Amicus Curiae Brief — New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Kevin P. Bruen, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of New York State Police, et al.

No. 20-843

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

NEW YORK STATE RIFLE & PISTOL ASSOCIATION, INC.,

ROBERT NASH, BRANDON KOCH,

Petitioners,

v.

KEVIN P. BRUEN, in His Official Capacity as Superintendent of New York State Police, RICHARD J.

MCNALLY, JR., in His Official Capacity as Justice of

the New York Supreme Court, Third Judicial Circuit,

and Licensing Officer for Rensselaer County,

Respondents.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

REPRESENTATIVE CLAUDIA TENNEY

AND 175 ADDITIONAL MEMBERS

OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

Brian D. Schmalzbach

Counsel of Record

Matthew D. Fender

John J. Woolard

MCGUIREWOODS LLP

Gateway Plaza

800 East Canal Street

Richmond, VA 23219

T: (804) 775-4746

bschmalzbach@mcguirewoods.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ............................... 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................... 1

ARGUMENT ............................................................... 2

I.

The Second Amendment Must Apply to

Everyone—Not Just the Privileged Few......... 4

II.

New York’s Sullivan Law Was Designed

to Limit the Right to Bear Arms to the

Elite. ................................................................. 6

III.

Interest-Balancing Tests Are Inappropriate in Second Amendment Jurisprudence Because the Government Always

Wins. ................................................................. 9

IV.

The Court Should Reiterate That the

Second Amendment Test Turns on Text,

History, and Tradition. .................................. 12

CONCLUSION ......................................................... 15

APPENDIX ............................................................... 1a

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases

Page(s)

Caetano v. Massachusetts,

577 U.S. 411 (2016) ........................................... 14

District of Columbia v. Heller,

554 U.S. 570 (2008) .................................. 2, 10-11

Heller v. District of Columbia,

670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ......................... 13

Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester,

701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).................... 3, 6, 11-12

McDonald v. City of Chi.,

561 U.S. 742 (2010) .......................................... 4-5

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Beach,

818 F. App’x 99 (2d Cir. 2020) .......................... 11

Woollard v. Gallagher,

712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) ...................... 5-6, 12

Woollard v. Sheridan,

863 F. Supp. 2d 462 (D. Md. 2012) .................. 5-6

Wrenn v. District of Columbia,

864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) ...................... 13-14

Young v. Hawaii,

992 F.3d 765 (9th Cir. 2021) ......................... 9, 12

State Statutes

N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 ...................................... 3, 6

iii

Other Authorities

Bar Hidden Weapons on Sullivan’s Plea:

Only Five Senators Vote Against His Bill

Making it a Felony to Carry Them, N.Y.

TIMES (May 11, 1911) ....................................... 6-7

Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 40

(Dec. 6, 1865) ....................................................... 5

First Conviction Under Weapon Law,

N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 1911) ................................ 8

Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and

Balancing in First and Second

Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L.

REV. 375 (2009) .................................................. 13

Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond,

Never Intended to Apply to the White

Population: Firearms Regulation and

Racial Disparity - The Redeemed South's

Legacy of a National Jurisprudence, 70

CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307 (1995) ........................ 7-8

The Rossi Pistol Case, N.Y. TIMES

(Sept. 29, 1911) ................................................. 8-9

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1

Amici curiae are Representative Claudia

Tenney and 175 additional members of the United

States House of Representatives. A complete list of

amici is set forth in the Appendix. Amici have sworn

an oath to uphold the U.S. Constitution and have an

obligation to defend and uphold the rights recognized

in the document, including the right to keep and bear

arms. Amici also have been elected to represent their

respective constituents. Those constituents are now

in danger of criminal prosecution should they

attempt to exercise their inalienable right to bear

arms in the State of New York.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

There is no serious argument that the preexisting right to keep and bear arms, as recognized

and preserved by the Second and Fourteenth

Amendments, does not extend beyond the home. But

the state law at issue here, New York’s infamous Sullivan Law, infringes on that right and effectively

eliminates any meaningful exercise of the right outside a person’s domicile. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to prevent states from

disarming disfavored and marginalized citizens—at

1 Under Supreme Court Rule 37.6, counsel for amici represent

that they authored this brief in its entirety and that none of the

parties or their counsel, nor any other person or entity other

than amici or their counsel, made a monetary contribution

intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

Petitioners filed a blanket consent to the filing of amicus briefs.

Respondents consented to the filing of this brief.

2

that time the recently freed slaves. When New York

passed the Sullivan Law in 1911, it was motivated by

animus against another marginalized group in society—recent immigrants from Europe. For many years

New York has gotten away with barring all but a

privileged few of its citizens from exercising their

right to keep and bear arms outside the home, and

this case presents a chance to right that Constitutional wrong.

In upholding the Sullivan Law, the Second

Circuit incorrectly evaluated the law using

intermediate scrutiny. That improper standard of

review violated this Court’s dictate in District of

Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008), that

interest-balancing tests are not to be used in Second

Amendment cases.

The Court should reverse the Second Circuit’s

decision and clarify that the Second Amendment

guarantees a fundamental right to carry a handgun

outside the home, and that this right is not subject to

interest balancing.

ARGUMENT

The question “whether the State’s denial of

petitioners’ applications for concealed-carry licenses

for self-defense violated the Second Amendment”

requires the Court to decide whether a government

authority can arbitrarily ration a Constitutional

right, by allowing only a privileged few to exercise it.

The very nature of rights is that they operate as

guarantees against certain government policy choices.

3

Respondents have conceded that the Second

Amendment right to keep and bear arms extends beyond the home. Brief in Opp. to Cert. at 1 (“[T]he

Second Circuit proceeded from an understanding

that the Second Amendment protects an individual

right to carry firearms outside the home for selfdefense.”). Startlingly, however, Respondents argue

that this fundamental right can only be exercised

with prior government permission.

Under New

York’s Sullivan Law, now codified at N.Y. Penal Law

§ 400.00, citizens can only carry a handgun outside

their homes if they satisfy a government official that

they have “proper cause.”

Respondents concede that such officials have

essentially unfettered discretion:

“To determine

whether ‘proper cause’ exists for the issuance of an

unrestricted license, licensing officials consider an

open universe of person- and locality-specific factors

bearing on the applicant’s need for self-defense.”

Brief in Opp. to Cert. at 5-6; see also Kachalsky v. Cty.

of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Licensing officers, often local judges, are ‘vested with

considerable discretion’ in deciding whether to grant

a license application, particularly in determining

whether proper cause exists for the issuance of a carry license.” (footnote omitted)).

In other words, the decision is arbitrary. Such

a scheme is anathema to ordered liberty.

4

Amici urge the Court to consider the bias

underlying the Sullivan Act, which is no secret, and

to clarify that any government attempt to abridge the

right to keep and bear arms, whether inside or

outside the home, is subject to review under the text,

history, and tradition standard set forth in Heller.

I.

The Second Amendment Must Apply to

Everyone—Not Just the Privileged Few.

New York’s regulation of Second Amendment

rights smacks of elitism.

It transforms a

fundamental right guaranteed to the people into a

special privilege to be enjoyed by only an elite few

deemed worthy by a government official exercising

unbridled discretion. But that is the opposite of what

the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended.

This Court acknowledged in McDonald v. City

of Chicago that it was the intent of those legislators

to guarantee the right to keep and bear arms to the

most disadvantaged segment of society at that time:

the recently freed slaves.

In debating the Fourteenth Amendment,

the 39th Congress referred to the right

to keep and bear arms as a fundamental

right deserving of protection. Senator

Samuel Pomeroy described three “indispensable” “safeguards of liberty under

our form of Government.” 39th Cong.

Globe 1182. One of these, he said, was

the right to keep and bear arms:

“Every man . . . should have the right to

bear arms for the defense of himself and

5

family and his homestead. And if the

cabin door of the freedman is broken

open and the intruder enters for purposes as vile as were known to slavery, then

should a well-loaded musket be in the

hand of the occupant to send the polluted wretch to another world, where his

wretchedness will forever remain complete.” Ibid.

McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 775–76

(2010). The freedmen lacked wealth, power, and

status. They had none of the privileges which might

have enabled them to gain the favor of a government

licensing officer.

As Senator Henry Wilson

commented on the Senate floor: “In Mississippi rebel

State forces, men who were in rebel armies, are

traversing the state, visiting the freedmen,

disarming them, perpetrating murders and outrages

on them; and the same things are done in other

sections of the country . . . .” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong.,

1st Sess. 40 (Dec. 6, 1865).

It is rarely, if ever, the affluent and privileged

members of society who need protection against overreach, but rather the disenfranchised, the poor, and

the weakest. The New York statutory scheme challenged here frustrates that very purpose by limiting

the right to bear arms to a privileged few.

If the Government wishes to burden a

right guaranteed by the Constitution, it

may do so provided that it can show a

satisfactory justification and a sufficiently adapted method. The showing,

6

however, is always the Government’s to

make. A citizen may not be required to

offer a “good and substantial reason”

why he should be permitted to exercise

his rights. The right’s existence is all

the reason he needs.

Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 475 (D.

Md. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Woollard v. Gallagher, 712

F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013).

II.

New York’s Sullivan Law Was Designed to

Limit the Right to Bear Arms to the Elite.

The Sullivan Act turns the purpose of the

Second Amendment—to protect the many rather

than the few—on its head. The history of the Act

confirms that it was designed to exclude non-elite

immigrants and disfavored minorities from gun

ownership. Respondents concede that N.Y. Penal

Law § 400.00 is the current codification of the

Sullivan Law. Brief in Opp. to Cert. at 3–5. The Act

was passed in 1911, and amended in 1913. Id. at 3;

see also Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 85.

Speaking on the floor of the New York Senate

in support of his bill, Senator Timothy Sullivan is

reported to have told the following anecdote:

A great big fellow driving a truck in one

of the crowded streets of New York City

only four days ago ran over a little

Italian boy and killed him. The father

in a burst of anger lost control of his

temper and shot the poor truckman

dead.

7

Bar Hidden Weapons on Sullivan’s Plea: Only Five

Senators Vote Against His Bill Making it a Felony to

Carry Them, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 1911). The mention

of the father’s Italian ethnicity was a not-so-subtle

appeal to nativist sentiment and anti-immigrant bias.

As two scholars have noted:

If the white South saw blacks as a

threat, the country as a whole saw

southern and eastern Europeans in

similar terms. For this reason, in part,

the numbers of such immigrants were

subject to significant limits. Beyond

this, these immigrants were associated

with mental deficiency, with crime, and

most dangerously, with the sort of

anarchist inspired crime that was

feared in Europe, such as political

assassination and politically motivated

robberies.

In New York, these fears found

expression in the passage of the

Sullivan Law in 1911. Of statewide

dimension, the Sullivan Law was aimed

at New York City, where the large

foreign born population was deemed []

peculiarly susceptible and perhaps

inclined to vice and crime. The statute

went beyond the practice of many gun

control statutes by not only prohibiting

the carrying of concealed weapons, but

also requiring a permit for ownership or

purchase of weapons. It is not without

significance that the first person

8

convicted under the statute was a

member of one of the suspect classes, an

Italian immigrant.

Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Never

Intended to Apply to the White Population: Firearms

Regulation and Racial Disparity - The Redeemed

South's Legacy of a National Jurisprudence, 70 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1307, 1333–34 (1995).

Besides the social circumstances surrounding

the passing of the Sullivan Law, the enforcement of

the law after its enactment provides more evidence of

its goal of keeping firearms beyond the reach of

recent immigrants from Italy and elsewhere in

Europe. Marino Rossi, the first person sentenced to

prison under the Sullivan Act, was an Italian man

who carried a .38 caliber revolver in his pocket for

self-protection. First Conviction Under Weapon Law,

N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 1911). Rossi, who maintained

that he had no intention of using the weapon

wrongfully, was sentenced to prison for a year. Id.

During the trial, the judge echoed stereotypes about

Italian immigrants and infamously declared, “It is

unfortunate that this is the custom with you and

your kind, and that fact, combined with your

irascible nature, furnishes much of the criminal

business in this country.” Id.

A contemporary editorial appearing in the

New York Times confirmed the bias behind the law.

The paper of record stated that “the police have

suitably impressed the minds of aliens in New York

that the Sullivan law forbids their bearing

9

arms[.]” The Rossi Pistol Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29,

1911) (emphasis added).

The animus is clear. The Court should strike

down the Sullivan Law, so that all New Yorkers can

exercise their fundamental right to bear arms.

III.

Interest-Balancing

Tests

Are

Inappropriate in Second Amendment

Jurisprudence Because the Government

Always Wins.

Since Heller and McDonald, lower courts have

largely ignored this Court’s admonition against

interest-balancing and done exactly that. See, e.g.,

Young v. Hawaii, 992 F.3d 765, 784 (9th Cir. 2021). 2

Interest-balancing tests borrowed from other

areas of law are poorly suited for the Second

Amendment because the government always wins,

2 The Ninth Circuit stated the following complex of balancing

tests in its en banc decision in Young: “If the challenged restriction burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment—either because the regulation is neither outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment, nor presumptively lawful—we move to the second step of the analysis and determine

the appropriate level of scrutiny. We have understood Heller to

require one of three levels of scrutiny: If a regulation amounts

to a destruction of the Second Amendment right, it is unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny; a law that implicates the

core of the Second Amendment right and severely burdens that

right receives strict scrutiny; and in other cases in which Second

Amendment rights are affected in some lesser way, we apply

intermediate scrutiny.” 992 F.3d at 784 (cleaned up).

10

thus rendering the right to keep and bear arms

largely illusory.

The Government will always be able to

articulate public policy arguments and governmental

interests contrary to allowing citizens to bear arms

outside their homes.

Those policy choices are,

however, off the table given the adoption of the

Second and Fourteenth Amendments.

Such

arguments deserve no weight. Heller, 554 U.S. at

636 (“[T]he enshrinement of constitutional rights

necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”).

The majority opinion in Heller was explicit on

this point, but most lower courts have simply

declined to follow it:

We know of no other enumerated

constitutional

right

whose

core

protection has been subjected to a

freestanding

“interest-balancing”

approach. The very enumeration of the

right takes out of the hands of

government—even the Third Branch of

Government—the power to decide on a

case-by-case basis whether the right is

really worth insisting upon.

A

constitutional guarantee subject to

future judges’ assessments of its

usefulness

is

no

constitutional

guarantee at all. Constitutional rights

are enshrined with the scope they were

understood to have when the people

adopted them, whether or not future

legislatures or (yes) even future judges

11

think that scope too broad. We would

not apply an “interest-balancing”

approach to the prohibition of a peaceful

neo-Nazi march through Skokie.

Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35.

The decision below likewise ignored Heller’s

admonition against interest-balancing. The Second

Circuit wrote: “As this Court has recently reaffirmed,

New York’s proper cause requirement does not

violate the Second Amendment.” N.Y. State Rifle &

Pistol Ass'n v. Beach, 818 F. App’x 99, 100 (2d Cir.

2020). The court relied on its prior decision in

Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81, without elaboration.

Kachalsky provides a fine example of why interest

balancing serves only to stack the deck in favor the

state. The court first arbitrarily decided to apply

intermediate scrutiny, then jumped to the obligatory

conclusion that the state indeed had an “important

government interest”:

Because our tradition so clearly indicates a substantial role for state regulation of the carrying of firearms in public,

we conclude that intermediate scrutiny

is appropriate in this case. The proper

cause requirement passes constitutional

muster if it is substantially related to

the achievement of an important governmental interest.

As the parties agree, New York has

substantial,

indeed

compelling,

governmental interests in public safety

12

and crime prevention.

The only

question then is whether the proper

cause requirement is substantially

related to these interests. We conclude

that it is.

Id. at 96–97 (citations omitted and emphasis added).

Needless to say, the Second Circuit concluded that

the Sullivan law is in fact sufficiently related. Id. at

98 (“Restricting handgun possession in public to

those who have a reason to possess the weapon for a

lawful purpose is substantially related to New York’s

interests in public safety and crime prevention.”).

The Second Circuit’s decision to apply

intermediate scrutiny effectively ended the case.

That shows why such an interest-balancing approach

is unworkable if the right to keep and bear arms is to

be a meaningful restriction on government power.

See Young, 992 F.3d at 784; Woollard v. Gallagher,

712 F.3d 865, 882 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[U]nder the

applicable intermediate scrutiny standard, the State

has demonstrated that the good-and-substantialreason requirement is reasonably adapted to

Maryland’s significant interests in protecting public

safety and preventing crime.”).

IV.

The Court Should Reiterate That the

Second Amendment Test Turns on Text,

History, and Tradition.

Because no balancing test can protect Second

Amendment rights, the Court should clarify that the

correct standard of review for Second Amendment

challenges is the “text, history, and tradition” test set

13

forth in Heller. Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent in

Heller II makes the case quite cogently:

In

short,

I

do

not

see

how Heller and McDonald can

be

squared with application of strict or intermediate scrutiny to D.C.’s gun laws.

The majority opinion here refers to the

levels of scrutiny as “familiar.” Maj. Op.

at 40. As one commentator has stated,

however, “the search for the familiar

may be leading courts and commentators astray: The central disagreement

in Heller was a debate not about strict

scrutiny and rational basis review but

rather about categoricalism and balancing.” Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment

Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 379.

That disagreement in Heller was resolved in favor of categoricalism — with

the categories defined by text, history,

and tradition — and against balancing

tests such as strict or intermediate scrutiny or reasonableness.

Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1282

(D.C. Cir. 2011) (footnote omitted) (Kavanaugh, J.,

dissenting).

New York’s Sullivan law is effectively a blanket ban on bearing arms outside home. Such a ban

must fall under any “text, history, and tradition”

analysis. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d

650, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Indeed, all of the circuits

14

settling on a level of scrutiny to apply to good-reason

laws explicitly declined to use Heller I's historical

method to determine how rigorously the Amendment

applies beyond the home.”). Justice Alito’s concurrence in Caetano v. Massachusetts, where he followed

the text, history, and tradition approach to conclude

that the Massachusetts ban on possession of a stun

gun violated the Second Amendment provides further

support:

The state court repeatedly framed the

question before it as whether a particular weapon was in common use at the

time of enactment of the Second

Amendment. In Heller, we emphatically rejected such a formulation. We

found the argument that only those

arms in existence in the 18th century

are protected by the Second Amendment not merely wrong, but bordering

on the frivolous. Instead, we held that

the Second Amendment extends, prima

facie, to all instruments that constitute

bearable arms, even those that were not

inexistence at the time of the founding. It is hard to imagine language

speaking more directly to the point. Yet

the Supreme Judicial Court did not so

much as mention it.

Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411, 136 S. Ct.

1027, 1030 (2016) (cleaned up).

The Court should expressly reaffirm its prior

ruling and make it clear that no form of balancing

15

test is ever appropriate to adjudicate a challenge

brought under the Second Amendment.

CONCLUSION

The Court should reverse the judgment of the

Second Circuit and restore the Second Amendment

to its rightful place as a guarantee for all Americans.

Respectfully submitted,

Brian D. Schmalzbach

Counsel of Record

Matthew D. Fender

John J. Woolard

MCGUIREWOODS LLP

Gateway Plaza

800 East Canal Street

Richmond, VA 23219

T: (804) 775-4746

bschmalzbach@mcguirewoods.com

mfender@mcguirewoods.com

jwoolard@mcguirewoods.com

Counsel for Amici Curiae

July 19, 2021

1a

APPENDIX

THOSE JOINING IN AMICI CURIAE BRIEF

The following members of the United States

House of Representatives join in this brief:

Representative Claudia Tenney (NY-22, R)

Representative Robert B. Aderholt (AL-4, R)

Representative Rick W. Allen (GA-12, R)

Representative Mark E. Amodei (NV-2, R)

Representative Kelly Armstrong (ND-AL, R)

Representative Jodey C. Arrington (TX-19, R)

Representative Brian Babin, D.D.S. (TX-36, R)

Representative James R. Baird (IN-4, R)

Representative Troy Balderson (OH-12, R)

Representative Jim Banks (IN-3, R)

Representative Andy Barr (KY-6, R)

Representative Cliff Bentz (OR-2, R)

Representative Jack Bergman (MI-1, R)

Representative Stephanie Bice (OK-5, R)

Representative Andy Biggs (AZ-5, R)

Representative Gus M. Bilirakis (FL-12, R)

Representative Dan Bishop (NC-9, R)

Representative Lauren Boebert (CO-3, R)

Representative Mo Brooks (AL-5, R)

Representative Larry Bucshon, M.D. (IN-8, R)

Representative Ted Budd (NC-13, R)

Representative Tim Burchett (TN-2, R)

Representative Michael C. Burgess, M.D. (TX-26, R)

Representative Ken Calvert (CA-42, R)

Representative Kat Cammack (FL-3, R)

Representative Jerry L. Carl (AL-1, R)

Representative Earl L.”Buddy” Carter (GA-1, R)

Representative John R. Carter (TX-31, R)

2a

Representative Madison Cawthorn (NC-11, R)

Representative Steve Chabot (OH-1, R)

Representative Liz Cheney (WY-AL, R)

Representative Ben Cline (VA-6, R)

Representative Michael Cloud (TX-27, R)

Representative Andrew S. Clyde (GA-9, R)

Representative Tom Cole (OK-4, R)

Representative James Comer (KY-1, R)

Representative Eric A. "Rick" Crawford (AR-1, R)

Representative Dan Crenshaw (TX-2, R)

Representative John R. Curtis (UT-3, R)

Representative Warren Davidson (OH-8, R)

Representative Scott DesJarlais (TN-4, R)

Representative Byron Donalds (FL-19, R)

Representative Jeff Duncan (SC-3, R)

Representative Neal P. Dunn M.D. (FL-2, R)

Representative Tom Emmer (MN-6, R)

Representative Ron Estes (KS-4, R)

Representative Pat Fallon (TX-4, R)

Representative Randy Feenstra (IA-4, R)

Representative Drew Ferguson (GA-3, R)

Representative Michelle Fischbach (MN-7, R)

Representative Scott Fitzgerald (WI-5, R)

Representative Chuck Fleischmann (TN-3, R)

Representative Virginia Foxx (NC-5, R)

Representative Scott Franklin (FL-15, R)

Representative Russ Fulcher (ID-1, R)

Representative Mike Gallagher (WI-8, R)

Representative Andrew R. Garbarino (NY-2, R)

Representative Mike Garcia (CA-25, R)

Representative Bob Gibbs (OH-7, R)

Representative Louie Gohmert (TX-1, R)

Representative Tony Gonzales (TX-23, R)

Representative Bob Good (VA-5, R)

Representative Lance Gooden (TX-5, R)

3a

Representative Paul A. Gosar, D.D.S. (AZ-4, R)

Representative Kay Granger (TX-12, R)

Representative Sam Graves (MO-6, R)

Representative Mark E. Green, M.D. (TN-7, R)

Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene (GA-14, R)

Representative H. Morgan Griffith (VA-9, R)

Representative Glenn Grothman (WI-6, R)

Representative Michael Guest (MS-3, R)

Representative Brett Guthrie (KY-2, R)

Representative Jim Hagedorn (MN-1, R)

Representative Andy Harris, M.D. (MD-1, R)

Representative Diana Harshbarger (TN-1, R)

Representative Vicky Hartzler (MO-4, R)

Representative Kevin Hern (OK-1, R)

Representative Yvette Herrell (NM-2, R)

Representative Jaime Herrera Beutler (WA-3, R)

Representative Jody Hice (GA-10, R)

Representative Clay Higgins (LA-3, R)

Representative French Hill (AR-2, R

Representative Ashley Hinson (IA-1, R)

Representative Trey Hollingsworth (IN-9, R)

Representative Richard Hudson (NC-8, R)

Representative Bill Huizenga (MI-2, R)

Representative Darrell Issa (CA-50, R)

Representative Ronny L. Jackson (TX-13, R)

Representative Chris Jacobs (NY-27, R)

Representative Bill Johnson (OH-6, R)

Representative Dusty Johnson (SD-AL, R)

Representative Mike Johnson (LA-4, R)

Representative Jim Jordan (OH-4, R)

Representative John Joyce, M.D. (PA-13, R)

Representative John Katko (NY-24, R)

Representative Fred Keller (PA-12, R)

Representative Mike Kelly (PA-16, R)

Representative Trent Kelly (MS-1, R)

4a

Representative Darin LaHood (IL-18, R)

Representative Doug LaMalfa (CA-1, R)

Representative Doug Lamborn (CO-5, R)

Representative Robert E. Latta (OH-5, R)

Representative Jake LaTurner (KS-2, R)

Representative Debbie Lesko (AZ-8, R)

Representative Julia Letlow (LA-5, R)

Representative Barry Loudermilk (GA-11, R)

Representative Billy Long (MO-7, R)

Representative Frank Lucas (OK-3, R)

Representative Nancy Mace (SC-1, R)

Representative Tracey Mann (KS-1, R)

Representative Kevin McCarthy (CA-23, R)

Representative Michael T. McCaul (TX-10, R)

Representative Tom McClintock (CA-4, R)

Representative Patrick McHenry (NC-10, R)

Representative David B. McKinley (WV-1, R)

Representative Cathy McMorris Rodgers (WA-5, R)

Representative Dan Meuser (PA-9, R)

Representative Carol D. Miller (WV-3, R)

Representative Mary E. Miller (IL-15, R)

Representative Mariannette Miller-Meeks, M.D.

(IA-2, R)

Representative John R. Moolenaar (MI-4, R)

Representative Alex X. Mooney (WV-2, R)

Representative Barry Moore (AL-2, R)

Representative Blake Moore (UT-1, R)

Representative Markwayne Mullin (OK-2, R)

Representative Gregory F. Murphy, M.D. (NC-3, R)

Representative Troy Nehls (TX-22, R)

Representative Dan Newhouse (WA-4, R)

Representative Ralph Norman (SC-5, R)

Representative Jay Obernolte (CA-8, R)

Representative Burgess Owens (UT-4, R)

Representative Steven M. Palazzo (MS-4, R)

5a

Representative Gary Palmer (AL-6, R)

Representative Greg Pence (IN-6, R)

Representative Scott Perry (PA-10, R)

Representative August Pfluger (TX-11, R)

Representative Bill Posey (FL-8, R)

Representative Tom Reed (NY-23, R)

Representative Guy Reschenthaler (PA-14, R)

Representative Tom Rice (SC-7, R)

Representative Mike D. Rogers (AL-3, R)

Representative John Rose (TN-6, R)

Representative David Rouzer (NC-7, R)

Representative John Rutherford (FL-4, R)

Representative Steve Scalise (LA-1, R)

Representative Austin Scott (GA-8, R)

Representative Pete Sessions (TX-17, R)

Representative Adrian Smith (NE-3, R)

Representative Jason Smith (MO-8, R)

Representative Lloyd Smucker (PA-11, R)

Representative Victoria Spartz (IN-5, R)

Representative Pete Stauber (MN-8, R)

Representative Elise Stefanik (NY-21, R)

Representative Bryan Steil (WI-1, R)

Representative W. Gregory Steube (FL-17, R)

Representative Chris Stewart (UT-2, R)

Representative Tom Tiffany (WI-7, R)

Representative Glenn 'GT' Thompson (PA-15, R)

Representative William R. Timmons, IV (SC-4, R)

Representative David G. Valadao (CA-21, R)

Representative Jeff Van Drew (NJ-2, R)

Representative Beth Van Duyne (TX-24, R)

Representative Ann Wagner (MO-2, R)

Representative Tim Walberg (MI-7, R)

Representative Jackie Walorski (IN-2, R)

Representative Michael Waltz (FL-6, R)

Representative Randy K. Weber (TX-14, R)

6a

Representative Daniel Webster (FL-11, R)

Representative Brad R. Wenstrup (OH-2, R)

Representative Bruce Westerman (AR-4, R)

Representative Roger Williams (TX-25, R)

Representative Joe Wilson (SC-2, R)

Representative Robert J. Wittman (VA-1, R)

Representative Steve Womack (AR-3, R)

Representative Don Young (AK-AL, R)

Representative Lee Zeldin (NY-1, R)