Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Aaron Evan Perry, Petitioner v. Tennessee

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Supiemo Court, U.S.

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Supreme Court of tfjr fHntteb States

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK

AAEON EVAN PERRY,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The

Tennessee Court Of Criminal Appeals

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Aaron Evan Perry

Pro Se

23721 Marlow St.

Oak Park, MI 48237

423-647-2567

1

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether, as private corporations and law enforce■ ment agencies increasingly cooperate to investigate

and prosecute retail crimes, the distinction between

State and private actors has blurred and this Courts

review is necessary to provide guidance to the lower

courts review of Tennessee’s agency law and to address

important questions of public interest about the con­

stitutional protections afforded to citizens who are

subject to search or seizure by private loss prevention

employees? (Does Tennessee’s agency law give private

loss prevention employees the right to infringe upon

United States citizens Constitutional Rights?)

11

PARTIES TO PROCEEDING

All parties appear in the caption of the case on the

cover.

RELATED CASES

State of Tennessee v. Aaron Evan Perry, Case No.

45785, 45786

State of Tennessee v. Aaron Evan Perry, Case No.

82CC1-2020-CR-73412

Ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.......

1

PARTIES TO PROCEEDING...............................

11

RELATED CASES..................................................

11

TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................

in

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES...................................

iv

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI...........

1

OPINIONS BELOW................................................

1

JURISDICTION......................................................

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED..

2

STATEMENT OF CASE........................................

2

BELK INCIDENT...................................................

4

TRAFFIC STOP......................................................

6

DIRECT APPEAL...................................................

9

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT.....................

15

CONCLUSION.........................................................

16

APPENDIX

Opinion, Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals

(April 29, 2021).................................................. App. 1

Letter, Office of the Attorney General (June 29,

2021)

App. 69

Order Denying Review, Tennessee Supreme

Court (September 22, 2021)

App. 70

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

State v. Burroughs, 926 S.W.2d 243 (Tenn.

10,14,15

1996)

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443

(1971).................................................................

10

United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740 (6th Cir.

2008)...................................................................

11

State v. Donaldson, 380 S.W.3d 86 (Tenn. 2012)..

12

United States v. Macias, 658 F.3d 509 (5th Cir.

2011)...................................................................

12

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009)....................

13

United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d 1115 (8th Cir.

2008)................................................................... 11,12

Constitutional Provisions

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT IV

2,9,10,15

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT XIV..........................................

2,15

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Aaron Perry who was incarcerated October 10,

2017 - November 1, 2019 (see State v. Perry, No.

E2019-02210-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 Tenn. Crim.) at Roger

D. Wilson Detention Facility, 5001 Maloney Ville Rd,

Knoxville, TN 37918, November 1, 2019 - May 6, 2020

Washington County Detention Center, 114 W Jackson

Blvd, Jonesborough, TN 37659, May 6, 2020 - Decem­

ber 3, 2020 Sullivan County Detention Facility, 140

Blountville Bypass, Blountville, TN 37617, respectfully

petitions this court for a writ of certiorari to review the

judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee at Knox­

ville.

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee at

Knoxville, to deny Aaron Evan Perry application to ap­

peal pursuant to Rule 11 of Tennessee Rules of Ap­

pellate Procedure on September 22, 2021 (State of

Tennessee v. Aaron Evan Perry, No. E2019-02210-SCRll-CD) That order is attached, see App. 70.

JURISDICTION

Mr. Perry’s application for permission to appeal

was denied September 22,2021. Mr. Perry invokes this

court’s jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. 1257, having timely filed

this petition for a writ of certiorari within 90 days of

the Tennessee Supreme Court.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

United States Constitution Amendment IV

The right of the people to be secure in their per­

sons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup­

ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describ­

ing the place to be searched and the persons or things

to be seized.

United States Constitution Amendment XIV

All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi­

zens of the United States and of the state wherein they

reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of

the United States, nor shall any state deprive any per­

son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Mr. Aaron Perry, was charged via indictment with

twelve counts of identity theft, in violation of T.C.A.

39-14-150. T.R., Vol. 1, p. 1-6. Mr. Perry went to trial

before the honorable Scott Green, Knox County Crim­

inal Court, Division III, and a jury on October 28,2019.

3

After the close of the State’s proof at trial, the

court granted Mr. Perry’s motion for judgment of ac­

quittal as to counts five through eleven of the indict­

ment. R., Vol. 3, p. 294-95; T.R., Vol. 2, p. 170.

The Jury returned a not guilty verdict on count

three of the indictment. T.R. Vol. 2, p. 173-74. It found

Mr. Perry guilty of the lesser included offense of fraud­

ulent use of a credit card, in violation of T.C.A. 39-14118, on counts one, two, four, and twelve. T.R., Vol. 2,

p. 169-78. Mr. Perry was sentenced to eleven months

and twenty-nine days to serve on each count of convic­

tion, with the sentences for counts two, four, and twelve

served concurrently to count one.

Mr. Perry timely filed a motion for a new trial on

November 26, 2019. T.R., Vol. 2, p. 179-82. The trial

court granted the motion as to count twelve and en­

tered a judgment of acquittal for that count. T.R., Vol.

2, p. 183-84, 189-90. The court denied the motion for

the remaining counts. T.R., Vol. 2, p. 183-84.

On November 17, 2020, in the court of criminal

appeals of Tennessee at Knoxville (due to technical

difficulties, the oral arguments in this case were not

recorded) the judgments of the trial court are reversed

and the case remanded for the entry of amended judg­

ments reflecting three convictions for attempted theft

(a Class B-Misdemeanor) and six-month, concurrent

sentences.

4

1.

BELK INCIDENT

This case began when Mr. Perry attempted to pur­

chase several gift cards at a Belk, Inc. (Belk) store

Knoxville, Tennessee on October 10, 2017. Based on a

hunch, the Belk loss prevention employee working that

day prevented Mr. Perry from completing any transac­

tion and took the ID and credit card, then Mr. Perry

left the store, the employee called a retail theft task

force officer on her cell phone to report his feeling that

Mr. Perry might be committing credit card fraud. Mr.

William Muenzer testified that at the time of alleged

offenses he had worked as a loss prevention associate

for Belk for approximately sixteen years. R., Vol. 3,

p. 5. he said that his responsibilities were “to prevent

any sort of loss to Belk” R., Vol. 3, p. 9.

Mr. Muenzer testified that on October 9, 2017, the

day before alleged offense, he received an email from a

Belk loss prevention manager in Johnson City, Tennes­

see, a subject either attempted to or did purchase sev­

eral large Belk gift cards and is suspected of credit card

fraud. R., Vol. 3, p. 6. Mr. Muenzer later that day (Oc­

tober 9) received a call from a sales associate at the

Knox Center store stating that someone was suspected

of committing credit card fraud, after review of video

transaction he believed it to be the same individual.

Based on this information, alone, Mr. Muenzer spoke

to the Knox Center Belk Manager, who voided the

transaction. R., Vol. 3, p. 7. Mr. Muenzer testified that

by voiding the transaction, they were able to limit the

amount of loss to Belk. R., Vol. 3, p. 7. The State asked

“was there any reason you didn’t call the Sheriff’s

5

Department?” R., Vol. 3, p. 7-8 his response “I mean he

- he was gone and I wouldn’t have done that anyway.”

R., Vol. 3, p. 8. There was no testimony that Mr. Muenzer or anyone else verified in any way whether this

transaction was legitimate or not.

On October 10,2017, Mr. Muenzer was working at

the Belk location at Turkey Creek, in West Knoxville,

Tennessee. R., Vol. 3, p. 10. He said that he received a

call from a sales associate who told him that someone

was trying to purchase several large gift cards. R., Vol.

3, p. 10. He told the associate that they “might possibly

have a case of credit card fraud” and instructed her, “to

go over to that register and to handle that situation,

but don’t complete any sort of purchase until I come

over.” R., Vol. 3, p. 11; see also R., Vol. 3, p. 51.

After the sales associate stalled until Mr. Muenzer

approached the register, he immediately took Mr.

Perry’s drivers license and credit card from Ms. Lopez.

R., Vol. 3., p. 53. He said that he took the items “to pro­

tect Belk.” I suspected credit card fraud and I did not

know definitively if there was. I wanted to gather more

information and verify the situation either way. After

Mr. Muenzer took Mr. Perry’s items, Mr. Perry began to

walk out of the store and Mr. Muenzer followed him to

the parking lot, where Mr. Perry left without incident.

R., Vol. 3, p. 62. Mr. Muenzer testified that he called

Officer Varner while Mr. Perry was in the parking lot

to describe Mr. Perry’s vehicle and direction Mr. Perry

was headed. R., Vol. 3, p. 62. He said that he told Officer

Varner: “that we had a situation that I did not know

anything for sure, but we suspected it could be credit

6

card fraud and that the subject was exiting the build­

ing”. R., Vol. 3, p. 20. Mr. Muenzer said that he used his

cell phone to call Officer Varner’s cell phone. R., Vol. 3,

p. 46. Mr. Muenzer claimed that he “never had much

contact” with the members of the retail theft task force

and it was “possible” he worked with Officer Varner. R.,

Vol. 3,p. 45,47.

2.

TRAFFIC STOP

Following the Belk incident after Mr. Perry left the

premises, he was tailed by a Knox County Sheriffs Of­

ficer “Officer Robert Hubbs” at the time of incident he

worked on the retail task force next to the Belk. R., Vol.

3, p. 70-71. Officer Hubbs Testified that he was in the

office with Officer Varner when she received a call from

Mr. Muenzer that “they had a person who was trying

to pass a stolen or forged credit card.” R., Vol. 3, p. 75.

Officer Hubbs said that Officer Varner left to go to Belk

after receiving the call. R., Vol. 3, p. 75. He said that,

after a few minutes, he realized that no one accompa­

nied Officer Varner. She told him that Mr. Perry left the

store, but that “he left his ID and driver’s license all in

the store ” R., Vol. 3, p. 75. Officer Hubbs stated that he

saw Mr. Perry exiting Belk “at a very fast pace, almost

a jog.” R., Vol. 3, p. 76. He said that Mr. Perry drove

away “at a fairly fast rate” and then Officer Hubbs be­

gan following Mr. Perry in his cruiser, R., Vol. 3, p. 76.

Officer Hubbs said that he did not pull Mr. Perry over

because “we were wanting to see where he went . . .

and we wanted to find out if indeed those were stolen

and forged items that he had left.” R., Vol. 3, p. 76.

7

Officer Hubbs acknowledged on cross-examination

that he did not attempt to pull Mr. Perry over at this

point because he “did not have legal grounds to detain

him.” R., Vol. 3, p. 96-97. Officer Hubbs Stated that he

observed Mr. Perry run a red light at an intersection

and pulled him over. R., Vol. 3, p. 76-77. Officer Hubbs

stated that after Mr. Perry stopped his vehicle, Officer

Hubbs “called it in on the radio” but he was worried

Mr. Perry might have a gun or weapon, so he “waited a

few minutes and called for another car.” R., Vol. 3, p. 78.

Despite his claims that he was worried about a

weapon, Officer Hubbs approached Mr. Perry’s vehicle

before any other officers arrived and Mr. Perry handed

him his drivers license and rental agreement for the

car. R., Vol. 3, p. 78-79,84. The license Mr. Perry handed

Officer Hubbs was a Michigan Drivers license with Mr

Perrys name on it. R., Vol. 4, p. 101. The rental agree­

ment also had Mr. Perry’s name on it. R., Vol. 3, p .89.

Officer Hubbs acknowledged that these were the docu­

ments he would need from a driver during a traffic stop

for a red light violation. R., Vol. 4, p. 101. Officer Hubbs

testified on cross examination that, based on his usual

practice and experience, citing someone for a red light

violation would take “ten or 15 (minutes) maybe” from

pulling that person over, ticketing them, and the indi­

vidual leaving. R., Vol. 4, p. 114. Officer Hubbs said on

direct examination that he then went back to his

cruiser and began running an NCIC check on Mr.

Perry. R., Vol. 3, p. 79. But then Officer Hubbs acknowl­

edged on cross-examination that at the preliminary

hearing in Mr. Perry’s case, he testified that by the

8

time Mr. Muenzer came to the traffic stop (at least ten

or fifteen minutes later if not longer), Officer Hubbs

had not yet run an NCIC check on Mr. Perry’s driver’s

license. R., Vol. 4, p. 103. Officer Hubbs also testified on

cross-examination that, when he returned to his

cruiser, he did not begin doing any paperwork to cite

Mr. Perry for the red light violation. R., Vol. 4, p. 103.

In fact, he testified that he didn’t even have a ticket

book. R., Vol. 4, p. 103. Officers Strzelecki and Varner

arrived to the traffic stop. R., Vol. 3, p. 79. At the sup­

pression hearing, the video recording from Officer

Strezlecki’s body camera was introduced into evidence.

Exhibits, Vol. 2, Exhibit 5, R., Vol. 3, p. 81. The video

begins with Officer Strzelecki approaching the window

of Mr. Perry’s car, trying to get him to exit the vehicle.

See Exhibits, Vol. 2, Exhibit 5, at 00:30.

At timestamp 01:17 of the video, Officer Strzelecki

opened Mr. Perry’s car door, over Mr. Perry questioning

why he needed to get out of the car for a red light vio­

lation after he already given the officers his license and

registration. Exhibits, Vol. 2, Exhibit 5. At 01:35, Of­

ficer Strzelecki responded, “well you just left the Belk.

Did you not-did you just leave the Belk?” Exhibits, Vol.

2, Exhibit 5. When Mr. Perry complained that Officer

Hubbs did not have the right to reach into his car win­

dow to open his door. Through the body camera footage

Officer Strzelecki can be heard asking about Belk inci­

dent after Mr. Perry ask for an attorney to be present.

Exhibits, Vol. 2, Exhibit 5, at 2:08. Moments later into

the body camera you can hear an exchange between

Officer Strzelecki and Mr. Perry, “Sir I know my rights.”

9

(Mr. Perry) “What are-how do you know your rights?

You don’t know your rights because you’re not follow­

ing a lawful order of a police officer. I’m asking you to

step out of the car” (Officer Strzelecki). Approximately

ten minutes and thirty seconds into the body camera

video, Mr. Muenzer arrived at the scene and provided

officers with the credit card and driver’s license that

Mr. Perry presented at Belk. R., Vol. 4, p. Ill; Exhibit

5, at 10:30. After that, Mr. Perry was formally arrested

and taken into custody. R., Vol. 3, p. 89-90. Following

arrest, the vehicle was searched see Exhibits, Vol. 2,

Exhibit 6 (inventory of items taken from car); Officer

Hubbs testified that the car was impounded because

“it belonged to the rental company. It was blocking a

lane of travel in the parking lot ... , the driver was

arrested” and there was no one else there to take the

car. R., Vol. 3, p. 90. He also said that Mr. Perry did not

“ask him to make arrangements for somebody else to

take the car.” R., Vol. 3, p. 90. However, on Officer

Strzelecki’s body camera, Officer Hubbs can be heard

telling another officer, “we can leave the car here for

now, or we can tow it, whichever way you want to do

it.” Exhibits, Vol. 2., Exhibit 5, at 11:00.

3.

DIRECT APPEAL

On appeal Mr. Perry holds the drivers license and

credit card presented at Belk must be suppressed be­

cause William Muenzer was acting as an agent of law

enforcement at the time that he warrantlessly seized

those items to assist in retail task force investigation.

Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States

10

Constitution and article I, & 7 of the Tennessee Con­

stitution, individuals are protected against unreason­

able searches and seizures by state actor. Although the

Fourth Amendment only applies to state actors, “a

search by a private individual may transgress the pro­

tections of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

when an individual acts as an agent or instrument of

the state.” State v. Burroughs, 926 S.W.2d 243, 245

(Tenn. 1996) {citing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 487 (1971)),

the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed this kind of

agency relationship for the first time and, adopting the

test used by the United States Courts ofAppeals for the

Sixth and Ninth Circuits, held that “the critical factors

in the agent or instrument analysis are (1) the govern­

ment’s knowledge and acquiescence, and (2) the intent

of the party performing the search.” Mr. Muenzer tes­

tified that he told Ms. Lopez to refrain from completing

the transaction until he arrived to the counter on Oc­

tober 10,2017 prior to the seizure of credit card and ID

there was not any purchase, (1) this information was

passed to Officer Varner before she arrived and Mr.

Muenzer called visa, (2) when Mr. Muenzer took ID

and credit card to traffic stop his intent was to only

help with the retail fraud investigation there was no

loss for him to protect at an alleged traffic stop, his

job as a loss prevention employee was to prevent Belk

losses. At the October 1, 2019 suppression hearing, Mr.

Muenzer testified that on October 9, 2017, he was

working at the Belk store in the Knoxville Center

Mall when he received an email from Rick Santino, a

Belk loss prevention manager in Johnson City, Tennes­

see. The email detailed an incident in which a person

11

purchased or attempted to purchase several gift cards;

Mr. Santino suspected credit card fraud had occurred,

but Mr. Muenzer did not recall whether Mr. Santino

told him the customer’s name nor possible stolen credit

card. Later that day, a sales associate reported to Mr.

Muenzer that a customer who had already left the

building had purchased several large gift cards. Upon

examining store footage not transaction Mr. Muenzer

informed the store manager, and she voided the

transaction, thereby voiding the gift cards and limiting

Belk’s loss. When asked why he did not call the police,

Mr. Muenzer stated “He was gone and I wouldn’t have

done that anyway.” Law enforcement officers illegally

detained Mr. Perry at the traffic stop because they

were not pursuing the red light violation for which

they had probable cause, but were instead investigat­

ing the Belk incident without a lawful basis to do so.

Officer Hubbs contradicting testimony of a traffic stop

began once he tailed Mr. Perry while he was leaving

the premises, Officer Hubbs stated “Mr. Perry drove

through the parking lot at a fairly fast rate”, then tes­

tified that he didn’t have probable cause to further de­

tain Mr. Perry was why he didn’t immediately pull him

over. Officer Hubbs stated that Mr. Muenzer showed up

at the traffic stop ten if not fifteen minutes after Mr.

Perry had gave him his license and rental agreement.

When determining the reasonableness of the traffic

stop, see United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 752 (6th

Cir. 2008) (holding that two minute continued deten­

tion for purpose of bringing K9 unit to traffic stop —

after traffic stop should have been completed — was un­

reasonable); see also United States v. Peralez, 526 F.3d

12

1115,1119-20 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that duration of

traffic stop was unreasonably extended where officer

admitted that, for thirteen minutes of the sixteen mi­

nute stop, he asked the defendant questions that were

unrelated to the traffic violation) (cited as example of

impermissible delay by State u. Donaldson, 380 S.W.3d

86, 94, n. 8 (Tenn. 2012); United States v. Macias, 658

F.3d 509, 518-22 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that eleven

minute delay in running computer checks of defend­

ant’s license and registration after traffic stop was un­

reasonable because delay caused by officer questioning

defendant about matters unrelated to the scope of the

stop). Officer Hubbs stated “He was worried Mr. Perry

had a weapon so he informed two other units but did

not wait for back up to approach vehicle and was given

license and rental agreement by Mr. Perry. Officer

Hubbs states Mr. Perry was frantic and nervous. Al­

though when asked why he was nervous on Officer

Strezlecki’s body camera, Mr. Perry can be seen hands

on the wheel with both driver and passenger door

opened and when asked by Officer Strezlecki why he

was nervous Mr. Perry response “because you guys are

opening my car doors for a red light violation”. The

State looks to argue further detention. Without article

facts and proof of a criminal act at Belk they don’t have

probable cause for further detention, especially with­

out implementing Mr. Muenzer as an instrument of

law enforcement. There was no criminal act for law

enforcement to gather information if Mr. Muenzer

was preventing a loss to Belk he would not need to

help further their investigation, once suspect left Belk

premises without anything stolen or damaged. Mr.

13

Muenzer compromises his loss prevention job by as­

sisting the retail task force with information that was

gathered off mere suspicion a hunch. Officers lacked

any basis other than the red light violation to stop and

detain Mr. Perry. Officer Hubbs knew that Officer Var­

ner had responded to a call from Mr. Muenzer that

“they had a person who was trying to pass a stolen or

forged credit card.” R., Vol. 3, p. 75. However, the spe­

cifics of what Mr. Muenzer told Officer Varner were

“that we had a situation that I did not know anything

for sure, but we suspected it could be credit card fraud

and that the subject - I had the ID and the credit card

and that subject was exiting the building.” R., Vol. 3, p.

20. Although Mr. Muenzer suspected something was

afoot, he didn’t provide officers with any specific artic­

ulable facts that a crime had occurred or was occurring,

(example October 9,2017 they suspected fraud without

customer name, alleged stolen credit card information,

these things are obtainable for a loss prevention em­

ployee in order to provide officers with articulable facts

that a crime had occurred or is occurring.) The war­

rantless search of Mr. Perry’s vehicle was not justified

as a search incident to arrest or as an inventory search.

The State did not have probable cause that Mr. Perry’s

vehicle would contain evidence relating to his arrest.

In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), the United

States Supreme Court held that “police may search a

vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the

arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger

compartment at the time of the search or it is reason­

able to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the of­

fense of arrest.” There is no question that, at the time

14

officers searched Mr. Perry’s vehicle, he was in hand­

cuffs in the back of police transport. See R., Vol. 3,

p. 89-90. The officers did not, pursuant to Gant, have

probable cause to believe evidence of the red light vio­

lation or any alleged offense related to the driver’s li­

cense and credit card presented at Belk would be in the

vehicle. The lower courts argue that Mr. Perry resem­

bled alleged suspects in an on-going scheme of fraud in

the previous Belk locations mentioned on October 9,

2017. Not once were any article facts and or proof of

Mr. Perry being connected to offenses at other Belks

presented at trial. Mr. Muenzer did not retrieve alleged

stolen credit card or identification that were allegedly

used in these other locations nor did he have infor­

mation of any resent fraudulent transaction on the

matter. The only information that there was a discrep­

ancy between whether the individual in their posses­

sion was Will Andrews or Aaron Perry and whether

something illegal just happened at Belk. Without

credit card information and ID, that was seized at Belk

by Mr. Muenzer Officer Hubbs has no probable cause

for further detention during traffic stop in doing so Mr.

Muenzer satisfy the two critical factors needed to es­

tablish being an instrument of law enforcement. See

State v. Burroughs, 926 S.W.2d 243 (Tenn. 1996). (1)

Officer Varner was aware that no purchase was com­

menced and was aware Mr. Muenzer called visa after

seizing ID and credit card, with that information re­

tail task force pursued further detainment through al­

leged red light violation ... (2) Mr. Muenzer presented

ID and credit card to retail theft task force to assist

with investigation. There were no assets of Belks to

15

protect at the traffic stop he acted as an instrument to

law enforcement and provided them with illegally ob­

tained evidence.

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

To avoid the continuous deprivation of the Fourth

and Fourteenth amendment rights of Mr. Perry. The

state has refused to re-examine Tennessee’s agency

law under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments

and Article I & 7 since State v. Burroughs, 926 S.W.2d

243 (Tenn. 1996).

The lower courts refuse to acknowledge the clear

erroneous utilization of loss prevention employee Wil­

liam Muenzer denying he acted as an instrument to

law enforcement, outside of his duties listed in the loss

prevention manual submitted into evidence at trial

there was no reason for devaluing or denying a pur­

chase. His prior to not having article, facts or proof of

credit card fraud on October 9, 2017 at other Belk lo­

cations outside of a blurred description and similar

attire. Mr. Muenzer didn’t have knowledge of any

fraudulent purchases prior to October 10, 2017 only

suspicion. From that point he seized Mr. Perry’s ID and

credit card and called Officer Varner to inform her of

incident her knowledge that Mr. Muenzer obtained

from visa was enough information to have Officer

Hubbs detain Mr. Perry for an alleged traffic violation

and have him sit until they completed an investigation.

On October 10,2017 Mr. Muenzer prevented asset loss

16

by denying purchase. His investigation through visa

was information he gathered to assist retail fraud task

force in their investigation on Mr. Perry. Mr. Muenzer

proved to be an instrument of law enforcement when

he did not call his store manager but called Officer Var­

ner on her cell phone. As well as bringing ID and credit

card to alleged traffic stop, there was no loss for Mr.

Muenzer to protect Belk from during a traffic stop. For

these reasons, my case should be granted review.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Perry respectfully

requests that this court issue a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the Tennessee Court of Ap­

peals at Knoxville.

Originally filed December 15, 2021

Re-filed February 2022

Respectfully submitted,

Aaron Evan Perry

Pro Se/Defendant

(423) 647-2567

23721 Marlow St.

Oak Park, MI 48237