Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lawrence T. Newman, Petitioner v. Robert W. York

I

LEs

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

No.

m mz

iV;

AUG 0 9 2021

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Supreme fflflurl nf tip Bnitcii States

IN RE SUPERVISED ESTATE OF AL KATZ:

LAWRENCE T. NEWMAN

Petitioner,

v.

ROBERT W. YORK

as Personal Representative,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LAWRENCE T. NEWMAN

Pro Se

4102 66th Street Circle West

Bradenton, FL 34209

(317) 397-5258

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Lawrence T. Newman, respectfully

requests that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to

review the judgments of the Indiana Court of Appeals

and of the Indiana Supreme Court approving an

award of $167,437.50 in appellate attorney fees

against Newman in the absence of Constitutional due

process afforded to Newman in all of the legal

proceedings leading up to said award and without any

findings of specific wrongdoing by Newman relative to

the bases for said award.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order of the trial court dated October 22,

2019, awarding appellate attorney fees is set forth in

Appendix A. The Order of the Indiana Court of

Appeals dated October 7, 2020, affirming the trial

court is set forth in Appendix B. The Order of the

Indiana Court of Appeals dated December 7, 2020,

denying Newman’s Petition for Rehearing is set forth

in Appendix C. The Order of the Indiana Supreme

Court dated April 20, 2021, denying transfer is set

forth in Appendix D.

JURISDICTION

This cause arises from an award of appellate

attorney fees against Newman by the trial court,

which award was upheld by the Indiana Court of

Appeals and by the Indiana Supreme Court.

Accordingly, the jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C § 1257(a).

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the following Constitutional

provisions, the pertinent portions of which are set

forth below:

Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom

of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people

peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Const, amend. I.

No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process of law ....

U.S. Const, amend. V.

.... No state shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any State deprive any person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, Section 1.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive

fines imposed, ....

U.S. Const, amend. VIII

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On October 22, 2019, the Marion County

(Indiana) Superior Court awarded $167,437.50 in

appellate attorney fees against Newman based upon

prior Orders of the Indiana Court of Appeals and the

2

This case presents a

Indiana Supreme Court,

singular question of the outer limits of a citizen’s

Constitutional due process and other related

Constitutional rights in legal proceedings stretching

over years and involving multiple levels of courts,

trial, appellate, and state Supreme Court, which

courts at all levels repeatedly denied said rights to the

citizen, and culminating in a punitive grosslyexcessive award of appellate attorney fees resulting

from said denials of Constitutional rights.

The events that led to the fee award are as

follows.

Petitioner Lawrence Newman ("Newman") is

the husband of Dr. Beverly Newman and the son-inlaw of Dr. Newman’s father, A1 Katz, a Holocaust

Survivor and domiciliary of Indianapolis, Indiana,

since 1947.

In July 2010, at age 90, A1 Katz passed away in

Florida, and Dr. Newman opened his Estate in the

Marion County, Indiana, Probate Court, which

appointed her as Personal Representative of the A1

Katz Estate in October 2010, and her husband,

Lawrence Newman, a licensed attorney in Indiana

and

Ohio,

represented

her

as

Personal

Representative.

The Estate was chronically short of liquid

assets from its inception because A1 Katz had been

put into an involuntary professional guardianship in

Florida in September 2009, which guardianship

consumed almost all of Katz’s liquid assets in less

than one year’s time, and Lawrence Newman, as the

3

son-in-law of A1 Katz, personally paid for many of the

ongoing administrative expenses of the Estate,

including, inter alia, expenses for the upkeep of A1

Katz’s domiciliary home at 4727 North Ritter Avenue,

Indianapolis, Indiana (“Ritter Property”), such as

utilities, insurance, maintenance, and property taxes,

expenses for the upkeep of A1 Katz’s Florida

condominium, litigation expenses for four damage

lawsuits filed by the Estate in Florida against A1

Katz’s professional guardian, his condominium

association, an attorney, and a nursing home.

At the time he paid for Estate administrative

expenses, Newman expected that the Estate would, in

the future, have sufficient funds to reimburse him for

such necessary expenses through, inter alia, the sale

of the Ritter Property and through the Florida

damage lawsuits.

In this respect, on April 27, 2013, Newman

filed a motion for reimbursement of Estate

administrative expenses in the amount of $42,284.54.

On August 28, 2013, Newman filed another

motion for reimbursement of Estate administrative

expenses in the amount of $2,054.11.

On October 9, 2013, Newman filed a further

motion for reimbursement of Estate administrative

expenses in the amount of $1,075.48.

On March 19, 2014, Newman filed his final

motion for reimbursement of Estate administrative

expenses in the amount of $5,422.68, and in the

aggregate amount of $50,836.81.

4

Newman’s

four

administrative

expense

reimbursement Motions were set for hearing on

March 19, 2014, but not heard on said date; reset for

hearing on May 2, 2014, but not heard on said date;

and the trial court adjourned said May 2, 2014,

hearing without ever resetting said hearing and

without ever holding a subsequent hearing on

Newman’s Motions, as documented by the trial

court’s CCS entry on May 5, 2014:

Administrative Event. Per jacket entry

.... L. Newman in person,

Court

adjourns without addressing 5 motions

set for 3/19/14 .... File Stamp:

05/02/2014.

In fact, the adjourned hearing was never

thereafter reset, and Newman’s four reimbursement

Motions were never heard or otherwise determined by

the trial court.

In addition to his four reimbursement Motions,

Newman subsequently filed on January 25, 2016, a

"Verified Petition for Payment of Estate Attorney

Fees" for administrative expenses in the amount of

$52,050.00, in payment for his attorney fees earned

while representing Estate Personal Representative

Dr. Beverly Newman from the opening of the Estate

through Lawrence Newman’s withdrawal on

February 3, 2012. Said Petition for administrative

expenses was never scheduled for hearing or

determined by the trial court.

5

Newman thereafter filed on May 9, 2016, a

"Notice to Court of Transfer of Interest of

Administrative Expense Claim and Motion for

Approval and Payment of Claim" relative to $1,554.20

paid by the Newmans for 2016 property taxes on the

Estate’s Ritter Property,

Said claim for

administrative expenses was similarly never heard or

determined by the trial court.

The

aggregate

amount

of Newman’s

administrative expenses in his six Motions totals

$104,441.01. None of said six Motions was ever heard

or otherwise determined by the trial court.

In January 2015, the court appointed

Indianapolis attorney Robert York as both the

successor Personal Representative and attorney for

the A1 Katz Estate. In May 2015, over Dr. Beverly

Newman’s objections, York sought and obtained trial

court authorization to dismiss with prejudice the

Estate’s four Florida damage lawsuits, which

dismissals eliminated a significant source of Estate

funds available to pay Newman’s administrative

expense Motions.

In order to effectuate the dismissals of the four

Florida lawsuits by the Indiana-sited Estate, York, an

attorney licensed in Indiana but never licensed in

Florida: (1) falsely registered with the Florida EFiling Portal as a "self-represented litigant" and

(2) personally made four separate filings in various

Florida courts on behalf of the Estate through the

Florida E-Filing Portal, each of which filings

constituted the unlicensed practice of law in Florida

6

by York, a third degree felony under Fla. Stat. §

454.23.

Although the trial court in the A1 Katz Estate

proceeding was notified multiple times by Lawrence

Newman and by Dr. Beverly Newman of York’s illegal

repeated felonious unlicensed practice of law in

Florida, the Indiana court never reported York to

appropriate authorities, sanctioned York, or took any

other actions against York.

Further, although annual accountings are

required by Indiana estate law, York has never filed a

single accounting since being appointed successor

Personal Representative in January 2015.

On July 13, 2016, upon motion for

disqualification filed by Newman alleging bias and

prejudice by the judge, trial court Judge Rosenberg

and his supervising judge both recused themselves for

cause, and the Indiana Supreme Court thereupon

appointed Judge James Joven, a legal colleague of

Robert York from the small town of Lawrence,

Indiana, as successor judge on July 20, 2016.

Although Judge Rosenberg had never heard or

determined any of Newman’s six administrative

expense Motions, and the trial court’s own written

record, through its CCS and the specific

determinations cited herein, conclusively documented

that Newman’s Motions had never been heard or

determined, Judge Joven beginning upon his

appointment and thereafter repeatedly erroneously

held that the court had previously denied or dismissed

Newman’s Motions during Judge Rosenberg’s tenure.

7

In said holdings, Judge Joven never cited to

any actual specific court Order that had actually

denied or dismissed any of Newman’s Motions,

notwithstanding:

documentation

repeated

Newman’s

(1)

submitted to Judge Joven that no such Order(s) had

ever been issued at any time by the court;

(2) Newman’s repeated requests that Judge

Joven cite the specific alleged court Orders; and

(3) that Judge Joven himself had previously

listed as unheard on his November 29, 2016, ’’Order

Setting Pretrial Conference" Newman’s Motion for

administrative expense attorney fees filed on January

25, 2016, in the amount of more than $50,000.00.

In this respect, Indiana Trial Rule 53.1(C)

provides that “a court is deemed to have set a motion

for hearing on the date the setting is noted in the

Chronological Case Summary, and to have ruled on

the date the ruling is noted in the Chronological Case

Summary.”

Judge Joven consistently refused

Newman’s multiple and repeated requests to set his

administrative expense Motions for hearing, even

though the court’s CCS conclusively established that

no hearing on said Motions had ever taken place and

that no Order determining any of said Motions had

ever been issued by any predecessor judge in the case.

From the time he assumed jurisdiction of the

A1 Katz Estate proceeding in 2016, Judge Joven

refused to even consider hearing any of Newman’s

subject Motions, leaving Newman without any relief

at the trial court level, thus denying Newman his

fundamental due process rights to access to the

8

courts, to redress of grievances, and to consideration

of his Motions on their merits at the trial court level.

Beginning in 2017, Newman began his quest to

obtain judicial relief and due process at the appellate

court level in Indiana.

In 2017, York obtained an Order from the trial

court to attempt to consummate a sale of the Ritter

Property without consideration of Newman’s six

unheard administrative expense Motions, which sale

would thus have excluded Newman from sharing in

the sale proceeds of the last asset of substantial value

held by the Estate.

Newman thereafter filed an interlocutory

Appeal, challenging the trial court’s Order which

authorized the distribution of the proceeds of the sale

of the Ritter Property without consideration of

Newman’s six administrative expense Motions that

still had never been heard or determined by the trial

court. Said interlocutory Appeal was dismissed with

prejudice by the Court of Appeals before any briefs

had been filed by Order of January 4, 2018, on the

basis that Newman had filed an untimely

interlocutory Appeal. Because no briefs had been

filed in said Appeal before it was dismissed, the

appellate court never considered or issued any

determinations on the merits of Newman’s contention

that his Constitutional due process rights had been

violated by the trial court through its refusal to hear

Newman’s six administrative expense Motions before

ordering the distribution of the proceeds from the sale

of the Ritter Property, preventing Newman from

sharing in the proceeds of said sale.

9

After said Appeal was dismissed as untimely

filed, the proposed sale of the Ritter Property did not

take place, and the issue Newman had attempted to

appeal became moot. Thereafter, in 2018, York

notified the trial court of his intent to sell the Ritter

Property to a different buyer, from which sales

proceeds York again intended to make no

distributions to Newman.

On May 31, 2018, Newman filed a Verified

Response to York’s notification of his intent to sell the

Ritter Property without any distributions to

Newman, in which Newman stated in pertinent part:

Lawrence Newman submits to this

Court that any distributions to the

United States of America and to the

State of Indiana for their respective tax

claims without payment of Lawrence

Newman’s

administrative

expense

claims will be a violation of probate law

and of Lawrence Newman’s due process

rights under the United States

Constitution

and

the

Indiana

Constitution, as well as a violation of

Lawrence Newman’s rights of access to

the courts guaranteed by the Indiana

Constitution....

As

Lawrence

Newman

further

repeatedly notified this Court and as he

does so herein, it is necessary that this

Court hear and determine Lawrence

Newman’s six (6) administrative expense

10

claims prior to any distribution of the

sale proceeds of the Ritter Property ....

Nonetheless, on June 12, 2018, the trial court

issued an Order in which the trial court set forth the

distributions to be made from the proceeds of the sale

of the Ritter Property, which Order did not mention

Newman or provide for any payment to Newman for

his administrative expense claims. Further, the trial

court took no actions to set any of Newman’s

administrative expense Motions for hearing.

Thus, at the trial court level since 2013,

Newman had filed a total of six Motions for payment

of administrative expenses seeking to be reimbursed

for personal cash advances he made to financially

support the Estate of his father-in-law and to be paid

for his legal services to the Estate, which

administrative expenses have priority under Indiana

law.

After Newman had repeatedly sought to have

said Motions heard and determined, the trial court

culminated five years of inaction on Newman’s

Motions by ordering the sale of the Estate’s Ritter Property without hearing or determining Newman’s

Motions, so that Newman could not share in the

proceeds of the last significant Estate asset.

Newman thereupon appealed said Order for

the sale of the Ritter Property to the Indiana Court of

Appeals on July 12, 2018. but the court denied

Newman’s Appeal on the basis that its Order

dismissing Newman’s prior Appeal for untimeliness,

prior to the filing of any briefs or arguments on the

11

merits, was nonetheless a judgment on the merits of

the prior Appeal and thus was res judicata as to

Newman’s subsequent subject Appeal, ruling:

With respect to Newman’s argument

that the trial court erred in

determining that his administrative

claims were dismissed or denied,

Newman cites the court’s August 4,

2017 order in which the trial court

stated that it had repeatedly denied

Newman’s claims for administrative

expenses. Newman also cites the trial

court’s August 28, 2017 order in which

the court mentioned it had previously

dismissed

his

claims.

However,

an

Newman

already

sought

interlocutory appeal of these orders

under Cause No. 2475 and the appeal

was dismissed with prejudice. “It is

generally recognized that a dismissal

with prejudice is a dismissal on the

merits.”

As such it is conclusive of

the rights of the parties and res

judicata as to the questions which

might have been litigated. Id. As we

dismissed Newman’s appeal with

prejudice, we do not disturb the trial

court’s finding that it had denied

Newman’s claims for administrative

expenses, and this issue is foreclosed

for our review.

As part of its Order of dismissal, the Court of

Appeals granted appellate attorney fees to York,

12

which amount would be ultimately determined by the

trial court. The Court of Appeals did not give any

reasons in its dismissal Order for assessing appellate

attorney fees against Newman, which lack of reasons

violated

Indiana

caselaw

precedents,

which

precedents authorized the assessment of appellate

attorney fees only in specified circumstances, none of

which circumstances were found by the Court of

Appeals to apply to Newman, as the Court failed to

state any reasons for assessment of attorney fees

against Newman. Said failure by the Court to state

its reasons violated Newman’s Constitutional due

process rights, as he was assessed attorney fees

without any finding of wrongdoing or misconduct by

Newman.

As a result of the actions of the Indiana Court

of Appeals, Newman was subject to being punitively

charged tens of thousands of dollars of appellate

attorney fees for seeking to enforce his Constitutional

due process rights to a hearing on the merits for his

administrative expense claims that had been

repeatedly denied to him at the trial court level.

Newman thereafter filed a Petition To Transfer

with the Indiana Supreme Court, seeking justice at

the ultimate state court level to enforce his

Constitutional due process rights to a hearing on the

merits of his administrative expense Motions, access

to the courts, and redress of grievances. The Indiana

Supreme Court denied transfer, thus, in essence,

approving the actions of the lower courts in denying

fundamental due process to Newman by failing to

afford him a hearing on the merits of his expense

claims and by imposing punitive appellate attorney

13

i

fees upon Newman without any findings of

wrongdoing by Newman and without finding any of

the required legal grounds necessary under Indiana

law for awarding appellate attorney fees against a

party.

As a result of the actions and inactions of the

trial court, the Indiana Court of Appeals, and the

Indiana Supreme Court decision not to consider the

issue on the merits, Newman’s six administrative

expense Motions remained unheard, undecided, and

unpaid.

In separate litigation during the same period of

time, Lawrence Newman and his wife sued A1 Katz

Estate successor Personal Representative and

attorney Robert W. York for damages in a lawsuit

filed in the Florida courts for wrongful actions taken

by York in Florida relative to his administration of

the A1 Katz Estate, including, inter alia, the repeated

unlicensed practice of law in Florida by York, who is

only licensed in Indiana, by York’s filings of four

separate documents in the Florida courts on behalf of

the Indiana-sited Estate, and York’s conspiracy with

Florida-licensed opposing counsels to effect the

dismissal of four Florida damage lawsuits filed by the

Estate prior to York’s appointment as successor

Personal Representative, pursuant to May 11, 2015,

hearing arranged by York in which multiple Floridalicensed attorneys appeared at the behest of York at

he six-hour hearing until 9:00 at night, respectively

representing their Florida clients against the interests

of the A1 Katz Estate.

14

1

York, who appeared and defended by counsel in

the Newmans’ Florida litigation against him, months

later filed for an injunction in the Indiana Estate

proceeding for the Indiana Estate court to enjoin the

Newmans from continuing their Florida lawsuit

The Indiana court granted the

against York,

injunction sought by York, and the Newmans ceased

litigating against York in their Florida lawsuit, and

Lawrence Newman brought an Appeal of the

injunction in the Indiana Court of Appeals.

Rather than hear Newman’s Appeal on its

merits, the Indiana Court of Appeals dismissed it

without stating any legal grounds for said dismissal,

and further assessed appellate attorney fees against

Newman without stating any finding of wrongdoing

by Newman or stating of the required legal grounds

for an award of appellate attorney fees in Indiana.

After the Court of Appeals denied Newman’s

Motion for Rehearing, Newman filed a Petition To

Transfer in the Indiana Supreme Court.

The

Supreme Court denied transfer without any stated

reason, and imposed further appellate attorney fees

against Newman, similarly without any finding of

wrongdoing by Newman and without stating any of

the required legal and factual findings necessary for

an award of appellate attorney fees under Indiana

law. See Ballaban v. Bloomington Jewish Cmty., Inc.,

982 N.E.2d 329 (Ind.App. 2013) and Orr v. Turco Mfg.

CoInc., 512 N.E.2d 151 (1987).

On August 7, 2019, York filed a Petition for

Determination of Appellate Attorney Fees with the

trial court, which hearing was set for September 17,

15

2019, to determine the dollar amount of attorney fees

to be imposed upon Newman in both of his Appeals.

In his Petition, York requested an award of appellate

attorney fees against Newman in the two Appeals for

453.2 hours at $375.00 per hour, totaling $169,950.00.

On September 2, 2019, Newman filed his

Verified Response to Robert W. York’s “Personal

Representative’s Verified Petition for Determination

of Appellate Attorney Fees" in the trial court,

challenging both the amounts charged by York and

York’s proffered documentation in support of his fee

request. In particular, Newman argued that, inter

alia-.

York’s requested fees were intolerably

(1)

inflated, as he requested attorney fees in excess of

$1,000.00 per page for some of his appellate filings;

(2)

York’s total amount of fees requested of

$169,950.00 far exceeded the total value of the A1

Katz Estate, which was approximately an estimated

$10,000.00 at the time York made his charges;

(3)

York charged for legal work unrelated to

the Estate of A1 Katz;

York sought an award of attorney fees of

(4)

$169,950.00, which was far in excess of the total

financial exposure of the Estate by the administrative

expenses Newman sought to be paid in his Appeals of

$104,441.01;

(5)

the Affidavit of York’s expert witness,

Karl Mulvaney, was not verified, was not based upon

personal knowledge, and was based upon facially-false

factual errors;

(6)

York never offered his Appellate Time

Records into evidence at the fee hearing, so there was

no evidence on the record to support the trial court’s

16

findings regarding York’s claimed fees; nevertheless,

the trial court falsely stated in its Judgment of

Attorney’s Fee Award that York’s Appellate Time

Records had been admitted into evidence.

Newman cited Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S.

424,434 (1983), for the maxim that "Hours that are

not properly billed to one’s client also are not properly

billed to one’s adversary." Newman thus argued that

an Indiana lawyer cannot ethically charge a client

over $65,000.00 more in appellate attorney fees than

the amount of money for which the attorney’s client

(the Estate) could have been liable had it not

defended the Appeal, and over $150,000.00 more in

appellate attorney fees than the Estate was worth.

In this respect, York’s requested appellate fees

exceeded the financial exposure of the Estate in the

subject Appeals - the administrative expenses and fees

of Lawrence Newman - by over 60% and York’s

requested fees exceeded the current value of the

Estate by well over 1,700%.

Newman did not appear at the trial court’s fee

hearing, but rested upon his Verified Response that

was submitted to the trial court under oath subject to

penalties of perjury.

On October 22, 2019, the trial court issued its

Judgment of Appellate Attorneys Fees Award,

granting $167,437.50 in appellate attorney fees to

York, which amount subtracted only 6.7 hours of

wholly-unrelated legal work from York’s requested

amount of fees.

17

Newman appeals the trial court’s award of

$167,437.50 in appellate attorney fees to York as a

gross violation of Newman’s Constitutional rights to

due process because said fee award was not only an

unconstitutional abuse of power by the trial court, it

was based upon and derived from unconstitutional

prior actions and inactions by the trial court, the

Indiana Court of Appeals, and the Indiana Supreme

Court, inter alia, denying Newman his Constitutional

rights to access to the Courts and to redress of

grievances.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The award of extraordinary punitive

1.

appellate attorney fees of $167,437.50

against

Newman based upon Newman’s Constitutionallyprotected assertions of his due process rights to a

hearing

on the merits violates the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause and other

Constitutional provisions.

This case concerns a first impression issue of

the deprivation of due process by the impositions of

extraordinary appellate attorney fees as a punishment

because of a litigant’s repeated Constitutionallyprotected attempts at all levels of the state courts to

obtain a hearing on issues of substantial property

rights.

While this Court has considered many cases

dealing with the issue of the right to an award of

appellate attorney fees, and while this Court has also

considered many cases of due process considerations

dealing with issues of sufficiency of notice, timing of

18

hearings, and the substance of hearings, this case

presents the unique circumstance where a litigant is

assessed an extraordinary amount of appellate

($167,437.50) because of his

attorney fees

Constitutionally-protected efforts over a period of

years to obtain his likewise Constitutionally-protected

right to present his case on the merits in a hearing in

a court of law on property right claims totaling over

$100,000.00., an egregious denial of the fundamental

Constitutional rights to due process, access to the

courts, and redress of grievances enacted in the Bill of

Rights over two centuries ago.

While this Court has multiple times considered

the issue of the right to be awarded attorney fees, it

has never considered the right not to be assessed

attorney fees when such fees were assessed against a

party due to his assertion of Constitutionallyprotected rights.

Specifically, this Court has considered the issue

of the right to an award of attorney fees in numerous

cases.

See, inter alia, Alyeska Pipeline Service

Company v. The Wilderness Society, et al, 421 U.S.

240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d

40 (1983); Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 163

L.Ed.2d 547, 546 U.S. 132, 126 S. Ct. 707 (2005); and

Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health, 134 S.Ct. 1749,

188 L.Ed.2d 816, 82 USLW 4330 (2014).

None of the above cases considers the issue

brought before this Court herein: whether attorney

fees can Constitutionally be assessed against a litigant

for the litigant’s assertion of his own Constitutional

19

right to a hearing on the merits of his claims,

particularly when the courts assessing the attorney

fee awards fail to articulate any of the required bases

for making such awards of fees.

As recounted above, Newman spent years

attempting to obtain a single hearing in the trial

court on his six administrative expense claims in the

Estate of A1 Katz, but the trial court initially refused

to even hold a hearing and then afterward repeatedly

falsely claimed that such a hearing had already been

held and that Newman’s subject claims had already

been denied or dismissed. The trial court’s position

was clearly wrong, both factually and legally, as the

trial court’s own CCS record established conclusively

that no such hearing had ever taken place and that

likewise, no such denials or dismissals had ever been

ordered.

In this respect, Ind. Trial Rule 77(B) provides

in pertinent part (emphasis added):

Chronological Case Summary (CCS).

For each case, the clerk of the circuit

court shall maintain a sequential

record of the judicial events in such

proceeding .... The judge of the case

shall cause CCS entries to be made of

all judicial events. Notation of judicial

events in the CCS shall be made

promptly, and shall set forth the date

of the event and briefly define any

documents,

orders,

rulings,

or

judgments filed or entered in the case

20

.... The CCS is an official record of the

trial court....

Further, Indiana law provides that: "a court is

deemed to have decided on the date the decision is

noted in the Chronological Case Summary." Ind.

Trial Rule 53.2(C).

As noted above, while trial court Judge Joven

insisted for years that Newman’s administrative

expense Motions had been previously denied or

dismissed, Newman thereupon repeatedly asked the

trial court to specify the date and content of said

purported court Orders, as such Orders did not

appear on the trial court’s CCS, but Judge Joven

never so specified.

Likewise, the Indiana Court of Appeals, in two

separate Appeals by Newman, while assessing

appellate attorney fees against Newman by adopting

the trial court’s position that Newman Motions had at

some time been denied or dismissed, likewise would

not specify any of the purported Orders or actions of

the trial court, and assessed fees without stating any

wrongdoing by Newman to justify said fee

assessments.

Lastly, the Indiana Supreme Court, while

denying Newman’s Petition To Transfer, nonetheless

assessed its own appellate attorney fees against

Newman, once again without specifying any

wrongdoing by Newman to justify said assessment of

fees, and further without comment on the issue of the

failures of the Indiana courts at both the trial court

and the appellate levels to identify any actual action,

21

Order, or hearing by the trial court that denied or

dismissed

Newman’s

subject

Motions

for

administrative expenses.

The result of these combined actions/inactions

by the Indiana courts at all three levels of the state

judiciary - trial, appellate, and Supreme Court - was

to deny Newman of his Constitutional right to a

hearing on the merits of his subject Motions for

administrative expenses totaling $104,441.01, while

penalizing Newman for his years’ long assertions of

his Constitutional right to a hearing by seeking

justice from Indiana’s appellate courts.

The right to a hearing on the merits in a court

for the redress of grievances is inviolate and stretches

back centuries in Constitutional law. Over 150 years

ago, even prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth

Amendment, in Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223 (1 Wall.

223, 17 L.Ed. 531) (1863), this Court clearly

recognized the right of a litigant in American courts

to have his case actually heard as established in cases

dating back to 1850.

Parties whose rights are to be affected are

entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy

that right they must first be notified. Common justice

requires that no man shall be condemned in his

person or property without notice and an opportunity

to make his defence. Nations et al. v. Johnson et al,

24 How., 203; Boswell's Lessee v. Otis et al., 9 How.,

350; Oakley v. Aspinwall, 4 Comst., 514.

In the present case, Newman was "condemned

in his ... property ... without notice and an

22

opportunity to make his defence" twice by the Indiana

courts - first, by the courts’ repeated denials of

Newman’s right to a hearing on his administrative

expense Motions, and second, by imposing

$167,437.50 in appellate attorney fees against

Newman without notice of any legal grounds for

imposing said penalties against Newman for his acts

of seeking justice though his legal right to appeal in

Indiana’s appellate courts.

In these respects, the Indiana Constitution

guarantees Newman the “absolute right to one

appeal.” Ind. Const, art. VII, §6, but Newman’s rights

to appeal were denied to him because: (1) the

appellate courts refused to confront on the merits the

trial court’s documented failure to provide Newman

with his Constitutionally-protected right to a hearing

on the merits; and (2) the Indiana appellate courts

punished Newman for asserting his appellate rights

by imposing without stated legal cause extraordinary

appellate attorney fees.

“[S]ome form of hearing is required before an

individual is finally deprived of a property [or liberty]

interest,” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,333

(1976), but no hearing was required for Newman

before he was deprived of his administrative expense

claims.

"Both liberty and property are specifically

protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against any

state deprivation which does not meet the standards

of due process

Giaccio v. State of Pennsylvania,

382 U.S. 399 (1966).

23

In this case, the Indiana courts twice did not

"meet the standards of due process" in their

imposition of $167,437.50 in attorney fees against

Newman, in their failure to give Newman a hearing

and in their imposition of fees upon Newman without

any stated legal cause.

Said imposition of fees

without stated legal cause further impacted

Newman’s due process rights because he was

hamstrung in opposing said fee assessments because

he never knew the reason why he was being punished

with the massive penalty of $167,437.50 in appellate

attorney fees.

"[F] airness can rarely be obtained by secret,

one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights,"

Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S.

123,170 (1951), but Newman was assessed over

$165,000.00 in appellate attorney fees by multiple

Indiana appellate courts without once being notified

by said courts of the legal reasons why he was being

penalized.

The deprivation of property interests without

due process, and the requirement for an actual

hearing and decision on the merits of a controversy

are cornerstones of this Court’s principles and

practice, and this Court has explicated the various

requirements of due process of law in a myriad of

cases over decades of decisionmaking.

Due process has been interpreted by this Court

as preventing the states from denying litigants use of

established adjudicatory procedures, when such an

action would be “the equivalent of denying them an

24

opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right[s].”

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,380 (1971).

The essence of due process is the requirement

that "a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given]

notice of the case against him and opportunity to

meet it." Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath,

341 U.S. 123,171 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

In Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980), this

Court held:

The Due Process Clause entitles a

person

to

an

impartial

and

disinterested tribunal in both civil and

criminal cases. This requirement of

neutrality in adjudicative proceedings

safeguards the two central concerns of

procedural due process, the prevention

of unjustified or mistaken deprivations

and the promotion of participation and

dialogue by affected individuals in the

decisionmaking process. See Carey v.

Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259-262, 266-267

(1978)....

We have employed the same principle in

a variety of settings, demonstrating the

powerful and independent constitutional

interest in fair adjudicative procedure.

Indeed, "justice must satisfy the

appearance of justice," Offutt v. United

States, 348 U.S. 11,14, (1954) ....

25

At all judicial levels, the State of Indiana has

demonstrated that certain persons are not entitled "to

an impartial and disinterested tribunal ... [a]

requirement of neutrality ... the prevention of

unjustified or mistaken deprivation." In the instant

case, Newman is a publicly-known adversary of child

predators and their enablers, for which actions Robert

W. York fired Newman prior to York’s appointments

as Estate attorney and Personal Representative. It

was Newman and his wife who first publicly exposed

the serious child abuse occurring at the Indianapolis

Jewish Community Center, where numerous

convicted predators frequented, including Jared

Fogle, having preyed upon children globally as the

spokesman for Subway restaurants. Thus, Newman

has been targeted for years by the Indiana courts

where Robert W. York is well-known.

“It is a violation of due process for a state to

enforce a judgment against a party to a proceeding

without having given him an opportunity to be heard

sometime before final judgment is entered. Postal

Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport; 247 U.S. 464,476

(1918).

In the Indiana courts, for Newman, who

publicly exposed child abuse at an influential site, the

state has proven that it will "enforce a judgment

against a party to a proceeding without having given

him an opportunity to be heard ...." and punitively

deprive him of hundreds of thousands of dollars

without access to the courts or opportunity to redress

grievances.

26

Indeed, the failures of the trial court, the

Indiana Court of Appeals, and of the Indiana Supreme

Court to afford Newman the most rudimentary

aspects of due process are direct affronts to the basic

characteristics of due process long established by this

Court. The trial court refused to allow Newman to

have a hearing on a single one of his six

The Court of

administrative expense Motions.

Appeals compounded the state’s deprivation of

Newman’s due process rights by denying Newman the

opportunity for an appeal on the merits, The Indiana

Supreme Court further compounded the deprivations

of Newman’s due process by refusing transfer, thus in

essence confirming the lower courts’ deprivations of

Newman’s Constitutional due process rights, but

nonetheless imposing additional appellate attorney

fees against Newman..

Due process rights are considered as so

fundamental that they are guaranteed in multiple

clauses in the United States Constitution.

See

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403,415 n.12 (2002)

(holding the right to be “grounded in the Article IV

Privileges and Immunities Clause, the First

Amendment Petition Clause, the First Amendment

Petition Clause, the Fifth Amendment Due Process

Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal

Protection and Due Process Clauses.”). See also id. at

415 (access to the courts is a “fundamental right”

that is a “separate and distinct right to seek judicial

relief for some wrong.”).

“[T]he Due Process Clauses protect civil

litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as

defendants hoping to protect their property or as

27

plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances.” Logan v.

Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,429 (1982).

Due process rights are the type of

“fundamental rights” that are both “deeply rooted in

this Nation’s history and tradition” and “implicit in

the concept of ordered liberty.”

Washington v.

Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702,720-21 (1997).

Ultimately, on the foundation of the multiple

deprivations of Constitutional due process owed to

Newman by the Indiana trial court, Court of Appeals,

and Supreme Court, in denying Newman his right to

a hearing on the merits of his administrative expense

Motions and by the repeated impositions of appellate

attorney fees awards without any findings of

wrongdoing by Newman and without any of the

necessary findings to support said fee awards, the

trial court thereafter charged appellate attorney fees

against Newman in the exorbitant total amount

claimed by York of $167,437.50.

Because the

assessment of attorney fees against Newman by the

trial court were based upon violations of his

Constitutional due process rights as a punishment for

Newman’s attempts at three levels of Indiana’s courts

to exercise his Constitutional rights to a hearing on

the merits of his claims, the award of attorney fees of

$167,437.50, far in excess of the worth of the Estate,

was in itself an additional violation of Newman’s

Constitutional due process rights.

“For while an individual certainly may be

penalized for violating the law, he just as certainly

may not be punished for exercising a protected

28

statutory or constitutional right.”

Goodwin, 357 U.S. 368,372 (1982).

United States v.

This Court has stated that “some errors are so

fundamental and pervasive that they require reversal

without regard to the facts and circumstances of the

case.” Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787,810

(1987). An error is fundamental if it undermines

confidence in the proceeding. Id., at 812-813.

Due to the pervasive and fundamental errors

committed in violation of Newman’s Constitutional

due process rights by all three levels of Indiana state

courts in denying Newman of his right to a hearing on

the merits, of denying Newman appeals on the merits,

and of imposing an extraordinary punitive penalty of

$167,437.50 against Newman without any findings of

wrongdoing and in the absence of any stated legal

justification for such a penalty imposed upon

Newman because he exercised his Constitutional right

to a obtain a hearing on the merits, this Court should

grant Newman’s Writ of Certiorari and reverse the

judgment of attorney fee award by the Indiana courts.

It is small wonder that for decades, crimes

against children were covered up by sports

organizations headquartered nearby the three levels

of courts sited in Indianapolis, crimes so widespread

and severe involving thousands of children that made

headlines worldwide, crimes covered up by codes of

silence imposed by Indianapolis leaders.

29

The imposition by the trial court of

$167,437.50 in appellate attorney fees against

Newman upon assessments by the Indiana Court of

Appeals and the Indiana Supreme Court, without any

necessary findings of wrongdoing by Newman to

justify said imposition of appellate attorney fees

violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines

Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and

Immunities Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s

Due Process Clause and other Constitutional

provisions.

2.

The trial Court’s imposition upon Newman of

an appellate attorney fee judgment of $167,437.50

violates the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines

clause and the excessive fines clause in the Indiana

Constitution.

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor

excessive fines imposed,....

U.S. Const, amend. VIII

“The phrase ‘nor excessive fines imposed’

limits the government’s power to extract payments,

whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some

offense.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S.

321,327-328 (1998). The Fourteenth Amendment

incorporates this protection against the states. Timbs

(2019).

v. Indiana, 586 U.S.

Likewise, the trial court’s Judgment violates

the Indiana Constitution, which provides:

Excessive fines shall not be imposed.

Ind. Const, art I, §16.

30

Indiana’s Supreme Court has held that the

Indiana Constitution should be interpreted to impose

the same restrictions as the Eighth Amendment.

Norris v. State, 394 N. E. 2d 144,150 (1979).

“The protection against excessive fines has

been a constant shield throughout Anglo-American

history:

Exorbitant

tolls

undermine

other

constitutional liberties .... Protection against

excessive punitive economic sanctions secured by the

Clause is, to repeat, both ‘fundamental to our scheme

of ordered liberty’ and ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s

history and tradition.’” Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S.

(2019).

For all of the reasons stated hereinabove,

which are fully incorporated herein, the trial court’s

Judgment imposing a $167,437.50 fee award was an

“excessive fine” against Newman and violated

Newman’s federal and state Constitutional rights

against excessive fines.

In addition to violating Newman’s federal and

state Constitutional rights against excessive fines, the

trial court’s Judgment imposing a $167,437.50 fee

award violated Newman’s Constitutional rights under

the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.

...No State shall make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1

31

“I would hold that the right to be free from

excessive fines is one of the ‘privileges or

immunities The Constitution of Indiana

provides that: ... "All courts shall be open; and

every man, for injury done to him in his person,

property, or reputation, shall have remedy by

due course of law. Justice shall be administered

freely, and without purchase; completely, and

without denial; speedily, and without delay"

(Article 1, § 12); .... These provisions of the

Constitution are a part of the fundamental law

of the state, declared by the people themselves

acting in their sovereign capacity. Ellingham v.

Dye (1913), 178 Ind. 336, 99 N.E. 1, Ann. Cas.

1915C 200. As such they are entitled to strict

construction.

Lafayette,

Muncie,

and

Bloomington R.R. Co. and Another v. Geiger

(1870), 34 Ind. 185. It has been said that the

language of each provision of the Constitution

is to be considered as though every word had

been hammered into place. State ex rel. Hovey

v. Noble {1888), 118 Ind. 350, 353, 21 N.E. 244.

Uniformity in the interpretation and

application of the law is the keystone of our

system of jurisprudence.... Id., 217 Ind. 93 at

107-112, 26 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 1940).

When the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,

“the terms ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ had an

established meaning as synonyms for ‘rights.’” Those

“rights” were the “inalienable rights” of citizens that

had been “long recognized,” and “the ratifying public

understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to

protect constitutionally enumerated rights” against

32

interference by the States. Timbs v. Indiana, 586

(2019), J. Thomas, concurring, citing

U.S.

McDonaldv. Chicago, 561 U. S. 742 (2010).

The prohibition on excessive fines is a right

that “operates, as a qualification upon powers,

actually granted by the people to the government”;

without such a “re-strictrionl.” the government’s

“oxftrcise or abuse” of its power could be “dangerous

to the people.” 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the

Constitution of the United States §1858, pp. 718-719

(1833).

The attention given to abusive fines at the time

of the Fourteenth Amendment, along with the

ubiquity

of state

excessive-fines

provisions,

demonstrate that the public continued to understand

the prohibition on excessive fines to be a fundamental

right of American citizenship. Timbs v. Indiana, 586

(2019), J. Thomas, concurring.

U.S.

Because Newman’s right to be free from

“excessive fines” is a fundamental right under the U.S.

Constitution and is one of the “privileges or

immunities” guaranteed to Newman by the Fourteenth

Amendment, for all of the reasons stated herein above,

which are fully incorporated herein, the trial court’s

Judgment violated Newman’s Constitutional rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment’s “Privileges or

Immunities Clause.”

The trial court further deprived Newman of his

Constitutional rights by imposing $167,437.50 in

appellate attorney fees without any stated legal

justification by the appellate courts that had awarded

33

the penalty because Newman had asserted his both

his federal and state Constitutional rights to a

hearing and his Indiana state Constitutional right to

a substantive appeal on the merits.

The Indiana Constitution guarantees Newman

the “absolute right to one appeal.” Ind. Const, art.

VII, §6.

Our courts are the bulwark, the final authority

which guarantees to every individual his right to

breathe free, to prosper and be secure within the

framework of a constitutional government. State ex

rel. Fifer, 234 Ind. at 181-82, 125 N.E.2d at 714

Noble County Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 234_Ind.

172, 180, 125_N.E.2d_709, 713 (1955).

N otwithstanding

Newman’s

state

Constitutional "absolute" right to an appeal and his

right to "prosper and be secure within the framework

of a constitutional government," the Indiana Court of

Appeals dismissed Newman’s first subject Appeal

without any stated legal justification for said

dismissal and denied Newman’s second Appeal based

upon a previous untimely interlocutory Appeal by

Newman on a separate legal issue that had been

dismissed "with prejudice," even though the only basis

for said dismissal was its untimeliness as an

interlocutory Appeal, even though the parties had

never filed briefs or submitted arguments on the

merits, and even though the Court of Appeals never

made a decision on the merits of the aborted Appeal.

In construing the Indiana Constitution, we

look to "the language of the text in the context of the

34

history surrounding its drafting and ratification, the

purpose and structure of our constitution, and case

law interpreting the specific provisions." .... The "first

line of inquiry in any constitutional case" is the text of

the constitution itself. State v. Monfort, 723 N.E.2d

407,409-10 (Ind. 2000).

By dismissing Newman’s prior time-barred

interlocutory Appeal “with prejudice,” the Court of

Appeals violated Newman’s Constitutional “absolute

right to one appeal” under the Indiana Constitution

and Newman’s due process rights under the Indiana

and federal Constitutions.

Under Indiana law, even though Newman’s

prior Appeal may have been filed too late to perfect an

interlocutory Appeal, Newman still retained the right

to file an Appeal at the conclusion of the case on the

same legal issue; thus, the Court of Appeals’ dismissal

of the time-barred interlocutory Appeal "with

prejudice" was not only in error, it served to deny

Newman his due process rights. See Kindred v.

Townsend, 4 N.E.3d 793 (Ind.Ct.App. 2014), in which

the court held:

...our supreme court has held that “[a]

claimed error in an interlocutory order is

not waived for failure to take an

interlocutory appeal but may be raised

on appeal from the final judgment.”

Bojrab v. Bojrab, 810 N.E.2d 1008, 1014

(Ind. 2004) (citing Georgos v. Jackson,

790 N.E.2d 448, 452 (Ind. 2003)). Thus,

the Kindreds may attack the trial court’s

interlocutory orders on appeal from the

35

final judgment. See id. But we hold that

they have forfeited their right to an

interlocutory appeal by failing to timely

appeal the trial court’s entry of the

preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals’ Order dismissing

Newman’s untimely interlocutory Appeal with

prejudice, which decision the Court of Appeals

referenced as the res judicata basis for denying

Newman an Appeal on its merits in his second

Appeal, unconstitutionally denied Newman his

inviolate right to an Appeal as guaranteed by the

Indiana Constitution. In its Order in Warren v.

Indiana Telephone Co., 217 Ind. 93, 26 N.E.2d

399 (Ind. 1940), the Indiana Supreme Court

recognized:

In Newman’s case, "All courts shall be open;

and every man, for injury done to him in his person,

property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due

course of law" does not apply; for Newman has

publicly sought to prevent injury done to children, for

which he has been glaringly denied "remedy by due

Indiana stands as a bastion of

course of law."

protection for child predators and deprivations of

child advocates.

In sum, the Indiana Court of Appeals twice

denied Newman his state Constitutional right to an

appeal on their merits concerning the Indiana courts’

prior denials of his Constitutional due process rights

to a hearing on the merits of his administrative

expense claims, and then severely punished Newman

with multiple fines of appellate attorney fees

36

ostensibly because he had sought to enforce his

Constitutional rights to a hearing and to substantive

Appeals.

“For while an individual certainly may be

penalized for violating the law, he just as certainly

may not be punished for exercising a protected

statutory or constitutional right.” United States v.

Goodwin, 357 U.S. 368,372 (1982).

The trial court’s penal award of $167,437.50 in

attorney fees against Newman was intended to and

caused him to be "punished for exercising a protected

constitutional right,” which punishment was in

itself a violation of Newman’s Constitutional rights to

be free from such governmental oppression.

The trial court’s $167,437.50 appellate fee

award against Newman was clearly punitive on

several bases. First, said amount is an extraordinary

sum for a single attorney to charge for two Appeals,

averaging to over $80,000.00 in appellate fees per

Appeal, when the appellate attorney was also the trial

attorney, and therefore was fully informed about the

case below in preparing the Appeals.

Second, York’s requested fees were intolerably

inflated, as he requested attorney fees in excess of

$1,000.00 per page for many of his appellate filings.

Third, the $167,437.50 in fees awarded to York

far exceeded the total value of the A1 Katz Estate,

which was an estimated $10,000.00 at the time York

made his charges.

37

Fourth, the $167,437.50 in attorney fees

awarded was far in excess of the $104,441.01 sought

by Newman in his Appeals.

Fifth, York never offered his Appellate Time

Records into evidence at the fee hearing, so there was

no evidence on the record to support the trial court’s

findings regarding York’s claimed fees; nevertheless,

the trial court falsely stated in its Judgment of

Attorney’s Fee Award that York’s Appellate Time

Records had been admitted

into evidence and

awarded $167,437.50 in fees completely unsupported

by evidence.

Importantly, since January 2015, six-and-a-half

years ago, York has never filed an Estate accounting,

and Judge James Joven has denied Newman’s request

for same.

The problem of disproportionate awards of

attorney fees dates back nearly two centuries, as

exemplified in the Remarks of Senator Bradbury;

Cong.Globe App., 32d Cong., 2d Sess., 207 (1853)

(emphasis added):

It is not only the officers of the courts, but

the suitors also, that are affected by the

present unequal, extravagant, and often

oppressive system. ’The abuses that have

grown up in the taxation of attorneys’ fees

which the losing party has been compelled to

pay in civil suits, have been a matter of

serious complaint .... in some cases those

costs have been swelled to an amount

exceedingly oppressive to suitors, and

38

altogether disproportionate to the magnitude

and importance of the causes in which they

are taxed, or the labor bestowed.

In the 21st century, the problem of assessment

of attorney fees in the absence of findings has recently

been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court

(emphasis added):

Hence, a plaintiff should not be

assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees

unless a court finds that his claim was

frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless.

or that the plaintiff continued to

litigate after it clearly became so.

Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp546

U.S. 132 (2005).

In Newman’s case, no appellate court assessing

attorney fees ever found that Newman’s subject

Appeals were “frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless”

or brought “in bad faith” as grounds for imposing said

sanction, thus clearly violating Newman’s due process

rights.

The refusal to supply readily available

evidentiary support for a conclusion strongly suggests

that the conclusion is, well, unsupported. See, e.g.,

Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U. S.

208, 226 (1939) Biesteck v. Berryhill, 587 U. S.____

(2019), Justice Gorsuch, dissenting.

This Court ruled in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461

U.S. 424,433 (1976):

39

Although the trial court must

ultimately calculate the amount of

reasonable

attorney’s

fees.

the

prevailing party has the burden of

proving that the amount requested is

reasonable.

By any legitimate standard, the $167,437.50

assessed against Newman, far in excess of the amount

of expenses sought by Newman, far in excess of the

value of the Estate, billed at a rate of $1,000.00 per

page, and unsupported by admissible evidence, was

not "reasonable."

For a frank appraisal summing up the types of

unsupported determinations against Newman in the

proceedings in all levels of the Indiana courts

culminating the fee award of $167,437.50, all of which

determinations violated Newman’s due process rights

as discussed herein, see Zelman v. Zelman, 175 So.3d

871 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2015): "We note that the

judgment here was infected

containing findings so unsupported by the record as

to be clearly erroneous."

CONCLUSION

In this case of first impression and in the

interest of the public good, the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be granted to correct the

"fundamental and pervasive" errors of the Indiana

trial court, the Indiana Court of Appeals, and the

Indiana Supreme Court, all of whose factually and

legally-unsupported decisions against Newman

40

culminated in the trial court’s imposition of the

punitive award of $167,437.50 in attorney fees against

Newman, all of which decisions so substantially

violated Newman’s Constitutional due process rights

as to compel the complete reversal of the attorney fee

award.

Respectfully submitted,

Lawrence T. Newman, Pro Se

4102 66th Street Circle West

Bradenton, FL 34209

(317) 397-5258

41