Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Terrance Carvell Guinn, Petitioner v. United States
Supreme Court briefMar 7, 2022
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APPENDIX A
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
No. 21-60550
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff- Appellee,
Versus
TERRANCE CARVELL GUINN,
Defendant-Appealant
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi
USDC No. 5:99-CR-8-l
Before DAVIS, WILLETT, and OLDHAM,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Terrance Carvell Guinn pleaded guilty in 1999
to one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The
predicate felony was Guinn's 1997 Louisiana
* Pursuant to 5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be published and is not
precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
5TH CIRCUIT RULE 47.5.4.
2a
conviction for possession of a controlled substance
with intent to distribute. As part of his plea
agreement, Guinn waived the right to contest the
conviction or sentence In 2020, after Guinn had fully
discharged his federal sentence, the State of
Louisiana expunged his 1997 drug conviction. Guinn
initiated this postconviction proceeding shortly
thereafter, seeking a writ of audita querela vacating
his federal conviction based on the expungement of
the predicate felony. He wanted his § 922(g)(1)
conviction set aside so that he could obtain
occupational and professional licenses through the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
The district court denied relief, holding that
the collateral review waiver incorporated into
Guinn's plea agreement precluded his challenge and
that, even absent a waiver, Guinn would not be
entitled to relief on the merits because the
expungement did not invalidate his federal felon-inpossession conviction. Guinn then filed a motion for
reconsideration under FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e),
repeating his earlier arguments for postconviction
relief. The district court denied the motion.
Guinn appeals the district court's denials of
his petition for a writ of audita querela and motion
for reconsideration. The government, for its part,
moves to dismiss the appeal or, alternatively, for
summary affirmance. For the reasons explained
below, we hold that this action is barred by Guinn's
collateral-review waiver and DISMISS the appeal.
3a
Guinn seeks postconviction relief in the form
of a writ of audita querela. This common-law
procedural device is used to challenge an initially
valid judgment that has become invalid due to a
legal defect that arose after its rendition. See United
States v. Miller, 599 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2010).
While the writ of audita querela has been expressly
abolished in civil cases, we have "acknowledged,
with some reservation, that the writ... might...
survive in criminal adjudications, if there is a gap for
it to fill." Id. at 488.
We need not decide whether the writ is
generally available in criminal cases, however,
because we conclude that Guinn's waiver of his right
to seek postconviction relief bars his present action
seeking audita querela relief. Guinn, as part of his
plea agreement, "expressly waive[d] the right to
contest the conviction and/or sentence or the manner
in which the conviction was imposed in any post
conviction proceeding, including but not limited to a
motion brought under § 2255, Title 28, United States
Code ...."A collateral-review waiver of this type is
enforceable if it "was knowing and voluntary," and
"applies to the circumstances at hand, based on the
plain language of the agreement." United States v.
Barnes, 953 F.3d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting
United States v. Kelly, 915 F.3d 344,348 (5th Cir.
2019)).
Guinn does not deny that he knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to seek postconviction
relief. Instead, he argues that the waiver does not
bar this postconviction proceeding. We disagree.
4a
Guinn seeks a writ of audita querela setting aside
his 1999 conviction. In doing so, he is _inarguably
attempting to ('contest [that] conviction ... in a post
conviction proceeding" -which, by the plain language
of his plea agreement, he surrendered the right to
do. See Dong Qj Ming v. United States, 2013 WL)
2397674, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 31, 2013) (collateralreview waiver barred challenge to conviction via writ
of audita querela).
Indeed, we held in an earlier case that
Guinn's plea agreement barred an attempt to
challenge his conviction via the writ of coram nobis.
See United States v. Guinn, 310 F. App'x 693, 694
(5th Cir. 2009). We see no reason why the same
waiver would not also bar a similar challenge by way
of a writ of audita querela. Moreover, Guinn's waiver
is enforceable even though he seeks to set aside his
conviction based on a legal development
(expungement of his predicate conviction) that
occurred after he waived his right to seek
postconviction relief. See United States v. Burns, 433
F.3d 442, 446-51 (5th Cir. 2005).
Finally, Guinn argues that even if his
collateral-review waiver is valid and bars his
petition for a writ of audita querela, we should
decline to enforce the waiver because doing so would
result in a miscarriage of justice. While some circuits
have recognized a miscarriage-of-justice exception to
the enforceability of collateral-review waivers, see,
e.g., United States v. Cudjoe, 634 F.3d 1163, 1167
(10th Cir. 2011), this court has thus far "declined
explicitly either to adopt or to reject it," Barnes, 953
5a
F.3d at 389. We need not determine the validity of
such an exception here because Guinn's briefing of
the issue, which consists of some conclusory
statements that enforcing the waiver would result in
a miscarriage of justice, is plainly inadequate, in
that he does not "explain the proper scope of th[e]
exception, ... cite any cases purporting to do so, or ...
detail how and why it should apply to his case."id
"By only briefly alluding to that theory," Guinn has
forfeited "any contention that [the miscarriage-ofjustice] exception applies." Id.
Because Guinn waived his right to bring this
postconviction challenge, this appeal is DISMISSED.
February 4, 2022
6a
APPENDIX B
United States District Court
Southern District of Mississippi
Western Division
USA
Plaintiff.
v.
Terrance Guinn
Defendant.
Criminal Action No 5:99-cr-8-l
ORDER
This Matter is before the Court on Terrance
Guinn’s Motion for Writ of Audita Querla [ECF No.
66] and Motion for Notice of Hearing [ECF No. 67].
After carefully considering the motions, the
applicable law, and being fully advised in the
premises, the Court finds as follow:
Background
Guinn (“Defendant”) was originally sentenced
by this Court on August 16, 1999, after pleading
guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1),
Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon. He
was sentenced to thirty (30) months imprisonment,
to be followed by a two (2) year term of supervised
release. Guinn again appeared before this Court
August 3, 2004 and pleaded guilty to the violations
of his supervised release alleged in a Petition for
Summons filed November 21, 2003. He was
7a
sentenced to time served (196 days) with 12-month
term of reimposed supervised release. He again
appeared before the Court on August 8, 2005, for a
revocation hearing based on allegations that he had
violated his conditions of supervised release as
stipulated in a Petition for Warrant filed on June 28,
2005.
On August 19, 2005 the Court found the
Defendant not guilty of the alleged violations and,
since Guinn original date of termination of
supervised release was August 2, 2005, ordered the
Defendant immediately terminated from supervise
release.
On July 24, 2007, Defendant filed for Writ of
Error Coram Nobis [ECF No. 55]; two days later he
filed a Motion to Amend Motion for Writ of Error of
Coram Nobis [ECF No. 57]. This Court denied the
amended motion. [ECF No. 59]. Inasmuch as Guinn
had waived his right to pursue post-conviction
challenges to his conviction because he pleaded
guilty, the Court found that his motion was
untimely, and that he failed to show 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1) is unconstitutionally vague. Id. On appeal,
the Fifth Circuit agreed that Guinn waived his right
to pursue post-conviction relief. [ECF No. 64]. The
Fifth Circuit further found that Guinn had
presented a frivolous issue and dismissed the appeal.
Id.
The State of Louisiana recently expunged
Guinn’s 1997 conviction of possession of marijuana
with the intent to distribute. [ECF No. 66]. It was
8a
this 1997 conviction that led to Guinn’s status as a
felon. Id._Guinn now seeks a writ of audita querla
and request the Court to vacate or set aside his
conviction pursuant to the All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. §
16511.
Analysis
A writ of audita querela is a common law writ
which constitutes the initial process in an action
brought by a judgment defendant on the ground that
some defense or discharge has arisen since its
rendition. United States u. Reyes, 945 F. 2d 862, 863
n.l (5th Cir. 1991). “Audita querela is directed
against the enforcement, or further enforcement, of a
judgment which, when rendered, was just and
unimpeachable.” United States v. Miller,
599 F. 3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2010) citing 7A C.J.S.
Audita Querela § 4 (2004).
Guinn seeks to have his 1999 conviction vacated
because the state of Louisiana recently expunged his
1997 conviction that established his status as a
felon. See_La. Cr. C PR Art. 971, et seq. When
Defendant pleaded guilty, he waived his right to
pursue post-conviction challenges to his conviction,
he is procedurally barred from
1 (a) The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of
their respective jurisdiction and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.
(b) An alternative writ rule nisi may be issue by justice or
judge of a Court which has jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1651
9a
pursuing the instant petition for writ of audita
querela. See Mata-Soto v. U.S., 558 Fed. Appx 844
(10th Cir. 2014); U.S. v. Masilotti, 965 F. Supp. 2d
1380 (S.D. Fla. 2013), aff d, 565 Fed. Appx. 837 (11th
Cir. 2014), cert, denied, 135 S. Ct. 983, 190 L. Ed. 2d
836 (2015); U.S. v. Bastien, 111 F. Supp. 3d 315
(E.D. N.Y. 2015).
Louisiana law provides for the expungement
of certain arrest and conviction records under
limited circumstances. However, expungement
merely removes the record from public access; it does
not result in the destruction of the record. See La.
Cr. C. Pr Art. 971. Louisiana’s criminal Code of
Procedure states:
[n]othing in the Title shall be construed to
limit or impair in any way the subsequent use of any
lawful manner by law enforcement, law enforcement
agencies, prosecutors, or judges, including its use as
a predicate offense.... Id. Even though the
Defendant’s state court conviction has been
expunged, it still can be used as a predicate offense.
Thus, Defendant’s expunged state conviction
has no bearing on his conviction in this Court.
Additionally, Defendant argues that the
expungement of his conviction in Louisiana
by the Court that entered the conviction entitles the
petitioner to relief from his conviction in the state of
Mississippi. [ECF No.66]. Petitioner’s state
conviction was expunged; Louisiana did not expunge
his federal conviction.
10a
Inasmuch as the Defendant has waived his
right to seek post-conviction relief and Louisiana’s
law provides that an expunged conviction can serve
as a predicate offense, the Court finds that a hearing
on the motion is futile. For the foregoing reasons, the
Court finds that Defendant is not entitled to any of
the relief he seeks.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
Defendant’s Motion for Audita Querla [ECF No.66]
is here by Denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s
Motion for Notice of Hearing [ECF No. 67] is hereby
Denied.
SO ordered this the 31st day of March, 2021.
/s/ David Bramlette
United States District Judge
11a
APPENDIX C
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
CORRECTIONS
DIVISION OF PROBATION AND PAROLE
BATON ROGUE, LOUISIANNA
DATE: 12/11/08
LETTERFOP
VERIFICATION OF FIRST OFFENDER PARDON
TERRANCE C GUINN
Race/Sex: B/M
110 ROYAL STREET
DOB: 09/14/73
PORT GIBSON, MS 39150
SID# 001724774
DOC# 00388976
DOCKET#: LIN 42042
To Whom It May Concern:
It appearing to Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections, Division of Probation and
Parole, that TERRANCE C GUINN was sentenced
by the Honorable JAMES BODDIE, Judge of the
3RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT Court, Parish of
LINCOLN, State of Louisiana, under the above
listed docket number (s) for the crime (s) of:
SCHEDULE I: HALLUCINOGENIC SUB POSS.
WITD MARIJUANA.
12a
And it further appearing that defendant has
completed this sentence and meets all of the
requirements for an automatic first offender pardon,
as outlined in R.S. 15:572. Now, therefore, as
provided by Article 1, Section 20, and Article 4,
Section 5(E) (1), of the Louisiana Constitution, this
will certify that effective FEBRUARY 8, 2005,
TERRANCE GUINN has discharged his/her
sentence for the above stated offense(s) and that all
rights of citizenship and franchise are restored in
Louisiana.
The right to receive, possess or transport a firearm
may not be restored unless all legal provisions are
met and should be determined through the local law
enforcement agency. Similarly, this pardon does not
constitute a waiver of any unpaid fines and fees, due
and owing, which may be enforced by the Court.
Eugenie C. Powers
Probation and Parole Director
Arlena McDonald
District Director
L-
13a
APPENDIX D
State Of Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections
Public Safety Service
September 03, 2020
Re: State of Louisiana v. Terrance Carvell Guinn
No: 42042
Certificate of Compliance with La C.CR.P. Art. 971,
et seq. As occasioned by the Honorable Judge in the
above captioned case and in compliance with La
C.Cr.P. Art. 971, et seq. all records on file with the
Louisiana State Police Criminal Identification and
Information, as they relate to the arrest of:
Terrance Guinn on 01/31/1997 by Lincoln Parish
Detention Center for possession of marijuana with
the intent and LA-DOC P&P Ouchita Probation for
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.
Have been expunged and will be disclosed on a
confidential basis to any persons or agency entitled
to such Information pursuant to La. C. Cr. P. Art.
971.et.seq. The FBI has been notified of this action.
Lieutenant Lanica M. Kennedy, Deputy Director
Bureau of Criminal Identification and Information
Louisiana State Police.
Displaying title 18, up to date of 2/24/2022. Title 18
was last amended 2/15/2022. There have been
1
15a
APPENDIX E
TITLE 18 CONSERVATION OF POWER AND WATER
CHAPTER I—FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY
COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Chapter I, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission,..............................................
1 -399
Department of Energy
'Chapter III, Delaware River Basin
Commission.........................................
400 - 499
Subchapter A, Administrative Manual
400 - 420
Subchapter B, Special Regulations
430 - 499
Chapter VI, Water Resources Council
700 - 799
Part 700 {Reserved]
Part 701, Council Organization
701.1 - 701.314
Part 704, Plan Formulation Standards and
704.39
Procedures
Part 705, Nondiscrimination in Federally
705.1 - 705.12
Assisted
Programs - Effectuation of Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964
Part 706, Employee Responsibilities and
706.101 - 706.413
Conduct
16a
Part 707, Compliance with the
National........................................
707.1 - 707.11
Environmental Polley Act (NEPA)
Part 708 Upper Mississippi River Basin
Commission:................................................. 708.1 - 708.5
Public Participation in Upper Mississippi
River System Master Plan
Part 725, Implementation of Executive Orders
725.0 - 725.9
11988,
Floodplain Management and 11990, Protection
of Wetlands
Part 740, State Water Management
Planning................................................ 740.1 - 740.13
Program
Parts 741-799 [Reserved]
Chapter VIII, Susquehanna River Basin Commission
Part 800 [Reserved]
Part 801 General Policies
Parts 803-805 [Reserved]
Part 806, Review and Approval of
Projects...............................................
806.1-806.45
17a
Part 807, Water Withdrawal
Registration.............................
807.1-807.5
Part 808, Hearings and Enforcement
Actions.....................................................
808.1-808.19
Parts 809-899 {Reserved}
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