Reply Brief — Paul Xavier Espinoza, Petitioner v. United States

No. 20-8275

In The Supreme Court Of The United States

Paul Xavier Espinoza, Desmond Quinntrail Hayes,

Mitchell Pulido, and Adolph Vytautas Stankus,

v.

Petitioners,

United States of America,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Reply Brief for the Petitioners

RENE L. VALLADARES

Federal Public Defender

*Wendi L. Overmyer

*Amy B. Cleary

Assistant Federal Public Defenders

Office of the Federal Public Defender

411 E. Bonneville, Ste. 250

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 388-6577

Wendi_Overmyer@fd.org

Amy_Cleary@fd.org

*Counsel for Petitioners

Dated: October 21, 2021

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ........................................................................................................... ii

Table of Authorities ...................................................................................................... iii

Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari.......................................................... 1

I. The categorical approach renders the government’s offense conduct

recitation irrelevant to the Question Presented. ............................................... 2

II. The Hobbs Act robbery statute’s plain language is overbroad......................... 3

III. The government’s response fails to acknowledge this Court’s recent

interpretation of the physical force clause in Borden, which further

demonstrates the need for review. ..................................................................... 5

IV. The government does not dispute that proper interpretation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(c) is of exceptional, national importance. ................................................. 7

Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 8

ii

Table of Authorities

Federal Constitution

Page(s)

U.S. Const. amend. V ................................................................................................... 1

Federal Cases

Borden v. United States,

141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) ......................................................................................... 5, 6

Descamps v. United States,

570 U.S. 254 (2013) ............................................................................................. 2, 4

Izumi v. U.S. Philips Corp.,

510 U.S. 27 (1993) ................................................................................................... 4

Johnson v. United States,

576 U.S. 591 (2015) ................................................................................................. 2

Mathis v. United States,

136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) ......................................................................................... 2, 4

Moncrieffe v. Holder,

569 U.S. 184 (2013) ................................................................................................. 2

United States Dominguez,

954 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2020),

pet. for cert. pending, No. 20-1000 (filed Jan. 21, 2021) ........................................ 3

United States v. García-Ortiz,

904 F.3d 102 (1st Cir. 2018) ................................................................................... 6

United States v. Gray,

260 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2001) ............................................................................... 6

United States v. Grisel,

488 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) ............................................................... 3, 4

United States v. Davis,

139 S. Ct. 2319, (2019) ........................................................................................ 2, 4

Federal Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 924 .................................................................................................... passim

18 U.S.C. § 1951 ............................................................................................... 1, 4, 5, 7

iii

18 U.S.C. § 3559 ........................................................................................................... 7

18 U.S.C. § 3583 ........................................................................................................... 7

Supreme Court Rules

Supreme Court Rule 24(1)(a) ................................................................................... 4, 5

Other

Brief for the United States in Opposition,

Steward v. United States, No. 19-8043 (U.S. May 21, 2020) ................................. 3

Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions,

§ 8.143A Hobbs Act—Robbery (Mar. 2021) ............................................................ 6

U.S. Sent. Comm’n,

Quick Facts: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Firearms Offenses (May 2021) ........................... 7

iv

Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Certiorari

Petitioners Paul Xavier Espinoza, Desmond Quinntrail Hayes, Mitchell

Pulido, and Adolph Vytautas Stankus have jointly petitioned for a writ of certiorari

as to whether the federal Circuits now interpret Hobbs Act robbery, 18 U.S.C. §

1951(a), too narrowly and against its plain language by requiring violent physical

force as an offense element. This question is pressing given United States v. Davis,

139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), which holds the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) residual clause is

unconstitutionally vague, violating the Due Process Clause, and which the

government does not dispute is retroactive to cases on collateral review like

Petitioners’. U.S. Const. amend. V; Government Brief in Opposition (Gov. Brief) at

7-11.

Because only the physical force clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) remains, Circuits

now interpret offenses that used to be caged within the residual clause, such as

Hobbs Act robbery, to make them “fit” within the physical force clause. The

resulting unprecedented narrowing of Hobbs Act robbery to include only violent

physical force—which the Circuits did not require of Hobbs Act robbery before

Davis—requires review by this Court. The federal circuit consensus that Hobbs Act

robbery necessarily requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent

physical force conflicts with the plain language of 18 U.S.C § 1951. It is imperative

this Court decide the proper interpretation of Hobbs Act robbery so defendants are

not mandatorily incarcerated for firearms offenses that do not truly fit the § 924(c)

statutory definition.

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I.

The categorical approach renders the government’s offense conduct recitation

irrelevant to the Question Presented.

This Court, in both Johnson and Davis, specifically requires applying the

categorical approach for crime-of-violence analysis, as established by Taylor and its

progeny. Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 596 (2015); United States v.

Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2326-36 (2019); See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602; see also

Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 263-64 (2013); Mathis v. United States,

136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). In applying categorical analysis, courts neither

examine the underlying facts nor make a sufficiency-of-the-evidence determination.

Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2251-52 (reiterating rules for categorical and modified

categorical analysis, prohibiting consideration of “the particular facts underlying

the [] convictions”). How a defendant committed the offense “makes no difference”

to the crime of violence determination. Id. at 2251.

Thus, the government’s recitation of the underlying offense conduct in its

oppositional brief is irrelevant to this Court’s categorical analysis. Gov. Brief at 3-5.

Only the statute underlying the offense is relevant to categorical analysis of the

Petitioners’ 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) convictions and sentences, not the conduct underlying

that offense. Davis, 139 S. Ct. at 2328-36 (explaining long-standing rule limiting

categorical analysis to statutory elements, not the particular facts of an offense); see

also Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190-91 (2013) (“[W]e examine what the []

conviction necessarily involved, not the facts underlying the case. . . .”) (internal

citations omitted). The Court should thus disregard the government’s recitation of

offense conduct when determining whether to grant review.

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II.

The Hobbs Act robbery statute’s plain language is overbroad.

Hobbs Act robbery plainly encompasses causing fear of future injury to

property—either tangible or intangible. See Petition for Certiorari (Pet.) at 14-22.

In response, the government does not dispute that threats to intangible property

can be made without violent physical force; it instead relies on the Ninth Circuit’s

holding that Hobbs Act robbery nonetheless constitutes a crime of violence under

§ 924(c)’s physical force clause. Gov. Brief at 8-12 (citing United States Dominguez,

954 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 2020), pet. for cert. pending, No. 20-1000 (filed Jan. 21,

2021)). The government also incorporates the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous finding

that there is no “realistic scenario in which a robber could commit Hobbs Act

robbery by placing his victim in fear of injury to an intangible economic interest.”

See Gov. Brief at 8-9 (incorporating Brief for the United States in Opposition at 10,

Steward v. United States, No. 19-8043 (U.S. May 21, 2020) (quoting Dominguez,

954 F.3d at 1260), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 167 (2020) (“Gov. Steward Brief”)).

But the government, like Dominguez, misapplies the categorical approach.

When a “statute explicitly defines a crime more broadly” than the crime of violence

definition, “no ‘legal imagination’ is required to hold that a realistic probability [of

prosecution] exists”—the “statute’s greater breadth is evident from its text.” United

States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), abrogated on other

grounds by United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018).

Dominguez does not bind this Court. And Dominguez was also wrongly

decided, conflicting with both this Court’s and the Ninth Circuit’s precedent. Pet. at

3

18-22 (citing, among other cases, Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261, and Grisel, 488 F.3d at

850). In addition, the “rule of lenity’s teach[es] that ambiguities about the breadth

of a criminal statute should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.” Davis, 139 S. Ct.

at 2333.

Therefore, Hobbs Act robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) is overbroad because

it can be committed by causing “fear of injury” to intangible property, rather than

requiring the violent physical force necessary under § 924(c)’s physical force clause.

Pet. at 14-18. The government, moreover, does not claim that Hobbs Act robbery is

divisible. See Gov. Brief at 7-10; Gov. Steward Brief at 6-12. An overbroad,

indivisible offense cannot categorically be a crime of violence. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at

2251-52.

The defendant in Dominguez has requested review of the Ninth Circuit’s

attempted Hobbs Act robbery holding relative to § 924(c)’s physical force clause,

which remains pending—an issue upon which this Court granted review in United

States v. Taylor, No. 20-1459 (oral argument scheduled for Dec. 7, 2021). Gov. Brief

at 7 n.1, and 10. But review of attempted Hobbs Act robbery under § 924(c)’s

physical force clause does not foreclose review of substantive Hobbs Act robbery

here. And this Court may grant a writ of certiorari in Dominguez on any question

presented by the record and law, even if not raised by a petitioner. Izumi v. U.S.

Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 32-33 and n.6 (1993) (noting that a question presented

“does not limit our power to decide important questions not raised by the parties.”)

(listing cases); see also Supreme Court Rule 24(1)(a) (“At its option, however, the

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Court may consider a plain error not among the questions presented but evident

from the record and otherwise within its jurisdiction to decide.”).

The Ninth Circuit’s error in Dominguez and in the other Circuits as to

substantive Hobbs Act robbery under § 924(c)’s physical force clause remain binding

on the courts below, and the Petitioners present this Court the opportunity to

correct those errors here. Because Hobbs Act robbery is both overbroad and

indivisible, a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 cannot qualify as a predicate offense

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s physical force clause. The Ninth Circuit’s contrary

holding is legally erroneous and requires correction by this Court.

III.

The government’s response fails to acknowledge this Court’s recent

interpretation of the physical force clause in Borden, which further

demonstrates the need for review.

Whether a predicate offense qualifies under § 924(c)’s physical force clause is

a question that must be examined under the law in place today—including this

Court’s recent clarification that the force clause requires the intentional use of force.

Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021).

Two days after Petitioners filed their petition for a writ of certiorari, this

Court issued Borden that held the use of force must be intentional for an offense to

qualify under a physical force clause—settling a circuit split on this issue. Borden,

141 S. Ct. at 1826. By relying on pre-Borden Circuit cases in its response, the

government neither acknowledges Borden nor the now open issue of whether Hobbs

Act robbery requires the intentional use of force required by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Gov. Brief at 8-9.

5

Hobbs Act robbery lacks the specific intent to use force, thus failing to qualify

as a crime of violence under Borden. Borden explains it is insufficient under the

physical force clause’s mens rea requirement for an offense to merely require

intentional performance of a particular act. Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1826. Both the

Borden plurality and concurring opinions agreed that, to satisfy the physical force

clause, the offense elements must require a specific intent to harm another. Id. at

1825-27 (plurality opinion), 1834 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thus, Borden requires

intentional use of force—there must be a “conscious object (not the mere recipient)

of the force.” Id. at 1826. What is dispositive under the physical force clause, the

plurality underscored, is not that a defendant’s prior actions did cause harm, but

that–when he acted–he intended to harm another. Id. at 1831 & n.8. Justice

Thomas, who supplied the fifth vote, agreed with the plurality on that critical

point: the elements clause only captures intentional conduct “designed to cause

harm” to another. Id. at 1835 (Thomas, J., concurring).

Hobbs Act thus robbery lacks Borden’s specific intent requirement. Hobbs

Act robbery requires only the general intent to take money or property from a

person or in the person’s presence. Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Criminal Jury

Instructions, § 8.143A Hobbs Act—Robbery (Mar. 2021); see also United States v.

García-Ortiz, 904 F.3d 102, 108-09 (1st Cir. 2018) (noting Hobbs Act robbery

includes “an implicit mens rea element of general intent . . .”); United States v.

Gray, 260 F.3d 1267, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a requirement

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of specific intent to commit Hobbs Act robbery). Hobbs Act robbery requires no

specific intent to harm another person or property.

Given Borden, this Court’s review is necessary as Hobbs Act robbery can be

violated with unintentional force. It does not require that force, attempted force, or

threatened force to be intentionally directed against another person or property.

IV.

The government does not dispute that proper interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §

924(c) is of exceptional, national importance.

Because of the Circuits’ misapplication of categorical analysis to the elements

of Hobbs Act robbery, Petitioners Hayes and Pulido remain in prison serving

mandatory sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Petitioners Espinoza and Stankus

have completed their mandatory sentences, but remain serving longer supervised

release terms than would otherwise be imposed, because of the § 924(c) convictions. 1

And § 924(c) convictions continue unabated nationwide. In fiscal year 2020,

over 2500 individuals were convicted of a § 924(c) offense, at least 22% of which

involved a robbery offense, with an average sentence of 138 months (11½ years) in

prison. U.S. Sent. Comm’n, Quick Facts: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) Firearms Offenses (May

2021). 2

1 Petitioners’ convictions under § 924(c) led to higher supervision terms than

would have been imposed for Hobbs Act robbery. Because 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) carries

a statutory imprisonment maximum of life imprisonment, it is a Class A felony with

a five-year maximum supervised release term. In contrast, Hobbs Act robbery, with

a 20-year imprisonment statutory maximum, is a Class C felony and carries a

three-year maximum supervised release term. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); 18 U.S.C. §

3559(a) (felony classifications); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (authorized terms of supervised

release).

2 Available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-

publications/quick-facts/Section_924c_FY20.pdf.

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Given the vast numbers of defendants’ lives affected by the Circuits’

interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), this Court’s intervention is necessary.

Petitioners ask this Court to review the Circuit’s misapplication of the categorical

approach to the Hobbs Act robbery statute to ensure compliance with the

Constitution and Supreme Court post-Davis precedent.

Conclusion

Petitioners request the Court grant this joint petition for a writ of certiorari.

Dated: October 21, 2021.

Respectfully submitted,

RENE L. VALLADARES

Federal Public Defender

/s/ Wendi L. Overmyer

Wendi L. Overmyer

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Office of the Federal Public Defender

411 E. Bonneville, Ste. 250

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 388-6577

Wendi_Overmyer@fd.org

/s/ Amy B. Cleary

Amy B. Cleary

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Office of the Federal Public Defender

411 E. Bonneville, Ste. 250

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 388-6577

Amy_Cleary@fd.org

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