Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Harmon L. Taylor, Petitioner v. City of Sherman, Texas, et al.

No.

-l°s

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

JUL 1 9 2021

OFFICE OF THE CLERK ■

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

HARMON L. TAYLOR,

Plaintiff - Appellant - Petitioner,

v.

CITY OF SHERMAN, TEXAS, et al.,

Respondents - Appellees - Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

Original Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

with Appendices A and B

HARMON L. TAYLOR

H.L. Taylor Farms

225 Old Patterson Road

Howe, Texas 75459

socratic_method@

argentum-keceph-argurio.us

Questions Presented

Threshold Service

1. Was it abusive to deny that extension?

Malicious Prosecution

Compelled consent - “transportation”

2. Is the TEX. TRANSP. CODE “unconstitutional,” as

applied?

Compelled commerce - Illegal seizure

3. Did Respondents illegally seize Taylor’s van?

Compelled consent - magistrate participation

4. Was it abusive to dismiss?

Disqualification

5. Is E.D.Tex. disqualified?

Transfer of Venue

6. Was it abusive to deny transfer to N.D.Tex.?

Sanctions

7. Is USCA5’s dismissal abusive?

.

Parties to USCA5 Proceeding

USCA5 dismissed at the threshold. There was no

proceeding in the normal sense.

There was also no Service at trial, which issue is

preserved via the (ex parte) motion for extension.

Appellant

HARMON L. TAYLOR

pro se

Appellees

CITY OF SHERMAN,

a municipal corporation

BRANDON SHELBY,

City Attorney, officially and individually

CODY SHOOK,

Police Officer, officially and individually

FNU LNU, a/k/a ALEX AVILES,

Assisting Officer, officially and individually

ZACHARY FLORES,

Chief of Police, officially

BOB UTTER TOWING

DRIVER

n

•

DRIVER’S ASSISTANT

• MIDWAY STORAGE FACILITY

• T. SCOTT SMITH,

Judge, Municipal Court, Sherman,

officially and individually

•

SUSAN MORRIS,

Clerk, Municipal Court, Sherman,

officially and individually

• JANIE FLETCHER,

Clerk, Municipal Court, Sherman,

officially and individually

•

MUNICIPAL COURT ASST. PROSECUTOR

(Nos. 1700002951, 52, 53, 54, and 4472),

officially and individually

•

GRAYSON COUNTY, TEXAS

•

CAROL M. SIEBMAN,

Judge, County Court at Law No. 2,

Grayson County,

officially and individually

•

MICHAEL SISSNEY,

Prosecutor, Muni, and CCL2,

officially and individually

in

'

• MATT RALSTON,

Asst. Prosecutor, CCL2,

officially and individually

* WHITNEY BREWSTER,

Exec. Dir, TX DEPT OF MOTOR VEHICLES

officially and individually

[STATE OF TEXAS; see the Companion case]

*

RON CLARK,

Chief Judge (at the time), E.D.Tex.,

officially and individually

• AMOS L. MAZZANT, III

assigned § 45-1 judge, E.D.Tex.,

officially and individually

*

CHRISTINE A. NOWAK,

designated but unconsented-to magistrate, i.e.,

arbiter,

officially and individually

•

CARL E. STEWART,

Chief Justice (at the time), USCA5,

officially and individually

IV

Directly Related Proceedings

• Trial

E.D.Tex., No. 4:20-CV-114

TAYLOR v. CITY OF SHERMAN

BRANDON SHELBY

CODY SHOOK

FNU LNU, a/k/a ALEX AVILES

ZACHARY FLORES

BOB UTTER TOWING

DRIVER

DRIVER’S ASSISTANT

MIDWAY STORAGE FACILITY

T. SCOTT SMITH

SUSAN MORRIS

JANIE FLETCHER

MUNICIPAL COURT ASST.

PROSECUTOR

GRAYSON COUNTY, TEXAS

CAROL M. SIEBMAN

MICHAEL SISSNEY

MATT RALSTON

WHITNEY BREWSTER

RON CLARK

AMOS L. MAZZANT, III

CHRISTINE A. NOWAK

CARL E. STEWART

Dismissed: Feb. 1, 2021 (Doc [13])

• Appeal

USCA5, No. 21-40158

TAYLOR v. CITY OF SHERMAN,

BRANDON SHELBY

v

✓*

;.

CODY SHOOK

FNU LNU, a/k/a ALEX AVILES

ZACHARY FLORES

BOB UTTER TOWING

DRIVER

DRIVER’S ASSISTANT

MIDWAY STORAGE FACILITY

T. SCOTT SMITH

SUSAN MORRIS

JANIE FLETCHER

MUNICIPAL COURT ASST.

PROSECUTOR

GRAYSON COUNTY, TEXAS

CAROL M. SIEBMAN

MICHAEL SISSNEY

MATT RALSTON

WHITNEY BREWSTER

RON CLARK

AMOS L. MAZZANT, III

CHRISTINE A. NOWAK

CARL E. STEWART

Dismissed: April 20, 2021

vi

Some Additional Related Proceedings

Companion Malicious Prosecution case (2020)

* Trial

15th Dist. Ct., Grayson County, Texas

No. CV-20-270

TAYLOR v. STATE OF TEXAS

The Malicious Prosecutions

• Muni. Court (2017)

Sitting in CITY OF SHERMAN, TEXAS

T. Scott Smith, presiding

STATE v. TAYLOR

No. 1700002951 (no “license”)

No. 1700002952 (no DMV-approved taggage)

No. 1700002953 (no registration)

No. 1700002954 (no insurance)

No. 1700004472 (no appearance)

Advisory panel proceeding: Feb. 8, 2018.

.

• County Court (2018)

COUNTY COURT-AT-LAW NO. 2

GRAYSON COUNTY, TEXAS

Carol M. Siebman, presiding

STATE v. TAYLOR

No. 2018-2-0223

No. 2018-2-0224

No. 2018-2-0225

No. 2018-2-0226

No. 2018-2-0227

Dismissed: Feb. 18, 2019. (Exs. 01 to 05)

Vll

\

The immediate effort in equity to mitigate

damages - the “sanctions” issue (2017)

• Trial

E.D.Tex., No. 4:17-CV-488

TAYLOR v. CITY OF SHERMAN,

SHELBY,

SHOOK,

“ASSISTING OFFICER” (FNU LNU

a/k/a AVILES),

FLORES,

BOB UTTER TOWING (B.U.T.),

B.U.T.’s DRIVER,

B.U.T.’s DRIVER’S ASSISTANT,

MIDWAY STORAGE FACILITY, and

BREWSTER (DMV).

Dismissed: Feb. 28, 2018 (Doc [76-1])

• Appeal

USCA5, No. 18-40272

TAYLOR v. CITY OF SHERMAN,

SHELBY,

SHOOK,

“ASSISTING OFFICER” (FNU LNU

a/k/a AVILES),

FLORES,

BOB UTTER TOWING (B.U.T.),

B.U.T.’s DRIVER,

B.U.T.’s DRIVER’S ASSISTANT,

MIDWAY STORAGE FACILITY, and

BREWSTER (DMV).

Affirmed, with Sanctions: July 8, 2019

Cert. Denied.

vm

The suit in N.D.Tex. arising from judicial

abuse, including breach of Judge-Respondent

agreement made in open court, in Walker

County, Texas (2007)

•

Trial

N.D.Tex., No. 3:07-CV-1634

TAYLOR v. HALE (County Court judge)

WEEKS (Dist. Atty. Walker County)

GAINES (Muni. Ct. judge)

CITY OF HUNTSVILLE

WALKER COUNTY

STATE OF TEXAS

Dismissed: Sept. 30, 2009

•

Appeal

USCA5, No. 09-11057

TAYLOR v. HALE

WEEKS

GAINES

CITY OF HUNTSVILLE

WALKER COUNTY

STATE OF TEXAS

Affirmed, with “warning:” Sept. 24, 2010

• Here

No. 10-819 (the early days - no Demand Letter)

The 10-year Walker County matter in which

Taylor first obtained his “no jurisdiction”

rulings on his “no commercial nexus” defense

County Court at Law, Walker County, Texas

No. 07-1392

STATE v. TAYLOR (See Exs. 06, 07)

IX

Taylor’s Petition for

a Writ of Certiorari to USCA5

Citations below

None.

Jurisdiction

(i) Date of Clerk’s dismissal.

No. 21-40158.

Apr. 20, 2021 [+90: July 18 (Sun.), thus July 19]

(ii) Extension^).

N/A

(iii) Rule 12.5.

N/A

(iv) Statutes. Jurisdiction.

28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 2101(c).

(v) Statutory challenges. Rules 29.4(b). (c).

TEXAS’S A.G. and U.S.’s S.G. are both served.

Primary Statutory Provisions

TEX. TranSP. Code § 502.001(45) (“vehicle”).

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 636(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(2) (consent, “civil

cases”).

28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a).

E.D.Tex. Local Rules. (~40 Exhibits; 61 total)

Statement of the Case

Jurisdiction - E.D.Tex.

28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1367; but see § 455(a).

Merits - No “vehicle.” No Probable Cause.

No “transportation.”

Taylor wasn’t “carrying passengers or cargo.”

Taylor wasn’t (1) removing people and/or property (2)

from one place to another (3) for hire (4) under any

choice of law, including that of “this state.”

No “consent.”

• No “Certificate of Title” trust for this van or in

Taylor’s name; both had been terminated.

• No “registration” (no sticker on windshield) meaning (in Texas):

o No DMY-approved taggage (Taylor’s Mom

(1931-2018) returned DMV’s tags to County),

o No inspection,

o No insurance.

• No “license” - due to expiration.

Favorable ruling(s) + No Probable Cause.

All five “consent”-based charges were dismissed.

Plus, Taylor’s display of clearly legible non-DMVapproved taggage negated Probable Cause ab initio.

Service and “at filing” Compelled Arbitration

“At filing,” Taylor understood that SHOOK had

moved out of state. Plus, there’s one openly recalci­

trant party (plus three generic parties).

“At filing,” if E.D.Tex. didn’t change policies,

there’d be no authority in any Summons, given their

addiction to “at filing” District-wide Disqualification.

“At filing,” pro se’s face the jurisdictional abuses

of compelled commerce (represented plaintiffs aren't

2

compelled into arbitration “at filing”), compelled

arbitration, denial of access, denial of trial, and etc.

To the non-consenting party, “at filing” referral, of

anything, activates all threshold jurisdictional

issues. So, when does the non-consenting party stop

participating? Apparently, “immediately,” per Roell,

i.e., “at filing,” is too early. E.g., Nos. 20-1325, -1475.

Adversarial (“immediately” can't be too early) v.

Administrative (but it can). How, then, does the non­

consenting pro se preserve “at filing” the non-consent

issue? Via the ex parte motion for extension regard­

ing Service. Given one unworkable “unknown” and

one unworkable “known,” Taylor moved “at filing” for

time to perform Service. Since E.D.Tex. gratified,

one more time, their decades-long “at filing” addic­

tion to “at filing” Disqualification, who throughout

E.D.Tex. had authority to grant or deny that motion?

Two picosecond-timed scenarios: (A) All plaintiffs

filings go in; then comes the “at filing” compelled

arbitration; (B) plaintiffs Orig. Compl. gets filed,

which faster-than-instantly triggers the compelled

arbitration policy; then the “at filing” motion is filed.

The Docket Sheet should track (A); it tracked (B).

Taylor delivered (via overnight) one package: Orig.

Compl., with its Exhibits; motion for extension; and,

the filing fee. Cf. No. 5:20-CV-139-SLP, Taylor v.

Sherman, W.D.Okla. (one pkg). Whether (A) or (B) is

what should be, Taylor’s “at filing” motion regarding

Service, necessarily ex parte, preserves not only the

Service issue but also all threshold jurisdictional

issues. A Summons, exactly as with Discovery, is

worthless when issued from, styled under, a court

that has absolutely no authority to do anything.

3

Sanctions

It’s fascinating how many threshold barriers must

be overcome just to “break into” court these days.

The sanctions are illegal.

Since “sanctions” are the basis for denial of access

on appeal, their merits are here subject to review.

A RULING CONFIRMING THE “NO COMMERCIAL

NEXUS” DEFENSE ALREADY EXISTS.

Perkins has done the heavy lifting in these

matters. The bulk of the discussion is in 3d.CoA and

USCA5, which bodies are co-dependent, feeding on

each other’s refusals to reflect on the obvious and to

analyze the statute(s), e.g., per Lozman (2013).

3d.CoA says that the “no commercial nexus” defense

is “rejected.” USCA5 boldly calls it “frivolous.”

Both “rejected" and “frivolous” are legally

impossible. See Exs. 06, 07.

Where the pro se is moronic, the County Judge

and DA are also. USCA5’s, 3d.CoA’s ego-, politicalangle is along this line: “What could a county judge

(all morons, of course) possibly know? We're the

appellate court; so, we tell you what the law is.” Yet,

this (moronic) County Judge clearly knew enough to

apply Lozman (2013), as presented by the (moronic)

pro se, to the updated, materially changed commer­

cial, jurisdictional facts, so as to dismiss, which

rulings the (moronic) DA didn't appeal.

“No consent” means “no commercial nexus,” thus

“no jurisdiction ” Exs. 06, 07. The defense can be

“denied” or “overruled,” where there turns out still to

be some clandestine fact still activating “consent.”

But, since these aren't pre-screened, “I don’t consent”

can never lawfully be “rejected,” stigmatized as

“frivolous,” or “sanctioned.” Such policies compel

4

consent, compel commerce, deny access, and deny not

only a complete defense but also any defense, at all.

Mandamus is judicial, not legislative.

Mandamus exists, but it’s a Judicial Power.

Legislative Power is prohibitive in nature. In the

United States, mandamus Legislative Power, as still

“seen” by USCA5 and 3d.CoA,” has never existed.

Obviously, “Thou shalts” are enforceable. Cf.

Wilkie v. Robbins.

• Thou shalt get a Certificate of Title;

• Thou shalt register;

• Thou shalt display that registration

windshield sticker;

• Thou shalt purchase insurance;

• Thou shalt get inspections;

• Thou shalt display DMV-approved taggage;

• Thou shalt get a “licence.”

But, no “Thou shalt” within the territory to which

the jurisdiction extends is enforced without evidence

of “consent.” Mandamus is for agreements, not edicts.

So, it’s facially nuts, and illegal, for USCA5 to

stigmatize as “frivolous,” 3d.CoA to “reject,” the only

actual defense (liability) to these commercial-nexusdependent matters: “No commercial nexus.” All

other responses sound in negotiations (sentencing).

USCA5’s policy is just about as illegal as it gets.

“You’re trying to mitigate the state actors’ damages

by requesting holding status quo pending the out­

come, because you’re demanding that STATE

actually prove jurisdiction, which it can't, as you’ve

already proved once before on this very same fact

pattern? - You’re sanctioned! You terr*rist, you!”

5

The sanctions are satisfied.

Cf. B-3 (permission until paid) with A-27

(effectively, permission regardless o/paid). Clerks

can’t rewrite an order’s substance!

Taylor submitted, under protest, a money order of

the amount illegally demanded by USCA5: $500.

The context preserves his objection to that outrage.

USCA5 boldly admits receipt while simultaneously

both keeping it (the “document”) and asserting non­

satisfaction. B-4 to -5. USCA5 can’t legally do both.

UCC (negotiable instruments).

Argument

Threshold Service

1. Was it abusive to deny that extension?

There being no consent, no arbiter (d/b/a “magis­

trate”) had signature authority. Extension was

denied via dismissal, ordered by a Disqualified judge.

Violation of law, especially jurisdiction, is abusive.

Malicious Prosecution

Compelled consent - “transportation”

2. Is the Tex. Transp. Code “unconstitutional ”

as applied?

Consent cannot be compelled. Lozman, 568 U.S.

115 (2013).

Compelled commerce - Illegal seizure

3. Did Respondents illegally seize Taylor’s van?

Taylor’s van wasn’t a “vehicle.” They had Notice:

(A) from Taylor, via his mm-DMV-approved taggage;

(B) from themselves, via all their facially “consent”dependent, “Thou shalt” “charges.”

6

Compelled consent - magistrate participation

4. Was it abusive to dismiss?

Taylor pled the facts. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544

(abrogating Conley, 355 U.S. 41), and Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 677-80 (applying Twombly).

Taylor never consented to arbitration. Mathews,

423 U.S*. 261 (SSA appeal), A-6, is not a “civil case/’

Disqualification

5. Is E.D.Tex. disqualified?

In E.D.Tex., the decades-long, standing policy is

to compel pro se plaintiff cases into arbitration. That

policy compels commerce and consent, denies access,

denies trial, and violates Structural Due Process.

Transfer of Venue

6. Was it abusive to deny transfer to N.D.Tex.?

There is not one dissenting voice throughout

E.D.Tex. regarding its “at filing,” compelled com­

merce / consent / arbitration policy.

N.D.Tex. is the next closest U.S. trial court.

Sanctions

7. Is USCA5’s dismissal abusive?

USCA5’s sanctions are illegal.

There is only one actual defense to any commer­

cial-nexus-dependent “charge:” “No commercial

nexus,” which, necessarily, is / means “no jurisdic­

tion.” This defense is systemically stigmatized via

the FBI/SPLC orchestrated “witch hunt” programme,

by which all “jurisdiction” challengers are libeled and

slandered as “domestic terrorists.” USCA5 flat out

stigmatizes “no commercial nexus” as “frivolous,”

7

which amounts to compelled consent, compelled

commerce, denial of access, and not only denial of a

complete defense but also of any defense, at all.

The sanctions were satisfied.

Clerks can’t rewrite orders. Taylor paid the

$500. USCA5 admits receiving payment and yet still

asserts non-satisfaction. B-4 to -5.

Relief Requested

1. Grant this petition.

2. Vacate USCA5’s dismissal, thereby dissolving the

sanctions ruling / barrier.

3. Reinstate the appeal and either remand to

USCA5, or, alternatively, transfer it to, say,

USCA10, USCA11, or USCA-DC.

4. Or, preferred, if already possible,

a. Vacate E.D.Tex.’s dismissal.

b. Declare TEX. TRANSP. CODE “unconstitutional/1

as applied.

c. Reinstate Taylor’s “civil case,” and either

i. directly Remand to N.D.Tex (Dallas) or

ii. Remand with instructions to transfer to

N.D.Tex. (Dallas).

5. Award costs; and

6. Grant all other relief applicable.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Harmon Tayl

HARMON L. TAYLOR

8

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