Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Preston L. Drane, Petitioner v. Stephania Drane
Supreme Court briefMay 10, 2022
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. _____________
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
_______________
PRESTON L. DRANE,
Petitioner,
v.
STEPHANIA DRANE,
_______________
Respondent.
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The Fifth
District Court of Appeal Of Florida
_______________
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
_______________
Andrew B. Greenlee, Esq.*
Andrew B. Greenlee, P.A.
Attorney for Petitioner
401 E. 1st Street, Unit 261
Sanford, Florida 32772
407-808-6411
andrew@andrewgreenleelaw.com
*Counsel of Record for Petitioner
June 22, 2022
___________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
In a dissolution of marriage proceeding, may a
court disregard military documentation showing that
a veteran is receiving payments for disability, which
are not subject to equitable distribution under the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act,
10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A), and instead rely on expert
testimony to conclude that the payments are a
pension that may be divisible upon divorce?
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Petitioner Preston L. Drane was the Appellant
in the court below.
Respondent, who was the Appellee in the court
below, is Mr. Drane’s former wife, Stephania Drane.
Petitioner is not a corporation. No party is a
parent or publicly held company owning 10% or more
of any corporation’s stock.
iii
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS
•
Drane v. Drane, Case No. 05-2017-DR-22905,
•
Drane v. Drane, 333 So. 3d 1128 (Fla. 5th DCA
Fla. 18th Jud. Cir. 2017). Supplemental Final
Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage entered
on December 16, 2020.
2022).
Supplemental Final Judgment of
Dissolution of Marriage per curiam affirmed
on February 22, 2022.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
QUESTION PRESENTED ........................................... i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING AND RULE
29.6 STATEMENT ..................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS ....... iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................vii
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ................. 1
DECISIONS BELOW .................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ............................ 1
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS INVOLVED ......................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .................................... 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .................. 9
CONCLUSION .......................................................... 17
APPENDIX
Appendix A
Opinion in the District Court of Appeal of the
State of Florida Fifth District
(February 22, 2022) ............................................ App. 1
v
Appendix B
Supplemental Final Judgment of Dissolution of
Marriage in the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth
Judicial Circuit in and for Brevard County,
Florida (December 16, 2020) .............................. App. 3
Appendix C
Medical Board Report (January 10, 2022)......... App. 9
Appendix D
Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active
Duty (November 24, 2020) ............................... App. 10
Appendix E
Letter from Defense Finance and Accounting
Service dated February 14, 2018
(November 24, 2020)......................................... App. 11
Appendix F
Letter from Defense Finance and Accounting
Service dated October 5, 2017
(November 24, 2020)......................................... App. 17
Appendix G
Transcript Excerpt (November 24, 2020) ........ App. 19
Appendix H
Transcript Excerpt, Hearing Before Judge
Roberts in the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth
Judicial Circuit in and for Brevard County,
Florida (January 16, 2021) ............................... App. 21
vi
Appendix I
Special Order in the Department of the Air
Force Washington DC 20330-5026 dated May
26, 2010 (November 24, 2020) .......................... App. 31
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
Florida v. Rodriguez,
469 U.S. 1 (1984) ...................................................... 2
Howell v. Howell,
137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017) .................................. 9, 11, 13
Mansell v. Mansell,
490 U.S. 581 (1989) ............................................ 2, 10
McCarty v. McCarty,
453 U.S. 210 (1981) ............................................ 9, 11
Michigan v. Long,
463 U.S. 1032 (1983) ................................................ 2
Constitution and Statutes
U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2 ................................................ 3
10 U.S.C. § 1201(a) .................................................... 11
10 U.S.C. § 1401(a) .................................................... 12
10 U.S.C. § 1408 .......................................................... 9
10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A) .......................... i, 2, 8, 10, 11
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ...................................................... 1
viii
Other Authorities
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Is it
Taxable?
available
at
https://www.dfas.mil/retiredmilitary/manage/t
axes/isittaxable/ (last visited June 15, 2022) ........ 16
DoD 7000.14-R, Vol. 7B, Chapter 24, § 240201
(August 2017) ................................................... 13, 14
1
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The Petitioner, Preston L. Drane, respectfully
petitions the Court for a writ of certiorari to review
the decision of Florida’s Fifth District Court of
Appeal, which affirmed a judgment holding that his
military disability payments are subject to equitable
distribution in dissolution of marriage proceedings.
DECISIONS BELOW
The Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial
Circuit, in and for Brevard County, Florida, entered a
Supplemental Final Judgment of Dissolution of
Marriage. App. 3.
Florida’s Fifth District Court of Appeal issued
an order per curiam affirming that decision without a
written opinion. That order is published at 333 So. 3d
1128 (Fla. 5th DCA 2022) and reproduced in the
appendix. App. 1.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Fifth District Court of Appeal issued its
order on February 22, 2022. App. 1. This Court
extended the time for Mr. Drane to submit this
petition until June 22, 2022. This petition is timely.
This Court has jurisdiction to review the
decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal under
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), because the appellate court, the
state court of last resort, ruled on Petitioner’s claim
that his permanent military disability benefits were
2
indivisible under a federal statute, 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408(a)(4)(A).
See Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S.
581, 583 (1989) (reviewing similar question); see also
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 2 (1984) (granting
petition for writ of certiorari to the Third District
Court of Appeal of Florida to review per curiam
affirmance on issue of federal constitutional law);
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040-41 (1983)
(jurisdiction lies where the decision in question
“appears to rest primarily on federal law, or to be
interwoven with the federal law,” or where the
“adequacy and independence of any possible state
law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion”).
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses’
Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A), provides as
follows:
The term ‘disposable retired pay’ means
the total monthly retired pay to which a
member is entitled less amounts
which—
(i) are owed by that member to
the
United States for previous
overpayments of retired pay and for
recoupments required by law resulting
from entitlement to retired pay;
(ii) are deducted from the retired
pay of such member as a result of
3
forfeitures of retired pay ordered by a
court-martial or as a result of a waiver
of retired pay required by law in order
to receive compensation under title 5 or
title 38;
(iii) in the case of a member
entitled to retired pay under chapter 61
of this title, are equal to the amount of
retired pay of the member under that
chapter computed using the percentage
of the member’s disability on the date
when the member was retired (or the
date on which the member’s name was
placed on the temporary disability
retired list); or
(iv) are deducted because of an
election under chapter 73 of this title to
provide an annuity to a spouse or former
spouse to whom payment of a portion of
such member’s retired pay is being
made pursuant to a court order under
this section.
The Supremacy Clause provides that the
United States Constitution and all federal laws
enacted pursuant to the federal constitution are “the
supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Drane served in the Air Force for twentythree years and attained the rank of Master
4
Sergeant.
App. 10.
He received multiple
commendations for his service, including a
“Meritorious Service Medal,” an “Air Force
Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster,” an
“Air Force Achievement Medal,” an “AF Outstanding
Unit Award with 4 oak leaf clusters,” an “AF Good
Conduct Medal with 7 oak leaf clusters” a “National
Defense Service Medal with 1 service star,” a “Global
War on Terrorism Service Medal,” and an “AF
Longevity Service with 4 oak” award. App. 10.
During his service, Mr. Drane suffered a back
injury that prevented him from “reasonably
performing the duties of his office, grade, rank, or
rating.” App. 9. The Air Force found this injury was
sustained in the line of duty and constituted a
permanent disability that required Mr. Drane to be
relieved from further service under 10 U.S.C.
chapter 61. App. 9, 32. Mr. Drane was placed on the
“Permanent Disability Retired List” (PDRL) and
granted retirement pay calculated based on a
disability formula. App. 11, 14-16.
During “9.22 years” of his service in the Air
Force, Mr. Drane was married to his former wife,
Stephania Drane (“Former Wife”), who also served as
an active-duty member of the Air Force during their
marriage. App. 4, 6. In 2017, however, Mr. Drane
petitioned the state trial court for dissolution of
marriage. App. 6.
5
The parties entered a Marital Settlement
Agreement, which was filed on February 14, 2020. In
the agreement, each of the parties expressly waived
the right to “receive any Survivor Benefits” from the
estate of the other. The trial court ratified the
Marital Settlement Agreement and Parenting Plan
and incorporated its terms into the Final Judgment
of Dissolution of Marriage. App. 23. The court
reserved ruling on the type of pay Mr. Drane was
receiving, its valuation and distribution of the
parties’ retirement pay. App. 3.
The trial court convened a hearing on that
issue. In opening statements, Mr. Drane emphasized
that all the paperwork related to his discharge from
the military characterizes his retirement as
occasioned by his permanent disability. App. 19-20.
And, he argued, under federal law, those permanent
disability payments are not subject to equitable
distribution. App. 20. The Former Wife argued in
response that, notwithstanding the plain language of
his discharge papers, Mr. Drane’s permanent
disability pay was a pension and therefore subject to
equitable distribution as regular Air Force
retirement pay. App. 4.
To support her theory, the Former Wife called
an expert, Timothy Voit, a “financial analyst” in a
“forensic economics firm.” App. 4. Mr. Voit testified
that the marital portion of monthly benefit was
$875.90. Mr. Voit did not use any military formula to
6
arrive at his figure. Nor did he attempt to reconcile
his calculations with section 1408(a)(4)(A) of the
Uniform Services Former Spouses Act, which
precluded the equitable distribution of any portion of
Mr. Drane’s permanent disability pay.
Instead, he claimed that Mr. Drane’s payments
were not disability payments at all, but instead were
retirement pay. See App. 24, 32. Mr. Voit based his
determination primarily on the fact that a certain
portion of the income of Mr. Drane was listed as
taxable income. See App. 25. According to Mr. Voit,
this meant that 100% of the payments, apart from
other VA payments, constituted a disposable retired
pay. See App. 25.
After Mr. Voit concluded his testimony, Mr.
Drane testified regarding his disability and discharge
from military service. See App. 25. Mr. Drane
disputed the notion that all disability payments are
non-taxable and referenced his exhibits, as well as
Department of Defense regulation 7000.14-R. Mr.
Drane testified that he had intimate experience with
the regulations governing permanent disability
payment because he helped author some of those
regulations during his military service. See App. 30.
Mr. Drane introduced into evidence a series of
documents related to his permanent disability
retirement. His Air Force DD-214 form, the official
paperwork documenting his separation from the Air
7
Force, states that he was medically discharged due to
his permanent disability. App. 10.
In addition, Mr. Drane introduced a letter
dated February 14, 2018, from the Defense Finance
Accounting Service (“DFAS”) that stated that he was
placed on the “Permanent Disability Retired List.”
App. 11. That letter described the two different
methods of calculating his disability retirement pay.
“Method A” employed a calculation using his
permanent disability rating of 40%, while “Method B”
utilized the longevity of his service. Because Method
B was more favorable to Mr. Drane, DFAS
automatically used that calculation to arrive at the
rate of his permanent disability pay. App. 11.
The Air Force determined that Mr. Drane was
injured “in the line of duty.” App. 9. Mr. Drane’s
medical report revealed a finding that his injury was
permanent but was not a “direct result of a combat
related injury” or a “disability that was the direct
result of armed conflict or was caused by an
instrumentality of war and incurred in the line of
duty during a period of war.” App. 9.
According to a Special Order issued by the Air
Force governing his discharge from the military, Mr.
Drane was “relieved from active duty” and
“permanently disability retired . . . with compensable
percentage for physical disability” of 40%. App. 31.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the lower court
8
reserved ruling on matter. The court held another
hearing in December of 2020, where it announced its
ruling. At the outset, the trial court announced that
it was accepting Mr. Voit’s “opinion as set forth in his
opinion letter.” App. 27. And it found, based on the
testimony of Mr. Voit, that “taxable income is
equivalent to the retirement pay and is not disability
pay,” and so it concluded that there was “no
component of this that is disability pay.” App. 28-29.
Despite the exhibits Mr. Drane introduced into
evidence, the lower court found that there was “no
evidence that there was some sort of separate 40
percent component to his disability.” App. 28. Thus,
it ruled that all the monthly payments Mr. Drane
received from the Air Force were subject to equitable
distribution. App. 29. The trial court entered a
supplemental final judgment in accordance with
those rulings. App. 3.
On appeal, Mr. Drane renewed his argument
that his permanent disability payments were not
subject to equitable distribution under section
1408(a)(4)(A) of the Uniform Services Former
Spouses Act. He observed that, as a chapter 61
medical retiree, the disability components of his pay
were exempted from the definition of “disposable
retired pay” that is divisible upon divorce.
Mr. Drane also observed that the documents
received in evidence established that payments he
9
received from the Air Force were not a retirement
pension, but instead were payments for his
permanent disability. Finally, Mr. Drane argued
that the trial court erred when it ordered Mr. Drane
to name the Former Wife as the beneficiary of
survivor benefits after she expressly waived the right
to receive those benefits in a marital settlement
agreement.
The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the
judgment without a written opinion. App. 1. Mr.
Drane now petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari
to review that decision.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
In 1981, this Court held that, under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
federal law precluded state courts from dividing
military retirement pay under state community
property or equitable distribution laws. McCarty v.
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 211, 235 (1981). In response
to this decision, Congress enacted the Uniformed
Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act, 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408. See generally Howell v. Howell, 137 S. Ct.
1400, 1403 (2017).
Under this statutory framework, Congress
permitted states to treat veterans’ “disposable retired
pay” as divisible property, i.e., community property
divisible upon divorce. Id. However, disability
benefits were exempted from this definition. See
10
Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 583 (1989); 10
U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A).
Under 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A), “disposable
retired pay” is defined as follows:
The term ‘disposable retired pay’ means
the total monthly retired pay to which a
member is entitled less amounts
which—
(i) are owed by that member to
the
United States for previous
overpayments of retired pay and for
recoupments required by law resulting
from entitlement to retired pay;
(ii) are deducted from the retired
pay of such member as a result of
forfeitures of retired pay ordered by a
court-martial or as a result of a waiver
of retired pay required by law in order
to receive compensation under title 5 or
title 38;
(iii) in the case of a member
entitled to retired pay under
chapter 61 of this title, are equal to
the amount of retired pay of the
member
under
that
chapter
computed using the percentage of
the member’s disability on the date
when the member was retired (or
the date on which the member’s
11
name was placed on the temporary
disability retired list); or
(iv) are deducted because of an
election under chapter 73 of this title to
provide an annuity to a spouse or former
spouse to whom payment of a portion of
such member’s retired pay is being
made pursuant to a court order under
this section.
10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(A).
As the Court opined in Howell v. Howell, the
“basic reasons McCarty gave for believing that
Congress intended to exempt military retirement pay
from state community property laws apply a fortiori
to disability pay.” Howell, 137 S. Ct. at 1406.
In this case, the documentary evidence showed
that Mr. Drane retired from the military because of a
permanent disability under chapter 61. Mr. Drane’s
Form DD214 conclusively establishes that his
“REASON FOR SEPARATION” was “DISABILITY,
PERMANENT.” App. 10. And because Mr. Drane
was “unfit to perform [his] duties” because “of
physical disability,” 10 U.S.C. § 1201(a), he was
placed on the Permanent Disability Retired List and
awarded “compensable disability” pay. App. 17.
In addition to his DD214 form, Mr. Drane
introduced a letter dated February 14, 2018, from
12
DFAS that stated that he was placed on the
“Permanent Disability Retired List.” App. 11. That
letter described the two different methods of
calculating his disability retirement pay, “Method A”
and “Method B.” App. 14. The calculation employed
a formula derived from a federal statute governing
the rate of military disability pay, 10 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a). Although the lower court suggested that
there was “no evidence that there was some sort of
separate 40 percent component to his disability,”
Method A expressly refers to Mr. Drane’s “disability
rating (40%)” in its calculation. App. 14-15.
So, too, does the Findings and Recommended
Disposition of the Air Force Physical Evaluation
Board, in which the board found Mr. Drane “unfit”
and recommended “permanent retirement with a
disability rating of 40%.” App. 9. Moreover, the
Special Order from the Air Force stated that Mr.
Drane was “relieved from Active Duty” and
“permanently disability retired . . . with compensable
percentage for physical disability of 040 percent.”
App. 31.
Finally, in an October 2017 letter, DFAS
stated that Mr. Drane remains “on the
retired/retainer rolls of this center and has a
compensable disability retirement rated at 40%
effective September 4, 2010.” App. 17. If the trial
court found “no evidence that there was some sort of
separate 40 percent component to his disability,”
13
then it clearly disregarded most of the documents
submitted by Mr. Drane.
In support of its decision, the trial court relied
on expert testimony, along with a notation in Mr.
Drane’s Monthly Retiree Account Statement that
showed his disability payments were taxable income.
R. at 858. According to the lower court, “taxable
income is equivalent to the retirement pay and is not
disability pay,” and so it found that there was “no
component of this that is disability pay.” App. 25.
This premise is flawed.
While disability
payments
received
from
the
Veteran’s
Administration are not taxable, see Howell, 137 S. Ct.
at 1403, under Department of Defense regulations,
disability pay from the individual branches of the
military may be subject to federal income tax
withholding. See DoD 7000.14-R, Vol. 7B, Chapter
24, § 240201 (August 2017).
The applicable
regulation, “Gross Retired Pay Not Subject to FITW”
(Federal Income Tax Withholding), provides as
follows:
The gross retired pay of a
member is not subject to FITW if the
member’s retired pay is computed only
on the basis of percentage of disability,
and the member is on the temporary or
permanent disability retired lists, if:
14
A. On or before September 24,
1975, the member was entitled to
receive retired pay computed on the
basis of percentage of disability Title 26,
United States Code (U.S.C.), sections
104(a)(4) and 104(b)(2)(A);
B. On September 24, 1975, he or
she was a member of the Armed Forces
(or Reserve Component thereof) or
under a binding written commitment to
become such a member (26 U.S.C.
§ 104(a)(4) and § 104(b)(2)(B)); or
C. The member receives disability
retired pay because of a combat-related
injury. The term “combat-related injury”
means personal injury or sickness
incurred as a direct result of armed
conflict, or while engaged in extra
hazardous service, or under conditions
simulating war, or caused by an
instrument of war. This determination
is made by the applicable Service at the
time of discharge.
DoD 7000.14-R, Vol. 7B,
paragraph 240201 (August 2017).
Chapter
24,
With regard to the first two categories, Mr.
Drane was not a member of the military on or before
15
September 24, 1975. He therefore could not possibly
have been “entitled to receive retired pay computed
on the basis of percentage of disability” at that point
in time. And, according to the findings of the Air
Force Physical Evaluation Board, Mr. Drane was
found not to have suffered a “combat-related injury.”
Thus, because Mr. Drane did not fit into any of those
three categories, his disability pay was taxable
income.
This conclusion is reinforced by the guidance
provided on the website of DFAS, which states as
follows:
TDRL/PDRL Exemption: If you
retired
under
a
disability
law
(Temporary Disability Retirement List
or Permanent Disability Retirement
List), your retired pay will be fully nontaxable if your pay is calculated based
upon your military (not VA) disability
percentage and you meet one of the
following conditions:
• You were in the military or
under a contractual obligation to join
the military on September 24, 1975, or
• Your military disability rating
is combat-related.
16
See Defense Finance and Accounting Service, Is it
Taxable?
available
at
https://www.dfas.mil/retiredmilitary/manage/taxes/isi
ttaxable/ (last visited June 15, 2022).
Once again, Mr. Drane was placed on the
Permanent Disability Retirement List, but he was
not in the military in 1975, and his military disability
was
deemed
not
to
be
“combat-related.”
Notwithstanding the expert testimony to the
contrary, Mr. Drane’s military retirement payments
were both taxable income and designed to
compensate him for his permanent disability
sustained in the line of duty.
This Court should hold that trial courts in
dissolution of marriage proceedings should not
blindly accept the opinions of expert on pure issues of
law, such as the proper categorization of military
retirement pay, particularly when the documentary
evidence from the military conclusively resolves the
question.
Mr. Drane placed his body on the line during
his military service.
He paid a heavy price:
Permanent Disability. Affirming the judgment below
would not only contravene binding federal statutes
that prohibit the division of disability pay as marital
property, it would divest Mr. Drane of money he
receives to compensate him for the physical sacrifice
17
he made for this Country. This Court should not
countenance such an outcome.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should
grant this petition and review the decision below.
Respectfully submitted on this 22nd day of
June, 2022.
Andrew B. Greenlee, Esq.*
Andrew B. Greenlee, P.A.
Attorney for Petitioner
401 E. 1st Street, Unit 261
Sanford, Florida 32772
407-808-6411
andrew@andrewgreenleelaw.com
*Counsel of Record for Petitioner
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.