Petition for Writ of Certiorari — P. F., Petitioner v. J. S., et al.

Supreme Court briefOct 22, 2020

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Text

No.

3n tf)t

Supreme Court

of tfje

Unite!) States

P.F.,

Petitioner,

J.S. and L.S.

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the Kansas Supreme Court

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

P.F.

Pro Se

1106 N. Jefferson St.

Wichita, KS 67203

(316) 390-9410

RECEIVED

DEC I 7 2020

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT. U S

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Between 1972 and 1989, this Court decided five

unwed biological father cases, None of those

decisions, however, discussed constitutional rights

regarding an infant placed for adoption at birth.

With this fact being perverted for unscrupulous

gain, the salience is undeniable.

When an unwed father demonstrates a full

commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood,

“due process entitles him to substantial protection

of that interest.” This father, not fitting the mold

of any archaic gender stereotype,

has

demonstrated that commitment tenaciously.

However, as gender assumptions and open-ended

construction render adoption statutes vulnerable

across the country, Father’s substantive due

process and liberty rights were overtly violated as

the bond he shared with his child had been coldly

severed. As written, he had reasonably satisfied

the statute’s demands. Father has maintained a

fervent desire to raise his child, being sensibly fit

and percipient to do so.

1. With the familial landscape having evolved over

the last thirty years, neither parent fitting

assumed roles and a bond formed between father

and child as a case in point, can the “biology-plus”

standard still be considered constitutional when it

can no longer be justly applied?

2. Ultimately having a negative impact on the

children, does it serve the ends of justice if

fundamental rights afforded to parents by the U.S.

Constitution are unethically contemned when

contesting adoption?

3. As federal laws provide encompassing standards

with which state adoption laws comply, any action

based on the implemented statute, which a

broader definition of support is to be affixed,

requires

that

all

relevant

surrounding

circumstances be considered. Once accurately

interpreted, is there clear and convincing evidence

that Father did not provide support to Mother for

the last six months of pregnancy?

(i)

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Since this case involves a child, initials have been

used to identify the parties.

Petitioner is Paul Fiscus III, (P.F.),

Baby Girl G.’s father.

Respondents are Joe Salazar and Laci Salazar,

(J.S., L.S.), adoptive resource.

(A.G.), Andrea Gile,

Baby Girl G.’s mother.

(ii)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION .... 3

i. Fundamental rights..............

3 - 6, 10

ii. Statute obscurity and conflict

7,8

iii. Adoptee concerns..................

8, 9

iv. Case law disparity................. 10 - 12, 26, 29

v. Amoral actions....................... .......... 12 - 26

vi. Justice Stegall’s dissent........ ............26, 28

CONCLUSION

TABLE OF APPENDICES

No. 121,051

In the Matter of the Adoption of BABY GIRL G.

APPENDIX A- Kan. Sup. Ct. petition for review.

July 10th- 2020

App. la

APPENDIX B- 18th Jud. Dist. Ct. trial ruling.

(Mar. 8th) Mar. 20th> 2019...................

App. 20a

APPENDIX C- Kan. Ct. App. opinion.

Nov. 22nd> 2019.....................................

App. 28a

APPENDIX D- Motion for rehearing, denied.

Aug. 7th- 2020.....................................

.. App. 48a

APPENDIX E- Provisions................

.. App. 51a

APPENDIX F- Omitted citations....

.. App. 57a

APPENDIX G- Constitutional rights

.. App. 61a

APPENDIX H- ROA components....

.. App. 63a

APPENDIX I- Analogous cases.......

App. 195a

APPENDIX J- Case components.....

App. 249a

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - CASES

Elliott v. Peirsol,

26 U.S. 328, 329 (1828)........................

Yick Wo v. Hopkins,

118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886).................

Matter of Cozza,

163 Cal. 514, 524 (Cal. 1912)..............

Meyer v. Nebraska,

262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)..........

........

11, 28

358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).............................

Cooper v. Aaron,

Goss v. State of Illinois,

312 F.2d 257, 259 (1963)............. ........

In re Waters,

195 Kan. 614, 617 (Kan. 1965)...........

Stanley v. Illinois,

405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)......................

Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)......................

Carson v. Elrod,

411 F. Supp. 645, 649 (E.D. Va. 1976)

Doe v. Irwin,

441 F. Supp. 1247, 1250 (W.D. Mich. 1977)

In re Lathrop,

2 Kan. App. 2d 90, 96 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978)

In re Cooper,

621 P.2d 437, 438 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980)......

Langton v. Maloney,

527 F. Supp. 538, 549 (D. Conn. 1981)........

Santosky v. Kramer,

455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) .................................

(iv)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - CASES cont.

Lehr v. Robertson,

463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983)...............

Franz v. United States,

707 F.2d 582, 599 (1983)...............

Bell v. City of Milwaukee,

746 F.2d 1205, 1244 (7th Cir. 1984)

In re Gentry,

142 Mich. App. 701, 705 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) .. 23

Matter of Adoption of Hallo way,

732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986)..................

Williams Telecommunications C. v. Gragg,

242 Kan. 675, 676 (1988)............................

Matter of John E. v. Doe,

164 A.D.2d 375, 394 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)

In re Baby Boy B.,

254 Kan. 454, 463 (1994)...........................

In re Baby Boy N.,

19 Kan. App. 2d 574, 584, 588 (1994).......

2, 26

In the Interest of K.D.O.,

20 Kan. App.2d 559, 561-62, 1160 (1995)..

12, 20

In re Adoption of Baby Boy S.,

22 Kan. App.2d 119, 124, 130 (1996)........

In re Adoption of D.M.M.,

24 Kan. App.2d 783, 789 (1997)................

J.B. v. Washington County,

127 F.3d 919, 925 (10* Cir. 1997).............

In re Adoption of B.M.W.,

268 Kan. 871, 882 (2000)............................

Troocel v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57, 66-67 (2000).........................

(v)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - CASES cont.

In re Adoption of G.L. V.,

286 Kan. 1034, 1048, 1057-58 (2008)

10, 24

In re Adoption of

224 P.3d 1168, 1173 (Kan. 2010).......

In re Adoption of Baby Girl P.,

291 Kan. 424, 430, 433 (2010)..........

passim

In re Baby Girl B.,

46 Kan. App.2d 96, 108 (2011)..........

11, 19

In re C.L.,

427 P.3d 951, 953-54 (2018)..............

3, 11, 13

In re C.J.C.,

No. 19-0694, 3 (Tex. Jun. 26, 2020)...

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Const, amend. XTV § 1

U.S. Const, amend. XTV § 2

STATUTES AND RULES

K.S.A. 59-2136 ..

passim

K.S.A. 60-211 ....

K.S.A. 60-212 ....

18U.S.C. §241 .

18U.S.C. § 1001

28 U.S.C. §453..

9, 23

28U.S.C. § 1257

42 U.S.C. § 1983

OTHER AUTHORITIES

ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct

14, 18

Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges.......

15, 18

(vi)

OTHER AUTHORITIES - cont.

ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.... 24, 25

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure............

The Adoption Network........................................

AFFCNY................................................................

8, 9

Center Treatment Anxiety & Mood Disorders

American Psychiatric Association...................

Adoption Related Trauma.................................

Father Knows Best (1992)................................ 11, 14

The Biological Rights Doctrine (1998)............

The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers (2004) ....

The Rights of Putative Fathers (2006)...........

3,4

Thwarted Fathers or Pop-Up Pops? (2007) ....

Focus on the Family (2010)...............................

Blood over Bond? (2013).....................................

The Ties That Bind (2014).................................

The Unfit Parent (2016).....................................

Foundling Fathers (2016)..................................

A Curious Parental Right (2018).....................

Unequal Protection (2018).................................

Adopting Civil Damages (2019).......................

5 Reasons Dads Are So Important to Their

Daughters (2020)................................................

Dads are Capable of Raising Daughters on

Their Own (2020).................................................

(vii)

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of Kansas Supreme Court to review

the merits appears at App. 1 in the appendix to

this petition and is published at 466 P.3d 1207

(2020).

The opinion of Kansas Court of Appeals appears at

App. 28 in the appendix to this petition and is

published at 452 P.3d 881 (Kan. Ct. App. 2019).

The ruling of 18th Judicial District Court appears

at App. 20 in the appendix to this petition.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The date on which Kansas Supreme Court decided

on petition for review is July 10th- 2020. A timely

petition for rehearing was denied by that Court on

Aug. 27th’ 2020 and a copy of the order denying

rehearing appears at App. 48.

This Court has jurisdiction to review issues of

denial of due process by the State Court, e.g.,

Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284 (1973) and

under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). 28 U.S.C. § 2403(b)

may apply and a copy shall be served on the

Kansas Attorney General. Notice had been served

challenging K.S.A. 59-2136(h) on March 9th- 2020.

Copy appears at App. 62.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The constitutional provisions involved are Title 18,

U.S.C. §§ 241, 1001, Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 453, 1257,

Title 42, U.S.C. § 1983 and the 14th Amendment to

the U.S. Constitution, §§ 1, 2 which are set forth in

Appendix E, infra, starting at 51a.

The statutes involved are Kan. Stat. Ann. chapter

59, Probate Code § 59-2136 and chapter 60,

Procedure, Civil §§ 60-211, 60-212 which are set

forth in Appendix E, infra, starting at 53a.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Due to the nature of this case, discussing select

merits and errors is consequential as a vade

mecum.

Parents were involved until Jan. 2018. On Feb.

14th- Mother (A.G.) confirmed to Father (P.F.) that

she was pregnant. After an appointment on Mar.

14th- A.G. said she was certain he was the father.

Paternity had been a looming issue. Eventually,

she admitted to relations with two other men

during the time of conception. Notwithstanding,

P.F. immediately expressed avidity to be the

father and they began planning based on that

assumption. A.G. moved in with her boyfriend,

(Z.H.), in May. His testimony, “Did you charge her

rent when she moved in with you?” “No.” “So, she

had free [housing]?” “Basically.” “Did she pay any

[bills]?” “No, not really.” See In re Baby Boy N., 19

Kan. App. 2d 574, 588 (1994) (“It is possible that

the mother’s needs and requirements are a

relevant circumstance in determining whether a

natural father acted reasonably ... .”)

In June, Father made a hardship withdrawal from

his 401k for a down payment on a house to

accommodate the baby, advising A.G. and others

that he wanted enough space for her if she ever

needed shelter. For reasons assumingly related to

her mental health, this sparked a change in her

demeanor.

7/1/18, 5:55 p.m. Father, “I just bought a house

with my main intention to accommodate my

daughter ... [I] am not saying that to make you

look bad, I am saying that is the effort I have put

in. I ask you constantly if you need something. I

also want to give you space and I want to respect

you.”

5:56 p.m. Mother, “And I have told you 100 times,

I do not need nor want anything from you. Also,

are you saying I am lesser of a parent because I do

not have the financial means to buy a house?”

Later that month, Father expressed willingness to

bear an immensity of parenting after she spoke

with an air of trepidation,

Soon after, she

suddenly stopped responding. Confused, he gave

her space, periodically reaching out and

continuing to anticipate the due date.

Unbeknownst to P.F., this silence coincided with

an appointment regarding adoption.

After learning of an induced birth and adoption

plan by Mother’s stunned aunt, Father claimed

paternity on Oct. 11th He provided a check to the

adoptive resource, offering help with anything on

Oct. 18th On Dec. 10th> he submitted a paternity

action. By Feb. 12th- 2019, he had completed

infant CPR and first aid classes, located a day care

provider, a pediatrician, and had attempted to add

his child to his health insurance, continuously

pressing for more time with his daughter during

proceedings. After a three-day trial, District Court

ruled to terminate his rights despite a showing of

the statute being met and an established bond

with his child.1 He immediately filed intent to

appeal. Kansas Court of Appeals heard oral

argument on Oct. 15th- releasing an obstinate

opinion on Nov. 22nd- He filed a petition for review

on Dec. 23rd- being granted on Feb. 25th’ 2020.

While C.L., in 2018, opened with “When a natural

father assumes his parental responsibilities, the

right to raise his child is entitled to constitutional

protection,”2 the same consideration had been

oddly absent with a glib affirmation on July 10th

P.F. submitted a motion for rehearing on July 31stand a petition to file a pro se supplemental brief on

Aug. 17th Both had been denied by Aug. 27th

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

“And for over 30 years now, [this] Court has

remained silent on this topic. ”

“The best person to bring up a child is the natural

parent . . . For [unwed fathers of infants], this

principle is not readily accepted. Further, when a

father has established his [interest], the courts

disadvantage the natural father-child relationship

by granting pendente lite custody to preadoptive

parents during the legal proceedings,

These

statutes and procedures [do not] adequately

protect a father’s interest in gaining custody of his

infant child.”

1 U.S. Const, amend. XTV § 2

2 C.L., 427 P.3d 951, 953 (2018)

“In extreme cases, [they] violate fathers’

constitutional parental rights by relying on the

presumption that unwed fathers are unfit

parents.” See Gonzalez, The Rights of Putative

Fathers to Their Infant Children in Contested

Adoptions: Strengthening State Laws that

Currently Deny Adequate Protection, 13 MICH. J.

GENDER & L. 39, 40 (2006)

Kansas Supreme Court’s opinion, “Appellant’s

briefs do not [explain] why the issue was not

presented [below].”

However, rule 6.02(a)(5)

states, “If the issue was not raised below, there

must be an explanation why the issue is properly

before the court.” Rule 6.02 - Content of

Appellant’s Brief, Kan. R. App. P. 6.02

“Given the burgeoning and still developing case

law nationally and in Kansas on parentage and

family formation, it is wrong, in my judgment, to

leave unwed biological fathers languishing in the

‘stunningly anachronistic’ world of gendered roles

and traditional family formation (a world this

court has generally striven to put in our past)

without even considering the merits of this case.”3

This is not simply an erroneous ruling or

misapplication of law; this is a matter of national

concern that should be addressed.

Under the Due Process clause of the 14th

Amendment, this Court has held that natural

parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the

care, custody, and management of their children.

Considering this, decisions in state proceedings to

terminate parental rights must be based on clear

and convincing evidence; findings based on a

preponderance of the evidence standard are

insufficient. Under the Equal Protection clause of

the 14th Amendment, this Court found

unconstitutional a state law that differentiated

between the unwed parents of an illegitimate child

with respect to their right to consent to the child’s

adoption, where the father had shown a significant

paternal interest in the child.

3 Adoption of Baby Girl G., 466 P.3d 1207 (2020) (Stegall, J.,

dissenting)

This Court ruled that there was no substantial

relationship between the law’s gender-based

discrimination and the state’s interest of providing

for the well-being of illegitimate children, and

therefore the discrimination was impermissible

under the Equal Protection Clause. The sine qua

non of constitutional rights and contested adoption

is Due Process and Equal Protection, each being

derided here.

K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(l)(D) “The father, after having

knowledge of the pregnancy, failed without

reasonable cause to provide support for the mother

during the six months prior to the child’s birth.”

K.S.A. 59-2136(h)(4) “For the purposes of this

subsection, ‘support’ means monetary or non

monetary assistance that is reflected in specific

and significant acts and sustained over the

applicable period.”

59-2136(h)(2) “In making a finding whether

parental rights shall be terminated under this

subsection, [the court shall] consider all of the

relevant surrounding circumstances . . . .”

Father reverentially comes before this Court as a

pro se litigant by virtue of severity and progeny.

The invoked statute does not reflect “particularly

financial support” in its language. There has been

a pertinacious focus on an exchange of cash when

the statute has broader standards. Sensibly,

giving a mother unwarranted money for her own

discretionary spending completely unrelated to a

pregnancy does not equate to a father providing

support for that pregnancy. Providing, discussing,

planning, sharing excitement, encouragement,

feedback,

nurturance,

sustenance,

shelter,

ensuring medical coverage, transportation, love for

the child, respect, and a sustaining offer to help

with anything in relation to the pregnancy,

however, does. P.F. carried out these actions while

never refusing to provide support within reason.

See In re Adoption of B.M.W., 268 Kan. 871, 882

(2000) (“Adoption statutes are to be strictly

construed in favor of maintaining the rights of

natural parents . . . .”)

Mother did not have needs in relation to the

pregnancy that Father failed to provide. For most

of the relevant timeframe, she had no financial

obligations. This misplaced ostracization divulges

of ulterior motive, indolence, or ineptitude as the

evidence does not jibe with the result or

opprobrium.

Father has been lambasted for acting responsibly

while Mother has been incorrectly portrayed as

destitute. Common sense and rationality has been

disturbingly absent in each decision, as if the

staidness were inscrutable. Without ramification,

similar actions will continue across the country,

leaving undeserving citizens woeful beyond

convalesce.

This case circumstantiates the inexactitude in

adoption statutes across the nation that has been

repeatedly exploited for unascertained benefit.

Z.H., when asked, “You [did] not want the baby,

correct?” “I already have a son of my own that I

was working on raising, so...” . . .

“[If] she was going to [be with you] and you did not

want her baby, she had to do something else?” “I

suppose, [yes.]” See In re Adoption of Baby Girl P.,

291 Kan. 424, 430 (2010) (“A court is to consider

all of the relevant surrounding circumstances in

an action based on [59-2136(h)(l)(D)].”)

The adoptive resource gained a culpable

advantage by filing to terminate the unsuspecting

Father’s rights without factual basis after Mother

deceptively induced birth. Knavish maneuvers of

this shade are often dependent on a father

trusting a mother and go ceaselessly unchecked.4

The utilized statute does not specify what is

considered satisfactory. As suggested, it matters

not the effort, any action can be deemed

insufficient.

4 See, e. g., Strickland v. Demke et al, online at

https://brunchrecipeszawiy.wordpress.com/2014/01/09/getover-yourself-lady /

This is boldly unamerican. See Novak, Blood over

Bond? A Call to Define Kansas's Requirements for

Biological Fathers to Retain Parental Rights.

Kan. L. R., Kan. L. R. Inc. 6/1/2013: vol. 61(5),

1141 (2013) (“The statute should clearly specify

the requirements biological fathers must meet to

preserve their parental rights, particularly in

regard to what is meant by the word ‘support’ in

sections 59-2136(h)(l)(C) and (D).”)

When challenged, appellate courts often uncloak a

parti pris by sidestepping and responding

farcically. Here, the clear and immediate issues

had been litigated. Based off the statute, case law,

testimony, and evidence, challenging constitutional

infractions in superior courts should not have been

on the horizon.

Court of Appeals responded obstructively on that

which should have remanded the case, with

Supreme Court following suit.

At each stage it had been reiterated that Father

has a constitutional right to parent his child. The

appendix to this petition holds these instances.

There is a vast amount of overlooked case law, as

P.F. has been answered with a confoundedly cold

repudiation.

No matter the motive, it does not usurp

fundamental rights or a child’s best interests. See

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (“It is

plain that the interest of a parent in the

companionship, care, custody, and management of

his or her children ‘come[s] to this Court with a

momentum for respect lacking when appeal is

made to liberties which derive merely from shifting

economic arrangements.’”)

The efforts taken to thwart and cause anguish to

P.F. and his child have been immense,

unbridled, near 405,000 citizens could potentially

be affected on an annual basis. See The Adoption

Network

(Nov.

24,

2020),

online

http: / / www.adoptionnetwork.com/adoptionstatistics

The propensity of exponents to take an adversarial

stance, violating the Equal Protection and Due

Process Clauses while “making assertion of

parental rights a Herculean task,”5 distorts the

integrity of adoption and the Constitution. With

sensitive components fused within, advocates have

an inherent responsibility to uphold the rectitude

that adoption demands. Adoption statutes are

‘strictly construed’ in favor of maintaining the

rights of natural parents, however, the weight

they are to hold is frequently obviated. This case

has an unjust outcome with instances across the

country6 resembling the aesthetic.7

Ethical and mental health issues tend to

intertwine with adoption. Per the AFFCNY, there

are seven core issues for adoptees. Loss: Their

loss can feel more prominent at various

developmental stages. Rejection: They often feel

rejected by their birth parents and subsequently

avoid situations where they might be rejected or

provoke others to reject them to validate their

negative self-perceptions. Shame: They often

believe there is something intrinsically wrong with

them and that they deserved to lose their birth

parents. Grief: There is no ritual to grieve the

loss of a birth parent. Suppressed or delayed grief

can cause depression, substance abuse, or

aggressive behaviors.

5 Adoption of Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. 424, 433 (2010) (“We do

not find in the statutory scheme a legislative call to make the

assertion of paternal rights a Herculean task.”)

6 See, e. g., Lemley v. Barr, 176 W. Va. 378, 343 S.E.2d 101

(W. Va. 1986), Smith v. Malouf, 826 So. 2d 1256, 2000 CA 465

(Miss. 2002), Kessel v. Leavitt, 204 W. Va. 95, 511 S.E.2d 720

(W. Va. 1998), Osborne v. Adoption Center of Choice, 70 P.3d

58, 2003 UT 15 (Utah 2003), In re C.L.S, 252 P.3d 556 (Colo.

App. 2011), Wyatt v. McDermott, 283 Va. 685, 725 S.E.2d 555

(Va. 2012), Manzanares v. Byington (In re Adoption Baby B.),

308 P.3d 382 (Utah 2012), In re Krigel, 480 S.W.3d 294 (Mo.

2016), Frank R. v. Adoptions, 402 P.3d 996 (Ariz. 2017),

Kimberly Rossler and her son James Elliott (Alabama 2015),

online at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/wrongful-adoptionreturn-_b_7739426, Petersen, former AZ official, sentenced to

prison for running an illegal adoption scheme (Ariz. 2020),

online at https://www.foxlOphoenix.com/news/ex-maricopacounty-assessor-paul-petersen-sentenced-to-74-months-inprison-for-adoption-scheme), et al.

7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Civil action for deprivation of rights.

Identity: They often feel at a loss regarding their

identity because of gaps in their genetic and family

history. Intimacy: Adoptees tend to be more

reserved with developing relationships. Control:

Whether placed at birth or as an older child, they

were not given an option. See Seven Core Issues of

Adoption

(Oct.

16,

2017),

online

http://www.affcny.org/ 7-core-issues-of-adoption/

For adopted adults, many of these issues can carry

over from childhood. See What Problems Do

Adopted Adults Have? (Nov. 18, 2019), online at

http://www.centerforanxietydisorders.com/whatproblems-do-adopted-adults-have/ For parents

who contest adoptions but are wrongly defeated,

there is perennial heartache.

For adoptees,

adoption can be a trauma of loss and separation

that results in PTSD. Parents who unconscionably

lose children to adoption can also experience that

trauma, but in addition they can also suffer from

“moral injury.”

See Riben, Adoption-Related

Trauma and Moral Injury (Dec. 6, 2017), online at

http://www.huffpost.com/entry/adoption-relatedtrauma-a_b_l 0492058

“State judges, as well as federal, have the

responsibility to respect and protect persons from

violations of federal constitutional rights.” Goss v.

State of Illinois, 312 F.2d 257, 259 (1963) This

Court has noted that if a court is “without

authority, its judgments and orders are regarded

as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply

void; and form no bar to a remedy sought in

opposition to them, even prior to a reversal. They

constitute no justification; and all persons

concerned in executing such judgments, or

sentences, are considered, in law, as trespassers.”

Elliott v. Peirsol, 26 U.S. 328, 329 (1828)

Due process requires that the procedures by which

laws are applied must be evenhanded.8 The

Courts of Kansas cannot be considered

evenhanded with the disregarded evidence,

ignored procedural and case law, misconstrued

testimony, misemployed statutes and mendacious

concoction of events and character in this case.

28 U.S.C. § 453 - Oaths of justices and judges.

Father and daughter are victims of wrongful

family separation. See, e. g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins,

118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886); Seymore, Adopting

Civil Damages: Wrongful Family Separation in

Adoption, 76 Wash. & Lee L.R. 928-929 (2019)

(citations omitted)

Clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate

standard of proof between a preponderance of the

evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.

g., Williams Telecommunications C. v. Gragg, 242

Kan. 675, 676 (1988); In re Adoption ofB.B.M., 224

P.3d 1168, 1173 (Kan. 2010) (citations omitted)

Courts have reviled Father, stood firmly with

statute ambiguity, created false truths, and

responded with a baffling tone.9

See In re

Adoption of G.L.V., 286 Kan. 1034, 1048 (Kan.

2008) (“[BJecause parental rights are fundamental

rights that deserve constitutional protection, any

ambiguity in the statute must be resolved in favor

of the natural parents.”) Antiquated gender

stereotypes should not have been applied as

indicated, with parents here substantially

swapping assumed roles.10

The rehearing response, “[T]hat would negate the

statute’s purpose, which is to provide a measure by

which to gauge a father’s commitment for his child

during pregnancy . . .”

“The test is to foster support for the child, but it

also serves as a measure of the possible father’s

commitment to the child . . .”

“If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some

measure of responsibility for the child’s future, he

may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child

relationship . . .” See, e. g., In re Adoption of

D.M.M., 24 Kan. App. 2d 783, 789 (1997); Lehr v.

Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (citations

omitted)

9 28 U.S.C. § 1257 - State courts; certiorari.

10 See, e. g., Sakai, "Dad wins sole custody of missing Baby

Gabriel,"

(Oct.

2011)

online

https://www.eastvalleytribune.com/news/dad-wins-solecustody-of-missing-baby-gabriel/article_0ca7f246-b690-52358916-ld88a2809f8b.html

P.F.’s commitment to his child before and after her

birth has been recognized by each appellate court.

See Craig, Establishing the Biological Rights

Doctrine to Protect Unwed Fathers in Contested

Adoptions, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 391, 392 (1998)

(“When the father has been unable to assume

parenting responsibilities because the child has

been placed at-birth with prospective adoptive

parents, the biological connection and the father’s

asserted willingness to assume his parenting role

should be sufficient to trigger full constitutional

protection . . . .”)

Somehow, this parallelism has been lost. Parents

who express consistent interest in their children

deserve the chance to parent and an active desire

to raise their children should establish a primary

right to custody. See, e. g., Zinman, Father Knows

Best: The Unwed Father’s Right to Raise His

Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60 Fordham L.

Rev. 971, 988-991 (1992); Adoption of C.L., 2018

WL 1022887, at *8 (Malone, J., concurring)

(citations omitted)

Father should have been granted such custody,

just as his actions pre-birth should have voided the

adoption.

See, e. g., Matter of Adoption of

Holloway, 732 P.2d 962, 972 (Utah 1986); Meyer v.

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); In re Baby

Girl B., 46 Kan. App.2d 96, 108 (2011); In re

Adoption of Baby Girl P., 291 Kan. 424, 430, 433

(2010), et al. (citations omitted)

Several decisions by these Courts show an

empathy that is strikingly absent here. See Baby

Boy F., C.L., Baby Girl P., et al. There is conflict

with an abundance of case law. In Baby Boy B.,

“As the father correctly points out, the legislature

did not state that it must be shown that the father

failed to support the mother but rather that he

failed to provide support for her ... A father who

contributed to the support of the mother but failed

to fully support her before the birth of the child

would not seem to be in the same category or to

deserve the same sanction — having his parental

rights terminated — as those who raped and

abandoned and were unfit.” See In re Adoption of

Baby Boy B., 254 Kan. 454, 463 (Kan. 1994)

In Baby Girl P., “We find nothing in the adoption

statute requiring that a parent must make

extraordinary displays of financial support . . .

[Father’s] efforts were clearly more than

incidental. He retained counsel, he filed court

actions to obtain visitation, he gave gifts, and he

offered to give anything that was needed for his

daughter’s support ... It demonstrated a

commitment to assuming the role of a father.”

“A mother’s refusal of support offered constitutes

reasonable cause for an alleged lack of support.”

See Interest of K.D.O., 20 Kan.App.2d 559, 561-62,

1160 (1995) While Court of Appeals acknowledged

that “Father made several offers of financial help

that Mother did not accept,” that Court did not

acknowledge Father’s appeal citing that case law.

Brief of Appellant, p. 27. Where a court finds that

a father has “failed to provide support but has a

reasonable cause, [59-2136] may not serve as a

ground for terminating his parental rights.”

Mother in K.D.O. testified that father offered to

provide support, but she “did not want to be

bothered by his offers.”

Comparably, A.G.

testified, “I declined his offer . . . .”

In June, C.J.C. answered “an important question

about the constitutionally mandated presumption

that a fit parent acts in his child’s best interest,

holding that the presumption applies not just in

an original suit affecting the parent-child

relationship but also in a proceeding by a

nonparent ... we hold that it does.” See In re

C.J.C., No. 19-0694, 3 (Tex. Jun. 26, 2020)

“Parents who assume their responsibilities have a

fundamental right, protected by the Constitution

to raise their children.” Baby Girl P., supra, at

430.

The U.S. considers an act an infringement if it

violates the spirit or the letter of the written

Constitution. Actions on behalf of the government

that prevent an individual from exercising

constitutionally protected rights is exactly that.

Highlighting furtive conjuncture, on Oct. 24th2018, Father submitted a motion for immediate

He had been ordered to take a

custody.11

urinalysis and a hair follicle test, an extensive

request for someone without a criminal record.

The next hearing had been scheduled on a date

where hair follicle results could not have yet been

returned. This cost Father an additional ten days

before he could meet his child.

On Nov. 6th- P.F. submitted a motion for a more

definite statement as the petition to terminate

rights made sweeping allegations without factual

basis. On Nov. 15th> adoption counsel stated that

an amended petition would be filed. Per K.S.A.

60-212(e), the deadline to file had been 14 days

from that date.

On Dec. 4th- Father filed a motion to dismiss as

Per K.S.A. 60that deadline quietly passed.

211(b)(3), the factual contentions required

evidentiary support when originally submitted as

a reasonable opportunity for further investigation

had not been identified. District Court simply

extended the deadline by 14 more days. In C.L.,

Justice Biles harangued the attorney during oral

argument for using similar tactics. “These alleged

grounds for terminating Father’s parental rights

were made without prior factual investigation.”

C.L., supra, at 954.

On Jan. 17th- 2019, once the petition had finally

been amended, a psychologist hired by the

adoptive resource had peculiarly diagnosed P.F.

with a dependent personality disorder after only

conducting three simple tests (WAIS-IV, MMPI-2,

MCMI-IV) and a brief two-hour interview. District

Court had been well aware of the motion to

dismiss and the need for an amended petition, yet

“chose to believe” this farce as fact. Father does

not exhibit even one of the diagnostic features,12

the intent being obvious. Even still, there is little

published connecting this to parenting.

11 U.S. Const, amend. XIV § 1

12 American Psychiatric Association.

Diagnostic and

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. (5th Edition), 675

(2013)

In contrast, many studies show that those with

bipolar disorder, A.G.’s diagnosis, can be found

unfit due to erratic behaviors. See Van Brunt,

Zedginidze, A.A. and Light, P.A., The Unfit Parent:

Six Myths Concerning Dangerousness and Mental

Illness. Family Court Review, 54: 18-28, 20 (2016)

(“Individuals

experiencing

schizophrenic

symptoms or bipolar disorder may not make

appropriate parenting decisions or could become

consumed by the illness.”)

P.F. is undeniably fit to parent. If he had actually

failed to provide support or were mentally

impaired, an amended petition would have never

been an issue.

It takes a duplicitous mind to proclaim that a

person supposedly with this disorder would buy a

house “solely for himself’ while someone is most

likely pregnant with his child.

P.F. motioned to have his child stay overnight at

the house purchased primarily for her. Instead, he

had to travel a three and a half hour drive every

weekend to see her for only four hours each day.

Having no valid reason to deny the request, this

exposes a concurrent partisanship. See Zinman,

Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father's Right to

Raise His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60

Fordham L. Rev. 971, 981 (1992) (“When an infant

is placed for adoption at birth, the natural unwed

father can have no more than a biological link to

his child. [This] Court has yet to rule on what this

unwed father must do to protect his parental

rights, effectively leaving the states free to find

their own answers.”)

Corruption undermines the core of the

administration of justice, blockading the right to

an impartial trial.

It takes little effort to see

prejudice in District Court “choosing to believe

Mother’s version” over three separate testimonies

and a plethora of evidence.13

13 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 1.1: Compliance

with the Law

“He was not emotionally supportive but instead

verbally abusive, self-centered, mean, and

sarcastic and not responsive to [Mother’s] needs.

It is not in the child’s best interests to deny the

adoption.”

This is contrary to the manifest weight of the

evidence. Circumstances were not considered, nor

were these conclusions delineated,

There is

nothing compelling to suggest that District Court

perused the text messages, admitted evidence,

past the first month of assumed paternity. They

reveal over 170 instances of emotional support

from Father to Mother and over 70 supportive

comments he had made about their daughter.

Reading sarcasm in text can only be subjective.

The ROA does not support termination being in

his child’s best interests. See In re Waters, 195

Kan. 614, 617 (1965) (“[W]here the absolute

severance of the relation is sought without the

consent and against the protest of the parent, the

inclination of the courts is in favor of maintaining

the natural relation.”) The last time that he has

seen his child, she cried for him as he reluctantly

walked away. L.S. was witness to this, as well as

Mother’s teenage cousin, who had been

accompanying Father. Reunification with Father

will be a much easier and gentler transition

compared to her discovery of a childhood that

existed within a spurious context. See Lumme, 5

Reasons Dads Are So Important to Their

Daughters (October 18, 2020), online at

https://redtri.com/5-reasons-dads-are-soimportant-to-their-daughters /

“He gave her no means of transportation, but to be

fair, he did give her a couple rides when it also

benefited him.”

The ROA shows that transportation sustainably

provided without ever somehow being “beneficial”

to Father.14

14 Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, Canon 2A - An

appearance of impropriety occurs when reasonable minds,

with knowledge of all the relevant circumstances disclosed by

a reasonable inquiry, would conclude that the judge's

honesty, integrity, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to

serve as a judge is impaired.

He had stated, “If you need to go somewhere and it

is too hot I will . . . take you because we need you

to not be too hot,” on June 11th and, “If you need a

ride somewhere in the meantime ... I can help.”

on June 22nd

“He gave her no home or residence.”

The ROA features a sustaining offer of shelter.

Father stated, “Aside from saying you can stay

with me . . . .” on Mar. 21st’ after offering shelter

on Mar. 14th> which she reacted impassively

towards. The fact that she lived with Z.H. is not

acknowledged in the ruling. On May 4th- P.F. said,

“I will help anyway that I can. You can keep your

stuff at my house . . . you could stay there too . . . .”

His real estate agent testified, “He was getting

ready to be a father and wanted a place for his

daughter to grow up and also for the mother of the

child to have a place to stay.”

A former coworker testified that P.F. had said, “I

[offered shelter] until she has the baby, even after

if need be, regardless if she’s in another

relationship or not.”

See Mayeri, Foundling

Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in

the Age of Equality, Faculty Scholarship at Penn

Law 1657, 2292 (2016) (“As nonmarital

parenthood becomes the American norm,

recovering its constitutional history illuminates

how and why marital status still delimits the

boundaries of equality law.”)

“[P.F.] had money for anything he wanted. He was

never overdrawn.”

Father’s balances at the end of each relevant

month were $334.25 in Mar., $41.41 in Apr.,

$10.30 in May, $104.70 in June with $1,371.24 of

401k deposited, -$27.98 in July with $3,036.91 of

401k deposited, $46.28 in Aug., and -$37.34 in

Sept, as $350 had returned to his account in error.

In July and September, P.F. had indeed been

overdrawn.

His bank records were never decorously reviewed.

“And the statements were, quote, ‘I was not going

to give her money,’ end quote and the second one

was, quote, ‘I was not going to give her money

unless she asked for it,’ end quote.”

Willfully misconceived testimony. P.F. testified, “I

offered something that would have been more

beneficial because I wanted to provide shelter,

food, storage, and transportation ... I wanted to

take care of a child,” and, “I wanted to do

something that I knew was going to benefit her

and the child.”

There is much to the inclination of a preordained

agenda, as District Court’s confirmation bias

suggests. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,

754 (1982) (“When the State moves to destroy

weakened familial bonds, it must provide the

parents with fundamentally fair procedures.”)

“He was able to buy a house. He reduced his

income in May or June of 2018 when he quit [job]

because ‘it just wasn’t worth it.’”

Portraying Father in this light for purchasing a

house for his child is absurd. P.F.’s testimony, “I

did not make a significant amount of money to

continue working 60 hours a week and I wanted to

prepare for my child, to be available for my child.”

“She had no job.

She had no means of

transportation. She had no way to get to job

interviews.

There were times that she was

without a residence and was couch surfing with

family and others.”

This is a blunt falsification of facts.

By Apr. 21st' she had been employed and, in

addition to P.F.’s support, had access to three

different vehicles during pregnancy. A.G. had

never been without residence or had to “couch

surf.”

“That was more important, at least he believed,

than the child that was being carried by the

woman.”

P.F.’s testimony never reflects disregard for his

child.15 The reference occurred on June 30th On

June 28th- he had said to A.G., “I hope she is active

next time I see you. I would love to feel her

moving around ... If you need anything, let me

know. I have been thinking about her all day.”

“It has affected his everyday life and work and

without therapy [P.F.] will not get better . . . .”

Along with the incorrect diagnosis, there has been

an unabating misconception in the difference

between “recommended” and “required.” Father

has never wavered from being a rational and

responsible adult. See In re Lathrop, 2 Kan. App.

2d 90, 96 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978) (“[A] putative father

who appears and asserts his desire to care for his

child has rights paramount to those of non

parents, unless he is found to be an unfit father in

a fitness hearing. The trial court found that he

was a fit parent; therefore, his right to have

custody of his child is clear.”)

“Not giving her any cash was an excuse by [P.F.]

just to not give her any money. Candidly, it is not

[his] call. The statute does not let you make that

decision.” (Emphasis added.)

The statute distinctly states “support means

monetary or non-monetary assistance.”16

Father’s testimony, “You were going to provide for

her in other ways?” “Yes.”

District Court “failed” to properly apply the clear

and convincing standard.17 That court also “erred”

by not honoring the strict construing of statutes to

favor maintaining parental rights.

15 18 U.S.C. § 1001 - Statements or entries generally.

16 Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges Canon 2A. - Respect for

Law. A judge should respect and comply with the law and

should act at all times in a manner that promotes public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

17 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 1.1 - A judge

shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial

Conduct.

Being thoroughly egregious, the decision to

terminate Father’s rights seems to have been

made before trial began. See In re Baby Girl B.,

46 Kan. App.2d 96, 108 (2011) (“When applying

[59-2136], Kansas appellate courts have strongly

endorsed the parental preference doctrine,

required strict compliance and diligently enforced

the clear and convincing evidence standard.”)

The last 40 hours Father and his child spent

together were unsupervised where supervision had

never been necessary. He naturally parented

quite well. “Supervision” is another maneuver

infringing upon rights with “supervisor” creating

false narratives. P.F. does not have a history of

violence or instability. The first visitors brought to

meet his child were members of Mother’s family.

This Court should feel compelled to exercise

review as these slanted actions go against the

Constitution and have inequitably deprived a child

from her father and her family, a ringing alarm on

a national scale. “No [judicial officer] can war

against the Constitution without violating his

undertaking to support it.” See Cooper v. Aaron,

358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) Kansas Court of Appeals had

taken dialogue from the start of the texts out of

context to imply that Father did not provide

emotional support, though the reference had been

outside the statutory timeframe and inapplicable.

This lends support to the notion that evidence in

the record had not ever been carefully reviewed.

“Mother also told Father that she did not want or

need anything from him. But Mother did accept

other offers of support. . . .”

Accepting varied offers does not abrogate offers

not accepted. A.G. never testified that she had

significant financial difficulties during the

pregnancy. See In re Adoption of Baby Boy S., 22

Kan.App.2d 119, 130 (1996) (“Where a trial court

finds that a father’s reasonable efforts to provide

for his child’s welfare failed because of interference

by the mother, adoption agency, or adoptive

parents, the statute should not operate to

terminate his parental rights.”)

“Father notes he offered to let Mother live with

him twice. But Mother testified she did not think

the offers were genuine and this was not a realistic

option.” (Emphasis added.)

Janus-faced remarks do not nullify verifiable

intentions.

There is a perceivable lack of

substance to all her subjectiveness.

Nearly every shred of testimony was manipulated

to imply negativity towards Father. He testified,

“She would have had safe haven at my house

anytime.”

“She asked for Father’s address so she could have

one piece of mail sent there . . . Father provided

her a ride home ... but he did not give her a ride

there. As for Father’s offer to allow Mother to

store her belongings at his home, she never took

him up on this offer.” (Emphasis added.)

She selected healthcare coverage he suggested,

covering all medical expenses. It is irrelevant that

she only requested a ride home or that “she never

took him up on this offer.” See K.D.O., 889 P.2d

1158, 1160 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (“The trial court

found that although the father failed to provide

support to the mother during her pregnancy, he

had a reasonable cause for his failure, namely, the

mother’s refusal to accept his offers of support.”)

“The supervisor testified she found it unusual that

Father would fall asleep during the . . . time he

had for the visit.”

The “supervisor,” a licensed social worker, found it

unusual that a father and daughter napped

together?

Father’s testimony, “Was she comfortable enough

to fall asleep on your chest?”

“Yes.” “Did you close your eyes when that was

happening?” “Yes.” “Why did you do that?”

“Because it was amazing. I love her.”

“While on the one hand society has recognized that

a father’s interest in having a child is a

fundamental right, society still imposes outdated

stereotypes on what a father wants, or is willing to

do, based upon his legal relationship with the

mother when the child is born,

This is

fundamentally unfair. With each passing year,

researchers have documented how fathers are

more involved in their children’s lives than fathers

of previous generations.” Kolinsky, The Ties That

Bind: Reevaluating the Role of Legal Presumptions

of Paternity, 48 hoy. L.A. L. Rev. 223, 266 (2014)

“He later testified he started using illegal drugs

when he was 16 and had used them for the past 25

years.”

Testimony does not support this statement. The

ROA reflects only casual use at any time. As with

responsibly utilizing professional help, drug use

has been terribly blown out of proportion. Three

clean urinalyses and a voluntary intake

assessment not recommending treatment had been

submitted. He has abstained from use since before

his child’s birth, having no criminal record.

“[H]e was paying down his debt, and he acquired

baby items for his home. But Father did these

things for his own benefit. . . .”

Focus of support is another weapon wielded

against unwed fathers, with Courts completely

ignoring the circumstances.

“He spent hundreds of dollars on credit card

payments and withdrew hundreds of dollars in

cash.”

Kansas Courts have puzzlingly miscomprehended

the framework of consumer credit. His testimony

had established that most withdrawn funds were

for financial obligations.

Court of Appeals even confirmed that P.F. had

indeed satisfied the statute. “Father intended to

parent. . . and provided some support.”

Father has only been viewed with a jaundiced eye,

absent any defined valid cause,

These

unreasonable stances are against the Constitution

and bring to light how ethically vulnerable the

statutes truly are. See Troxel v. Granville, 530

U.S. 57, 66-67 (U.S. 2000) (“In light of this

extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that

the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment

protects the fundamental right of parents to make

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control

of their children”) Disregarding a child’s future is

an alarming issue of national concern.

“In 2018, [Kansas] replaced [best interest] with a

mandatory

assessment

the

[relevant

circumstances]. On appeal, the parties have not

invited us to look at the [amendment]—they have

not even mentioned it. (Father’s briefs mention it

at least seven times.) [District Court] did [not]

apply the new statutory provision . . . the

[consideration] in [59-2136] replicates [Care of

Children, 38-2201].”

In the appendix to this petition, App. 63, is

transcript of P.F.’s counsel objecting to a

fraudulent trial brief that spoke of chapter 38,

presented at 5:00 p.m. on Friday before a Monday

morning trial.

That Court quickly overruled,

further signaling prearrangement. Considering

relevant circumstances has been a provision of the

statute since at least 2009, even if temporarily

removed. See Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d

1205, 1244 (7th Cir. 1984) (“The state may not

separate the parent from the child, even

temporarily, without according them due process

of law to protect their liberty interests.”)

“[District Court] pointed out Father’s . . . chronic

depression and personality disorder, both of which

were

. . resistant to quick treatment or

resolution.”

Plainly, his character and actions do not match the

massive slander. It is very disturbing to discover

the unjust tactics employed by those that society

typically sees as arbitors of justice, all in the effort

to, bluntly, steal this child’s family away from her.

From that Supreme Court’s opinion, “[He

complains] that undue weight was placed on the

mother’s subjective experience ... it did not base

its legal conclusions on her reactions.”

“But Mother testified she did not think the offers

were genuine . . .

(Emphasis added.)

“Father’s brief [pointed] out that the right to

parent [is a] protected constitutional right. But

[he] acknowledged that the right to raise a child is

tempered by the extent to which the parent has

assumed parental responsibilities.”

Constitutional liberties are not antithetical to

parental responsibilities, they are woven within.

This is another of many sophisms. Naturally,

Father wanted and attempted to help in any way

he reasonably could. See In re Gentry, 142 Mich.

App. 701, 705 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (“A parent's

right to the custody of his or her children is an

element of ‘liberty’ guaranteed by the 5th and 14th

Amendments to the Constitution of the United

States.”)

“[Giving] her occasional rides, accompanying her

to some classes and medical appointments and

encouraging text messages, were inconsistent and

of dubious value . . . .”

It is unbefitting to depict a loving father’s efforts

diminishingly

dismissive

manner.

Rebarbatively, the testimony and evidence support

the diametrical opposite of these conclusions.

Each Court has been inappropriately obdurate.18

Further, A.G. had made many intentionally

inaccurate statements while under oath. When

asked, “Isn’t it true that he offered to allow you to

store your items at his place?” “Correct and I was

going to, but when the day came around to move

them, he had made other plans.” “He was at work,

wasn’t he?” “No. It was a Saturday.” A Sunday,

May 20th- Mother, “I talked with my aunt [and] I

can store it all there ... I super appreciate your

offer to help I just feel like I am asking a lot of you

by doing this.”

18 28 U.S.C. § 453 - Oaths of justices and judges.

“He didn’t ask you . . . how everything is going?”

“He asked me that, yes. He did not specifically ask

me how I was feeling, no.”

The ROA says otherwise. On Mar. 16th> “Feeling

good, nothing different?” Apr. 10th- “Feeling well?”

Apr. 15th> “Hope you feel better soon.” May 6th- “I

hope you are figuring things out for the move and

you feel ok.” May 29th- “How are you feeling,” June

18th- “How are you feeling?”

“It is not that I want to keep her from him ... [I]

do not want him to be able to do anything to take

her.

I do not want some [joint] custody

arrangement. I do not want him to be able to

make decisions. I want it to be on my terms when

he sees her.” Mother is demonstrably unfit to

parent but that is not coalesced to Father, who has

devotedly held a proclivity to parent. Her mental

health and disconcerting actions have not been

addressed. Not only has she been very cruel to

Father, but she has also regarded her own family

with similar malice and betrayed her own child.

The initial petition to terminate rights, “[A.G.], of

lawful age, being first duly sworn on oath, states

that she has read the foregoing petition, knows the

contents thereof, and that the statements and

allegations contained therein are true and does

further swear they are correct.”19

“You knew he was willing to support her if he

turned out to be the father?” “Correct.” See In re

Adoption of G.L.V., 286 Kan. 1034, 1057-58 (2008)

(“[59-2136(d)] implicitly expresses Kansas’ public

policy that the best interests of children are served

by fostering their relationships with their natural

parents in cases where the parents have assumed

parental duties toward their children.”)

“He was expressing that he was upset that he was

not the father, not that he was upset that he

wanted to be the father even though she might

have developmental delays.”

19 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(b) - A

lawyer shall not: falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness

to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is

prohibited by law.

This statement is incongruous with logic and

sensibility. “[Y]ou had not told him about guy

number three at all at this point?” “As I previously

stated, no, because I did not remember.”

“And why would you not have remembered having

sex with someone? Were you under the influence

of something at the time?”

“No. It was just insignificant to me, I guess.”

Responding to the petition for review, “The gist of

Father’s argument was that his incessant texting

to Mother and his decision to purchase himself the

house he always wanted . . . .”20 p. 1

Lacking probity, these tactics are discernible.

“Father took steps to prepare for parenthood by

purchasing a house, attending parenting classes,

making sure Mother was doing alright, and

offering any service she might require at any given

time—despite her having another man as her

boyfriend and Mother’s resistance to his offers to

help.” See Langton v. Maloney, 527 F. Supp 538,

549 (D. Conn. 1981) (“The liberty interest of the

family encompasses an interest in retaining

custody of one’s children and, thus, a state may

not interfere with a parent’s custodial rights

absent due process protections.”)

“The fact that Father was not found to be unfit

does not magically make him fit. [Trial] court

clearly indicated it was prepared to find Father

unfit, but it declined to do so ‘to avoid any

potential adverse impact on [Father’s] life in the

future.” p. 7 (Emphasis added.)

If P.F. were indeed unfit, he would have been

found unfit.

20 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3 Advocate:

Candor Toward the Tribunal . A statement is material if

it ‘had the potential to mislead’ the court. A lawyer who

knowingly misrepresents the trial record in appellate filings

or at oral argument ‘make[s] a false statement of fact,’ and if

the misstatement is material, the lawyer violates Rule

3.3(a)(1). Under Rule 8.4(c), it is professional misconduct for

a lawyer to ‘engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,

deceit or misrepresentation.’”

Any alluding dialogue was intended as a threat

not to appeal. The scenerio that counsel suggests

is utterly irrational and would be beyond

irresponsible if the slightest bit accurate.

“The clear and convincing evidence was that when

Mother tried to accept Father’s general offers . . .

Father refused to follow through.” p. 41

Prevarication, the appeal response states “clear

and convincing” 77 times. Not merely censure,

District Court and counsel hold positions on the

Kansas adoption law committee. Actions taken

soundly imply a conflict of interest.21

The ROA

holds irrelevant and duplicate components, while

many pages have additional markings penned

post-trial.22

In the transcript of evidentiary

hearing, specific words are omitted. To identify

each example of unethical conduct would be

redundant. Had Father failed in any manner,

there would be no need for these actions. It is

quite perceptible that impartiality and neutrality,

required of each Court, had been absent with an

unprincipled intent. Nearly every aspect of this

case is unethically tainted. A “supervisor” report

from Jan. 26th- 2019 stated, notably, “[P.F.] was

recording the visit on a small personal voice

recorder.” What purpose could it serve to have a

recorder on his person other than false statements

having already been made?

Justice Stegall observed, “This duty clearly flows

from a world of assumptions about gender roles

[this] Court has called obsolescing and stunningly

anachronistic. And it is indisputable that this

duty falls unequally on unwed biological fathers

and not on any other class of parent now

recognized under Kansas law.

In my view,

whether this discriminatory rule can survive the

heightened scrutiny demanded by equal protection

jurisprudence is something this court has a duty to

consider.”

21 18 U.S.C. § 241 - Conspiracy against rights.

22 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 10 - The Record

on Appeal (a) Composition of the Record on Appeal. The

following items constitute the record on appeal: (1) the

original papers and exhibits filed in the district court.

“Where the father’s right is purely biological and

there has been no family formed, no bonding, no

support, and no love, that right seems to be

obviously less deserving of support.”23

There had been support, there had been bonding,

there is love. He explicitly loves his daughter, as

evident in his unwavering pertinacity. See Matter

of Cozza, 163 Cal. 514, 524 (Cal. 1912) (“The law is

solicitous toward maintaining the integrity of the

natural relation of parent and child, and in

adversary proceedings in adoption, where the

absolute severance of that relation is sought,

without the consent and against the protest of the

parent, the inclination of the courts, as the law

contemplates it should be, is in favor of

maintaining the natural relation.”) As a

constitutional matter, when government seeks to

impose parental obligations on a man, such as

support, proof of biology alone suffices. Yet, when

a man seeks to protect rights to his child, he only

enjoys constitutional protection if he can meet the

biology plus standard.

See Oren, Thwarted

Fathers or Pop-Up Pops? How to Determine when

Putative Fathers Can Block the Adoption of Their

Newborn Children, University of Houston Law

Center No. 2007-A-23, 153-154(2007)

An adoptive resource having pendente lite custody

over a parent is an infringement on parental

rights. They each witnessed the bond between

father and daughter but have shown no hesitance

in dissevering it. See Carson v. Elrod, 411 F.

Supp. 645, 649 (E.D. Va. 1976) (“No bond is so

precious, and none should be more zealously

protected by the law as the bond between parent

and child.”) It is unreservedly in his child’s best

interests to be in her Father’s custody. They have

a bond that only a parent and child could have,

and it has been unjustly ripped away. See J.B. v.

Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir.

1997) (“The forced separation of parent from child,

even for a [time,] represents a serious

infringement upon the rights of both.”)

23 Baby Boy N., 19 Kan. App. 2d 574, 584 (Kan. Ct. App.

1994)

Justice

Stegall,

“[T]he

equal

protection

implications raised by Father are sufficiently

important to warrant this court hearing the case.

[T]he Court noted that ‘such laws may disserve

men who exercise responsibility for raising their

children. This is precisely the claim made by

Father here. He asserts that he is fully prepared

to exercise his rights and responsibilities to raise

Baby Girl G.

Indeed, the Court of Appeals

agreed.” See Daniel, Dads are Capable of Raising

Daughters on Their Own (2018) online at

https: //www .professorsho use.com/ dads-arecapable-of-raising-daughters-on-their-own/;

Vaughan, Focus on the Family (2010) online at

https://www.focusonthefamily.ca/content/theimpact-a-fathers-love-has-on-his-daughter

When adopted children learn that a parent fought

valiantly to raise them but were unethically

thwarted, they gain a bitter weight of betrayal.

Father’s rights were only viewed as a roadblock

before a transaction could be finalized.

Mistreating any fit parent heinously is exceedingly

violative of their rights. See, e. g., Franz v. United

States 707 F 2d 582, 599 (1983); Elrod v. Burns,

427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262

U.S. 390, 399 (1923)

“This period of separation between the child and

[father] may not be attributed to any lack of

interest on the petitioner’s part. Rather, it is due

to the unfortunate pace of these court

proceedings.” Matter of John E. v. Doe, 164 A.D.2d

375, 394 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)

This case should be remanded with the adoption

being ordered reversed and physical custody being

granted to Father by-way-of immediate transfer.

See Ryznar, A Curious Parental Right, 71 SMU L.

Rev. 127, 130 (2018) (“A uniform or predictable

level of scrutiny in parental right cases will not

appear without being addressed by [this] Court.

On the contrary, selecting a level of scrutiny grows

more complicated as courts encounter a wider

range of parental right cases and as said regulate