Amicus Curiae Brief — Timothy K. Moore, in His Official Capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, et al., Petitioners v. Rebecca Harper, et al.
Supreme Court briefOct 26, 2022
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No. 21-1271
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
TIMOTHY K. MOORE, in his official capacity as
Speaker of the North Carolina House of
Representatives, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
REBECCA HARPER, et al.,
Respondents.
On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina
BRIEF OF RETIRED FOUR-STAR ADMIRALS
AND GENERALS, AND FORMER SERVICE
SECRETARIES OF THE ARMED FORCES AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF
RESPONDENTS
ILANA H. EISENSTEIN
Counsel of Record
WHITNEY CLOUD
KATHLEEN S. KIZER
M. DAVID JOSEFOVITS
DLA PIPER LLP (US)
One Liberty Place
1650 Market Street
Suite 5000
Philadelphia, PA 19103
(215) 656 3351
Ilana.Eisenstein@us.dla piper.com
October 26, 2022
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................. ii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE........................................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...........................................9
ARGUMENT.....................................................................11
I. Adoption of the Independent State Legislature Theory Would Undermine Election
Integrity and Harm National Security ...................11
A. The Independent State Legislature
Theory Will Damage Public Faith in
Elections ..........................................................11
B. A Lack of Election Integrity Threatens
the Military’s Ability to Operate
Effectively .......................................................17
C. A Lack of Election Integrity Exacerbates
Threats to National Security ............................20
II. The Independent State Legislature Theory
Will Disenfranchise Active Duty Military
Service Members and Their Families ....................24
CONCLUSION .................................................................29
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases:
Amer. Legion v. Amer. Humanist Ass’n,
139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) ................................... 12, 14
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Indep.
Redistricting Comm’n, (AIRC),
576 U.S. 787 (2015) ....................................... 12, 16
Carrington v. Rash,
380 U.S. 89 (1965) ............................................... 28
Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109 (1986) ............................................. 16
Rucho v. Common Cause,
139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) ......................................... 16
State v. Arctic Village Council,
495 P.3d 313 (Alaska 2021) ................................ 28
Vieth v. Jubelirer,
541 U.S. 267 (2004) ............................................. 16
Other Authorities
Bipartisan Policy Center, Deterring Threats to
Election Workers (July 2022), https://
bipartisanpolicy.org/report/deterringthreats-to-election-workers/ ............................... 22
Brennan Center for Justice, Local Elections
Official Survey (Apr. 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/
our-work/research-reports/local-electionofficials-survey .................................................... 22
iii
Brennan Center for Justice, Local Elections
Official Survey (Mar. 2022),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
research-reports/local-election-officialssurvey-march-2022 ............................................. 22
Brennan Center for Justice, State Voting
Laws, Overview (2022), https://www.
brennancenter.org/issues/
ensure-every-american-can-vote/votingreform/state-voting-laws..................................... 24
Brennan Center for Justice, Voting Laws
Roundup (May 2022), https://www.
brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/voting-laws-roundup-may-2022 ............. 13
C. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 152 (T.
Nugent trans. 1949) (1748)................................. 15
Campaign Legal Center, New Bipartisan Poll
on Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://campaign
legal.org/sites/default/files/201901/CLC%20Bipartisan%20Redistrictig%20
Poll.pdf ................................................................ 16
Emerging Threats to Election Administration:
Hearing before S. Comm. on Rules and Admin,
117th Cong. (Oct. 26, 2021) (Testimony of
Matthew Masterson) .......................................... 22
Federal Voting Assistance Program, 2020 PostElection Report to Congress,
https://www.fvap.gov/info/
reports-surveys/2020-report-to-congress ........... 26
iv
Federal Voting Assistance Program, Post-Election Voting Survey: Active Duty Military
Technical Report 2020, 23,
https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/
Reports/FVAP_ADM-Technical-Report2020_FINAL_20210831.pdf .......................... 25, 26
Federal Voting Assistance Program, State of
the Military Voter,
https://www.fvap.gov/info/reportssurveys/StateoftheMilitaryVoter........................ 25
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022:
The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule
(Feb. 2022), https://freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansionauthoritarian-rule ............................................... 20
Genevieve Nadeau and Helen White, Independent State Legislatures and Presidential
Elections: Addressing Misconceptions About
Current Law and Prospects for Reform, Just
Security (Aug. 16, 2022), https://www.justsecurity.org/82685/independent-statelegislatures-and-presidential-electionsaddressing-misconceptions-about-currentlaw-and-prospects-for-reform/ ............................ 14
Helen White, The Independent State Legislature Theory Should Horrify Supreme Court’s
Originalists, Just Security (Jun. 30, 2022),
https://www.justsecurity.org/81990/theindependent-state-legislature-theory-shouldhorrify-supreme-courts-originalists/ .................. 15
v
Howard et al., Defending Elections: Federal
Funding Needs for State Election Security,
Brennan Center for Justice (July 18, 2019),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
research-reports/defending-elections-federalfunding-needs-state-election-security ................ 22
Kevin Johnson, Russian Hackers Target U.S.
Computer Systems; Feds Say Elections Data
Not Compromised, USA Today (Oct. 22,
2020), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/elections/2020/10/22/
election-2020-new-wave-russian-hackingefforts-detected-officials/3735228001/
(discussing attempts to interfere with the
2020 general election)......................................... 23
Letter From Former High-Ranking National
Security Officials To Congress: Election Subversion Poses National Security Threat,
Medium (Nov. 9, 2021), https://medium.com/
@FormerU.S.NatSecOfficials/letter-from-former-high-ranking-national-security-officialsto-congress-election-subversion-poses69a269962ac ........................................................ 23
Miriam Seifter, Countermajoritarian
Legislatures, 121 Colum. L. Rev. 1733 (2021) ... 16
Nicole Perlroth and David E. Sanger, Ransomware Attacks Take On New Urgency Ahead
of Vote, New York Times, (Nov. 16, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/27/
technology/2020-election-securitythreats.html ........................................................ 23
vi
Open Letter from Former Secretaries of Defense and Former Chairmen of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, To Support and Defend:
Principles of Civilian Control and Best Practices of Civil-Military Relations, War on the
Rocks (Sep. 6, 2022), https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/to-support-anddefend-principles-of-civilian-control-andbest-practices-of-civil-military-relations/ ........... 18
Richard Wike, et al, What People Around the
World Like – and Dislike – About American
Society and Politics, Pew Research Center
(Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/11/01/what-peoplearound-the-world-like-and-dislike-aboutamerican-society-and-politics/ ............................ 21
Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo,
The Origins of Judicial Review,
70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 887 (2003).............................. 12
Scott Ikeda, Iranian Hackers Indicted over
2020 US Election Interference, CPO Magazine (Nov. 23, 2021), https://www.cpo
magazine.com/cyber-security/iranian-hackers-indicted-over-2020-us-electioninterference-used-confidential-voterinformation-to-send-targetedmisinformation-and-threats/ .............................. 23
vii
States United Democracy Center, A Democracy
Crisis in the Making 9–10 (Aug. 2022),
https://statesuniteddemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/DCIMAugust2022.pdf ............................................. 14, 15
States United Democracy Center, Democracy
Crisis in the Making: How State Legislatures
are Politicizing, Criminalizing, and Interfering with Election Administration (June 2021
Rpt. & Aug. 2022 Update),
https://statesuniteddemocracy.org/resources/
democracy-crisis-in-the-making-how-statelegislatures-are-politicizing-criminalizingand-interfering-with-elections/#section-2 .......... 13
The Federalist No. 47 at 301 .................................. 11
The Independent State Legislature Theory and
Its Potential to Disrupt Our Democracy:
Hearing Before the H. Com. on H. Admin.,
117th Cong., 1 (Jul. 28, 2022) (written testimony of Carolyn Shapiro) ................................... 14
U.S. Election Assistance Commission to the
117th Congress, Election Administration
and Voting Survey 2020 Comprehensive Report, 74 (Aug. 2021), https://www.eac.gov/
sites/default/files/document_library/files/2020_EAVS_Report_Final_
508c.pdf ......................................................... 26, 28
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are retired four-star admirals and generals,
and former service secretaries of the U.S. armed forces.
Amici are deeply interested in this case because
adoption of the independent state legislature theory
threatens to undermine election integrity and poses a
profound threat to national security. Amici are also
concerned that adoption of the independent state
legislature
theory
would
result
in
the
disenfranchisement of active duty military service
members and their families by unduly restricting
mail-in voting. Amici’s submissions are based on their
collective experience serving in and leading our
military, and on their collective interest in
safeguarding national security and the votes of active
duty service members. Amici’s short biographies
listed below only begin to describe their distinguished
service to our country.
Admiral Steve Abbot, United States Navy
(Retired): Admiral Abbot graduated from the United
States Naval Academy in 1966, deployed to Vietnam,
and began a career of over 35 years with the United
States Navy. He was chosen to study at Oxford as a
Rhodes Scholar, and he completed U.S. Air Force Test
Pilot School. He is an accomplished commander,
overseeing the aircraft carrier USS Theodore
Roosevelt (CVN 71) during Operation Desert Storm,
commanding the Theodore Roosevelt battle group
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part.
No person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary
contribution to this brief’s preparation or submission. All parties
have given either blanket consent or have specifically consented
to the participation of amici curiae.
2
Carrier Group EIGHT, and the Sixth Fleet from 19961998. His final active duty tour was as deputy
commander in chief, U.S. European Command from
1998 to 2000. He retired with the rank of 4-star
Admiral and his awards include the Legion of Merit
and a Bronze Star. Following his retirement in 2000,
Admiral Abbot served as Deputy Homeland Security
Advisor to President George W. Bush from 2001 to
2003, and then served for sixteen years as president of
the Navy-Marine Corps Relief Society, a non-profit
organization assisting sailors, Marines, and their
families.
Admiral Thad Allen, United States Coast Guard
(Retired): Admiral Thad Allen retired in 2010 as the
23rd Commandant of the US Coast Guard. He retired
as an Executive Vice President (2017) and senior
executive advisor (2021) at Booz Allen Hamilton. He
serves on several federal advisory committees. He
chairs the Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing Advisory Board, is a member of the Board of
Visitors to the National Intelligence University, and a
member of the Comptroller General’s Advisory Board.
Admiral Allen led the federal responses to Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.
He led Atlantic Coast Guard forces in response to the
9/11 attacks and coordinated the Coast Guard
response to the Haitian Earthquake. He is a 1971
graduate of the US Coast Guard Academy and holds
master’s degrees from George Washington University
and the MIT Sloan School. He is a recipient of 5
Honorary Doctorate degrees and held the James Tyler
Distinguished Chair of Leadership at the Loy
Institute of Leadership at the Coast Guard Academy
from 2014 to 2021.
3
Former Secretary of the United States Army
Louis Caldera: Louis Caldera graduated from the
United States Military Academy at West Point in 1978
and served in the Army on active duty from 1978 to
1983. After obtaining a J.D./M.B.A. degree from
Harvard in 1987, Caldera practiced law and was
elected to serve as a California State Assemblyman for
the 46th State Assembly district from 1992 to 1997.
He served in two Senate-confirmed positions in the
Clinton Administration, including as Secretary of the
Army, and in the Obama White House as an Assistant
to the President and Director of the White House
Military Office. Louis Caldera served as President of
The University of New Mexico and has taught law in
California, New Mexico and Washington D.C., most
recently, from 2018 to 2021, as a Distinguished
Adjunct Professor of Law at American University
Washington College of Law. He serves on numerous
nonprofit and public company boards and has served
on a number of educational, foreign policy and
national security commissions, task forces, and study
groups.
Former Secretary of the United States Air Force
Deborah Lee James: Deborah Lee James served as
the 23rd Secretary of the Air Force, appointed by
President Obama in 2013. Before this appointment,
Ms. James worked as an assistant to the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, before
being appointed by President Clinton and confirmed
by the Senate in 1993 to work in the Pentagon as the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Ms.
James has 30 years of senior homeland and national
security experience not only in the federal government
but in the private sector as well, including President
4
of Science Applications International Corporation’s
Technical and Engineering Sector, Executive Vice
President and Chief Operating Officer at Business
Executives for National Security, and Vice President
of International Operations and Marketing at United
Technologies. Ms. James now serves as a board
member of various companies and works as an author,
speaker, and strategic advisor.
General Craig McKinley, United States Air
Force (Retired): After 38 years in the Air Force,
General Craig McKinley retired as a four-star general
in November 2012. His last assignment was as the
Chief of the National Guard Bureau, where he also
served as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In this
capacity, he was a military adviser to the President,
the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security
Council, and he was the Department of Defense’s
official channel of communication to the Governors
and to State Adjutants General on all matters
pertaining to the National Guard. Gen. McKinley was
elected Chairman of the ANSER Board of Directors in
November 2020. He completed his tenure as National
Chair of Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve
on November 14, 2019. General McKinley retired as
the President and CEO of the National Defense
Industrial Association (NDIA) on June 30, 2017. Gen.
McKinley came to NDIA from the Air Force
Association (AFA) where he had served as President
since October 1, 2012.
Former Secretary of the United States Navy
Sean O’Keefe: Sean O’Keefe began his public service
career in 1978 with the Department of Defense and
the United States Senate staff until appointment as
5
the Department of Defense Comptroller and Chief
Finance Officer in 1989, serving until 1992 when
President George H. W. Bush named him the 69th
Secretary of the Navy. Sean O’Keefe also served in
President George W. Bush’s administration, as
Deputy Director of the Office of Management and
Budget in 2001 and 10th Administrator of NASA from
2001-2005.
Following these Senate confirmed
Presidential appointments, O’Keefe then served as
Chancellor of the Louisiana State University and later
as chairman and CEO of the U.S. subsidiary of the
Airbus Group, the global aerospace corporation. He
is a Fellow of the National Academy of Public
Administration and serves on the board of directors of
the Partnership for Public Service in addition to other
non-profit and corporate boards. He is presently a
member of the Syracuse University faculty at the rank
of University Professor and the Howard and
Louise Phanstiel Endowed Chair in Leadership at the
Syracuse University Maxwell School of Citizenship
and Public Affairs.
Concurrently, he is a
Distinguished Senior Adviser at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a partner
institution with the Syracuse Maxwell School in
Washington, D.C.
General George Casey, United States Army
(Retired): General George W. Casey, Jr., enjoyed a
41-year career in the US Army following his
graduation from Georgetown University’s School of
Foreign Service in 1970. He is an accomplished soldier
and an authority on strategic leadership. During his
tenure as the Army Chief of Staff, he is widely credited
with restoring balance to a war-weary Army and
leading the transformation to keep it relevant in the
6
21st Century. Prior to this, from July 2004 to
February 2007, he commanded the Multi-National
Force – Iraq, a coalition of more than 30 countries
where he guided the Iraq mission through its toughest
days.
Currently, he lectures internationally on
leadership to the leaders of national and
multinational corporations and at other business
schools. He also lectures on International Relations at
the Korbel School, University of Denver and serves on
several corporate boards and numerous boards of
organizations that support our servicemen and women,
our veterans, and their families.
General John Jumper, United States Air Force
(Retired):
General John P. Jumper is an
accomplished Air Force Fighter Pilot, Instructor, and
Commander, who served as the 17th Chief of Staff of
the United States Air Force from 2001 to 2005.
General Jumper began his military career as a
distinguished graduate of Virginia Military Institute’s
ROTC program in 1966. He has commanded a fighter
squadron, two fighter wings, a numbered Air Force,
and U.S. Air Forces in Europe and Allied Air Forces
Central Europe, and served as Commander of the Air
Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base, VA.
General Jumper went on to serve at the Pentagon as
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, as
the Senior Military Assistant to two secretaries of
defense, and as Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff
for Roles and Missions before becoming the Chief of
Staff of the United States Air Force. His tour as Chief
of Staff has spanned operations Enduring Freedom
and Iraqi Freedom. Following his retirement in 2005,
General Jumper joined the Board of Directors of
Science Applications International Corporation in
7
2007, where his tenure has been marked by the
company’s sustained growth, strong position in key
markets, innovation, and strong customer affinity.
General Tony Zinni, United States Marine Corps
(Retired): General Zinni joined the Marine Corps’
Platoon Leader Class program in 1961 and was
commissioned an infantry second lieutenant in 1965
upon graduation from Villanova University. He held
numerous command and staff assignments that
included platoon, company, battalion, regimental,
Marine
Expeditionary
Unit,
and
Marine
Expeditionary Force command. His staff assignments
included service in operations, training, special
operations, counter-terrorism, and manpower billets.
General Zinni’s 23 personal awards include the
Defense Distinguished Service Medal with Oak Leaf
Cluster; the Distinguished Service Medal; the Defense
Superior Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters;
the Bronze Star with Combat “V” and Gold Star; the
Purple Heart, and more. From 2017 to 2019, General
Zinni agreed to reenter public service as a special
envoy to resolve disputes in the Persian Gulf region.
Admiral James Loy, United States Coast Guard
(Retired): Admiral James Loy led a 45-year career in
public service, graduating from the Coast Guard
Academy in 1964, retiring from the U.S. Coast Guard
in 2002 having served as its Commandant since May
1998. Prior to his position as Commandant, Admiral
Loy served as Coast Guard Chief of Staff from 1996 to
1998, and Commander of the Coast Guard’s Atlantic
Area from 1994 to 1996. Admiral Loy left the Coast
Guard in 2002 to become the first Administrator in
charge of the newly created Transportation Security
8
Administration (TSA). In 2003, President George W.
Bush nominated Admiral Loy to the position of U.S.
Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, where he
served until his resignation in 2005.
9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioners advocate adoption of a profoundly
destabilizing and undemocratic approach to election
administration. The independent state legislature
theory would undermine election integrity and
diminish public confidence in electoral outcomes.
Centralizing authority over federal elections in the
hands of state legislatures would result in election
chaos by undermining professional nonpartisan
election administrators and undoing hundreds of laws
enshrined in state constitutions, adopted by voter
referenda, or implemented through administrative
rules. Moreover, the jettisoning of judicial review and
state constitutional limitations greenlights extreme
partisan gerrymandering and removes any constraint
on voter suppression in federal elections.
The
predictable outcome is severe damage to election
integrity and public faith in election legitimacy.
The weakening of election integrity creates serious
threats to national security. Civil unrest resulting
from public mistrust of electoral outcomes engenders
calls for military intervention. As former military
leaders, Amici are greatly concerned that
politicization of the military will tarnish its reputation
and decrease public support for the military. Public
mistrust of electoral outcomes also increases political
polarization, demoralizes election workers, and leaves
the democratic institutions they support vulnerable to
foreign interference. It further creates opportunities
for our enemies to sow division and reap the benefit of
a fragmented and divided nation. And because
elections are a cornerstone of democracy, declining
faith in our own elections diminishes the influence and
10
standing of the United States to advocate for
democracy throughout the world.
The independent state legislature theory also
threatens to disenfranchise military voters. Without
the important checks and balances imposed by state
constitutions, judiciaries, and executives, state
legislatures would be free to pass restrictive
legislation designed to constrain the accessibility of
mail-in voting. These restrictions pose a particular
risk to active duty service members and their families
who rely on the availability of mail-in voting to cast
their ballots and participate in the democracy they
serve and protect.
11
ARGUMENT
I.
Adoption of the Independent State
Legislature Theory Would Undermine
Election Integrity and Harm National
Security.
The independent state legislature theory advanced
by petitioners undermines election integrity and
exacerbates both domestic and foreign threats to
national security. State constitutions and judicial
review safeguard the fundamental right of citizens to
vote and choose who will represent them through free
and fair elections. Removing these protections and
granting
state
legislatures
unilateral
and
unreviewable power over federal elections would
destabilize election administration and have
foreseeable
domestic
and
foreign
negative
implications for national security.
A. The
Independent
State
Legislature
Theory Will Damage Public Faith in
Elections.
One of the most important features of American
democracy is the system of checks and balances among
the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Our founders
recognized that “[t]he accumulation of all powers,
legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” The
Federalist No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961). This is a hallmark of our federal
government, but it is an important and longstanding
feature of state government as well. Saikrishna B.
12
Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial
Review, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 887, 929–939, 933 n.169
(2003) (describing the rise of state judicial review and
collecting examples of such review in the preconstitutional period).
State constitutions also play a role in constraining
state legislatures. See Arizona State Legislature v.
Arizona Indep. Redistricting Comm’n (AIRC), 576 U.S.
787, 817–818 (2015) (“Nothing in [the Elections]
Clause instructs, nor has this Court ever held, that a
state legislature may prescribe regulations on the
time, place, and manner of holding federal elections in
defiance of provisions of the State’s constitution.”).
States’ constitutions may go “above and beyond” in
protecting the rights of individual citizens. Amer.
Legion v. Amer. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2094
(2019) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
These safeguards are especially important in the
context of federal elections and impact a citizen’s
fundamental right to vote. Yet, adoption of the
independent state legislature theory would grant
state legislatures plenary authority to regulate federal
elections, unchecked by state-level constraints—
including state constitutions, state courts, citizen
ballot initiatives, and in extreme versions of the
theory, gubernatorial veto.
Stripping away established state-level protections
undermines election integrity by destroying the
longstanding expectation and understanding of voters
and state election officials.
Hundreds, if not
thousands, of election laws could be nullified by the
independent state legislature theory. Moreover, many
13
of the laws protecting election integrity were adopted
by voters through referenda, incorporated into state
constitutions, or have been relied upon for decades to
safeguard both state and federal elections. But under
the independent state legislature theory, voters may
find these protections discarded and swept aside by
state legislatures unilaterally seeking to pass
restrictive voting laws.2 Without state constitutional
restraints, state legislatures may also interfere in the
nonpartisan administration of elections and thereby
undermine public confidence in election outcomes.3
Moreover, if control over federal congressional
elections is centralized in the hands of the state
legislatures, election officials and state courts would
be constrained in their ability to interpret ambiguous
state statutes to make election administration
workable within the compressed timeframe that often
2 The threat of state legislatures seeking to restrict voting
access is more than theoretical. See, e.g., Brennan Center for
Justice, Voting Laws Roundup (May 2022), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundupmay-2022 (cataloguing restrictive voting laws already proposed
by state legislatures).
3 See, e.g., States United Democracy Center, Democracy Crisis
in the Making: How State Legislatures are Politicizing, Criminalizing, and Interfering with Election Administration (June 2021
Rpt. & Aug. 2022 Update), https://statesuniteddemocracy.org/resources/democracy-crisis-in-the-making-how-state-legislaturesare-politicizing-criminalizing-and-interfering-with-elections/#section-2 (reporting on measures that “represent a
dangerous trend: efforts to increase the ability of partisan actors
to subvert the will of the voters”).
14
apply.4 State election officials could also be required
to oversee two sets of potentially conflicting rules—
one governing federal elections and another governing
state elections.5 Vote counting may be opened up to
challenge if federal ballot tallies differ from state
ballot tallies, as may happen when applying
conflicting rules. For example, the same ballot could
be ruled insufficient for federal election purposes but
sufficient for state election purposes. 6 Requiring
election officials to administer simultaneous state and
federal elections governed by different rules and
separate ballots engenders uncertainty that will
undermine the fair and effective administration and
regulation of federal elections. The Independent State
Legislature Theory and Its Potential to Disrupt Our
Democracy: Hearing Before the H. Com. on H. Admin.,
117th Cong., 1 (Jul. 28, 2022) (written testimony of
Carolyn Shapiro).
The independent state legislature theory seeks to
diminish (or eliminate) the essential and historic role
of the state judiciary in resolving conflicting
interpretations of election law and in adjudicating
disputes arising under that law. Meanwhile, if
stripped of the long-standing means of resolving
4 Genevieve Nadeau and Helen White, Independent State Legislatures and Presidential Elections: Addressing Misconceptions
About Current Law and Prospects for Reform, Just Security (Aug.
16, 2022), https://www.justsecurity.org/82685/independent-statelegislatures-and-presidential-elections-addressing-misconceptions-about-current-law-and-prospects-for-reform/.
5 States United Democracy Center, A Democracy Crisis in the
Making 9–10 (Aug. 2022), https://statesuniteddemocracy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2022/08/DCIM-August2022.pdf.
6 Ibid.
15
disputes through judicial review, minimal precedent
exists for how disputes over the validity,
interpretation, or application of state election law
would be resolved by a state legislature. To allow
unchecked action by a single branch defies the
fundamental principle of separation of powers,
because: “there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be
not separated from the legislative and executive.
Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty
of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control;
for the judge would be then the legislator.” C.
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 152 (T. Nugent
trans. 1949) (1748).
The potential chaos of such a system will inevitably
undermine the integrity of federal elections.
Eliminating long-established pathways for judicial
review of election law and election disputes would
result in confusion that would make it easier to claim
election fraud and cast doubt on election outcomes.7
These problems will exacerbate the growing problem
of partisanship in election administration.8
The protections provided by state constitutions and
state judicial review also strengthen confidence in
electoral outcomes where they limit the excesses of
extreme partisan gerrymandering. Gerrymandering
is anti-majoritarian and deeply undemocratic because
it allows politicians to entrench themselves by
7 Helen White, The Independent State Legislature Theory
Should Horrify Supreme Court’s Originalists, Just Security (Jun.
30, 2022), https://www.justsecurity.org/81990/the-independentstate-legislature-theory-should-horrify-supreme-courts-originalists/.
8 A Democracy Crisis in the Making, supra note 5, at 9.
16
drawing unfair electoral districts. See AIRC, 576 U.S.
at 824 (gerrymandering violates “the core principle of
republican government, namely, that the voters
should choose their representative, not the other way
around”) (citation and quotation omitted). See also
Miriam Seifter, Countermajoritarian Legislatures,
121 Colum. L. Rev. 1733, 1762–1767 (2021)
(describing
how
gerrymandering,
as
a
countermajoritarian tendency of state legislatures,
can lead to outright minority-party control).
Protections at the state level are the only feasible way
to ensure that congressional districts are fairly drawn.
See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2507
(2019) (acknowledging that state courts applying state
statutes and state constitutions are well-placed to
protect against partisan gerrymandering).
The independent state legislature theory would
grant the state legislatures unreviewable power to
draw congressional districts and would destroy any
attempt by the States to rein in partisan
gerrymandering. Gerrymandering undermines the
public’s faith in elections. Indeed, “[i]ntelligent voters,
regardless of party affiliation, resent this sort of
political manipulation of the electorate for no public
purpose.” Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
overruled by Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
Contemporary polls show that voters across party
lines have unfavorable views of gerrymandering. 9
And yet because the result of gerrymandering is to
9 Campaign Legal Center, New Bipartisan Poll on Gerryman-
dering and the Supreme Court (Jan. 25,
https://campaignlegal.org/sites/default/files/201901/CLC%20Bipartisan%20Redistrictig%20Poll.pdf.
2019),
17
entrench the incumbent legislators, the legislative
branch is particularly ill-suited to address or
ameliorate the problems partisan gerrymandering
presents. Accordingly, Amici foresee public loss of
faith in radically gerrymandered elections as a
predictable consequence of the independent state
legislature theory.
B. A Lack of Election Integrity Threatens the
Military’s Ability to Operate Effectively.
Amici believe the lack of election integrity and loss
of public faith that would result from adopting the
independent state legislature theory has foreseeable
negative implications for national security. The
public’s trust in elections is essential to the military’s
continued success as an apolitical entity above the fray
of partisan politics.
As an institution subject to civilian control, it is
critically important for the military to remain, and be
perceived, as apolitical and outside of the political
realm. Civilian control of the military places decisionmaking in the hands of democratically elected
leadership.
Such leadership, if it is to govern
effectively, must have confidence in the nonpartisan
nature of the military. But election instability leaves
the military vulnerable to the pulls of partisan politics.
In some recent elections, political actors from both
parties suggested military intervention was needed to
quell civilian unrest in the aftermath of elections.
Because of such calls, a coalition of Former Secretaries
of Defense and Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff signed an open letter reaffirming that the
military has no role to play in elections and must be
18
kept separate from partisan political activity.10 Amici,
who are former military leaders, anticipate that calls
for military intervention will only increase in the wake
of further disruption to the election system that would
result from adoption of the independent state
legislature theory.
Amici further believe that even the perception of
politicization would have devastating consequences
for the military’s effectiveness. And a lack of election
integrity may cause politicization of the military even
when the military appropriately decides not to involve
itself in the election process. When large swaths of
voters view an election as illegitimate, necessary
statements by military leaders reaffirming that the
military has no role to play in election outcomes may
be viewed as political acts.
Amici are also gravely concerned that National
Guard units may be called to quell civil disturbances
engendered by a lack of confidence in electoral
outcomes, which would further politicize and
undermine support for the military. When federalized,
State National Guard units are responsive to the
President as commander in chief. But when in their
state roles, they act at the direction of State Governors
who are partisan elected officials and who could deploy
them to quash constitutionally protected speech and
demonstrations against electoral rules and outcomes
10 Open Letter from Former Secretaries of Defense and For-
mer Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, To Support and Defend:
Principles of Civilian Control and Best Practices of Civil-Military
Relations, War on the Rocks (Sep. 6, 2022), https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/to-support-and-defend-principles-ofcivilian-control-and-best-practices-of-civil-military-relations/.
19
that favor one party’s fortunes. This role is anathema
for the military of a democratic society, and the mere
perception of military involvement would further
damage the military’s standing.
A politicized military is unable to operate
effectively. The U.S. armed forces, as an all-volunteer
military of a constitutional democracy, rely on the
popular support of the American people for the
financial and other resources needed for the nation’s
defense. The U.S. armed forces are one of the most
trusted institutions and seen as deserving of such
support, precisely because they conduct themselves
above partisan politics and are solely dedicated to
defending the nation against foreign and domestic
threats.
The military also depends on its ability to recruit a
force from across the political spectrum and deploy
those forces in operations that put service members’
lives at risk. Amici’s experience leading the armed
forces enables them to understand the unique
recruitment needs of the military. They are concerned
that increased politicization of the military will erode
the public’s perception of the apolitical nature of the
military and diminish the military’s continued ability
to field the most qualified force to protect the nation.
Public trust in free and fair elections is therefore
critical to the military’s continued success at staying
above the fray of partisan politics. The independent
state legislature theory will increase the public’s
disillusionment with the electoral process and risk
drawing the military into the political arena.
20
C. A Lack of Election Integrity Exacerbates
Threats to National Security.
Amici believe that a lack of election integrity poses
a profound threat to national security. Election
instability weakens our standing and influence
around the world. And extreme polarization
emboldens our adversaries and demoralizes our allies.
Amici also recognize that public distrust of elections
and election officials creates opportunities for foreign
and antidemocratic actors to subvert elections.
Elections present the most visible display of our
democratic process and constitutional safeguards.
Harm to this pillar of U.S. democracy compromises
efforts at foreign diplomacy and degrades the nation’s
standing as a leader for freedom and self-governance
on the world stage. Ultimately, loss of faith in
American democracy destabilizes our world thereby
increasing threats to our national security.
The military’s greatest strength stems from its
position as an organ of American democracy. Around
the world, democracy is in retreat, authoritarianism is
on the rise, and for the first time in almost two decades,
the number of non-democratic countries outnumber
that of democratic countries.11 At home and abroad,
respect for American democracy as a model for the
world is waning. A recent Pew Research Center report
shows 72% of Americans and 57% of the median
survey responses from citizens of 16 advanced
11 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2022: The Global Ex-
pansion
of
Authoritarian
Rule
(Feb.
2022),
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule.
21
democracies say the United States used to be, but is
no longer, a good model of democracy.12
During a time when authoritarian governments
are becoming alarmingly powerful and prevalent, it is
critical that the United States stand as an exemplar of
a well-functioning democracy. The degradation of
faith in election integrity directly impacts this ability
because the United States cannot promote the value of
democracy abroad without public confidence that its
own elections are free and fairly administered. And
without such ability, the march of authoritarianism
will continue with predictable harmful consequences
for the security of the United States and other
democracies.
The public’s lack of faith in elections would also
create opportunities for foreign actors to further
inflame domestic tensions and create significant longterm threats to our security. As recent events have
shown, extreme political polarization is a predicable
consequence of undermined elections.
Partisan
polarization makes us more vulnerable to
disinformation campaigns designed to fracture the
country and make it more difficult to respond to, and
defend against, foreign adversaries.
Distrust in elections has also increasingly
subjected election officials to harassment and
intimidation. The Brennan Center for Justice recently
12 Richard Wike, et al, What People Around the World Like –
and Dislike – About American Society and Politics, Pew Research
Center (Nov. 1, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2021/
11/01/what-people-around-the-world-like-and-dislike-aboutamerican-society-and-politics/.
22
reported that one in three election officials felt unsafe
because of their job and nearly one in five said their
lives were threatened due to their work on elections.13
Moreover, nearly one in three local election officials
know at least one election worker who has left the job,
partly because of safety concerns, increased threats, or
intimidation.14 The Bipartisan Policy Center reports
that election workers have recently experienced a
“barrage of threats” “in what had traditionally been a
very low threat environment.”15 Many state election
officials facing such increased hostility are considering
quitting their jobs, and the field is already losing
election officials at an alarming rate. Emerging
Threats to Election Administration: Hearing before S.
Comm. on Rules and Admin, 117th Cong. (Oct. 26,
2021) (Testimony of Matthew Masterson).
The loss of experienced election officials leaves our
electoral systems vulnerable at a critical time for
American democracy. In the past few elections, bad
faith foreign actors have attempted to interfere with
our electoral systems. 16 Those efforts have largely
13 Brennan Center for Justice, Local Elections Official Survey
(Apr. 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/local-election-officials-survey.
14 Brennan Center for Justice, Local Elections Official Survey
(Mar. 2022), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/local-election-officials-survey-march-2022.
Bipartisan Policy Center, Deterring Threats to Election
Workers (July 2022), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/deterring-threats-to-election-workers/.
16 See, e.g., Howard et al., Defending Elections: Federal Funding Needs for State Election Security, Brennan Center for Justice
(July 18, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/defending-elections-federal-funding-needs-stateelection-security (discussing attempts to interfere with the 2016
15
23
been unsuccessful due to the diligence and expertise of
election workers. The loss of experienced election
workers would leave our election systems susceptible
to foreign interference and divert attention from
ensuring the security of election platforms.17
At this important juncture, nothing is more
important to the promotion of democracy globally than
regaining the public’s trust in U.S. elections. Adoption
of the independent state legislature theory would
serve only to destabilize our election system and
further erode the nation’s trust in electoral outcomes.
The predictable consequences of such a decision is the
politicization of the military, the weakening of
general election); Kevin Johnson, Russian Hackers Target U.S.
Computer Systems; Feds Say Elections Data Not Compromised,
USA
Today
(Oct.
22,
2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/
2020/10/22/election-2020-new-wave-russian-hacking-efforts-detected-officials/3735228001/ (discussing attempts to interfere
with the 2020 general election); Nicole Perlroth and David E.
Sanger, Ransomware Attacks Take On New Urgency Ahead of
Vote, New York Times, (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/2020/09/27/technology/2020-election-security-threats.html;
Scott Ikeda, Iranian Hackers Indicted over 2020 US Election Interference, CPO Magazine (Nov. 23, 2021), https://www.
cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/iranian-hackers-indicted-over2020-us-election-interference-used-confidential-voter-information-to-send-targeted-misinformation-and-threats/.
17 See Letter From Former High-Ranking National Security
Officials To Congress: Election Subversion Poses National Security
Threat,
Medium
(Nov.
9,
2021),
https://medium.com/@FormerU.S.NatSecOfficials/letter-fromformer-high-ranking-national-security-officials-to-congress-election-subversion-poses-69a269962ac.
24
American democracy, and the enhancement of threats
to the nation’s security.
II.
The
Independent
State
Legislature
Theory Will Disenfranchise Active Duty
Military Service Members and Their
Families.
Beyond the grave national security threats that are
posed by the independent state legislature theory, it
also creates a unique threat to the votes of active duty
military service members. Centralized power over
congressional elections in the hands of state
legislatures poses a concrete threat to the mail-in vote
of active duty military service members. At least 405
restrictive voting bills have been proposed in 39 state
legislatures during 2022. 18 Many of those bills are
designed to make mail-in voting more difficult,
sometimes based on the specious argument that mailin voting is less reliable. These restrictions will have
a significant, negative impact on military service
members and their families who overwhelmingly rely
on mail-in voting to participate in elections.
Americans today trace their ability to vote by mail
to soldiers voting far from home during the Civil War.
For the estimated three-quarters of the 1.4 million
military service members stationed away from their
legal voting residence, mail and absentee voting
18 Brennan Center for Justice, State Voting Laws, Overview
(2022),
https://www.brennancenter.org/issues/ensure-everyamerican-can-vote/voting-reform/state-voting-laws.
25
remain an area of critical concern.19 In every election,
active duty troops and their families cast their ballots
from wherever they are stationed, all across the globe.
Nearly half of military members voted in 2020, and
75% of military members are eligible to vote
absentee.20 For military members, the most common
method of voting is by mailing in their ballots.21 In
2020, 84% of military voters who returned an absentee
ballot did so by mail. 22 The high rate of ballots
returned by mail can be explained by the fact that
many states do not accept ballots electronically, and
mail return is the only ballot option for military
absentee voters from these states.23 Indeed, in 40% of
states, mail-in voting is the only allowed transmission
method of absentee ballots.24
The independent state legislature theory advanced
by petitioners risks imposing greater restrictions on
mail-in voting to the detriment of military members
who rely on it. Mail-in voting already faces significant
hurdles. For a mail-in ballot to be counted, military
members must comply with deadlines by which their
19 Federal Voting Assistance Program, State of the Military
Voter, https://www.fvap.gov/info/reports-surveys/StateoftheMilitaryVoter.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Federal Voting Assistance Program, Post-Election Voting
Survey: Active Duty Military Technical Report 2020, 23,
https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/Reports/FVAP_ADMTechnical-Report-2020_FINAL_20210831.pdf.
23 Ibid.
24 Federal Voting Assistance Program, State of the Military
Voter, supra note 19.
26
ballots must be postmarked and received.25 Because
active duty military members are becoming more
aware of the need to return their mail-in ballots on
time, an increasing number of service members opt to
take advantage of states’ early voting periods to return
their ballots.26
Nonetheless, for military members voting by mail,
missing the deadline was the most common reason
why states rejected their 2020 general election mail-in
ballots.27 During the 2020 election, many active duty
service members were located in areas where postal
service was delayed or suspended because of the
COVID-19 pandemic.28 Therefore, setting aside post2020 proposed restrictions on mail-in voting, the 2020
election cycle demonstrated how structurally difficult
25 Generally, military mail-in ballots must be postmarked in
advance of Election Day. As to the deadline by which the ballot
must be received, in approximately one-third of states, a military
member’s 2020 general election ballot had to have been received
by Election Day. In the remaining two-thirds of states, the deadline ranged from two to 20 days after Election Day. See U.S.
Election Assistance Commission to the 117th Congress, Election
Administration and Voting Survey 2020 Comprehensive Report,
74 (Aug. 2021), https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/
2020_EAVS_Report_Final_508c.pdf.
26 Active Duty Military Technical Report 2020, supra note 22,
at 20.
27 Of the mail-in ballots that were rejected in the 2020 general
election, 44.7% were rejected for missing the deadline, and another 23.9% were rejected because of verification and signature
issues. Election Administration and Voting Survey 2020 Comprehensive Report, supra note 25, at 186.
28 Federal Voting Assistance Program, 2020 Post-Election Re-
port to Congress, https://www.fvap.gov/info/reports-surveys/
2020-report-to-congress.
27
it is for military votes to be properly counted given
military members’ service in remote locations.
The difficulties faced by mail-in voting would only
increase if the power over elections were centralized
in the hands of the state legislatures without any
judicial oversight. Although federal law provides
some protection for military mail-in voting, such as
requiring absentee military voters to automatically
receive their ballots 45 days before Election Day,
federal law does not entirely insulate military voters
from the requirements of state law. Military voters
who return their ballots by mail must still comply with
state deadlines for postmarking and receiving ballots,
as well as state signature and witnessing
requirements.
State legislatures are attempting to narrow the
window during which absentee ballots must be
received to be counted.
Such efforts include
shortening the early voting period, moving up the
deadline by which ballots must be postmarked,
moving up the deadline by which ballots must be
received, and eliminating discretion to count ballots
received later than three days after Election Day.
Similarly, there have been attempts by state
legislatures to make it harder to satisfy witnessing
and signature requirements by requiring mail-in
ballots to be notarized.
The independent state
legislature theory advanced by petitioners would place
such voting restrictions beyond challenge by the
persons impacted by them. Without the important
limitations imposed by states’ constitutions and
judiciary, these restrictions and requirements will
28
have devastating effects on military voters who
already struggle with ballot rejection due to missed
deadlines and verification issues.29
Where the legislature, executive, and judiciary
play their traditional roles in a three-branch system of
government, military service members stand a much
better chance of being able to exercise their
constitutional right to vote. For example, during the
COVID-19 pandemic, the Alaska judiciary suspended
the requirement that voters who submitted a mail-in
absentee ballot have a witness sign their ballot return
envelope. See State v. Arctic Village Council, 495 P.3d
313, 325–326 (Alaska 2021). Such continued interplay
between the different branches of government is
necessary if the mail-in vote of active duty military
service members is to remain protected.
“The uniform of our country must not be the badge
of disfranchisement for the man or woman who wears
it.” Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 97 (1965). The
voting rights of active duty military voters and their
families are particularly deserving of protection.
These service members volunteer to serve far from
home and to endure the risks of being put in harm’s
way. The nature of their service requires them to vote
by mail, and our nation owes them a debt to ensure
their votes are counted. The independent state legislature theory would create new barriers to military
service members’ participation in the democracy they
29 Election Administration and Voting Survey 2020 Compre-
hensive Report, supra note 25, at 186.
29
seek to defend. And for this reason, it should be rejected.
CONCLUSION
The independent state legislature theory will harm
election integrity and weaken public faith in elections.
Its adoption poses threats to national security and will
also serve to disenfranchise military voters. For these
reasons, the Court should reject the independent state
legislature theory and affirm the decision below.
Respectfully submitted,
ILANA H. EISENSTEIN
Counsel of Record
WHITNEY CLOUD
KATHLEEN S. KIZER
M. DAVID JOSEFOVITS
DLA PIPER LLP (US)
One Liberty Place
1650 Market Street
Suite 5000
(215) 656-3351
Ilana.Eisenstein@us.dlapiper.com
October 26, 2022
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.