cases.” Virginia

v. Harris, 558 U.S. 978 (2009) (dissenting from denial

of certiorari). While the police can observe the subject

of other types of tips “and step in before actual harm

occurs[,]” a “wait-and-see approach” with drunk driving

“may prove fatal.” Id. Indeed, unlike other criminal

activity, drunk driving “is always dangerous, as it is

occurring.” Id. It is not passive activity—it is a

dangerous criminal activity that, when undertaken,

often has an immediate deadly impact on innocent

citizens who unknowingly step into its path. Balancing

the public’s interest in safety against the minimal

intrusion occasioned by the brief investigatory stop

here, and considering the totality of the facts presented

to Officer Cooper in this case, we conclude that the

scales of justice tilt in favor of the stop.

App. 29

IV.

Conclusion

We hold that the investigatory stop in this case

satisfied the Fourth Amendment. Considering the

totality of the circumstances, the officers had

reasonable suspicion to suspect that Mr. Trott was

engaged in drunk driving. The anonymous 911 call had

sufficient indicia of reliability—the tipster alleging the

drunk driving provided the make, model, and license

plate of the vehicle, as well as its location. The police

arrived within minutes of receiving the call and

observed the running vehicle parked at a liquor store

around 11:30 p.m. on a Friday night. We determine

that the stop was reasonable given the nature of the

criminal activity—drunk driving, with its attendant

imminent danger to the public—as well as the minimal

and non-intrusive nature of the stop. Under the totality

of the circumstances, the officer’s stop was reasonable.

CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED.

JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT

COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL

COUNTY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE

PAID BY APPELLANT.

App. 30

APPENDIX B

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

COA-MISC-0009-2020

CSA-REG-1853-2019

(No. C-02-CR-19-001378,

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County)

[Filed: October 30, 2020]

_______________________________________

BENJAMIN CALEB TROTT

)

)

v.

)

)

STATE OF MARYLAND

)

_______________________________________)

CORRECTED

ORDER

Upon a preliminary examination of the Certification

pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304, filed in the

above-captioned case, it is this 26th day of October,

2020,

ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of Maryland,

that the Certification, be, and it is hereby, granted,

pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304(c)(3), to include the

entire action; the question of law modified, as follows,

pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304(c)(2):

App. 31

Did the circuit court err in denying Appellant’s

motion to suppress?

and the writ of certiorari to the Court of Special

Appeals shall issue and the case shall be heard in the

February session of Court; and it is further

ORDERED, that the record extract shall be e-filed

on or before January 4, 2021.

/s/ Mary Ellen Barbera

Chief Judge

App. 32

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

COA-MISC-0009-2020

CSA-REG-1853-2019

(No. C-02-CR-19-001378,

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County)

_______________________________________

BENJAMIN CALEB TROTT

)

)

v.

)

)

STATE OF MARYLAND

)

_______________________________________)

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

STATE OF MARYLAND, to wit:

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF THE

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

MARYLAND:

OF

WHEREAS, BENJAMIN CALEB TROTT v. STATE

OF MARYLAND, No. 1853, September Term, 2019 is

pending before your Court and the Court of Appeals is

willing that the record and proceedings therein be

certified to it.

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED TO HAVE

THE RECORD TRANSMITTED TO THE COURT

OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND ON OR BEFORE

November 9, 2020, together with this writ, for the

said Court to proceed thereon as justice may require.

App. 33

WITNESS the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals

of Maryland this 26th day of October, 2020.

/s/ Suzanne C. Johnson

Clerk

Court of Appeals of Maryland

App. 34

APPENDIX C

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 1853,

September Term, 2019

Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County,

C-02-CR-19-001378

[Filed: October 6, 2020]

_______________________________________

BENJAMIN CALEB TROTT

)

)

Appellant

)

)

v.

)

)

STATE OF MARYLAND,

)

)

Appellee

)

_______________________________________)

Certification Pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-304

Description of Action

Appellant, Benjamin Caleb Trott, was convicted in

the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County of driving

while impaired. On appeal, he presents a single

question for review: Whether the circuit court erred in

denying his motion to suppress. Rephrased, the

certified question reads as follows:

App. 35

Did the circuit court err in finding that a police

officer had reasonable suspicion to engage in an

encounter with appellant based upon the police

dispatcher’s information conveyed to him over

his police radio, following a 911 call, stating

“intoxicated driver at 5823 Deale Churchton

Road,” and indicating further facts limited to the

color of vehicle, Maryland tag number, Maryland

registration number, and that the vehicle was in

a parking lot?

Reasons for Certification

This case presents an important question of public

policy balancing the interests of individual privacy and

protection of the public from drunk drivers. As the

State notes in its brief, this case concerns the

parameters of the Fourth Amendment and presents the

question of what a police officer should do when

presented with the barebones information of

“intoxicated driver” accompanied with a tag number,

registration number, and a particular location and no

further information concerning the 911 caller’s name or

basis of knowledge, or any predictive behavior of the

driver. The State argues that “there is substantial

government interest in effecting a stop as quickly as

possible . . . balanced against an individual’s right to

remain free from unreasonable government intrusion.”

Each party relies on Supreme Court law to support

its position. The State relies on Navarette v. California,

572 U.S. 393 (2014) (holding that reasonable suspicion

of an ongoing crime existed when the anonymous caller

was an eyewitness, claiming she had been run off the

road). Trott relies on Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266

App. 36

(2000) (holding that the tip lacked the necessary indicia

of reliability because it did not explain the tipster’s

basis of knowledge about the gun and was without

“predictive information” that would allow the police “to

test the informant’s knowledge or credibility” by

corroborating details) and Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.

325, 332 (1990) (holding that the officers’ corroboration

of movements predicted by the tipster demonstrated a

special familiarity with respondent’s affairs and made

the anonymous tip sufficiently reliable to create

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).

Many of our sister jurisdictions have considered the

question of an “anonymous” 911 call in the context of

driving while intoxicated. Several state courts have

held that 911 calls, in light of today’s technology, are

not anonymous because they are readily traceable. See,

e.g., State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338 (N.H. 1995); State

v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000). Many of the states

have held that given the high threat to public safety

posed by drunk drivers, the “minimal intrusion” upon

an individual’s privacy is warranted and that an officer

may perform an investigative stop based upon an

unidentified 911 caller who describes the driving

activity. But see Navarette, 572 U.S. at 409 (Scalia, J.,

dissenting) (impugning that 911 traceability would be

an indicium of reliability because, among other

reasons, an average anonymous tipster to 911 likely is

not aware of any traceability). This case is one step

removed from the extant jurisprudence, i.e., there is no

explicit description contained in the tip about the

nature of the driving.

App. 37

This case presents the opportunity for the Court of

Appeals to set forth the parameters of the Fourth

Amendment in the above-described circumstances.

Because this case presents the single constitutional

issue, the issue is of state-wide importance, and it is

likely that whatever the outcome in the Court of

Special Appeals, the aggrieved party will petition the

Court of Appeals for writ of certiorari.

Relevant Factual Background

On December 4, 2015, at approximately 11:26 p.m.,

Corporal Cooper was on duty when he was dispatched

to 5823 Deale Churchton Road. He testified that the

dispatch was for an intoxicated driver at that location,

and the dispatcher stated the color of the vehicle along

with a Maryland tag number and a Maryland

registration. When he arrived at that location,

accompanied by another officer, he observed a silver

Honda CR-V parked in front of Captain Kidd’s liquor

store, with the same Maryland tag number that was

provided to him by the dispatcher. Appellant was in the

driver’s seat of the car and his girlfriend was seated in

the front passenger seat. The car was parked, the keys

were in the ignition, and the engine was running. The

officer parked ten to fifteen feet behind appellant’s

automobile, and activated his lights but no siren. Both

officers approached the car, one to the passenger’s side

and one to the driver’s side. Corporal Cooper

approached the vehicle, knocked on the window, asked

him to roll down the window and to present his license

and registration. Corporal Cooper detected a strong

odor of an alcoholic beverage on appellant’s breath.

Appellant stated that his driver’s license was

App. 38

suspended and revoked. Following an unsuccessful

field sobriety test, the police arrested appellant.

Appellant was tried in the Circuit Court for Anne

Arundel County and convicted of driving while

impaired. He appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.

Arguments of the Parties on Appeal

Appellant argues that the officers did not have a

legal basis to stop and detain him and that the 911 call

from an anonymous person cannot support a finding of

reasonable suspicion. He argues that the caller to 911

referred to an “intoxicated driver,” without any

reference as to timing or description of any driving

behavior or any basis of knowledge of the caller. He

maintains that this sparse reference provides nothing

more than pure speculation that any criminal activity

was ongoing. What is missing in the call, he claims, is

sufficient indicia of reliability and basis of knowledge

of the caller, given that reasonable suspicion requires

that a tip be reliable in its assertion of ongoing

illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a

determinate person. The mere reference to “intoxicated

driver” is “a conclusory allegation,” which is insufficient

under the Supreme Court jurisprudence and

particularly Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403

(2014). He argues that the Supreme Court findings in

Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271, applies here: “[a]ll

the police had to go on in this case was the bare report

of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither

explained how he knew about the [‘intoxicated driver’]

nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside

information about [appellant].”

App. 39

The State argues that the motions court did not err

in denying the motion to suppress for three reasons:

(1) the police encounter with appellant was consensual

and not a detention; (2) the police had reasonable

suspicion to detain appellant for investigation; and

(3) the police acted in their community caretaking

function. First, the State argues that Corporal Cooper’s

approach of appellant’s vehicle and appellant was a

mere accosting, not a Terry stop, because Corporal

Cooper turned on his emergency lights behind

appellant’s vehicle without intent to show authority but

rather to make sure that his vehicle would be visible.

The State contends that appellant rolled down his

window voluntarily in response to Corporal Cooper’s

request, and that the encounter was consensual until

some point after appellant opened the car window,

when Cooper gathered more evidence, leading to the

field sobriety test. Second, the State argues that

Corporal Cooper had reasonable suspicion to stop

appellant because the tip, as relayed by the dispatcher,

included specific information to identify the car along

with the allegation that the driver was intoxicated. The

State contends that this is sufficient to meet the

reasonable suspicion standard for a driving while

intoxicated or impaired case. The State argues that this

case is distinguishable from J.L. because identification

of a specific car makes it less likely that the wrong

person would be stopped than would a description of a

person on the street. Furthermore, the State argues

that “anonymity does not undermine [a] call’s

reliability.” Third, the State argues that the community

caretaking function provided an independent rationale

for the stop.

App. 40

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, and pursuant to

Maryland Rule 8-304(a), these issues are certified to

the Court of Appeals on this 6th day of October, 2020.

(JUDGE’S SIGNATURE APPEARS

ON THE ORIGINAL OF THIS

DOCUMENT)

Stuart R. Berger, Judge, Panel Chair

For the Panel:

Melanie Shaw-Geter, Judge

Irma S. Raker, Senior Judge, Specially Assigned

[SEAL]

App. 41

APPENDIX D

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR

ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND

CRIMINAL DOCKET

CASE NO. C-02-CR-19-001378

[Dated: October 29, 2019]

_______________________________________

STATE OF MARYLAND,

)

)

vs.

)

)

BENJAMIN CALEB TROTT,

)

)

Defendant

)

_______________________________________)

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDING

* * * *

[pp. 24]

COURT’S FINDINGS

THE COURT: All right. Well, viewing what you

gentlemen have submitted in writing and your

arguments along with the testimony of Officer Cooper,

I find that the circumstances were sufficient to support

the stop conducted by Officer Cooper and therefore the

Motion is denied.

* * * *