Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Thomas Wood, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Philip Talmadge Wood, Petitioner v. The Boeing Co.

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 25, 2019

Decided January 10, 2020

No. 18-7193

IN RE: AIR CRASH OVER THE SOUTHERN INDIAN OCEAN

ON MARCH 8, 2014,

ELIZABETH SMITH, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF

THE SPOUSES, NEXT OF KIN, OTHER STATUTORY

BENEFICIARIES, AND THE ESTATES OF THE MH370

PASSENGERS (SEE COMPLAINT FOR STATUTORY

BENEFICIARIES), ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

MALAYSIA AIRLINES BERHAD, DOING BUSINESS AS

MALAYSIA AIRLINES, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Consolidated with 18-7195, 18-7196, 18-7197, 18-7198

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:16-mc-01184)

Stephen F. Rosenthal argued the cause for appellants

Thomas C. Gaspard, et al. With him on the briefs was

Floyd A. Wisner.

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Caitlyn E. Hubbard argued the cause for appellant

Thomas Wood. With her on the briefs were Marianne M.

Auld and Hugh G. Connor II.

Mary Schiavo was on the brief for appellants Elizabeth Smith, et al. Jodi W. Flowers entered an appearance.

Eric B. Wolff argued the cause for appellees. With him

on the joint brief were Gregory F. Miller, Telly Andrews,

and Richard A. Walker. Eric J. Rhine entered an appearance.

Before: WILKINS and RAO, Circuit Judges, and

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.

RAO, Circuit Judge: This appeal arises out of the unexplained disappearance of Malaysia Airlines Flight

MH370 somewhere over the Southern Indian Ocean in the

early hours of March 8, 2014. A series of extensive

searches and investigations conducted over more than

four years yielded no definitive answers as to the cause of

this tragedy, and all passengers and crew members on

board the flight are presumed dead. Representatives of

many of the passengers filed lawsuits in the United States

asserting, inter alia, Montreal Convention claims against

Malaysia Airlines Systems Berhad, Malaysia’s national

airline at the time of Flight MH370, its current national

airline, Malaysia Airlines Berhad, and the airlines’ insurers, as well as state law products liability and wrongful

death claims against Boeing, which manufactured the aircraft in question in Washington state.

Those lawsuits were centralized into a multidistrict litigation in the United States District Court for the District

of Columbia and coordinated for pretrial purposes. Appellees moved jointly to dismiss for forum non conveniens

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and the district court granted that motion in full, concluding that Malaysia is a more convenient forum to hear all of

the appellants’ claims. While the Court has great sympathy for the victims of this tragedy and their families, we

cannot disregard the narrow standard governing our review in this case. We conclude that the district court did

not clearly abuse its discretion in dismissing appellants’

lawsuits for forum non conveniens and affirm the decision

in full.

I.

The district court’s opinion recounts the factual history

surrounding Flight MH370’s disappearance and the ensuing investigations in detail. See In re Air Crash Over S.

Indian Ocean, 352 F. Supp. 3d 19 (D.D.C. 2018). We will

therefore focus only on the facts pertinent to this appeal.

Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 disappeared en route

from Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Malaysia to

Beijing, China, early in the morning on March 8, 2014. On

board Flight MH370 were 227 passengers and 12 Malaysian crew members. The 227 passengers were of 14 nationalities, including 152 Chinese citizens, 38 Malaysian

citizens, and 3 United States citizens. The aircraft in question was a Boeing 777-2H6ER that was designed and manufactured at Boeing’s facility in Washington state and delivered to the airline in new condition in May 2002.

An extensive search for the missing aircraft ensued following the plane’s disappearance. The search team ultimately concluded that Flight MH370 likely crashed in the

Southern Indian Ocean after running out of fuel, but neither the plane nor other critical pieces of evidence, such as

the cockpit voice recorder and flight data recorder, were

recovered. In addition to the search for physical evidence,

the Malaysian government took the lead on a separate civil

investigation into why Flight MH370 had disappeared.

This investigation culminated in a 449-page report, which

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concluded that while the investigation team was “unable

to determine the real cause for the disappearance of

MH370,” human interference or error were more likely

the cause of the plane’s disappearance than aircraft or system malfunction. In connection with this investigation and

a related criminal investigation, the civil investigation

team and the Malaysian government conducted numerous

interviews of witnesses located in Malaysia, including airline employees, family members and acquaintances of the

Malaysian crew, air traffic controllers, cargo shippers, and

Malaysian investigators.

At the time of Flight MH370’s disappearance, Malaysia Airlines Systems Berhad (“MAS”) served as the national airline of Malaysia and the Malaysian government

held a direct, controlling stake in the company. After the

crash, the Malaysian government enacted the Malaysian

Airline System Berhad (Administration) Act 2015 (“Act

765”). Act 765 incorporated a new, separate entity—Malaysia Airlines Berhad (“MAB”)—as the new Malaysian

national airline, transferred MAS’s assets to MAB, and

placed MAS under administration. Under the explicit

terms of Act 765, MAB is not a successor corporation to

MAS and has not assumed any of MAS’s liabilities related

to Flight MH370.

Beginning in early 2016, a total of forty lawsuits related to Flight MH370’s disappearance were filed in various federal district courts across the United States, and

the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred

them to the District of Columbia district court for pretrial

proceedings. The various plaintiffs, all legal representatives or beneficiaries of decedents, divided into two groups

in the proceedings below, one represented by Podhurst

Orseck, P.A. and Wisner Law Firm, P.C. (the “Podhurst

Appellants”), and another represented by Motley Rice

LLC and Spagnoletti & Co. (the “Motley Rice Appellants”). The parties are largely the same on appeal, except

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that one appellant, Thomas Wood, now proceeds individually. Appellant Wood is a U.S. citizen and resident suing

on behalf of his deceased brother, Philip Wood, a U.S. citizen who was living in Malaysia at the time of Flight

MH370.1

Following more than a year of court-ordered discovery

on various threshold issues, appellees filed a joint motion

to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

MAS/MAB also sought dismissal on other threshold

grounds, including sovereign immunity under the Foreign

Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) and lack of subject

matter jurisdiction under the Montreal Convention. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., the

district court declined to reach the jurisdictional challenges and instead dismissed on the basis of forum non

conveniens. In re Air Crash Over S. Indian Ocean, 352 F.

Supp. 3d at 35 (citing 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007)). This timely

appeal followed.

II.

A party seeking dismissal for forum non conveniens

bears the burden of showing both (1) that an adequate alternative forum is available to hear the dispute, and (2) if

so, that the balance of certain public and private interest

factors strongly counsels in favor of trying the dispute in

the alternative forum. See, e.g., Agudas Chasidei Chabad

of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n, 528 F.3d 934, 950 (D.C. Cir.

Numerous civil cases arising out of Flight MH370’s disappearance are also pending in Malaysia. Seventy-seven of the eighty-eight

decedents represented in the legal actions that comprise this litigation

are also represented in cases pending in Malaysia. Boeing has not

been named as a party to any of the Malaysian suits to date, but Boeing has consented to the jurisdiction of the Malaysian courts and

agreed to make all relevant evidence available in Malaysia as a condition of dismissal for forum non conveniens.

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2008). The Supreme Court has instructed that “[t]he forum non conveniens determination is committed to the

sound discretion of the trial court.” Piper Aircraft Co. v.

Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). So long as the district

court “has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and … its balancing of these factors is reasonable,” we must afford that decision “substantial deference” and will overturn only if we find a “clear abuse of

discretion.” Id. Under this narrow standard, we find no

basis to reverse the district court’s reasoned decision.

First, the district court did not abuse its discretion

when it concluded that Malaysia is an adequate, available

forum for appellants’ Montreal Convention and state law

products liability and wrongful death claims. Only the

Motley Rice Appellants directly challenge this determination on appeal. They argue that the Malaysian government “has demonstrated clear intent to, and did, deprive

[appellants] of any real adequate and available forum in

Malaysia” through its enactment of Act 765, which transferred all of MAS’s assets to MAB without deeming MAB

a successor entity to MAS. For the first time on appeal,

the Motley Rice Appellants also contend that Malaysian

law would provide such insignificant damages for appellants’ tort claims against Boeing that forcing appellants to

try those claims in Malaysia would “obliterate[] any real

likelihood of trial.”

We agree with the district court that the enactment of

Act 765 does not render Malaysia an inadequate forum. As

the district court explained, MAS appears to have an insurance policy that would apply to appellants’ Montreal

Convention claims—and even assuming Act 765 did render MAS judgment proof, a U.S. forum would not provide

any greater likelihood of redress. Moreover, because the

Motley Rice Appellants failed to raise any challenge to the

adequacy of tort damages under Malaysian law before the

district court, those arguments are forfeited. See Gov’t of

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Manitoba v. Bernhardt, 923 F.3d 173, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2019)

(“Absent exceptional circumstances, a party forfeits an argument by failing to press it in district court.”).

In any event, in the context of a forum non conveniens

inquiry, “a foreign forum is not inadequate merely because

it has less favorable substantive law.” Agudas Chasidei

Chabad, 528 F.3d at 950 (citation and quotation marks

omitted); accord Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 247 (“The possibility of a change in substantive law should ordinarily not

be given conclusive or even substantial weight in the forum non conveniens inquiry.”). Where, as here, it appears undisputed that an alternative forum would provide

a plaintiff at least some remedy, a district court acts within

its discretion in deeming that forum an adequate alternative to a U.S. court. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at

254 n.22 (explaining that a forum will only be deemed inadequate “[i]n rare circumstances … where the remedy

offered by the other forum is clearly unsatisfactory,” such

as “where the alternative forum does not permit litigation

of the subject matter of the dispute”).2

Nor did the district court clearly abuse its discretion in

concluding that the balance of relevant public and private

interest factors weighs heavily in favor of trying appellants’ cases in Malaysia. The relevant public interest factors include, inter alia, the “‘administrative difficulties’

when ‘litigation is piled up in congested centers,’” the “‘local interest in having localized controversies decided at

In his discussion of the public interest factors governing the forum non conveniens analysis, Appellant Wood argues that his difficulty in securing the counsel of his choice in Malaysia “casts doubt on

whether Malaysia constitutes an adequate, alternative forum.” Neither Wood nor any of the Podhurst Appellants raised this argument

in the proceedings below. Thus, to the extent this passing reference

can be construed as a standalone challenge to Malaysia’s adequacy as

an alternative forum, that challenge has been forfeited. See Manitoba, 923 F.3d at 179.

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home,’” and the desire to avoid requiring a court to “‘untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to

itself.’” Shi v. New Mighty U.S. Tr., 918 F.3d 944, 952

(D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S.

501, 508–09 (1947)). The private interest analysis, on the

other hand, focuses on “‘the relative ease of access to

sources of proof,’” the costs and procedural mechanisms

required to secure the attendance of witnesses, and “‘all

other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive.’” Id. at 950 (quoting Gilbert,

330 U.S. at 508).

The district court found that Malaysia’s public interest

in hearing claims arising out of Flight MH370’s disappearance far outweighs that of the United States, even as to

the tort claims asserted against U.S.-based manufacturer

Boeing. The district court further held that the private

interest factors tilt strongly in favor of trying these cases

in Malaysia, given the overwhelming amount of evidence

and witnesses located in Malaysia and the potentially insurmountable challenges that would arise from attempting to make that evidence available in a United States

court.

We affirm on substantially the same grounds provided

in the district court’s well-reasoned opinion, but pause

here to address two points raised by appellants. The first

relates to the degree of deference the district court applied

to the various appellants. As the court recognized, the

starting point for the forum non conveniens analysis is “a

strong presumption in favor” of a plaintiff’s chosen forum.

Simon v. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d 1172, 1182 (D.C.

Cir. 2018) (quoting Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 255–56).

But the precise degree of deference afforded a plaintiff’s

forum choice varies depending on the plaintiff’s connection

to the forum. A plaintiff who chooses to sue in his home

forum receives the strongest presumption, whereas a foreign plaintiff with minimal or no connections to the United

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States is entitled to less deference. Piper Aircraft, 454

U.S. at 256. Accordingly, the district court afforded Appellant Wood, as a U.S. citizen and resident representing

a U.S. citizen decedent, “the highest degree of deference”

and tailored its analysis of the remaining appellants’ interests in having their claims heard in the United States to

their particular circumstances. In re Air Crash Over S.

Indian Ocean, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 45.

On appeal, the foreign appellants contend that the district court erroneously refused to afford any deference at

all to their decision to sue in the United States. They also

criticize the district court for failing to specify the precise

degree of deference it applied to them, claiming that

“[t]his omission, in and of itself, was reversible error.”

These arguments rest on a fundamental misconception of

what the forum non conveniens analysis requires. Indeed, this Court has stressed that “applying the correct

burden of proof is not a box-checking exercise.” Simon,

911 F.3d at 1185. What matters is not the particular words

a district court uses but whether the court’s analysis fits

the proper standard.

Here, the district court’s analysis reflected a careful

consideration of the foreign appellants’ interests in trying

these cases in the United States and a thoughtful balancing of the public and private interest factors with respect

to those individuals specifically. Moreover, as already

noted, the district court correctly recognized that Appellant Wood was entitled to the greatest degree of deference. Because the court concluded that even Wood’s substantial interest in trying these claims in the United States

could not overcome the significant evidentiary problems

posed by proceeding in a U.S. court, it necessarily followed

that the foreign appellants—who were concededly entitled

to less deference than Wood—could not succeed in showing that the balance of interests weighed in favor of maintaining their claims here. We find no reversible error in

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the district court’s reasoning regarding the appropriate

levels of deference afforded to appellants’ claims.

Second, appellants argue that the district court erred

by first declining to reach the separate sovereign immunity challenges raised by MAS/MAB and then relying on

the existence of potentially “intractable immunity questions” as a justification for its forum non conveniens dismissal. According to appellants, this analysis was inconsistent with Sinochem, under which a court may elect to

grant a motion for forum non conveniens while “bypassing” threshold issues relating to the court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. See 549 U.S. at 432.

As an initial matter, appellants incorrectly suggest

that the district court treated MAS/MAB’s immunity challenges under the FSIA “as granted for purposes of its forum non conveniens analysis.” Nor did the court impermissibly “leapfrog” the immunity questions and then rely

on the same unresolved immunity issues to deny appellants their chosen forum. Instead, the district court

merely conducted a preliminary assessment of

MAS/MAB’s immunity claims and concluded that “[t]he

potential of intractable immunity questions that might

stymie Boeing’s ability to implead other defendants raises

the prospect of precisely the kind of oppressive and vexatious outcome that forum non conveniens dismissal is designed to avoid.” In re Air Crash Over S. Indian Ocean,

352 F. Supp. 3d at 53 (citation omitted). Nothing in Sinochem requires district courts to conclusively determine

whether a defendant enjoys sovereign immunity before

considering immunity as a relevant factor in its forum non

conveniens analysis. Here, Boeing and MAS/MAB raise

serious arguments regarding MAS/MAB’s likely immunity, and it was entirely proper for the district court to recognize that serious jurisdictional questions exist and

weigh that as a factor in favor of dismissal.

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In addition, appellants argue that the district court

placed undue weight on sovereign immunity concerns as a

private interest factor favoring dismissal. The district

court’s opinion, however, makes clear that it considered all

relevant circumstances, including the potential immunity

issues, and concluded that “taken as a whole, the private

interest factors favor dismissal of these claims.” In re Air

Crash Over S. Indian Ocean, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 53 (emphasis added). Sinochem imposes no bar on a district

court’s ability to acknowledge the existence of meaningful

jurisdictional questions in determining whether “a foreign

tribunal is plainly the more suitable arbiter of the merits

of the case.” See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 425. Thus, appellants’ Sinochem-based challenges also fail.

***

In considering appellees’ motion to dismiss for forum

non conveniens, the district court carefully weighed the

relevant public and private interest factors and reasonably

concluded that Malaysia is a more convenient forum to try

appellants’ claims. Because we find no “clear abuse of discretion” in the district court’s reasoning, we affirm.

So ordered.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

[November 21, 2018]

IN RE: AIR CRASH OVER

THE SOUTHERN INDIAN

OCEAN, ON MARCH 8, 2014

This Document Relates To:

MDL Docket No. 2712

Misc. No. 16-1184 (KBJ)

ALL CASES

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The legal claims in this multi-district litigation

(“MDL”) arise from one of the greatest aviation mysteries

of modern times: the disappearance of Malaysia Airlines

Flight MH370 somewhere in the southern Indian Ocean in

the early morning hours of March 4, 2014. Flight MH370

took off from Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Malaysia at 12:42 AM that morning, en route to Beijing,

China, with 227 passengers and 12 crew members aboard

the plane. Thirty-nine minutes after takeoff, while the

Boeing 777 aircraft was flying over the South China Sea

and transitioning from Malaysian to Vietnamese airspace,

Malaysian air traffic controllers lost radar contact with the

aircraft. At Malaysia’s behest, a massive international

search and rescue effort ensued, but neither the plane nor

any wreckage was recovered, and on January 28, 2015, the

Malaysian Department of Civil Aviation (“MDCA”) announced that all aboard Flight MH370 were presumed deceased. Some pieces of wreckage have since washed

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ashore on islands in the Indian Ocean and on the eastern

coast of Africa, but, to date, most of the plane remains unaccounted for, including the cockpit voice recorder and the

flight data recorder.

Following the disappearance of Flight MH370, litigation commenced in both Malaysia and in the United

States; many plaintiffs have filed suit in both jurisdictions.

In the United States, complaints were filed in California,

the District of Columbia, Illinois, New York, South Carolina, and Washington state, and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation subsequently centralized the pretrial

proceedings with respect to all of these cases in this District. (See Transfer Order, ECF No. 1.) The complaints in

these matters can generally be grouped into two categories. First, there are cases that assert claims under the

Montreal Convention against the defendant airlines—Malaysia Airlines System Berhad (Administrator Appointed)

(“MAS”) and Malaysia Airlines Berhad (“MAB”)—and/or

their insurers, Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty SE

(“AGCS SE”), and Henning Haagen, an officer at AGCS

SE. Second, there are cases that assert common law

wrongful death and products liability claims against airplane manufacturer Boeing, including claims based on a

res ipsa loquitor tort theory. There is also a single complaint that resides in the overlap between these two

groups—it asserts Montreal Convention, wrongful death,

and personal injury claims, and names MAS, MAB, AGCS

SE, Haagen, and Boeing as defendants. All told, 40 complaints are currently pending in this MDL.

Before this Court at present are five ripe motions pertaining to particular threshold issues that various defendants have raised: (1) a joint motion seeking dismissal of all

pending cases based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens, in which Defendants argue that it would be more convenient to ligate these matters in Malaysia, as opposed to

the United States (see Joint Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to

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Dismiss on the Ground of Forum Non Conveniens (“FNC

Mem.”), ECF No. 37-1); (2) a motion by MAS and MAB

seeking dismissal of the claims against them on the

grounds that they are agencies of the Malaysian government and immune from suit in United States courts pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1330, 1602 (see Defs.’ MAS and MAB’s Mem. in Supp.

of Their Rule 12(b)(1) Mot. to Dismiss on the Ground of

Immunity Pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities

Act (“FSIA Mem.”), ECF No. 39-1) 1; (3) a motion by MAS

seeking dismissal of the Montreal Convention claims

against it on the grounds that no provision of the Convention provides a court in the United States with jurisdiction

over these claims (see Def. MAS’s Mem. in Supp. of Its

Rule 12(b)(1) Mot. to Dismiss on the Ground of Lack of

Subject Matter Juris. Pursuant to the Montreal Convention (“Montreal Convention Mem.”), ECF No. 38-1) 2; (4) a

motion by AGCS SE seeking dismissal of the claims

against it for lack of personal jurisdiction, because it is a

foreign company that did not engage in any conduct connected to the loss of Flight MH370 in any of the jurisdictions in which it has been sued (see Def. AGCS SE’s Rule

12(b)(2) Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Juris.

(“AGCS SE Pers. Juris. Mot.”), ECF No. 35-1); and (5) a

motion by AGCS SE and Haagen seeking dismissal for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, in

which they argue that Plaintiffs’ attempt to make them

representatives of MAS and MAB, based solely on their

status as alleged insurers of MAS, has no legal foundation

(see Defs. AGCS SE and Henning Haagen’s Mem. in Supp.

MAB and AGCS SE have moved to join this motion. (See Motion for

Joinder, ECF No. 41.)

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MAB and AGCS SE have moved to join this motion. (See Motion for

Joinder, ECF No. 40.)

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of Their Rule 12(b)(6) Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State

a Claim (“Reinsurer Rule 12(b)(6) Mem.”), ECF No. 36-1).

This Court has carefully parsed the myriad dismissal

arguments Defendants have presented, and as fully explained below, it has determined that, on balance, the

claims asserted in the consolidated complaints have a substantial and overriding nexus to Malaysia that outweighs

the less substantial connection to the United States. As

such, litigation of these claims in the United States is comparatively inconvenient, and Defendants’ joint motion for

dismissal based on forum non conveniens will be

GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ cases will be DISMISSED

without prejudice. The remaining threshold motions will

be DENIED as moot. A separate Order consistent with

this Memorandum Opinion will follow.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND3

A. The Incident And Its Aftermath

1. Flight MH370’s Disappearance

At 12:42 AM on the morning of March 8, 2014, Flight

MH370 took off from Kuala Lumpur International Airport

in Malaysia, en route to Beijing, China. (See Malaysian

ICAO Annex 13 Safety Investigation Team for MH370,

Factual Information Safety Investigation For MH370

(March 8, 2015, updated on April 15, 2015) (“Factual Investigation Rpt.”), ECF No. 37-4, at 21; Malaysian

The facts contained within this section are derived from the complaints filed in the various underlying actions, as well as the exhibits

that the parties have attached to their various filings in this matter.

See Johnson v. PPI Tech. Servs., L.P., No. 11cv2773, 2012 WL

1865713, at *2 (E.D. La. May 22, 2012) (explaining that a court adjudicating a forum non conveniens motion “is not limited to the allegations in the complaint, but may consider all of the evidence before it”);

see also Goldberg v. UBS AG, 660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)

(relying on the complaint and materials that the parties had submitted

when ruling on a motion seeking dismissal based on forum non conveniens).

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Department of Civil Aviation Press Release (“MDCA

Press Release”), ECF No. 37-3, ¶ 3.) 4 MAS was the national airline of Malaysia at that time (see Decl. of Rizani

Bin Hassan, Ex. 2 to FISA Mem., ECF No. 39-3, ¶¶ 5, 8,

20–21), and 12 Malaysian citizens staffed Flight MH370—

a pilot, a first officer, and 10 cabin crew (see MDCA Press

Release ¶ 4; Decl. of Mohd Fuad Bin Mohd Sharuji, Ex. 3

to FNC Mem., ECF No. 37-5, at ¶ 15). Also on board were

227 passengers of 14 nationalities, including 152 Chinese

citizens, 38 Malaysian citizens, and three United States

citizens. (See Decl. of Tan Sri Dato Seri Adbull Hamid

Embong, Ex. 10 to FNC Mem., ECF No. 37-12, ¶ 13). 5

At 1:19 AM, while the aircraft was over the South

China Sea and transitioning from Malaysian airspace to

Vietnamese airspace, Malaysian air traffic controllers instructed Flight MH370 to contact Vietnamese air traffic

controllers on a specific radio frequency, a request that the

pilot in charge acknowledged with, “Good night Malaysian

Three Seven Zero.” (Malaysian ICAO Annex 13 Safety Investigation Team for MH370, Safety Investigation Report

(July 2, 2018) (“Safety Investigation Rpt.”), ECF No. 1021, at 48, 477.) The pilot “did not read back the assigned

frequency, which was inconsistent with radio-telephony

procedures.” (Id. at 477.) This was the last recorded radio

transmission that the pilots of Flight MH370 sent, and two

Page numbers cited herein refer to those that Court’s electronic case

filing system automatically assigns.

5

The U.S. citizens were Philip Wood, Leo Meng, and Nicole Meng.

(See No. 1:16cv01063, Huang First Am. Compl. ECF No. 9, at ¶ 8; No.

1:16cv01048, Zhang 2d Am. Compl., ECF No. 7, ¶ 10; No. 1:16cv00439,

Smith Compl., ECF No. 1, at ¶ 8; and 1:16cv00053, Wood Compl., ECF

No. 1, at ¶ 23.) All three were living overseas at the time of the incident.

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minutes later, at 1:21 AM, Malaysian air traffic controllers

lost radar contact with the aircraft. (Id. at 48– 49.)6

“The Malaysian military radar and radar sources from

two other countries, namely Vietnam and Thailand, also

captured the disappearance of the radar position symbol

of MH370” in this same timeframe. (Id. at 49.) Once Malaysian air traffic controllers lost sight of Flight MH370 on

their radar, Malaysian military radar showed a “blip” that

appeared to be the plane. However, this “blip” appeared

to be diverting from Flight MH370’s northerly flight plan;

it briefly veered to the right, and then turned left dramatically, flying west-southwest across Malaysia, at variable

altitudes and speeds, before turning right when the plane

was south of Penang Island, off of the western coast of Malaysia. (See id. at 50, 55.) The “blip” indicated that the

plane was flying in a west-northwest direction, and it disappeared from the military radar entirely at 2:22 AM, 10

nautical miles north of a flight navigation waypoint known

as MEKAR. (See id. at 52, 55.)

The Boeing 777 the Malaysia Airlines used as equipment for Flight MH370 was equipped with a satellite communications system, and except for two brief periods, “the

aircraft [itself] communicated through the Inmarsat Indian Ocean Region . . . I-3 Satellite and the [Ground Earth

Station] in Perth, Australia.” (See id. at 165.)7 The satellite

connections were briefly lost sometime between 1:07 AM

and 2:03 AM, presumably as the result of equipment failing or being powered down, but Flight MH370’s satellite

Thirty minutes later, at 1:52 AM, a mobile phone tower at Bandar

Baru Farlim Penanang recorded a signal “hit” from the First Officer’s

mobile telephone, but no actual call took place. (See Safety Investigation Rpt. at 66.)

7

Plaintiffs represent that Inmarasat is located in the United Kingdom. (See Pls.’ Resp. to the Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss Under the Doctrine

of Forum Non Conveniens, (“Podhurst FNC Opp’n’), ECF No. 68, at

13 n.4.)

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data unit logged back onto the system and sent a “handshake” at 2:25 AM. (See id. at 171.) The aircraft then initiated five additional “handshakes” before the satellite

communications system again briefly lost power, likely as

a result of fuel running low and engines losing power, but

then logged back on. (See id. at 171–175; 480.) The system

initiated a seventh and final “handshake” at 6:19 AM, but

when the Perth ground station attempted to contact the

plane again at 7:15 AM, it did not receive any response.

(See id. at 175–76.)

2. Search Efforts And Subsequent Investigations

Malaysia’s Minister of Transport authorized a team of

officials—known as the Malaysian ICAO Annex 13 Safety

Investigation Team for MH370 (hereinafter referred to as

the “Malaysian MH370 Investigation Team”)—to coordinate the initial search and rescue efforts, and also to investigate the cause of Flight MH370’s disappearance.

(MDCA Press Release ¶ 28.)8 On March 17, 2014, at Malaysia’s request, the Australian Transportation Safety

Board (“ATSB”) “took charge of the coordination of the

search and rescue operation[, and o]ver the next 6 weeks

The Convention on International Civil Aviation, also known as the

Chicago Convention, established the International Civil Aviation Organization (“ICAO”), a specialized agency of the United Nations that

works with the Convention’s 192 Member States (including the United

States and Malaysia) to establish standards for regulating international civil aviation. See About ICAO, available at https://www.

icao.int/about-icao/Pages/default.aspx; see also Convention on Int’l

Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180. Annex 13 to

the Chicago Convention, which adopts procedures for aircraft accident and incident investigation, requires a member state to investigate both incidents that take place inside its territory and also accidents involving aircraft registered in the member state in circumstances where the location of the incident cannot be determined to be

in any particular state. See Sections 5.1, 5.3 of Annex 13 to Convention

on

Int’l

Aviation

(available

at

https://www.emsa.europa.eu/retro/Docs/marine_casualties/annex_13.pdf).

8

19a

from 18 March, an intensive aerial and surface search was

conducted by assets from Australia, Malaysia, China, Japan, Korea, UK and the USA.” (ATSB, MH370—Definition of Underwater Search Areas (updated Aug. 18, 2014)

(“ATSB June 2014 Rpt.”), Ex. E to Pls.’ Resp. in Opp’n to

Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss on the Ground of Forum Non Conveniens (“Motley Rice FNC Opp’n”), ECF No. 67-6, at 7.)

ATSB’s initial search for Flight MH370 was focused on

the South China Sea, which was the flight’s last known location as detected by air traffic control. “The search area

was later extended to the Straits of Malacca, to the west of

Malaysia, based on military radar showing that an aircraft

like Flight MH370 had made an air turn back from the

South China Sea and headed west back across the Malaysian Peninsula.” (Decl. of Hillary Barr (“Barr Decl.”), Ex.

5 to FNC Mem., ECF No. 37-7, ¶ 4.) Using the satellite

data “handshakes,” investigators plotted the plane’s likely

course, which included making a southern turn shortly after passing the northern tip of Sumatra, after the plane

had disappeared from military radar. (See Safety Investigation Rpt. at 184.) “The 52 days of the surface search involving aircraft and surface vessels covered an area of several million square kilometres[,]” and an extensive “sub

surface search for the aircraft’s underwater locator beacons was also conducted[.]” (Id. at 67.)9

Ultimately, the search team concluded that Flight

MH370 likely crashed in the Southern Indian Ocean after

running out of fuel. (See id.) “[T]he search and rescue

phase transitioned to a search and recovery phase” on

The subsurface search was massive in both scope and scale: “[t]he

underwater search started with a bathymetry survey which mapped a

total of 710,000 square kilometres of Indian Ocean seafloor and continued with a high-resolution sonar search which covered an area in

excess of 120,000 square kilometres.” (Safety Investigation Report at

67.)

9

20a

April 28, 2014 (MDCA Press Release ¶ 9), and on January

28, 2015, having not located the plane or any wreckage, the

MDCA announced that the “data supports the conclusion

that MH370 ended its flight in the southern Indian

Ocean[,]” away from any possible landing site. (Id. ¶ 20.)

Accordingly, the MDCA presumed that all passengers and

crew had perished. (Id. ¶ 23.)

Three pieces of confirmed wreckage and more than 20

pieces of likely wreckage have since washed ashore on islands in the Indian Ocean and on the eastern coast of Africa, but most of the plane remains unaccounted for, including the cockpit voice recorder and the flight data recorder. (See id. at 185–99.)10 In January of 2017, the governments of Malaysia, Australia, and China officially suspended the underwater search for Flight MH370. (See id.

at 67.) Thereafter, in January of 2018, a private company,

Ocean Infinity, entered into a contract with the Malaysian

government to conduct an additional underwater search

for wreckage, centered on an area that it believed was

most likely to contain wreckage from the aircraft. (See id.

at 67, 184.) Over a period of 90 days, Ocean Infinity

searched an additional 112,000 square kilometers north of

this initial search area, also to no avail. (See id.)

3. The Annex 13 Report And Criminal Investigation

With Australia taking the lead on locating the physical

remains of Flight MH370, the Malaysian MH370 Investigation Team—consisting of an Investigator in Charge and

18 additional subordinates—worked with representatives

from seven countries to determine why Flight MH370 had

disappeared; this investigation is known as “the Annex 13

Safety Investigation[.]” (See Safety Investigation Rpt. at

The various pieces of debris have been taken to different locations

for analysis, including France, Australia, and Malaysia. (See Barr

Decl. ¶ 13.)

10

21a

15, 443.) The United States participated in the Annex 13

Safety Investigation through the National Transportation

Safety Board (“NTSB”), because the United States is the

county of manufacture and design of the aircraft, and in

this regard, Boeing—which designed and manufactured

the aircraft at issue (see infra Part I.B)—served as a technical adviser to the NTSB. (Barr Decl. ¶ 9.)

Australia, the United Kingdom, Singapore, France,

China, and Indonesia also participated in the Annex 13

Safety Investigation. (See Safety Investigation Rpt. at

15.) The collective investigative effort involved interviewing more than 120 people, including MAS employees, crew

member relatives, Malaysia aviation officials, and representatives of companies that were shipping cargo on

Flight MH370. (See Malaysian ICAO Annex 13 Safety Investigation Team for MH370, Interim Stmt., Safety Investigation for MH370 (9M-MRO) (Mar. 8, 2015) (“Safety Investigation Interim Stmt.”), Ex. 6 to FNC Mem., ECF No.

37-8, at 3.) The team also reviewed airline-maintenance

records, as well as Boeing’s records, air traffic control records and recordings, closed-circuit footage of the crew,

bank records, and statements from friends, relatives, coworkers, and medical providers of the crew members.

(See id.; Safety Investigation Rpt. at 71, 82.) Annex 13 investigators thoroughly researched the pilots and the crew

members, and even analyzed the voices on the flight’s radio transmissions to detect signs of stress. (See Safety Investigation Rpt. at 71–84.)

On July 2, 2018, the Malaysian MH370 Investigation

Team issued a 449-page report, which was the culmination

of the years-long Annex 13 Safety Investigation’s inquiry

into the causes of the flight’s disappearance. (See generally Safety Investigation Rpt.; see also id. at 21 (noting

that the “sole objective of the investigation [was] prevention of accidents and incidents [and not] to apportion

blame or liability”).)

22a

In that report, the team noted that it “was likely” that

the left turn that took the aircraft back over Malaysia “was

under manual control and not the autopilot.” (Id. at 475.)

However, the investigators could not determine whether

or not “the other two turns over the south of Penang and

the north of MEKAR were made under manual control or

autopilot.” (Id.) The report also found that Malaysian air

traffic controllers “did not comply fully with established

[air traffic control] procedures” and did not initiate emergency procedures “in a timely manner[,]” and that Vietnamese air traffic controllers had also failed to communicate timely with Malaysian controllers about the disappearance of the plane. (Id. at 476.)

With respect to the initial loss of communication, investigators reported that

[a]lthough it cannot be conclusively ruled

out that an aircraft or system malfunction

was a cause, based on the limited evidence

available, it is more likely that the loss of

communication (VHF and HF communications, ACARS, SATCOM and Transponder) prior to the diversion is due to

the systems being manually turned off or

power interrupted to them or additionally

in the case of VHF and HF, not used,

whether with intent or otherwise.

(Id. at 478.) However, the investigation did not otherwise

reveal any apparent issues with the crew, nor did it indicate any problems with the plane’s systems, maintenance,

or cargo. (See id. at 486–89.)

Ultimately, the Annex 13 Investigation Team reported

that it was simply “unable to determine the real cause for

the disappearance of MH370.” (Id. at 489.) According to

the report, this inconclusive result was primarily due to

the lack of aircraft wreckage or data from any of the flight

23a

recorders—an acute absence of critical information that

prevented investigators from definitively ruling in or ruling out any specific causes. (See id. at 488–89 (“Without

the benefit of the examination of the aircraft wreckage and

recorded flight data information, the investigation was unable to identify any plausible aircraft or systems failure

mode that would lead to the observed systems deactivation, diversion from the filed flight plan route and the subsequent flight path taken by the aircraft. However, the

same lack of evidence precluded the investigation from

definitely eliminating that possibility. The possibility of

intervention by a third party cannot be excluded either.”).)

The Annex 13 Safety Investigation was not the only review of the potential causes of the Flight MH370 disaster;

Malaysian authorities also launched a criminal investigation into Flight MH370’s disappearance. As part of the

criminal investigation, the Royal Malaysian Police seized

a flight simulator from the home of the pilot in charge (see

Safety Investigation Rpt. at 73), and analysis of this simulator revealed “that there were seven ‘manually programmed’ waypoint coordinates . . . that when connected

together, will create a flight path from [Kuala Lumpur International Airport] to an area south of the Indian Ocean

through the Andaman Sea” (id. (footnote omitted)). However, the analysis “did not find any data that showed the

aircraft was performing climb, attitude or heading

manouevres, nor did [it] find any data that showed a similar route flown by MH370.” (Id.) In connection with its investigation, the Royal Malaysian Police also obtained

statements “from the next of kin and relatives, doctors/care givers, co-workers, friends and acquaintances”

of the crew members, and reviewed “financial records of

the flight crew [and] CCTV recordings at [the airport in

Kuala Lumpur,]” along with “analy[zing] the radio

24a

transmission made between MH370 and ground Air Traffic Control.” (See id. at 404.)11

4. The Reorganization Of MAS And The Passage

Of Act 765

Malaysia Airlines System Berhad (referred to herein

as “MAS”) is a “Government Linked Company” under Malaysian law, meaning that “it is a company in which the

Government of Malaysia has a direct controlling stake.”

(FSIA Mem. at 16.) Following the disappearance of Flight

MH370, Khazanah Nasional Berhad—a political subdivision of the Government of Malaysia and its sovereign

wealth fund—purchased the remaining ownership shares

of MAS from minority shareholders, and MAS was delisted from the Malaysian stock exchange. (See id. at 17.)

The Malaysian government then enacted a law entitled the

Malaysian Airline System Berhad (Administration) Act

2015 (“Act 765”), pursuant to which MAS was placed under administration and a new, separate entity—Malaysia

Airlines Berhad (“MAB”)—was incorporated to operate

as the national airline. (See id.) Among other things, Act

765 empowers MAS’s Administrator to manage and compromise liabilities for the company (Act 765 §§ 9(1)(b–e));

defend MAS in litigation (id. §§ 10(g–h)); transfer assets

from MAS to MAB (id. § 10(o)); and liquidate the assets of

MAS (id. § 10(e)). (See id. at 32– 33.) MAB assumed certain rights and liabilities from MAS, but under the terms

of Act 765, MAB is not a successor corporation of MAS,

see id. § 25(1)(a), and has not assumed any liabilities in connection with Flight MH370, (see Ex. 5 to FNC Reply).

Citing to news reports, Plaintiffs contend that the United States’

Federal Bureau of Investigation also participated in the Royal Malaysian Police’s criminal investigation, including analyzing data from the

flight simulator. (See Podhurst FNC Opp’n at 16 n.20.)

11

25a

5. Litigation In Malaysia

As of the briefing of the threshold issues that are now

before this Court, there are 27 civil cases pending in the

High Court of Malaya at Kuala Lumpur (Civil Division)

relating to the loss of Flight MH370, and these cases have

been transferred to a single judge for coordinated proceedings. (Decl. of Saranjit Singh (“Singh Decl.”), Ex. 13

to FNC Mem, ECF No. 37-13, ¶ 7.) Of the 88 decedents

represented in legal actions that are part of the instant

MDL, 77 are also represented in the cases pending in Malaysia, and the defendants in the Malaysian cases include

MAS, MAB, AGCS SE, and a number of Malaysian governmental entities. (See id. ¶ 9.) Boeing has not been

named as a defendant in any of the Malaysian cases.

The Malaysian High Court has declined the plaintiffs’

request to stay the Malaysian proceedings pending resolution of the instant forum non conveniens motion. (See

id. ¶¶ 10–13.) In addition, the Malaysian High Court also

denied the request of some of the attorneys who have filed

MDL cases to be admitted to represent their clients in the

Malaysian matters. (See Decl. of Tommy Thomas, Ex. 1

to Podhurst FNC Opp’n, ECF No. 68-1, ¶ 11.)

B. The Design, Manufacture, And Maintenance Of

The Aircraft

The equipment for Flight MH370 was a Boeing 7772H6ER (Serial Number 28420) that was designed and

manufactured at Boeing’s facility in Washington state in

May of 2002, and was delivered to MAS in new condition

on May 31, 2002. (See Barr Decl. ¶ 17; Fact Investigation

Rpt. at 42.) It is undisputed that all of the records related

“to the design, manufacture, assembly, testing, and certification of the 777 model aircraft” are located in Boeing’s

facilities in Washington, as are the Boeing employees who

have knowledge of these matters. (See Barr Decl. ¶ 17.) In

addition, records related to any customer support that

26a

Boeing may have provided to MAS regarding the plane

are also located in the United States, possibly in California. (See id.)

After delivery of the aircraft, the MDCA certified the

plane as airworthy, and that certification was current at

the time of Flight MH370’s disappearance. (See Safety Investigation Rpt. at 409.) MAS was responsible for maintenance of the aircraft, and original records related to such

work are located in Malaysia, as are the MAS employees

who completed the work. (See Barr Decl. ¶¶ 12–13.) Review of MAS’s maintenance files during the Annex 13 investigation indicated that MAS conducted regular maintenance on the aircraft, and that “all applicable Airworthiness Directives for mandatory compliance were complied

with.” (See Fact Investigation Rpt. at 44; Safety Investigation Rpt. at 409–411.)12 The only maintenance issue that

the Annex 13 Investigation revealed was that the battery

on the plane’s solid state flight data recorder underwater

locator beacon was overdue for replacement. (See Safety

Investigation Rpt. at 183.)

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. The Commencement Of Litigation In The

United States

In early 2016, many of the legal representatives or beneficiaries of passengers who had perished on Flight

MH370 initiated litigation in the United States related to

the disappearance of the flight—a total of 40 cases were

initially filed in four different locations (the District of Columbia, California, New York, and Illinois). (See Sch. A to

Plaintiffs assert that there are “364 Airworthiness Directives currently posed on the FAA website” related to the Boeing 777-200 aircraft, many of which “concern potential electrical and structure failure[s] of the 777-200[.]” (Motley Rice FNC Opp’n at 7–8.) Plaintiffs

further contend that records pertaining to these directives are located

in the United States. (Id.)

12

27a

Transfer Order, ECF No. 1; Sch. CTO-1 to Conditional

Transfer Order (“CTO-1”), ECF No. 2.) On June 6, 2016,

the JPML centralized all proceedings regarding the disappearance of Flight MH370 in this Court (see Transfer

Order), and issued orders transferring the pending cases

to this Court for coordinated pretrial proceedings (see id.

at 3; CTO-1 at 1). After the MDL was created and the initial transfers took place, two additional cases were filed—

one in the District of South Carolina, and another in the

Western District of Washington—and those two cases

were also transferred to this Court. (See Conditional

Transfer Order, ECF No. 57, at 3.)

1. The Plaintiffs

For the purpose of the instant threshold motions,

Plaintiffs have self-divided into two groups, with one

group consisting of legal representatives/beneficiaries

who are represented by the law firms of Podhurst Orseck,

P.A., and Wisner Law Firm P.C. (collectively, the

“Podhurst Plaintiffs”), and the second group consisting of

similar individuals represented by Motley Rice LLC, and

Spagnoletti & Co. (collectively, the “Motley Rice Plaintiffs”). The Podhurst Plaintiffs can be further subdivided

into two groups, with the first consisting of the plaintiffs

in two cases brought against MAS and MAB under the

Montreal Convention,13 and the second consisting of the

plaintiffs in 32 cases that assert state law wrongful death

and products liability claims against Boeing.14 (See infra

See Wood v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv0053; Gaspard v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv0419.

14

Li v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1128; Xiao v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1129;

Gao v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1130; Feng v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1131;

Wang v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1132; Wang v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1134;

Pang v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1135; Liang v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1136;

Hu v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1137; Zhou v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1138;

Hu v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1139; Wang v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1140;

Zhang v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1143; Tian v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1144;

13

28a

Part II.A.3.) The Motley Rice Plaintiffs can similarly be

subdivided into groups on the basis of the claims they are

asserting. (See infra, Part II.A.3.) One group of Motley

Rice Plaintiffs has brought claims under the Montreal

Convention against MAS and MAB, and their complaints

additionally name reinsurers AGCS SE and Haagen as defendants15 A second group of Motley Rice Plaintiffs have

filed suits that assert state law wrongful death and products liability claims against Boeing.16 The final Motley Rice

Plaintiffs group consists of a single case that has scores of

named plaintiffs and asserts claims related to 44 of the

Flight MH370 decedents.17 This group asserts both Montreal Convention claims and wrongful death/products liability claims against all of the defendants.

The Podhurst Plaintiffs are citizens and residents of a

variety of countries—four are citizens of the United

States; one is a resident of the United States; and 24 are

citizens and residents of India, Australia, or China. (See

Podhurst FNC Opp’n. at 21–22; see also infra, Part

IV.A.2; IV.B.2.) The Podhurst Plaintiffs represent, or are

otherwise related to, 62 of the passengers of the fateful

Li v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1145; Shirath v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1146;

Jia v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1147; Gaspard v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1148;

Wood v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1149; Santhanam v. The Boeing Co.,

16cv1151; Huang v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1152; Kolekar v. The Boeing

Co., 16cv1153; Han v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1161; Zhang v. The Boeing

Co., 16cv1164; Chen v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1165; Kolekar v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1166; Gaspard v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1296; Gaspard v.

The Boeing Co., 16cv1299; Zhang v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1306; Yuan

v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1307; Weeks v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1167; Richards v. The Boeing Co., 17cv0503.

15

See Smith v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv0429; Kanan v. Malaysia Airlines Sys. Berhad, 16cv1062; Huang v. Malaysia Airlines

Berhad. 16cv1063.

16

Kanan v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1159, Keith v. The Boeing Company,

17cv0518.

17

Zhang v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv1048.

29a

Flight MH370, only one of whom was a citizen of the

United States. The rest of the decedents who are referenced in the Podhurst Plaintiffs’ complaints are citizens

and/or residents of India, Australia, Indonesia, Japan, and

China. (See Podhurst FNC Opp’n at 21-22.)

Two of the Motley Rice Plaintiffs are citizens of the

United States (see Compl., Keith v. The Boeing Co.,

17cv0518, ECF No. 1, ¶ 1; Compl., Smith v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv0439, ECF No. 1, ¶ 39), and one appears

to be a citizen of Malaysia (see Notice of Removal, Kanan

v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1159, at 6), while the remainder appear to be citizens of China (see Compl., Zhang v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv1048, ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 42, 44–84).

Of the decedents who are referenced in the Motley Rice

complaints, two are United States citizens who were residents of China, and one is a lawful permanent resident of

the United States who was living in China at the time of

Flight MH370’s disappearance. (See Pls.’ Resp. to Def.

MAS’s Montreal Conv. Mot. (“Motley Rice Montreal Convention Opp’n”), ECF No. 66, at 6.) One appears to be a

citizen of Malaysia, and the remainder appear to be citizens of China. (See Kanan Notice of Removal at 6; Zhang

Compl., ¶¶ 42, 44–84.)

2. The Defendants

The various complaints that comprise this MDL name

one or more of five defendants. Defendants MAS and

MAB are based in Malaysia, while Boeing’s commercial

aircraft operations are based on the west coast of the

United States, in Washington state. (See Part I.B., supra.)

Four of the pending complaints also name as a defendant

AGCS SE, alleging that it is an insurer of MAS; AGCS SE

contends that it is a “Societas Europaea”-organized corporation that exists under the laws of the European Union,

and that it maintains its principal place of business in

30a

Munich, Germany. (See AGCS SE Pers. Juris. Mot. at 9.)18

The final defendant—Haagen—is an executive of AGCS

SE; he is named as a defendant in two complaints. (Id.)

3. The Claims

As noted above, the complaints consolidated in this

MDL assert two different types of claims: Montreal Convention claims against MAS and MAB (and in some cases,

their insurers), and state law wrongful death and products

liability claims against Boeing.

a. The Montreal Convention

The Montreal Convention—formally titled the “Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air” —is an international treaty to

which both the United States and Malaysia are parties.

See May 28, 1999, S. Treaty Doc. No. 10645, 1999 WL

33292734 (2000).19 The Montreal Convention “sets forth

uniform rules for claims that arise out of incidents that occur during international air transportation[,]” Marotte v.

Am. Airlines, Inc., 296 F.3d 1255, 1258–59 (11th Cir.

2002), and it “applies to all international carriage of persons, baggage or cargo performed by aircraft for reward[,]” Art. 1.1, Montreal Conv. There is no dispute that

the disappearance of Flight MH370 involved international

carriage within the meaning of the Montreal Convention.

Article 17 of the Montreal Convention provides that an

air “carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death

or bodily injury of a passenger upon condition only that

the accident which caused the death or injury took place

AGCS SE describes its relationship with MAS as “the reinsurer of

a retrocession of reinsurance issued by a Malaysian company to the

actual direct insurer of MAS”—in other words, a reinsurer of a reinsurer. (Id.)

19

The Montreal Convention, which became effective on November 4,

2003, succeeded the Warsaw Convention. See Bassam v. Am. Airlines, 287 Fed. Appx. 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam).

18

31a

on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.” Art. 17, Montreal

Conv. “According to Article 21, a carrier is strictly liable

up to [113,000] Special Drawing Rights (SDR) . . . for damages sustained in case of death or bodily injury to passengers[.]” Delgado v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 12-23272,

2013 WL 9838339, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 31, 2013) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).20 In addition, an air

carrier is liable for damages in excess of the initial 113,000

SDR if the plaintiff claims and establishes such damages,

unless the carrier can establish that the “accident is entirely attributable to events wholly outside the carrier’s

control.” Id.

The Montreal Convention specifies that a plaintiff generally can file a lawsuit seeking damages under the treaty

for passenger death or personal injury, as well as damage

to property, “before the court of the [1] domicile of the carrier or [2] of its principal place of business, or [3] where it

has a place of business through which the contract has

been made or [4] before the court at the place of destination.” Montreal Conv., Art. 33. Moreover, where the claim

involves the death or injury of a passenger, a legal action

may also be filed in the country where “at the time of the

accident the passenger has his or her principal and permanent residence and to or from which the carrier operates

services for the carriage of passengers by air, . . . and in

which that carrier conducts its business of carriage of passengers by air from premises leased or owned by the carrier itself or by another carrier with which it has a commercial agreement.” Id.

“An SDR is a unit of artificial currency which fluctuates based on

the global currency market.” Lee v. Air Canada, 228 F. Supp. 3d 302,

306 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). The Montreal Convention strict liability cap,

which was originally set at 100,000, is adjusted periodically, and was

113,000 at the time of the incident.

20

32a

b. Wrongful Death And Products Liability

Tort Claims Pertaining To Aviation Disasters

Wrongful death claims are a creature of state law, and

in the United States typically exist to provide “just compensation” to the survivors of a person wrongfully killed.

See Reiser v. United States, 786 F. Supp. 1334, 1335 (N.D.

Ill. 1992) (citing Ill. Rev. Stats. Ch. 70 ¶ 2); see also Aspinall v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 625 F.2d 325, 327 (9th

Cir. 1980) (noting that “[u]nder California law the right of

a survivor to recover under the wrongful death theory is

purely statutory”); Rentz v. Spokane Cty., 438 F. Supp. 2d

1252, 1257 (E.D. Wash. 2006) (explaining that Washington

law permits a personal representative of a deceased individual to maintain a wrongful death suit for the benefit of

the heirs). The evidence in a wrongful death case in the

context of an aviation disaster, as in other wrongful death

cases, typically involves proof of the traditional elements

of a negligence claim: duty, breach, causation, and damages, including proof that the injury was a death. See Kasongo v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 2d 759, 792 (N.D. Ill.

2007).

Products liability claims, which are generally brought

under state common law, can proceed under either a strict

liability or a negligence theory, and require proof of the

causal relationship between a manufacturer’s product and

the injury a plaintiff has suffered. Thornton v. M7 Aerospace LP, 796 F.3d 757, 770 (7th Cir. 2015); see also Joy v.

Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 554 (D.C. Cir.

1993) (explaining that “[i]n order to recover, an injured

plaintiff must demonstrate not only that the product is defective, but also that the defect proximately caused plaintiff’s injury in that but for the defect, the injury would not

have occurred” (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)). Thus, such cases typically involve evidence regarding the nature of the defect (manufacturing, design,

33a

or otherwise); the incident itself; and the damages suffered. See id. Plaintiffs here intend to rely upon a res ipsa

loquitur theory of causation, pursuant to which a jury can

infer that a manufacturer’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury based on the circumstances of the case, rather

than direct proof of a product defect. (See Mot. Hr’g Tr.

at 38:4–8.) See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Phy. &

Emot. Harm § 17 (2010). With respect to aviation disasters, which might involve negligence by someone other

than the plane manufacturer, “res ipsa loquitur can be

found applicable only if the plaintiff has offered evidence

tending to negate the presence of causes other than the

defendant’s negligence.” Restatement (Third) of Torts:

Phy. & Emot. Harm § 17.

B. Defendants’ Threshold Motions

At the parties’ request, this Court ordered initial discovery limited to six topics—forum non conveniens; jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; jurisdiction under the Montreal Convention; personal jurisdiction; plaintiffs’ capacity to bring suit; and whether

plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim against AGCS SE

and Haagen—and set a schedule for the briefing and filing

of dispositive motions related solely to those topics. (See

Scheduling Order, ECF No. 14, at 1–2.) Following the discovery period, Defendants filed the joint motion seeking

dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens that

is the subject of this opinion. (See Joint Mot. to Dismiss

on the Ground of Forum Non Conveniens (“FNC Mot.”),

ECF No. 37.) Various defendants filed four other motions

related to these threshold topics.21

These are: a motion by MAS and MAB seeking dismissal of the

claims against them based on sovereign immunity (see Defs.’ Rule

12(b)(1) Mot. to Dismiss on the Ground of Immunity Pursuant to the

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, ECF No. 39); a motion by MAS

seeking dismissal of the Montreal Convention for lack of jurisdiction

21

34a

In their joint forum non conveniens motion, Defendants argue that all of the pending complaints should be dismissed in favor of litigation in Malaysia, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454

U.S. 235 (1981).22 Defendants maintain that Malaysia is an

adequate and available forum for litigation of all of Plaintiffs’ claims. (See FNC Opp’n at 21–23.) They also argue

that the balance of private and public factors weighs in favor of dismissal, because the vast majority of evidence regarding liability is in Malaysia, and that it would be difficult to obtain the testimony of unwilling Malaysian witnesses in the United States. (See id. at 24–32.) Defendants

further assert that not all potential defendants can be

joined as defendants in United States courts (see id. at 32–

33), and that this Court could be called upon in the context

of this litigation to determine the validity of Act 765 (see

id. at 39–40). Moreover, Defendants contend that Malaysia’s interest in resolving lawsuits arising from the disappearance of Flight MH370 far outweighs any interest the

United States has in this matter, even taking into account

Boeing’s status as an American company and the presence

of a few American plaintiffs and decedents. (See id. at 37–

41.)

(see Def. MAS’s Rule 12(b)(1) Mot. to Dismiss Pls.’ Compls. On the

Ground of Lack of Subject Matter Juris. Pursuant to the Montreal

Convention, ECF No. 38); a motion by AGCS SE seeking dismissal of

the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction (see Def. AGCS

SE’s Rule 12(b)(2) Mot. to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Juris., ECF

No. 35); and a motion by AGCS SE and Haagen seeking dismissal for

failure to state a claim (see Defs. AGCS SE and Henning Haagen’s

Rule 12(b)(6) Mot. to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, ECF No.

36).

22

After the two most recent cases were filed and transferred to this

Court, Boeing moved to dismiss these two cases on grounds of forum

non conveniens as well. (See Mot. to Dismiss Newly Transferred

Cases, ECF No. 58.)

35a

Plaintiffs oppose dismissal based on forum non conveniens, and the two plaintiffs groups have filed two separate oppositions.23 The Podhurst Plaintiffs concede that

Malaysia is an adequate and available alternative forum

(see Podhurst FNC Opp’n at 20 n.30), while the Motley

Rice Plaintiffs assert that, because Act 765 has insulated

MAB from liability and there is nothing left of MAS, Malaysia is not an adequate forum (see Motley Rice FNC

Opp’n at 11–17). Both sets of plaintiffs’ briefs also maintain that little, if any, relevant evidence is located in Malaysia because the plane was never found and the Malaysian investigators were unable to determine the cause of

the disappearance even after conducting an extensive investigation. (See Podhurst FNC Opp’n at 35–37; Motley

Rice FNC Opp’n at 10.) Plaintiffs further maintain that all

records related to Boeing are located in the United States,

and that other relevant evidence is located in other countries such as China (records related to Chinese decedents),

the United Kingdom (satellite data records), or Australia

(search records). (See Podhurst FNC Opp’n at 30–42;

Motley Rice FNC Opp’n at 8–11). In this regard, the

Podhurst Plaintiffs emphasize that none of the decedents

that Podhurst represents are from Malaysia, and that certain of the decedents and plaintiffs in cases they have filed

have connections to the United States. (See Podhurst

FNC Opp’n at 17–18.) Both plaintiff groups also insist that

the United States has a strong public interest in ensuring

that an American aircraft manufacturer produces safe airplanes. (See Podhurst FNC Opp’n at 48–49; Motley Rice

FNC Opp’n at 22.)

(Pls.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Joint Mot. to Dismiss on the Ground

of Forum Non Conveniens, ECF No. 67; Pls.’ Resp. to the Defs.’ Mot.

to Dismiss Under the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, ECF No.

68.)

23

36a

Defendants’ joint forum non conveniens motion became ripe for this Court’s consideration on September 8,

2017 (see Joint Reply in Supp. of FNC Mot., ECF No. 72),

and the Court heard oral argument on all of the threshold

motions on December 19, 2017 (see Min. Entry Of Dec. 19,

2017).

III. MOTIONS TO DISMISS BASED ON FORUM NON

CONVENIENS

Although a court must ordinarily rule upon questions

concerning its own jurisdiction before assessing the merits

of any other motion, an exception exists when a forum non

conveniens motion is filed; it is well established that a

court may opt to decide a forum non conveniens motion

before considering any jurisdictional issues. See Sinochem Int’l Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549

U.S. 422, 425 (2007). The standard used to evaluate a motion seeking dismissal based on the doctrine of forum non

conveniens is clear beyond cavil. The movant bears the

burden of showing that (1) there is an available and adequate alternative forum, and (2) the balance of various

public and private interest factors indicates that maintaining the case in the current forum is comparatively inconvenient. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254 n.22; see

also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947);

Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n, 528

F.3d 934, 950 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Azima v. RAK Inv. Auth.,

305 F. Supp. 3d 149, 160 (D.D.C. 2018). “[T]he district

court is accorded substantial flexibility in evaluating a forum non conveniens motion, and each case turns on its

facts.” Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529

(1988) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Indeed, “[i]f central emphasis were placed on any one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much

of the very flexibility that makes it so valuable.” Simon v.

Rep. of Hungary, 277 F. Supp. 3d 42, 62 (D.D.C. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

37a

A foreign forum is available and adequate when it “provide[s] the plaintiff with ‘some’ remedy[,]” Loya v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 583 F.3d 656, 666

(9th Cir. 2009), even if the damages available to the plaintiff would be less than those available in the United States,

and even if certain theories of liability are not recognized,

see Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 247, 255. On the other

hand, where the alternative forum could not award any relief to a plaintiff at all, courts will find that the forum is not

adequate. See Nemariam v. Fed. Democratic Republic of

Ethiopia, 315 F.3d 390, 394 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding alternative forum was inadequate because the governing law

barred plaintiff from directly filing her claim); Yueh-Lan

Wang by & through Winston Wen-Young Wong v. New

Mighty U.S. Tr., 322 F.R.D. 11, 26 (D.D.C. 2017) (holding

that alternative forum was inadequate where plaintiff’s

claim would be time-barred); see also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India on Jan. 1, 1978, 531 F. Supp.

1175, 1191 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (finding that a case involving

India’s national air carrier should be litigated in India, but

denying forum non conveniens motion where Indian forum was unavailable to plaintiffs).

The public interest factors that a court must consider

when assessing a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens include “having localized controversies decided at

home”; minimizing “administrative difficulties” such as

court congestion and imposing jury duty on citizens in a

“community which has no relation to the litigation”; and

unnecessarily burdening courts with “problems in choiceof-law and the application of foreign law.” D & S Consulting, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 322 F. Supp. 3d 45,

49–50 (D.D.C. 2018); see also Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at

508–09; Pain v. United Techs. Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 791–92

(D.C. Cir. 1980). And when balancing the private interests

in litigating the claims at issue in a particular forum, a

court considers a variety of factors, including “the relative

38a

ease of access to sources of proof”; the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses and the

cost of obtaining attendance; the enforceability of any

judgment; the “possibility of view of premises, if view

would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical

problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and

inexpensive.” Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443,

448 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Because forum non conveniens is a procedural question, this Court applies D.C. Circuit law in deciding forum

non conveniens motions. See Am. Dredging Co., 510 U.S.

at 453; In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983,

829 F.2d 1171, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Moreover, and notably, in the context of aviation disasters, “[t]he plaintiff’s

choice of forum will not be disturbed unless the private

and public interest factors strongly favor trial in the foreign country.” In re Air Crash Over Mid-Atl. on June 1,

2009 (“Air France”), 760 F. Supp. 2d 832, 839 (N.D. Cal.

2010). Furthermore, the nationality of the plaintiff has

some relevance to a court’s consideration of the forum non

conveniens question, as the Supreme Court has explained:

[T]here is ordinarily a strong presumption

in favor of the plaintiff’s choice of forum,

which may be overcome only when the private and public interest factors clearly

point towards trial in the alternative forum. . . . [H]owever, . . . the presumption

applies with less force when the plaintiff

or real parties in interest are foreign.

Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255.

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendants’ joint motion for dismissal of the instant

MDL cases on forum non conveniens grounds requires

this Court to consider the adequacy of Malaysia as a forum

for litigating claims related to this incident, and, as

39a

reflected in the myriad applicable public and private interest factors, the Court must also balance the significant relationship between Malaysia and the claims brought in

these cases, on the one hand, against the manifestly lesssubstantial connection between the Flight MH370 disaster and the United States, on the other. The substantial

connections that exist between the country of Malaysia

and the tragic incident that precipitated the legal actions

that comprise the instant MDL are undeniable, as explained below. Boeing’s role as the missing plane’s manufacturer and the alleged U.S. citizenship or resident status

of a few of the named plaintiffs and decedents are significant considerations too, but this Court’s assessment of the

established forum non conveniens factors compels the

conclusion that neither the Montreal Convention claims

nor the wrongful death and products liability claims that

are at issue in these cases are ultimately more conveniently litigated in the United States than in Malaysia. As

a result, and for the reasons discussed below, the Court

concludes that Defendants’ motion for dismissal based on

forum non conveniens must be granted, and the 40 pending cases that compromise this MDL must be dismissed.

A. On Balance, And When Compared To Malaysia,

The United States Is An Inconvenient Forum

For The Litigation Of Plaintiffs’ Montreal Convention Claims Against MAS/MAB

Six cases currently pending in this MDL assert Montreal Convention claims against MAS and MAB (and, in

two instances, their affiliated insurers): two of the cases

that the Podhurst Plaintiffs have filed, and four of the

cases that the Motley Rice Plaintiffs have filed. See Wood

v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv0053; Gaspard v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv0419; Smith v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv0439; Kanan v. Malaysia Airlines Sys.

Berhad, 16cv1062; Huang v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad.

16cv1063; Zhang v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv1048.

40a

Careful consideration of the established forum non conveniens factors persuades this Court that, notwithstanding the fact that some of these cases involve U.S. plaintiffs

or decedents, the Montreal Convention claims that these

cases raise would be more conveniently litigated in Malaysia than the United States. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454

U.S. at 255–56.

1. Malaysia Is An Available And Adequate Forum For Litigation Of Plaintiffs’ Montreal

Convention Claims

With respect to the first factor in the forum non conveniens analysis, this Court readily finds that Malaysia is

an available and adequate alternative forum for litigation

of Plaintiffs’ Montreal Convention claims. See Giro, Inc.

v. Malaysian Airline Sys. Berhad, No. 10 CIV. 5550

(JGK), 2011 WL 2183171, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 3, 2011)

(holding that Malaysia is an adequate alternative forum

under the Piper standard); Simcox v. McDermott Intl.,

Inc., 152 F.R.D. 689, 700 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (same); Jayaraman v. Salomon, Inc., No. 87 Civ. 2781 (MJL), 1991 WL

61071, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 1991) (same). The Podhurst

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Malaysian courts are

available and adequate with respect to litigating these

claims (see Podhurst FNC Opp’n at 20 n.30), and as noted,

cases brought against MAS and MAB relating to the

Flight MH370 disaster are currently pending in that country’s courts (see Singh Decl. ¶ 7). Malaysia is also a signatory to the Montreal Convention, and because Malaysia is

both the domicile and the principal place of business of the

airline that operated Flight MH370, Malaysian courts

have the power to hear Plaintiffs’ Montreal Convention

claims under the terms of the Montreal Convention itself.

See Montreal Conv., Art. 33.

The Motley Rice Plaintiffs contend nevertheless that

Malaysia is not an available and adequate forum for the

41a

purpose of the forum non conveniens analysis because,

due to the Malaysian legislature’s enactment of Act 765,

“there is nothing left of MAS except one ‘Administrator’

who has no MAS property, records or assets to administer.” (Motley Rice FNC Opp’n at 12.) In this Court’s view,

this assertion is an unpersuasive basis for continuing to litigate these matters in the United States for at least two

reasons. First of all, it appears that MAS’s status as a former commercial entity is immaterial to its ability to satisfy

any judgment against it under the Montreal Convention

or otherwise, because MAS holds an insurance policy from

which claims and judgments can be paid. (See Decl. of

Brendan Baxter, Ex. A to AGCS SE Pers. Juris. Mot.,

ECF No. 35-2, ¶¶ 20–23.) Moreover, even if MAS is judgment-proof, that status hardly compels the conclusion that

the United States is a more convenient forum, which is the

relevant issue with respect to the forum non conveniens

analysis. Indeed, if the Motley Rice Plaintiffs are correct

that MAS no longer has any assets as a result of the Malaysian legislature’s enactment of Act 765, it is debatable

whether they can obtain the relief they seek even if their

cases remain in the United States. Cf. Hourani v.

Mirtchev, 796 F.3d 1, 11–12 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that

the act of state doctrine “prevents federal courts from declaring invalid the official act of a foreign sovereign involving activities undertaken within its own territory” (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted)).

In any event, it is well established that the availability

and the adequacy of a forum does not turn on whether exactly the same remedy that exists in the United States is

available in the foreign forum. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454

U.S. at 247, 255 (holding that a forum is adequate so long

as some remedy is available, even if the remedy is not as

fulsome as in the United States); see also Chin-Ten Hsu v.

New Mighty U.S. Tr., 308 F. Supp. 3d 178, 185 (D.D.C.

2018) (noting “[t]he inquiry under [forum non conveniens]

42a

is focused on the availability and adequacy of an alternate

forum, not the nuances of each party’s respective advantages or disadvantages if the suit is brought abroad”

(internal alterations omitted)). It is only in “rare circumstances where the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory[] that it is

no remedy at all, that this requirement is not met.” Lueck

v. Sundstrand Corp., 236 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2001)

(internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). And Motley Rice has not provided any reason to suggest that plaintiffs “will be deprived of all remedies or

treated unfairly” if these cases are litigated in the Malaysian legal system. Irwin v. World Wildlife Fund, Inc., 448

F. Supp. 2d 29, 33 (D.D.C. 2006). Compare id. at 34 (finding that Gabon was an adequate and available alternative

forum because “the Gabonese legal system would allow

plaintiffs to maintain an action against defendant to recover for injuries caused by defendant, Gabonese law recognizes claims that are similar or comparable to the claims

in the complaint, and these type of claims are routinely

heard in Gabon”) with Nemariam, 315 F.3d at 394 (holding that alternative forum was inadequate because the legal claim could not be brought under governing law);

Yueh-Lan Wang, 322 F.R.D. at 26 (same).

Accordingly, this Court finds that Defendants have

satisfied the first prong of the forum non conveniens test.

See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255.

43a

2. The Balance Of The Public And Private Interests Weighs In Favor Of Litigation In Malaysia

a. Malaysia Has A Significant Public Interest

In Litigating The Montreal Convention

Claims That Arise From The Disappearance Of Flight MH370

As to the public interest in litigating the claims at issue,

this Court finds that Malaysia has an overwhelming interest in the resolution of any Montreal Convention claims

that have been asserted against its own national carrier

due to one of the largest aviation disasters in Malaysian

history. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Near Peixoto De

Azeveda, 574 F. Supp. 2d 272, 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting

that Brazil’s interest in resolving litigation involving the

largest aviation accident in its history “is obvious”), aff’d

sub nom. Lleras v. Excelaire Servs. Inc., 354 F. App’x 585

(2d Cir. 2009); see also Torreblanca de Aguilar v. Boeing

Co., 806 F. Supp. 139, 144 (E.D. Tex. 1992) (finding that

Mexico had “the paramount interest in this lawsuit” because, among other things, the airline at issue was “owned

and regulated by the Mexican government”).

To be sure, Flight MH370 disappeared when it was flying over international waters rather than over Malaysian

territory (see Podhurst FNC Opp’n at 12–13 (arguing that

“Flight MH370 crashed . . . not in Malaysia, nor anywhere

near Malaysia, but [in the ocean] thousands of miles

away”)), but Malaysia’s myriad connections to that flight

are undeniably substantial. It was Malaysia’s national air

carrier—MAS—that operated Flight MH370, and the illfated aircraft departed from an airport in Kuala Lumpur

shortly before its disappearance, as detailed and documented in Part I.A.1 above. Malaysian air traffic controllers were the last persons to have direct contact with the

pilot and crew, who were themselves Malaysian citizens.

44a

And after the aircraft vanished, Malaysian officials were

responsible for leading the civil safety investigation pursuant to an international treaty. Malaysian authorities

further conducted a separate criminal investigation concerning individuals who were known to have contact with

the flight and/or aircraft, and the Malaysian court system

has now undertaken to entertain a host of lawsuits that

were filed in that jurisdiction by representatives and heirs

of the decedents—in fact, 77 of the 88 Flight MH370 passengers whose interests are represented in the cases that

are now before this Court are also the subject of pending

Malaysian lawsuits that arise out of these same unfortunate circumstances. What is more, the Flight MH370 disaster was of such significance to the government of Malaysia that it enacted legislation reorganizing MAS and creating MAB in the wake of these events.

All of these facts underscore the very strong Malaysian interest in the Montreal Convention claims arising

from this tragedy. See Air France, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 846

(explaining that “France’s interest is especially obvious

here because it is also conducting the official civil investigation and an official criminal investigation”); Torreblanca

de Aguilar, 806 F. Supp. at 144 (finding that public interest favored Mexico where, among other things, “[t]he accident investigation was conducted by the Mexican government at considerable expenditure of resources”); In re

Disaster at Riyadh Airport, Saudi Arabia, on Aug. 19,

1980, 540 F. Supp. 1141, 1152 (D.D.C. 1982) (dismissing

case based on forum non conveniens where airplane was

owned and operated by national corporation of proposed

alternative forum and maintained in that foreign country,

and where alternative forum conducted the official investigation of the accident); Lumenta v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 01-14-00207-CV, 2015 WL 5076299, at *6

(Tex. App. Aug. 27, 2015) (granting forum non conveniens

motion where crash occurred in Indonesia, and witnesses

45a

and relevant records related to maintenance of aircraft

and air traffic control communications with aircraft before

crash were located in Indonesia).

Setting aside the fact that three of the plaintiffs in the

MDL cases that assert Montreal Convention claims have

connections to the United States, and four of the related

decedents were either citizens or legal residents of the

United States—factors that are discussed separately in

Part IV.A.2.c below—the United States’s interest in Plaintiffs’ Montreal Convention claims against MAS and MAB

is relatively minor. Indeed, the best that the Motley Rice

Plaintiffs can muster on this front is the argument that

“the President of the United States promised these plaintiffs, families of the relatives of MH370, in English and

Chinese, that the United States of America would do ‘all

we can to help in the search efforts to find the plane that

carried your family members[.]’” (Motley Rice FNC Opp’n

at 4 (alterations omitted)). Of course, this is far from a

commitment to make the U.S. court system available as a

forum for the litigation of these family members’ legal

claims against Malaysia’s national air carrier. And “given

the comparatively limited interest that the United States

has in resolving litigation stemming from the crash,” it is

relatively easy to find “that the burden on the judiciary

and potential jurors if these matters were kept here is another public interest factor favoring dismissal.” Air

France, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 84; see also Vivendi SA v. TMobile USA, Inc., 586 F.3d 689, 696 (9th Cir. 2009); see

also In re Disaster at Riyadh Airport, Saudi Arabia, on

Aug. 19, 1980, 540 F. Supp. at 1152 (finding that “jury duty

ought not to be imposed upon the people of the United

States nor should United States courts be clogged by processing these cases when the underlying accident has such

tenuous contacts to the United States”).

Finally, this Court notes that these cases will likely

present complex conflicts-of-law questions, which is

46a

another public interest factor that weighs in favor of dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 265 (noting that “the public interest

factors point towards dismissal where the court would be

required to untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in

law foreign to itself” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Air France, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 847

(explaining that “the possibility that French law will apply

is an additional factor favoring dismissal”); Proyectos Orchimex de Costa Rica, S.A. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &

Co., 896 F. Supp. 1197, 1204 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (“Without

deciding the choice of law issue, the court finds that the

possibility that foreign law will apply weighs strongly in

favor of dismissal.”). Indeed, “[t]he selection of the applicable law in aircraft disaster litigation has been a vexing

issue for courts over time.” In re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, New York on Nov. 12, 2001, No. MDL 1448 (RWS),

2006 WL 1288298, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2006); see also

In re Air Crash Off Long Island, New York, on July 17,

1996, No. 96-cv-7986, 1998 WL 292333, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.

June 2, 1998) (noting that “[d]ifficult choice of law issues

arise when an aircraft transporting people from several

nations meets a tragic end in federal territory not belonging to any state”), aff’d and remanded, 209 F.3d 200 (2d

Cir. 2000). Courts presiding over cases involving airline

disasters have to decide whether to apply the law of the

primary place of business of the airline, the law of the decedent’s residence, or the law of the place where the accident took place, among other options. See In re Air Crash

Disaster Near Chicago, Ill. on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594,

604 (7th Cir. 1981). The parties here have already pointed

to a variety of jurisdictions as possible sources of governing law in this case, including Malaysian law, Chinese law,

the U.S. Death on the High Seas Act, and the common law

of the various states where the plaintiffs initially filed their

47a

complaints. (See FNC Mem. at 42; Podhurst FNC Opp’n

at 53–55.)

“The doctrine of forum non conveniens . . . is designed

in part to help courts avoid conducting complex exercises

in comparative law.” Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 251.

It is also potentially troubling that this Court might be

called upon to consider the validity of Act 765, which the

Motley Rice Plaintiffs have alleged is invalid and improper. (Motley Rice FNC Opp’n at 13–16.) Questions regarding the validity of foreign laws that are effective in

foreign countries are better left to courts in those countries, see Hourani, 796 F.3d at 11–12; thus, the possibility

that this Court might have to address such complex, novel

legal issues is another public interest factor that weighs

heavily in favor of dismissing the Montreal Convention

claim cases.

b. The Private Interests Also Generally Weigh

In Favor Of Litigating Plaintiffs’ Montreal

Convention Claims In Malaysia

As explained above, the relevant private interest factors in the forum non conveniens analysis include “the relative ease of access to sources of proof; [the] availability of

compulsory process for attendance of unwilling [witnesses] and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing[]

witnesses; [the] possibility of view of premises, if view

would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical

problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and

inexpensive.” Gulf Oil Corp., 330 U.S. at 508. This Court’s

evaluation of these and similar private interest factors begins with the recognition that standard Montreal Convention claims are strict liability claims that ordinarily raise

limited questions of fact—specifically, whether an accident occurred with respect to a carrier’s aircraft, and the

amount of damages suffered. See Art. 21, Montreal Conv.

(imposing strict liability on a carrier for damages up to a

48a

set amount of special drawing rights). Moreover, here, in

addition to the lack of any dispute regarding the existence

of the Flight MH370 disaster, Plaintiffs have agreed to

make all damages-related evidence available, at their own

expense, in the United States. (See Podhurst FNC Opp’n

at 33 n.59.) Thus, litigation of Plaintiff’s strict liability

Montreal Convention claims in the United States will not

necessarily inconvenience Defendants.

However, with respect to the Montreal Convention

claims at issue in this MDL, the private interest-balancing

inquiry does not stop there, because Plaintiffs have made

clear that they are seeking damages in excess of the first

113,000 special drawing rights. (See, e.g., Compl., Wood v.

Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv0053, ECF No. 1, ¶ 59;

Compl., Smith v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv0439,

ECF No. 1, ¶ 115.) The Montreal Convention permits

plaintiffs to recover such excess damages (assuming their

evidence establishes those loss values), but the carrier is

also authorized to defend against any such judgment by

demonstrating that the “accident is entirely attributable

to events wholly outside the carrier’s control.” Delgado,

2013 WL 9838339, at *4. And it is that inquiry that will

necessarily expand the scope of the litigation related to

Plaintiffs’ Montreal Convention claims such that litigating

these claims in the United States could become unduly

burdensome.

This is so because the logical alternative party to which

MAS/MAB could point as being responsible for the disappearance of Flight MH370 is aircraft manufacturer Boeing—Plaintiffs have acknowledged (and embraced) this

possibility, presumably because Boeing is a U.S. corporation. (See Podhurst FNC Opp’n at 31–35; see also id. at

35–36 (observing that the evidence pertaining to Boeing’s

role in manufacturing the aircraft at issue is located in the

United States).) And Boeing’s response to any such charge

might well be to contend that the design and manufacture

49a

of the aircraft was not responsible for Flight MH370’s disappearance; instead its loss was caused by some other factor—such as pilot suicide, cargo fire, or terrorism—and

such allegations plainly open the door to an assessment of

what, in fact, caused Flight MH370 to disappear. In other

words, because a carrier sued under the Montreal Convention can cast blame on other potentially responsible parties to defend against the plaintiffs’ recovery of amounts

in excess of the 113,000 drawing rights strict-liability cap,

and those other parties can point to other potential causes,

any claim for excess damages necessarily involves the possibility of full-blown litigation into the fault issue that the

strict-liability aspect of Montreal Convention claims seeks

to avoid.

And, of course, once liability is at issue, MAS/MAB and

any other implead defendants would be entitled to take

discovery on that topic. See Fed. R. Civ. P 26(b) (authorizing parties to take discovery “regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense”). Here, liability-related evidence might include satellite-communication evidence located in the United Kingdom, debris evidence in France and Australia, and search

records that are also located in Australia, and the discovery quest would also inevitably include seeking the potentially vast amounts of materials and information that are

located in Malaysia, including personnel files, airline

maintenance records, manuals, air traffic control recordings, video recordings, cargo records, and bank records.

See Pain, 637 F.2d at 786–87 (noting that maintenance

records and accident reports prepared by a foreign government were relevant to an aircraft manufacturer’s defense or tort claims arising from crash). Many relevant

witnesses are also located in Malaysia, including airline

employees, family members and acquaintances of the

crew, air traffic controllers, cargo shippers, and Malaysian

investigators, among others. And the fact that Malaysia is

50a

not a party to the Hague Convention means that the only

way to enforce any discovery requests on any unwilling

Malaysian parties would be through the “burdensome,

costly, and time-consuming” letters rogatory process.

Quaak v. KPMG Bedrijfsrevisoren, 361 F.3d 11, 21 & n.4

(1st Cir. 2004). (See also FNC Mem. at 31; Podhurst FNC

Opp’n at 42 (acknowledging that Malaysia is not subject to

the Hague Convention).)

Courts regularly find that the inability to compel witnesses and evidence except through letters rogatory is a

compelling factor that weighs in favor of dismissal based

on forum non conveniens. See, e.g., Tazoe v. Airbus

S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1331 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal where United States court

“lack[ed] the authority to compel certain witnesses to attend proceedings in that jurisdiction”); Clerides v. Boeing

Co., 534 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming forum non

conveniens dismissal where “the court concluded reasonably that the superiority of live testimony and the inconvenience of taped depositions obtained by letters rogatory

favored dismissal”). This Court considers this potential

practical problem to be a compelling argument that supports dismissal of the instant cases.

Plaintiffs’ response is to insist that there is really no

need to look at Malaysian sources of evidence, nor should

the Court be concerned about the difficulty of enforcing

any discovery-related subpoenas, because the Annex 13

Safety Investigation did not unearth any issues with

maintenance of the plane, the pilots, the weather, cargo, or

anything else that pointed to the cause of the incident, so

it is safe to assume that no relevant evidence currently exists in Malaysia. (See Motley Rice FNC Opp’n at 4

(“[A]lmost no evidence is in Malaysia—a fact confirmed in

Malaysia’s Safety Investigation for MH370.”); Mot. Hr’g

Tr. (Dec. 19, 2017), ECF No. 90, at 39:25–40:1 (arguing

that “there is no evidence in Malaysia relevant to the

51a

question of what happened to this plane”).) Plaintiffs fail

to cite a single case that squarely supports the proposition

that a civil defendant is barred from revisiting issues and

evidence that were explored during an investigation conducted under Annex 13 of the Convention on International

Civil Aviation, much less that a court must grant preclusive effect to the conclusions of any such Annex 13 investigation in the context of related civil litigation. Rather, it

is axiomatic that civil defendants have the right to develop

and present their defense, and in this case, because Plaintiffs are seeking damages in excess of the strict-liability

drawing rights cap, the defense would necessarily involve

discovery pertaining to the issue of fault, including exploration of any and all potential causes of the disappearance

of Flight MH370. See Nolan v. Boeing Co., 762 F. Supp.

680, 683 (E.D. La. 1989), aff’d, 919 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.

1990).

Two final points bear noting. First, except as discussed

in Part IV.A.2(c) below, the vast majority of the Montreal

Convention decedents appear to have no connections

whatsoever to the United States or Malaysia. 42 of the 45

decedents who are referenced in Motley Rice’s cases, in

particular, are citizens of China. (See, Compl., Zhang v.

Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv1048, ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 42,

44–84; Compl., Kanan v. Malaysia Airlines System Berhad, 16cv1062, ¶ 8 (naming a Malaysian decedent); Compl.,

Smith v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv0439, ECF No.

1, ¶¶ 41–42 (naming two American decedents).) The plaintiffs who are proceeding on behalf of these 42 individuals

appear to have brought these Montreal Convention claims

in the United States solely by virtue of Defendants AGCS

SE American and Haagen—alleged reinsurers of

MAS/MAB who purportedly do business in the United

States. (See Pls.’ Resp. in Opp’n to Def. MAB’s Mot. to

Dismiss Pls.’ Compls. on the Ground of Lack of Subject

Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to the Montreal Convention,

52a

ECF No. 66 at 12– 13.) This means that most of the evidence related to the damages claimed in Motley Rice’s

cases will likely be located in China or Malaysia. And it is

no more convenient to have that evidence translated into

English and brought to the United States than it is to have

that evidence translated to Malay and brought to the Malaysian courts to be considered along with any other evidence pertaining to both damages and liability that the

parties will marshal in litigating the expanded universe of

issues that these Montreal Convention claims raise. See

In re Air Crash at Madrid, Spain, on Aug. 20, 2008, 893

F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (noting that “no

matter where these suits are tried, one side will face difficulty in gathering evidence and presenting witnesses for

its case”), amended on reconsideration in part sub nom.

In re Air Crash at Madrid, Spain, No. 2:10-ML-02135GAF, 2011 WL 2183972 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2011), and aff’d

sub nom. Fortaner v. Boeing Co., 504 F. App’x 573 (9th

Cir. 2013).

The second residual point is the fact that, because

Plaintiffs have opted to sue both MAS and MAB (on the

grounds that MAB is, in effect, a successor to MAS), evidence regarding the contractual relationship between

these two entities is likely to be relevant to any determination of which entity is responsibility for the payment of

damages with respect to Plaintiffs’ Montreal Convention

claims. See Paleteria La Michoacana, Inc. v. Productos

Lacteos Tocumbo S.A. De C. V., 247 F. Supp. 3d 76, 88

(D.D.C. 2017) (explaining that a successor corporation

generally does not assume liabilities of predecessor unless, among other things, there was an agreement to transfer the liabilities). That evidence, too, will be undoubtedly

be located in Malaysia—yet another factor that weighs in

favor of dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Montreal Convention

claims on forum non conveniens grounds.

53a

c. The Fact That Some Of Plaintiffs’ Montreal

Convention Claims Involve Plaintiffs Or Decedents With United States Connections Is

Insufficient to Alter The Outcome

The strongest point that Plaintiffs make in favor of

maintaining the Montreal Convention claims against

MAS/MAB in United States courts is the fact that a plaintiff’s choic4e of forum generally controls, and that some of

the plaintiffs and/or decedents in the cases at issue here

have connections to the United States. (See Podhurst

FNC Opp’n at 21–22.) It is clear beyond cavil that, when

faced with a motion seeking dismissal based on forum non

conveniens, a court must grant deference to a plaintiff’s

choice of forum. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255.

The level of deference varies based on the nationality of

the plaintiff, with a foreign plaintiff being entitled to less

deference than a domestic plaintiff. Id. at 255–256; see

also Ravelo Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir.

2000) (noting that “less deference is not the same thing as

no deference”). “The presence of American plaintiffs,

however, is not in and of itself sufficient to bar a district

court from dismissing a case on the ground of forum non

conveniens”; rather, a court must still conduct the Piper

Aircraft balancing test. Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d

1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Pain, 637 F.2d at 795–

99 (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion

in granting forum non conveniens motion, notwithstanding the presence of an American plaintiff, when aviation

accident took place in the North Sea).

Two of the Montreal Convention plaintiffs in this

MDL, Smith and Gaspard, are United States citizens who

are the personal representatives of the estates of decedent

passengers, and their choice of forum is therefore afforded

deference under Piper Aircraft. See Piper Aircraft Co.,

454 U.S. at 255. However, it is not readily apparent that

either Smith or Gaspard had any pre-accident connection

54a

to the decedents, and the possibility that they were selected solely for purposes of this litigation cases doubt on

the suggestion that their choice of forum warrants significant deference. (See Gaspard v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv0419; Smith v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad,

16cv0439.) See also Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 239

(noting that personal representative “was a legal secretary to the attorney who filed this lawsuit” and did “not

know any of the decedents or their survivors”). Plaintiff

Gaspard represents, among others, a family of three decedents, Rui Wang (who was employed by an American company and the provider of the family), Weiwei Jiao, and

Shuling Dai (collectively, the “Wang Decedents”). (See

Gaspard Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 3–7; Podhurst FNC Opp’n

at 33.) Plaintiff Smith represents, among others, Nicole

and Leo Meng, minor children who were United States citizens by birth and who resided with their parents in China.

(See Smith Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 39–42.) Smith also represents Meng Zhang, a Chinese citizen who held a United

States green card, and who was residing in China with her

new husband when she flew aboard Flight MH370. (See

id.; see Motley Rice Montreal Convention Opp’n at 6.) 24

Only one other Montreal Convention plaintiff has any

connection to the United States: Thomas Wood, who is a

United States citizen and the personal representative of

his brother, Flight MH370 decedent Philip Wood, who was

also a United States citizen. (See Wood v. Malaysia

The Meng children and Zhang are all Motley Rice plaintiffs, and

their counsel filed complaints on their behalf in three separate districts. Those complaints are the subject of a motion for leave to file a

consolidated amended complaint (see Pls.’ Mot. for Leave to File Consolidated Compl., ECF No. 24), which is yet another motion that is

mooted by the Court’s instant decision. For the purpose of the forum

non conveniens analysis, this Court has focused on Smith v. Malaysia

Airlines Berhad, 16cv0439, the complaint that contains the most allegations regarding connections to the United States.

24

55a

Airlines Berhad, 16-cv-0053.) This Court will afford

Thomas Wood’s choice of forum the highest degree of deference. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 255. Decedent

Wood worked for IBM and resided in Texas until late

2010/early 2011, when he moved to China for a three-year

international assignment, following his separation from

his wife. (See Pls.’ Resp. to Malaysia Airlines’ Motion to

Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, ECF No.

63, at 40.) While in China, Wood began a romantic relationship, and thereafter moved to Malaysia when he accepted

a two-year assignment with IBM-Malaysia in Kuala Lumpur. This assignment would have ended in February of

2016 (and could have been renewed for additional terms).

(See id. at 21 n.37, 40.)

Notably, the fact that all of the decedents were living

abroad (i.e., not in the United States) at the time of their

deaths is an additional consideration to be taken into account when determining what weight to give to the United

States connections that Plaintiffs have asserted in these

cases. See Varnelo v. Eastwind Transp., Ltd., No. 02-cv2084, 2003 WL 230741, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (noting the choice of forum of “an expatriate U.S. citizen living

abroad” is afforded a “diminished degree of deference”).

As the Second Circuit has explained, United States residence supports a plaintiff’s choice to litigate in the United

States “not because of chauvinism or bias in favor of U.S.

residents” but “rather because the greater the plaintiff’s

ties to the plaintiff’s chosen forum, the more likely it is that

the plaintiff would be inconvenienced by a requirement to

bring the claim in a foreign jurisdiction.” Wiwa v. Royal

Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 102 (2d Cir. 2000). Alternatively, where a plaintiff (or the decedent whom that

plaintiff represents) is (or was) located overseas, the inconvenience of having to litigate issues pertaining to damages and other matters in a non-U.S. forum is somewhat

lessened.

56a

With the relative degrees of deference that must be afforded to these U.S.-connected plaintiffs and/or decedents

in mind, this Court has undertaken to determine whether

the balance of the public and private interests discussed

above shifts. With respect to the Wang Decedents, the

United States’ interest in these claims is still minimal, as

the sole connection to this country (other than the citizenship of the personal representative) is the fact that the

Wang Decedents’ tickets were purchased through a USbased online travel agent. (See Gaspard Compl. ¶ 18(g).)

Likewise, the United States has a relatively minor interest

in claims associated with the death of Zhang, because although she was a United States green card holder, she had

been residing in China with her new husband in the years

prior to her death. (See Resp. to MAS’s and MAB’s Interrogs. for Passenger Meng Zhang, at Nos. 3–12, Ex. 51 to

Montreal Convention Mem., ECF No. 38-52.) By contrast,

the United States interest in the claims related to the

Meng children and Decedent Wood is substantial, because

these decedents are citizens of the United States. See Air

France, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (acknowledging “the importance of making courts in this country available to

American citizens”).

In Air France, the court considered whether or not to

dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds Montreal Convention claims that had been brought by U.S.-citizen plaintiffs involving U.S.-citizen decedents, see Air France, 760

F. Supp. 2d 832, and was unmoved by the suggestion that

the citizenship status of the small number of represented

parties was sufficient to sway the analysis toward maintaining the lawsuits in the United States. The Air France

litigation arose from the crash over the Atlantic Ocean of

an Air France flight that had “left Brazil for France carrying a plurality of French citizens and just two Americans living abroad at the time of the crash[,]” and the Air

France plaintiffs had sued the American companies that

57a

manufactured component parts of the aircraft, among others, in United States courts. Id. at 845. In the context of

its forum non conveniens analysis, the court specifically

found that, while “the American interest here, ensuring

the quality of component parts on aircraft and protecting

the rights of two American citizens, is real and legitimate[,]” it was “less significant than the French interest.”

Id. (emphasis added).

So it is here. All told, the Montreal Convention cases

in this MDL involve only six U.S. citizens with a direct connection to the Flight MH370 tragedy, as either plaintiffs

or decedents. Among the hundreds of passengers on that

flight, only three were citizens of the United States (see

Part IV.A.2.a., supra), and while the United States undoubtedly has a strong public interest in the claims involving their deaths, its interest pales in comparison to Malaysia’s interest in litigating these claims. Malaysia’s public

interest includes not only an interest in the untimely

deaths of the Malaysian pilot and crew, but also an interest

in determining precisely what happened to Flight MH370,

given that a Malaysian airline owned, operated, and maintained the aircraft; the flight took off from an airport in

Malaysia for a destination outside the United States; and

it disappeared from radar when Malaysian air traffic controllers were handing off the flight. And Malaysian authorities made substantial investments of time and resources in the wake of this disaster: Malaysia conducted

extensive civil and criminal investigations, and changes in

Malaysian law led to the creation of a new national Malaysian airline. It is Malaysia’s strong interest in the events

that give rise to the claims at issue here that makes this a

distinctly Malaysian tragedy, notwithstanding the presence of the few Americans onboard Flight MH370. Thus,

just as the Air France court found that France had a

greater public interest in the Montreal Convention claims

concerning U.S. plaintiffs and decedents than the United

58a

States did, so too does this Court find that, on balance and

comparatively speaking, Malaysia has a greater public interest in the instant Montreal Convention claims, even

taking into account the United States citizenship of plaintiffs Wood, Smith, and Gaspard, and of Philip Wood and

the Meng children.

In addition to this public interest, this Court must also

consider the private interests that, as noted above, implicate the practicality of litigating a particular matter in one

forum or another. See Am. Dredging Co., 510 U.S. at 448

(requiring the court to consider, among other things, access to sources of proof, enforceability of judgment, and

the location of relevant evidence and witnesses). When

considering the Montreal Convention claims of plaintiffs

and decedents with connections to the United States, the

most substantial difference on the private interest front

could be the location of, and access to, evidence and witnesses regarding damages. However, no such differences

exist with respect to the Meng children who, while United

States citizens, spent almost all of their lives with their

parents in China. (See Resps. to MAS’s and MAB’s First

Set of Interrogs. for Bing Meng, at Nos. 2–3, Ex. 14 to

FNC Mem., ECF No. 37-16.) Zhang and the Wang Decedents are on somewhat different footing: Zhang had some

employment history in the United States and allegedly intended to return there, even though her most recent work

history appears to have been in China (see Motley Rice

Montreal Convention Opp’n at 6), and Rui Wang’s wages

from a U.S.-based employer supported the Wang Decedents (See Podhurst FNC Opp’n at 33). Likewise, evidence regarding damages in regard to Decedent Wood’s

estate and his heirs will likely be located in the United

States, given his United States citizenship and family connections, and his employment with IBM. (See Podhurst

FNC Opp’n at 32–33.)

59a

Nevertheless, as discussed in Part IV.A.2.b., supra,

the relevant evidence in this case extends beyond damages

and into the realm of causation. And as far as this Court

can tell, a substantial amount of this causation evidence is

located outside of the United States, including documentary items such as cargo records, personnel files, airline

maintenance records, manuals, air traffic control recordings, video recordings, and bank records, as well as witnesses, such as crew family members, air traffic controllers, cargo shippers, and maintenance technicians. See

Pain, 637 F.2d at 786–87. Cf. In re W. Caribbean Crew

Members, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1201–03 (S.D. Fla. 2009)

(denying forum non conveniens motion where plane was

located in United States for 19 years before crash, and relevant maintenance records were therefore located in the

United States). As explained, significant practical problems with gathering such evidence could arise in the context of both discovery and trial, even taking into account

that some of the damages evidence would be located in the

United States with respect to these claims. See Tazoe, 631

F.3d at 1335 (finding that district court did not abuse its

discretion in dismissing claims arising from death of an

American citizen in a plane crash that occurred in Brazil

where the defendant manufacturers’ “inability to compel

third-party witnesses or the production of documents

from those witnesses, and the inability to implead potentially liable third-parties, is both unusually extreme and

materially unjust”). Indeed, even where claims involving

United States parties are involved, courts considering forum non conveniens motions regularly find that “difficulties in obtaining testimony and evidence located in foreign

jurisdictions is a strong factor favoring forum non conveniens dismissal.” Torreblanca de Aguilar, 806 F. Supp. at

144; see, also, e.g., Clerides, 534 F.3d at 629–30; Lleras, 354

F. App’x at 587.

60a

To summarize, after considering the availability and

adequacy of Malaysia as an alternative forum for ligating

Plaintiffs’ Montreal Convention claims, balancing the relative public interests of Malaysia and the United States in

resolving these claims, and weighing the private interests

that inform whether litigating in Malaysia would be substantially more convenient than in the United States, this

Court has determined that the substantial and overriding

connections to Malaysia outweigh the connections these

claims have to the United States, such that forum non conveniens dismissal is warranted here.

B. On Balance, Malaysia Is A More Convenient Forum Than The United States For Litigating

Plaintiffs’ Wrongful Death And Products Liability Claims Against Boeing

Thirty-five of the cases currently pending in this MDL

assert wrongful death and products liability claims against

Boeing. (See Notes 14, 16–17, supra (listing 32 Podhurst

products liability cases and three Motley Rice products liability cases).) Podhurst and Motley Rice have filed these

cases on behalf of various plaintiffs. Five of the products

liability plaintiffs (Wood, Gaspard, Li Li, Smith, and

Keith) are United States citizens, as are three of the various decedents these plaintiffs represent (Philip Wood, Nicole Meng, and Leo Meng). One products liability plaintiff

resides in the United States (Yang Chen).25 In addition,

one of the decedents represented in the products liability

cases (Meng Zhang) held a United States green card.

While the public and private considerations with respect to these claims differ from those involved with the

Montreal Convention claims, this Court reaches the same

conclusion regarding the forum non conveniens analysis,

as explained below. Once again, the Court agrees with

25

See Chen v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1165.

61a

Boeing that these claims must be dismissed, because, on

balance and in light of the relevant factors, litigation of

these claims in the United States will be less convenient

than in Malaysia.

1. Malaysia Is An Available And Adequate Forum For Plaintiffs’ Wrongful Death And Products Liability Claims

Just as with Plaintiffs’ Montreal Convention claims,

this Court finds that Malaysia is an available and adequate

alternative forum for litigation of Plaintiffs’ wrongful

death and products liability claims against Boeing. See

Giro, 2011 WL 2183171, at *7; Simcox, 152 F.R.D. at 700;

Jayaraman, 1991 WL 61071, at *4. Plaintiffs do not contend that such legal claims are unavailable in Malaysian

courts. Cf. Domanus v. Lewicki, 645 F. Supp. 2d 697, 702

n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding that Poland was not an adequate alternative forum where “Polish law does not recognize many of the causes of action asserted, including

shareholder derivative claims”). And Boeing has consented to being subjected to the jurisdiction of Malaysia’s

courts as a condition of the forum non conveniens dismissal of this matter. (See FNC Mem. at 22 & n.5.) Boeing

has further agreed to toll the statute of limitations with

respect to any such claims for 120 days (id.), and it is well

established that defendant concessions of this type undermine the argument that a foreign forum is not available

and/or is inadequate to litigate claims against the agreeing

party. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254 n.22;

Pain, 637 F.2d at 785.

Once again, the Podhurst Plaintiffs do not dispute that

Malaysia is an available and adequate forum for the products liability claims that they seek to litigate. (See

Podhurst FNC Opp’n at 20 n.30.) The Motley Rice Plaintiffs object to dismissal in favor of Malaysia, on the

grounds that Boeing has not specifically agreed to

62a

“participate in U.S.-style discovery” in that jurisdiction,

and because the other defendants in this matter have not

provided assurances about participating in litigation in

Malaysia. (Motley Rice FNC Opp’n at 17.) But Motley

Rice has not pointed to any particular prejudicial deficiencies in Malaysia’s own fact-finding process that would indicate the inadequacy of such proceedings such that a concession in this regard is needed. Moreover, and in any

event, the fact that the United States may have a more robust discovery process than that of another country is not

sufficient to establish that the other forum is unavailable

or inadequate for forum non conveniens purposes. See,

e.g., FieldTurf USA Inc. v. TenCate Thiolon Middle E.,

LLC, No. 11-cv-50, 2011 WL 13234176, at *5 (N.D. Ga.

Aug. 8, 2011) (holding that Dubai was an adequate forum

even though its law “does not provide for oral testimony,

full discovery, or independent experts”).

Courts have long credited defendants’ representations

that they will submit to the jurisdiction of a foreign forum

for the purpose of forum non conveniens analysis, without

extensive evaluation of whether the procedural rules that

govern the course of litigation in the other forum are comparable to those applied in federal courts in the United

States. See, e.g., Melgares v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 613

F. Supp. 2d 231, 246 (D. Conn. 2009); Jose v. M/V Fir

Grove, 801 F. Supp. 349, 352 (D. Or. 1991). And, here, Boeing has expressly represented that it will “agree to consent

to jurisdiction in Malaysia as a condition to dismissal[,]”

(FNC Mem. at 22)—a representation that this Court accepts, and deems sufficient with respect to the adequacy

issue. See Fortaner, 504 F. App’x at 580 (noting that the

requirement of an available and adequate alternative forum “is ordinarily satisfied when the defendant agrees to

submit to the jurisdiction of the alternative forum” (citation omitted)); see also Azima, 305 F. Supp. 3d at 173 (rejecting defendant’s forum non conveniens argument

63a

where defendant was “careful to avoid making any representation that it would necessarily consent to the [alternative court’s] jurisdiction with respect to the [plaintiff’s]

claims”).

2. The Balance Of The Public And Private Interests Weighs In Favor Of Dismissal Of These

Claims On Convenience Grounds

a. Malaysia’s Public Interest In These Products Liability Claims Is Generally Greater

Than That Of The United States

Boeing’s status as an aircraft manufacturing company

that is founded and headquartered in the United States

necessarily means that the United States has a significant

public interest in any products liability claims that are

brought against it. See Lueck, 236 F.3d at 1147 (noting

that “[t]he citizens of Arizona certainly have an interest in

the manufacturing of defective products by corporations

located in their forum”). But when a disaster like the one

at issue here occurs, the key question as far as the forum

non conveniens balancing is concerned is whether the significant public interest of the country that manufactured

the aircraft outweighs the public interest of the country

that maintained and operated the ill-fated plane, and

courts evaluating similar products liability ligation have

routinely considered the public interest of the carrier’s

country to be weighed most heavily in the context of their

consideration of forum non conveniens. See Schijndel v.

Boeing Co., 263 F. App’x 555, 557 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding,

in litigation arising from crash that occurred in Singapore,

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting forum non conveniens motion based on finding that

Singapore’s interest in litigation was greater, even though

“the aircraft and some components were manufactured in

the United States”) (internal quotation marks omitted);

see also Clerides, 534 F.3d at 630 (recognizing the interest

64a

of foreign countries “in regulating the use of allegedly defective products within their borders”).

One can certainly conceive of a case in which the interest of the country where the aircraft is manufactured

might be considered superior to that of the country where

the aircraft was maintained and operated—say, in a case

involving specific allegations of fact pertaining to a single

identified design or manufacturing defect that allegedly

caused the crash. See, e.g., D.F. by & through Amador v.

Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., No. 13-cv-0331, 2017 WL

4922814, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2017) (alleging that an

individual’s death was caused by a known defect in a helicopter’s wiring). But, here, Plaintiffs intend to proceed on

a res ipsa theory of causation. (See, e.g., Compl., Keith v.

The Boeing Co., 17cv0518, ECF No. 1-3, ¶ 58 (alleging that

“there are no reasonable causes and no evidence of other

causes for the disappearance of Flight MH370” beyond a

product defect); Compl., Wood v. Boeing Co., 16cv1149,

ECF No. 1-3, ¶¶ 44–45 (alleging that because the safety

investigation “has, to a reasonable degree of certainty,

foreclosed . . . pilot error, pilot suicide, terrorism or other

foul play, maintenance error, and weather” as the cause of

the disappearance of Flight MH370, “a reasonable inference that can be drawn from all of the available evidence

is that the disappearance of Flight MH370 was the result

of one or more defects in the manufacture and/or design of

the airplane”); see also Motley Rice FNC Opp’n at 8 (noting that “[t]he Malaysia investigation report found no

problems with the pilots and other crew, training, maintenance, security and cargo”).) And given that no one specific cause of the disappearance of Flight MH370 has been

claimed affirmatively, much less that a certain known design or manufacturing defect precipitated this accident,

this Court is hard pressed to find that the interests of the

United States in resolving the instant product-defect

65a

claims against Boeing outweigh what is, at its core, a Malaysian tragedy, for the reasons explained above.

Put another way, despite Plaintiffs’ general contention

that (by process of elimination) a mechanical problem with

the U.S.-manufactured Boeing aircraft must have caused

the events that give rise to their claims, “a defendant’s

manufacturing activities within the U.S. do not tilt the

public interest in favor of retaining jurisdiction where

overseas events are the primary catalyst for litigation initiated by foreign plaintiffs.” In re Air Crash Near Peixoto

De Azeveda, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 288; see also Air France,

760 F. Supp. 2d at 845 (explaining that “the American interest here, ensuring the quality of component parts on

aircraft and protecting the rights of two American citizens, is real and legitimate but less significant than the

French interest”); Clerides, 534 F.3d at 630 (noting that

while the “United States has an interest in regulating domestic companies, its interest is matched by the interests

of Greece and Cyprus in regulating the use of allegedly

defective products within their borders”). The same public interest factors discussed in Part IV.A.2.a., supra, that

weigh in favor of the dismissal of the MDL cases involving

Montreal Convention claims are equally applicable to the

MDL cases that involve wrongful death and products liability claims, because both sets of claims arise from the

same underlying set of facts. And under the circumstances presented here, there can be no dispute that Malaysia—which owned and operated the aircraft at issue as

part of its fleet of national carriers on the day of the plane’s

disappearance—has the primary public interest in litigating these products liability claims.

66a

b. There Are Compelling Private Interests On

Both Sides, But Much Relevant Evidence Is

Located Outside The United States, And

The Prospect Of Impleading Raises Complex Immunity Considerations That Weigh

In Favor Of Dismissal

The balancing of the private interests is a closer call in

the products liability context than it was with respect to

the Montreal Convention claims. Plaintiffs are asserting

manufacturing and design products liability claims directly against Boeing—a United States party—and it is

undeniable that most of the evidence pertaining to these

claims is inside the United States. This would suggest that

the private interest factor concerning the location of the

evidence points squarely in the direction of litigating the

claims in the United States; however, notably, Boeing has

agreed to make all such evidence available in Malaysia,

and has also agreed to pay any judgment that the Malaysian courts hand down. (See FNC Mm. at 22 n.5.)

Most importantly, “[e]ven if plaintiffs intend to base

their case on the negligence of defendants in the planning,

design, manufacture, assembly, testing, service and inspection of the aircraft and its engines, the evidence regarding the crash itself and the actions of [the airline] are

central to the tragedy.” Nolan, 762 F. Supp. at 683; see

also King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 562 F.3d 1374, 1384 (11th

Cir. 2009) (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal

where evidence regarding causation was located in the foreign forum); Lueck, 236 F.3d at 1146 (affirming forum non

conveniens dismissal where foreign evidence relating to

the cause of the accident was “essential”). This is particularly so because Plaintiffs plan to proceed both on traditional negligence and strict products liability theories, and

on a res ipsa loquitur theory of causation, as noted above.

(See Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 38:4–8.) To succeed on the latter

67a

theory, Plaintiffs will have to rule out other likely causes

of the plane’s disappearance—e.g., weather, terrorism,

crew sabotage, and the like—and a substantial portion of

the evidence regarding possible alternative causes is located in Malaysia, as previously discussed. (See Part

IV.A.2.b., supra.) Similar evidence pertaining to the cause

of the disaster is likely located in Australia, the United

Kingdom, and other non-U.S. countries. (See Podhurst

FNC Opp’n at 15 (noting that the pieces of wreckage that

washed ashore were taken to Australia, and that the Inmarsat satellite communication data is located in the

United Kingdom).)26 Thus, when the nature of these claims

and the scope of the related litigation is carefully considered, the location-of-the-evidence aspect of the private interest factor tips in favor of dismissing the instant claims.

It is also clear that other types of relevant evidence—

including damages evidence—is largely located outside of

the United States. That is, while Plaintiffs’ counsel and

their retained expert witnesses are, in fact, located inside

the United States (see Motley Rice FNC Opp’n at 10;

Podhurst FNC Opp’n at 28), the vast majority of the decedents and the plaintiffs are from places other than Malaysia, such as China and Australia (see, e.g., Podhurst FNC

Opp’n at 17–18). Therefore, evidence pertaining to damages with respect to the products liability claims in these

MDL cases is located abroad—in locales other than the

United States or Malaysia—and, indeed, it might well be

more convenient and less costly to bring these claims to

trial in Malaysia, given that the places where most of the

damages evidence is likely to be are physically closer to

Malaysia than to the United States. See In re Air Crash

at Madrid, Spain, on Aug. 20, 2008, 893 F. Supp. 2d at

Plaintiffs maintain that the satellite communication data “is also in

the possession of Boeing in the United States” (Podhurst FNC Opp’n

at 14), but have not cited any evidence regarding this contention.

26

68a

1033 (noting that the costs of transporting witnesses to

trial would be lower if case were litigated in Spain). In

other words, the dearth of U.S.-based plaintiffs or decedents means that both Plaintiffs and Defendants will likely

face evidence-related burdens regardless of where the

products liability cases are litigated. See id.

An additional private interest factor related to the litigation of Plaintiffs’ products liability claims in the United

States is the extent to which Boeing could, or would, seek

to implead all potential defendants. See Piper Aircraft

Co., 454 U.S. at 259 (noting that the ability to implead the

estate of the pilot was a factor that weighed in favor of a

forum non conveniens dismissal). Whether or not Boeing

can implead MAS or MAB as third party defendants raises

questions of sovereign immunity, given that both MAS and

MAB appear to be agencies or instrumentalities of the Malaysian government for purposes of the Foreign Sovereign

Immunities Act. (See Plaintiffs’ Resp. to MAS’s Rule

12(b)(1) Mot. to Dismiss Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, ECF No. 64, at 10 n.6 (conceding that MAS

and MAB are agencies or instrumentalities of the Malaysian government but opposing dismissal based on sovereign immunity); see also FSIA Mem. at 12 (arguing that

MAS and MAB are presumptively immune from suit and

that Plaintiffs have not established that any FSIA exception applies).) And there appear to be other potentially

sovereign defendants: the plaintiffs in the Flight MH3 70related cases that are pending in Malaysia have named

several Malaysian government entities as defendants, including the Department of Civil Aviation, the Royal Malaysian Air Force, the Immigration Department of Malaysia, and the Government of Malaysia, as well as certain individual Malaysian officials. (See Singh Decl. ¶ 9.) Any effort to implead such defendants would substantially complicate any litigation involving the wrongful death and

products liability claims that are pending against Boeing

69a

in the United States. See Kryvicky v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 807 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding that

district court did not abuse its discretion in granting forum non conveniens dismissal where, among other things,

“the defendants could not implead Spanish aviation authorities or [foreign airline] in U.S. courts”).

The potential of intractable immunity questions that

might stymie Boeing’s ability to implead other defendants

raises the prospect of precisely the kind of “oppressive and

vexatious outcome that forum non conveniens dismissal is

designed to avoid”—namely, a manufacturer defendant

that is “unable to seek indemnification in the same action

in which they are being sued by foreign [p]laintiffs[.]” Air

France, 760 F. Supp. 2d at 847. And in the final analysis

of the private interest factors at issue, it is this circumstance that persuades this Court that, taken as a whole,

the private interest factors favor dismissal of these claims.

See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 259 (noting that “the

inability to implead potential third-party defendants” is a

factor that can weigh in favor of a forum non conveniens

dismissal); In re Air Crash Near Peixoto De Azeveda,

Brazil, on Sept. 29, 2006, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 289 (finding

that the “lack of jurisdiction in this forum over potentially

liable parties” was an “important factor[]” in favor of forum non conveniens dismissal).

c. Dismissal Is Warranted Even With Respect

To The Cases With Concrete Connections

To The United States

Finally, the Court has considered whether the fact that

some of the plaintiffs and decedents in these MDL products liability cases have concrete connections to the United

States impacts the forum non conveniens analysis, and for

the following reasons, it has determined that such ties do

not demand a different result. Thus, even when the products liability claims of U.S. plaintiffs and/or U.S. decedents

70a

are isolated and that status is taken into account, the

United States is still not a convenient forum for the litigation of manufacturing claims against Boeing related to the

Flight MH370 disaster.

The Wood lawsuit presents the closest call in this regard, given that there are U.S. parties on both sides, and

an American decedent, which suggests that much of the

relevant discovery involves evidence that is inside the

United States. (See Wood v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1149.)

But as previously explained, given the tort theories on

which Plaintiffs are proceeding, evidence and witnesses

pertaining to the aircraft, the crew, the events preceding

the disappearance, and the search will be indispensable to

litigating Plaintiffs’ claims. See Nolan, 762 F. Supp. at

683; King, 562 F.3d at 1384; Lueck, 236 F.3d at 1146. This

same evidence will likewise be necessary to resolve the

products liability claims that Plaintiff Li Li—a United

States citizen residing in China—and Plaintiff Yang

Chen—a Chinese citizen residing in the United States—

have brought on behalf of their deceased parents, who

were both Chinese citizens. (See Li v. The Boeing Co.,

16cv1128; Chen v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1165.) And just as

with the Montreal Convention claims, the United States’

strong public interest in securing a legal remedy for its

citizens—specifically, Decedent Wood and the Meng children—is nonetheless overshadowed by Malaysia’s overwhelming interest in the resolution of claims concerning

this national disaster. See In re Air Crash Near Peixoto

De Azeveda, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 288; Air France, 760 F.

Supp. 2d at 845; Clerides, 534 F.3d at 630.

The handful of other cases that have concrete connections to the United States concern attenuated relationships that do not give rise to a significant public or private

interest in having the claims litigated in the United States,

71a

for the reasons laid out above, in Part IV.A.2.c.27 The

Court does give some deference to the plaintiff’s choice of

forum when the products liability and wrongful death

claims are brought by, or on behalf of, American citizens,

just as with the Montreal Convention claims. But in this

Court’s view, even when Boeing is the defendant, the balance of the Piper factors weighs against litigation of these

claims in the United States. See, e.g., Fortaner, 504 F.

App’x at 580–81 (affirming forum non conveniens dismissal of products liability claims against Boeing); Nolan, 919

F.2d at 1069 (same).

V. CONCLUSION

At its core, this case is about the unexplained disappearance of a passenger plane operated by Malaysia Airlines as part of its national air carrier fleet following its

departure from a Malaysian airport. The disappearance

of Flight MH370 was the subject of a years-long investigation by Malaysian authorities, and while a host of other

countries undeniably participated and undoubtedly have

some interest in the legal claims that have been made in

the wake of this tragedy—including China, Australia, India, and the United States—these other points of connection do not alter the fundamental and substantial nexus

between this tragic incident and the country of Malaysia.

Plaintiffs Keith and Richards are United States citizens, and thus

their choice of forum is entitled to deference, but as with Plaintiffs

Gaspard and Smith, it appears that they may have no pre-accident

connections to the decedents they represent and may have been selected solely for purposes of this litigation. (See Part IV.A.2.c., supra.)

See also Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 239. Plaintiff Chen is a resident

of the United States, but not a citizen, and Meng Zhang’s connection

to the United States is predicated on her status as a green-card holder

and her past work and residence in the United States. In the Gaspard

case, the Wang Decedents’ connection is premised on Gaspard’s citizenship, and Rui Wang’s employment with an American company,

even though he lived and worked overseas.

27

72a

In consideration of all of the relevant forum non conveniens factors, this Court has concluded that litigation in the

United States related to the Flight MH370 disaster is inconvenient, and that dismissal of the MDL cases in favor

of Malaysia is warranted. Thus, as reflected in the attached Order and subject to the conditions laid out

therein, Defendants’ joint motion for forum non conveniens dismissal is GRANTED, and the cases in this MDL

are DISMISSED without prejudice. Moreover, Defendants’ other threshold motions are DENIED as moot.

DATE: November 21, 2018

/s/ Ketanji Brown Jackson

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON

United States District Judge

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[November 21, 2018]

IN RE: AIR CRASH

OVER THE SOUTHERN

INDIAN OCEAN, ON

MARCH 8, 2014

This Document Relates To:

MDL Docket No. 2712

Misc. No. 16-1184 (KBJ)

ALL CASES

ORDER

For the reasons stated in the accompanying

Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss

on the Ground of Forum Non Conveniens (ECF No. 37)

and Boeing’s Motion to Dismiss Newly Transferred Cases

(ECF No. 58) are GRANTED, and as a result, Plaintiffs’

cases1 are DISMISSED without prejudice. This dismissal

Wood v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv0053; Gaspard v. Malaysia

Airlines Berhad, 16cv0419; Smith v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, No.

16cv0429; Zhang v. Malaysia Airlines Berhad, 16cv1048; Kanan v.

Malaysia Airlines Sys. Berhad, No. 16cv1062; Huang v. Malaysia

Airlines Berhad. No. 16cv1063; Li v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1128; Xiao

v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1129; Gao v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1130; Feng v.

The Boeing Co., 16cv1131; Wang v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1132; Wang

v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1134; Pang v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1135; Liang

v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1136; Hu v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1137; Zhou v.

The Boeing Co., 16cv1138; Hu v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1139; Wang v.

1

(73a)

74a

is expressly conditioned on Defendants’ agreement to: (a)

submit to personal jurisdiction in Malaysia in actions

refiled there on or before March 21, 2019, by Plaintiffs in

MDL 2712; (b) toll any statutes of limitation that might be

applicable to such refiled actions until March 21, 2019; (c)

make available in any such refiled actions, at Defendants’

expense, all documents, witnesses, and other evidence that

the Malaysian courts deem relevant; and (d) each pay or

cause to be paid any damages awarded by the Malaysian

courts in such refiled actions, subject to any right of

appeal.

DATE: November 21, 2018 /s/Ketanji Brown Jackson

KETANJI BROWN JACKSON

United States District Judge

The Boeing Co., 16cv1140; Zhang v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1143; Tian

v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1144; Li v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1145; Shirath

v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1146; Jia v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1147; Gaspard

v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1148; Wood v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1149;

Santhanam v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1151; Huang v. The Boeing Co.,

16cv1152; Kolekar v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1153; Kanan v. The Boeing

Co., 16cv1159; Han v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1161; Zhang v. The Boeing

Co., 16cv1164; Chen v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1165; Kolekar v. The

Boeing Co., 16cv1166; Gaspard v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1296; Gaspard

v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1299; Zhang v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1306; Yuan

v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1307; Weeks v. The Boeing Co., 16cv1167;

Richards v. The Boeing Co., 17cv0503; Keith v. The Boeing Company,

17cv0518.

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 18-7193

September Term, 2019

1:16-mc-01184-KBJ

Filed On: February 28, 2020

In re: Air Crash Over the Southern Indian

Ocean on March 8, 2014,

Elizabeth Smith, As personal representative

of the Spouses, Next of Kin, Other Statutory

Beneficiaries, and the Estates of the MH370

Passengers (See Complaint for Statutory

Beneficiaries), et al.,

Appellants

Thomas Wood, Individually and as Personal

Representative of Phillip Talmadge Wood

(Deceased), et al.,

Appellees

v.

Malaysia Airlines Berhad, doing business as

Malaysia Airlines, et al.,

Appellees

Consolidated with 18-7195, 18-7196,

18-7197, 18-7198

(75a)

76a

BEFORE: Srinivasan, Chief Judge; Henderson*,

Rogers, Tatel, Garland, Griffith, Millett,

Pillard, Wilkins, Katsas, and Rao, Circuit

Judges; and Randolph, Senior Circuit

ORDER

Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing en

banc filed by Thomas Wood in No. 18-7197; the joint

petition for rehearing en banc filed by the Weeks

appellants in No. 18-7196 and the Gaspard appellants in

No. 18-7198, and the absence of a request by any member

of the court for a vote, it is

ORDERED that the petitions be denied.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Mark J. Langer, Clerk

BY: /s/

Michael C. McGrail

Deputy Clerk

* Circuit Judge Henderson did not participate in this

matter.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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