Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Quannah L. Harris, Petitioner v. Jerry Biddle, et al.

No.

INAL

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

QUANNAH L. HARRIS - PETITIONER

FILED

JUN 0 3 2022

vs.

JERRY BIDDLE. ET AL - RESPONDENT

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

QUANNAH L. HARRIS, Pro Se

2195 S THIRD STREET

MEMPHIS, TN 38109

(901) 603-2764

RECEIVED

JUN - 7 ?o?2

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does Rule 4(a)(6) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure limit equitable relief

as it is part of the broad powers granted to the Federal Courts?

( Answer: YES)

2. Where the failure to transmit critical filing (orders or otherwise) is made by

the Office of the Court, Should deference be granted ?

( Answer: YES)

3. Does Rule 60(b) allow for equitable consideration despite Rule 4(a) of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure?

(Answer: YES )

i

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the cover page. A list of all

parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is the subject of this petition

is as follows ^

PETITIONER

1. QUANNAH L. HARRIS

RESPONDENTS

2. JERRY BIDDLE, State Investigator for TN Board of Cosmetology and Barber

Examiners, in his individual capacity.

3. JOHN McCLAIN, State Investigator for TN Board of Cosmetology and

Barber Examiners, in his individual capacity.

4. ROXANA GUMUCIO, Executive Director for TN Board of Cosmetology and

Barber Examiners, in her individual capacity.

li

LIST OF RELATED CASES

•

Harris vs Biddle, No. 2:i8-cv-02631-MSN-tmp, U. S. District Court for the

Western District of Tennessee. Judgment entered April 23, 2021.

•

Harris vs Biddle, No. 2:l8*cv-02631-MSN-tmp, U. S. District Court for the

Western District of Tennessee. Judgment affirmed July 15, 2021

•

Harris vs Biddle, No. 21-5557, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

Judgment entered August 10, 2021.

•

Harris vs Biddle, No. 21*5557, U. S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

Judgment affirmed April 1, 2022.

Due to retaliation of filing Compliant No. 2-18-cv 02631-MSN-tmp, the following

cases were filed:

1. U.S. District Court of Western Tennessee, Docket No. 2:21-cv02717‘MSNtmp

Quannah Harris, Last Minute Cuts

vs

Melissa Hutson, as investigator for Tennessee Department of Commerce and

Insurance, in their individual capacity', TERRYBARNES, as investigator for

Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance, in their individual

capacity, TENNESSEE BOARD OF COSMETOLOGYAND

BARBERING/RONALD R. GILLIHAN, II, Chairman of the Tennessee Board

and Cosmetology and Barber Examiners, sued in his official capacity for

injunctive reliefonlyi and ROXANA GUMUCIO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

for the Tennessee Board and Cosmetology and Barber Examiners, sued in

her individual capacity.

m

Harris filed this Civil Rights lawsuit due to retaliation, additional fraudulent

documentation, deceitful practices, failure to follow Tennessee Statue in the

unjust closure of Harris’ school, and injunctive relief.

2. U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit, Case No. 21-6251

Quannah Harris, Last Minute Cuts

vs

Melissa Hutson, as investigator for Tennessee Department of Commerce and

Insurance, in their individual capacity; TERRYBARNES, as investigator for

Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance, in their individual

capacity, TENNESSEE BOARD OF COSMETOLOGYAND

BARBERING/RONALD R. GILLIHAN, II, Chairman of the Tennessee Board

and Cosmetology and Barber Examiners, sued in his official capacity for

injunctive reliefonly; and ROXANA GUMUCIO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

for the Tennessee Board and Cosmetology and Barber Examiners, sued in

her individual capacity.

On appeal for Injunctive Relief, which was denied in the U.S. District Court

of Western Tennessee.

3. Shelby County Chancery Court,

Docket #CH-22-0166

Quannah Harris, Last Minute Cuts

vs

Tennessee Department of Commerce and Insurance, Office ofSecretary of

State Administrative Procedures Division, and Tennessee Board of

Cosmetology and Barber Examiners

In retaliation, the Respondents listed above closed Harris’ school in a hearing

whereas the Respondents denied Harris due process, failed

to follow Tennessee State Statue, denied Harris’ civil rights, and unjustly

closed the Petitioner’s school.

IV

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and Sixth Circuit Rule 26.1,

Appellant hereby make the following disclosures:

(l) Is said party a subsidiary or affiliate of a publicly owned corporation? No.

(2) Does a publicly owned corporation or its affiliate, not a party to the appeal, have

a financial interest in the outcome? No

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1

LIST OF PARTIES

11

RELATED CASES

m

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Vll

STATUES AND RULES

Vlll

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

1

OPINIONS BELOW

1

JURISDICTION

1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

15

CONCLUSION

16

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A • Decision And Opinion Of The U.S.

Court of Appeals For The Sixth Circuit

20

APPENDIX B - Decision And Opinion Of The U.S.

District Court

27

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

PAGE NUMBER

CASES

Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trustees of UMWA Combined Benefit Fund

26

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007).

16, 19

Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2005)

14

Browder v. Dir., Dept, of Corrs. ofIllinois, 434 U.S. 257, 264,

98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (197$

14

Guaranty Trust Co ofNew York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464,

8 9 L.Ed. 2079,160 A.L.R. 1231 (1945)

8

Harris Truck Lines, Inc v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc, 371 U.S. 215,

83 S.Ct. 283,9 L.Ed.2d 261 (1962)

17, 18

Hazel—Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford—Empire Co.,322 U.S. 238, 244,

64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944))

21

In re Sulzer Orthopedics & Knee Prosthesis Prods. Liab. Litig.,

399 F.3d 816, 817 (6th Cir.2005)

14

Johnson v. Bell, 605 F.3d 333, 336 (6th Cir.2010)

22

Oja v. Dep't ofArmy, 405 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2005)

15

Olle v. Henry & Wright Corp., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1990)

26

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 233—34, 115 S.Ct. 1447,

131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995)

21

Peake v. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. ofMarquette, 717 F.2d 1016, 1018

(6th Cir.)

14

vu

Tanner v. Yukins, 776 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2015)

23, 24

Thompson v. INS,375 U. S. 384, 387 (1964) (per curiam)

18

STATUTES

28 USC Section 1331 and 1334

2

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

3

RULES

Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

2

Rule 28(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure

2

Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Appellate

2

Rule 4(a)(6) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure

8, 13

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 77(d)

9

Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

9, 10

Fed. R. Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)

14

Fed. R. Civil Procedure Rule 59

7, 13

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 5

25

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 77

11

Vlll

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Quannah Harris respectfully prays the issuance of the writ of certiorari

to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals from the Sixth

Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

1. The decision and opinion of the highest court to review the merits, The U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, appears at Appendix A to the petition

and is unpublished.

2. The decision and opinion of the trial court, The U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Tennessee appears at Appendix B to the petition and is

unpublished.

JURISDICTION

Pursuant to Rule 28(4) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appellant

asserts the following basis of jurisdiction-

The District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Memphis, Division

had original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC Section 1331 and 1334. The appellant

1

timely appealed to the United States Circuit Court for the 6th Circuit

pursuant to Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure which granted the

right to appeal from a final decision of the United States District Court. The 6th

Circuit entered its Order Affirming the decision of the United States District Court

on the 7th day of February, 2022. Pursuant to Rule 40 of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure, Quannah Harris, pro se filed the Petition for Rehearing within

14 days of the Order of the Court. A petition for rehearing was timely filed with the

6th Circuit and was thereafter denied on the following date of March 28, 2022.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1)

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

United States Constitution, Amendment IV

Page 12

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants

shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.

United States Constitution, Amendment Y-

Page 6, 17, and 27

No person shall be ...be deprived of life, hberty, or property, without due process of

law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

United States Constitution, Amendment XTV:

Page 6, 12, and 27

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No

State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person

of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On September 18 2018, The Petitioner filed a complaint against Jerry Biddle,

John McCain and Roxanna Gumucio (RE 1) based upon violation of Her Fifth

Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments. The Respondents in an attempt to close

Harris’ school, denied Harris’ civil rights by using fraud and forgery. Harris’

complaint was amended on 12/7/2018 (RE 10). The Respondents filed their Motion

for Summary Judgment on 12/4/2019 (RE 43). Harris filed a response to the Motion

for Summary Judgment on 1/21/2020 (RE 49). On 2/26/2020, the Magistrate entered

the report and recommendation granting the appellee’s Motion for Summary

Judgment. (RE 57). The District Court Judge on 4/1/20 adopted the Report and

Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (RE 62) and the Final Judgment issued

(RE 63). May 7, 2020, the Petitioner filed a Rule 59 motion to alter/amend the

judgment (RE 64). The Court denied the Motion on 7/30/2020 (RE 66).

February 4, 2021, Harris received a letter from the attorney for the Board of

Cosmetology in which he stated he had just received notification that Motion to

Alter/Amend the Judgment had been denied. (RE 67 Exhibit 6/c) Harris did not

receive notice of the Court’s Order by email, mail, fax or electronic filing. Prior to

this order, Harris had received all other notifications from the Court. She

immediately filed a Motion for An Out of Time Appeal (RE 67). The Court denied

4

the Motion on 4/23/21 (RE 69). Once again, Harris did not receive notification of the

Court’s denial of the Motion. 5/28/21, The Petitioner filed the notice of appeal after

(RE 70) and another Motion for an Out of Time Appeal (RE 71). 7/15/21, the District

Court granted in part the right to appeal and denied in part the April 23, 2021

Order denying the right to appeal the Final Judgement (RE 74).

Does Rule 4(a)(6) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure limit equitable relief as it is

part of the broad powers granted to the Federal Courts?

The Supreme Court in Guaranty Trust Co of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65

S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079, 160 A.L.R. 1231 (1945 wrote that equitable relief is

warranted wherein a “plain, adequate and complete remedy at law is wanting” Rule

4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the Court may

reopen the time to file and appeal for 14 days if the Court finds that the moving

party did not receive notice under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the

entry of the judgment or order ... within 21 days after entry, the motion is filed

within 180 days after the judgment or order appealed from..., and the Court find

that no party would be prejudiced.

Harris, the appellant, has represented that on two separate occasions she did

not receive notice of the Court’s order entered under Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure. Rule 77 (d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Conducting

Business?' Clerk’s Authority? Notice of an Order or Judgment (Federal Rules of Civil

5

Procedure (2019 Edition)) provides that immediately after entering an order or

judgment, the clerk must serve notice of the entry, as provided in Rule 5(b), on each

party who is not in default for failing to appear. The clerk must record the service

on the docket. A party also may serve notice of the entry as provided in Rule 5(b). It

should be noted that the clerk does not record the service of the orders on the docket

as required by Rule 77.

Rule 5(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that service is made as

follows:

(b) Service: How Made.

(2) Service in General. A paper is served under this rule by:

(A) handing it to the person,’

(B) leaving it:

(0 at the person’s office with a clerk or other person in charge or, if no one is

in charge, in a conspicuous place in the office; or

(ii) if the person has no office or the office is

closed, at the person’s dwelling or usual place

of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there;

(C) mailing it to the person’s last known address-in which event service is

complete upon mailing;

(D) leaving it with the court clerk if the person has no known address;

(E) sending it to a registered user by filing it with the court’s electronic-filing

6

system or sending it by other electronic means that the person consented

to in writing-in either of which events service is complete upon filing or

sending, but is not effective if the filer or sender learns that it did not reach

the person to be served; or

(F) delivering it by any other means that the person consented to in writingin which event service is complete when the person making service delivers

it to the agency designated to make delivery.

In this instance, Harris did not receive the orders dated July 30,2020 (RE 66)

and 4/23/21 (RE 69) personally, by leaving it at her home or place of business ( mail

or courier), filing it electronically and transmitted automatically or any other

means.

Harris also did not receive electronic transmission of the following

filings- Pro Se Motion for an Out of Time Appeal (RE 67) 2/9/21,

USCA Case

No. (RE 68) 6/7/21, and USCA Fees, (RE 73) 6/14/21. Interestingly, Harris

received the electronic notification of electronic filing of the appellees on 2/21/20

(RE 68) Opposition in Response to Harris Motion for Out of time appeal. Harris

does not simply contend that the Court inadvertently failed to mail the required

documents, she specifically states that all other documentation prior to the order

dated 7/30/22 (RE 66) denying the relief under Rule 59 were forwarded

electronically and by mail. She makes a clear statement that the failure of the

District Court clerk to mail the required documents was not inadvertence but

7

intentional, gross negligence, complete electronic failure, possible collusion, or the

interplay of the pandemic upon the Court staff which is a once in a lifetime world

event or a combination. Harris has since the time of the filing of the complaint

been a registered user with Pacer and had in prior instances commencing from

September 14, 2018 until received all notifications, orders and other filing by

electronic transmission and mail.

The remedy which Harris seeks is far beyond

Rule 4(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure but requires an in-depth

look into the actions of the U.S. District Court and its impact upon pro se litigants

and the exercise of this Court broad based powers to grant equitable relief.

The Court’s reliance upon Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2005) is

misplaced wherein the error to transmit filing by mail or electronic transmission is

the error of the Court

This Court wrote in Bowles v Russell 32 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir.

2005), “Rule 4(a) has been interpreted as both mandatory and jurisdictional by the

Supreme Court and this Circuit. See Browder v. Dir., Dept, of Corrs. of Illinois, 434

U.S. 257, 264, 98 S.Ct. 556, 54 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978); In re Sulzer Orthopedics & Knee

Prosthesis Prods. Liab. Litig., 399 F.3d 816, 817 (6th Cir.2005); Peake v. First Nat.

Bank and Trust Co. of Marquette, 717 F.2d 1016,1018 (6th Cir. 1983); Oja v. Dep't of

Army, 405 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed.Cir.2005) (noting that it is "beyond cavil" that

4(a)(6) is mandatory and jurisdictional).”

8

This Court in its decision refers to the Notes of the Advisory Committee on

Appellate Rules by referencing that the purpose of the 1991 amendment was to

provide "a limited opportunity for relief in circumstances where the notice of entry

of a judgment or order, required to be mailed by the clerk pursuant to [Fed.R.Civ.P.

77(d)], is either not received by a party or is received so late as to impair the

opportunity to file a timely notice of appeal" Bowles at 673.

The Supreme Court in "the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is

a jurisdictional requirement. Because this Court has no authority to create

equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements, use of the 'unique

circumstances' doctrine is illegitimate." Bowles v. Russell. 551 U.S. 205 (2007).

Harris asserts that sixteen years have passed since Bowles was decided by

this Court and the use of electronic fifing and transmission is mandated.

The fact

that Harris did not receive critical fifing is not simply a mailing issue but goes to

the working of the clerk’s office and the mandate to transmit and docket the service

of all filings. Moreover, Harris contends that she did not receive notification of two

orders but three (3) other filings by the Court, which leads to a deprivation of

Harris’ Fifth Amendment Rights.

Where the failure to transmit critical filing (orders or otherwise) is made by the

Office of the Court, Should deference be granted ?

In 1962, The Supreme Court in Harris Truck Lines, Inc v. Cherry Meat

Packers, Inc, 371 U.S. 215, 83 S.Ct. 283, 9 L.Ed.2d 261 (1962) wrote that, “ In view

9

of the obvious great hardship to a party who relies upon the trial judge's finding of

'excusable neglect' prior to the expiration of the 30day period and then suffers

reversal of the finding, it should be given great deference by the reviewing court.

Whatever the proper result as an initial matter on the facts here, the record

contains a showing of unique circumstances sufficient that the Court of Appeals

ought not to have disturbed the motion judge's ruling. The judgment is vacated and

the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals so that petitioner's appeal may be

heard on its merits.”

Although the Supreme Court overruled Harris in Bowles. Justice Souter in

writing the dissent correctly framed the overriding issue of responsibility of the

Court to litigants to timely notify them of filings and not to place the loss upon the

litigant. Justice Souter wrote:

Consistent with the traditional view of statutes of limitations, and the

carefully limited concept of jurisdiction explained in Arbaugh, Eberhart, and

Kontrick, an exception to the time limit in 28 U. S. C. §2107(c) should be

available when there is a good justification for one, for reasons we recognized

years ago. In Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc.,371 U. S.

215, 217 (1962) (per curiam), and Thompson v. INS,375 U. S. 384, 387 (1964)

(per curiam), we found that "unique circumstances" excused failures to

comply with the time limit....

10

We have the authority to recognize an equitable exception to the 14-day limit,

and we should do that here, as it certainly seems reasonable to rely on an

order from a federal judge. Bowles, though, does not have to convince us as a

matter of first impression that his reliance was justified, for we only have to

look as far as Thompson to know that he ought to prevail.

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)

Harris should not be made to suffer the loss of an appeal wherein the failure

to transmit orders electronically and by mail falls squarely with the clerk’s

office. To require that Harris shoulder the burden and duty of the Clerk’s office by

the loss of her appeal denies Harris a remedy.

Does Rule 60(b) allow for equitable consideration despite Rule 4(a) of the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure?

The Sixth Circuit Court in 2015 wrote that Fed. R. Civil Procedure Rule

60(b) permits a district court to vacate and grant relief from a final judgment. The

Court wrote,

“Notwithstanding Rule 4(a)(l)'s time limits for filing a notice of appeal, we

conclude that, in this case, the district court had the authority to vacate and

reinstate its denial of Tanner's habeas petition pursuant to Rule 60(b). That

11

rule permits the court to grant relief from a final judgment, order, or

proceeding for several enumerated reasons, as well as “any other reason that

justifies relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b), which dates back to the

earliest promulgation of the federal rules, “reflects and confirms the courts'

own inherent and discretionary power, ‘firmly established in English practice

long before the foundation of our Republic,’ to set aside a judgment whose

enforcement would work inequity.” Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.

211, 233-34, 115 S.Ct. 1447, 131 L.Ed.2d 328 (1995) (quoting Hazel-Atlas

Glass Co. v. Hartford—Empire Co.,322 U.S. 238, 244, 64 S.Ct. 997, 88 L.Ed.

1250 (1944)); see also id. at 234-35, 115 S.Ct. 1447 (explaining that Rule

60(b) “is simply the recitation of pre-existing judicial power”); Johnson v. Bell,

605 F.3d 333, 336 (6th Cir.2010) (stating that Rule 60(b) “is inherently

equitable in nature,” and “empowers district courts to revise judgments when

necessary to ensure their integrity”); Fed. R. Civ. P 60(b), advisory committee

notes (explaining that the committee “endeavored ... to amend the rules to

permit... the granting of various kinds of relief from judgments which were

permitted in the federal courts prior to the adoption of these

rules”).” Tanner v. Yukins, 776 F.3d 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2015.

In Tanner, this Court references the fact that Tanner’s problem is not one of

failure to receive notice but the actions of the guards to thwart her timely delivery

12

to the law library for filing. This Court writes,

The decision in Bowles —that we lack jurisdiction to hear an appeal filed

outside the 14-day period in Rule 4(a)(6), even where weighty equitable

considerations exist—is understandable in fight of the drafting history of

Rule 4(a)(6), which demonstrates that the time periods in Rule 4(a)(6) are

themselves an accommodation of equitable considerations. See Vencor

Hosps., 279 F.3d at 1310. Unlike Bowles, however, the case before us does not

involve a Rule 4(a)(6) notice problem. Here, as in Lewis, Tanner has asked

the district court to grant her relief from judgment, pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6),

not to solve a problem related to a failure to receive notice, but to restore her

right to appeal, a right she lost due to the unconstitutional conduct of the

guards at her prison. Even if Rule 4(a)(6) represents a mandatory and

jurisdictional balancing of the interests of fairness and finality in cases in

which there has been a notice problem, nothing in the drafting history of Rule

4 suggests that the drafters intended Rule 4(a)(6) to be the sole means of

accommodating all equitable considerations that arise due to the Appellate

Rules' strict fifing deadlines. Tanner v. Yukins, 776 F.3d 434, 440, 441 (6th

Cir. 2015),

Harris is not simply claiming a lack of notice or not receiving a document

that was mailed, she is referencing a breach of duty owed to her as a litigant by the

13

clerk’s office and set forth in Rule 77(d) and Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure. Harris argues exceptional or extraordinary circumstances in the failure

of the Court to transmit orders and filing on five occasions during a

pandemic. Harris is not tone deaf to the lock down, fear, and changes in procedure

experienced by business and courts around the world and as such ask this Court to

consider the impact of the pandemic on the day to day workings of the

Court. Notwithstanding, the fact remains that the Court clerk failed to act to the

detriment of Harris. The District Court failed to take these factors into

consideration in denying the Motion to leave for an out of time appeal.

This Court wrote in Tanner, “ Relief pursuant 25 to Rule 60(b)(6) is available

“only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are not addressed by the

first five numbered clauses of the Rule” and “only as a means to achieve substantial

justice.” Olle v. Henry & Wright Coip., 910 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir.1990) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). The rule contemplates situations where

“something more ... is present” than those situations contemplated by the other

clauses in the rule. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The

‘something more,’... must include unusual and extreme situations where principles

of equity mandate relief.” Id. (emphasis in the original). In considering the merits of

a Rule 60(b) motion, a district court is required to “intensively balance numerous

factors.” See Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trustees of UMWA Combined Benefit Fund,

249 F.3d 519, 529 (6th Cir.2001).

14

As noted in Tanner, the district court did not undertake “intensive balancing”

of “numerous factors,” in deciding that Rule 4(a)(6) applied solely to the facts.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. Harris is pursuing this case in the interest of justice. The Respondents have

gone beyond their official capacity and abused their authority by closing

small black businesses and creating monopolies by forging the signatures of

business owners and falsifying State Documents.

2. State officials should not use their abuse their positions to deprive law

abiding citizens their Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment Rights.

3. Rule 4(a)(6) of the Rules of Appellate Procedures cannot limit equitable relief

as it is part of the broad powers granted to the

Federal Courts.

4. The failure to transmit critical filing (Orders or otherwise) is made by the

Office of the Court, deference should be granted.

5. Rule 60(b) allows for equitable consideration despite Rule 4(a) of the Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

15

CONCLUSION

The appellant petitions this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to determine whether

extraordinary equitable relief existed to warrant and grant the appellant, Harris

additional time to file the Notice of Appeal based upon lack of notice of final judgement

and the exigent circumstances of derelict of duty of the clerk and world-wide pandemic,

which is permitted by Rule 60(b). Harris requests that the Court consider the arguments

and grants this petition for review.

Dated: the 30th day of May, 2022

Respectfully Submitted,

Quannah Harris

LAST MINUTE CUTS

2195 S. Third Street

Memphis, TN 38109

(901) 603-2764

16

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

QUANNAH L. HARRIS - PETITIONER

VS.

JERRY BIDDLE. ET AL - RESPONDENT

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Quannah Harris, do swear or declare that on this date, the 30th day of May, 2022,

as required by Supreme Court Rule 29,1 have served the enclosed PETITION FOR

A WRIT OF CERTIORARI on each party to the above proceeding or that party’s

counsel, and on every other person required to be served, by depositing an envelope

containing the above documents in the United States mail properly addressed to

17