Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Louisiana Public Service Commission, Petitioner v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Supreme Court briefJan 27, 2022
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App. 1
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
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Argued December 10, 2020
Decided August 20, 2021
No. 20-1024
LOUISIANA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
PETITIONER
V.
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
RESPONDENT
ENTERGY SERVICES, LLC AND
ARKANSAS PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION,
INTERVENORS
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On Petition for Review of Orders of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
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Michael R. Fontham argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Dana M. Shelton
and Justin A. Swaim.
Lona T. Perry, Deputy Solicitor, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were David L. Morenoff,
Acting General Counsel, and Robert H. Solomon, Solicitor.
Glen Ortman, Dennis Lane, Gregory W. Camet,
Mark Strain, and Marnie A. McCormick were on the
App. 2
brief for intervenors Entergy Services, LLC and Arkansas Public Service Commission in support of respondent. Jennifer S. Amerkhail and Marie Denyse
Zosa entered appearances.
Before: HENDERSON, PILLARD, and KATSAS, Circuit
Judges.
Opinion of the Court filed by Circuit Judge
KATSAS.
KATSAS, Circuit Judge: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission required Entergy Corporation’s
five operating companies to roughly equalize their
electricity production costs. In determining which costs
must be equalized, FERC excluded purchased-power
costs that a Louisiana affiliate incurred in 2005 and
amortized in 2008 and 2009. The agency reasoned that
the governing tariff excluded the disputed amortization expenses. The Louisiana Public Service Commission (LPSC) challenges this exclusion.
I
Entergy, a public-utility holding company, owns
five operating companies that sell electricity in four
states, including Louisiana. The companies have been
governed by a system agreement requiring them to act
as a “single economic unit.” LPSC v. FERC, 184 F.3d
892, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (LPSC I). The agreement provided for the companies to operate power facilities
jointly, and it required a “rough equalization” of their
App. 3
production costs. LPSC v. FERC, 522 F.3d 378, 383–84
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (LPSC II) (cleaned up).1
FERC has long reviewed the operating companies’
allocation of production costs, which affect electricity
rates. See LPSC II, 522 F.3d at 389–90. In 2005, FERC
determined that the production costs were not roughly
equal and imposed a “bandwidth remedy” to achieve
rough equalization after the fact: Whenever the yearly
production costs of an individual operating company
deviated from the average by more than 11%, companies with lower costs were required to pay companies
with higher costs as necessary to bring all five companies within that range. LPSC, 111 FERC ¶ 61,311,
PP 28, 145 (2005). Although FERC initially made the
bandwidth remedy effective in 2006, we set aside that
effective date in 2008. See LPSC II, 522 F.3d at 400. In
2011, on remand from this Court, FERC extended the
bandwidth remedy to production costs incurred on or
after June 1, 2005. See LPSC, 137 FERC ¶ 61,047, P 34
(2011).
In the meantime, Entergy filed a tariff establishing a formula to calculate production costs subject to
the bandwidth remedy, which FERC largely accepted.
LPSC, 117 FERC ¶ 61,203, P 75 (2006). The formula
incorporated cost data from the operating companies’
annual Form 1 reports, which classify assets and expenses according to FERC’s Uniform System of Accounts. See 18 C.F.R. pt. 101. The bandwidth formula
1
The agreement terminated in August 2016, after the events
underlying this petition.
App. 4
was keyed mostly to these FERC accounts. The formula included a variable for purchased-power expenses (PURP), which utilities incur when buying
power on wholesale markets. PURP incorporated expenses recorded in FERC Account 555, which covers
purchased-power expenses. See id. pt. 101, acct. 555.
The bandwidth remedy led to annual compliance
proceedings. In April of each year, the operating companies would report production-cost data for the preceding year on Form 1. Using that data, Entergy would
determine whether any of its operating companies fell
outside the 11% bandwidth and report the results to
FERC.
This petition concerns how the bandwidth formula
accounts for deferred production costs. Utilities often
must spread over many years their recovery of large,
non-recurring costs. To do this, a company offsets
those costs by creating a regulatory asset—a type of
credit. The company then amortizes the asset in later
years, creating debits chargeable to customers. Over
time, FERC and Entergy have taken different positions on whether the bandwidth formula should recognize these production costs when an operating
company incurs them or in later years as it amortizes
the associated regulatory asset.
Historically, the Entergy companies recorded regulatory assets and their related amortization expenses
in two FERC accounts not referenced in the bandwidth
formula—Account 407.3 (Regulatory Debits) and Account 407.4 (Regulatory Credits). Entergy continued
App. 5
this practice in its first bandwidth filing, the 2007 filing concerning 2006 production data. In excluding
regulatory assets and their amortization from the
bandwidth calculation, Entergy effectively accounted
for deferred production costs when they were incurred,
rather than when the related amortization expenses
were recorded. But FERC rejected this approach. It
prohibited the companies from recording regulatory
assets and amortization expenses in Accounts 407.3
and 407.4 when the assets and expenses could be
traced to another account. See Entergy Servs., Inc., 130
FERC ¶ 61,023, PP 261–65 (2010). And when the assets and expenses could be traced to accounts incorporated into the bandwidth formula, it ordered Entergy
to treat amortization expenses as production costs
for purposes of the formula. See LPSC, 132 FERC
¶ 61,253, P 34 (2010).
Perhaps anticipating these rulings, Entergy revised its accounting for deferred purchased-power
costs during the 2008 bandwidth proceedings for 2007
cost data. Because the regulatory assets and related
amortization expenses could be traced to Account 555,
Entergy began recording them there, rather than in
Accounts 407.3 and 407.4. And because the bandwidth
formula defined purchased-power expenses by reference to Account 555, this approach included amortization expenses in the bandwidth calculation. Entergy
thus counted deferred purchased-power costs when the
associated regulatory assets were amortized, rather
than when the underlying costs actually were incurred.
App. 6
LPSC challenged this approach, and the parties
reached a settlement. See Entergy Servs., Inc., 128
FERC ¶ 61,181 (2009). It required Entergy to amend
the bandwidth formula “starting with the 2009 Bandwidth Calculation (i.e., effective May 31, 2009) to provide that all purchased power costs will be included in
the Bandwidth Calculation in the year the costs are
incurred, regardless of whether they are deferred on
the individual Operating Company’s books.” J.A. 1298.
Pursuant to the settlement, Entergy proposed
amending the definition of PURP. Under the amendment, PURP still would include most purchased-power
expenses recorded in Account 555, but it would “exclud[e] the effects, debits and credits, resulting from a
regulatory decision that causes the deferral of the recovery of current year costs or the amortization of previously deferred costs.” J.A. 1327. FERC accepted the
proposal and made the amendment effective May 31,
2009, before the 2009 bandwidth proceedings. See
Entergy Servs., Inc., 128 FERC ¶ 61,069, P 11 (2009).
Under the amendment, the bandwidth formula again
considered deferred purchased-power costs when the
operating companies incurred them, not when the companies amortized the relevant regulatory assets.
This petition concerns application of the amendment to the 2009 and 2010 bandwidth proceedings,
which involve production costs for 2008 and 2009.
FERC reopened these proceedings after it discovered
accounting errors in the delayed bandwidth proceeding
for 2005 production costs. There, an administrative
law judge ruled that the operating companies had
App. 7
erroneously recorded certain regulatory assets and
their associated amortization expenses in Accounts
407.3 and 407.4. LPSC, 157 FERC ¶ 63,018, P 101
(2016). One of these deferrals is at issue—a $56.3 million purchased-power cost that Entergy Louisiana, one
of the operating companies, incurred in 2005. To blunt
its impact on ratepayers, LPSC had ordered the company to establish a regulatory asset and amortize it
over four years. Id. The ALJ ruled that Entergy Louisiana should have recorded the asset and its amortization in Account 555, and that Entergy had to
revise the bandwidth calculation accordingly. Id.
PP 113–14. FERC agreed, but stressed that any corrections “should be limited to accounting adjustments
that have been shown to have a bandwidth implication.” LPSC, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116, PP 119–20 (2018)
(Recalculation Order). Recognizing that the error implicated the bandwidth calculations for later years,
FERC ordered Entergy Louisiana to refile its Form 1
report and ordered Entergy to adjust bandwidth payments for subsequent years “to ensure that legitimate
production costs are properly accounted for on the
FERC Form 1 reports and reflected in rates under the
filed formula.” Id. P 121.
Entergy corrected the accounting and bandwidth
calculations for the $56.3 million regulatory credit that
Entergy Louisiana received in 2005 and the associated
amortization expenses that it recorded in 2006 and
2007. But Entergy did not change its calculations for
the amortization expenses recorded in 2008 and 2009.
It reasoned that those expenses would not affect the
App. 8
bandwidth remedy under the 2009 amendment, which
expressly excluded amortization expenses from the
calculation of purchased-power costs.
Entergy’s calculation locked a portion of Entergy
Louisiana’s $56.3 million production cost out of the
bandwidth remedy. When Entergy Louisiana incurred
that cost in 2005, the bandwidth formula recognized
deferred purchased-power costs only upon amortization, so the bandwidth calculation for 2005 did not account for the costs. But for amortization expenses
realized in 2008 and 2009, Entergy read the amended
bandwidth formula to recognize deferred purchasedpower costs only when they were actually incurred, so
its revised calculations excluded those amortization
expenses. As a result, Entergy Louisiana never received bandwidth credit for portions of the 2005 production cost that it amortized in 2008 and 2009.
FERC agreed with Entergy that the 2009 amendment excluded these amortization expenses. LPSC,
167 FERC ¶ 61,186, PP 23–25 (2019) (Compliance Order). It reasoned that because the amended bandwidth
formula was part of the filed rate, FERC could not include the amortization expenses in the bandwidth calculation. Id. P 29. On rehearing, FERC rejected LPSC’s
proposed interpretation of the 2009 amendment and
its fallback arguments for departing from the amendment. See LPSC, 169 FERC ¶ 61,247 (2019) (Rehearing Order).
App. 9
LPSC now seeks review of FERC’s ruling. We have
jurisdiction to consider its petition under 16 U.S.C.
§ 825l(b).
II
We review FERC orders under the Administrative
Procedure Act, which requires us to set aside decisions
that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A); see Verso Corp. v. FERC, 898 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C.
Cir. 2018). In a “technical area like electricity rate design,” we give FERC a significant degree of deference.
FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 577 U.S. 260, 292
(2016). We must accept FERC’s factual findings if
they are “supported by substantial evidence.” 16 U.S.C.
§ 825l(b). We must also defer to FERC’s reasonable interpretation of tariffs, PSEG Energy Res. & Trade LLC
v. FERC, 665 F.3d 203, 208 (D.C. Cir. 2011), and of its
own prior orders, NSTAR Elec. & Gas. Corp. v. FERC,
481 F.3d 794, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
The Federal Power Act requires electric utilities to
charge “just and reasonable” rates. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a).
If FERC finds that a rate is unreasonable, it may establish a just and reasonable rate. Id. § 824e(a). Under
this authority, FERC may reallocate production costs
under the Entergy system agreement, including by ensuring compliance with the bandwidth remedy. LPSC
II, 522 F.3d at 390–91. But because the bandwidth formula is part of a filed rate, FERC’s discretion is significantly limited. See LPSC v. FERC, 771 F.3d 903, 910
App. 10
(5th Cir. 2014) (LPSC III); LPSC v. FERC, 606 F. App’x
1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (LPSC IV). Under the filed-rate
doctrine, a utility “may not charge, or be forced by
[FERC] to charge, a rate different from the one on file.”
SFPP, L.P. v. FERC, 967 F.3d 788, 801–02 (D.C. Cir.
2020) (cleaned up); see also 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c), (d) (requiring regulated utilities to prospectively file rates
with FERC). As a corollary, FERC may adjust rates
only prospectively. See id. § 824e(a). It cannot alter
rates to retroactively correct for a past under-collection. Verso Corp., 898 F.3d at 10.
A
Because this case turns on the effect of the 2009
amendment, we first decide what it means. We review
FERC’s tariff interpretations with a “Chevron-like
analysis.” PSEG, 665 F.3d at 208 (cleaned up). Under
that framework, we must enforce unambiguous tariff
language, but we defer to FERC’s reasonable interpretation of ambiguous text. Id.
The 2009 amendment added the emphasized language to the definition of the PURP variable in the
bandwidth formula:
PURP = Purchased Power Expense recorded
in FERC Account 555, but excluding payments made pursuant to Section 30.09(d) of
this Service Schedule and excluding the effects, debits and credits, resulting from a regulatory decision that causes the deferral of the
recovery of current year costs or the amortization of previously deferred costs.
App. 11
J.A. 1327 (emphasis added). The parties dispute
whether the amendment applies to costs that are
amortized after its adoption but rest on deferral decisions that predate it. FERC and Entergy contend that
the amendment does so apply, while LPSC contends
that it does not.
We agree with FERC, for nothing in the amendment turns on the timing of a deferral decision. The
amendment does not target deferral decisions as such,
but rather their “effects.” So long as a purchased-power
expense arises after the amendment’s effective date
and results from a deferral decision, the amendment
applies by its terms. And when a regulatory decision
orders a company to amortize a previously incurred
cost over several years, the ensuing amortizations
plainly qualify as such “effects.”
In response, LPSC highlights the phrase “debits
and credits.” It argues that the amendment applies
only if it would exclude both the debits and credits associated with a particular deferral decision. And so,
LPSC concludes, the amendment does not exclude the
“debits” of a preexisting deferral decision because the
related “credits” occurred at the time of the deferral—
before the amendment had become effective.
LPSC’s interpretation defies grammar. As nouns
set off by commas, “debits and credits” are “explanatory equivalent[s]” of “effects,” the immediately preceding noun. Appositives, The Chicago Manual of Style
§ 6.28 (17th ed. 2017); see R. Huddleston & G. Pullum,
The Cambridge Grammar of the English Language
App. 12
1357–58 (1st ed. 2002). In this context, “and” assumes
its “distributive sense”—i.e., it means “A and B, jointly
or severally.” Or and And, Garner’s Dictionary of Legal
Usage (3d ed. 2011) (emphasis added); see also Huddleston & Pullum, supra, at 1281 (distributive sense is the
“default”). The amendment treats debits and credits as
distinct classes of excluded “effects.” After all, an effect
is “[s]omething brought about by a cause or agent; a
result.” Effect, American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed.
2018). And no fair reading of that term requires both a
debit and a credit to constitute an effect resulting from
a deferral decision. Instead, debits that arise from a
deferral decision are “effects” of the decision regardless
of whether the amendment also happens to cover a related credit.
LPSC’s interpretation is also in tension with the
rest of the amendment, which contemplates decisions
that create only debits or only credits. Recall that the
amendment excludes the effects of regulatory decisions that cause “the deferral of the recovery of current
year costs or the amortization of previously deferred
costs.” J.A. 1327 (emphasis added). A decision that requires a company to defer cost recovery causes only a
credit, while a decision that permits the company to
amortize previously deferred costs causes only debits.
By listing these causes disjunctively, the amendment
confirms its extension to regulatory decisions that
cause only credits or only debits. In contrast, to apply
only to decisions that cause both a credit and a debit,
the amendment would have had to cover regulatory
App. 13
decisions that cause “the deferral of the recovery of
costs and the amortization of those costs.”
LPSC next argues that other evidence, such as
trial testimony and the settlement agreement that precipitated the amendment, show an intent to limit the
amendment to later deferral decisions. According to
LPSC, the settlement agreement is particularly important because it too is part of the filed rate. But because the amendment “unambiguously addresses the
matter at issue,” its language controls. PSEG, 665 F.3d
at 208 (cleaned up). As for the settlement agreement,
it simply required Entergy to amend the definition of
the PURP variable in the future; the agreement itself
did not alter the bandwidth formula, so it is not part of
the filed rate.2
In sum, the 2009 amendment is not limited to
deferral decisions that postdate it. So long as an
amortized purchased-power expense “result[s] from” a
deferral decision, the amendment applies.
B
Our construction of the 2009 amendment largely
resolves this appeal. As noted, the bandwidth formula
2
To the extent LPSC contends that the settlement agreement should control over the amendment, we cannot consider its
argument. The 60-day deadline to challenge FERC’s order approving the 2009 amendment has long expired. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 825l(b). Challenging the validity of that amendment would constitute an untimely collateral attack on the order approving it.
See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 533 F.3d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
App. 14
is part of the filed rate. See LPSC III, 771 F.3d at 910;
LPSC IV, 606 F. App’x at 4. In the proceedings below,
FERC found that the amendment was part of the
bandwidth formula—and thus the filed rate—for the
2009 and 2010 proceedings. See Rehearing Order, 169
FERC ¶ 61,247, P 29; Compliance Order, 167 FERC
¶ 61,186, P 25. This ruling, which no party disputed
below, is consistent with FERC’s order accepting the
amendment and ruling that it was effective for the
2009 bandwidth proceedings. Entergy Servs., Inc., 128
FERC ¶ 61,069, P 11.
This finding obligated Entergy to exclude the disputed expenses from the bandwidth calculation. Even
though the purchased-power expenses that Entergy
Louisiana amortized in 2008 and 2009 were recorded
in Account 555, they were also “effects” (or “debits”)
“resulting from a regulatory decision that causes the
deferral of the recovery of current year costs.” The 2009
amendment thus unambiguously excluded them from
the bandwidth calculation. And FERC was bound to
enforce the amendment as part of the filed rate, which
it could not waive or retroactively amend. See NSTAR,
481 F.3d at 800.
C
LPSC raises three fallback arguments to support
including the amortized expenses in the bandwidth
formula despite the 2009 amendment. They are unpersuasive.
App. 15
First, LPSC contends that FERC failed to follow
its Recalculation Order, which required Entergy to
adjust bandwidth payments after correcting the accounting errors uncovered in the 2005 bandwidth proceeding. 163 FERC ¶ 61,116, P 121. LPSC claims that
this required Entergy to include amortization expenses in its subsequent bandwidth calculations for
later years. But the Recalculation Order mandated corrections to ensure that Entergy Louisiana’s expense
was “reflected in rates under the filed formula.” Id. And
beginning with bandwidth calculations for 2008 expenses, the “filed formula” included the 2009 amendment, which FERC was bound to apply. See NSTAR,
481 F.3d at 800.
Second, LPSC contends that applying the amendment to expenses that stem from the 2005 deferral decision would violate the prohibition on retroactive
ratemaking. According to LPSC, the 2005 rate must
govern because it was effective when LPSC ordered
Entergy Louisiana to defer recovering the $56.3 million expense. By changing the applicable rate, LPSC
reasons, FERC retroactively removed a benefit that
Entergy Louisiana could reasonably expect to receive.
LPSC misunderstands the rule against retroactive ratemaking. As discussed, the bandwidth remedy
turns on production costs recorded in the preceding
year. At most, the rule prohibited FERC from changing
the rate for expenses that the companies had already
recorded. See NSTAR, 481 F.3d at 800. For example, as
the ALJ in these proceedings held, the rule prohibited
applying the 2009 amendment to 2005 production
App. 16
costs, which would have allowed Entergy Louisiana to
fully account for its costs. LPSC, 157 FERC ¶ 63,018,
P 111. Although LPSC’s 2005 deferral decision led to
the amortization expenses at issue, Entergy Louisiana
incurred those expenses in 2008 and 2009. And the
rule against retroactive ratemaking does not protect a
utility’s expectation that a rate will not change in the
future. By seeking to change the rate that would otherwise govern production expenses recorded in 2008
and 2009, LPSC itself asks for an improper retroactive
rate increase. As FERC correctly concluded, it cannot
adjust current rates to make up for “over- or undercollection in prior periods.” Old Dominion Elec. Coop. v.
FERC, 892 F.3d 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (cleaned
up).
Alternatively, LPSC contends that the rule
against retroactive ratemaking at least prohibited
FERC from applying the 2009 amendment to expenses
that the operating companies had incurred before
FERC approved the amendment—that is, to production costs between January 2008 and May 2009. Because LPSC did not raise this argument before FERC,
we cannot consider it. See 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b). In its
rehearing motion, LPSC argued only that the rule required the 2005 rate to govern all amortization expenses related to the deferral. It did not seek to apply
the filed rate for the year in which expenses were
amortized. Indeed, LPSC asserted to the ALJ that
the amendment was “effective beginning with the
2009 Bandwidth filing for the 2008 test year.” J.A. 90.
And it told FERC that the settlement agreement
App. 17
“unambiguously applies to costs and deferrals going
forward, beginning in the 2008 test year used for the
2009 Bandwidth Calculation.” J.A. 1335. LPSC cannot
now pivot to new arguments that it previously conceded. See Cal. Dep’t of Water Res. v. FERC, 306 F.3d
1121, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2002).3
Third, LPSC contends that FERC arbitrarily declined to account for the amortized expenses under 16
U.S.C. § 825h, which allows FERC to “perform any and
all acts . . . as it may find necessary or appropriate” to
enforce the Federal Power Act. But the filed-rate doctrine “restrict[s] the remedies that FERC may order”
under § 825h, Verso Corp., 898 F.3d at 10, by depriving
it of “discretion to waive the operation of a filed rate or
to retroactively change or adjust a rate for good cause
or for any other equitable considerations,” Old Dominion, 892 F.3d at 1230. And, to reiterate, the filed rate
required FERC to exclude the disputed expenses from
the bandwidth calculation.
LPSC objects that the filed-rate doctrine does not
apply “when judicial invalidation of Commission decisions has resulted in retroactive changes in rates.” W.
Deptford Energy, LLC v. FERC, 766 F.3d 10, 22 (D.C.
Cir. 2014). But the exception LPSC invokes is narrow:
FERC can retroactively correct for legal error only
where, among other requirements, the parties “were
3
Given our disposition, we need not consider FERC’s alternative ruling that LPSC consented to any retroactive rate. Rehearing Order, 169 FERC ¶ 61,247, P 30; see also NSTAR, 481
F.3d at 801 (parties can “agree[ ] to make a rate effective retroactively” (cleaned up)).
App. 18
aware in advance of the risk of litigation-induced
change.” Id. at 23. To create notice, there must be a
close link between the claimed error and the change
retroactively imposed on remand. Usually this means
that the rate itself is subject to challenge, though in
one case the challenge concerned the lawfulness of a
rate in a settlement agreement that a party had accepted “in reliance on an unlawful FERC order.” Pub.
Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 988 F.2d 154, 162–66
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
Here, there was no notice that the rate set by the
2009 amendment was subject to change. The validity
of the amendment itself has never been questioned. Instead, LPSC offers an attenuated chain of causation
between an unrelated legal error and approval of the
amendment: This Court invalidated FERC’s decision
to make the bandwidth remedy effective in 2006,
which led FERC to extend the remedy to some costs
incurred in 2005, which led an ALJ to discover that the
operating companies had mistakenly recorded amortization expenses in non-bandwidth accounts. Had the
arbitrary effective date not substantially delayed
bandwidth proceedings for the 2005 production costs,
LPSC continues, Entergy would have discovered the
error in time to propose a different 2009 amendment
permitting all deferred-production costs to be recognized in the bandwidth calculation. Even assuming
that LPSC’s inferences are true and that legal errors
unrelated to underlying rates can trigger the exception, more than bare, but-for causation is required to
overcome the “nearly impenetrable shield” against
App. 19
retroactive ratemaking. Old Dominion, 892 F.3d at
1230. The litigation over the bandwidth’s start date
could not have given notice that an ALJ would find accounting errors significant enough to affect settlement
negotiations over the 2009 amendment. The notice
exception to the filed-rate doctrine does not apply. And
because the filed-rate doctrine does apply, LPSC’s
§ 825h argument is without merit. See Verso Corp., 898
F.3d at 10.
III
For these reasons, we deny the petition for review.
So ordered.
App. 20
169 FERC ¶ 61,247
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Before Commissioners:
Neil Chatterjee, Chairman;
Richard Glick and Bernard
L. McNamee.
Louisiana Public
Service Commission
Docket No.
EL01-88-022
v.
Entergy Services, Inc.
ORDER DENYING REHEARING
(Issued December 27, 2019)
1. On May 30, 2019, the Commission issued an order1
accepting Entergy Services, Inc.’s (Entergy) July 16,
2018 compliance filing required by Opinion No. 561.2
Opinion No. 561 addressed rates filed by Entergy
on behalf of the Entergy Operating Companies (Operating Companies),3 implementing the Commission’s
1
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 167 FERC
¶ 61,186 (2019) (Compliance Order).
2
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., Opinion No.
561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 (2018), reh’g denied, Opinion No. 561-A,
166 FERC ¶ 61,021 (2019).
3
The five Operating Companies involved in this proceeding
were, at the time of the Louisiana Public Service Commission’s
(Louisiana Commission) initial complaint: Entergy Arkansas,
Inc. (Entergy Arkansas); Entergy Louisiana, Inc. (Entergy Louisiana); Entergy Mississippi, Inc. (Entergy Mississippi); Entergy
New Orleans, Inc. (Entergy New Orleans); and Entergy Gulf
States, Inc. (Entergy Gulf States). At the end of 2007, Entergy
App. 21
bandwidth formula for a seven-month period from
June 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005, as required
by a prior order.4
2. On June 28, 2019, the Louisiana Commission filed
a request for rehearing of the Compliance Order.5 In
this order, we deny the rehearing request.
I.
Background
3. This proceeding has a lengthy and complex history
which is summarized in the Compliance Order.6 As
relevant here, this proceeding arose from a complaint
filed by the Louisiana Commission against Entergy
and the Operating Companies concerning the Entergy
System Agreement’s requirement that production
costs be “roughly equal” among the Entergy Operating
Companies. Upon review of an initial decision,7 in
Gulf States was split into Entergy Texas, Inc. (Entergy Texas)
and Entergy Gulf States Louisiana, LLC (Entergy Gulf States
Louisiana).
4
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 137 FERC
¶ 61,047, at P 34 (2011). As explained below, Entergy bandwidth
calculation filings are annual filings to achieve rough production
cost equalization among the Operating Companies participating
in the Entergy System Agreement (System Agreement). The System Agreement terminated in 2016.
5
Louisiana Commission June 28, 2019 Rehearing Request
(Rehearing Request).
6
Compliance Order, 167 FERC ¶ 61,186 at PP 2-7.
7
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 106 FERC
¶ 63,012 (2004).
App. 22
Opinion Nos. 480 and 480-A,8 the Commission determined that rough production cost equalization on the
Entergy system had been disrupted, and that a numerical bandwidth of +/- 11 percent was an appropriate
remedy. This remedy, usually referred to as the bandwidth remedy or bandwidth formula, changes the allocation of production costs among the Operating
Companies on an annual basis to maintain rough production cost equalization. Following Opinion No. 480,
Entergy submitted a compliance filing to include its
proposed bandwidth formula as part of the System
Agreement. The Commission accepted the bandwidth
formula, to be applied prospectively for production
costs incurred during calendar year 2006 and all
calendar years thereafter.9 The bandwidth remedy
provided that Entergy would submit an annual bandwidth calculation of the production costs for each Operating Company for that calendar year using data
8
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., Opinion No.
480, 111 FERC ¶ 61,311, at P 136, order on reh’g, Opinion No.
480-A, 113 FERC ¶ 61,282 (2005), order on compliance, 117 FERC
¶ 61,203 (2006) (November 2006 Compliance Order), order on
reh’g and compliance, 119 FERC ¶ 61,095 (2007) (April 2007
Compliance Order), aff ’d in part and remanded in part sub nom.
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 522 F.3d 378 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Louisiana Remand), order on remand, 137 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2011)
(2011 Order on Remand), order dismissing reh’g, 137 FERC
¶ 61,048 (2011), order on reh’g, 146 FERC ¶ 61,152 (2014) (2014
Order on Rehearing), order denying reh’g, 153 FERC ¶ 61,034
(2015), remanded, La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 866 F.3d 426
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (affirming 2011 Order on Remand and 2014 Order on Rehearing).
9
See November 2006 Compliance Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,203;
April 2007 Compliance Order, 119 FERC ¶ 61,095.
App. 23
from the FERC Form 1, compared to the Entergy System average, to determine if the Operating Company’s
production costs deviated from the average by more
than 11 percent.10
4. In its remand of Opinion Nos. 480 and 480-A, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) held that the Commission
had not provided a reasonable explanation for the
Commission’s decision to delay implementation of the
bandwidth remedy until a full year of data had become
available for the 2006 test year.11 In the subsequent
2011 Order on Remand, the Commission held that it
would implement the bandwidth remedy on June 1,
2005, the date the Commission issued Opinion No. 480,
determining that the rates were unjust and unreasonable. The Commission directed Entergy to submit a
compliance filing calculating the bandwidth payments
and receipts for the period June 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005 (2005 period).12
5. On April 29, 2014, as amended on May 7, 2014 and
May 23, 2014, Entergy submitted a compliance filing
calculating bandwidth payments and receipts for the
2005 bandwidth period. On October 15, 2015, the Commission issued an order stating that Entergy’s compliance filing raised issues of material fact and set the
10
See System Agreement, Service Schedule MSS-3, section
30.11.
11
12
Louisiana Remand, 522 F.3d at 400.
2011 Order on Remand, 137 FERC ¶ 61,047 at P 34.
App. 24
matter for hearing and settlement judge procedures.13
As relevant here, at hearing, Trial Staff conducted discovery into the accounting source of certain regulatory
asset amounts recorded in Accounts 407.3 (Regulatory
debits) and 407.4 (Regulatory credits) during calendar
year 2005. Trial Staff found that the Operating Companies incorrectly used Accounts 407.3 and 407.4 during calendar year 2005 to record the establishment
and/or amortization of certain regulatory assets where
the source of the regulatory asset is specifically identifiable. Trial Staff specifically identified three regulatory assets that were incorrectly accounted for using
Accounts 407.3 and 407.4, which are excluded from the
bandwidth calculation. Trial Staff determined that the
regulatory debits and credits related to these items
should be recorded in Account 555 (Purchased Power),
which is a bandwidth eligible account.14 Trial Staff explained that in Opinion No. 505, the Commission found
that when the source of a regulatory asset is identifiable, the Commission’s Uniform System of Accounts
(USofA) requires the entries establishing and amortizing a regulatory asset to be credited and charged to the
same account that would have been charged if the item
had been included in income when incurred.15 Following the hearing, on November 7, 2016, the Presiding
13
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 153 FERC
¶ 61,032 (2015), reh’g denied, 155 FERC ¶ 61,118 (2016), aff ’d,
Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 712 F.App’x 3 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
14
Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 97.
15
Id. P 98 (citing Opinion No. 505, 130 FERC ¶ 61,023, at PP
261-63 (2010)).
App. 25
Judge issued his initial decision adopting Trial Staff ’s
recommendation.16
A. Opinion No. 561
6. On May 17, 2018, the Commission issued Opinion
No. 561, affirming the Initial Decision, including the
determination to change the accounting for the three
regulatory asset deferrals at issue to a bandwidth eligible account. The Commission based its decision on
the Commission’s holding in Opinion No. 505.17 The
Commission agreed with the Louisiana Commission
that once accounting errors are shown to be relevant
to the 2005 bandwidth calculation, the Operating Companies should be required to correct their FERC Form
1 reports for the three regulatory assets at issue for
subsequent bandwidth test years, and make corresponding corrections to the bandwidth payments and
receipts for those test years, to ensure that legitimate
production costs are properly accounted for on the
FERC Form 1s.18 The Commission also affirmed the
Presiding Judge’s determination that accounting corrections should be limited to accounting adjustments
that have been shown to have a bandwidth implication.19 The Commission directed Entergy to revise
and refile the Operating Companies’ FERC Form 1s to
16
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 157 FERC
¶ 63,018 (2016) (Initial Decision).
17
Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 119 (citing Opinion No. 505, 130 FERC ¶ 61,023 at PP 262-63).
18
Id. P 121.
19
Id. P 120.
App. 26
correct the accounting for the regulatory assets for
subsequent years, to “revise and refile” the bandwidth
filings in accordance with the refiled FERC Form 1s,
and to “calculate the revised tariff payments and receipts among the Operating Companies for the test
years affected.”20
B. Compliance Filing and Protest
7. On July 16, 2018, Entergy filed its compliance filing containing the comprehensive bandwidth recalculation report showing the payment/receipt amounts
based on the 2005 period (June 1 through December
31, 2005) data, including workpapers (Entergy Compliance Filing). The Entergy Compliance Filing also
contained the recalculation report showing revised
payment/receipt amounts based on 2006 and 2007 data
following accounting corrections directed by the Commission in Opinion No. 561.21
8. Entergy stated that, consistent with the Commission’s directive in Opinion No. 561, Entergy corrected
the accounting for the three identified regulatory asset
deferrals for the 2005 period and the associated
amortization in 2006 and 2007. Entergy asserted that,
beginning with the 2008 bandwidth calculation, the
bandwidth formula was amended (2009 Amendment)22
20
Id. P 121.
Entergy Compliance Filing at 12-13.
22
The Commission accepted the 2009 Amendment with an
effective date of May 31, 2009. Entergy Servs., Inc., 128 FERC
¶ 61,069 (2009). Entergy filed the 2008 bandwidth calculation on
21
App. 27
to require purchased power costs to be reflected in the
year in which they are incurred.23 Entergy stated that,
specifically, the definition of Purchased Power Expense
(PURP) was modified to exclude “the effects, debits
and credits, resulting from a regulatory decision that
causes the deferral of the recovery of costs or the amortization of previously deferred costs.”24 Entergy contended that, therefore, in bandwidth calculations for
years subsequent to 2007, accounting changes associated with the regulatory assets identified in Opinion
No. 561 were not relevant to the bandwidth calculation.25
9. On August 6, 2018, the Louisiana Commission protested the filing, explaining that, in Opinion No. 561,
the Commission ordered Entergy to change the 2005
deferrals of the three regulatory assets from Accounts
407.3 and 407.4 to Account 555 and to reflect the related amortization of the deferred costs in subsequent
years in Account 555 as well.26 The Louisiana Commission stated that Entergy did so for 2006 and 2007, but
did not do so for 2008 and 2009. The Louisiana Commission contended that this adjustment violated the
May 29, 2009. Entergy, Filing of Rates to Implement Opinion Nos.
480 and 480-A, Docket No. ER09-1224-000 (filed May 29, 2009).
23
Entergy Compliance Filing at 7 n.37.
24
Id. (citing Entergy Servs., Inc., 128 FERC ¶ 61,069 at P 6).
25
Id.
26
Louisiana Commission August 6, 2018 Protest at 4 (citing
Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 121).
App. 28
Commission’s instructions to reflect the changes “for
any subsequent years.”27
II.
Compliance Order and Rehearing Request
10. On May 30, 2019, the Commission issued the
Compliance Order, accepting Entergy’s accounting
changes. The Commission agreed with Entergy that
the 2009 Amendment to the bandwidth formula was
directly relevant as to whether the amortizations for
2008 and 2009 should be included in the bandwidth
calculations for those years. The 2009 Amendment revised the definition of variable PURP in the bandwidth
formula to include the following language:
PURP = Purchased Power Expense recorded
in FERC Account 555, but excluding payments made pursuant to Section 30.09(d) of
this Service Schedule and excluding the effects, debits and credits, resulting from a regulatory decision that causes the deferral of the
recovery of current year costs or the amortization of previously deferred costs.28
11. The Commission found that, because the 2009
Amendment was in effect for the 2008 and 2009 bandwidth calculations, any revisions to the accounting for
the 2005 regulatory asset deferrals for 2008 and 2009
would have had no effect on the bandwidth payments
27
Id.
Entergy, Filing to Amend the System Agreement, Docket
No. ER09-1185-000, Attached First Revised Sheet No. 54 (emphasis added) (filed May 21, 2009) (2009 Filing Letter).
28
App. 29
and receipts for those years. Accordingly, given the
Commission’s directive in Opinion No. 561 that accounting corrections should be limited to adjustments
that have a bandwidth implication, the Commission
found that Entergy was correct to revise the accounting for the 2005 regulatory assets for only the test
periods in which those adjustments would have a
bandwidth implication – the 2005, 2006, and 2007 periods.29
12. The Commission noted that the 2009 Amendment
was the filed rate for the 2008 and 2009 bandwidth
calculations and Entergy had no discretion in making
accounting adjustments for 2008 and 2009.30 The
Commission also stated that not making accounting
adjustments for 2008 and 2009 did not constitute retroactive application of the 2009 Amendment because
if Entergy had, for 2008 and 2009, reclassified amortization related to the three regulatory assets deferrals
from Accounts 407.3 and 407.4 to Account 555, and
then recalculated bandwidth payments and receipts
for 2008 and 2009 without excluding that amortization, its calculation would have violated the filed rate
for those test years.31 The Commission also dismissed
the Louisiana Commission’s argument that the Commission should take into consideration the fact that if
this proceeding had not been delayed, the accounting
would have been corrected long before the filing of the
29
Compliance Order, 167 FERC ¶ 61,186 at P 25.
Id. P 27.
31
Id. P 28.
30
App. 30
2008 bandwidth calculation. The Commission stated
that, in a compliance proceeding, the Commission considers only whether the filing complies with the underlying order.32
13. On June 28, 2019, the Louisiana Commission
filed its rehearing request.
III. Discussion
A. Interpretation of the 2009 Amendment
14. On rehearing, the Louisiana Commission argues
that the Compliance Order arbitrarily adopts an interpretation of the 2009 Amendment to the bandwidth
formula that is at odds with the parties’ intent, the
explanatory filing by Entergy Services, and a settlement that was filed and approved by the Commission.33 Specifically, the Louisiana Commission argues
that the Compliance Order interprets the 2009 Amendment to apply prospectively to deferrals commencing
in 2008, but to amortizations related to deferrals
that occurred prior to 2008.34 The Louisiana Commission states that the Commission’s interpretation of
the 2009 Amendment conflicts with statements made
in the settlement that led to the 2009 Amendment
32
Id. P 29.
Rehearing Request at 4-12.
34
Id. at 1.
33
App. 31
(Settlement Agreement)35 and Entergy’s 2009 Filing
Letter that accompanied the 2009 Amendment.36
15. The Louisiana Commission explains that the
Settlement Agreement made no mention of excluding
the amortizations of prior year deferrals. The Louisiana
Commission asserts that the Settlement Agreement
applied to costs and deferrals going forward, beginning
in the 2008 test year used for the 2009 bandwidth calculation to ensure that “all purchased power costs will
be included in the bandwidth calculation in the year
the costs are incurred.”37 The Louisiana Commission
points to section 7.3 of the Settlement Agreement to
support its point:
ESI will make a Section 205 filing amending
MSS-3 starting with the 2009 Bandwidth
Calculation (i.e., effective May 31, 2009) to
provide that all purchased power costs will
be included in the Bandwidth Calculation in
the year the costs are incurred, regardless of
35
Entergy, Offer of Settlement, Docket No. ER08-1056-002
(filed May 21, 2009). The Settlement Agreement is an uncontested
partial settlement concerning the 2008 and 2009 bandwidth calculations filed by Entergy on behalf of the Arkansas Public Service Commission, the Council of the City of New Orleans, the
Louisiana Commission, the Mississippi Public Service Commission, East Texas Cooperatives, and the Texas Industrial Energy
Consumers.
36
Rehearing Request at 7-8 (citing 2009 Filing Letter at 5
n.15).
37
Id. at 1-2, 5-7.
App. 32
whether they are deferred on the individual
Operating Company’s books.38
16. The Louisiana Commission further argues that
Entergy stated in its 2009 Filing Letter that the 2009
Amendment applied only to “new deferrals beginning
in 2008.”39 The Louisiana Commission reasons that
since the 2009 Amendment applied for the first time to
“2008 costs,” to both the “debits and credits” resulting
from each deferral decision, and did not apply to pre2008 deferrals, it could not apply to the debits resulting from the 2005 deferral. The Louisiana Commission
maintains that the Commission adopted an imbalanced interpretation of the 2009 Amendment that disconnects the “debits” from the “credits” resulting from
a regulatory decision.
17. The Louisiana Commission also asserts that extrinsic evidence demonstrates that the 2009 Amendment was never intended to apply to the amortization
of past deferrals.40 In addition to its own witness, the
Louisiana Commission points to testimony of Trial
Staff witness John Sammon to argue that no one contemplated that the 2009 Amendment might be used
to exclude the amortization of a past deferral.41 The
Louisiana Commission also references testimony of
Entergy witness Bruce Louiselle who stated that, “if
38
Id. at 6 (citing Louisiana Commission August 8, 2018 Protest, Attachment 2, section 7.3 of the Settlement Agreement).
39
Id. at 2, 4-5.
40
Id. at 9-10.
41
Id. at 10 (citing Tr. 357-58).
App. 33
the Commission were to accept [Trial Staff witness’]
accounting recommendation for purposes of the June
1, 2005 through December 31, 2005 test period used in
this proceeding, it should be necessary to recalculate
the compliance filing for at least the Bandwidth test
years 2006, 2007, and 2008.”42
18. We deny rehearing. We are not persuaded that
statements in the Settlement Agreement and the 2009
Filing Letter are dispositive of our determination here,
nor are we persuaded by the statements made at the
hearing regarding the parties’ intent. In the 2009
Amendment, Entergy modified the definition of variable PURP in the bandwidth formula to exclude current
year deferrals as well as amortization associated with
prior period deferrals from variable PURP. In accordance with this amendment, in its compliance filing,
Entergy excluded amortization associated with the
2005 regulatory asset deferrals that occurred in the
2008 and 2009 bandwidth periods because doing so
allowed Entergy to follow the applicable filed rate.
While the Louisiana Commission claims that the Settlement Agreement made no mention of excluding
amortization of prior years’ deferrals and the 2009 Filing Letter indicated the amendment would only apply
to “new deferrals beginning in 2008,” the 2009 Amendment expressly states that PURP excludes “the amortization of previously deferred costs.”43
42
Id. at 9 (citing ESI-28 at 14-15).
See supra P 10 (quoting 2009 Filing Letter, First Revised
Sheet No. 54).
43
App. 34
19. The Louisiana Commission is now taking issue
with the language of the filed rate that it previously
supported,44 pointing to isolated statements in the
record to reinterpret that language. The Commission
is cognizant that, when the 2009 Amendment was introduced, parties may not have anticipated that accounting corrections stemming from a bandwidth
calculation for the 2005 period would impact bandwidth test years for which the 2009 Amendment was
applicable, and that this possibility was not addressed
in the 2009 Filing Letter or Settlement Agreement.
However, we cannot ignore the express language of the
filed rate. That language – which no party protested45
– excludes the amortization of previously deferred
costs. The statements at hearing do not persuade us to
interpret the language differently, and as the Commission has stated previously, in the event of a conflict
between pleadings and proposed tariff language, the
tariff language controls.46
20. We also disagree with the Louisiana Commission’s contention that the Commission’s interpretation
of the 2009 Amendment disconnects the “debits” from
44
Entergy Servs., Inc., 128 FERC ¶ 61,069 at P 4.
Id.
46
See Midcontinent Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc., 162 FERC
¶ 61,253, at P 6 (2018) (citing Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys.
Operator, Inc., 142 FERC ¶ 61,149, at P 25 (2013); Cal. Indep.
Sys. Operator Corp., 132 FERC ¶ 61,154, at P 10 (2010); Midwest
Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 129 FERC ¶ 61,268, at
n.8 (2009); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 124 FERC ¶ 61,095,
at P 22 (2008)).
45
App. 35
the “credits” resulting from a regulatory decision.47 The
Commission correctly interpreted the 2009 Amendment to apply both prospectively to newly established
deferrals beginning in 2008 as well as amortizations
that occurred in the 2008 and 2009 bandwidth periods,
stemming from a previously established deferral. We
recognize that, due to the express language of the 2009
Amendment, amortized amounts relating to the 2005
deferral were not fully captured in the bandwidth formula. However, as the Commission explained in the
Compliance Order, to the extent any costs were not
fully captured, that is the result of the application of
the filed rate in effect in 2008 and 2009.48 The Louisiana Commission has provided no argument on rehearing to persuade us that the 2009 Amendment, the filed
rate, should not be followed.
B. Compliance Requirements
21. On rehearing, the Louisiana Commission argues
again that Entergy did not comply with the requirement in Opinion No. 561 to include amortization for
any subsequent years after the 2005 deferral.49 The
47
Rehearing Request at 8.
Compliance Order, 167 FERC ¶ 61,186 at P 26.
49
Rehearing Request at 19-21. The Louisiana Commission
points to the following passage in Opinion No. 561 to support its
point:
However, we agree with the Louisiana Commission
that once accounting errors are shown to be relevant to
the 2005 bandwidth calculation, the Operating Companies should be required to correct their FERC Form 1
reports for the three regulatory assets at issue for
48
App. 36
Louisiana Commission asserts that the Commission
misinterpreted Opinion No. 561 in finding Entergy in
compliance because the 2009 Amendment was not
even discussed in Opinion No. 561.50 We are not persuaded by this argument. As the Commission stated in
the Compliance Order, Opinion No. 561 directed that
changes in accounting with regard to the three regulatory assets should be reflected in rates under the filed
formula.51 For 2008 and 2009, the filed formula includes the 2009 Amendment. We maintain that it is
appropriate to follow the filed rate, regardless of
whether the Commission specifically identified the
2009 Amendment in its compliance directive.
22. Similarly, we are not persuaded by the Louisiana
Commission’s contention that the Compliance Order
erred in stating that there was a “directive in Opinion
No. 561 that accounting corrections should be limited
to adjustments that have a bandwidth implication.”52
subsequent bandwidth test years, and make corresponding corrections to the bandwidth payments and
receipts for those test years, to ensure that legitimate
production costs are properly accounted for on the
FERC Form 1 reports and reflected in rates under the
filed formula.
Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 121.
50
Rehearing Request at 19-20.
51
Compliance Order, 167 FERC ¶ 61,186 at P 26 (citing
Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 123) (“We also affirm
the Presiding Judge’s determination that accounting corrections
should be limited to accounting adjustments that have been
shown to have a bandwidth implication.”)).
52
Rehearing Request at 21 (citing Compliance Order, 167
FERC ¶ 61,186 at P 25).
App. 37
Pointing to the Commission’s directive concerning Entergy Arkansas’ Grand Gulf purchased power energy
regulatory asset, the Louisiana Commission explains
that while the Commission held that accounting corrections were unnecessary for accounts not in the
bandwidth formula, the Commission also held that
accounting corrections “are necessary for accounts in
the formula even if the tariff excludes the costs at issue.”53 Specifically, in Opinion No. 561, the Commission
stated, in reference to Grand Gulf, “[a]lthough this accounting change will not change the results of the
bandwidth calculation, because Account 555 is a bandwidth-eligible account, Entergy must nevertheless correct its accounting to help ensure that the bandwidth
calculation will be populated with the correct inputs.”54
23. We recognize that the correction required for
Grand Gulf differs from the Commission’s directive to
limit accounting corrections to those adjustments that
have a bandwidth implication. In hindsight, the Commission did not need to require the correction as to
Grand Gulf because such correction did not impact
the bandwidth payments and receipts.55 In any event,
this point is irrelevant to the Louisiana Commission’s
53
Id. (citing Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 123).
Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 123.
55
As noted by the Louisiana Commission, the System Agreement explicitly excludes the costs at issue from the bandwidth
formula. See System Agreement, Service Schedule MSS-3, section
30.12, n.1 (excluding from the bandwidth formula “the [Entergy
Arkansas] and [Entergy Mississippi] retail approved Grand Gulf
Accelerated Recovery Tariff effects on purchased power on [Entergy Arkansas] and [Entergy Mississippi] production cost”).
54
App. 38
request that amortization associated with the 2005
regulatory asset deferrals that occurred in the 2008
and 2009 bandwidth periods be included in the compliance filing at issue here. The 2009 Amendment required Entergy to exclude current year deferrals as
well as amortization associated with prior period deferrals from variable PURP. Because the 2009 Amendment was in effect for the 2008 and 2009 bandwidth
calculations, any revisions to the accounting for the
2005 regulatory asset deferrals for 2008 and 2009
would have had no effect on the bandwidth payments
and receipts for those years. Thus, we affirm that it was
appropriate for Entergy to follow the filed rate in effect
and to limit its accounting revisions, for purposes of its
compliance filing, to the 2005, 2006 and 2007 bandwidth periods.
C. Nature of the Proceeding
24. On rehearing, the Louisiana Commission asserts
that any unjust results in the bandwidth calculation in
this proceeding result from the Commission’s unlawful
delay of the bandwidth remedy.56 The Louisiana Commission explains that had this proceeding not been
delayed, it would have preceded other bandwidth proceedings, particularly the 2008 bandwidth calculation
proceeding. The Louisiana Commission argues that,
when the accounting for the deferral was corrected,
the accounting for subsequent years would have been
as well. The Louisiana Commission contends that,
56
Rehearing Request at 13.
App. 39
therefore, there would be no possibility of an “incomplete” correction because the 2009 Amendment would
have explicitly provided for the recognition of the
amortization of past deferrals.57
25. The Louisiana Commission also argues that the
Compliance Order fails to consider the Commission’s
power to correct the unjust consequences of its own
legal error by relying on the fact that this is a compliance proceeding.58 The Louisiana Commission asserts
that the Commission’s Federal Power Act (FPA) section 30959 power is not constrained by the nature of
the proceeding because “[t]he Commission is obligated to correct the unjust consequences of its delay
of the remedy in any proceeding in which the consequence arises.”60
26. We are not persuaded by these arguments. As
the Commission previously stated, in a compliance
proceeding, the Commission considers only whether
the filing complies with the underlying order.61 Based
on the Commission’s directive in Opinion No. 561, affirming the Presiding Judge’s determination that
accounting corrections should be limited to accounting adjustments that have been shown to have a
57
Id. at 14.
Id. at 12-21.
59
16 U.S.C. § 825h (2018).
60
Rehearing Request at 12; see also id. at 14-16 (citing TNA
Merch. Products, Inc. v. FERC, 857 F.3d 354 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Xcel
Energy Servs. v. FERC, 815 F.3d 947 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
61
Compliance Order, 167 FERC ¶ 61,186 at P 29 (citing ISO
New England Inc., 133 FERC ¶ 61,013, at P 22 (2010)).
58
App. 40
bandwidth implication,62 the parties reasonably should
have and could have anticipated that Entergy would
prepare – and Entergy did, in fact, prepare – its compliance filing in accordance with the applicable bandwidth formula which, for 2008 and 2009, includes the
2009 Amendment. However, even if this proceeding
were not limited to only compliance-related issues, we
cannot presume – as the Louisiana Commission asks –
that the text of the 2009 Amendment would have been
different if the 2005 bandwidth calculation at issue in
Opinion No. 561 had been conducted at an earlier date.
The 2009 Amendment is part of the filed rate for 2008
and 2009, and Entergy was required to comply with its
terms when preparing its compliance filing.
27. In addition, we find the Louisiana Commission’s
arguments regarding FPA section 309 to be misplaced.
Even assuming that Entergy was not required to adhere to the 2009 Amendment, we are not persuaded
that FPA section 309 requires a different result here.63
The decision whether to direct remedial relief is discretionary,64 based on the Commission’s evaluation of the
62
Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 120.
16 U.S.C. § 825h (“to perform any and all acts, and to prescribe, issue, make, amend, and rescind such orders, rules, and
regulations as it may find necessary or appropriate to carry out
the provisions of this [Act]”) (emphasis added).
64
The Louisiana Commission is incorrect that FPA section
309 “obligates” the Commission to provide its requested relief. See
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 772 F.3d 1297, 1302-03 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
63
App. 41
relevant equities.65 As noted above, the Commission is
cognizant that, when the 2009 Amendment was introduced, parties may not have expected that accounting
corrections stemming from a bandwidth calculation for
the 2005 period would impact bandwidth test years for
which the 2009 Amendment was applicable, and that
this possibility was not addressed in the 2009 Filing
Letter or Settlement Agreement. That said, there is
no suggestion that the parties lacked adequate notice of the 2009 Amendment. Nor do we agree with
the Louisiana Commission that the timing of this
proceeding warrants additional remedial relief. As explained above, the Louisiana Commission’s arguments
concerning delay incorrectly presume that the 2009
Amendment would have been different if the 2005
bandwidth calculation required by Opinion No. 561
had been conducted at an earlier date.
D. Retroactive Ratemaking
28. Finally, we disagree with the Louisiana Commission’s argument that applying the 2009 Amendment to
debits resulting from the 2005 deferral constitutes
retroactive ratemaking.66 The Louisiana Commission
argues that it is impermissibly retroactive to apply the
2009 Amendment to some debits resulting from a
2005 deferral, but none of the credits.67 The Louisiana
65
See Xcel Energy Servs. Inc. v. FERC, 815 F.3d at 955 (remanding for the Commission to consider the relevant equities in
deciding whether to order refunds).
66
Rehearing Request at 22-23.
67
Id. at 22.
App. 42
Commission also states that the 2009 Amendment applies to deferral decisions because the 2009 Amendment excludes the effects “resulting from a regulatory
decision that causes the deferral of the recovery of current years costs or the amortization of previously deferred costs.”68 The Louisiana Commission asserts that
applying the 2009 Amendment to a decision made
prior to the amendment is retroactive ratemaking.69
29. As noted above, we disagree with the Louisiana
Commission’s interpretation of the 2009 Amendment
and reiterate that the 2009 Amendment applies both
prospectively to newly established deferrals beginning
in 2008 as well as amortizations that occurred in the
2008 and 2009 bandwidth periods, stemming from a
previously established deferral.70 We do not view this
as retroactive ratemaking. Instead, application of the
2009 Amendment is a straightforward recognition of
the bandwidth formula rate, the applicable rate, in effect for 2008 and 2009. As the Commission explained
in the Compliance Order:
If, for 2008 and 2009, Entergy had reclassified
amortization related to the three regulatory
assets deferrals from Accounts 407.3 and
407.4 to Account 555, and then recalculated
bandwidth payments and receipts for 2008
and 2009 without excluding that amortization, its calculation would have violated the
filed rate for those test years. No party at
68
Id. at 23 (emphasis in pleading).
Id.
70
See supra P 20.
69
App. 43
hearing argued that the effective date or application of the 2009 Amendment should be
reopened or altered, and the Commission did
not direct Entergy to disregard the 2009
Amendment when following the Commission’s directives in Opinion No. 561.71
30. The Louisiana Commission’s citation to Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. FERC to support its retroactive ratemaking argument is similarly unpersuasive.72 In that
case, the court ruled that the Commission could not
adopt a new rate imposing liability for rate undercollections accrued prior to the notice of the new rate.73
However, here, there is no notice issue with regard to
the 2009 Amendment because the Louisiana Commission, as a timely intervenor in the proceeding,74 was
aware of both the 2009 Amendment and its effective
date as early as June 11, 2009. In fact, the 2009
Amendment and its effective date were supported by
all parties in the proceeding, including the Louisiana
Commission.75 The fact that parties may not have been
able to predict that the 2009 Amendment would eventually prevent accounting corrections from the 2005
test period from being included in subsequent-year
bandwidth calculations does not allow us to ignore the
71
Compliance Order, 167 FERC ¶ 61,186 at P 28.
Rehearing Request at 23 (citing Transwestern Pipeline Co.
v. FERC, 897 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Transwestern Pipeline)).
73
Transwestern Pipeline, 897 F.2d at 580.
74
Louisiana Public Service Commission, Notice of Intervention and Comments, Docket No. ER09-1185-000, at 2 (filed June
11, 2009).
75
Entergy Servs., Inc., 128 FERC ¶ 61,069 at P 4.
72
App. 44
filed rate for test years 2008 and 2009. Accordingly, the
Louisiana Commission has not persuaded us to alter
the Commission’s previous findings.
The Commission orders:
The rehearing request is hereby denied, as discussed in the body of this order.
By the Commission.
(SEAL)
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.
Deputy Secretary
App. 45
167 FERC ¶ 61,186
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Before Commissioners:
Neil Chatterjee, Chairman;
Cheryl A. LaFleur,
Richard Glick, and
Bernard L. McNamee.
Louisiana Public
Service Commission
Docket No.
EL01-88-021
v.
Entergy Services, Inc.
ORDER ON COMPLIANCE
(Issued May 30, 2019)
1. On July 16, 2018, Entergy Services, Inc. (Entergy)
filed a compliance filing as required by Opinion No.
561.1 Opinion No. 561 addressed rates filed by Entergy
on behalf of the Entergy Operating Companies (Operating Companies),2 implementing the Commission’s
bandwidth formula for a seven-month period from
June 1, 2005 through December 31, 2005, as required
1
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., Opinion No.
561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 (2018).
2
The five Operating Companies involved in this proceeding
were, at the time of this filing: Entergy Arkansas, Inc. (Entergy
Arkansas); Entergy Louisiana, Inc. (Entergy Louisiana); Entergy
Mississippi, Inc. (Entergy Mississippi); Entergy New Orleans,
Inc. (Entergy New Orleans); and Entergy Gulf States, Inc. (Entergy Gulf States). At the end of 2007, Entergy Gulf States was
split into Entergy Texas, Inc. (Entergy Texas) and Entergy Gulf
States Louisiana, LLC (Entergy Gulf States Louisiana).
App. 46
by a prior order.3 As discussed below, in this order we
accept Entergy’s compliance filing.
I.
Background
2. This case arose from a complaint filed by the Louisiana Public Service Commission (Louisiana Commission) against Entergy and the Operating Companies
concerning the Entergy System Agreement’s requirement that production costs be “roughly equal” among
the Entergy Operating Companies. Upon review of an
Initial Decision,4 in Opinion Nos. 480 and 480-A,5 the
Commission determined that rough production cost
equalization on the Entergy system had been disrupted, and that a numerical bandwidth of +/- 11 percent was an appropriate remedy. This remedy, usually
3
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 137 FERC
¶ 61,047, at P 34 (2011).
4
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 106 FERC
¶ 63,012 (2004).
5
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., Opinion No.
480, 111 FERC ¶ 61,311, at P 136 (2005), order on reh’g, Opinion
No. 480-A, 113 FERC ¶ 61,282 (2005), order on compliance, 117
FERC ¶ 61,203 (2006) (November 2006 Compliance Order), order
on reh’g and compliance, 119 FERC ¶ 61,095 (2007) (April 2007
Compliance Order), aff ’d in part and remanded in part sub nom.
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 522 F.3d 378 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Louisiana Remand), order on remand, 137 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2011)
(2011 Order on Remand), order dismissing reh’g, 137 FERC
¶ 61,048 (2011), order on reh’g, 146 FERC ¶ 61,152 (2014) (2014
Order on Rehearing), order denying reh’g, 153 FERC ¶ 61,034
(2015) (2015 Order Denying Rehearing II), remanded, La. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 866 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (affirming
2011 Order on Remand and 2014 Order on Rehearing).
App. 47
referred to as the bandwidth remedy or bandwidth formula, changes the allocation of production costs among
the Operating Companies on an annual basis to maintain rough production cost equalization. Opinion No.
480, issued June 1, 2005, implemented the bandwidth
remedy prospectively based on a full calendar year of
data, i.e., data for 2006, with payments beginning in
June 2007 after calendar year 2006 data were available. Entergy subsequently submitted a compliance filing containing its proposed bandwidth formula, as part
of the System Agreement. The Commission accepted
the bandwidth formula, to be applied prospectively for
production costs incurred during calendar year 2006
and all calendar years thereafter.6
3. In its remand7 of Opinion Nos. 480 and 480-A, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) held that the Commission
had not provided a reasonable explanation for the
Commission’s decision to delay implementation of the
bandwidth remedy until a full year of data had become
available for the 2006 test year. In the subsequent 2011
Order on Remand, the Commission held that it would
implement the bandwidth remedy on June 1, 2005, the
date the Commission issued Opinion No. 480, determining that the rates were unjust and unreasonable.
The Commission directed Entergy to submit a compliance filing calculating the bandwidth payments and
6
See November 2006 Compliance Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,203;
April 2007 Compliance Order, 119 FERC ¶ 61,095.
7
Louisiana Remand, 522 F.3d 378.
App. 48
receipts for the period June 1, 2005 through December
31, 2005 (2005 period).8
4. On February 28, 2014, the Commission issued an
order9 rejecting a compliance filing submitted by Entergy on December 19, 2011 in response to the 2011
Order on Remand. The Commission rejected Entergy’s
use of six months of data as the basis for the calculation for the seven-month period at issue, rather than
actual data for all seven months, and required Entergy to submit a subsequent compliance filing. The
Commission stated that in Entergy’s subsequent compliance filing, Entergy must perform bandwidth calculations for the 2005 period using monthly data
wherever possible. The Commission stated that, for
components of the bandwidth formula where monthto-month variations in costs are not meant to be captured, end-of-year amounts should be used.10
5. On April 29, 2014, as amended on May 7, 2014 and
May 23, 2014, Entergy submitted a compliance filing
(2014 Compliance Filing) in response to the 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing. The 2014 Compliance
Filing calculated bandwidth payments and receipts for
the 2005 period. On October 15, 2015, the Commission
issued an order stating that the 2014 Compliance
Filing raises issues of material fact and setting the
8
2011 Order on Remand, 137 FERC ¶ 61,048 at P 37.
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 146 FERC
¶ 61,153 (2014) (2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing), order
denying reh’g, 153 FERC ¶ 61,033 (2015) (2015 Order Denying
Rehearing I).
10
Id. PP 26-27.
9
App. 49
matter for hearing and settlement judge procedures.11
On December 4, 2015, the participants in the settlement proceedings recommended initiation of hearing
procedures to be conducted with settlement procedures. On January 29, 2016, the Presiding Judge issued an Order Establishing Procedural Schedule for
the hearing to be conducted regarding the 2014 Compliance Filing.12
6. Following the hearing, the Presiding Judge issued
his initial decision13 on November 7, 2016. The Commission subsequently issued Opinion No. 561, affirming the Initial Decision and providing additional
discussion regarding an accounting issue. As pertinent
here, in Opinion No. 561 the Commission affirmed the
Presiding Judge’s decision “to change the accounting
for three regulatory asset deferrals from Accounts
407.3 (Regulatory Debits) and 407.4 (Regulatory Credits), which are not bandwidth-eligible accounts, to Account 555 (Purchased Power), which is a bandwidtheligible account.”14 This finding was based on the
Commission’s holding in Opinion No. 505, which
found that when the source of a regulatory asset is
identifiable, the Commission’s Uniform System of Accounts (USofA) requires the entries establishing and
11
Hearing Order, 153 FERC ¶ 61,032.
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., Docket No.
EL01-88-015, Order Establishing Procedural Schedule (Jan. 29,
2016).
13
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 157 FERC
¶ 63,018 (2016).
14
Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 119.
12
App. 50
amortizing a regulatory asset to be credited and
charged to the same account that would have been
charged if the item had been included in income when
incurred.15
7. The Commission agreed with the Louisiana Commission that once accounting errors are shown to be
relevant to the 2005 bandwidth calculation, the Operating Companies should be required to correct their
FERC Form 1 reports for the three regulatory assets
at issue for subsequent bandwidth test years, and
make corresponding corrections to the bandwidth payments and receipts for those test years, to ensure that
legitimate production costs are properly accounted for
on the FERC Form 1s.16 The Commission also affirmed
the Presiding Judge’s determination that accounting
corrections should be limited to accounting adjustments that have been shown to have a bandwidth implication.17 The Commission directed Entergy to revise
and refile the Operating Companies’ FERC Form 1s to
correct the accounting for the regulatory assets for
subsequent years, to “revise and refile” the bandwidth
filings in accordance with the refiled FERC Form 1s,
and to “calculate the revised tariff payments and receipts among the Operating Companies for the test
years affected.”18
15
Id. (citing Opinion No. 505, 130 FERC ¶ 61,023 at PP 262-
263).
16
Id. P 121.
Id. P 120.
18
Id. P 121.
17
App. 51
II.
Entergy’s Compliance Filing
8. Entergy’s compliance filing contains the comprehensive bandwidth recalculation report showing the
payment/receipt amounts based on the 2005 period
(June 1 through December 31, 2005) data, including
workpapers. Entergy’s filing also contains the recalculation report showing revised payment/receipt
amounts based on 2006 and 2007 data following accounting corrections directed by the Commission in
Opinion No. 561.19
9. Entergy’s compliance filing addresses, inter alia,
accounting changes for three regulatory assets. Entergy states that, in Opinion No. 561, the Commission
“affirm[ed] the Presiding Judge’s decision to adopt
Trial Staff ’s recommendation to change the accounting for three regulatory asset deferrals from Accounts
407.3 (Regulatory Debits) and 407.4 (Regulatory Credits), which are not bandwidth-eligible accounts, to Account 555 (Purchased Power), which is a bandwidtheligible account.”20 Entergy states that, consistent
with the Commission’s directive, Entergy has corrected the accounting for the three identified regulatory asset deferrals for the 2005 period and the
associated amortization in 2006 and 2007. Entergy
asserts that, beginning with the 2008 bandwidth calculation, the bandwidth formula was amended (2009
19
Entergy Compliance Filing at 12-13.
Id. at 6 (citing Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at
P 119).
20
App. 52
Amendment)21 to require purchased power costs to be
reflected in the year in which they are incurred.22 Entergy states that, specifically, the definition of Purchased Power Expense was modified to exclude “the
effects, debits, and credits, resulting from a regulatory decision that causes the deferral of the recovery
of costs or the amortization of previously deferred
costs.”23 Entergy contends that, therefore, in bandwidth calculations for years subsequent to 2007, accounting changes associated with the regulatory assets
identified in Opinion No. 561 are not relevant to the
bandwidth calculation.24
III. Notice of Filing and Responsive Pleadings
10. Notice of Entergy’s compliance filing was published in the Federal Register, 83 Fed. Reg. 34,840
(2018), with interventions and protests due on or before August 6, 2018. The Louisiana Commission filed
a protest. Entergy filed an answer to the Louisiana
Commission’s protest. The Louisiana Commission filed
an answer to Entergy’s answer.
21
The Commission accepted the 2009 Amendment with an
effective date of May 31, 2009. Entergy Servs., Inc., 128 FERC
¶ 61,069 (2009). Entergy filed the 2008 bandwidth calculation on
May 29, 2009. Entergy, Filing of Rates to Implement Opinion Nos.
480 and 480-A, Docket No. ER09-1224-000 (filed May 29, 2009).
22
Entergy Compliance Filing at 7 n.37.
23
Id. (citing Entergy Servs., Inc., 128 FERC ¶ 61,069 at P 6).
24
Id.
App. 53
A. Louisiana Commission’s Protest
11. The Louisiana Commission contends that Entergy did not follow the requirements of Opinion No.
561 in its compliance filing. The Louisiana Commission
explains that, in Opinion No. 561, the Commission ordered Entergy to change the 2005 deferrals of the three
regulatory assets from Account 407.4 to Account 555
and to reflect the related amortization of the deferred
costs in subsequent years in Account 555 as well.25 The
Louisiana Commission explains that Entergy did so for
2006 and 2007, but did not do so for 2008 and 2009.
The Louisiana Commission contends that this adjustment violates the Commission’s instructions to reflect
the changes “for any subsequent years.”26
12. The Louisiana Commission argues that Entergy’s
failure to include the 2008 and 2009 amortization
traps costs outside the bandwidth calculation and defeats the purpose of the amendment. The Louisiana
Commission contends that Entergy’s action also creates an imbalance in Entergy’s accounting for Entergy
Louisiana. The Louisiana Commission argues that the
deferral of $56 million in 2005 has not been corrected
by moving the deferral to Account 555. The Louisiana
Commission adds that, however, only $24.5 million of
the amortization has been moved to Account 555, while
$31 million remains in the wrong account – Account
407.4 – for 2008 and 2009. The Louisiana Commission
25
Louisiana Commission Protest at 4 (citing Opinion No.
561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 121).
26
Id.
App. 54
adds that in this compliance proceeding Entergy is required to follow the directives in Opinion No. 561. The
Louisiana Commission argues that Entergy does not
have discretion to make changes based on late-arising
legal theories.27 The Louisiana Commission also notes
that Entergy did not request rehearing of the issue of
excluding the costs at issue in 2008 and 2009.
13. The Louisiana Commission argues that the 2009
Amendment was never intended to apply to an amortization of costs from a prior year that results from the
correction of an accounting error. The Louisiana Commission explains that, in Docket No. ER08-1056-000,
Entergy deferred purchased power costs from Account
555 rather than following its prior practice of deferring
them in Account 407.4. The Louisiana Commission explains that this change raised a concern that the costs
might not ultimately be reflected appropriately in
bandwidth filings. The Louisiana Commission further
explains that Entergy’s deferral was contested and the
parties eventually settled, agreeing to reflect the deferred costs in the year they were deferred rather than
over time.28
14. The Louisiana Commission contends that if the
Commission were to apply the 2009 Amendment, it
would create a conflict with Opinion No. 561. The Louisiana Commission argues that the bandwidth remedy does not require the exclusion of deferrals.29 The
27
Id. at 7.
Id. at 10.
29
Id. at 11 (citing Ex. ESI-3 at 48F (PURP variable)).
28
App. 55
Louisiana Commission contends that Opinion No. 561
required that current year deferrals be included in the
bandwidth calculation; i.e., the deferral is to be recognized in the appropriate account and be removed from
production costs in the test year. The Louisiana Commission adds that even if Entergy’s action did not violate Opinion No. 561, Entergy’s filing would be unjust
and unreasonable because it would exclude legitimate
production costs from the bandwidth calculation.30
15. The Louisiana Commission argues that applying
the 2009 Amendment to a deferral decision made in
2005 would be retroactive ratemaking. The Louisiana
Commission explains that the costs were deferred in
2005, before the 2009 Amendment was filed. The Louisiana Commission argues that, because the deferral
required the related amortization in 2008 and 2009,
the amortization cannot be separated from the deferral
in an attempt to avoid the rule against retroactive
ratemaking. The Louisiana Commission adds that the
2009 Amendment applies to deferral decisions, i.e., it
excludes the effects “resulting from a regulatory decision that causes the deferral of the recovery of current
years’ costs or the amortization of previously deferred
costs.”31 The Louisiana Commission explains that, unless the amendment is only applied prospectively to
deferral decisions, the results will be out of balance.
16. The Louisiana Commission argues that had
the remedy in this proceeding not been delayed, the
30
31
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17 (citing Ex. S-57 at 4 (emphasis added)).
App. 56
accounting would have been corrected long before the
2008 bandwidth filing. The Louisiana Commission contends that if the accounting for the deferrals had been
corrected, as is being required in this case, the accounting for subsequent years would have been corrected as
well. The Louisiana Commission explains that this
would have left no possibility of an incomplete correction that distorts the reflection of production costs in
the bandwidth calculation.32
B. Entergy’s Answer
17. In its answer, Entergy explains that the Commission held in Opinion No. 561 that “accounting corrections should be limited to accounting adjustments that
have been shown to have a bandwidth implication.”33
Entergy notes that, as it explained in its compliance
filing, the 2009 Amendment modified the definition of
Purchased Power Expense to exclude “the effects,
debits, and credits, resulting from a regulatory decision that causes the deferral of the recovery of costs or
the amortization of previously deferred costs.”34 Entergy contends that, because the Commission accepted
the 2009 Amendment with the requested date of May
31, 2009, for purposes of the 2008 bandwidth calculation (which was originally filed in 2009), the bandwidth
formula required Entergy to exclude amounts recorded
32
Id. at 18.
Entergy Answer at 2 (citing Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC
¶ 61,116 at P 120).
34
Id. (citing Entergy Servs., Inc., 128 FERC ¶ 61,069 at P 6).
33
App. 57
in Account 555 that resulted from the amortization of
deferred costs.35 Entergy notes that this language was
not in the formula for purposes of the 2005, 2006, or
2007 bandwidth calculation. Entergy contends that no
party at hearing argued that the effective date of the
2009 Amendment should be altered.36
C. Louisiana Commission’s Answer and
Motion to Lodge
18. In its answer, the Louisiana Commission argues
that Entergy errs in relying on the 2009 Amendment
to prevent recognizing the amortization of 2005 deferred costs in 2008 and 2009 in the 2008 and 2009
bandwidth calculations. The Louisiana Commission
reiterates that the 2009 Amendment was intended to
apply only to deferrals going forward and was intended
to ensure that legitimate costs are included, rather
than excluded from the bandwidth calculation. The
Louisiana Commission adds that in Entergy’s transmittal letter for the 2009 Amendment, Entergy stated
that:
[Entergy] is proposing that the Amendment
apply only to new deferrals beginning in 2008.
Thus, the Amendment will apply for the first
time to the bandwidth calculation that will be
35
36
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
App. 58
on or about May 29, 2009, which will be based
on 2008 costs.37
19. The Louisiana Commission adds that in accepting the 2009 Amendment, the Commission accepted
the change to the bandwidth formula as proposed by
Entergy.38 The Louisiana Commission contends that,
accordingly, the 2009 Amendment does not apply to
deferral decisions made before 2008. The Louisiana
Commission adds that the 2009 Amendment’s “goingforward intent” is reinforced by the language of the
amendment itself, which requires the exclusion of “the
effects, debits and credits, resulting from a regulatory
decision that defers costs.” The Louisiana Commission
argues that, in this case, the Commission required that
the entire amount of deferrals for 2005 be recognized
in Account 555 as credits, but Entergy only recognized
a portion of the debits to Account 555 necessary to
amortize the deferrals. The Louisiana Commission
argues that in the subsequent bandwidth calculations,
Entergy recognized the debits for 2006 and 2007, but
not for 2008 and 2009.39
20. The Louisiana Commission adds that, at hearing,
Trial Staff ’s witness testified that it would be “unfair”
37
Louisiana Commission Answer at 3 (citing Entergy, Transmittal Letter, Docket No. ER09-1185-000, at 5 n.15 (filed May 21,
2009)).
38
Id. at 4 (citing Entergy Servs., Inc., 128 FERC ¶ 61,069,
at P 11 (2009) (“Entergy’s proposed amendment to the System
Agreement, effective May 31, 2009, as requested.” (emphasis
added))).
39
Id. at 4.
App. 59
to exclude the amortization.40 The Louisiana Commission further adds that even Entergy advocated to
include the 2008 amortization in the bandwidth calculation. The Louisiana Commission contends that
Entergy’s witness stated that if the accounting recommendations for the deferrals were adopted for the 2005
period, “it should be necessary to recalculate the compliance filing for at least [b]andwidth test years 2006,
2007 and 2008.”41
21. The Louisiana Commission included with its answer a motion to lodge Entergy’s May 21, 2009 transmittal letter for the 2009 Amendment.
IV. Discussion
A. Procedural Matters
22. Rule 213(a)(2) of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure, 18 C.F.R. § 385.213(a)(2) (2018),
prohibits an answer to a protest or an answer unless
otherwise ordered by the decisional authority. We will
accept the answers filed in this proceeding because
they have assisted us in our decision-making process.
We will also accept the Louisiana Commission’s motion
to lodge as part of its answer.
40
41
Id. at 5 (citing Tr. 357-58).
Id. at 5-6 (citing Ex. ESI-28 at 14-15).
App. 60
B. Commission Determination
23. We accept Entergy’s accounting changes for three
identified regulatory asset deferrals for the 2005 period and the associated amortization in 2006 and 2007
as in compliance with Opinion No. 561. In Opinion No.
561, the Commission adopted the Presiding Judge’s decision to change the accounting for the three deferrals
from Accounts 407.3 (Regulatory Debits) and 407.4
(Regulatory Credits), which are not bandwidth-eligible
accounts, to Account 555 (Purchased Power), which is
a bandwidth-eligible account. The Commission also affirmed the Presiding Judge’s determination that accounting corrections “should be limited to accounting
actions that have been shown to have a bandwidth implication.”42 The Commission also found that:
once accounting errors are shown to be relevant to the 2005 bandwidth calculation, the
Operating Companies should be required to
correct their FERC Form 1 reports for the
three regulatory assets at issue for subsequent bandwidth test years, and make corresponding corrections to the bandwidth
payments and receipts for those test years, to
ensure that legitimate production costs are
properly accounted for on the FERC Form 1
reports and reflected in rates under the filed
formula.43
24. However, as noted by Entergy, the 2009 Amendment to the bandwidth formula is directly relevant as
42
43
Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 120.
Id. P 121.
App. 61
to whether the amortizations for 2008 and 2009 should
be included in the bandwidth calculations for those
years.44 The 2009 Amendment revised the definition
of variable PURP in the bandwidth formula to include
the following language:
PURP = Purchased Power Expense recorded
in FERC Account 555, but excluding payments made pursuant to Section 30.09(d) of
this Service Schedule and excluding the effects, debits and credits resulting from a regulatory decision that causes the deferral of the
recovery of current year costs or the amortization of previously deferred costs.45
25. We find that, because the 2009 Amendment was
in effect for the 2008 and 2009 bandwidth calculations,
any revisions to the accounting for the 2005 regulatory
asset deferrals for 2008 and 2009 would have had no
effect on the bandwidth payments and receipts for
those years. Accordingly, given the Commission’s directive in Opinion No. 561 that accounting corrections
should be limited to adjustments that have a bandwidth implication, we find that Entergy was correct to
revise the accounting for the 2005 regulatory assets for
only the test periods in which those adjustments would
have a bandwidth implication – the 2005 period, 2006,
and 2007. Beginning with the 2008 bandwidth calculation, the 2009 Amendment was part of the bandwidth
formula on file and in effect and required the exclusion
44
Entergy, Filing to Amend the System Agreement, Docket
No. ER09-1185-000, at 6 (filed May 21, 2009).
45
Id., Attached First Revised Sheet No. 54 (emphasis added).
App. 62
of amortization associated with the regulatory asset
deferrals recorded in Account 555 from variable PURP.
26. We are not persuaded by the Louisiana Commission’s argument that failure to make the accounting
change for 2008 and 2009 would impermissibly result
in costs trapped outside the bandwidth calculation.
First, we note that, in its exceptions to the Initial Decision, the Louisiana Commission only objected to
“trapping legitimate production costs outside the
[b]andwidth [c]alculation through an incomplete correction of accounting errors . . . ”46 Here, any “trapping” of costs would be the result of the application of
the filed rate in effect in 2008 and 2009, not accounting errors. Further, we note that the Commission
stated in Opinion No. 561 that any ordered changes
in accounting with regard to the three regulatory assets “should be reflected in rates under the filed formula.”47
27. We disagree that application of the 2009 Amendment causes a conflict with Opinion No. 561. The Louisiana Commission is correct that the 2009 Amendment
was not in effect for the 2005 period, and Entergy does
not propose to apply it to bandwidth payments and
receipts for the 2005 period. However, the 2009
Amendment was the filed rate for the 2008 and 2009
bandwidth calculations. Accordingly, Entergy has no
discretion to disregard the 2009 Amendment when
making accounting adjustments for 2008 and 2009.
46
47
Louisiana Commission Brief on Exceptions at 62-63.
Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 123.
App. 63
Similarly, we disagree with the Louisiana Commission’s argument that application of the 2009 Amendment conflicts with the amendment’s “going-forward
intent.” The 2009 Amendment explicitly requires the
exclusion of the effects, debits and credits resulting
from a regulatory decision that causes the deferral of
the recovery of current year costs or the amortization
of previously deferred costs.
28. We also disagree with the Louisiana Commission’s
argument that not making accounting adjustments for
2008 and 2009 constitutes retroactive application of
the 2009 Amendment. If, for 2008 and 2009, Entergy
had reclassified amortization related to the three regulatory assets deferrals from Accounts 407.3 and 407.4
to Account 555, and then recalculated bandwidth payments and receipts for 2008 and 2009 without excluding that amortization, its calculation would have
violated the filed rate for those test years. No party at
hearing argued that the effective date or application of
the 2009 Amendment should be reopened or altered,
and the Commission did not direct Entergy to disregard the 2009 Amendment when following the Commission’s directives in Opinion No. 561. To the
contrary, at hearing Trial Staff stated that:
Any accounting corrections ordered in this
proceeding concerning an Operating Company’s amortization of purchased power expenses deferred to a regulatory asset account
cannot effect annual bandwidth implementation calculations beginning with the 2009
annual bandwidth calculation. This is so
App. 64
because beginning with the third annual
bandwidth implementation, the Form 1 Account 555 input variable “PURP” must be
adjusted to “exclud[e] the effects, debits and
credits, resulting from a regulatory decision
that causes the deferral of the recovery of current costs or the amortization of previously
deferred costs.”48
29. Lastly, we dismiss the Louisiana Commission’s
argument that the Commission should take into consideration the fact that if this proceeding had not been
delayed, the accounting would have been corrected
long before the filing of the 2008 bandwidth calculation. In a compliance proceeding, the Commission
considers only whether the filing complies with the underlying order.49 Entergy complied with the requirements of Opinion No. 561, while taking into account
the filed rate, i.e., the bandwidth formula on file and in
effect as of June 1, 2009 for the 2008 and 2009 bandwidth calculations. The Louisiana Commission did not
seek to modify or amend the applicable bandwidth formula for the 2008 and 2009 calculations, but instead
asks the Commission to arbitrarily set it aside here,
which we cannot do. The Commission was also clear
in addressing the Louisiana Commission’s exceptions
that the ordered changes in accounting should be “reflected in rates under the filed formula.”50 Accordingly,
we will accept Entergy’s compliance filing as filed, and
48
Second Revised Ex. S-56 at 23.
ISO New England Inc., 133 FERC ¶ 61,013, at P 22 (2010).
50
Opinion No. 561, 163 FERC ¶ 61,116 at P 121.
49
App. 65
decline the Louisiana Commission’s requested modifications.
The Commission orders:
Entergy’s compliance filing is hereby accepted, as
discussed in the body of this order.
By the Commission.
(SEAL)
Kimberly D. Bose,
Secretary.
App. 66
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 20-1024
September Term, 2021
FERC-167FERC61186,
FERC-169FERC61247
Filed On: October 29, 2021
Louisiana Public Service Commission,
Petitioner
v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Respondent
--------------------------------Entergy Services, LLC and
Arkansas Public Service Commission,
Intervenors
BEFORE:
Srinivasan, Chief Judge; Henderson,
Rogers, Tatel, Millett, Pillard, Wilkins,
Katsas, Rao, Walker, and Jackson,
Circuit Judges
ORDER
Upon consideration of petitioner’s petition for rehearing en banc, the response thereto, and the absence
of a request by any member of the court for a vote, it is
ORDERED that the petition be denied.
App. 67
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
BY:
/s/
Daniel J. Reidy
Deputy Clerk
App. 68
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 20-1024
September Term, 2021
FERC-167FERC61186,
FERC-169FERC61247
Filed On: October 29, 2021
Louisiana Public Service Commission,
Petitioner
v.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Respondent
--------------------------------Entergy Services, LLC and
Arkansas Public Service Commission,
Intervenors
BEFORE:
Henderson, Pillard, and Katsas, Circuit Judges
ORDER
Upon consideration of petitioner’s petition for
panel rehearing filed on September 21, 2021, and the
response thereto, it is
ORDERED that the petition be denied.
App. 69
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
BY:
/s/
Daniel J. Reidy
Deputy Clerk
App. 70
163 FERC ¶ 61,116
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Before Commissioners: Kevin J. McIntyre, Chairman;
Cheryl A. LaFleur, Neil
Chatterjee, Robert F.
Powelson, and Richard Glick.
Louisiana Public
Service Commission
Docket No. EL01-88-015
v.
Entergy Services, Inc.
OPINION NO. 561
ORDER ON INITIAL DECISION
(Issued May 17, 2018)
1. This case is before the Commission on exceptions
to an Initial Decision1 issued November 7, 2016, and
involves a “bandwidth” calculation filing, covering a
seven-month period in 2005, submitted by Entergy
Services, Inc. (Entergy Services)2 on behalf of the Entergy Operating Companies (Operating Companies)3
1
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 157 FERC
¶ 63,018 (2016) (Initial Decision).
2
Entergy is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Entergy Corporation.
3
The five Operating Companies involved in this proceeding
were, at the relevant times for filing pursuant to this bandwidth
calculation filing: Entergy Arkansas, Inc. (Entergy Arkansas),
Entergy Louisiana, Inc. (Entergy Louisiana), Entergy Mississippi, Inc. (Entergy Mississippi), Entergy New Orleans, Inc.
App. 71
(collectively, Entergy).4 Entergy’s filing was made pursuant to a remand by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
and subsequent Commission order. On October 15,
2015, the Commission issued an order5 accepting and
suspending Entergy’s proposed rates and establishing
hearing and settlement judge procedures. In this order,
as discussed below, we affirm the Presiding Judge’s
findings in the Initial Decision, with additional discussion regarding one accounting issue.
I.
Procedural Background
2. The Commission has held that the System Agreement required that production costs be “roughly equal”
among those Operating Companies participating in
the System Agreement.6 In Opinion Nos. 480 and
(Entergy New Orleans), and Entergy Gulf States, Inc. (Entergy
Gulf States). At the end of 2007, Entergy Gulf States was split
into Entergy Texas, Inc. (Entergy Texas) and Entergy Gulf States
Louisiana, LLC (Entergy Gulf States Louisiana).
4
As explained below, Entergy bandwidth calculation filings
are annual filings to achieve rough production cost equalization
among the Operating Companies participating in the Entergy
System Agreement (System Agreement). The System Agreement
terminated in 2016.
5
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 153 FERC
¶ 61,032 (2015) (Hearing Order), reh’g denied, 155 FERC ¶ 61,118
(2016), aff ’d, Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, No. 16-1193 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 30, 2018).
6
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., Opinion No.
480, 111 FERC ¶ 61,311, at P 136 (2005), order on reh’g, Opinion
No. 480-A, 113 FERC ¶ 61,282 (2005), order on compliance, 117
FERC ¶ 61,203 (2006) (November 2006 Compliance Order), order
on reh’g and compliance, 119 FERC ¶ 61,095 (2007) (April 2007
Compliance Order), aff ’d in part and remanded in part sub nom.
App. 72
480-A, the Commission held that the Entergy System
was no longer in rough production cost equalization
and adopted a numerical bandwidth remedy. This
bandwidth remedy achieves rough production cost
equalization on the Entergy System among the Operating Companies participating in the System Agreement by not allowing any Operating Company to have
production costs that are more than 11 percent above
or below the Entergy System average production
costs. Under the bandwidth remedy, each calendar
year, the production costs of each Operating Company are calculated, with payments made by the low
cost Operating Company(ies) to the high cost Operating Company(ies) such that, after reflecting the payments and receipts, no Operating Company would
have production costs more than 11 percent above the
Entergy System average or more than 11 percent below the Entergy System average. The 11 percent figure
was based on historical cost data, such that the bandwidth remedy would apply if the Entergy System exceeded historical cost disparities.7
3. In Opinion No. 480, issued June 1, 2005, the
Commission found that the bandwidth remedy should
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 522 F.3d 378 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Louisiana Remand), order on remand, 137 FERC ¶ 61,047 (2011)
(2011 Order on Remand), order dismissing reh’g, 137 FERC
¶ 61,048 (2011), order on reh’g, 146 FERC ¶ 61,152 (2014) (2014
Order on Rehearing), order denying reh’g, 153 FERC ¶ 61,034
(2015) (2015 Order Denying Rehearing II), remanded, La. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n v. FERC, 866 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (affirming
2011 Order on Remand and 2014 Order on Rehearing).
7
Opinion No. 480, 111 FERC ¶ 61,311 at P 144.
App. 73
apply prospectively starting in calendar year 2006,
with the first payments, based on calendar year 2006
production costs, occurring in 2007. Entergy subsequently submitted a compliance filing containing its
proposed bandwidth formula, as part of the System
Agreement. The bandwidth formula was accepted by
the Commission8 to be applied prospectively for production costs incurred during calendar year 2006 and
all calendar years thereafter.
4. In its remand9 of Opinion Nos. 480 and 480-A, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) held that the Commission
had not provided a reasonable explanation for the
Commission’s decision to delay implementation of the
bandwidth remedy until a full year of data had become
available for the 2006 test year. The court held that the
Commission’s argument that use of the first calendar
year of data was “the most appropriate and equitable
way” to implement the bandwidth remedy was a conclusion rather than a reason, and that the Commission
had failed to explain why it believed that the first calendar year was the most equitable time.10
5. In the subsequent 2011 Order on Remand, the Commission held that it would implement the bandwidth
remedy on June 1, 2005, the date the Commission
8
See November 2006 Compliance Order, 117 FERC ¶ 61,203;
April 2007 Compliance Order, 119 FERC ¶ 61,095 (2006 Compliance Tariff ).
9
Louisiana Remand, 522 F.3d 378.
10
Id. at 400.
App. 74
issued Opinion No. 480 determining that the rates
were unjust and unreasonable. The Commission stated
that allowing the bandwidth remedy to be implemented on June 1, 2005 is consistent with the court’s
direction that, absent a reasonable explanation for a
delay to implement the bandwidth remedy, it would be
arbitrary and capricious for the Commission to delay
implementation of a just and reasonable rate.11 The
Commission directed Entergy to submit a compliance
filing calculating the bandwidth payments and receipts for the period June 1, 2005 through December
31, 2005 (2005 period).12
6. On February 28, 2014, the Commission issued an
order13 rejecting a compliance filing submitted by Entergy on December 19, 2011 in response to the 2011
Order on Remand. The Commission rejected Entergy’s
use of six months of data as a basis for the calculation
for the seven-month period at issue, rather than actual
data for all seven months, and required Entergy to submit a subsequent compliance filing. The Commission
stated that in Entergy’s subsequent compliance filing,
Entergy must perform bandwidth calculations for the
2005 period using monthly data wherever possible.
11
2011 Order on Remand, 137 FERC ¶ 61,047 at P 34. The
Commission denied a Louisiana Commission request for rehearing regarding these rulings in the 2014 Order on Rehearing. 2014
Order on Rehearing, 146 FERC ¶ 61,152 at P 33.
12
Id.
13
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 146 FERC
¶ 61,153 (2014) (2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing), order
denying reh’g, 153 FERC ¶ 61,033 (2015) (2015 Order Denying
Rehearing I).
App. 75
The Commission stated that, for components of the
bandwidth formula where month-to-month variations
in costs are not meant to be captured, end-of-year
amounts should be used.14 The Commission also stated
that payments associated with the 2005 period must
include interest.15
II.
Entergy’s Filing
7. On April 29, 2014, as amended on May 7, 2014 and
May 23, 2014, Entergy submitted a compliance filing
in response to the 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance
Filing. The compliance filing calculated bandwidth
payments and receipts for the 2005 period. As part of
its compliance filing, as amended, Entergy filed a comprehensive recalculation report showing the payment/
receipt amounts based on the 2005 monthly data. Entergy stated that the sources of the monthly data are
the actual books and records of each Operating Company that existed at that time. Entergy contended that
it used monthly data as the source for those variables
not based on data as of December 31, 2005, e.g., rate
base components use year-end balances. Entergy
stated that with respect to the Demand Ratio and Entergy Ratio, Entergy applied a seven-month average
balance. Entergy states that the resulting variations
or disparities from the system average cost for each
Operating Company are as follows. Variations below
the system average are in parentheses.
14
15
Id. PP 26-27.
Id. P 30.
App. 76
Operating Company
% Initial
% Final
Disparity
Disparity
(Before Remedy) (After Remedy)
Entergy Arkansas
(23.37%)
(11.00)%
Entergy Gulf States
Louisiana
13.92%
5.64%
Entergy Louisiana
(1.04)%
(1.04)%
Entergy Mississippi
10.56%
5.64%
Entergy New
Orleans
6.79%
5.64%
Entergy Texas
13.54%
5.64%
8. As shown above, Entergy Arkansas has an initial
disparity in the Compliance Filing exceeding the plus
or minus 11 percent from system average costs set
forth in Opinion No. 480 and 480-A. The payments and
receipts pursuant to Service Schedule MSS-3 section
30.11 are as follows:
Company
Entergy Arkansas
(Payment)/Receipt
($ Millions)
($167.3)
Entergy Gulf States Louisiana
$72.8
Entergy Louisiana
$0.0
Entergy Mississippi
$33.2
Entergy New Orleans
$2.1
Entergy Texas
$59.2
App. 77
9. With regard to interest calculations, Entergy
stated that it had computed interest on the payments
and receipts based on the calculations included in its
compliance filing. Entergy stated that interest was
compounded quarterly from June 1, 2006 through May
14, 2014, the date upon which its current compliance
filing payments will be made.
Company
(Payment)/Receipt
($ Millions)
(Interest Amounts)
Entergy Arkansas
($56.5)
Entergy Gulf States Louisiana
$24.0
Entergy Louisiana
$0.0
Entergy Mississippi
$11.0
Entergy New Orleans
$0.5
Entergy Texas
$21.0
10. On October 15, 2015, the Commission issued an
order stating that the compliance filing raises issues of
material fact and setting the matter for hearing and
settlement judge procedures.16 On December 4, 2015,
the participants in the settlement proceedings recommended initiation of hearing procedures to be conducted with settlement procedures.
11. On July 11, 2016, the parties and Commission
trial staff (Trial Staff) filed a Joint Statement of
16
Hearing Order, 153 FERC ¶ 61,032.
App. 78
Contested Issues and Positions17 in accordance with
the procedural schedule. The parties and Trial Staff
identified thirteen issues to be decided in this case.18
12. On June 30, 2016, Entergy filed a motion for partial summary judgment in this proceeding.19 Entergy’s
motion asserted that the Commission had already
ruled on the applicable tariff in this proceeding and
that the bandwidth formula accepted in the Commission’s prior orders governs the calculation of payments
and receipts for the 2005 period. On July 28, 2016, the
Presiding Judge issued a partial initial decision,20 finding that the Compliance Tariff filed by Entergy on December 18, 2006 constitutes the bandwidth formula
that should be used in this proceeding. The Presiding
Judge also summarily disposed of certain other issues
in this case pertaining to the application of the compliance tariff. On May 17, 2018 the Commission issued an
order21 affirming the Partial Initial Decision.
17
Entergy July 11, 2016 Joint Statement of Contested Issues
and Positions at 1-45.
18
In order to maintain consistency with briefs and exhibits
filed in this proceeding, the issues discussed herein (i.e., Issue
Nos. 4, 6, 12, and 13) retain the original numbers that were designated in the Joint Statement of Contested Issues and Positions
that were filed on July 11, 2016 in accordance with the procedural
schedule.
19
Entergy June 30, 2016 Motion for Partial Summary Disposition at 1.
20
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 156 FERC
¶ 63,018 (2016) (Partial Initial Decision).
21
La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Entergy Servs., Inc., 163 FERC
¶ 61,117 (2018).
App. 79
III.
Initial Decision
13. On November 7, 2016, the Presiding Judge issued
the Initial Decision addressing those issues not already resolved in the Partial Initial Decision. Entergy,
Trial Staff, and the Louisiana Public Service Commission (Louisiana Commission) filed briefs on exceptions.
Entergy, Trial Staff, the Louisiana Commission, and
the Arkansas Public Service Commission (Arkansas
Commission) filed briefs opposing exceptions.
14. The Initial Decision covered various issues, including: (1) whether interest on payments related to
the 2005 bandwidth test period should be accrued from
June 1, 2005, the first day of the test period, or from
June 1, 2006, the date that those payments should
have been made; (2) whether Entergy Louisiana’s Net
Operating Loss Accumulated Deferred Income Tax
(ADIT) is attributable to the Entergy Louisiana’s 2001
“Vidalia tax deduction,” and, if so, whether it is appropriate to exclude Entergy Louisiana’s Net Operating
Loss ADIT recorded in Account 190 caused by the Vidalia tax deduction from the 2005 bandwidth calculation; (3) whether Entergy Louisiana’s accounting for
the leased portion of the Waterford 3 Nuclear Plant
sale/leaseback should be changed to be the same as the
accounting for the owned portion of the plant; (4)
whether the Operating Companies properly accounted
for regulatory asset deferrals and amortizations identified in Exhibits S-28 through S-32; and (5) whether
the deferrals and amortizations identified in Exhibits
S-28 through S-32 should affect the amount of costs reflected in the bandwidth calculation.
App. 80
15. In the Initial Decision, the Presiding Judge finds,
inter alia, (1) that the appropriate start date for interest on bandwidth payments in this proceeding is June
1, 2006; (2) that a portion of Entergy Louisiana’s Net
Operating Loss ADIT must be excluded from the ADIT
input variable of the bandwidth formula to the extent
that the ADIT is properly attributable to the Vidalia
tax deduction; (3) that Entergy Louisiana’s accounting
for the leased portion of the Waterford 3 plant should
be revised to reflect that it is a financing transaction;
(4) that Entergy did not properly account for certain
regulatory asset deferrals and amortizations identified
in Exhibits S-28 through S-32; and (5) that Entergy
will be required to determine the impact of accounting
changes on the bandwidth calculation for the 2005
bandwidth period and make a compliance filing to
change the result accordingly.
IV.
Discussion
16. Having fully evaluated the Initial Decision, the
parties’ briefs, and the record before us, we affirm the
Presiding Judge’s findings. Specifically, we affirm the
Presiding Judge’s findings that the appropriate start
date for interest is June 1, 2006. We also agree with the
Presiding Judge’s finding that a portion of Entergy
Louisiana’s Net Operating Loss ADIT is attributable
to the Vidalia tax deduction. We affirm the Presiding
Judge’s related finding that it is appropriate to exclude
from the 2005 bandwidth calculation Net Operating
Loss ADIT recorded in Account 190 that is attributable to the Vidalia tax deduction. We agree with the
App. 81
Presiding Judge that Entergy did not properly account
for certain regulatory asset deferrals. Although the
Presiding Judge did not address whether corrections
for the regulatory asset deferrals should be made for
years subsequent to the 2005 bandwidth period, we
find that making such corrections is necessary to ensure proper implementation of the filed rate.22 We also
agree with the Presiding Judge that Entergy must determine the impact of accounting changes as discussed
in this order and file a compliance filing.
17. Lastly, we note that no parties excepted to the
Presiding Judge’s ruling on whether Entergy Louisiana’s accounting for the leased portion of the Waterford 3 plant should be changed to be the same as the
accounting for the owned portion of the plant. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the Presiding Judge on this
issue.
A. Issue Four: Start Date for Interest
on Bandwidth Payments
1. Background
18. On February 28, 2014, the Commission issued
two orders in this proceeding ordering interest on
bandwidth payments for 2005 bandwidth period. In
22
The Presiding Judge noted that the omission from the Initial Decision of any argument raised by the participants in this
proceeding does not mean it that it has not been considered. Rather, it indicates that issues not specifically discussed or addressed have been considered and are rejected. Initial Decision,
157 FERC ¶ 63,018 at P 28.
App. 82
the 2014 Order on Rehearing, which addressed requests for rehearing of the 2011 Order on Remand, the
Commission granted the Louisiana Commission’s request that interest be required on the bandwidth payments in this proceeding.23 The Commission required
that interest be calculated on the payment/receipt
amounts as of June 1, 2006.24 In the 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing, which rejected Entergy’s initial
compliance filing regarding bandwidth payments for
the 2005 bandwidth period, the Commission, inter alia,
agreed with the Louisiana Commission’s argument
that payments/receipts for the 2005 bandwidth period
must include interest.25
19. Entergy requested rehearing of the Commission’s
determination regarding interest in both orders, resulting in the issuance of two similar Commission orders26 on October 15, 2015. In the 2015 Order Denying
Rehearing I, the Commission rejected Entergy’s request for rehearing of the 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing, again affirming the Commission’s
prior determination regarding interest.27 In the 2015
Order Denying Rehearing II, the Commission denied
23
2014 Order on Rehearing, 146 FERC ¶ 61,152 at P 42.
Id.
25
2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing, 146 FERC
¶ 61,153 at P 30. The 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing
found that interest was required but did not specify a start date.
26
2015 Order Denying Rehearing I, 153 FERC ¶ 61,033 and
2015 Order Denying Rehearing II, 153 FERC ¶ 61,034 (jointly,
2015 Orders Denying Rehearing).
27
2015 Order Denying Rehearing I, 153 FERC ¶ 61,033 at
PP 12-16.
24
App. 83
Entergy’s request for rehearing of the 2014 Order on
Rehearing, affirming the Commission’s prior ruling
that interest must be included on payment/receipts for
the 2005 bandwidth period.28
20. In the 2005 bandwidth calculation, Entergy computed interest as of the date of issuance of transfer
payments and receipts among the Operating Companies, which is June 1, 2006.29 The Louisiana Commission argued that the 2015 Orders Denying Rehearing
indicated that the correct start date should be one year
earlier, June 1, 2005, the date on which the 2005 bandwidth period begins.30
2. Initial Decision
21. The Presiding Judge found that interest for the
2005 bandwidth period should begin to accrue as of
June 1, 2006. The Presiding Judge explained that there
is no overall rule dictating when the interest clock of a
remedy starts to run. The Presiding Judge explained
that the June 1, 2006 date was established in the 2014
Order on Rehearing, in which the Commission found
that:
In the instant case, due to the length of time
that has passed, we find that it is appropriate
to follow our general policy and require interest to be paid on the bandwidth remedy
28
2015 Order Denying Rehearing II, 153 FERC ¶ 61,034 at
PP 13-17.
29
Ex. ESI-2 at 6.
30
Louisiana Commission Post-hrg. Br. at 1.
App. 84
payments for the seven-month period in 2005
to ensure full compensation. As the court explained in Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v.
FERC, “interest is simply a way of ensuring
full compensation. This is why the delay between the time of the customers’ injury and
the granting of relief is a reason for awarding
interest, not denying it. . . .” This finding is
also consistent with our more recent orders
regarding the bandwidth remedy. Consistent
with those orders, we will direct that interest
be calculated on the payment/receipt amounts
from June 1, 2006 until the date of the Entergy Intra-System Bill that will reflect the
bandwidth calculation amounts for the sevenmonth 2005 period.31
22. The Presiding Judge explained that the Commission “muddied the waters” with regard to the interest
question in the 2015 Order Denying Rehearing II.32 In
that order, the Commission found:
On March 31, 2014, Entergy Services, Inc.,
(Entergy) requested rehearing of the Commission’s ruling in a prior order that Entergy
must include interest, beginning June 1, 2006,
and the recalculated bandwidth payment and
receipt amounts for the seven-month period
from June 1, 2005 through December 31,
2005. . . . The request for rehearing is denied.
31
2014 Order on Rehearing, 146 FERC ¶ 61,152 at P 42 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
32
Initial Decision, 157 FERC ¶ 63,018 at P 36.
App. 85
Entergy also argues that the general policy
considerations set forth in Anadarko in support of interest are inapplicable to bandwidth
payments. However, the first policy consideration, just compensation, is fully applicable. In
the circumstances of this case, the implementation date of the bandwidth remedy has been
pushed back seven months to June 1, 2005,
and full compensation requires interest from
that date until the date of the Intra-System
bill that will reflect the bandwidth calculation
amounts for calendar year 2006.33
23. The Presiding Judge found that because the text
of the Order Denying Rehearing II contains irreconcilable provisions, it is appropriate to ignore the language
in the two 2015 orders denying rehearing and to rely
instead on the 2014 Order on Rehearing’s interest
start date of June 1, 2006. The Presiding Judge also
noted that there is no language in the Order Denying
Rehearing II that overrides the motivations of the
2014 Order on Rehearing that the June 1, 2006 start
date ensures “full compensation.”34
24. The Presiding Judge found that there is a practical problem with starting the interest clock on the first
day of implementation of the bandwidth remedy. The
Presiding Judge explained that the Compliance Tariff provides that bandwidth transfer payments and
33
2015 Order Denying Rehearing II, 153 FERC ¶ 61,034 at
PP 1, 13, 17 (emphasis added). The 2015 Order Denying Rehearing I contained identical language.
34
Initial Decision, 157 FERC ¶ 63,018 at P 40.
App. 86
receipts are computed on the basis of “the preceding
year’s results.”35 The Presiding Judge explained that
the amounts of the first set of transfer payments were
unknowable until the applicable test period was completed. The Presiding Judge found that, accordingly, it
would not be possible to establish as of the very first
day of that period which Operating Companies would
be making transfer payments, and which would be receiving payments, or even if payments were to be made
at all.36 The Presiding Judge found that the Commission “cannot have intended Entergy to embark on a
mathematically impossible task.”37
3. Briefs on Exceptions
25. The Louisiana Commission argues that the correct start date for interest associated with the 2005
bandwidth period is June 1, 2005. The Louisiana Commission explains that in the 2011 Order on Remand,
the Commission ordered the bandwidth remedy to be
implemented on June 1, 2005, and further ordered
Entergy to calculate bandwidth payments and receipts for the seven-month period of June 1, 2005
through December 31, 2005.38 The Louisiana Commission contends that the Commission found the System
Agreement rates to be unduly discriminatory as of that
35
Id. P 41 (citing Arkansas Commission Post-hg. Brief at 4-
5).
36
Id.
Id.
38
Id. (citing 2011 Order on Remand, 137 FERC ¶ 61,047 at
P 34) (emphasis added).
37
App. 87
date, and that it “would be arbitrary and capricious of
the Commission to delay implementation of a just and
reasonable rate.”39 The Louisiana Commission argues
that, consistent with established practice in the bandwidth proceedings, interest is due on delayed payments from the time the bandwidth rate is made
effective. The Louisiana Commission contends that the
payments are for the seven-month 2005 bandwidth period, and interest must be paid for the delay since
that time to ensure adequate compensation for the undue discrimination. The Louisiana Commission argues
that the Commission reiterated in numerous orders
that the bandwidth payments and receipts were “for”
the 2005 bandwidth period, with an effective date of
June 1, 2005.40 The Louisiana Commission argues that,
accordingly, there can be no serious question that the
rates at issue in this proceeding are effective on June
1, 2005, and that interest should flow from the same
date that rates are effective.
26. The Louisiana Commission contends that this
case is different from other bandwidth implementation
proceedings in that the rates, as Entergy has filed
them, are not based on a preceding year of data as required by Service Schedule MSS-3. The Louisiana
Commission explains that in the other cases, the bandwidth calculation was based on data from the year
39
Louisiana Commission Brief on Exceptions at 10 (citing
2011 Order on Remand, 137 FERC ¶ 61,047 at P 34).
40
Id. at 19-20 (citing 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing, 146 FERC ¶ 61,153 at PP 1, 27; 2015 Order Denying Rehearing I, 153 FERC ¶ 61,033 at P 12).
App. 88
preceding the effective date of the rates. The Louisiana
Commission contends that, accordingly, unlike other
bandwidth implementation years, the “test period” and
the “rate effective period” are the same. The Louisiana
Commission argues that because the rate-effective period occurred many years ago, there is no need to use
a test year “proxy” to represent the rate-effective period.41
27. The Louisiana Commission contends that the interest start date should be based on the Commission’s
most recent expressions of will, which would support a
June 1, 2005 interest start date. The Louisiana Commission argues that although the 2014 Order on Rehearing establishes June 1, 2006 as the start date for
interest, the 2015 Orders Denying Rehearing required
that interest commence June 1, 2005.42 The Louisiana
Commission argues that the two orders should control
the start date for interest, as they are the most recent
and are consistent with the purpose of providing interest, i.e., ensuring just compensation. The Louisiana
Commission also argues that the order setting this
case for hearing is the latest, most applicable authority
on interest, and it recognized that payments associated with the 2005 bandwidth period “must include
interest.”43 The Louisiana Commission argues that the
41
Id. at 22.
Id. (citing 2015 Order Denying Rehearing II, 153 FERC
¶ 61,034 at P 17; 2015 Order Denying Rehearing I, 153 FERC
¶ 61,033 at P 16).
43
Id. at 24 (citing Hearing Order, 153 FERC ¶ 61,032 at P 6)
(emphasis added).
42
App. 89
Hearing Order also recognizes June 1, 2005 as the effective date for rates in this proceeding.44 The Louisiana Commission notes that the Hearing Order cites to
the 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing, which
states that “bandwidth payments associated with the
[2005 bandwidth period] must also include interest.”45
The Louisiana Commission further notes that the 2014
Order Rejecting Compliance Filing also confirms that
the remedy in this proceeding is “for” the 2005 bandwidth period.46 The Louisiana Commission explains
that in response to Entergy’s request for rehearing of
the 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing, the Commission issued the Order Denying Rehearing I, which,
according to the Louisiana Commission, specifies a
June 1, 2005 start date for interest.47 The Louisiana
Commission argues that, accordingly, the Hearing Order emerges from a line of Commission orders that recognize the June 1, 2005 effective date.
28. The Louisiana Commission argues that the Initial Decision erred in ignoring the 2015 Orders Denying Rehearing due to “irreconcilable” language, i.e.,
denying rehearing of the order listing June 1, 2006 as
the start date for interest, while, according to the
44
Id. (citing Hearing Order, 153 FERC ¶ 61,032 at P 22
n.30). The Hearing Order stated that June 1, 2005 is the effective
date for the rates in this proceeding, but did not discuss the start
date for interest.
45
Id. (citing 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing, 146
FERC ¶ 61,153 at P 30).
46
Id. (citing 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing, 146
FERC ¶ 61,153 at P 26).
47
Id. at 25.
App. 90
Louisiana Commission, stating that the interest start
date is June 1, 2005.48 The Louisiana Commission asserts that the Commission is free to clarify its orders
as long as it retains jurisdiction over the case. The Louisiana Commission argues that there is also an internal conflict in the 2014 Order on Rehearing. The
Louisiana Commission explains that in that order, the
Commission granted the Louisiana Commission’s request for rehearing, which requested a June 1, 2005
start date for interest, but inconsistently stated that
interest would start June 1, 2006. The Louisiana Commission adds that the Commission ruled that the
bandwidth remedy would be “for” the 2005 bandwidth
period.49 The Louisiana Commission argues that the
Initial Decision fails to explain how one “irreconcilable
conflict” differs from the other.50 The Louisiana Commission adds that because the 2014 Order Rejecting
Compliance Filing did not explicitly repeat the June 1,
2006 interest start date contained in the 2014 Order
on Rehearing, the Commission erred in referring to the
June 1, 2006 interest start date on rehearing of that
order in the 2015 Order Denying Rehearing I. The Louisiana Commission contends that the 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing only agreed in general terms
48
Id. at 11.
Id. (citing 2014 Order on Rehearing, 146 FERC ¶ 61,152
at P 42).
50
Id.
49
App. 91
“that bandwidth payments associated with the sevenmonth period must include interest. . . .”51
29. The Louisiana Commission disputes the Initial
Decision’s finding that it would be mathematically impossible to calculate interest from June 1, 2005, because the amounts owed are not known until the
remedy period is completed.52 The Louisiana Commission argues that the Presiding Judge mistakes calculating interest for the period June 1, 2005 forward with
calculating interest on June 1, 2005. The Louisiana
Commission adds that it is not necessary to know the
amounts of the payments on June 1, 2005 to calculate
interest beginning June 1, 2005. The Louisiana Commission argues that, instead, once the payments were
known, refunds and interest on those refunds could be
calculated. The Louisiana Commission argues that
this could occur any time after Entergy’s filing to determine the payments for the 2005 period.53
30. The Louisiana Commission argues that both
section 205(e)54 and 206(b)55 of the Federal Power
Act (FPA) make clear that refunds are determined
from the commencement of the remedy period, when
the Commission determines the just and reasonable
rates and provides for paying interest. The Louisiana
51
Id. at 27 (citing 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing,
146 FERC ¶ 61,153 at P 30).
52
Id. (citing Initial Decision, 157 FERC ¶ 63,018 at P 41).
53
Id. at 45.
54
16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (2012).
55
16 U.S.C. § 824e(b) (2012).
App. 92
Commission contends that the amounts are never
known during the period being remedied, but they are
known once the Commission determines the refunds
for the rate-effective period. The Louisiana Commission argues that the Initial Decision would prevent the
Commission from ever attaching interest for a refund
period, because it assumes that interest has to be calculated during that period. The Louisiana Commission
contends that when unjust and unreasonable costs in
rates are refunded, the amounts owed are always calculated after the unjust and unreasonable rates were
assessed.56
31. The Louisiana Commission contends that a June
1, 2005 start date for interest is required by the Commission’s regulations, which state that “[i]nterest shall
be computed from the date of collection until the date
refunds are made. . . .”57 The Louisiana Commission
argues that, in this case, the payments would have
started on the date of the rates. The Louisiana Commission adds that, even if they were delayed a year, the
“date of collection” in the regulation is not the date that
bandwidth payments would have started, but instead
should be the date that the overpayments were “collected” from ratepayers who were deprived of the use
of their money from that date.58
56
Louisiana Commission Brief on Exceptions at 11.
Id. at 41 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 35.19a (2017) (emphasis
added).
58
Id. (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. v. Sellers of Energy, 105
FERC ¶ 61,066 (2003)).
57
App. 93
4. Briefs Opposing Exceptions
32. Entergy, the Arkansas Commission, and Trial
Staff all argue that the correct start date for interest
in this proceeding is June 1, 2006. Trial Staff contends
that the 2014 Order on Rehearing unambiguously establishes a June 1, 2006 interest start date and is the
controlling legal precedent, and that the Commission’s
subsequent orders support this finding. Trial Staff argues that the 2015 Orders Denying Rehearing support
a June 1, 2006 interest effective date. Trial Staff explains that both of the 2015 Orders Denying Rehearing
denied Entergy’s request for rehearing of the issue of
whether interest was due for the payments and receipts in the 2005 bandwidth period, but did not address a change in the interest effective date.59
33. Trial Staff argues that because the 2014 Order on
Rehearing is the only Commission order that directly
addresses the interest effective date, and rehearing of
that order was denied, the establishment of a June 1,
2006 interest start date must stand. Trial Staff disagrees with the Louisiana Commission’s assertion that
a sentence in the 2015 Orders Denying Rehearing referring to June 1, 2005 requires a change in the start
date. Trial Staff contends that the sentence appears in
a paragraph responding to a claim in Entergy’s request
for rehearing whether policy considerations regarding
the application of interest apply to this proceeding.
Trial Staff argues that given the context, it is clear that
the Commission was addressing policy about whether
59
Trail Staff Brief Opposing Exceptions at 14.
App. 94
interest should apply, not the date from which interest
should be calculated.60
34. Entergy explains that the remedy effective date
is not the same as the effective date for payments and
interest. Entergy contends that the Louisiana Commission blurs the rate effective date and the interest
start date by arguing that, because bandwidth payments are “for” the 2005 bandwidth period, interest
must be paid beginning June 1, 2005. Entergy explains
that the Commission has previously explained the distinction between the effective date of the bandwidth
remedy and the date on which payments should be
made. Entergy contends that in Opinion No. 480, the
Commission originally held that the bandwidth remedy would be “effective for calendar year 2006.”61 Entergy explains that in its subsequent compliance filing
in that proceeding, Entergy proposed a rate schedule
that utilized calendar year 2006 production cost data
to calculate payments beginning June 1, 2007. Entergy
explains that the Commission rejected the Louisiana
Commission’s arguments that a June 1, 2007 payment
date was inconsistent with the Commission’s prior ruling that the bandwidth remedy be effective for calendar year 2006, thereby drawing a clear distinction
between the effective date of the remedy and the effective date of the annual bandwidth payments.62
60
Id. at 16.
Entergy Brief Opposing Exceptions at 8 (citing Opinion
No. 480, 111 FERC ¶ 63,111 at P 145).
62
Id. (citing Opinion No. 480-A, 113 FERC ¶ 61,282 at P 47).
61
App. 95
35. The Arkansas Commission adds that interest
should be determined on bandwidth payments per the
bandwidth formula in Service Schedule MSS-3. The
Arkansas Commission asserts that the tariff language
provides that payments start on June 1, 2006 following
the 2005 bandwidth period, and failure to follow that
mandate would violate the as-filed bandwidth formula.63 The Arkansas Commission disagrees with the
Louisiana Commission’s argument that interest is required as of June 1, 2005 to address alleged unjust and
unreasonable “cost disparities” among the Operating
Companies existing on that date. The Arkansas Commission argues that the Commission requires interest
payments to provide the time value of payments received by the Operating Companies starting June 1,
2006, not on alleged overpayments beginning June 1,
2005. The Arkansas Commission explains that there
can be no such overpayments since the bandwidth payments for 2005 would not commence until June 1,
2006.64
36. Entergy and the Arkansas Commission argue
that the Presiding Judge correctly determined that
the Commission did not intend for Entergy to undertake a mathematically impossible task. Entergy agrees
with the Presiding Judge that the amounts of the
transfer payments “were unknowable until the applicable test period was completed.”65 Entergy explains
63
Arkansas Brief Opposing Exceptions at 4.
Id. at 5.
65
Entergy Brief Opposing Exceptions at 15 (citing Initial Decision at P 41).
64
App. 96
that, therefore, it would be impossible to establish as
of the very first day of the test period which Operating
Company would be making or receiving payments.66
The Arkansas Commission contends that the Louisiana Commission’s exception misses the point that even
if it were mathematically possible to determine payments beginning June 1, 2005, the bandwidth remedy
is prospective in nature, and applying the formula retroactively to June 1, 2005 would violate the filed rate.67
37. Trial Staff, Entergy, and the Arkansas Commission also disagree with the Louisiana Commission’s assertion that a June 1, 2006 start date for interest is
inconsistent with the Commission’s regulations. Trial
Staff disputes the Louisiana Commission’s contention
that 18 C.F.R. 35.19a, Refund requirements under suspension orders, is controlling and requires interest to
be paid from the date customers initially began paying
overcharges. Trial Staff explains that this date does
not apply because the Commission has stated repeatedly that the bandwidth remedy does not involve refunds.68 Entergy and the Arkansas Commission add
that even if the interest regulation were applicable
here, the Initial Decision correctly recognized that the
date of collection is the date on which bandwidth payments would have started, which is June 1, 2006.69
66
Id.
Arkansas Commission Brief Opposing Exceptions at 13.
68
Trial Staff Brief Opposing Exceptions at 31 (citing, e.g.,
Opinion No. 480, 111 FERC ¶ 61,311 at P 145).
69
Entergy Brief Opposing Exceptions at 14; Arkansas Commission Brief on Exceptions at 12.
67
App. 97
Trial Staff argues that the Louisiana Commission incorrectly argues that the FPA requires interest to be
paid on unjustified rates or charges. Trial Staff contends that the Louisiana Commission cites a permissive passage despite claiming a mandatory rule. Trial
Staff explains that the cited material notes that the
Commission “may by further order require . . . refund,
with interest . . . such increased rates or changes as by
its discretion shall be found not justified.”70
38. The Arkansas Commission adds that, contrary to
the assertion made by the Louisiana Commission, the
most recent relevant order supports a June 1, 2006 interest start date. The Arkansas Commission explains
that the Commission’s order on rehearing and clarification issued September 22, 2016, in Docket No. ER1
0- 13 50-005, concludes that the interest effective date
is June 1, 2006.71 The Arkansas Commission explains
that, in that order (regarding bandwidth payments for
calendar year 2009), interest is necessary on bandwidth payments given the delay since the June 1, 2010
effective date of such payments, “in order to ensure full
compensation.”72 The Arkansas Commission further
explains that, in support of its determination, the
Commission stated that “[t]his determination is also
consistent with numerous recent orders regarding
70
Trial Staff Brief Opposing Exceptions at 33 (citing 16
U.S.C. § 824d(e) (emphasis added)).
71
Arkansas Commission Brief Opposing Exceptions at 10
(citing Entergy Servs., Inc., 156 FERC ¶ 61,196, at P 151 (2016)).
72
Id.
App. 98
interest and the bandwidth calculation,”73 with a citation to a paragraph in the 2014 Order on Rehearing
that requires interest in this proceeding to be calculated from June 1, 2006. The Arkansas Commission argues that because the Louisiana Commission believes
that the interest start date should be determined by
the Commission’s most recent expression of will, the
Commission’s September 22, 2016 order in Docket No.
ER1 0- 13 50-005 should control the interest start date
in this proceeding.
5. Commission Determination
39. We affirm the Presiding Judge’s ruling that interest on bandwidth payments in this proceeding should
accrue from June 1, 2006. To the extent that any language in any prior order is ambiguous, we clarify that
June 1, 2006 is the correct date.
40. In the April 2007 Compliance Order, the Commission, in part, addressed the issue of interest to be applied to bandwidth payments and receipts.74 In that
order, the Commission denied a Louisiana Commission
request for rehearing and reaffirmed that interest was
not required on bandwidth payments.75 Subsequently,
after the D.C. Circuit remanded to the Commission
the matter of determining the effective date of the
73
Id. (citing 2014 Order on Rehearing, 146 FERC ¶ 61,152
at P 42).
74
April 2007 Compliance Order, 119 FERC ¶ 61,095 at PP
30-32.
75
Id. P 32.
App. 99
bandwidth remedy, and after the Commission issued
its 2011 Order on Remand establishing a June 1, 2005
effective date for the bandwidth remedy,76 the Commission determined in the 2014 Order on Rehearing that
interest would be required on bandwidth payments in
this proceeding.77 The Commission determined that
“due to the length of time that has passed . . . it is
appropriate to follow our general policy and require
interest to be paid on the bandwidth payments for
the seven-month period in 2005 to ensure full compensation.”78 The Commission unambiguously ordered
that “interest be calculated on the payment/receipt
amounts from June 1, 2006 until the date of the Entergy IntraSystem Bill that will reflect the bandwidth
recalculation amounts for the seven-month period.”79
No party sought rehearing of the Commission’s ruling
on the effective date for interest. June 1, 2006 is therefore the correct date from which to calculate interest.
41. The Louisiana Commission argues incorrectly
that the Commission changed the start date to June 1,
2005 when the Commission denied Entergy’s request
for rehearing on the question of whether, not when, to
apply interest in the 2015 Orders Denying Rehearing.
The Louisiana Commission’s argument relies on a single sentence in the nearly identical 2015 orders. However, the purpose of those orders was not to change the
76
2011 Order on Remand, 137 FERC ¶ 61,047 at P 34.
2014 Order on Rehearing, 146 FERC ¶ 61,152 at PP 41-42.
78
Id. P 42.
79
Id. (emphasis added).
77
App. 100
effective date for interest. Rather, the 2015 Orders
Denying Rehearing only address the question of
whether interest should apply, not the date from which
interest should apply. Each of the relevant paragraphs
in the 2015 Orders Denying Rehearing describe Entergy’s request for rehearing and confirm that the
scope of the order is limited to whether interest should
apply. The 2015 Orders Denying Rehearing do not
meaningfully delve into the interest effective date
specified in the 2014 Order on Rehearing Accordingly,
we reject the argument that the Commission expressly
intended in those orders to reset that date to June 1,
2005.80
42. Moreover, the Commission made clear in the 2015
Orders Denying Rehearing that its decision to require
interest for the 2005 bandwidth calculation was “consistent with numerous recent orders regarding interest and the bandwidth formula,”81 which required that
interest be effective June 1 of the year following the
test period subject to the annual bandwidth calculation (i.e., when annual bandwidth payments and receipts occur).82 For example, in the first and second
80
Trial Staff Brief Opposing Exceptions at 14.
2015 Order Denying Rehearing I, 153 FERC ¶ 61,033 at P
12 n.19; 2015 Order Denying Rehearing II, 153 FERC ¶ 61,034 at
P 13 n.25).
82
See, e.g., April 2007 Compliance Order, 119 FERC
¶ 61,095 at PP 24-25 (noting that the 2007 bandwidth calculation
was based on a 2006 test year with payments to begin in June
2007); Entergy Servs., Inc., Opinion No. 518, 139 FERC ¶ 61,105,
at P 3 (2012) (noting that “Entergy is required, by June 1 of each
81
App. 101
bandwidth calculation filings, in Docket Nos. ER07956 and ER08-1056, respectively, interest was required
from the payment date, i.e., June 1 of the year following the test period.83 The 2014 Order on Rehearing, the
2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing, and the 2015
Orders Denying Rehearing all cite to the relevant orders in these two dockets, noting that the interest ruling for the instant proceeding is “consistent with
[these] more recent orders.” Furthermore, testimony
provided at hearing by Entergy witness Hunt indicated that all of the bandwidth calculations for which
interest is required would include interest from this
date, not including the test period.84 Accordingly, we
find that this approach, as specified in the Commission’s orders and relied upon for the June 1, 2006 interest requirement in this proceeding, should be
followed here rather than the Louisiana Commission’s
proposal to apply interest from the remedy effective
date.
year, to make a compliance filing implementing the bandwidth
formula using the prior year’s production costs.”).
83
Entergy Servs., Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,104, at P 13 (2012)
(requiring Entergy to calculate interest from June 1, 2007 for the
2006 bandwidth calculation); Entergy Servs., Inc., 142 FERC
¶ 61,011, at P 21 (requiring Entergy to calculate interest from
June 1, 2008 for the 2007 bandwidth calculation). See also Entergy Arkansas, Inc., 148 FERC ¶ 61,088, at PP 13-14 (2014) (ordering Entergy to file a new compliance filing “based on the 2006
and 2007 calendar year data, with interest, from June 1, 2007 or
June 1, 2008, as appropriate.”).
84
Tr. 275:17-22; Tr. 285:5-22.
App. 102
43. Given that our recent orders concerning interest
and the bandwidth formula require that interest be effective June 1 of the year following the test year, we
reject the Louisiana Commission’s argument that the
2014 Order on Rehearing is internally inconsistent in
establishing an interest start date of June 1, 2006
while also stating that interest is “for” the sevenmonth 2005 bandwidth period.85 As noted above, the
remedy is prospective, based on the annual production cost data, with rough production cost equalization payments to begin the following year. Accordingly,
payments beginning the following year are the Commission’s established remedy for the prior year, or in
this case, the seven-month 2005 bandwidth period. The
Commission’s use of the word “for” is simply referring
to the payments which are the remedy for the 2005
bandwidth period. It does not imply that interest
should be granted “for” the 2005 bandwidth period as
the Louisiana Commission suggests. To the contrary,
the Commission used nearly identical language in requiring interest to be paid in Docket Nos. ER07-956
and ER08-1056, which led to interest being calculated
from June 1 of the year following the test year. Specifically, in Docket No. ER07-956, the Commission required Entergy to calculate interest on the payment/
receipt amounts from June 1, 2007 until the IntraSystem Bill that will reflect the bandwidth calculation amounts for calendar year 2006.”86 The calculation was based upon calendar year 2006 production
85
86
Louisiana Commission Brief Opposing Exceptions at 32.
Entergy Servs., Inc., 139 FERC ¶ 61,104 at P 13.
App. 103
cost data, while interest accumulated from June 1,
2007, the date payments were to begin. Nearly identical language was used by the Commission in Docket
No. ER08-1056 in requiring interest to be calculated
from June 1, 2008 for the 2007 test period.87 Importantly, the 2014 Order on Rehearing noted that the
June 1, 2006 effective date was consistent with the
above cited orders in Docket Nos. ER07-956 and ER081056. Accordingly, the statement in the 2014 Order on
Rehearing that interest is required on the bandwidth
payments for the previous year cannot reasonably be
read to imply an interest effective date other than June
1 of the following year, i.e., 2006.
44. We also reject the Louisiana Commission’s argument that the Hearing Order supports its contention
that June 1, 2005 is the appropriate start date for interest. The Louisiana Commission’s primary argument
is that the Hearing Order cites the 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance, which in turn broadly states that interest is required, and states that the remedy is “for”
the 2005 bandwidth period. However, as discussed
above, use of the word “for” simply refers to bandwidth
payments being made a remedy “for” a relevant period,
and prior cases using similar language confirm this interpretation. The Louisiana Commission adds that the
2015 Order Denying Rehearing I denied rehearing of
the 2014 Order Rejecting Compliance Filing, which indicates that the Hearing Order “emerges from a line of
Commission orders that . . . recognize June 1, 2005 as
87
Entergy Servs., Inc., 142 FERC ¶ 61,152 at P 42 n.60.
App. 104
the start date for interest.”88 However, as discussed
above, the 2015 Orders Denying Rehearing substantively discuss whether interest should apply, not the
interest start date, and deny rehearing of the 2014 Order on Rehearing. The Hearing Order is otherwise bereft of any indication that the Commission intended a
June 1, 2005 start date for interest.
45. Further, we agree with the Presiding Judge that
it would be mathematically impossible to begin the interest clock on June 1, 2005. As explained above, the
bandwidth calculation uses a historical test period,
and the payments and receipts calculated based on
that test period occur beginning June 1 of the year following the test period. In this case, the test period ends
December 31, 2005. As noted by the Presiding Judge,
the amounts of the transfer payments “were unknowable until the applicable test period was completed.”89
Accordingly, the Presiding Judge was correct to find
that it would thus be impossible “to establish as of the
very first day of that period which Entergy Operating
Companies would be making payments, which would
be receiving payments, or even if payments were to be
made at all.”90 Therefore, it would also be mathematically impossible to calculate interest starting June 1,
2005.
46. Despite the Presiding Judge’s clear reasoning,
the Louisiana Commission contends that the Presiding
88
Louisiana Commission Brief Opposing Exceptions at 25.
Initial Decision, 157 FERC ¶ 63,018 at P 41.
90
Id.
89
App. 105
Judge was under the impression that it was necessary
to know the amounts of payments on June 1, 2005 to
calculate interest as of that date. However, we find that
this is not a reasonable interpretation of the Initial Decision. The Presiding Judge stated that it would be impossible “to compute interest on these payments” with
interest starting June 1, 2005 because the amounts of
the payments that would have been due are unknowable “until the applicable test period was completed.”91
It is only after the test year is completed that it becomes clear which Operating Companies would be
making or receiving bandwidth payments. Further,
contrary to the Louisiana Commission’s argument that
the Commission can simply backdate interest to June
1, 2005 once the amounts are known, the Commission
provides interest to compensate for the time value of
money, based on when a person would otherwise have
had use of the funds.92 Those Operating Companies
would not have use of any funds until after the 2005
bandwidth period. Accordingly, we find that the Presiding Judge was correct in ruling that the calculation of
interest from June 1, 2005 is not mathematically possible and not what the Commission intended.
47. We also disagree with the Louisiana Commission’s argument that a June 1, 2006 interest effective
91
Id.
See, e.g., H.Q. Energy Servs., Inc., 113 FERC ¶ 61,184, at
P 40 (2005). See also PPL Wallingford Energy, LLC, 116 FERC
¶ 61,078, at P 31 & n.38 (2006) (“[T]he purpose of ordering interest is to make the recipient whole for the time value of money it
would otherwise have received.”).
92
App. 106
date is inconsistent with the Commissions regulations.
Specifically, 18 C.F.R. § 35.19a, Refund requirements
under suspension orders, does not apply because the
bandwidth remedy does not involve refunds. The Commission has stated repeatedly since the inception of
the bandwidth remedy that the remedy is to apply prospectively, and does not involve refunds. In Opinion
No. 480, the Commission explicitly held that refunds
would not be allowed, citing section 206(c) of the FPA.93
The issue was reconsidered in the 2011 Order on Remand, and the Commission opted to “apply here our
usual practice in such cases, invoking our equitable
discretion not to order refunds, notwithstanding our
authority to do so.”94 The issue was laid to rest in the
2014 Order on Rehearing, which denied a Louisiana
Commission request for rehearing.95 Accordingly, as
applied prospectively and explicitly not involving refunds, the bandwidth remedy does not implicate the
Commission’s regulations regarding suspension orders.
48. Finally, the Louisiana Commission incorrectly argues that section 206 of the FPA requires interest to be
paid on unjustified rates or charges. However, we agree
with Trial Staff that the Louisiana Commission is citing a permissive passage despite claiming that it is a
mandatory rule.96 The cited material notes that the
93
Opinion No. 480, 111 FERC ¶ 61,311 at P 145 (citing
U.S.C. § 824e(c) (2000)).
94
2011 Order on Remand, 137 FERC ¶ 61,047 at PP 31-32.
95
2014 Order on Rehearing, 146 FERC ¶ 61,152 at P 59.
96
Trial Staff Brief Opposing Exceptions at 33.
App. 107
Commission “may by further order require . . . refund,
with interest . . . such increased rates or charges as
by its decision shall be found not justified.”97 As often
noted in bandwidth proceedings, the Commission’s
“discretion is at its zenith in determining an appropriate remedy.”98 Accordingly, this statutory provision
does not compel any particular result and therefore
does not controvert the correct application of a June 1,
2006 effective date.
B. Issue Six: Net Operating Loss ADIT
and the Vidalia Tax Deduction
1. Background
a. ADIT and the Bandwidth Formula
49. As a general matter, under federal and certain
state income tax regulations for the period at issue in
this case, a Net Operating Loss is created when deductions taken on a corporate tax return exceed taxable
income for a given year. In that situation, the company
may apply the Net Operating Loss against net taxable
income for that year, and if any Net Operating Loss remains the company may use it to offset taxable income
in other years and thereby reduce its tax expense for
those years. The offset may be applied to the company’s
net taxable income the previous two years in the case
of federal income tax and the previous three years in
97
98
16 U.S.C. § 824d(e) (emphasis added).
April 2007 Compliance Order, 119 FERC ¶ 61,095 at P 32.
App. 108
the case of Louisiana state income tax (a “carryback”),
and may also be applied in the following 20 tax years
for federal tax and the following 15 years for Louisiana
tax (a “carryforward”). The tax benefit of the Net Operating Loss carryforward is recognized as a deferred
tax asset recorded in Uniform System of Accounts
(USofA) Account 190, Accumulated deferred income
taxes (ADIT).
50. ADIT on the Operating Companies’ books as of
December 31, 2005 is a factor with regard to production costs as calculated in the bandwidth formula. The
ADIT input variable is derived from USofA Accounts
190, 281, and 282, with certain adjustments.99 Entergy
excludes several ADIT items of each Operating Company from the bandwidth formula’s ADIT variable. Entergy Louisiana’s excluded-ADIT items for the 2005
bandwidth period include ADIT for the year ended December 31, 2005 resulting from a Net Operating Loss
carryforward for Louisiana state income tax, in the
amount of $97 million.100
51. In the first bandwidth calculation proceeding, for
calendar year 2006, in Opinion No. 505,101 Opinion No.
505-A,102 and a subsequent clarifying order,103 the
Commission held that Entergy must include certain
Net Operating Loss carryforwards in the bandwidth
99
Ex. ESI-3 at 6.
Ex. ESI-2 at 185-186.
101
Opinion No. 505, 130 FERC ¶ 61,023 (2010).
102
Opinion No. 505-A, 139 FERC ¶ 61,103.
103
Opinion No. 505 Clarifying Order, 145 FERC ¶ 61,045.
100
App. 109
calculation according to a ratio of certain tax-deductible utility expenses derived from each Operating Company’s FERC Form 1.104 In 2013, Entergy made a
compliance filing to calculate the Net Operating Loss
carryforward amount to include in the bandwidth calculation for calendar year 2006 in accordance with the
ratio created by the Commission in the three orders. In
this proceeding, Entergy seeks to exclude from the
2005 bandwidth period ADIT associated with the Louisiana state income tax Net Operating Loss carryforward that results from the Vidalia tax deduction, as
discussed below.
b. The Vidalia Tax Deduction
52. In 1985, Louisiana Power & Light Company, the
predecessor of Entergy Louisiana, entered into an
agreement to purchase up to 94 percent of the output
from the Vidalia Hydroelectric Power plant (Vidalia).105 In that year, the Louisiana Commission approved a phased-in rate schedule for the costs of the
plant by means of a long-term contract (the Vidalia
Contract). The Vidalia Contract sets forth specific rates
to be paid by Entergy Louisiana, which escalate during
the contract term (ending in 2031) to a peak of 20.5
cents per kWh. These rates are, and are expected to
104
Opinion No. 505, 130 FERC ¶ 61,023 at P 234; Opinion
No. 505-A, 139 FERC ¶ 61,103 at PP 59-60; Opinion No. 505 Clarifying Order, 145 FERC ¶ 61,045 at PP 18-19.
105
Ex. ESI-4 Revised at 33:6-9 (Louiselle Answering Test.).
See also Opinion No. 480, 111 FERC ¶ 61,311 at n.14.
App. 110
remain, significantly above market value.106 In 2002, in
recognition of this above-market cost, Entergy Louisiana came up with a tax strategy to reduce the cost of
this contract to customers. This strategy resulted in a
$1.8 billion deduction that translated into a tax savings for Entergy Louisiana of approximately $680 million.
53. As explained by the Presiding Judge, Entergy
Louisiana took the Vidalia tax deduction in 2001, resulting in a Net Operating Loss for that year that Entergy Louisiana carried forward to succeeding years.107
In tax year 2001, the Vidalia tax deduction amounted
to $2.3 billion in 2001.108 Together with Entergy Louisiana’s other taxable income and deductions, the Vidalia tax deduction generated an initial Net Operating
Loss in tax year 2001 that was attributable to Louisiana state tax in the amount of $2.014 billion.109 The
Net Operating Loss for 2001 was carried forward on
Entergy Louisiana’s books to offset taxable income in
future years or until it expired.110 After 2001, Entergy
Louisiana generated Net Operating Losses in tax
years 2003 and 2005, whereas it had taxable income
in tax years 2002 and 2004.111 As a consequence, the
Louisiana state Net Operating Loss of $2.014 billion,
being the earliest Net Operating Loss available,
106
Initial Decision, 157 FERC ¶ 63,018 at P 50.
Id. P 53.
108
Id. P 54.
109
Id.
110
Trial Staff Post-hg. Brief at 9.
111
Entergy Post-hg. Brief at 17.
107
App. 111
reduced Entergy Louisiana’s taxable income by $61
million in 2002 and $156 million of its taxable income
in 2004. At the end of tax year 2004, $1.797 billion of
the 2001 Net Operating Loss was left for use, if needed,
in tax year 2005 and subsequent tax years.
54. The tax effect of the Net Operating Loss ADIT
generated by the Vidalia tax deduction was used in
part to reduce electric rates for Entergy Louisiana’s
customers. In 2002, the Louisiana Commission entered
a settlement with Entergy Louisiana whereby Entergy
Louisiana’s customers were provided a guaranteed
share of the tax benefits of the transaction.112 Through
2015, Entergy Louisiana’s customers have been credited with $199.1 million, and they are projected to be
credited with a total of $419.1 million through 2026.113
Thus, the settlement reduces rates for Louisiana jurisdictional customers of Entergy Louisiana, while at the
same time it grants Entergy Louisiana the right to retain Vidalia’s accelerated tax deductions for the remaining life of the contract.
c. Vidalia Tax Deduction and the
Bandwidth Formula
55. Because the tax benefits from the Vidalia tax deduction were retained by Entergy Louisiana and
flowed, in part, directly to its Louisiana retail ratepayers, the Commission concluded in Opinion No. 480 that
Vidalia was an Entergy Louisiana-only resource, not a
112
113
Id. at 10.
Id.
App. 112
system-wide production cost that should be equalized
among all the Operating Companies.114
56. The Commission directed that the bandwidth formula exclude the capital and tax-related effects of the
Vidalia tax deduction in order to avoid shifting its tax
burdens and benefits to other Operating Companies.
To ensure that costs associated with the Vidalia tax deduction stay in Louisiana, the Commission approved
the inclusion of footnote 1 to the bandwidth formula
which specifies, inter alia, that:
All Rate Base, Revenue and Expense items
shall be based on the actual amounts of the
Company’s books for the twelve months ended
December 31 of the previous year as reported
in FERC Form 1 or such other supporting
data as may be appropriate for each Company; and shall include certain regulatory adjustments . . . including, but not limited to: . . .
(3) repricing of energy associated with the Vidalia purchase power contract for [Entergy
Louisiana] based on the average annual Service Schedule MSS-3 rate paid by [Entergy
Louisiana], including the exclusion of the income tax savings of the Vidalia purchase
power contract from ADIT and reflecting
the reversal of the Vidalia capital transaction. . . .115
114
115
n.1).
Opinion No. 480, 111 FERC ¶ 61,311 at PP 183-184.
See Ex. ESI-3 at 5 (citing Compliance Tariff at § 30.12,
App. 113
2. Initial Decision
57. The Presiding Judge began his examination of
the Net Operating Loss ADIT and the Vidalia transaction by noting that the focus of this issue, footnote 1 of
the bandwidth formula, strives to fulfill the Commission’s longstanding aim concerning the Vidalia tax
transaction that “what happens in Louisiana stays in
Louisiana.”116 The Presiding Judge found that the following highlighted words of footnote 1 provide the
operative language: “All Rate Base, Revenue and Expense items . . . shall include certain regulatory adjustments . . . including the exclusion of the income tax
savings of the Vidalia purchase power contract from
ADIT. . . .”117 The Presiding Judge noted that no party
suggested that footnote 1 should be ignored.
58. The Presiding Judge rejected arguments by the
Louisiana Commission that Entergy Louisiana’s 2005
Net Operating Loss ADIT is a deferred tax accounting
item that has not yet produced a “tax savings,” and
therefore cannot fall within the meaning of the Vidalia
exclusion required by footnote 1. The Presiding Judge
found that, contrary to the Louisiana Commission’s argument, the plain meaning of footnote 1 is to remove a
certain “savings” amount from a deferred tax that is
found in an ADIT account, not a savings amount from
116
Initial Decision, 157 FERC ¶ 63,018 at P 73 (citing Entergy Servs., Inc., Opinion No. 514, 137 FERC ¶ 61,029, at P 78
(2011) (“ . . . [C]osts associated with Vidalia must stay in Louisiana.”).
117
Id. (citing Ex. ESI-3 at 5 n.1).
App. 114
a current tax that comprises an item of expense.118 The
Presiding Judge found that because Net Operating
Loss ADIT in Account 190 is plainly a savings of deferred tax, all or part of it can be excluded from the
ADIT input variable of the bandwidth formula to the
extent that it is properly attributable to the Vidalia tax
deduction.
59. The Presiding Judge disagreed with the Louisiana Commission’s argument that Opinion No. 505 and
the Opinion No. 505 Clarifying Order show how Net
Operating Loss ADIT should be allocated and included
in the ADIT input variable in the bandwidth formula.
The Presiding Judge found that the Commission orders in the Opinion No. 505 proceeding provide only a
general rule for including Net Operating Loss ADIT for
every Operating Company in the bandwidth formula.
The Presiding Judge explained that the Opinion No.
505 orders do not discuss the Vidalia tax deduction.
The Presiding Judge further explained that the general rule of those orders is an outcome of protracted
litigation and is not part of the bandwidth formula itself. The Presiding Judge found that, by contrast, “the
issue at hand concerns a specific rule for excluding only
the Vidalia portion of [Entergy Louisiana
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