Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Byron Wendell Phillips, Petitioner v. The Life Property Management Services, LLC, et al.

Supreme Court briefFeb 11, 2022

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2-1-1131-

nn r n

.i_

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

Supiom® Court, U.S.

FiLHD

FEB \ 1 2022

Byron Wendell Phillips

nFPiOP. OF THE CLERK

Petitioner

The Life Property Management Services, LLC, et al

Respondent(s)

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

byron-wendell: phillips

3308 Peppertree Circle, Apt. D

Decatur, Georgia 30034

Cell: (678) 596-3499

Questions Presented

1. Whether the courts below erred by excluding

and/or failing to constitutionally dispute all essential

elements of an argument(s).

2. Whether the petitioner abandoned a claim(s), and

whether the courts below erred when dismissing

claims against all defendants.

3. Whether there is abuse of personal jurisdiction.

4. Whether any category of fraud and/or corruption

exists in this case and whether the court(s) below

furthered a conspiracy.

Parties

1. 3321 Peppertree Circle Decatur LLC Appellee/Respondent

2. Carter, Tonya - Appellee/Respondent

3. Conroy, James W. - Appellee/Respondent

4. DeKalb, County of - Appellee/Respondent

5. Harris, Derrick L. - Appellee/Respondent

6. Havre, Bill - Appellee/Respondent

7. Mann, Jeffrey L. - Appellee/Respondent

8. McMurray, Curtis - Appellee/Respondent

9. Morgan, DeKalb Sergeant-Appellee/Respondent

10. NORTHWEST REGISTERED AGENT, LLC. Appellee/Respondent

11. Phillips, Byron Wendell — Appellant/Petitioner

12. QUICK DROP IMPOUNDING,TOWING &

RECOVERY, INC. - Appellee/Respondent

13. REGISTERED AGENTS INC. Ap p e lie e/Re sp onde nt

14. REGISTERED AGENTS INC Appellee/Respondent

15. Registered Agents Inc - Appellee/Respondent

16. The Life Property Management Services, LLC Appellee/Respondent

17. Thomas, Tenesha-Appellee/Respondent

Proceedings Below

1. USCA11, Opening Brief ([OB]), Case No. 2111350, 11/22/2021

2. NDGA, [Doc 1], Case No.l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

3. NDGA, [Doc 2], Case No.l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

4. NDGA, [Doc 5], Case No.l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

Ill

5. NDGA, [Doc 8], Case No.l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

6. NDGA, [Doc 9], Case No.l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

7. NDGA, [Doc 11], Case No.l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

8. NDGA, [Doc 12], Case No.l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

9. NDGA, [Doc 13], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

10. NDGA, [Doc 18], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

11. NDGA, [Doc 22], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

12. NDGA, [Doc 25], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

13. NDGA, [Doc 26], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

14. NDGA, [Doc 28], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

15. NDGA, [Doc 29], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

16. NDGA, [Doc 30], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

17. NDGA, [Doc 32], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

18. NDGA, [Doc 33], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

19. NDGA, [Doc 34], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

20. NDGA, [Doc 35], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

21. NDGA, [Doc 38], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

22. NDGA, [Doc 39], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

23. NDGA, [Doc 40], Case No.l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

24. NDGA, [Doc 44], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

25. NDGA, [Doc 48], [Doc 48-1], Case No. l:20-cv00812-SDG, 3/24/2021

26. NDGA, [Doc 53], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

27. NDGA, [Doc 54], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

28. NDGA, [Doc 56], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

29. NDGA, [Doc 57], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

30. NDGA, [Doc 58], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

31. NDGA, [Doc 59], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

32. NDGA, [Doc 60], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

33. NDGA, [Doc 61], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

34. NDGA, [Doc 62], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

35. NDGA, [Doc 63], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

36. NDGA, [Doc 64], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

37. NDGA, [Doc 65], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

38. NDGA, [Doc 66], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

39. NDGA, [Doc 67], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

40. NDGA, [Doc 73], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

41. NDGA, [Doc 74], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

42. NDGA, [Doc 76], Case No.l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

43. NDGA, [Doc 82], Case No. l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

44. NDGA, [Doc 83], Case No.l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

45. NDGA, [Doc 86], Case No.l:20-cv-00812-SDG,

3/24/2021

Table of Contents

Topic

Pg(s).

Questions Presented.........................................

Parties.................................................................

Proceedings Below............................................

ll-V

Eleventh Circuit..............................................

Northern District of Georgia........................

ll-V

Table of Contents...............................................

Vl-Vll

Table of Authorities..........................................

Vlll-XV

Petition For Writ of Certiorari.......................

Citation of Reports............................................

Basis for Jurisdiction........................................

Constitution Provisions...................................

Federal Statutory Provisions & Regulations

1-2

Statement of The Case.....................................

2-34

Background......................................................

2-3

Argument..........................................................

3-38

I. Whether the court(s) below erred by excluding

and/or failing to constitutionally dispute all

essential elements of an argument(s)

3-26

II. Whether the petitioner abandoned a claim(s),

and whether the court(s) below erred when

dismissing claims against all defendants

26-28

III. Whether there is abuse of personal jurisdiction

28-29

IV. Whether any category of fraud and/or

corruption exists in this case and whether the

court(s) below furthered a conspiracy............. 29-33

Reasons for Granting the Writ............................... 33-39

Conclusion.............................

Appendix Cover

Appendix Table of Contents

. iA-ivA

Appendix..................... ...........

1A-91A

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit Opinion Affirming the District's Final

Vll

Judgment

1A-7A

United States District Court Opinion and Order

8A-33A

Text of United States Constitution Provisions

..................................................................................34A-36A

Text of Federal Statutory Provisions & Regulations ..

...................................................................... ...........37A-47A

Text of Georgia Constitution Provisions

48A

Text of Georgia Statutory Provisions ....

48A-83A

Text of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Provisions ...

..................................................................................83A-88A

Other Essential Material

Other Collateral Conflicts, Reason (1)

Text of Holy Bible References.............

88A-90A

90A-91A

Vlll

Table of Authorities

Source

Pg(s).

Constitution Provisions

U.S. Const, amend. I... 1, 4, 9, 12, 18, 22, 26, App. 34A

U.S. Const, amend. IV

1, 12, 36, App. 34A

U.S. Const, amend. V .

1, 3-4, 12, 14, 19, 22, 24, 27, 36, App. 34A

U.S. Const, amend. IX

1, 4, 12, 14-15, 17, 19, 22, 26, App. 35A

U.S. Const, amend. XI

1, 16, 38, App. 35A

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §1

1, 3-4, 12, 14-19, 22, 27, 31, 38, App. 35A

U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §3

1, 39, App. 35A-36A

U.S. Const, art. IV, §1.........

.. 1, 4, 39, App. 36A

U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 2....

.. 1, 4, 39, App. 36A

U.S. Const, art. VI, cl. 3....

......1, 39, App. 36A

Federal Statutes & Regulations

18 U. S. C. §31(a)(6), (10).....

.......1, 19, App. 37A

28 U. S. C. §453 ..................

.......1, 39, App. 37A

28 U. S. C. §455(a), (b)(1).....

1, 39, App. 37A-38A

28 U. S. C. §1254(1).............

............... 1, App. 38A

28 U. S. C. §1291................

............... 1, App. 38A

28U. S. C. §1331................

......... 1, 2, App. 38A

28 U. S. C. §1343(a)(l), (2),(4)

.... 1, 2, 30, App. 39A

28 U. S. C. §1652 ....

... 1, 4, 39, App. 39A

28 U. S. C. §2072(b) .

1, 4, 18, 26, App. 40A

28 U. S. C. §2403(c) ..

................. 1, App. 40A

28 U. S. C. §3002(10)

.. 1, 4, App. 40A- 41A

42 U. S. C. §1981

1, 12, 14, 17-18, 26, App. 41A

42 U. S. C. §1982

1, 12, 14, 17, 22, 26, App. 41A

42 U. S. C. §1983

.. 1-2, 12, 16, 30, 39, App. 42A

42 U. S. C. §1985(3)

2, 14-15, 17, App. 42A-43A

49 CFR §390.5T.....

.................... 2, 20, App. 43A

49 CFR §523.2 ........

..................... 2, 19, App. 43A

49 CFR §523.3(a)....

..........2, 19, App. 43A-44A

49 CFR §523.4........

........... 2, 19, App. 44A-45A

49 CFR §523.5 ........

...........2, 19, App. 45A-46A

49 U.S.C. §20133....

.................... 2, 20, App. 46A

49 U.S.C. §30101, SEC. 2502(a)(3)

2, 20, App. 47A

49 U.S.C. §32901(a)(3)....................

2, 19, App. 47A

49 U.S.C. §32908(a)(l)....................

2, 19, App. 47A

Federal Cases

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).........

..................................................................... 10-11, 28, 34, 38

A.M. ex rel J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile

Detention Center, 372 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2004)

............................................................................15, App. 89A

Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3d

Cir. 1990)

16, 38, App. 90A

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)

................................................................................. 26, 28, 33

Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S. Ct. 241, 28 L. Ed.

825 (1884)...........................................

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)

26, 28, 33

Beyer v. Vill. of Ashwaubenon, 444 F. App’x 99, 101

(7th Cir. 2011)................................................................... 13

Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388

(1971)

30, 38

Boydv. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29

L.Ed. 746 (1886)...................................................... 24, 36

Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 2003)

.....................................................................16, 38, App. 90A

C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. ofEduc., 430 F.3d 159, 173 (3d

Cir. 2005)

15, App. 89A

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)

28, 34

Covington & L. Turnp. Co. v. Sandford, 17 S.Ct. 198

164 U.S., 578 ............................................

..4, 33

Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979)

30, 38

Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923) ..

25, 36

Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).....

29, 34

Flemming v. South Carolina Elec. Gas Co., 224 F.2d

752 (C.A. 4th Cir. 1955)

10, 11, App. 89A

Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271

22, 24, 35-36

U.S. 593 (1926).......................................

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)

Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S.Ct. 1913, 20

L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968)...................................

24, 36

Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964)

10, 11, App. 90A

Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408 (1882)

Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) ... App. 90A

Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de

Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982)

28, 34

Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) ... 10

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958)

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)

.........................................................................................10-12

Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 415

S.W.2d 347 (1966)............................................................ 22

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.

2d 653 (1964)............ ...................................

.... 24, 36

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137........

App. 90A

Marsh v. Alabama, 501 U.S. 496 (1946) .

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923)

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)

13, 18, 25, 36

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)............. 18, 39

Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 ........... 16, 38

Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 30

(1950), 70 S. Ct. 652

26, 28, 33

Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) ...

Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).................... 12, 38

Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622

16, 38-39

Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930)....

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925)

Roev. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 93 S. Ct. 705

.... 29, 36, 38

23, 31, 35, 38

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999)

Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm'r., 392 U.S. 280,

88 S.Ct. 1917, 20 L.Ed. 2d 1089 (1968)

24, 36

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) ...

18, 39

Sawyer v. Prickett, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 146, 22 L. Ed.

105 (1874).......................................................................... 35

Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 17 S.Ct. 265, 41 L.Ed.

632

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945)

.............................................................................4, 17, 34, 39

Sherarv. Cullen 481 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1973).... 24, 35

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)......

........................................................................................24, 35

Smyth v. Ames, 18 S.Ct. 418, 169 U.S. 466, ,42 L.Ed.

819

4, 33-34

Stevens v. Plumbers & Pipefitters Loc. 219, 812 F.

App’x 815, 819 (11th Cir. 2020).................................. 10

Texas N. O. R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548

(1930)

App. 90A

Texas Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916)

App. 90A

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, (1966)....... 23, 35

United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878)

................................................................................. 33, 34, 38

U. S. v. Supply Co., 30 S.Ct. 15, 215 U.S. 50, 54 L. Ed.

4, 34

Xll

Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2002) ... 18

State Cases

Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp. 224, 227 (Conn. 1972)

Aldrich v. City of Syracuse, 236 N.Y.S. 614, 134 Misc.

698

App. 89A

Berberian v. Lussier 87 R.I. 226, (R.I. 1958), 139 A. 2d

869

23, 35

Blue Island v. Kozul, 379 Ill. 511, 41 N. E. 2d 515 ... 22

Boyce et al. v. Brockway et al., 31 N.Y. 490 (1865).... 12

City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944 (Tex. Civ. App.

1922)

22, 34, 35

City of Dayton v. DeBrosse, 62 Ohio Ct. App. 232

(1939).................................................................................. 19

Debobes v. Butterly, 210 App. Div. 50 (N.Y. App. Div.

1924)................................................................................... 12

Decker v. City of Wichita, 109 Kan. 796 (1921)..........

....................................... ...........................................App. 89A

Ex Parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576, 85 S.E. 781, L.R.A.

1915F, 840 (1904)................................

25, App. 89A

Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234 (1904)

Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003, 49

L.R.A. 475 .....................................................................

Greer v. Board of Com'rs of Knox County, 33 Ohio App.

539, 169 N. E. 709 ................................

37-38

Jackson v. Jackson, 47 Ga. 99 (1872)

Johnson v. U.S., C.C.A. Alaska, 260 F. 783, 786 (1919)

J. W. Payne v. Otis Massey Et Al., 145 Tex. 237 (Tex.

1946)

Los Angeles County v. Craig, 38 Cal. App. 2d 58, 100 P.

2d 818

App. 89A

Marin v. Chenu, 188 Cal. 734 (Cal. 1922)

Xlll

McKnight v. Denny, 198 Pa. 323, 47 A. 970............... 37

Memphis Street Ry. v. Crenshaw, 165 Tenn. 536, 55

S.W.2d 758 (Tenn. 1933)................................................ 20

People v. FireAss’n, 92 N.Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 380 ..

4, 33

People v. Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389, (N.Y. 1888)....

People v. Kelly, 35 Barb., N.Y., 444, 457 (1862)

Pickelsimer v. Glazener, 173 N.C. 630, 92 S.E. 700 .. 19

Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 626, 181 Misc.

78 (1943)

9, 15, 33

Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend., N.Y., 267, 32 Am. Dec. 541

(1838)

App. 89A

Schultz v. City of Duluth, 163 Minn. 65 (Minn. 1925)

........................................................................................23, 35

Seymour v. Canandaigua & N F. R. Co., 25 Barb.,

N.Y., 284 (1857).....................................

..... App. 89A

Shultz v. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St. 659

20, App. 88A

Solbergv. Davenport, 211 Iowa 612, 232 N.W. 477

(Iowa 1930)

22, 34-35

State, exrel. Schorr, v. Viner, 119 Ohio St. 303, 164

N.E. 119

20, App. 88A

State v. Cuypers, 559 N.W. 2d 435 (Minn. Ct. App.

1997)........................................................................... 31, 37

State v. Dalton, 22 R.I. 77, 46 A. 234 (R.I. 1900)

Strong v. Neidermeier, 230 Mich. 117, 202 N.W. 938 ....

.........................................................................................37-38

Suzuki v. Small, 214 App. Div. 541, 212 N.Y.S. 589

(1925).................................................................................. 12

Wade v. Power Co., 51 S.C. 296, 29 S.E. 233, 64 Am.

St. Rep. 676....................................................................... 37

Wainscott v. Loan Ass'n, 98 Cal. 253, 33 P. 88 .... 37-38

XIV

Other Authorities

Dictionary

Noah Webster's American Dictionary of the English

Language, 47, 2. (Vol. II, 1828), PDF......................... 14

Georgia Constitution

Ga. Const., art. I., §IL, If I.

Ga. Const., art. I., §11., If II

19, App. 48A

Georgia Statutory Provisions

O.C.G.A. §9-11-4

4, App. 48A-66A

O.C.G.A. §40-1-1 (statutory definitions), p. 1

O.C.G.A. §40-1-1(14)............

O.C.G.A. §40-1-1(33)............

O.C.G.A. §40-1-1(41)............

O.C.G.A. §40-2-8(a), (b)(1), (c)

O.C.G.A. §40-2-20(a)(l)(A), (c)

O.C.G.A. §40-2-26(a), (d)(2) ....

O.C.G.A. §40-2-29(a), (d)......

O.C.G.A. §40-2-151..............

O.C.G.A. §40-5-20(a), (d)......

O.C.G.A. §40-5-29(a)-(c).......

O.C.G.A. §40-5-58(c)(l); (2) ....

O.C.G.A. §40-5-121(a), (d)....

O.C.G.A. §40-5-122 .............

O.C.G.A. §40-6-10(4); (b)......

O.C.G.A. §40-6-12(a)............

O.C.G.A. §40-6-15(a)-(c).......

21, App. 66A-68A

......20, App. 68A

21, App. 69A-70A

..... 21, App. 70A

21, App. 70A-71A

......21, App. 71A

21, App. 71A-77A

21, App. 77A-78A

21, App. 78A-79A

21, App. 79A-80A

21, App. 80A-81A

........... App. 82A

..... 21, App. 82A

.... App. 82A-83A

..... 21, App. 83A

Holy Bible

Holy Bible, King James Study Bible. Thomas Nelson,

1988; available at https://www.biblestudytools.com

Exo. 20.15, 135......

Gen. 1.26, 7...........

Gen. 1.27, 8...........

Gen. 2.7, 9.............

Jer. 34.8, 1155 .......

Lam. 3.35-36, 1190

35, App. 90A

35, App. 9lA

35, App. 91A

Rules and Procedure

Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 4(c)(l)-(3)................................................

......... 3-4, 6, 30-31, 37, App. 3A-4A, 23A, 27A, 83A-84A

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(d)(1)(G) . 3, 31, App. 4A, 84A-85A

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(e)..... 7-8, App. 4A-5A, 24A, 85A

Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(h).... ............... 7, App. 24A, 86A

Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 4(Z)(1),(3) ...........................8, App. 86A

Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 8(a)(2) .... ................8, App. 18A, 87A

Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 10(b)..... .....................8, 9, App. 87A

Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)...... ...................... App. 87A-88A

Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(e)...... .............................App. 88A

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Phillips petitions the Court for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

CITATION OF REPORTS

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion is unpublished. App.

1A-7A. The district court’s opinion and order is

unreported. App. 8A-33A.

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION

The Eleventh Circuit entered judgment on November

22, 2021. It had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291.

This petition is timely filed pursuant to Supreme

Court Rule 13.1. This Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. §1254(1). 28 U. S. C. §2403(b) may apply

and notice has been served on Georgia Attorney

General Christopher Carr. The Eleventh Circuit did

not certify to the State Attorney General the fact

that the constitutionality of a statute(s) was drawn

into question.

CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Provisions of the Constitution involved are Articles

IV, §1; VI, cl. 2, 3; Amendments I, IV, V, IX, XI, and

XIV. §§1, 3. App. 34A-36A.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS & REGULATIONS

INVOLVED

Statutory provisions and regulations involved are as

follows: (1) 18 U. S. C. §31(a)(6), (10), (2) 28 U. S. C.

§§453; 455(a), (b)(1); 1331; 1343(a)(1), (2), (4); 1652;

2072(b); 3002(10), (3) 42 U. S. C. §§1981, 1982, 1983,

1985(3); (4) 49 CFR §§390.5T; 523.2; 523.3(a); 523.4;

523.5, (5) 49 U.S.C. §§20133; 30101, SEC. 2502(a)(3);

32901(a)(3); §32908(a)(l). App. 37A-47A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Background

Petitioner, Phillips, filed suit in the District Court

under 42 U.S.C. §1983 on 2/21/2020 against

respondents after his personal automobile was

outright seized/stolen via conspiracy (§1985(3))

perpetrated by The Life and Quick Drop, thereby

violating and restricting his personal rights included

in life and liberty and his rights attached to said

property. The sheriff and the county police refused to

protect Phillips’s rights and property—furthering the

conspiracy. NDGA had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§1331, 1343(a)(1), (2), (4). App. 38A-39A.

Phillips amended the text of his complaint between

3/10 and 4/10/2020—before service. He filed his

amended complaint and reissued all summonses on

5/18/2020.

The District Court issued an order pursuant to Fed.

R. Civ. P Rule 4(m) on 6/22/2020. The court later

dismissed petitioner's complaint for failure (1) to

properly serve all but three Defendants and (2) to

allege a protected constitutional right of which he

was deprived, inter alia, on 3/23/2021.

Petitioner's research efforts confirmed that the State

is misclassifying the people of Georgia and their

personal property. Private individuals using personal

automobiles for personal/private purposes are being

classified as drivers and their vehicles are being

classified as motor vehicles. The State is operating

beyond its authority in its application, execution, and

enforcement of Title 40 MOTOR VEHICLES AND

TRAFFIC, and related laws used to penalize the

traveling public for exercising the rights directly

related to the ownership and use of personal

automobiles or automobiles not for hire. It’s licensing

scheme and that code section lawfully do not apply to

the traveling public and their private automobiles

being used on the highways for personal/private

purposes—also confirmed.

In the instant case, the State’s licensing scheme

ultimately resulted in violation and restriction of

Phillips's personal liberties included in life, liberty,

and property interests under Amendments V and

XIV, §1.

Argument

I. Failure to constitutionally dispute all essential

elements of an argument(s).

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4.

(1) Failure to properly serve all but 3 defendants.

As to Group I (NDGA,[Doc 18] 7), the District Court

(NDGA) dismissed all defendants because, in part,

petitioner served the summons along with the notice

(A0398) in the mail, following Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules

4(c)(1), 4(c)(2), 4(d)(1)(G), and the A0398—as

written.

Phillips exercised the freedom of choice under

Amendments I, V, IX, and XIV, §1, as to which

person would serve his papers. See USCA11, [OB]

31-40. Phillips argued that the USPS, a parent

corporation, is a person. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(c)(2)

makes no distinction between an artificial person

and a natural person. It says "Any person .. .".

"Corporations are "persons" as that word is used in

the first clause of the XIVth Amendment". Covington

& L. Turnp. Co. v. Sandford, 17 S.Ct. 198, 164 U.S.,

578, 41 L. Ed. 560; Smyth v. Ames, 18 S.Ct. 418, 169

U.S. 466,42 L.Ed. 819; U. S. v. Supply Co., 30 S.Ct.

15, 215 U.S. 50, 54 L. Ed. 87; People v. Fire Ass’n, 92

N.Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep. 380; See 28 U.S.C. §3002(10);

App. 40A-41A.

The term "person" is defined neither in Fed. R. Civ.

P. Rule 4, or elsewhere within the rules, nor in

O.C.G.A. §9-11-4, but the Constitution is defined. See

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 f 1; 105 1

(1945). If the supreme Law of the Land is defined,

then rules are not above being defined.

To bar or exclude a corporation as a "person" is a

violation of Art. IV, §1; Art. VI, cl. 2; Amendment

XIV, §1; 28 U.S.C. §§1652, 3002(10)—depriving

Phillips’s freedom of choice relative to Rule 4, a

violation of 28 U.S.C. §2072(b). Seemingly, these

violations are meaningless to the Eleventh Circuit

(USCA11), which sanctioned them with its decision,

and failed to constitutionally dispute them.

(A) The Life, 3321 Peppertree Circle Decatur, and

Tonya Carter, argued NDGA, [Doc 22] and Fed.

R. Civ. P. Rules 4(c)(2), (d), (h), (m), (e). The other

Group I defendants did not return a waiver or

answer by motion, and none of the packages were

returned except for Bill Havre, who refused

service twice (NDGA, [Doc 38] 1), including

refusing service by the Sheriffs Deputy—Johnson

County in Buffalo, Wyoming. Motions for Clerk's

entry of default were filed by Phillips. NDGA,

[Doc 88] 8-9.

(i) The Life answered by motion. NDGA,[Doc 301] 4-9. Phillips responded with NDGA,

[Doc 38] 9-19. The NDGA, [Doc 22] argument is

irrelevant. Phillips exercised the right to be free

to amend his complaint within the 90 days and

reissue the summonses under the replacement

of the original. The order was pursuant to Rule

4(m).

On 8/5/2020 Phillips responded to the Order

being submitted to Judge Grimberg. That

document pointed out that the District Court

was not allowing the defendants 30 days to

return a waiver or answer by motion, and that

an affidavit was not due. NDGA, [Doc 28] 1-2.

Therefore the Order (NDGA, [Doc 22]) was void

but no new Order was issued. Phillips was

allowed additional time resulting from his

response to the court's probable intention.

(ii) Also, Phillips pointed out the fact that The

Life fraudulently used a false address in its

lease document. That’s fraud, and invalidates

that document. The Life was also listed as the

registered agent. That's also fraud. NDGA, [Doc

38] 13, 15, 36. Group I was served notices

and invoices consistently during the 2-year

period of statute of limitations. They all knew

the lawsuit was imminent. After the original

complaint was filed, The Life's contact

information was changed as well as the

registered agent on 4/24/2020 (NDGA, [Doc 751], 2 ), a third instance of fraud. NDGA, [Doc

38] 13, 15, 36.

(iii) Peppertree answered by motion after

Phillips filed motion for Clerk's entry of default

(NDGA, [Doc 56]). NDGA, [Doc 68-1] 6-12.

Phillips responded with NDGA, [Doc 73] 14-24.

Its package was not returned.

(iv) Carter Answered by motion after motion for

Clerk's entry of default (NDGA, [Doc 57]).

NDGA, [Doc 69-1]) 2-3. Phillips responded with

NDGA, [Doc. 74] 5-16. Her package was not

returned.

(v) The remainder of Group I did not return a

waiver or answer by motion, and neither of

those packages were returned.

(B) The District Court omitted part (1) of rule 4(c)

when quoting in its Opinion. NDGA, [Doc 82] 17.

It says "A summons must be served with a copy of

the complaint." It makes no exception for the

A0398 (NDGA, [Doc 38] 34), which states "A

copy of the complaint is attached." (NDGA, [Doc

38] 9); USCA11, [OB] 35.

Curtis McMurray returned a waiver, inserting his

name as the party waiving instead of Quick Drop,

the party named as defendant. Curtis McMurray

failed to return a waiver from the package sent to

him named as a defendant, and his package was

not returned. Tenesha Thomas failed to return a

waiver, and her package was not returned. This

group knew the lawsuit was imminent, being

served notices and invoices consistently during

the 2-year period of statute of limitations.

(D) Out of Group III (NDGA, [Doc 18] 10)

Morgan did not answer or return a waiver.

Jeffrey

L. Mann, who was listed separate from

any group, took early retirement as did Conroy.

Neither of their packages were returned. They

both answered by motion after Phillips filed motion

for Clerk's entry of default ((NDGA, [Docs 63, 64]).

They responded with NDGA, [Doc 72] and

Phillips replied with NDGA, [Doc 76]. DeKalb

County and Harris returned waivers. All knew

the lawsuit was imminent, being served notices

and invoices consistently during the 2-year period

of statute of limitations.

(E) Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(e).

Under Rule 4(e)(2)(C) service may be made by

delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized

by appointment or by law to receive service of

process. "An" could mean anyone present at the

time of delivery and that individual could very

well be either "authorized by appointment" or

"authorized by law". See NDGA,[Doc 73] 17-18;

[Doc 74] 8-9; [Doc 76] 8-9.

(F) Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(h).

Under Rule 4(h)(1)(A),(B) a defendant corporation

must be served as in Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an

individual or by delivering a copy of the summons

and of the complaint to "an" officer, "a" managing

or general agent, or "any other agent" authorized

by appointment or by law to receive service of

process. Either "an" or "a" or "any other agent"

could mean anyone present at the time of delivery

and that individual could very well be either

"authorized by appointment" or "authorized by

law". The same situation as Rule 4(e).

(G) Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(1)Under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4(Z)(3) failure to prove

service does not affect the validity of service and

the court may permit proof of service to be

amended, however, it does not state to what

extent. That could mean anything including

certified mail receipts. NDGA, [Doc 73] 20-21;

[Doc 74] 12.

B. Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 8(a)(2) & 10(b).

Respondents DeKalb County and Derrick Harris

argued Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b). Rule 8(a)(2) states

that a pleading that states a claim for relief must

contain a "short and plain" statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

Short and plain is not defined by a word count, line

count, paragraph count, page count or any other

definite guideline. It's left open to interpretation.

Rule 10(b) states that a party must state its claims or

defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as

far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. "A

single set of circumstances" is not defined in that

rule, however, Phillips expound how the claims were

expressed as a single set of circumstances. It's also

left open to interpretation. Dismissal based upon

undefined rules deprived Phillips freedom of speech

and expression under Amendment I. NDGA, [Doc 481] 7-9; USCA11, [OB] 41-42.

(2) Failure to state a constitutionally protected right.

NDGA failed to recognize constitutionally protected

rights and USCA11 sanctioned it. Both failed to

consider that Phillips pointed out the material fact

that he used the Pro Se 15 to write his complaint and

followed it as closely as possible. USCA11, [OB] 3233, 41-42. Phillips consistently argued: "Life and

liberty include all personal rights." Rosenblum v.

Rosenblum, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 626, 630, 181 Misc. 78

(1943). Phillips asked USCAll "Are the rights of life,

liberty, and property no longer protected by the

Constitution?" USCAll, [OB] 32. Perhaps affirming

NDGA was the answer.

C. Groups I & II Liability.

USCAll failed to recognize that private parties

(Groups I & II) were acting under color of law or

using State authority when Phillips's vehicle was

seized/stolen pursuant to a term in the lease

agreement, which didn’t apply to the vehicle in the

first place. Groups I and II executed the conversion

based upon "license" and "appropriate statute"

clearly stated in the excerpt from the lease

document. See NDGA, [Doc 18] 100-101. Neither the

private respondents, nor NDGA, nor USCAll

lawfully proved that determining which vehicles

must be licensed and who has right of possession are

not public functions exclusively reserved to the State.

See NDGA, [Doc 18] 7-8; [Doc 38] 3-4. USCA11

falsely stated that "Nothing in Phillips’s amended

complaint suggests any action that was "fairly

attributable" to the state." Apparently, it ignored or

did not read neither [Doc 18] 7-8 nor [Doc 38] 3-4.

"We have, of course, found state action present in the

exercise by a private entity of powers traditionally

exclusively reserved to the State." Jackson v. Metro.

Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, at 352 (1974).

"A private person acts under color

of a state statute or other law

when he, like the official, in some

way acts consciously pursuant to

some law that gives him aid,

comfort, or incentive". . ., cf.

Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S.

130, 135-137 (1964); Flemming v.

South Carolina Elec. Gas Co., 224

F.2d 752, 753 (C.A. 4th Cir.

1955), appeal dismissed, 351 U.S.

901 (1956); or when he acts in

conjunction with a state.

Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,

at 212 (1970).

NDGA followed Stevens v. Plumbers & Pipefitters

Loc. 219, 812 F. App'x 815, 819 with Lugar, 457 U.S.

922, 923 stating that a private party's actions must

be "fairly attributable" to the state, but omitted the

definition provided by this Court, as did USCA11.

See NDGA, [Doc 82] 22; App. 29A; USCA11, [OB] 4648; App. 6A.

"Fair attribution is a two-part

approach. First, the deprivation

must be caused by the exercise of

some right or privilege created by

the State or by a rule of conduct

imposed by the State or by a

person for whom the State is

responsible. . . Second, the party

charged with the deprivation

must be a person who may fairly

be said to be a state actor. This

may be because he is a state

official, because he has acted

together with or has obtained

significant aid from state

officials, or because his conduct is

otherwise chargeable to the

State."

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.} Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937

1)1 (1982). Seizing an unlicensed vehicle is a right or

privilege created by the State and it is a rule of

conduct imposed by the State (O.C.G.A. §40-2-8

(b)(1)), therefore the private parties’ conduct is

chargeable to the State, making them state actors.

Also mentioned, Id., at 932 n. 14, a factual showing

that private parties acted with knowledge of, or

pursuant to a statute must be present. This was

demonstrated in the excerpt of the lease document

where the language included the terms "license" and

"appropriate statute", meeting that standard and the

"something more" standard (M, 939; USCA11, [OB]

6). Additionally, the "something more" standard is

met with Adickes, 398 U.S. 144, at 212 (citing

Griffin, 378 U.S. 130, 135-137; Flemming, 224 F.2d

752, 752-753) and Jackson, 419 U.S. 345, supra, at

352.

It's obviously undisputable that Groups I & II were

acting pursuant to State statutes. "Towing a vehicle

can be either a public or private matter, but licensing

is a state legislative matter, not a property

management company matter." NDGA, [Doc 38] 3.

Groups I & II had no ownership interest, no right of

possession, no warrant (probable cause), and there

was no hearing (NDGA, [Doc 18] 7-9), and is lawfully

defined as conversion. For respondents exercised

dominion over Phillips’s property. See Suzuki v.

Small, 214 App. Div. 541, 556-58, 212 N.Y.S. 589

(1925); Boyce et al. v. Brockway et al., 31 N.Y. 490,

493 (1865); Debobes v. Butterly, 210 App. Div. 50, 5455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1924). NDGA, [Doc 38] 2-5.

Groups I & II violated Amendments I (freedom of

choice), IV (unreasonable seizure), V (due process,

life, liberty, property, equal protection), IX (right to

reject state license), XIV, §1 (due process, life,

liberty, property, equal protection), §1981(a) (right to

the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings

for the security of persons and property), and §1982

(right to hold personal property).

A private entity using State authority is bound by

mandates that bind officials everywhere. Cf. Nixon v.

Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 88 (1932).

A private party can be liable under §1983 for

violating the Fourteenth Amendment. Lugar v.

Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, *932 (1982).

NDGA cited Beyer v. ViU. of Ashwaubenon, 444 F.

App'x 99, 101 (7th Cir. 2011) concerning rights of

property owners.

The rights of life, liberty, and

property occupy the preferred

position when balancing them

against the rights of a corporate

property owner, and corporations

can neither be permitted to

govern the people so as to restrict

their fundamental liberties nor to

enforce such restraint by the

application of a state statute.

See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946).

USCA11, [OB] 53-54.

D. Signing a lease.

NDGA failed to recognize that even though Phillips

signed a lease, he waived no rights, and USCA11

affirmed. Signing a document does not constitute a

waiver of rights. A waiver of rights must be done

knowingly and intelligently by the waiving party.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 492 (1966); cf.

Hodges V; Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882); Patton v.

United States, 281 U.S. 276, 309 (1930). "For a

waiver of constitutional rights in any context must,

at the very least, be clear." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407

U.S. 67, 95 (1972).

E. The Incident Report and Group III liability.

Firstly, Harris interfered with due process. The legal

process of reporting stolen property begins with

obtaining an incident report which must include the

information that identifies the said property. Harris

proscribed the report after being given information

that would identify Phillips’ property, i.e. the plate

number, and the VIN # was redacted. No one can

lawfully and rightfully claim property without being

able to properly identify it as his own. This is a

deprivation of Phillips’ right to due process under

Amendment XIV, §1; to hold personal property under

§1982; and to identify his own property pursuant to

Amendment IX and his life, liberty, and property

interests under Amendments V and XIV, §1.

Secondly, proscribing the report put Phillips out of

the protection of the law (Noah Webster’s American

Dictionary of the English Language, 47, 2. (Vol. II,

1828), 375 PDF), depriving him of equal protection of

the law under Amendment XIV, §1 and the full and

equal benefit of all the law and proceedings for the

security of person and property under §1981(a).

Thirdly, the aforementioned deprivations were/are

the proximate cause of Harris being accessory to the

conversion and furthering the conspiracy to deprive

Phillips of his rights (§1985(3)) as stated in the

counts or claims against him. Interfering with due

process set the stage for Harris being equally liable

for all the counts or claims against the chief

defendant actors in this case (Groups I & II). NDGA,

[Doc 18] 76-79. His actions furthered the conspiracy

already in existence whether he knew it or not,

making him a party to it. Phillips may recover

damages against Harris for furthering the conspiracy

(§1985(3)).

Fourthly, Harris refused to come forward when

Phillips attempted to contact him in an effort to

correct the incident report. Phillips had/has the right

to be free to confront Harris and demand correction

of the proscribed report. Harris disparaged that right

in violation of Amendment IX and Amendment XIV,

§1 pursuant to Phillips’s life and liberty interests,

which includes all personal rights. Rosenblum v.

Rosenblum, 42 N.Y.S.2d 626, supra, at 630.

DeKalb is charged with the exact counts or claims as

is Harris. Firstly, there were two (2) key officers who

were aware of Harris’ actions. Officer Morgan, a

Sergeant who stated that Harris “followed protocol”,

thereby approving of Harris’s deprivations and

furthering the conspiracy. He is personally liable.

See A.M ex rel JMK. v. Luzerne County Juvenile

Detention Center, 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004);

C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 173

(3d Cir. 2005)).

James W. Conroy, DeKalb County Police Chief, at

the relevant time, acquiesced to both Harris's and

Morgan’s course of action, after the fact, thereby

continuing the deprivations and furthering the

conspiracy. DeKalb County is liable through Conroy,

who was a policy-maker for the Department at the

relevant time, who acquiesced to the constitutional

violations in furtherance of a conspiracy by two (2)

subordinate officers who were following what

Morgan stated as “protocol”. Conroy was given

written notice that his subordinates were violating

Phillips's right to identify himself and his property,

inter alia. See Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895

F.2d 1469, 1481-1482 (3d Cir. 1990); Brennan v.

Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2003). See also

NDGA, [Doc 48-1] 6-7.

Both DeKalb and Harris claimed immunity.

DeKalb's claim of immunity is based upon Phillips's

alleged assertion of state law claims and O.C.G.A.

§36-1- 4 (“A county is not liable to suit for any cause

of action unless made so by statute.”) There are no

state law claims asserted. DeKalb is liable through

its Chief of Police, Conroy, at the relevant time. Four

reasons DeKalb is not immune from suit:

(1) The Eleventh Amendment grants immunity to

States and not to municipalities or counties.

"Political subdivisions of the state have no Eleventh

Amendment protection from suit in federal court."

Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717-721

(1973); (2) 42 U.S.C. §1983 is the supreme Law of the

Land and trumps O.C.G.A. §36-1-4; (3) DeKalb is a

"person" for §1983 purposes; and (4) municipalities

have no immunity from damages liability flowing

from their constitutional violations. . ."Congress

"abolished" municipal immunity when it included

municipalities "within the class of'persons' subject to

liability" under §1983. Owen v. City of Independence,

Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 657, 667 (1980)

Claim of immunity for Harris is meritless. Firstly,

Harris is being sued in his individual capacity.

Secondly, Harris deprived Phillips of his

constitutional rights to due process, and to equal

protection of the law under Amendment XIV, §1. He

also disparaged the unenumerated right Phillips has

to identify his own property under Amendment IX

and under Amendment XIV, §1 pursuant to his life,

liberty, and property interest(s). When it is shown

that an officer has violated the constitution he has no

qualified immunity. The Constitution is well

established iaw and Harris should have known he

was violating those provisions, for he took an oath to

support the Constitution of the United States. Harris

had no standing concerning qualified immunity.

"But willful violators of

constitutional requirements,

which have been defined,

certainly are in no position to say

that they had no adequate

advance notice that they would

visited with punishment"; "In all

its flux, time makes some things

axiomatic. One has been that

state officials who violate their

oaths of office and flout the

fundamental law are answerable

to it when their misconduct

brings upon them the penalty it

authorizes and Congress has

provided."

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, *105; 116-*117

(1945). State officials oath and first duty are to

uphold the constitution. Id., pp. 129 1|4-*130.

Secondly, in the process of committing those

violations and depriving Phillips of his rights, Harris

violated well established statutory provisions of 42

U.S.C.—§§1981(a), 1982, and 1985(3).

Thirdly, qualified immunity is entitlement not to

stand trial and not a defense from liability. Saucier

v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200-201 (2001), quoting

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). See

NDGA, [Doc 48-1] 10-12.

Dismissal based upon undefined rules (11(B), supra,

pp. 8-9) not only abridged the right to freedom of

speech and expression; to redress grievances; and the

personal choice to sue, but abrogated or nullified all.

This is a violation of the Amendment I and XIV, §1 ;

28 U. S. C. §2072(b); 42 U.S.C. §1981(a), and in

defiance of this Court {Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.

436, *491 f 1); USCA11, [OB] 43.

USCA11 affirmed NDGA's decision stating that

Phillips had no right to an investigation and lacked

the lesser right of proper recordation (citing Vinyard

v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1356 (11th Cir. 2002)).

USCA11, [OB] 56; App. 7A, 30A. Phillips expressed

that the claims against Group III and DeKalb was

not about the investigation but Harris's refusal to

come forth and correct the report. USCAll, [OB] 5659. Nowhere in the counts or claims is there a claim

about an investigation. Harris furthered the

conspiracy and is charged with the same counts or

claims as Groups I & II.

If Phillips were to argue the investigation, he has the

right to an investigation according to Georgia law.

"Public officers are the trustees

and servants of the people and

are at all times amenable to

them. The people of this state

have the inherent right of

regulating their internal

government. Government is

instituted for the protection,

security, and benefit of the

people; and at all times they have

the right to alter or reform the

same whenever the public good

may require it."

Ga. Const, art. I, §2,

I-II. Amenable means subject

to answer to the law; accountable; responsible; liable

to punishment. Pickelsimer v. Glazener, 173 N.C.

630, 92 S.E. 700, 704 (1917).

Under §1981(a) (App. 41A), he would have that right,

and under Amendment IX implemented pursuant to

life and liberty under Amendments V and XIV, §1.

USCA11 showed no proof of Harris's behavior either

protecting, securing, or benefitting Phillips. Instead,

it sanctioned and affirmed NDGA.

F. An automobile (not for hire) is neither a

motor vehicle nor a car.

NDGA failed to consider the material facts that

Phillips's vehicle is/was of the class of vehicles

intentionally misclassified by the State as a motor

vehicle (18 U. S. C. §31(a)(6), (10)) when the lawful

classification is an automobile (49 CFR §523.3(a); 49

U.S.C. §§32901(a)(3), 32908(a)(1); See also 49 CFR

§§523.2, 523.4, 523.5); App. 37A, 43A-47A) or

automobile not for hire, (C/. City of Dayton v.

DeBrosse, 62 Ohio Ct. App. 232, *238-241 (1939),

citing Memphis Street Ry. v. Crenshaw, 165 Tenn.

536, 55 S.W.2d 758; Shultz v. Cambridge, 38 Ohio St.

659; State, ex rel. Schorr, v. Viner, 119 Ohio St. 303,

164 N.E. 119); See also American Mutual Liability

Ins. Co. v. Chaput, 95 NH 200 (1948), 60 A.2d 118,

120; and that license fees or taxes do not apply to

automobiles used on the highways for personal or

private purposes.

(A) NDGA failed to consider the material fact

that the State defines motor vehicle (O.C.G.A. §

40-1-1(33); App. 68A)—contrary to 18 U.S.C.

§31 (a)(6),(10), and sub-classifies automobiles as

passenger cars (O.C.G.A. §40-1-1(41); App. 68A)—

contrary to (49 U.S.C. §§20133(a), 30101, SEC.

2502(a)(3); App. 46A-47A). It also failed to

consider the material fact that the State is

classifying travelers as drivers and defines driver

(O.C.G.A. §40-1-1(14); App. 68A)—contrary to 49

CFR§ 390.5T; App. 43A.

A traveler is one who passes from place to place,

whether for pleasure, instruction, business or

health. Lockett v. State, 47 Ala. 45 (1872), 10

C.B.N.S. 429. Phillips is lawfully a member of

this class of vehicle users, not a driver. A driver is

any person who operates any commercial motor

vehicle. 49 CFR §390.5T; App. 43A. These

undisputed facts draw into question the

requirement of a driver's license (O.C.G.A. §40-520; App. 77A-78A) being applied to travelers

using personal automobiles for personal/private

purposes and not using the highways as a place of

business. This draws into question the related

laws used to penalize or punish travelers who

choose to reject the licensing requirements and

exercise their rights ((B), infra, p. 22). (i.e.,

O.C.G.A. §§40-2-8(a), (b)(1), (c); 40-2-20(c); 40-226(d)(2); 40-2-29(d); 40- 5-29(c); 40-5-58(c)(l), (2);

40-5-121(a), (d); 40-6-10(4), (b); 40-6-15(a)-(c).

App. 68A-71, 78A-83A.

USCA11 sanctioned NDGA's failure to lawfully

consider vehicles under 10,000 pounds are not motor

vehicles (NDGA, [Doc 38] 7) and that license fees or

taxes, which are State required ((O.C.G.A. §§40-220(a)(1)(A); 40-2-26(a); 40-2-29(a), 40-2-151, 40-520(a)(d)). App. 69A-78A), don't apply to automobiles

being used for personal or private purposes. Notably,

automobile is not defined in O.C.G.A. §40-1-1

(statutory definitions), p. 1. App. 66A-68A.

"A license fee is the sum

extracted for the privilege of

carrying on a particular

occupation or business, and it

may be imposed either for

regulation under the police power

or for revenue, or for both

regulation and revenue. Under

such title the state exacts a

license or registration fee which

is a privilege tax in the nature of

a license or toll for the use of the

highways."

J. W. Payne v. Otis Massey Et AI., 145 Tex. 237, 241

(Tex. 1946). "[S]elf-propelling vehicles as are used

neither for the conveyance of persons for hire,

pleasure, or business, nor for the transportation of

freight, are exempted." Marin v. Chenu, 188 Cal.

734, 736 (Cal. 1922). Cf. Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S.

495, 497 1[3, 5 S. Ct. 241, 28 L. Ed. 825 (1884); Frost

& Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S.

593-594 (1926); Mallicoat v. Volunteer Finance &

Loan Corp., 415 S.W.2d 347, 350 (1966).

A person cannot be compelled to purchase, through a

license fee or a license tax, the privileges [rights]

freely guaranteed by the Constitution. Murdock v.

Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114 (1943), quoting Blue

Island v. Kozul, 379 Ill. 511, 41 N. E. 2d 515. A

license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional

validity because it classifies the privileges [rights]

guaranteed the people by the Constitution, which

exist apart from State authority. Id., 115.

(B) USCA11 sanctioned the failure of NDGA to

lawfully consider Phillips's rights, as a traveler,

directly attached to his personal automobile.

It is Phillips’s right to be free to

remove himself and his property

from a situation of actionable

fraud (U.S. Const, amend. I; V;

IX; XIV, §1 (App. 34A-35A));

maintain rightful and lawful

possession of his personal

property (42 U.S.C. §1982 (App.

41A)); and exercise his right to

be free to use his own property as

he sees fit (City Of Dallas v.

Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944, 945 (Tex.

Civ. App. 1922)); use the

highways in his ordinary travels

(Solbergv. Davenport, 211 Iowa

612, 621- 622; 232 N.W. 477

(Iowa 1930), Schultz v. City of

Duluth, 163 Minn. 65, 68 (Minn.

1925)); pursue a livelihood

without unreasonable

interference (Berberian v. Lussier

87 R.I. 226, 231-232 (R.L 1958),

139 A.2d 869, 872)); and to travel

freely and uninterrupted (Saenz

v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,515 (1999),

with impunity.

NDGA, [Doc 38] 6-7; [Doc 48-1] 13.

See also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, at

757 11, 758 11, 761 n.17 (1966)).

These are inherent and constitutional rights

the State is charging license fees or taxes to

exercise. Notably, the licensing scheme is

administered without full disclosure, and is

lawfully defined as actionable fraud and

corruption, having nothing to do with public

health, safety, and welfare—revenue is the

objective. Actionable fraud is deception practiced

in order to induce another to part with property

or surrender some legal right. Sawyer v. Prickett,

86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 146, 22 L. Ed. 105 (1874).

Corruption is an act done with an intent to give

some advantage inconsistent with official duty

and the rights of others. Johnson v. U. S., C.C.A.

Alaska, 260 F. 783, 786 (1919).

Ultimately, via its scheme of misclassification,

the State is regulating the right to travel. States

don’t have that authority. "The right to travel

is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen

cannot be deprived without due process of law

under the Fifth Amendment."; "If that "liberty"

is to be regulated, it must be pursuant to the

law-making functions of Congress." Kent v.

Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125, 129 (1958). NDGA,

[Doc 48-1] 16-17. The Georgia General

Assembly is aware of the unconstitutionality of

O.C.G.A. §40-5-20 and related laws—as applied to

the traveling public—but lacks the integrity to

protect the rights of the people. Id., 41-43.

A person faced with an unconstitutional licensing

law may ignore it and engage with impunity in the

exercise of a right secured by the Constitution for

which the law purports to require a license.

Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147,

151(1969).

The State cannot impose conditions that require

relinquishment of constitutional rights. Frost &

Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm. 271 U.S. 593*594 (1926).

A statute offering a choice between the exercise of a

constitutional right or the penalty created by it, is a

violation of that right. The injured party must be

restored. Sherarv. Cullen 481 F.2d 945, at 947 f3,

948 (9th Cir. 1973); See also Boyd v. United States,

116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524,29 L.Ed. 746 (1886); Malloy

v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Bd.2d 653

(1964); Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm'r., 392

U.S. 280, 88 S.Ct. 1917, 20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1968);

Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S.Ct. 1913, 20

L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968).

Where rights secured by the Constitution are

involved, there can be no rule-making or legislation

which would abrogate them. Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436, *491111 (1966).

The assertion of Federal rights when plainly and

reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the

name of local practice. Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S.

22, 24 (1923).

The due exercise of the police power is limited to the

preservation of the public health, safety, and morals,

and legislation which transcends these objects,

whatever other justification it may claim for its

existence, cannot be upheld as a legitimate police

regulation. Ex parte Dickey, 144 Cal. 234, 236 (1904),

77 P. 924. See also Ex Parte Dickey, 76 W. Va. 576,

579, 85 S.E. 781, L.R.A. 1915F, 840 (1904), quoting

Judge Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 7th

edition, p. 837 ("The limit to the exercise of the police

power in these cases must be this: The regulation

must have reference to the comfort, safety, or welfare

of society.").

"That power has never yet been

fully described nor its extent

plainly limited further, at least,

than this; it is not above the

Constitution, but it is bounded by

its provisions; and if any liberty

or franchise is expressly

protected by any constitutional

provision it cannot be destroyed

by any valid exercise by the

legislature or the executive of the

police power. Under an exercise

of the police power the enactment

must have reference to the

comfort, the safety or the welfare

of society, and it must not be in

conflict with the Constitution."

People v. Gillson 109 N.Y. 389, 400-*401

(N.Y. 1888). See also State v. Dalton, 22

R.I. 77, 80, 46 A. 234 (R.I. 1900).

NDGA failed to constitutionally dispute all elements

essential to Phillips’s arguments (II(A)-(F), supra),

meaningfully (Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,

552 (1965)) and appropriately (Mullane v. Central

Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, at 313 (1950), 70 S.

Ct. 652), obviating the standard of due process. See

Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, at 542 (1971). This was

sanctioned by USCAll's decision. Ultimately,

Phillips was deprived of the right to be free to choose

which person serves his papers; the right of freedom

of speech and expression; the personal choice to sue;

personal rights included in life and liberty; and his

property rights—sanctioned by USCA11 with it's

affirmation of NDGA's decision. This is in violation of

Amendments I, V, IX, & XIV, §1 (App. 34A-35A); 28

U.S.C. §2072(b) (App. 40A); 42 U.S.C. §§1981(a),

1982 (App. 41A). USCA11, [OB] 31-40.

II. Phillips did not abandon his claim that NDGA

erred in dismissing claims against all defendants,

and USCA11 erred in affirming it.

A. Defective Service

USCA11 stated that Phillips abandoned his claim(s)

that NDGA erred in its dismissal for defective

service stating that he did not argue that his service

complied with Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 4, on appeal.

(App. 4A). That's false.

Phillips’s argument on service was/is simple. He

stated that he followed (complied) the rules as

written (USCA11, [OB] 33-37); how the rules connect

to the A0398; that the USPS is a person by lawful

definition (undefined in the rules). Rightfully,

Phillips argued inclusively a review of Rule 4 parts;

his right(s) in the situation; this court’s decisions

concerning rules and rights; the Constitution; and

federal law. USCA11, [OB] 31-40. Notably, neither

NDGA nor USCA11 constitutionally disputed the

facts pointed out in either element.

(1) USCAll affirmed dismissal of all defendants but

stated:

"Even if this claim is not

abandoned, the district court did

not err in dismissing Phillips’s

complaint for defective service as

to those defendants who were not

personally served or did not

return a waiver of service. Only

DeKalb County, Officer Harris,

and Curtis McMurray waived

service, so Phillips was required

to effect personal service for all

other defendants.’’

App. 5A.

(2) NDGA didn’t constitutionally dispute the facts

Phillips presented in his arguments concerning the

rules or otherwise. Taking into account that USCA11

didn't constitutionally dispute the facts pointed out

by Phillips in his argument(s), it failed to lawfully

dispute all essential elements thereof. And,

according to the foregoing statement, NDGA did not

follow Rule 4(m). USCAll should not have affirmed

dismissal of any defendants because of undisputed

facts neither court was willing to reach. The

standard of due process was not met. See Armstrong

v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552; Mullane v. Central

Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, at 313; Bell v. Burson,

402 U.S. 535, at 542, supra.

III. Abuse of personal jurisdiction exists.

There is nothing in NDGA's decision that shows it

met the requirement of personal jurisdiction—

protect liberty interests. USCAll sanctioned it by its

affirmation, and it also failed to meet the

requirement. See Ins. Co. of Ireland v. Compagnie

Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, at 702 12 (1982).

The protection of constitutional rights may not be

watered down because some members of the public

[judiciary] actively oppose the exercise of

constitutional rights by others (citing Cooper v.

Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, at 6 (1958)). Adickes v. Kress Co.,

398 U.S. 144, 234 11 (1970). USCAll, [OB] 54, 61.

"Neither the President, nor Congress, nor the

Judiciary can disturb any one of the safeguards of

civil liberty incorporated into the Constitution,

except so far as the right is given to suspend in

certain cases the privilege of the writ of habeas

corpus." Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, *4 n. 11 (1866).

See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113, 169-170 \2

(1973).

IV. Constructive fraud and corruption is present.

(A) There’s eight (8) instances of what may be

construed as constructive fraud and corruption

committed by NDGA altering and manipulating the

narrative and the facts. USCA11 sanctioned it and

employed six (6) instances of the same tactics in its

decision.

NDGA

(1) Making the case out to be about Petitioner’s

vehicle and not his rights attached to it, its use, and

right of possession pursuant to the Constitution and

laws. USCA11, [OB] 33-34; NDGA, [Doc 82] 1, 4, 5, 8,

22. See App. 10A.

(2) Using the term ’’car" instead of automobile or

automobile not for hire when referring to Phillips’s

vehicle, and not defining that term. USCA11, [OB]

34-35, 53-54; App. 10A-12A, 15A, 29A.’’Car" has no

application in this case, neither does "motor vehicle"

(App. 9A). USCA11, [OB] 34.

(3) Stating that Phillips sought "compensatory and

punitive damages, the return of his 'car', litigation

fees and expenses". USCA11, [OB] 44-46; App. 15A.

"Compensatory" does not exist in the Amended

Complaint, or elsewhere. "Compensatory" damages

has no application in this case, but damages apply.

Reason (3)(a), infra, p. 37. "Historically, damages

have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an

invasion of personal interests in liberty." Davis v.

Passman, 442 U.S. 228, at 245 f2 (1979), quoting

Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, at 395. USCAll, [OB] 45-46;

See 28 U. S. C. §1343(a)(l), (2), (4). App. 39A.

(4) Failed to state subpart (1) when quoting Rule

4(c). App. 23A. This is the main point that Phillips

argued concerning Rule 4. USCAll, [OB] 35.

(5) Intentionally and incorrectly stating the excerpt

of the lease document using the term [unregistered,

rather than [unlicensed—different meanings.

USCAll, [OB] 48-50; App. 9A, 26A, 29A.

(6) Making out the claims against Harris and

DeKalb to be about the investigation and not the

refusal of Harris to come forward and correct the

report, thus furthering the conspiracy by Groups I &

II. USCAll, [OB] 56-59; App. 30A. There is no count

or claim for an investigation. Harris furthered a

conspiracy and is charged with the same counts or

claims as Groups I & II.

(7) Using class and/or race to aid in its justification

for dismissal by omitting part of §1983 that applies

to Phillips when quoting. USCAll, [OB] 59-60; App.

27A. Intentional omission of "or other person”.

(8) Labeling Phillips as a sovereign citizen to aid in

its justification for dismissal, because Phillips

identifies himself as a sovereign principal, which he

defined. USCAll, [OB] 61-64. NDGA failed to define

"sovereign citizen", and USCAll sanctioned it with

its acquiescence and affirmation. Notably, courts in

the Eleventh Circuit routinely and summarily

dismiss cases based upon that label (App. 30A-31A).

USCAll, [OB] 33. This may be construed as biased

and discriminatory.

A right is implicated when a law [rule] uses any

classification which serves to penalize the exercise of

that right. Cf. State v. Cuypers, 559 N.W. 2d 435, 437

(Minn. Ct. App. 1997). Using a classification to

penalize the exercise of the right to self-identify

violates the Equal Protection Clause. Cf. Saenz v.

Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 515 (1999). USCA11, [OB] 62.

USCA11

(1) Stating that Phillips asserted allegations of

violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process

rights when his unregistered "car" was towed . . .

App. 2A. "Car" has no application in this case.

Phillips defined "car" (USCA11, [OB] 34-35).

Apparently it was ignored. App. 6A-7A.

(2) Failed to state subpart (1) when quoting Rule

4(c). See App. 3A-4A. This is the main point that

Phillips argued concerning Rule 4. USCA11; [OB] 35.

(3) Omitted subpart (1)(G) when quoting Rule 4(d)

(App. 4A), knowing this was part of Phillips's

argument. USCA11, [OB] 40.

(4) Making the case out to be about Petitioner's

vehicle and not his rights attached to it, its use, and

right of possession pursuant to the Constitution and

laws. USCA11, [OB] 33-34; App. 6A.

(5) Making out the claims against Harris and

DeKalb to be about the investigation and not the

refusal of Harris to come forward and correct the

report, thus furthering the conspiracy by Groups I &

II. USCA11, [OB] 56-59; App. 6A-7A. Nowhere in the

counts or claims is there a claim for an investigation.

Harris furthered a conspiracy and is charged with

the same counts or claims as Groups I & II.

(6) Fabricating that Phillips argued "that the

relevant lease provision was meant to ensure

compliance with Georgia law regarding vehicle

registration". App. 6A. Phillips stated that private

actors were:

"using State authority and

performing public functions

customarily done by the State, to

wit, determining which vehicles

must be licensed, which involves

payment of a license fee or tax,

and deciding who has right of

possession . . . having no

ownership interest and no right

of possession, without a warrant

(no probable cause) and no

hearing prior to depriving the

owner/possessor of his/her

property, for not having a state

license"....

NDGA, [Doc 18] 7-9. These intentional acts of

constructive fraud and corruption (Johnson v. U. S.,

C.C.A. Alaska, 260 F. 783, 786, supra, p. 24) yielded

bias, proscription, and furtherance of the conspiracy

to deprive Phillips of his rights.

any

Constructive fraud consists of

act of commission or omission

contrary to legal or equitable

duty, trust, or confidence justly

reposed, which is contrary to good

conscience and operates to the

injury of another. ... an act,

statement or omission which

operates as a virtual fraud on an

individual, or which, if generally

permitted, would be prejudicial to

the public welfare.

People v. Kelly, 35 Barb., N.Y., 444, 457 (1862);

Jackson v. Jackson, 47 Ga. 99 (1872). Fraud vitiates

everything. United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S.

61, 66 (1878), quoting Wells, Res Adjudicata, sect.

499.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

(1) USCAll’s decision conflicts with Armstrong v.

Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552; Mullane v. Central

Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, at 313; Bell v. Burson,

402 U.S. 535, at 542 (A hearing must be meaningful

and appropriate to the nature of the case. Excluding

essential elements of an argument(s) don't meet that

standard). USCA11 sanctioned NDGA's departure

from meeting the standard of due process, and did

likewise.

(a) Those conflicts proximately caused collateral

conflicts.

(i) Collateral conflicts with state decisions:

People v. Fire Ass>i, 92 N.Y. 311, 44 Am. Rep.

380 (corporations are "persons"). Rosenblum v.

Rosenblum, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 626, 630, 181 Misc.

78 (1943) (life and liberty include all personal

rights).

(ii) Collateral conflicts with this court’s decisions:

Covington & L. Tump. Co. v. Sandford, 17 S.Ct.

198, 164 U.S., 578, 41 L. Ed. 560; Smyth v. Ames,

18 S.Ct. 418, 169 U.S. 466,42 L.Ed. 819; U. S. v.

Supply Co., 30 S.Ct. 15, 215 U.S. 50, 54 L. Ed. 87,

(corporations are "persons"); Screws v. United

States, 325 U.S. 91, 104 1f 1; 105 f 1 (the

Constitution is defined.); United States v.

Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 66 (fraud vitiates

everything). USCA11 sanctioned instances of

fraud ignored by NDGA, and employed its own

fraud.

For word limit purposes, see App. 88A-90A for

other collateral conflicts applicable to this reason.

(2) USCA11 sanctioned NDGA's abuse of personal

jurisdiction and furthered the abuse with its

decision. Neither NDGA nor USCAll protected

Phillips's liberty interest(s). USCAll's decision

conflicts with Ins. Co. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des

Bauodtes, 456 U.S. 694, at 702 \2 (1982) (protecting a

liberty interest is the requirement of personal

jurisdiction); Adickes v. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, at

234, f 1 (1970) citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, at

6 (1958)) (protection of constitutional rights may not

be watered down by active opposition to their

exercise); Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, *4 n. 11

(1866) (safeguards of civil liberty incorporated into

the Constitution are not to be disturbed by neither

the President, Congress, nor the Judiciary, excepting

the writ of habeas corpus in certain cases).

(a) Those conflicts proximately caused collateral

conflicts.

(i) Collateral conflicts with state decisions:

City Of Dallas v. Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944, 945 ^[7

(Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (right to use one's own

property as he sees fit); Solberg v. Davenport, 211

Iowa 612, 621-622; 232 N.W. 477 (Iowa 1930);

Schultz v. City of Duluth, 163 Minn. 65, 68 (Minn.

1925) (right to use the highways in ordinary

travels); Berberian v. Lussier 87 R.I. 226, 231-232

(R.I. 1958), 139 A.2d 869, 872) (right to pursue a

livelihood without unreasonable interference).

See also City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 245 S.W. 944,

supra, 945 1[9-*946 (rights are endowed by the

Creator; it is the duty of the courts to declare

encroachment of rights and afford relief). See

App. 90A-91A.

(ii) Collateral conflicts with another appeals

court's decision:

Sherar v. Cullen 481 F.2d 945, at 947, Tf3, 948

(9th Cir. 1973) (A statute offering a choice

between the exercise of a constitutional right or

the penalty created by it, is a violation of that

right. The injured party must be restored).

(iii) Collateral conflicts with this court's decisions:

Sawyer v. Prickett, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 146, 22 L.

Ed. 105 (1874) (deception practiced in order

to induce another to part with property or

surrender some legal right is actionable fraud);

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 515 (1999); United

States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, at 757 Ifl, 758 If 1,

761 n.17 (1966) (right to travel freely); Kent v.

Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125, 129 (1958) (right to

travel can only be regulated by Congress under

Amendment V); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham,

394 U.S. 147, 151(1969) (ignore a law requiring a

license to exercise a right secured by the

Constitution and engage in the exercise of that

right with impunity); Frost & Frost Trucking Co.

v. Railroad Comm. 271 U.S. 593-*594 (1926)

(State cannot impose conditions that require

relinquishment of constitutional rights); Boyd v.

United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524,29 L.Ed.

746 (1886) (a form of compulsion is violation of

Amendments IV and V); Malloy v. Hogan,

378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Bd.2d 653 (1964)

(right to remain silent and suffer no penalty);

Sanitation Men v. Sanitation Comm'r., 392 U.S.

280, 88 S.Ct. 1917, 20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1968) (public

employees protected against self-incrimination,

no forced choice between rights or job);

Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 88 S.Ct.

1913, 20 L.Ed.2d 1082 (1968) (attempted coercion to

waive immunity from self-incrimination

intolerable as conferred on penalty of employment

loss); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, *491 T|1

(1966) (no rule-making or legislation abrogating

rights secured by the Constitution); Davis v.

Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923) (plain and

reasonable assertion of Federal rights not to

be defeated in name of local practice); Roe v.

Wade, 410 U.S.113, 169-170 1)2 (1973) (protected

personal liberty to choose to terminate a

pregnancy. Lesser degrees of significance cited

within quotation of Abele v. Markle, 351 F. Supp.

224, 227 (Conn. 1972)—right to send a child

to private school protected in Pierce v. Society of

Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), right to teach a

foreign language protected in Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U. S. 390 (1923)). Perhaps these are to be

overturned.

An even lesser degree of significance was not

protected in this case—choosing the USPS to

serve a summons with a copy of the complaint,

following Rule 4(c)(1) and the A0398. Adding

insult to injury, Phillips’s personal liberties were

unprotected. E.g., NDGA, [Doc 18] 29-32.

(3) USCA11 sanctioned NDGA's constructive fraud

and corruption, and used the same tactics in its

decision, producing four levels of conflict.

(a) USCAll’s conflicts with State decisions:

People v. Kelly, 35 Barb., N.Y., 444, 457 (1862);

Jackson v. Jackson, 47 Ga. 99 (1872)

(constructive

fraud consists of any act of

commission or

omission contrary to legal or

equitable duty, trust,

or confidence justly

reposed, which is contrary to

good conscience and

operates to the injury of another. ... an act,

statement or omission which

operates as a virtual

fraud on an individual, or

which, if generally

permitted, would be

prejudicial to the public

welfare); Johnson v. U. S., C.C.A. Alaska, 260 F.

783, 786 (1919) (an act

done with an intent to give

some advantage

inconsistent with official duty

and the rights of others is corruption); State v.

Cuypers, 559 N.W. 2d 435, 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)

(a right is implicated when any classification is

used to

penalize the exercise thereof); McKnight

v. Denny,

198 Pa. 323, 47 A.970; Wade v. Power

Co., 51 S.C. 296,29 S.E. 233, 64 Am. St. Rep. 676;

Gatzow v.

Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W, 1003, 49

L.R.A. 475 (Compensatory damages is the proper

relief where there is physical injury suffered);

Wainscott v. Loan Ass'n, 98 Cal. 253, 33 P. 88;

Strong v. Neidermeier, 230 Mich. 117, 202 N.W.

938, 940; Greer v. Board of Com'rs of Knox

County, 33 Ohio App. 539, 169 N. E. 709,710

(Damages is the proper relief where a party is

injured in his rights);

(b) USCAll’s conflicts with this court's decisions:

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, at 142 12 (1973), (an

honest judge calls things by their proper names,

without compromise)—in other words [s]he would

define things; Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 17

S.Ct. 265,41 L.Ed. 632 (Damages is the proper

relief where a party is injured in his rights);

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 515 (1999) (using any

classification to penalize the exercise of a right

violates equal protection); Davis v. Passman, 442

U.S. 228, at 245 1f2 (1979), quoting Bivens, 403

U.S. 388, at 395 (damages regarded as ordinary

remedy for an invasion of personal interests in

liberty); .Adickes v. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 205

(1970); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932)

(Amendment XIV was originally meant to protect

a Negro or Colored—now labeled Black or African

American)); United States v. Throckmorton, 98

U.S. 61, 66 (1878) (fraud vitiates everything).

(i) Collateral conflicts with another appeals

court's decisions negated DeKalb County liability.

Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469,

1481-1482 (3d Cir. 1990); Brennan v. Norton, 350

F.3d 399, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2003) (policy-maker

acquiesced to constitutional violations by

subordinate officers, after the fact—he's liable).

(ii) Collateral conflicts with this court’s decisions

gave immunity to DeKalb County and Harris.

Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717721(no Eleventh Amendment protection from suit

in federal court for political subdivisions); Owen

v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 657, 667

(municipalities are persons subject to liability

under §1983 for violating the constitution);

Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 116-*117

(state officials violating their oaths are

answerable to it); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

200-201, quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.

511, 526 (qualified immunity is no defense

against liability).

CONCLUSION

Judges in this case rebelled against the Constitution,

violating Article VI, cl. 3 and Amendment XIV, §3,

and violated 28 U.S.C. §§453, 455(a),(b)(1) (oath,

disqualification for impartiality and personal bias).

This behavior yielded multiple violations of Articles

IV, §1, and VI, cl. 2, and 28 U.S.C. §1652—absolving

constitutional enemies. App. 35A-40A.

Fraud vitiates everything. United States v.

Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 66. The writ is warranted.

Respectfully submitted.

byron-wendell: pmllips

3308 Peppertree Circle, Apt. D

Decatur, Georgia 30034

Cell: (678) 596-3499

Date: 2/11/2022

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