Respondents Brief — National Postal Policy Council, et al., Petitioners v. Postal Regulatory Commission, et al.
Supreme Court briefMay 18, 2022
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No. 21-1124
In the Supreme Court of the United States
NATIONAL POSTAL POLICY COUNCIL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT POSTAL REGULATORY
COMMISSION IN OPPOSITION
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
MICHAEL S. RAAB
DANA KAERSVANG
MICHAEL SHIH
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
In the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act
(2006 Act), Pub. L. No. 109-435, 120 Stat. 3198, Congress directed the Postal Regulatory Commission to “establish,” and authorized it thereafter to “revise,” a “system for regulating rates and classes for market-dominant
products” of the U.S. Postal Service—products over
which the Postal Service possesses statutory exclusivity
or exercises sufficient market power to set prices.
39 U.S.C. 3622(a). The 2006 Act prescribed nine “objectives” that the system must “be designed to achieve,”
39 U.S.C. 3622(b) (capitalization omitted), as well as
“factors” to be taken into account “[i]n establishing or
revising such system,” 39 U.S.C. 3622(c) (capitalization
omitted). Congress also set forth various requirements
for the system, 39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(1) and (2), including
that it limit annual rate increases based on inflation,
39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(1)(A).
Congress directed the Commission, after ten years
and “as appropriate thereafter,” to “review the system”
it had established to determine whether that system
was achieving the stated “objectives,” taking into account the enumerated “factors.” 39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(3).
Section 3622(d)(3) authorizes the Commission, if it determines that the system is not achieving those objectives, to “make such modification or adopt such alternative system for regulating rates and classes for marketdominant products as necessary to achieve the objectives.” Ibid. The question presented is as follows:
Whether Congress’s authorization to the Commission to “make such modifications or adopt such alternative system * * * as necessary to achieve the” statute’s
enumerated “objectives,” 39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(3), violates
the nondelegation doctrine.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statement ...................................................................................... 1
Argument..................................................................................... 11
Conclusion ................................................................................... 26
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935).............................................................. 19
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC,
329 U.S. 90 (1946) ........................................18, 19, 20, 21, 25
Avent v. United States, 266 U.S. 127 (1924) ....................... 22
The Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 (1813) ...................................... 18, 25
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ..................................................... 16
CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685 (2011) ........ 25
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947) .............................. 19
Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591 (1944)........................................................ 19, 22
Gundy v. United States,
139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) ..................................... 15, 18, 19, 23
Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm’n,
502 U.S. 197 (1991) .......................................................... 25
J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394 (1928).......................................10, 17, 18, 19, 25
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018) .................. 15
Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446 (2015) ... 24, 25
Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) ............................. 25
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948) ..................... 19
(III)
IV
Cases—Continued:
Page
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) ..................... 19
Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) ..... 18, 25
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty.,
572 U.S. 782 (2014)........................................................ 24, 25
Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989) ......................................... 17, 18, 19, 20
National Ass’n of Greeting Card Publishers v.
United States Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810 (1983) ...... 1, 2, 23
National Broad. Co. v. United States,
319 U.S. 190 (1943)........................................................ 19, 22
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) .................. 19
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) ............................ 25
Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co.,
490 U.S. 212 (1989).............................................................. 23
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991)....................... 19
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) ................. 18
United States Postal Serv. v. Postal Regulatory
Comm’n, 785 F.3d 740 (D.C. Cir. 2015) .......................... 2, 4
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) .............................. 24
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457 (2001)................................. 10, 11, 17, 19, 20, 22
Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414 (1944) ......................................... 17, 19, 22, 23
Constitution, statutes, and rule:
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1 ............................................................ 17
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ................................... 16
42 U.S.C. 7411 .................................................................. 16
National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90,
48 Stat. 195 .......................................................................... 19
Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act,
Pub. L. No. 109-435, 120 Stat. 3198 .................................... 2
V
Statutes and rule—Continued:
Page
Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375,
84 Stat. 719 (39 Stat. 101 et seq.):
§ 3621, 84 Stat. 760 ............................................................ 2
39 U.S.C. 201 .................................................................... 20
39 U.S.C. 3622 ......................................................... passim
39 U.S.C. 3622(a) ..........................................2, 4, 12, 14, 20
39 U.S.C. 3622(b) ....................................3, 4, 12, 21, 23, 24
39 U.S.C. 3622(b)(1) .......................................................... 8
39 U.S.C. 3622(b)(2) .......................................................... 8
39 U.S.C. 3622(b)(6) .......................................................... 8
39 U.S.C. 3622(b)(8) .......................................................... 8
39 U.S.C. 3622(c) ......................................................... 3, 12
39 U.S.C. 3622(c)(1) ........................................................... 4
39 U.S.C. 3622(c)(3) ........................................................... 4
39 U.S.C. 3622(c)(7) ........................................................... 4
39 U.S.C. 3622(c)(12) ......................................................... 4
39 U.S.C. 3622(c)(14) ......................................................... 4
39 U.S.C. 3622(d) ......................................................... 4, 14
39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(1) .............................................. 4, 12, 13
39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(1)(A) ............................................... 4, 14
39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(2) .............................................. 4, 12, 13
39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(3) ............................................... passim
39 U.S.C. 3642(b)(1) .......................................................... 2
39 U.S.C. 3642(b)(2) .......................................................... 2
39 U.S.C. 3663 .............................................................. 9, 16
Sup. Ct. R. 10 ......................................................................... 16
Miscellaneous:
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Department of Labor, Consumer Price Index,
https://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (last visited May 17, 2022).......... 4
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 21-1124
NATIONAL POSTAL POLICY COUNCIL, ET AL.,
PETITIONERS
v.
POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT POSTAL REGULATORY
COMMISSION IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-30a)
is reported at 17 F.4th 1184. The order of the Postal Regulatory Commission (C.A. App. 2305-2788, excerpted at
Pet. App. 31a-93a) is unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
November 12, 2021. The petition for a writ of certiorari
was filed on February 10, 2022. The jurisdiction of this
Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. a. For most of the Nation’s history, Congress regulated postal rates directly. See National Ass’n of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal Serv.,
(1)
2
462 U.S. 810, 813 (1983). In 1970, Congress conferred
ratemaking authority on an agency (the Commission)
that was previously known as the Postal Rate Commission and is now called the Postal Regulatory Commission. Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375,
§ 3621, 84 Stat. 760. That grant of authority reflected
Congress’s recognition “that the increasing economic,
accounting, and engineering complexity of ratemaking
issues” made them ill-suited for Congress and its staff,
and that ratemaking duties were better entrusted to an
“expert[ ]” agency “composed of ‘professional economists, trained rate analysts, and the like.’ ” Greeting
Card Publishers, 462 U.S. at 822-823 (citation omitted).
b. In 2006, Congress enacted the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (2006 Act), Pub. L. No.
109-435, 120 Stat. 3198, to “reform[ ]” certain aspects of
the then-existing “ratemaking scheme.” United States
Postal Serv. v. Postal Regulatory Comm’n, 785 F.3d
740, 744 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (USPS). Among other things,
Congress directed that the “Commission shall * * * by
regulation establish * * * a modern system for regulating rates and classes of market-dominant products,”
39 U.S.C. 3622(a)—i.e., products over which the Postal
Service either “enjoys a statutory monopoly” or “exercises sufficient market power so that it can effectively
dictate the[ir] price,” USPS, 785 F.3d at 744 (citing
39 U.S.C. 3642(b)(1) and (2)). The 2006 Act further provides that, having established such a system, the Commission “may * * * revise” it “from time to time thereafter.” 39 U.S.C. 3622(a).
Congress provided several forms of guidance for the
Commission’s establishment and revision of the new
ratemaking system. First, Congress specified nine “objectives” that the system “shall be designed to achieve”:
3
(1) To maximize incentives to reduce costs and increase efficiency.
(2) To create predictability and stability in rates.
(3) To maintain high quality service standards established under [39 U.S.C.] 3691.
(4) To allow the Postal Service pricing flexibility.
(5) To assure adequate revenues, including retained earnings, to maintain financial stability.
(6) To reduce the administrative burden and increase the transparency of the ratemaking process.
(7) To enhance mail security and deter terrorism.
(8) To establish and maintain a just and reasonable schedule for rates and classifications, however
the objective under this paragraph shall not be construed to prohibit the Postal Service from making
changes of unequal magnitude within, between, or
among classes of mail.
(9) To allocate the total institutional costs of
the Postal Service appropriately between marketdominant and competitive products.
39 U.S.C. 3622(b) (capitalization omitted). Congress instructed the Commission to “appl[y]” each of those objectives “in conjunction with the others.” Ibid.
Congress also identified a list of “factors” that the
Commission “shall take into account” “[i]n establishing
or revising” its new ratemaking system for marketdominant products. 39 U.S.C. 3622(c) (capitalization
omitted). Those factors include, inter alia, “the value
of the mail service” supplied, the “effect of rate increases” on mail users and the public, “the importance
of pricing flexibility,” the “need for the Postal Service
4
to increase its efficiency and reduce its costs,” and “the
policies of [the 2006 Act].” 39 U.S.C. 3622(c)(1), (3), (7),
(12), and (14). Congress did not make the enumerated
factors exclusive, but instead directed the Commission
to take into account “such other factors as the Commission determines appropriate.” 39 U.S.C. 3622(c)(14).
Finally, Congress specified several particular “requirements” that the new system must satisfy. 39 U.S.C.
3622(d) (capitalization omitted); see 39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(1)
and (2). Most relevant here, the system must limit
annual rate increases to annual changes in a particular
measure of inflation: “the Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers,” 39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(1)(A), known
as the CPI, see United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, Consumer Price Index,
https://www.bls.gov/cpi/ (explaining that the CPI “is a
measure of the average change over time in the prices
paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and services”); USPS, 785 F.3d at 744-745.
In addition to authorizing the Commission to “revise” its new system “from time to time,” 39 U.S.C.
3622(a), the 2006 Act specifically instructs the Commission to conduct periodic notice-and-comment reviews
to determine whether the system is achieving Section
3622(b)’s “objectives.” 39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(3). Section
3622(d)(3) directs that, “[t]en years after the date of enactment of the [2006 Act] and as appropriate thereafter,
the Commission shall review the system for regulating
rates and classes for market-dominant products established under this section to determine if the system is
achieving the objectives in [Section 3622](b), taking into
account the factors in [Section 3622](c).” Ibid. Section
3622(d)(3) then states that,
5
[i]f the Commission determines, after notice and opportunity for public comment, that the system is not
achieving the objectives in [Section 3622](b), taking
into account the factors in [Section 3622](c), the
Commission may, by regulation, make such modification or adopt such alternative system for regulating rates and classes for market-dominant products
as necessary to achieve the objectives.
Ibid.
2. a. In 2017, following its review of the system it
had established under the 2006 Act, the Commission determined that, “while some aspects of the system of regulating rates and classes for market dominant products
have worked as planned, overall, the system has not
achieved the objectives of the [2006 Act].” C.A. App.
368; see generally id. at 361-653; Pet. App. 6a-7a. In
particular, the Commission found that, although the
Postal Service had “generally achieved short-term financial stability” under the Commission’s initial system, “both medium-term and long-term financial stability measures ha[d] not been achieved.” C.A. App. 367.
The Commission noted that, “while some cost reductions and efficiency gains [had] occurred, * * * the incentives were not maximized in a way that allowed the
Postal Service to achieve financial stability.” Ibid. In
addition, “there was not an adequate mechanism to
maintain reasonable rates * * * because certain products and classes failed to cover their attributable costs,
further threatening the financial health of the Postal
Service.” Ibid.; see id. at 2320.
The Commission found that, in the decade after the
2006 Act was enacted, the Postal Service had suffered a
cumulative net loss of approximately $59.1 billion, and
had defaulted on the vast majority of its statutory pay-
6
ment obligations. C.A. App. 534; see id. at 2316-2318.
As a result of that deficit, the Postal Service had resorted to “extraordinary measures to preserve liquidity,” including taking on large amounts of debt, “suspend[ing] all but the most essential capital investments,” and defaulting on congressionally mandated
benefits payments. Id. at 2646.
Based on its examination of the available economic
data, the Commission determined that those outcomes
had occurred because the Postal Service’s “operating
environment” had “rapidly” changed after the 2006
Act’s enactment. C.A. App. 2316. The Great Recession
of 2007 “had a substantial negative impact on Postal
Service volume and revenues.” Ibid. That economic
downturn had coincided with “emergent technological
trends (e.g., email, text messaging, and other electronic
transmission of messages and information) that resulted in even greater volume declines for First-Class
Mail[ ] in particular—the Postal Service’s most profitable
mail class.” Id. at 2317. The Postal Service’s liabilities
had also increased precipitously, due in part to the 2006
Act’s requirement that the Postal Service prefund
health benefits for retirees, which entailed payments
that averaged roughly $5.6 billion annually. Id. at
2316-2317.
The Commission concluded that the problems it had
identified were compounded by the initial system’s inflexible price-cap provision, which rigidly limited the
Postal Service’s ability to raise rates by restricting rate
increases to the rate of inflation reflected in the CPI.
C.A. App. 2323-2330, 2607-2608. The Commission observed that Congress had adopted the price cap in 2006
to “enable the Postal Service to achieve sufficient revenues to cover all of its * * * costs and statutorily man-
7
dated obligations while * * * motivat[ing] the Postal
Service to cut costs and become more efficient.” Id. at
366. It explained that linking potential Postal Service
rate increases to the rate of inflation had been reasonable when the 2006 Act was enacted because the Postal
Service’s finances were stable then, and increases in the
costs of delivering mail were largely correlated with inflation. Id. at 400.
The Commission further explained, however, that
the correlation between mail-delivery costs and inflation had begun to erode almost immediately after the
2006 Act became law. C.A. App. 2593-2594 & n.349. The
period of deflation that followed the 2007 economic
downturn had significantly constrained the Postal Service’s ability to increase rates in response to technological changes and diminishing mail volume. Id. at 2317.
Since 2007, the Postal Service’s costs had risen by more
than 54%, but inflation-based rate authority had risen
by only 27%. Id. at 2399. This “sudden divergence
‘made it extremely challenging for the Postal Service to
manage retained earnings through sustained net income.’ ” Id. at 2594 (citation omitted). Thus, instead, of
creating incentives to increase efficiency, the rate cap
had left the Postal Service “chronically underwater,”
lacking the capital to make efficiency-improving investments. Id. at 2651; see id. at 2612, 2650-2651.
b. The Commission engaged in two rounds of notice
and comment to determine how to address those concerns. C.A. App. 2314. In December 2020, it issued Order No. 5763 (Order), which petitioners have challenged
in this case. C.A. App. 2305-2788; Pet. App. 31a-93a (excerpts); see id. at 7a-10a.
As relevant here, the Order provides for a revised
rate cap, under which the Postal Service may increase
8
rates beyond the rate of inflation in certain limited respects where the initial price cap prevented the ratemaking system from achieving the 2006 Act’s stated objectives. Specifically, the Order authorizes the Postal
Service to raise rates to accommodate declines in mail
density, C.A. App. 2385, and to cover statutorily mandated retirement obligations, id. at 2411-2412; see id. at
2328, 2332. The Order also provides additional ratemaking authority to address certain longstanding problems concerning classes of mail whose revenues do not
cover the costs incurred to provide them because the initial price cap constrained the Postal Service’s ability to
set compensatory rates. Id. at 2493.
The Commission considered and rejected commenters’ objections to its revised rate cap. Those objections
included arguments by commenters who purchase
postal products (collectively, mailers) that the additional rate authority would undermine the statutory objectives of “maximiz[ing] incentives to reduce costs and
increase efficiency,” “creat[ing] predictability and stability in rates,” “increas[ing] the transparency of the
ratemaking process,” and “maintain[ing] a just and reasonable schedule for rates,” 39 U.S.C. 3622(b)(1), (2),
(6), and (8), as well as assertions by the Postal Service
that the additional rate authority the Commission had
proposed was inadequate. See C.A. App. 2390-2410,
2429-2450, 2477-2499, 2587-2591, 2612-2678. After reviewing the available economic data, the Commission
determined that its modified rate cap best advanced the
2006 Act’s objectives taken together. See, e.g., id. at
2581-2582, 2592, 2622-2623.
3. a. Organizations representing mailers—including
petitioners and respondent Association for Postal Commerce (APC)—and the Postal Service petitioned for re-
9
view of the Order in the D.C. Circuit. See 39 U.S.C. 3663;
Pet. App. 3a, 10a. The court of appeals denied requests
to stay the Order and rate increases promulgated thereunder pending judicial review, and increased rates took
effect in August 2021. Pet. App. 10a.
b. The court of appeals denied the petitions for review and upheld the Order. Pet. App. 1a-30a.
Petitioners contended that Section 3622(d)(3) does not
authorize the Commission to permit certain rate increases
that exceed increases in the CPI. The court of appeals
rejected that argument. Pet. App. 10a-16a. The court observed that “[t]he plain text” of Section 3622(d)(3) “permits the Commission to either make minor changes to the
ratemaking system or replace it altogether,” by specifying that the Commission may “ ‘make such modification
or adopt such alternative system for regulating rates and
classes * * * as necessary to achieve the objectives’ ” set
forth in the statute. Id. at 12a (quoting 39 U.S.C.
3622(d)(3)). The court noted that petitioners “d[id] not
contest this interpretation.” Id. at 13a.
Instead, petitioners contended that, even when adopting an “alternative ratemaking system,” the Commission
still “must incorporate the price cap” that the 2006 Act
required to be included in the Commission’s original
ratemaking system. Pet. App. 13a. The court of appeals
rejected that argument. Ibid. The court explained that,
in the context of “§ 3622(a) and (d)(1)(A), ‘system’ refers
broadly to a scheme for ‘regulating rates and classes for
market-dominant products,’ not to the subset of schemes
that comply with the price cap”; that “ ‘system’ most logically means the same in § 3622(d)(3)”; and that the alternative systems that provision authorizes the Commission to adopt “include[ ] rules that do not comply
with the price cap.” Ibid.
10
Petitioners also argued that Section 3622(d)(3)’s directive that the Commission review, and its authorization for the Commission to modify or replace, the system “established under” Section 3622 means that “any
alternate system adopted must also comply with all of
§ 3622’s requirements.” Pet. App. 13a. The court of appeals rejected that contention as well, explaining that
“the phrase ‘established under’ modifies only the system the Commission may review, not the alternative
system it may adopt.” Ibid. The court also rejected petitioners’ contention that Congress’s inclusion of an express “exception to the price cap for emergencies in
§ 3622(d)(1)(E)” bars construing Section 3622(d)(3) to
authorize departures from that cap. Id. at 14a. The
court explained that petitioners’ own reading was inconsistent with the statutory context and structure because
it would “render § 3622(a) superfluous” insofar as it authorizes the Commission to “revise” the ratemaking
system that Congress directed it to adopt. Ibid.
The court of appeals rejected petitioners’ further
contention that the Commission’s reading of Section
3622(d)(3) “runs afoul of the nondelegation doctrine
and should be rejected on constitutional avoidance
grounds.” Pet. App. 16a. The court explained that, under well-settled precedent, “[a] statutory delegation of
authority is constitutional so long as Congress has provided an ‘intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to act is directed to conf [o]rm.’ ” Ibid.
(quoting Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,
531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001), in turn quoting J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928)) (brackets omitted). The court contrasted Section 3622(d)(3) with the only “two statutes” for which
this Court has found “ ‘the requisite “intelligible princi-
11
ple” lacking’ ”—“ ‘one of which provided literally no
guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of
which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than
stimulating the economy by “assuring fair competition.” ’ ” Id. at 17a (quoting American Trucking, 531 U.S.
at 474). The court explained that, unlike those laws, Section 3622(d)(3) “provides an intelligible principle to guide
the Commission by requiring that alterations to the ratemaking system be ‘necessary to achieve the objectives’
in § 3622(b), which enumerates nine criteria.” Ibid.
Finally, the court of appeals rejected arguments that
the Order was arbitrary and capricious, finding that the
Commission had addressed every concern raised by the
parties and had “articulated a rational connection between the statutory objectives and the decision it
made.” Pet. App. 21a; see id. at 18a-30a.
ARGUMENT
The court of appeals correctly held that the Commission did not exceed its authority under 39 U.S.C.
3622(d)(3) in adopting the Order, including its revised
rate cap, and that Section 3622(d)(3) does not violate the
nondelegation doctrine. The court’s decision does not
conflict with any decision of this Court or of another
court of appeals.
Petitioners contend (Pet 15-27) that the Court should
grant review to reconsider its existing nondelegation
precedents. That argument lacks merit. Petitioners
have not demonstrated any special justification that
could plausibly warrant such a departure from stare
decisis principles. In any event, this case would be an
unsuitable vehicle to address that question. Further review is not warranted.
12
1. The court of appeals correctly held that the
Commission acted within its authority under Section
3622(d)(3) in adopting the Order. Pet. App. 10a-17a.
a. The 2006 Act directed the Commission to “establish,” “by regulation,” “a modern system for regulating
rates and classes for market-dominant products.”
39 U.S.C. 3622(a). Congress specified nine “objectives”
that the system must “be designed to achieve,” 39 U.S.C.
3622(b) (capitalization omitted); set forth a nonexhaustive list of “factors” that the Commission should consider in developing the system, 39 U.S.C. 3622(c) (capitalization omitted); and prescribed several parameters
for the system, including the cap on rate increases tied
to the CPI, 39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(1) and (2). Congress directed the Commission to establish the system within
18 months, and it authorized the Commission to “revise”
the system “from time to time thereafter by regulation,” 39 U.S.C. 3622(a), consistent with the criteria—
and taking into account the factors—that the statute
identifies, see, e.g., 39 U.S.C. 3622(c) (“In establishing or
revising such system, the [Commission] shall take into
account” the enumerated factors.).
In Section 3622(d)(3), Congress additionally directed
the Commission to review the system through a noticeand-comment process ten years after the statute’s enactment, and “as appropriate thereafter, * * * to determine if the system is achieving the objectives in [Section 3622](b), taking into account the factors in [Section
3622](c).” 39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(3). That provision states
that, “[i]f the Commission determines * * * that the system is not achieving” the statutory objectives, it may
“make such modification or adopt such alternative system
for regulating rates and classes for market-dominant
products as necessary to achieve the objectives.” Ibid.
13
The court of appeals correctly recognized that Section
3622(d)(3), “[b]y its plain terms, * * * permits the Commission” to make “two types of change” if it determines
following its review of the original system that the system
is not meeting the statutory objectives. Pet. App. 12a.
Under those circumstances, the Commission may “either
make minor changes to the ratemaking system” (pursuant to its authority to “ ‘make * * * modification[s]’ ”), or
“replace” the system with one that the Commission determines will meet the objectives (pursuant to its authority
to “ ‘adopt [an] alternative system’ ”). Ibid. (brackets in
original). In the proceedings below, petitioners “d[id] not
contest th[at] interpretation.” Id. at 13a. They instead
contended that, even when the Commission exercises its
authority to replace the original system with an “alternative system,” 39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(3), it cannot deviate from
the requirements (including the inflation-based rate cap)
that Section 3622(d)(1) specifies for the original system.
Pet. App. 13a. The court correctly rejected that argument. Id. at 13a-16a.
The term “system,” as used in preceding portions of
Section 3622, “refers broadly to a scheme for ‘regulating
rates and classes for market-dominant products,’ not to
the subset of schemes that comply with the price cap.”
Pet. App. 13a. In Section 3622(d)(3)’s authorization to
“adopt [an] alternative system,” 39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(3),
the term “ ‘system’ most logically means the same”
thing “absent evidence that Congress had a contrary intent,” which the court of appeals found lacking here.
Pet. App. 13a. The authority conferred by Section
3622(d)(3) thus includes the power to adopt an alternative system that does not track the original parameters
set forth in Section 3622(d)(1) and (2)—“includ[ing]
rules that do not comply with the price cap.” Ibid.
14
The court of appeals also correctly explained that petitioners’ contrary interpretation of Section 3622(d)(3)
would “render § 3622(a) superfluous.” Pet. App. 14a.
That provision authorizes the Commission to “revise”
the original system “from time to time,” including before the first review conducted under Section 3622(d)(3).
39 U.S.C. 3622(a); see p. 12, supra. Under the approach that
petitioner took below, “no meaningful difference” would
exist between the Commission’s authority to revise the
system under Section 3622(a) and its authority to adopt
an alternative system under Section 3622(d)(3). Pet. App.
14a. The statutory structure thus suggests that Section
3622(d)(3) confers “broader” authority than Section
3622(a) provides. Id. at 15a. The inference that Section
3622(d)(3) confers broader substantive authority is also
consistent with the fact that the Commission must satisfy
“more onerous procedural requirements”—including a
determination, based on a notice-and-comment process,
that the existing system is not achieving the statutory
objectives—before adopting an alternative system. Ibid.
The court of appeals correctly rejected petitioners’ remaining grounds for construing Section 3622(d)(3) not to
authorize an “alternative system” that departs from Section 3622(d)’s requirements. Pet. App. 13a; see id. at
13a-17a. The court held that neither Section 3622(d)(3)’s
reference to “the system ‘established under’ § 3622,” nor
Congress’s inclusion of an exception to the rate cap in Section 3622(d)(1)(A), limits Section 3622(d)(3) to alternatives
that preserve the original rate cap. Id. at 13a; see id. at
13a-14a. The court observed that the legislative history
supports the Commission’s reading of Section 3622(d)(3).
Id. at 15a-16a. And it correctly rejected petitioners’ contention that principles of “constitutional avoidance” compelled it to construe Section 3622(d)(3) narrowly to avoid
15
violating the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 16a. The court
explained that Section 3622(d)(3) presents no nondelegation problem because it “provides an intelligible principle
to guide the Commission by requiring that alterations to
the ratemaking system be ‘necessary to achieve the objectives’ in § 3622(b), which enumerates nine criteria.” Id. at
17a. And to the extent the court viewed its interpretation
as embodying “the plain meaning of the statutory text,”
id. at 16a, constitutional-avoidance principles could not
have justified rejecting that reading, see Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 842 (2018).
b. In this Court, petitioners do not appear to dispute
the court of appeals’ interpretation of Section 3622(d)(3) or
urge the Court to grant review on that issue. Instead, the
petition for a writ of certiorari takes that interpretation as
its premise in contending that Section 3622(d)(3), so construed, violates the nondelegation doctrine. Pet. i, 2, 28.
In its brief supporting petitioners, respondent APC
contests (Br. 4) the court of appeals’ interpretation of
Section 3622(d)(3) in light of that provision’s text, context, and structure. APC asserts that the provision “unambiguously” precludes the revised rate cap contained
in the Commission’s Order. See APC Br. 3-9. But petitioners have not sought review of that issue, and it is not
fairly included in the question presented in the petition,
which concerns whether the Court should abrogate its
existing nondelegation precedents. Pet. i. The interpretation of Section 3622(d)(3) is antecedent to the question
presented, in the sense that a court can apply nondelegation principles only after it has identified the scope of authority that a particular statutory provision confers.
See, e.g., Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123
(2019) (plurality opinion) (“[A] nondelegation inquiry always begins (and often almost ends) with statutory in-
16
terpretation.”). But the petition focuses on the nondelegation principles that should apply in determining
whether Section 3622(d)(3), “[a]s interpreted by the
court below,” violates that doctrine. Pet. 28 (emphasis
omitted); see Pet. 27-32.
In any event, the question whether the court of appeals correctly interpreted Section 3622(d)(3) as authorizing the Order’s revised rate cap would not independently warrant this Court’s review. APC identifies
no prior decision of this Court addressing that provision. APC’s assertion (Br. 1) that the court of appeals
“misapplied” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), does not warrant plenary review. See Sup. Ct. R. 10. And although
the 2006 Act vests the D.C. Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction to review the Commission’s final orders, see
39 U.S.C. 3663, so that no circuit conflict on that interpretive issue could emerge, APC has not established
that this issue of first impression is sufficiently important to warrant the Court’s review.
2. Petitioners contend (Pet. 27-32) that Section
3622(d)(3), as construed by the court of appeals, violates
the nondelegation doctrine. That argument lacks merit
and does not warrant review.1
In a footnote, petitioners contend (Pet. 3 n.2) that the Court
should hold their petition pending its decision in West Virginia v.
EPA, No. 20-1530 (argued Feb. 28, 2022). West Virginia involves a
provision of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq., that addresses
the measures that the Environmental Protection Agency may consider in developing emission guidelines, 42 U.S.C. 7411. Petitioners
have not explained how the Court’s forthcoming decision with respect to that markedly different statutory scheme might bear on the
permissibility of Congress’s conferral of authority on the Commission to modify or adopt an alternative to the existing ratemaking
system for certain Postal Service products.
1
17
a. The Constitution provides that “[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1. “This text
permits no delegation of those powers.” Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). The
Court “ha[s] recognized, however, that the separation-ofpowers principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent Congress from obtaining the assistance of its coordinate Branches.” Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). The Constitution does
not “deny[ ] to the Congress the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicality . . . to perform its function.”
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) (citation
omitted).
The Court “ha[s] ‘almost never felt qualified to
second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’ ” American Trucking, 531 U.S.
at 474-475 (quoting Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)). And it has recognized that “Congress is not
confined to that method of executing its policy which involves the least possible delegation of discretion to administrative officers.” Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425-426. Instead,
the “extent and character of [the] assistance” that Congress may seek from another Branch in a particular context “must be fixed according to common sense and the
inherent necessities of the governmental co-ordination” at
issue, J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394, 406 (1928)—matters that Congress is typically best
positioned to assess. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372; see
also id. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Court has held that Congress may confer discretion on the Executive to implement and enforce the laws
so long as Congress supplies an “intelligible principle”
18
defining the limits of that discretion. Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 372 (quoting J. W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409). The
Court has further clarified that the vesting of authority
in an Executive Branch official is “constitutionally sufficient” under that intelligible-principle standard “if Congress clearly delineates [1] the general policy, [2] the
public agency which is to apply it, and [3] the boundaries
of th[e] delegated authority.” Id. at 372-373 (quoting
American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105
(1946)). In determining whether a statute supplies an intelligible principle, a court should consider the “ ‘words
of a statute * * * in their context and with a view to their
place in the overall statutory scheme,’ ” and it may
“look[ ] to ‘history and purpose’ to divine the meaning of
language.” Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2126 (plurality opinion)
(brackets and citations omitted).
Consistent with those principles, the Court has rejected nearly every nondelegation challenge it has confronted. “From the beginning of the Government,”
Congress has enacted, and the Court has upheld, statutes “conferring upon executive officers power to make
rules and regulations * * * for administering the laws
which did govern.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S.
506, 517 (1911). For example, early Congresses enacted
a series of statutes that conferred on the President the
power to impose or lift trade sanctions and tariffs. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683-689 (1892).
The Court rejected a nondelegation challenge to one
such statute in 1813, see The Cargo of the Brig Aurora
v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813), and
again in 1892, see Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 681-694.
And in the nine decades since the Court articulated the
19
“intelligible principle” standard, it has similarly upheld
numerous statutes against nondelegation challenges. 2
In the Nation’s history, the Court has struck down
only two statutes on nondelegation grounds. American
Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474 (discussing Panama Ref. Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and A. L. A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). In
1935, the Court concluded that two provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195—
enacted in response to the Great Depression—contained
“excessive delegations” because Congress had “failed to
articulate any policy or standard that would serve to
confine the discretion of the authorities to whom Congress had delegated power.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 373
& n.7 (emphasis added). The Court held those provisions
See, e.g., Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2128-2130 (plurality opinion) (authority to specify how sex-offender registration statute applies to individuals who committed sex offenses before the statute was enacted); id. at 2130-2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 472-476 (authority to set nationwide airquality standards limiting pollution); Loving v. United States,
517 U.S. 748, 771-774 (1996) (authority to set aggravating factors for
death penalty in courts martial); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160,
165-167 (1991) (authority to temporarily designate controlled substances); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374-377 (Sentencing Guidelines);
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-786 (1948) (authority to set
standards for recovery of excessive profits from military contractors);
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 247, 249-250 (1947) (authority to set
rules for reorganization, etc., of savings-and-loan associations);
American Power & Light, 329 U.S. at 105 (authority to set standards
for prevention of unfair or inequitable distribution of voting power
among security holders); Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425-427 (authority to set
commodity prices); Federal Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co.,
320 U.S. 591, 600-601 (1944) (authority to set natural-gas wholesale
prices); National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-227
(1943) (authority to set standards for broadcast licensing); J. W.
Hampton, 276 U.S. at 407-411 (authority to set tariffs).
2
20
invalid because “one * * * provided literally no guidance
for the exercise of discretion, and the other * * * conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the
economy by assuring ‘fair competition.’ ” American
Trucking, 531 U.S. at 474. Since 1935, the Court has “upheld, again without deviation, Congress’ ability to delegate power under broad standards.” Mistretta, 488 U.S.
at 373.
b. The court of appeals correctly held that Section
3622(d)(3) comports with those principles. Pet. App.
16a-17a.
As discussed above, see pp. 17-18, supra, a statutory
delegation of authority is “constitutionally sufficient if
Congress clearly delineates” (1) “the general policy” to
be pursued, (2) “the public agency which is to apply it,”
and (3) “the boundaries of th[e] delegated authority.”
American Power & Light, 329 U.S. at 105. Although
petitioners do not frame their challenge in those terms,
they do not appear to dispute that Section 3622(d)(3)
satisfies the second and third requirements. The provision grants authority to “the Commission,” 39 U.S.C.
3622(d)(3), and the authority it confers consists of modifying or replacing the existing “system for regulating
rates and classes for market-dominant products” of the
Postal Service. 39 U.S.C. 3622(a). Section 3622(d)(3)
does not authorize regulation of any private conduct; it
empowers the Commission to alter the framework for
regulating the rates at which certain products will be
offered for sale to the public by the Postal Service, “an
independent establishment of the executive branch of
the Government of the United States,” 39 U.S.C. 201.
In substance, petitioners appear (Pet. 29-32) to contend that Section 3622(d)(3) supplies inadequate guid-
21
ance to the Commission—i.e., that it does not identify
“the general policy” to be pursued, American Power &
Light, 329 U.S. at 105. But the statutory text amply
specifies Congress’s policy. Section 3622(d)(3) permits
the Commission to “modif[y]” or “adopt [an] alternative” to the existing ratemaking system for marketdominant products only if it first “determines * * * that
the system is not achieving the objectives in [Section
3622](b), taking into account the factors in [Section
3622](c).” 39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(3). If the Commission
makes such a determination after notice and comment,
it may only make modifications or adopt an alternative
system that it finds to be “necessary to achieve the objectives” set forth in Section 3622(b). Ibid.
Those nine statutory objectives provide ample guidance to inform the Commission’s exercise of its authority. They include (1) “maximiz[ing] incentives to reduce
costs and increase efficiency”; (2) “creat[ing] predictability and stability in rates”; (3) “maintain[ing] high
quality service standards”; (4) “allow[ing] the Postal
Service pricing flexibility”; (5) “assur[ing] adequate
revenues, including retained earnings, to maintain financial stability”; (6) “reduc[ing] the administrative
burden and increas[ing] the transparency of the ratemaking process”; (7) “enhanc[ing] mail security and deter[ring] terrorism”; (8) “maintain[ing] a just and reasonable schedule for rates”; and (9) “allocat[ing] the total institutional costs of the Postal Service appropriately between market-dominant and competitive products.” 39 U.S.C. 3622(b). Congress further instructed
the Commission to “appl[y]” each objective “in conjunction with the others.” Ibid.; see pp. 2-3, supra.
Section 3622 is much more specific than other delegations the Court has upheld, such as authority to li-
22
cense radio broadcasters as the “public interest, convenience, or necessity” requires, National Broad. Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225 (1943); to set “just and
reasonable” rates for natural gas, Federal Power
Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600
(1944); and to establish commodity prices that would be
“fair and equitable,” Yakus, 321 U.S. at 427; see Avent
v. United States, 266 U.S. 127, 130 (1924) (Holmes, J.)
(determining that a statute authorizing emergency
rules for railroad-equipment shortages that are “reasonable and in the interest of the public and of commerce fixe[d] the only standard that is practicable or
needed”).
The adequacy of the direction that Congress supplied is particularly clear in light of the limited scope of
the authority Section 3622(d)(3) confers. “[T]he degree
of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according
to the scope of the power” delegated. American Trucking, 531 U.S. at 475. Indeed, when the authority conferred is narrow enough, Congress “need not provide
any direction.” Ibid.
As explained above, Section 3622(d)(3) does not authorize the Commission to regulate any private party, but
only to superintend the government’s own operations by
regulating rates charged by an Executive Branch instrumentality. See p. 20, supra. And even within that sphere,
Section 3622(d)(3) applies only to a specified category of
Postal Service products. That limited conferral of authority does not necessitate granular instructions.
c. Petitioners’ contrary arguments lack merit.
Petitioners contend (Pet. 30-31) that the statute does
not specify the precise degree to which the Commission
should prioritize a particular objective or deem it to be
achieved by the system. E.g., Pet. 30 (“[H]ow do we
23
know when and if incentives have been maximized
enough? At what point do rates become inflexible, unpredictable, or unstable? When are service standards
too low?”). But the Constitution does not require Congress to quantify the statutory objectives in such minute detail.
The particular types of judgments that Congress entrusted to the Commission are especially well suited for
an expert agency. Analyzing and balancing the objectives that Congress specified in Section 3622 requires
data-driven economic analysis of the type that has “long
[been] associated with the executive function.” Gundy,
139 S. Ct. at 2140 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citation
omitted). Determining the level of prices that will best
serve and harmonize the economic and other objectives
enumerated in Section 3622(b) is an inquiry appropriate
for delegation to the Commission. Id. at 2140 n.65; see
Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212,
214, 219-220 (1989). Congress long ago recognized that
“the increasing economic, accounting, and engineering
complexity of ratemaking issues” made postal ratemaking ill-suited for Congress and its staff. National Ass’n
of Greeting Card Publishers v. United States Postal
Serv., 462 U.S. 810, 822 (1983). Congress permissibly
assigned those duties to an “expert[ ]” agency “composed of ‘professional economists, trained rate analysts,
and the like.’ ” Id. at 822-823 (citation omitted).
Petitioners also contend (Pet. 31) that Section
3622(d)(3) provides inadequate direction because “many
of the[ ] objectives” set forth in Section 3622(b) “point in
competing directions.” But a conferral of authority on
the Executive is not defective merely because it requires an agency to exercise judgment and to balance
competing considerations. See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425
24
(“It is no objection that the determination of facts and
the inferences to be drawn from them in the light of the
statutory standards and declaration of policy call for the
exercise of judgment.”).
Congress’s instruction that “each” enumerated objective “shall be applied in conjunction with the others,”
39 U.S.C. 3622(b), provides significant guidance to the
agency. That directive makes clear that the Commission
should not pursue any one objective or subset of them to
the exclusion of the others, but instead should bear all of
them in mind in designing an appropriate system. Based
on public comment and an extensive, data-driven analysis, the Commission undertook that task in fashioning
the Order at issue here. See C.A. App. 2590-2671.
3. Petitioners do not contend that the D.C. Circuit’s
nondelegation holding conflicts with any decision of this
Court or another court of appeals. Instead, petitioners
principally contend (Pet. 15-27) that the Court should
grant review to consider overruling its existing nondelegation precedents. That argument lacks merit.
a. As the “proponent[s] of overruling precedent,”
petitioners bear “the heavy burden of persuading the
Court that changes in society or in the law dictate that
the values served by stare decisis yield in favor of a
greater objective.” Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254,
266 (1986). “Although not an inexorable command,
stare decisis is a foundation stone of the rule of law, necessary to ensure that legal rules develop in a principled
and intelligible fashion.” Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 798 (2014) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); see Kimble v. Marvel
Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (2015). Adherence to
precedent “promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reli-
25
ance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual
and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” Payne
v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991). “[T]his Court
has always held that any departure from the doctrine
demands special justification.” Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at
798 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioners’ burden is especially heavy because they
seek to overturn not a single decision but “a long line of
precedents.” Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 798. The Court’s
nondelegation standards have been settled by decisions
tracing back decades, see, e.g., American Power & Light,
329 U.S. at 105; J. W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 409, and the
underlying principle traces back to the early days of the
Republic, see, e.g., Marshall Field, 143 U.S. at 681-694;
The Cargo of the Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at
387-388. Granting review to reconsider that longstanding body of precedent “would ill serve the goals of ‘stability’ and ‘predictability’ ” that stare decisis “aims to ensure.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 699
(2011) (quoting Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys.
Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991)). That concern is particularly acute here, as congressional conferrals of authority on agencies “pervade[ ] the whole corpus of administrative law,” and petitioners’ proposed abrogation
of existing precedent could “cast doubt on many settled” delegations and agency actions taken pursuant to
them. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019).
Apart from their “belief ” that this Court’s nondelegation precedents were “ ‘wrongly decided,’ ” Kimble,
576 U.S. at 456 (citation omitted); see Pet. 15-27, petitioners offer no persuasive “special justification” for
overruling those decisions, let alone the type of “particularly special justification” that would be required to
overturn such a deeply ingrained principle, Kisor,
26
139 S. Ct. at 2423 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioners’ assertion that the doctrine “ha[s] lost any
clear meaning,” Pet. 18 (emphasis omitted), is belied by
the long line of this Court’s precedents, unbroken for
nearly 90 years, consistently applying the doctrine to
uphold congressional enactments that conferred authority on the Executive. See pp. 17-20, supra. Petitioners also identify no basis for concluding that lower
courts are confused about the doctrine’s contours or
have difficulty applying it.
b. In any event, this case would be a poor vehicle for
reconsidering the nondelegation doctrine. By nearly
any measure, Congress has provided ample guidance to
the Commission by setting out nine statutory objectives
and authorizing the Commission to modify or adopt an
alternative to the existing system only if “necessary to
achieve th[ose] objectives.” 39 U.S.C. 3622(d)(3). The
sufficiency of that instruction is especially clear given
the limited scope and nature of the Commission’s authority in designing the ratemaking system for a subset
of the products sold by an arm of the Executive Branch.
See p. 22, supra. Further review is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
ELIZABETH B. PRELOGAR
Solicitor General
BRIAN M. BOYNTON
Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General
MICHAEL S. RAAB
DANA KAERSVANG
MICHAEL SHIH
Attorneys
MAY 2022
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.