Opposition Brief — Sumotext Corp., Petitioner v. Zoove, Inc., dba StarStar Mobile, et al.

No. 21-1187

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------SUMOTEXT CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

v.

ZOOVE, INC., VIRTUAL HOLD TECHNOLOGY, LLC;

STARSTEVE, LLC; VHT STARSTAR LLC,

and MBLOX, INC.,

Respondents.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------APEX LAW APC

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

THOMAS N. FITZGIBBON

ELIZABETH G. “HEIDI” BLOCH

100 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 700

Counsel of Record

Santa Monica, CA 90401

State Bar No. 02495500

T: (310) 230-5280

blochh@gtlaw.com

F: (310) 496-3175

300 West 6th Street,

Suite 2050

Counsel for Respondent

Austin, TX 78701

StarSteve, LLC

T: (512) 320-7228

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

F: (512) 320-7210

DAVID SPENCER BLOCH

Counsel for Respondents

Zoove, Inc., Virtual Hold

blochd@gtlaw.com

Technology, LLC,

MICHAEL HOGUE

VHT StarStar LLC

hoguem@gtlaw.com

101 Second Street, Suite 2200

San Francisco, CA 94105

T: (415) 655-1300

F: (415) 707-2010

Counsel for Respondents

Zoove, Inc., Virtual Hold

Technology, LLC,

VHT StarStar LLC

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COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly held that

the jury’s verdict was supported by substantial evidence because Petitioner, as an antitrust plaintiff, factually failed to meet its burden of proving the existence

of two distinct relevant markets.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly held that

a qualified expert is permitted to attack the methodology of a competing expert.

ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.6, Zoove, LLC

(formerly Zoove, Inc.) is 100% owned by VHT StarStar,

LLC. VHT StarStar, LLC is 91% owned by Virtual Hold

Technology, LLC, with 6% owned by StarSteve, LLC

and 3% owned by Tom Turley. Virtual Hold Technology

has no parent corporation and no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of Virtual Hold Technology’s

stock. StarSteve, LLC has no parent corporation and

no publicly held corporation owns 10% or more of its

stock.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................

i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ......

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

v

INTRODUCTION ................................................

1

STATEMENT .......................................................

4

I.

Background ................................................

4

II.

Procedural history .....................................

5

A. Trial evidence regarding the relevant

markets ................................................

6

1. Sumotext’s expert—Dr. Sullivan ....

6

2. Respondents’ expert—Dr. Aron ......

8

3. Industry participants .....................

8

B. The pretrial rulings Sumotext cites

are irrelevant and misleading .............

9

REASONS TO DENY THE PETITION ............... 10

I.

This case does not reveal a circuit split regarding how to define a relevant market .... 10

A. Sumotext’s own expert failed to conduct the market analysis Sumotext

now says is “required” ......................... 10

B. Testimony of industry participants is

admissible and relevant ...................... 11

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

C. The Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the

relevant market is consistent with the

holdings of this Court and other circuits ..................................................... 12

II.

This case does not reveal a circuit split regarding admissibility of expert testimony .... 13

A. The Ninth Circuit does not have a “nonsense” standard for admissibility ......... 13

B. Sumotext advances a test for admissibility that its own expert failed to

meet ..................................................... 13

CONCLUSION..................................................... 15

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis Budget Grp., Inc.,

738 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2013) ....................................13

Brown Shoe Co. v United States, 370 U.S. 294

(1962) ............................................................. 2, 11, 12

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S.

579 (1993) ............................................................ 1, 13

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc.,

504 U.S. 451 (1992) .................................................11

Hicks v. PGA Tour, Inc., 897 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.

2018) ..........................................................................7

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137

(1999) .........................................................................1

Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018) ..........2

St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St.

Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775 (9th

Cir. 2015) ...................................................................7

TCL Commc’ns Tech. Holdings Ltd. v. Telefonaktenbologet LM Ericsson, 2016 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 194814, 2016 WL 7042085 (C.D. Cal.

Aug. 17, 2016) ..........................................................14

Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036

(2016) .......................................................................14

United States v. Bacon, 979 F.3d 766 (9th Cir.

2020) ........................................................................13

United States v. Ray, 956 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.

2020) ........................................................................13

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

RULES

Fed. R. Evid. 702 ...........................................................1

1

INTRODUCTION

This is a case about an antitrust plaintiff ’s burden

of proof. Petitioner Sumotext failed to meet its factual

burden to prove the existence of two narrowly-defined

relevant antitrust markets—one market for leasing **

numbers and a separate market for servicing ** numbers.1 The jury’s verdict on this threshold issue was

supported by substantial evidence presented during a

two-week trial. See App. 8-9 (“The jury’s verdict is supported by substantial evidence” and therefore “must

stand”).

There is no circuit split on either of the two alleged

“issues” presented by Sumotext. The Ninth Circuit

does not apply an “unduly lax standard” for identifying

economic substitutes in antitrust market analyses, nor

for the admission of expert testimony. And even if there

were a circuit split on either issue, the Ninth Circuit’s

opinion in this case would not implicate it. In this case,

the district court and the Ninth Circuit expressly relied on settled law—Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526

U.S. 137 (1999), Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,

509 U.S. 579 (1993), and Federal Rule of Evidence

702—to admit the testimony of economist Dr. Debra

Aron. App. 5. Likewise, the district court and the Ninth

1

Zoove was authorized by the four major mobile phone carriers to lease ** numbers (or star star numbers), mobile dial codes

that begin with **. Mobile dial codes are abbreviated phone numbers that begin with *, **, #, or ##, and are a shorthand way to

make a call from a mobile phone. Businesses use mobile dial codes

as a form of “call to action”—a way to connect with potential customers.

2

Circuit relied on settled law—Ohio v. Am. Express Co.,

138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018), Brown Shoe Co. v United States,

370 U.S. 294 (1962), and others—to conclude that Sumotext bore the burden of proof and hence that Dr.

Aron was entitled to highlight Sumotext’s failure to

carry its burden without offering an affirmative market definition of her own. App. 8.

In truth, Sumotext does not identify a circuit split

at all. Its argument goes deep into antitrust weeds,

boiling down to this: 1) proving a relevant market requires a market analysis, including identifying which

economic substitutes exhibit cross-elasticity of demand with the product at issue; and 2) because Respondents’ expert did not conduct her own market

analysis, she should not have been allowed to criticize

Sumotext’s expert. But Sumotext omits a vital fact in

its Petition to this Court: Sumotext’s own expert failed

to conduct the market analysis Sumotext now advocates. It was Sumotext’s burden to prove its two proffered narrow markets—a burden that, per the jury,

Sumotext failed to carry. Contrary to Sumotext’s argument, an antitrust defendant does not bear the burden

to prove a different or broader market.

The Petition reveals Sumotext’s continuing attempt at trial and on appeal to avoid its burden to

prove the existence of its two claimed relevant markets. See App. 6 (Ninth Circuit: “Sumotext challenges

the application of the burden of proof ”), App. 8 (Ninth

Circuit: “We reject Sumotext’s attempt to disclaim its

burden of proof”), App. 44 (District Court: “Sumotext

is attempting to shift the burden of proof ”). As an

3

antitrust plaintiff, Sumotext had the strategic choice

how to define the relevant markets to support its

claims. Sumotext tried but failed to convince the jury

that it should disregard all other calls to action and

conclude that ** numbers do not compete with any

other products or services that businesses use to engage consumers.

Among the many reasons to deny the Petition, two

stand out:

First, Sumotext contends that analyzing crosselasticity of demand is required in defining a relevant

market, yet Sumotext’s expert failed to examine crosselasticity of demand or conduct any other type of recognized market analysis.

Second, even if—contrary to the most basic AngloAmerican norms of jurisprudence—Dr. Aron should

not have been allowed to criticize the failures of Sumotext’s expert, the Ninth Circuit correctly concluded

that any such error was harmless because Sumotext’s

own efforts to prove its two relevant markets fell short.

App. 5 (any error in admitting Dr. Aron’s testimony

“was harmless” as “it is more probable than not that

the jury would have reached the same verdict even if

the evidence had not been admitted”).

The Court should deny the Petition.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

4

STATEMENT

Petitioner Sumotext Corporation sued for damages under the Sherman Act on the theory that Respondents Virtual Hold Technology LLC, VHT StarStar

LLC, Zoove LLC, and StarSteve LLC abused their alleged monopoly power in distinct markets for ** number leasing and ** number servicing.2

I.

Background

Businesses use ** numbers, as well as other mobile dial codes, as a form of “call to action”—a way to

connect with potential customers. App. 50-51, 62. At

trial, there was significant evidence about other calls

to action and forms of mobile engagement that compete with ** numbers, including other abbreviated dial

codes such as # numbers or * numbers, 10-digit telephone numbers, 1-800 numbers, text messages, social

networks, web searches, and mobile phone apps. App.

51-52, 62.

In June 2010, Zoove secured the exclusive right to

lease and support ** numbers (but not other mobile

dial codes) on behalf of AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and

Sprint. App. 6. After pursuing several unsuccessful

business models, Zoove’s owners sold the business to

Mblox in 2014. App. 6, 80. Mblox chose to implement a

2

Sumotext also sued Mblox, Inc., Zoove’s former owner.

Mblox is represented by separate counsel, was dismissed from the

case at the pleading stage, and had no role at trial. While Sumotext challenged Mblox’s dismissal on appeal to the Ninth Circuit,

it does not revive that argument here.

5

different business model relying heavily on resellers

like Sumotext.

Sumotext became a Zoove customer just before the

sale to Mblox and was Zoove’s most successful ** number reseller during the 18 months Mblox owned the

company.3 App. 6, 80. But Zoove itself was still not profitable, not least because Sumotext was able to capture

virtually all the economic value associated with a

leased ** number, leaving Zoove to act as little more

than a conduit between Sumotext and the mobile

phone carriers. App. 80.

Because Mblox was unable to operate Zoove profitably, it sold Zoove to VHT StarStar LLC (a wholly

owned acquisition subsidiary of Virtual Hold Technology LLC) in December 2015. App. 122-24. The new

owners changed Zoove’s business model yet again, altering ** number prices and the terms of its contracts

with resellers such as Sumotext. App. 80. As was its

right, VHT StarStar notified Sumotext that it would

terminate Sumotext’s ** number leases and offered

new contract terms. Sumotext refused to negotiate new

terms, instead filing suit. App. 86-87.

II.

Procedural history

During a 2-plus-week jury trial, Sumotext and

Respondents each called multiple fact and expert

3

Respondent StarSteve, another reseller, did not turn a

profit on its ** number leases. App. 82. Much later, it bought a

minority stake in VHT StarStar LLC. App. 79.

6

witnesses. The district court instructed the jury on the

law, using instructions agreed to by the parties. App. 7.

After being instructed, the jury asked only one question during deliberations: “Is question no. 1 asking:

‘Did Sumotext prove by a preponderance of the evidence a relevant market for leasing ** numbers in the

United States’ and ONLY ** numbers?” App. 15 (emphasis in original). The court—with the agreement of

the parties—answered: “yes.” Id. Not long after, the

jury returned its verdict, answering “no” to the following questions:

•

“Did Sumotext prove by a preponderance

of the evidence a relevant market for leasing ** numbers in the United States?”

and

•

“Did Sumotext prove by a preponderance

of the evidence a relevant market for servicing ** numbers in the United States?”

App. 183, 187. The district court then entered a takenothing judgment against Sumotext and later denied

Sumotext’s motion for new trial. App. 11.

The Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished memorandum opinion, affirmed in all respects. App. 1.

A. Trial evidence regarding the relevant

markets

1. Sumotext’s expert—Dr. Sullivan

Sumotext attempted to meet its burden to define

the relevant market through the expert testimony of

7

economist Dr. Ryan Sullivan, who opined—without

having conducted any traditional market analysis—

that there are two relevant markets for ** numbers

nationwide: one for leasing ** numbers and a separate

one for servicing ** numbers. App. 13.

While Dr. Sullivan acknowledged the existence of

other customer calls to action such as 10-digit telephone numbers, 1-800 numbers, short codes, text messaging, internet apps, and other mobile dial codes (*, #,

and ## numbers), he concluded that no other forms of

mobile engagement belonged in the same market as **

numbers. App. 27. In his view, “there are no other economic substitutes that are reasonably interchangeable” with ** numbers. App. 27.

Under cross-examination, Dr. Sullivan admitted

that he had not performed a SSNIP test4 or any industry or market surveys (App. 28-29, 32, 35), and had

not analyzed cross-elasticity of demand5 between **

number pricing and any other forms of consumer engagement. (ER1645: “I did not calculate across [sic]

elasticity. That’s not feasible here, nor is it necessary”).

As the district court correctly noted, Dr. Sullivan

4

SSNIP is an acronym for “small but significant nontransitory increase in price.” App. 28. A SSNIP test is a common technique for determining the extent to which competing goods are

substitutable for one another. See St. Alphonsus Med. Ctr.Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 784 (9th

Cir. 2015).

5

“Cross-elasticity of demand” is a way to measure the “reasonable interchangeability of use” between two products, indicating they may be substitutes for each other. See Hicks v. PGA Tour,

Inc., 897 F.3d 1109, 1120 (9th Cir. 2018).

8

“provided very little information regarding his determination that servicing [**] numbers is a distinct market” from leasing ** numbers, and never described his

methodology for determining that there were two distinct markets. App. 33, 35-36. That failure alone

doomed Sumotext, which insisted the two markets

were separate and distinct, and that each was confined

to ** numbers, with no economic substitutes or competitors of any kind.

2. Respondents’ expert—Dr. Aron

To rebut Dr. Sullivan, Respondents proffered Dr.

Debra Aron. She did not provide her own definition

of a relevant market (because she had no obligation

to do so), but instead challenged Dr. Sullivan’s failure

to properly define the markets he proposed. Among

other things, Dr. Aron opined that Dr. Sullivan “did not

apply any accepted or standard or recognizable methodology” in defining the alleged relevant markets. App.

30. She also criticized his conclusions and opinions.

App. 29, 31-32, 34.

The jury and the district court rightfully credited

Dr. Aron’s testimony that Dr. Sullivan “did not use any

recognized methodology to define the relevant markets.” App. 35.

3. Industry participants

Although Respondents had no burden to prove a

relevant market, they presented substantial evidence

9

from several industry witnesses that ** numbers compete with other types of mobile engagement, including

10-digit telephone numbers, 1-800 numbers, short

codes, MMS or SMS texting, social networks, web

and search, and other abbreviated dial codes such as

# numbers or * numbers. App. 45-46.

B. The pretrial rulings Sumotext cites are

irrelevant and misleading

Sumotext attempts to bolster Dr. Sullivan’s testimony by quoting two statements of the district court in

denying Respondents’ motion for summary judgment.

Pet. at 10, citing App. 97-98 (“Dr. Sullivan provides a

cogent explanation” regarding interchangeability with

other consumer engagement products, and “Dr. Sullivan also indicates that he conducted a significant nontransitory increase in price (‘SSNIP’) test, commonly

used in economic analysis of antitrust to define the relevant market”).

But a non-moving party’s burden to raise a fact issue at summary judgment is very different than a

plaintiff ’s burden of proof at trial. And the testimony

the jury heard was quite different. At trial, Dr. Sullivan

gave no cogent explanation of his self-defined markets

based on any recognized methodology, and he admitted

that he had not performed a traditional SSNIP test.

When measuring the evidence to support a jury’s verdict, the testimony at trial controls, not evidence in opposition to a pretrial motion for summary judgment.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

10

REASONS TO DENY THE PETITION

I.

This case does not reveal a circuit split regarding how to define a relevant market

This case is not about an incorrect or inconsistent

application of the law. It is about Sumotext’s failure at

trial to present enough evidence to convince a jury that

its two proposed relevant markets exist. Even if there

were the circuit split Sumotext imagines, the Ninth

Circuit’s opinion here does not fall on either side of it.

Instead, with respect to the relevant market, the opinion simply affirms that Sumotext had the burden of

proof and failed to meet it. App. 8-9.

A. Sumotext’s own expert failed to conduct the market analysis Sumotext now

says is “required”

Sumotext argues that the Ninth Circuit has a

more “lax standard” than other circuits because it allegedly “does not require admissible evidence of crosselasticity” when defining a relevant market. Pet. at i,

19, 23. But a “lax standard” would have benefitted Sumotext, as the party with the burden of proof. Sumotext now argues that an analysis of cross-elasticity of

demand is “required,” yet its own expert admittedly

failed to conduct that analysis, labeling it unnecessary.

(ER1645: “I did not calculate across [sic] elasticity.

That’s not feasible here, nor is it necessary.”)

In other words, even if Sumotext is correct that analyzing cross-elasticity of demand is required in every

11

case, Sumotext failed to analyze or present evidence of

cross-elasticity of demand.

B. Testimony of industry participants is

admissible and relevant

Sumotext next contends that the Ninth Circuit

should not have credited the testimony of numerous

industry executives regarding what products they believed competed with ** numbers. Pet. at 19-20. Yet the

jury instructions agreed to by Sumotext correctly allowed jurors to consider “the perceptions of either the

industry or the public as to whether the products or

services are in separate markets” and “the views of Sumotext and Defendants regarding who their respective

competitors are.” App. 181. The jury was entitled to

credit the testimony of percipient industry witnesses

when considering whether Sumotext had met its burden of defining the relevant antitrust markets.

Moreover, Dr. Aron correctly considered the testimony of industry participants while Dr. Sullivan ignored it. In antitrust cases, it is not only permissible

but prudent for an economic expert to consider the

testimony of industry participants regarding the scope

of a relevant market. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United

States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962) (pointing out that

“the definition of the relevant market” must “correspond to the commercial realities of the industry”);

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504

U.S. 451, 482 (1992) (the market definition could “be

12

determined only after a factual inquiry into the ‘commercial realities’ faced by the consumers”).

C. The Ninth Circuit’s discussion of the

relevant market is consistent with the

holdings of this Court and other circuits

Sumotext advances the idea that a cross-elasticity

of demand analysis is rigidly required in every antitrust case, regardless of the facts and the context. But

as this Court noted in Brown Shoe, “Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the definition

of the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one.”

Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 336-37 (quotations and citations omitted).

Without citing any Ninth Circuit opinions, Sumotext contends that the Ninth Circuit does not require

admissible evidence of cross-elasticity to establish a

relevant market while other circuits do. Pet. at 19-21.

Even if Sumotext were correct about the existence of

a circuit split (it is not), the Ninth Circuit’s opinion

here does not speak to this issue or even mention crosselasticity. That is because Sumotext wholly failed to

prove the existence of its two proposed relevant markets. If Sumotext had been required to perform a market analysis including cross-elasticity of demand to

establish its relevant markets, as Sumotext now asserts, it would have failed even more profoundly.

In sum, this case (i) does not implicate any

perceived circuit split on the evidence required to

13

establish a relevant antitrust market; and (ii) would be

a poor vehicle for addressing the issue given Sumotext’s wholesale failure of proof.

II.

This case does not reveal a circuit split regarding admissibility of expert testimony

A. The Ninth Circuit does not have a “nonsense” standard for admissibility

Sumotext wrongly contends that the Ninth Circuit’s test for admissibility of expert testimony excludes “only” “unreliable nonsense opinions.” Pet. at 27.

But the Ninth Circuit analyzes the admissibility of

expert testimony under the proper Daubert standards

to ensure both reliability and relevancy. See United

States v. Ray, 956 F.3d 1154, 1157-58 (9th Cir. 2020)

(per curiam); United States v. Bacon, 979 F.3d 766, 767

(9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

Sumotext cites Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avis

Budget Grp., Inc., 738 F.3d 960, 969 (9th Cir. 2013), as

holding that a trial court’s gatekeeping role is to

“ ‘screen the jury’ only from ‘unreliable nonsense opinions.’ ” Pet. at 27. But Alaska Rent-A-Car merely holds

that nonsense opinions should be screened, not that

they are the only types of opinions to exclude.

B. Sumotext advances a test for admissibility that its own expert failed to meet

Sumotext argues that Dr. Aron should have

been prohibited from testifying because she failed to

14

conduct her own independent market analysis and

failed to analyze cross-elasticity of demand. Pet. at 29.

Yet Dr. Aron’s critique of Dr. Sullivan is that he did not

conduct a market analysis to support his conclusions.

Despite Sumotext’s representations to this Court, the

evidence showed Dr. Sullivan did not perform the

cross-elasticity analysis that Sumotext now contends

is required. Sumotext’s own expert failed to satisfy its

proposed inflexible standard for admissibility.

Sumotext’s argument misplaces the burden of

proof. It was neither Respondents’ nor Dr. Aron’s burden to identify or define the relevant markets. It was

Sumotext’s burden to do so, and it failed. Dr. Aron’s

criticisms of Dr. Sullivan’s methodology were reliable

and relevant. See TCL Commc’ns Tech. Holdings Ltd.

v. Telefonaktenbologet LM Ericsson, 2016 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 194814, 2016 WL 7042085, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug.

17, 2016) (rebuttal expert is permitted to challenge an

experts’ methodology and conclusions); see also Tyson

Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1044 (2016)

(criticizing party for failing to “discredit the evidence

with testimony from a rebuttal expert”).

Finally, even if the Ninth Circuit erred in agreeing

that Dr. Aron’s testimony was admissible, it rightly

concluded that any such error would be harmless. App.

5 (Dr. Aron’s testimony did not prejudice Sumotext because the jury would have probably reached the same

verdict).

This case does not implicate any perceived circuit

split on admissibility of expert testimony and, given

15

Sumotext’s evidentiary failures, would be a poor vehicle for addressing the issue.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION

The Court should deny the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

APEX LAW APC

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

THOMAS N. FITZGIBBON

ELIZABETH G. “HEIDI” BLOCH

100 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 700

Counsel of Record

Santa Monica, CA 90401

State Bar No. 02495500

T: (310) 230-5280

blochh@gtlaw.com

F: (310) 496-3175

300 West 6th Street,

Suite 2050

Counsel for Respondent

Austin, TX 78701

StarSteve, LLC

T: (512) 320-7228

GREENBERG TRAURIG, LLP

F: (512) 320-7210

DAVID SPENCER BLOCH*

Counsel for Respondents

blochd@gtlaw.com

Zoove, Inc., Virtual Hold

MICHAEL HOGUE

Technology, LLC,

hoguem@gtlaw.com

VHT StarStar LLC

101 Second Street, Suite 2200

San Francisco, CA 94105

T: (415) 655-1300

F: (415) 707-2010

Counsel for Respondents

Zoove, Inc., Virtual Hold

Technology, LLC,

VHT StarStar LLC

* Ms. Bloch and Mr. Bloch are not related.