Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Reginald Charles Harvey, Petitioner v. Tennessee, et al.

(2 of 2)

U-- •

Case No. 19-6434

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ORDER

REGINALD CHARLES HARVEY

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE; OFFICER MARK BENDER, Badge #930; OFFICER ALEXANDER

EGO; OFFICER JANE DOE; INVESTIGATOR JOHN DOE #1, Chattanooga Police

Department; ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY AMANDA MORRIS; GENERAL

SESSION CRIMINAL COURT; INVESTIGATOR JOHN DOE #2, Chattanooga Police

Department; OFFICER [UNKNOWN] WISE, Badge # 1690

Defendants - Appellees

Appellant having previously been advised that failure to satisfy certain specified

obligations would result in dismissal of the case for want of prosecution and it appearing that the

appellant has failed to satisfy the following obligation:

The proper fee was not paid by November 10, 2020,

It is therefore ORDERED that this cause be, and it hereby is, dismissed for want of

prosecution.

ENTERED PURSUANT TO RULE 45(a),

RULES OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

Issued: January 08, 2021

\

V-.-'w V

No. 19-6434

FILED

Oct 27, 2020

DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

REGINALD CHARLES HARVEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al„

Defenuants-Appellees.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

/

ORDER

Before: McKEAGUE, DONALD, and READLER, Circuit Judges.

Reginald Charles Harvey, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se, petitions this court to

rehear its June 18, 2020, order denying his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal from a

district court judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

He also moves for appointment of counsel.

Harvey’s petition does not show that the court overlooked or misapprehended any point of

law or fact. See Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(2). Accordingly, the petition for rehearing and motion for

appointment of counsel are DENIED.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

m\ iPf\

D, , j-i23?.r3 1

i\huhii b hiy

No. 19-6434

FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

REGINALD CHARLES HARVEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Jun 18, 2020

DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk

ORDER

Before: COOK, Circuit Judge.

Reginald Charles Harvey, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals a district court

judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U-S.C. § 1983. The district

court denied Harvey permission to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal by certifying that an appeal

would not be taken in good faith. See 28 U-S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Harvey now requests permission

from this court to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5).

On October 18, 2017, Harvey mailed a § 1983 civil rights complaint from prison,

identifying the following defendants: the State of Tennessee; Officers Mark Bender, Alexander

Ego, and Wise; three unknown Jane and John Doe officers; and Assistant District Attorney

Amanda Morris. Harvey alleged that, on October 19, 2015, Wise served him with an eviction

notice. Harvey informed Wise that he “was the legal owner of the property” and “refused to

vacate” the property. When Wise called other officers for assistance, Harvey tried to show the

officers documents to verify his ownership of the property, “but they refused to acknowledge

anything” he said or showed them. A scuffle ensued between Harvey and the officers. Ultimately,

Harvey was arrested, detained, and charged with assault, resisting arrest, false identification,

No. 19-6434

-2-

obstruction of service of process, criminal impersonation, and aggravated criminal trespass. All

charges were dismissed on August 23, 2016.

Harvey alleged that the defendants conspired to violate his civil and constitutional rights,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241; deprived him of his civil and constitutional rights in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 242; violated Uniform Commercial Code 3-505 and 3-401; violated his rights under

42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983, and 1986; and violated his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. Harvey also alleged claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, kidnapping, illegal search

and seizure, excessive force, and assault and battery. He sought monetary and injunctive relief.

On initial screening, the district court concluded that the complaint was time-barred and

sua sponte dismissed it under 28 U-S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A for failure to state a claim on

which relief may be granted. The district court reasoned that a one-year statute of limitations

applies to § 1983 actions brought in Tennessee; that the incident about which Harvey complained

occurred on October 29, 2015, when he was arrested and allegedly subjected to an illegal search

and seizure and other alleged civil rights and constitutional violations; that “[t]he latest date on

which the statute of limitations” for Harvey’s claims could have begun to run was August 23,

2016, when the criminal charges lodged against him as a result of the October 29, 2015, incident

were dismissed; and that his October 18, 2017, complaint was untimely because it was filed more

than one year after the criminal charges were dismissed. Harvey filed a motion for reconsideration,

which the district court construed as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion to alter or

amend the judgment and denied. Harvey filed a timely appeal.

This court may grant a motion to proceed in forma pauperis if it determines that an appeal

would be taken in good faith and the movant is indigent. See Owens v. Keeling, 461 F.3d 763, 776

(6th Cir. 2006). A frivolous appeal, one that “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact,”

would not be taken in good faith. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U-S. 319, 325 (1989); see also

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).

Although Harvey based his claims on various sources of law, all of his claims essentially

alleged violations of his civil and constitutional rights and must be construed as falling under

■

'■

V

r-V

'• * v ;■ ^

7->:;

r

V'

No. 19-6434

-3-

§ 1983. For § 1983 actions, federal courts apply the state personal-injury statute of limitations.

Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). The appropriate statute of limitations for personalinjury actions arising in Tennessee and “brought under the federal civil rights statutes” is one year.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(1)(B); Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., Ill F.3d

838, 843 (6th Cir. 2015) (discussing former version of Tennessee statute). The statute of

limitations “starts to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the

basis of his action.” Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’tof Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007)

(citation omitted).

For the reasons stated by the district court, Flarvey’s § 1983 complaint is time-barred by

the applicable one-year statute of limitations. Because Harvey’s complaint is untimely, an appeal

in this case would be frivolous. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.

Accordingly, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED. Unless Harvey pays

the $505 filing fee to the district court within thirty days of the entry of this order, this appeal will

be dismissed for want of prosecution.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

0

r\

\

%

J

DEC 0 2 MW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

REGINALD CHARLES HARVEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, MARK

BENDER, P. EGO, JANE DOE, JOHN

DOE #1, AMANDA MORRIS,

GENERAL SESSIONS CRIMINAL

COURT, JOHN DOE #2, AND OFFICER

WISE,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No.

1:17-CV-297-CLC-CHS

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

On October 9, 2019, the Court dismissed this pro se prisoner’s civil rights action filed

pursuant to § 1983 as time-barred [Docs. 32 and 33]. In doing so, the Court noted that a one-year

statute of limitations applied to Plaintiffs claims, that the latest date on which any of Plaintiff s

claims accrued was August 23, 2016, and that as Plaintiff had not filed his claims until October

18, 2017, they were clearly time-barred, and the Court therefore denied Petitioner’s pending

motions as moot [Doc. 32 pp. 2-3; Doc. 33].

Plaintiff has now filed an “objection” to the Court’s order dismissing this case, in which

he states that the order is not signed [Doc. 34], and a motion for reconsideration of this dismissal

[Doc. 35], which the Court liberally construes as a motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to

Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Williams v. Thaler, 602 F.3d 291, 303-04

(5th Cir. 2010) (providing that “[wjlien a litigant files a motion seeking a change in judgment,

courts typically determine the appropriate motion based on whether the litigant filed the motion

within Rule 59(e)’s time limit”).

Case l:17-cv-00297-CLC-CHS Document 36 Filed 11/26/19 Page 1 of 3 PagelD #: 255

* :

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief based on either of these

filings and they will be DENIED.

I.

OBJECTION

First, while Plaintiff objects to the Court’s order dismissing this case because he states that

■ it does not contain a signature in violation of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Id.],

the order contains the Court’s electronic signature that the Court routinely uses in its orders [Doc.

33 p. 1], Moreover, Rule 11 does not apply to the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. Accordingly, to the

extent that Plaintiff seeks relief from the Court based on this objection [Doc. 33], it is DENIED.

II.

RULE 59(E)

In his motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff reiterates his claims, asserts that the applicable

statute of limitations for his claims is two years, and states that his complaint is therefore timely

and not moot [Doc. 35 pp. 1-8]. “A district court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend

judgment only if there is: ‘(1) a clear error °f law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an

intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.’” Henderson v.

Walled Lake Consol. Schs., 469 F.3d 479, 496 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Intera Corp. v. Henderson,

428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th Cir. 2005)). It is improper, however, for a party to use such a motion “to

relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised

[earlier].” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 486 n.5 (2008) (citation omitted).

Moreover, a district court should gram such relief sparingly. Ira Green, Inc. v. Military Sales &

Serv. Co., 775 F.3d 12, 28 (1st Cir. 2014).

As the Court previously explained, the statute of limitations that applies to Plaintiff s

claims is one year, not two, and, as such, Plaintiffs claims are untimely [Doc. 32 pp. 2-3].

Moreover, Plaintiffs mistaken belief that he had two years to file his claims is not a ground for

2

Case l:17-cv-00297-CLC-CHS Document 36 Filed 11/26/19 Page 2 of 3 PagelD #: 256

1

u

relief under Rule 59(e), nor is it grounds for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See

Taylor v. Palmer, 623 Fed. App’x 783, 789 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that “it is well-established

that a mistaken belief in calculating the statute of limitations does not constitute an extraordinary

circumstance sufficient to warrant equitable tolling”); Griffin v. Rogers, 399 F.3d 626, 637 (6th

Cir. 2005) (holding that “ignorance of the law alone is not sufficient to warrant equitable tolling”).

As such, Plaintiffs § 1983 complaint was subject to dismissal as untimely and the Court therefore

denied Plaintiffs pending motions as moot [Id.].

Plaintiff has not established that the Court’s dismissal of this case resulted from a clear

error of law or that he is otherwise entitled to relief under Ruie 59(e). Accordingly, Plaintiffs

motion for reconsideration [Doc. 35] is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

1st

CURTIS L. COLLIER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

3

Case l:17-cv-00297-CLC-CHS Document 36 Filed 11/26/19 Page 3 of 3 PagelD #: 257

*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

REGINALD CHARLES HARVEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, MARK

BENDER, P. EGO, JANE DOE, JOHN

DOE #1, AMANDA MORRIS,

GENERAL SESSIONS CRIMINAL

COURT, JOHN DOE #2, AND OFFICER

WISE,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No.:

1:17-CV-297-CLC-CHS

)

)

')

)

JUDGMENT ORDER

In accordance with the accompanying memorandum opinion, even liberally construing the

complaint in favor of Plaintiff, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under

§ 1983. Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915(A) and Plaintiffs pending motions [Docs. 24, 2, 29, 30, and 31] are DENIED as moot.

Because the Court CERTIFIED in the memorandum opinion that any appeal from this order

would not be taken in good faith, should Plaintiff file a notice of appeal, he is DENIED leave to

appeal in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24. The Clerk is

DIRECTED to close the file.

SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

Isl

CURTIS L. COLLIER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case l:17-cv-00297-CLC-CHS Document 33 Filed 10/09/19 Page 1 of 2 PagelD #: 236

'.

I

\

ENTERED AS A JUDGMENT

s/ John L. Medearis

CLERK OF COURT

i.'

2

Case l:17-cv-00297-CLC-CHS Document 33 Filed 10/09/19 Page 2 of 2 PagelD#:237

t

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

REGINALD CHARLES HARVEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF TENNESSEE, MARK

BENDER, P. EGO, JANE DOE, JOHN

DOE #1, AMANDA MORRIS,

GENER AL SESSIONS CRIMINAL

COURT, JOHN DOE #2, AND OFFICER

WISE,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

*

No.:

L17-CV-297-CLC-CHS

■)

)

)

)

)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff is a pro se prisoner who filed his complaint for violation of his civil rights pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this action on October 18, 2017, based upon allegations that Defendants

used excessive force against him and committed other improper acts arising out of an incident on

October 29, 2015, in which various officers attempted to force Plaintiff to vacate certain property

pursuant to an eviction notice and carried out what Plaintiff alleges was an unconstitutional search

and seizure of his property [Doc. 2 at 9-25], Based on this incident, Plaintiff relies on Uniform

Commercial Code 3-401 to assert that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983, 1986, and

241,18 U.S.C. § 242, and his rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments by falsely

arresting and imprisoning him and illegally searching him and seizing his property without a

warrant [Doc. 2 at 19-23]. While Plaintiff was charged with a number of crimes arising out of

this incident, all such charges were dismissed on August 23, 2016 [Doc. 2 at 31]. For the reasons

set forth below, however, the complaint is untimely and therefore fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted under § 1983. As such, this action will be DISMISSED.

Case l:17-cv-00297-CLC-CHS Document 32 Filed 10/09/19 Page 1 of 4 PagelD #: 232

:V —

I.

SCREENING STANDARD

Under the PLRA, district courts must screen prisoner complaints and shall, at any time,

sua sponte dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are

against a defendant who is immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); Benson

v. O’Brian, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard articulated by the Supreme

Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and

1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)." Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA,

a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Courts

liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold them to a less stringent

standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). .

In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that he was

deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Polk

County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 315 (1981).

II.

ANALYSIS

District courts apply state statutes of limitations to § 1983 claims. Harris v. United States,

422 F.3d 322, 331 (6th Cir. 2005). Tennessee applies a one-year statute of limitations to § 1983

actions. Zundel v. Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 281 (6th Cir. 2012); Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-104(a)(l).

Federal law, however, determines “[t]he date on which the statute of limitations begins to run in a

§ 1983 action.” Eidson v. State of Tenn. Dept, of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634-35 (6th

Cir. 2007) (citing Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 1997)).

2

Case l:17-cv-00297-CLC-CHS Document 32 Filed 10/09/18 Page 2 of 4 PagelD#:233

■'i

The statute of limitations for many of Plaintiff s civil rights claims began to run on October

29, 2015, the date of Plaintiffs arrest and the alleged illegal search and seizure of Plaintiff s

property without a warrant. Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir 2007) (holding that a claim

for excessive force under § 1983 arising out of the effectuation of an arrest accrues at the time of

arrest); Michel v. City ofAkron, 278 F. App’x 477, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a Fourth

Amendment claim under § 1983 begins to run at the time of the search and seizure); Otyvorth v.

Vanderploeg, 61 Fed. App’x 163, 165 (6th Cir. 2003) tholdinethat the statute of limitations for a

due process claim began to run when the plaintiff had reason to know that he was subject to certain

restrictions on a property he inherited).

The latest date on which the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs other civil rights claims

began to run would be August 23,2016, however, as that is the date on which the criminal charges

"

L

••

against Plaintiff based on the incident in the complaint were dismissed [Doc. 2 at 31]. See Tenm

Code. Ann..§ 28-3-104(a); see also King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that

/

the statute of limitations for a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 did not begin to run until

the date on which a-charge is dismissed); Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996)

(holding that the statute of limitations for false imprisonment claim under § 1983 begins to run

when plaintiff is released from false imprisonment). ^

As such, all of Plaintiff s claims, which he filed on October 18, 2017 [Doc. 2 at 26], are

clearly time-barred.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, even liberally construing the complaint in favor of Plaintiff,

it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983. Accordingly, this action

3

Case l:17-cv-00297-CLC-CHS Document 32 Filed 10/09/19 Page 3 of 4 PagelD #: 234

^

■

«

' i

5

will be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A) and Plaintiffs pending

motions [Docs. 24, 2, 29, 30, and 31] will be DENIED as moot.

The Court CERTIFIES that any appeal from this action would not be taken in good faith

'and would be totally frivolous. See Fed. R. App. P. 24.

AN APPROPRIATE ORDER WILL ENTER.

Isl

CURTIS L. COLLIER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4

Case l:17-cv-00297-CLC-CHS Document 32 Filed 10/09/19 Page 4 of 4 PagelD#:235

\

• f

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT CHATTANOOGA

REGINALD CHARLES HARVEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

STATE OF TENNESEE, el al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

No.:

1:17-cv-297-CLC-CHS

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

This is a pro se prisoner’s civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Reginald

Charles Harvey (“Plaintiff’). Upon receipt of Plaintiff s complaint [Doc. 2] and motion for leave

to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1], the Court entered a deficiency order [Doc. 14] notifying

Plaintiff that he had failed to file a certified copy of his inmate trust account for the previous sixmonth period as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). In response, Plaintiff timely submitted a

second in forma pauperis motion with the inmate trust account certification attached [Doc. 20]. It

appears from the newly submitted motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and certification

l

that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28

,

U.S.C. § 1915, Plaintiffs second in forma pauperis motion [Doc. 20] is GRANTED. Plaintiffs

original motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1] is DENIED as moot.

Because Plaintiff is an inmate in the Jenkins Correctional Center, he is ASSESSED the

civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff s inmate trust account will be directed to

submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Chattanooga, Tennessee 37402, twenty percent (20%) of '

Plaintiffs preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiffs trust account for the

preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the full

Case l:17-cv-00297-CLC-CHS Document21 Filed 02/11/19 Page lot2 PagelD#:183

filing fee ofthree hundred fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been

paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

To ensure compliance with this fee-collection procedure, the Clerk is DIRECTED to mail

a copy of this order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now

confined. The Clerk is also DIRECTED to furnish a copy of this order to the Court’s financial

deputy. This order shall be placed in Plaintiffs prison file and follow him if he is transferred to

another correctional institution.

Plaintiff is NOTIFIED that the Court WILL NOT consider any amendments and/or

supplements to the complaint or any other kind of motion for relief until after the Court has

screened the complaint pursuant to the Prisoner Reform Litigation Act, see, e.g., 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A), which the Court will do as soon as practicable. Accordingly, the

Court will automatically deny any requests to amend or supplement the complaint and/or motions

filed before the Court has completed this screening.

Plaintiff is ORDERED to immediately inform the Court and Defendants of any address

changes in writing. Pursuant to Local Rule 83.13, it is the duty of a pro se party to promptly notify

the Clerk and the other parties to the proceedings of any change in his or her address, to monitor

the progress of the case, and to prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13

Failure to provide a correct address to this Court within fourteen days of any change in address

may result in the dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

Isl

CURTIS L. COLLIER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

Case l:17-cv-00297-CLC-CHS Document 21 Filed 02/11/19 Page 2 of 2 PagelD#:184