Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Darvin Castro Santos, Petitioner v. Craig White, et al.

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[filed Nov. 17, 2021]

_____________________________________

No. 20-30048

_____________________________________

DARVIN CASTRO SANTOS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CRAIG WHITE, Major; JOHN WELLS, Captain;

ALLEN VERRET, Colonel; ASHLEY MARTELL, Lieutenant,

Defendants-Appellees.

_____________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

No. 3:16-CV-598

_____________________________________

Before SMITH, STEWART, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:

Darvin Santos, an inmate at the Elayn Hunt Correctional Center in Louisiana, sued prison officials

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that they had used

excessive force against him in violation of his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary

judgment for the defendants, deter-mining that Santos’s claims were barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477 (1994). In doing so, the court relied on prison disciplinary reports that contradicted Santos’s allegations.

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Santos appeals both the district court’s determination based on Heck and its consideration of the

disciplinary reports, which he claims are hearsay.

For the reasons given below, we affirm the district

court’s decision to admit the reports but vacate and

remand for further proceedings with regard to the

application of Heck.

I.

Santos was walking to his cell when, he alleges,

he witnessed six prison officers beating another inmate. Santos intervened, imploring the officers to

stop the beating. The officers, including Colonel Allen Verret, Major Craig White, and Lieutenant Ashley Martell, told him to mind his business before ultimately turning their attention to him as the focus

of their beating. He claims that he was knocked to

the ground, hit, kicked, choked, handcuffed and

dragged in a manner that caused his head to hit

poles in the walkway. He was then placed in a shower cell, where Captain John Wells sprayed him in the

face with a chemical agent, ordered him to strip naked, and sprayed him again with the chemical agent

in the genitals and anus. After prohibiting Santos

from taking a shower to wash off the chemical, the

officers ordered him to put on his jumpsuit and escorted him to another area, where Wells cut Santos

with a knife and threatened to kill him. Santos was

ultimately transferred to a medical center where, he

alleges, he was denied any real medical attention.

This version of events is contradicted by the findings of prison officials who investigated. According to

their narrative, Santos approached the officers in a

threatening manner and then physically attacked

them. Despite initially being restrained, he remained

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uncooperative and violent, at one point striking

Wells hard enough to break his dentures. His actions

necessitated the use of a chemical agent to gain compliance, though after it was used he ceased resisting.

Based on the incident, a prison disciplinary board

concluded that Santos was guilty of nine violations:

three “Defiance” violations, four “Aggravated Disobedience” violations, one “Property Destruction” violation, and one “Unauthorized Area” violation. He

was disciplined accordingly, including by the forfeiture of 180 days of good-time credit.

II.

Having exhausted his administrative remedies

within the prison system, Santos sued White, Wells,

Verret, and Martell under § 1983, claiming that they

had subjected him to corporal punishment and excessive force while seizing and detaining him, thus

violating his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. He sought money damages.

The defendants moved for summary judgment,

averring that the incompatibility between Santos’s

claims and the findings of the disciplinary board

meant that the suit was barred by Heck. Santos opposed the motion and moved to strike the investigative and disciplinary reports as hearsay.

Granting summary judgment for the defendants,

the court first concluded that, because Santos’s disciplinary violations resulted in the loss of good-time

credits, those findings were “convictions” for purposes of the Heck bar. It considered the contradictions

between Santos’s allegations and the reports that

had accompanied his disciplinary sanctions and concluded that a ruling in Santos’s favor “would directly

challenge the validity of his convictions.” Heck thus

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barred the consideration of Santos’s claims in a

§ 1983 suit.

The district court also denied Santos’s motion to

strike the prison officers’ reports. The court reasoned

that those reports were not offered for the truth of

their contents but rather to provide a record of the

disciplinary board’s findings.

III.

On appeal, Santos challenges the summary judgment with regard to his Eighth Amendment claims.

He contends that his claims are not barred by Heck

and that the court erred by not excluding the prison

disciplinary reports as hearsay. Summary judgment

is a determination of law that we review de novo.

Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 864 F.3d 326, 328 (5th

Cir. 2017) (per curiam). In doing so, we view all facts

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,

here Santos, and draw all reasonable inferences in

his favor. Coleman v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 113

F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997). We conclude that the

district court was correct in its decision to consider

the disciplinary reports, but we vacate and remand

its determination that Santos’s claims were Heckbarred.

IV.

The application of Heck to § 1983 claims by prisoners is a subject that we examine today in No. 2030218, Gray v. White, and a fuller discussion can be

found in Part IV of that opinion. Here, we only briefly summarize the governing law before applying it to

Santos’s claims.

Section 1983 creates a cause of action against individuals who, under color of state law, deprive the

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plaintiff of his constitutional rights. To decide an

Eighth Amendment claim based on excessive force, a

court must deter-mine “whether force was applied in

a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline,

or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). But under

Heck, a prisoner may not “seek[] dam-ages in a §

1983 suit” if “a judgment in favor of the plaintiff

would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. The fundamental rationale behind the Heck bar is that

“[c]hallenges to the validity of any confinement or to

particulars affecting its duration are the province of

habeas corpus,” whereas “requests for relief turning

on circum-stances of confinement may be presented

in a § 1983 action.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S.

749, 750 (2004) (per curiam) (emphasis added).

Because Heck applies to the duration of confinement, it applies not just to criminal convictions but

also to prison disciplinary rulings that “result[] in a

change to the prisoner’s sentence, including the loss

of good-time credits.” Clarke v. Stalder, 154 F.3d 186,

189 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Heck therefore bars

claims that would, if accepted, “negate” a prison disciplinary finding that had resulted in the loss of

good-time credits. Bourne v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484,

491 (5th Cir. 2019).

Meanwhile, Heck is not “implicated by a prisoner’s challenge that threatens no consequence for his

conviction or the duration of his sentence.” Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 751. Rather, a claim is barred only

if granting it “requires negation of an element of the

criminal offense or proof of a fact that is inherently

inconsistent with one underlying the criminal conviction.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir.

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2008). The resulting inquiry is “fact-intensive” and

dependent on the precise nature of the disciplinary

offense. Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir.)

(quoting Bush, 513 F.3d at 497), cert. denied, 141 S.

Ct. 567 (2020).

It is unclear, from the record, whether any of

Santos’s claims are barred by Heck. In his disciplinary proceeding, Santos was found guilty of nine

rules violations: three “Defiance” violations, four

“Aggravated Dis-obedience” violations, one “Property

Destruction” violation, and one “Un-authorized Area”

violation. Though the disciplinary reports list factual

findings, the elements required to find a prisoner

guilty of those violations do not appear anywhere in

the record. It is thus impossible to determine which

facts were necessary to the disciplinary board’s conclusions. It may be that the elements of, for instance,

aggravated disobedience would be logically incompatible with some of Santos’s claims of excessive force,

but the record does not currently permit that inference.

Furthermore, not all of the disciplinary board’s

findings implicate Heck. The board imposed a forfeiture of 180 days of good time for one count each of

aggravated disobedience, defiance, and property destruction, all arising from Santos’s assault on Wells

in the Fox-6 D-Tier area of the prison; his other violations, including all of those in the shower, resulted

in sanctions such as loss of canteen and phone privileges. Disciplinary sanctions of that type bear on the

“circumstances of confinement,” rather than on that

confinement’s “validity” or “duration,” and are thus

not barred by Heck. Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 750.

Moreover, the disciplinary board imposed no sanctions at all on Santos for actions after the admin-

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istration of the chemical agent in the shower, and it

noted that he “complied with orders” after that point.

Thus, Heck does not bar Santos’s claims from that

point onward.

It is not sufficient to deem Santos’s claims to be

“intertwined” with his loss of good-time credits. Rather, in applying Heck, a court must bar only those

claims that are “necessarily at odds with” the disciplinary rulings, and only with those rulings that resulted in the loss of good time credits. Aucoin, 958

F.3d at 383. The defendants have thus not met their

burden for summary judgment on the current record.

Whether the board’s findings related to the assault

on Wells bar the corresponding claims by Santos

must be determined by a fact-specific analysis informed by the elements necessary to establish those

violations.

V.

Santos also appeals the ruling on the defendants’

exhibits, contending that they were inadmissible

hearsay. To be considered on summary judgment,

materials must be of a type that can be “presented in

a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c)(2); see also LSR Consulting, LLC v.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 835 F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir.

2016). Evidentiary rulings by trial courts are affirmed unless they constitute abuses of discretion.

See, e.g., United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 232, 243

(5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

A statement is hearsay if it is not made while testifying and a party “offer[s it] in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted” in the statement.

Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). The reports submitted by the

defendants were offered to demonstrate that the dis-

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ciplinary board had found Santos guilty of various

offenses, not to prove the truth of the matter, that is,

that he actually had committed the offenses. As with

criminal convictions, the Heck bar does not, in theory, assume that the prison disciplinary board’s determin-ations were true, but only that they cannot be

challenged through § 1983. Cf. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487

(noting that § 1983 may be used to challenge a conviction or sentence that “has already been invalidated”). The district court did not err in considering the

exhibits.

***

In sum, although the district court was correct in

considering the doc-uments, Santos’s claims cannot

be dismissed as Heck-barred without further development of the record to determine which of his allegations would be necessarily incompatible with the

prison board’s ruling that deprived him of good time

credits. In light of these conclusions, the summary

judgment is VACATED and REMANDED. We place

no limitation on the matters that the court can address and decide on remand. Nor do we suggest how

the court should rule on which claims are precluded

by Heck.

DON R. WILLETT, Circuit Judge, concurring in the

judgment.

This case involves an all-too-common set of facts:

Appellant (a prisoner) claims that Appellees (prison

officers) spontaneously and unlawfully abused him.

Appellees, on the other hand, insist they used lawful

force to control Appellant’s misbehavior. Though the

majority opinion reaches the correct conclusion—the

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district court erred in its unqualified dismissal under

Heck—I write to emphasize two points of departure.

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First, my colleagues punt on Heck when a handoff is warranted. Could the record have more information? Absolutely. Do we need more? No. Heck does

not categorically compel an element-by-element inquiry, and the majority opinion needlessly complicates things by concluding that the record precludes

analysis.

This case is Aucoin redux.1 Appellant maintains

he was subject to unprovoked, unlawful violence at

every stage of the encounter.2 But if true, he “cannot

be guilty of [the offenses for which he lost good-time

credit]—in direct conflict with his disciplinary conviction.”3 So we need not dwell on the component elements of Appellant’s conviction to determine that

most of his claims are incompatible with the disciplinary board’s findings.

Take the claims arising from the pre-shower salvo. The majority implies that some of these claims

may not be Heck barred.4 Sure, Heck is not “implicated by a prisoner’s challenge that threatens no

consequence for . . . the duration of his sentence.”5

1 See Aucoin v. Cupil, 958 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2020).

2 Cf. id. at 383 (noting plaintiff-appellant “challenge[d] the conviction by maintaining his innocence in the events that led up

to his disciplinary conviction”).

3 Id.

4 Ante at 5–6.

5 Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750–51 (2004) (per curiam)

(observing that punishments of this type bear on the “circumstances of confinement” rather than its “validity” or “duration”);

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But all of Appellant’s pre-shower claims turn on the

same narrative: He was attacked without provocation. This is fundamentally inconsistent with the officers’ account, which prompted Appellant’s loss of

good-time credit for property destruction, aggravated

disobedience, and defiance. Most of Appellant’s suit

thereby “challenges the factual determination that

underlies his conviction[s],”6 meaning most of his

claims fail.

But most does not mean all. A portion of Appellant’s suit alleged violence unrelated to any supposed

need to gain control. Appellant pleaded an excessiveforce claim against Captain Wells for ordering him to

“spread his butt cheeks” and spraying him “in the

anus with pe[p]per spray.” Appellant also pleaded

that Captain Wells threatened and cut him with a

knife after he was “no longer resisting or attempting

to flee or, otherwise, commit any crime.” These are

not trivial details. Neither the incident report nor

any other summary-judgment evidence provides an

iota of justification for this alleged force. We are thus

left with no circumstance where these claims, if

proven true, would conflict with Appellant’s disciplinary conviction—let alone those portions that impacted the duration of his confinement.7 This is not

to say that the elements underlying an administra-

see also, e.g., Bourne v. Gunnels, 921 F.3d 484, 491 (5th Cir.

2019).

6 Id.

7 As the majority correctly observes, Appellant was found guilty

of nine prison rule violations, yet only three (property destruction, aggravated disobedience, and defiance—each arising from

the initial salvo) resulted in the loss of good-time credit. Ante at

6.

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tive offense are categorically irrelevant under Heck.8

But no case, until today, suggests this information is

an analytical prerequisite.9

I nonetheless join the judgment because, as was

the case in Aucoin, “the district court erred in dismissing all of [Appellant’s] claims under Heck.”10

II

I must also depart from the majority opinion’s

hearsay analysis, though my colleagues again reach

the correct conclusion. No one seriously disputes that

“[t]he reports . . . were offered to demonstrate that

the disciplinary board had found Santos guilty of

various offenses, not to prove . . . that he actually

had committed the offenses.”11 But this does little

more than invite the question presented: Why is this

not hearsay?

A prison disciplinary report is an out-of-court

statement,12 and the report here was offered by the

Appellees “to provide a record of Plaintiff’s prison

See, e.g., Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d 391, 397–99 (5th Cir.

2006) (analyzing elements to determine whether the plaintiff’s

prior conviction was fundamentally inconsistent with his claim

of excessive force).

9 The majority’s belief otherwise casts a jaundiced eye on

Aucoin, which was decided just last year and offered nary a

mention of the elements underlying the administrative offenses

at issue there. See Aucoin, 958 F.3d at 383–84. But our silence

was understandable: The appellant claimed total innocence,

which was “necessarily inconsistent with the validity of the

[administrative] conviction.” Id. at 383.

8

10 Id. at 383–84.

11 Ante at 7.

12 See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (defining “statement”); cf., e.g., Unit-

ed States v. Jimenez, 275 F. App’x 433, 437 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008)

(“Police reports are generally excludable as hearsay.”).

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disciplinary convictions” and thus “establish . . . that

the Heck doctrine bars [relief].” This, at bottom,

points to the truth of the matter asserted in the disciplinary report: Appellant was found guilty of (and

punished for) his administrative offenses. Needless

to say, the disciplinary report would be irrelevant if

it did not accurately communicate the board’s findings. The majority opinion nonetheless suggests that

there is only one way to offer these statements for

their truth: by claiming Appellant actually committed the offenses. I disagree. The truth asserted here

is that Appellant was found guilty and lost good-time

credit—not whether this outcome was justified.

But we mustn’t lose the forest for the trees. In the

end, the majority opinion correctly observes that evidence need not be in admissible form at summary

judgment.13 I would thus hold that the defendants

could have later admitted the challenged evidence

under any number of theories.14 This low bar does

not compel reversal.

***

It is believed that Solon, one of the Seven Sages of

Greece, once observed that justice would not come to

Athens until the unaggrieved were as indignant as

the oppressed. Whether this case merits indignance

13 See, e.g., LSR Consulting, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 835

F.3d 530, 534 (5th Cir. 2016); accord FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2).

14 Cf., e.g., Autin v. La. Dep’t of Public Safety Corr., No. 20-CV1214, 1210471, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 31, 2021) (Heck-bar case,

admitting disciplinary reports as public records); Aucoin v.

Cupil, No. 16-00373-BAJ-RLB, 2018 WL 6332831, at *1 n.2

(M.D. La. Dec. 4, 2018) (Heck-bar case, judicial notice of disciplinary convictions), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 958

F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2020).

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is not before us.15 But we are called to determine

whether Appellant’s claim is beyond the reach of

§ 1983. It is not. Appellant has the right to present

his case to a jury, and the district court’s belief otherwise was error.

15 If faced with this question, perhaps we might pause to note

Captain Wells’s apparent familiarity with the impact of Heck on

civil rights claims. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Wells, 16-CV-00865-BAJEWD, 2019 WL 4170185, at *1 (M.D. La. Sept. 3, 2019) (granting Heck dismissal, § 1983 claim against Captain Wells for unlawful use of chemical agents and force resulting in a broken

ankle and leg); Johnson v. Sharp, No. 05-1244-A, 2007 WL

580667, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 13, 2007) (granting Heck dismissal, § 1983 claim against then-Sergeant Wells for an unprovoked, “vicious beating”); see also, e.g., Gray v. White, ___ F.4th

___ (5th Cir. 2021) (involving Captain Wells, again).

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APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

[filed Jan. 3, 2022]

_____________________________________

No. 20-30048

_____________________________________

DARVIN CASTRO SANTOS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CRAIG WHITE, Major; JOHN WELLS, Captain;

ALLEN VERRET, Colonel; ASHLEY MARTELL, Lieutenant,

Defendants-Appellees.

_____________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

No. 3:16-CV-598

_____________________________________

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before SMITH, STEWART, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Treating the petition for rehearing en banc as a petition for panel rehearing (5th CIR. R. 35 I.O.P.), the

petition for panel rehearing is DENIED. Because no

member of the panel or judge in regular active service

requested that the court be polled on rehearing en

banc (FED. R. APP. P. 35 and 5TH CIR. R. 35), the petition for rehearing en banc is DENIED.

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APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

[filed Jan. 7, 2020]

DARVIN CASTRO SANTOS

CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS

CRAIG WHITE, ET AL. NO.: 16-00598-BAJ-EWD

RULING AND ORDER

Before the Court are Defendants Craig White,

John Wells, Alien Verret, and Ashley Martell’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 70). For the

reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion is

GRANTED.

I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Prison Altercation

This matter arises from allegations of excessive

force at a correctional facility. Plaintiff is a prisoner

currently incarcerated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary but was incarcerated at Elayn Hunt Correctional Center in St. Gabriel, Louisiana at the time of

the event on which this suit is based. On January 28,

2016, around 4:30 p.m., Plaintiff alleges that he was

walking into his dorm when he witnessed six correctional officers beating an inmate named Charlie Morris. (Doc. 1 at p. 4). Plaintiff alleges that he pleaded

with officers to stop hitting Morris. Plaintiff alleges

that the officers told him, shut up, this is not your

business. Plaintiff alleges that these same officers

then jumped on him and began to hit and kick him,

knocking Plaintiff to the ground. Plaintiff claims that

he was forcefully and tightly handcuffed and thrown

on an empty metal bed. (Id.).

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Plaintiff further claims that Colonel Alien Verret

(“Col. Verret”) then grabbed him by the throat and

choked him while Captain Billy Verret (“Capt. Verret”), Lieutenant Jarrod Verret (“Lt. Verret”), Major

Craig White (“Major White”), and Captain John Wells

(Capt. Wells) struck his face and body with their fists

and radios. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that the officers

dragged him from his dorm to another unit while continuously beating him and causing his head to hit the

poles in the walkway. (Id.). Upon arrival to the unit,

the officers allegedly threw Plaintiff to the ground and

continued to beat him.

Plaintiff alleges that was he was placed in a

shower cell alone for an extended period of time.

Plaintiff claims he sustained cuts from the beating

and that his hands were swollen from the lightness of

the handcuffs (Id. at p. 5). Plaintiff alleges that Capt.

Wells eventually came to the cell with Sergeant Justin

Washington and ordered him to approach the bars of

the cell door to remove his handcuffs. Plaintiff claims

that when he approached the bars of the cell door,

Capt. Wells sprayed him in the face with a chemical

agent and made racially charged statements. (Id.).

Soon thereafter, Plaintiff’s handcuffs were removed,

and Plaintiff claims he was ordered to remove his

clothing. Plaintiff alleges that Capt. Wells then

sprayed the chemical agent on his genitals and anus.

(Id. at p. 6). When Plaintiff turned on the shower to

wash away the chemical agent, he claims he was ordered by Capt. Wells to turn off the shower and put on

a jumpsuit. Capt. Wells then allegedly escorted him

from the shower cell to another area where Capt.

Wells retrieved a folded knife, which Plaintiff alleges

was about 5 inches long. (Id. at p. 7). Plaintiff claims

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that Capt. Wells cut him and threatened to kill him

with the knife.

B.

Plaintiff’s Alleged Injuries from the Incident

Plaintiff was later transported to a diagnostic center where he was cleaned up. Plaintiff alleges that the

Emergency Medical Technicians refused to stitch his

hand and face to conceal the fact that he was beaten.

(Id. at p. 8). Plaintiff asserts that the medical technicians refused to give him medicine for his pain. Plaintiff further asserts that he was kept in isolation for

three to four days while his repeated requests for medical attention for his wounds were ignored. Plaintiff

alleges that he was never allowed to see a doctor during his time at the diagnostic center. (Id.).

Plaintiff further alleges that he suffered acute injury and multiple serious and prolonged injuries including, but not limited to, his anus, arm, back, chest,

face, genitals, hands, shoulder, and ribs. (Id. at p. 11).

Plaintiff further alleges that he suffered scarring on

his legs and arms from the leg irons and handcuffs

and has difficulty with sight since the incident. Plaintiff further claims that he has blood clots in both eyes,

on the back of his legs, on his face, and suffers from

discomfort, humiliation, burning in his respiratory

system, mental and emotional injury, medical expenses, and lost wages. (Id.).

C.

Prison Disciplinary Proceeding

As a result of the altercation, Plaintiff was issued

several disciplinary reports for violations such as “aggravated

disobedience”,

“defiance”,

“property

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destruction”, entrance into an unauthorized area.” 1

On February 1, 2016, the prison disciplinary board

found Plaintiff guilty on nine rule violations. Plaintiff

received a combined sentence of isolation for a period

of twenty days and the forfeiture of 180 days of good

time. Plaintiff also received the loss of canteen privileges for a period of eighteen weeks and thirty weeks

loss of phone restrictions. 2

D.

Procedural History

On September 10, 2016, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit

under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (Doc. 1), alleging unreasonable

use of excessive force. Plaintiff later amended his

Complaint (Doc. 45) to add Sgt. Washington as a defendant. Defendants responded with an Answer (Doc.

20), denying all allegations. On August 14, 2018,

Plaintiff filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 63) to dismiss

Defendants Sgt. Washington, Lt. Verret, and Lt. Troy

Rogers, which the Court granted. (Doc. 69). Plaintiff

filed his Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 66) on September 17, 2018, adding Lieutenant Ashley Martell as

a defendant. On July 22, 2019, Defendants filed this

Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that Plaintiffs §1983 action is barred by the Heck doctrine.

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Rule 56, “[t]he [C]ourt shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). In determining whether the movant

is entitled to summary judgment, the Court views the

facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant

1 Doc. 71.

2 Id.

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and draws all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Coleman v. Houston Independent School

Dist, 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th Cir. 1997).

After a proper motion for summary judgment is

made, the non-movant must set forth specific facts

showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). At this

stage, the Court does not evaluate the credibility of

witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes. Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d

1257, 1263 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1059

(1992). However, if the evidence in the record is such

that a reasonable jury, drawing all inferences in favor

of the non-moving party, could arrive at a verdict in

that party’s favor, the motion for summary judgment

must be denied. Int’l Shortstop, Inc., 939 F.2d at 1263.

On the other hand, the non-movant’s burden is not

satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, or by conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or a mere scintilla of evidence. Little

v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-movant

“fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case.”

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). In

other words, summary judgment will be appropriate

only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Sherman v.

Hallbauer, 455 F.2d 1236, 1241 (5th Cir. 1972).

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III.

DISCUSSION

Federal law provides a cause of action against

“every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State...,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen... to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws...” 42 U.S.C.

§1983. To state a claim under §1983, a plaintiff must:

(1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) show that

the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Southwestern Bell Telephone,

LP v. City of Houston, 529 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir.

2008). Although §1983 actions are potent proceedings

designed to vindicate deprived rights, they are often

vulnerable to dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey, 512

U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994), otherwise known as

the Heck doctrine.

A.

Heck v. Humphrey

Defendants contend that the success of Plaintiff’s

claims would necessarily implicate the validity of the

prison disciplinary proceedings in which Plaintiff was

found guilty of multiple violations. Under Heck, a

§1983 claim must be dismissed if the adjudication of

the claim would imply the invalidity of a plaintiff’s

prior criminal convictions or sentence. Heck, 512 U.S.

at 486-87. In the summary judgment analysis, the

presence of a genuine issue of material fact in the basis for the conviction does not preclude the application

of Heck. The Heck doctrine rests on the “principle that

civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments. Id. However, the constitutional violation claim

will not be barred if the factual basis for the conviction

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is temporally and conceptually distinct from the excessive force claim.” Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 498

(5th Cir. 2008).

The Heck doctrine also applies to prison disciplinary proceedings. A conviction, for purposes of Heck,

includes a ruling in a prison disciplinary proceeding

that results in a change to the prisoner’s sentence, including the loss of good-time credits. Heck, 512 U.S, at

189. The conviction, in the prison disciplinary sense,

is the finding of guilt on the disciplinary charge, and

if success of the plaintiff’s §1983 claim necessarily

would imply the invalidity of that finding, then Heck

bars the claim until such time as its requirements are

satisfied. Id. (citing Stone-Bey v. Barnes, 120 F.3d 718,

721 (7th Cir. 1997)). The disciplinary ruling must first

be reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid.

Plaintiff was found guilty on multiple disciplinary

reports. These violations included: (1) refusing direct

verbal orders of several corrections officers for Plaintiff to comply after being restrained; (2) striking Capt.

Wells in his eyes, nose, and mouth; (3) severely damaging Capt. Wells dentures; (4) refusing to obey direct

verbal orders to approach the bars to allow Capt.

Wells to remove his restraints; (5) threatening to kill

corrections officers; (6) kicking and spitting in Lt Ashley Martell’s face; (7) failing to comply with Major

White’s orders to exit the tier; and (8) refusing direct

verbal orders which necessitated Capt. Wells’ use of

chemical agent to gain Plaintiff’s compliance. (Doc.

70-1 at p. 7). 3

After a review of Plaintiff’s disciplinary proceeding

record, the Court finds that a favorable verdict on

3 See Doc. 71, Exhibits 2, and 3, and 4.

22a

Plaintiff’s excessive force claim would undermine his

convictions. The facts of Plaintiff’s excessive force allegation are the same as the basis for his convictions;

therefore, the facts do not differ temporally and conceptually in a manner that permits the claim to proceed. If the Court were to rule in favor of Plaintiff on

these facts, it would directly challenge the validity of

his convictions. Plaintiff must first have his convictions reversed, expunged, or invalidated before bringing an §1983 action on this set of facts. The Court also

finds that Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that

the convictions from his disciplinary proceeding have

been reversed, expunged, or declared invalid. Thus,

the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are barred pursuant to the Heck doctrine.

B.

Claim for Relief Costs and Attorney’s

Fees

Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees and costs pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. §1988 and punitive damages under

§1983. Under §1988, the Court, in its discretion, may

allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorneys fee

as part of the costs. The Court declines to exercise its

discretion to award attorney’s fees, costs, and punitive

damages to Plaintiff, as he is not the prevailing party

in this matter.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 70), is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs claims

against the remaining Defendants are DISMISSED.

23a

Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 7th day of January,

2020.

/s/ Brian A. Jackson

JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA