Petition for Writ of Certiorari — M. S. Willman, Petitioner v. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General

Supreme Court briefNov 24, 2020

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No.

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

M.S., WILLMAN.,

Petitioner,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Sixth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DANIEL C. WILLMAN (P55867)

P.O. 606

Pinckney, MI 48169

(248)-231-0705

Attorney for Petitioner

-iQUESTIONS PRESENTED

If a State sex offender is not legally required 34

U.S.C. §20921 to be on their Jurisdiction’s registry,

then they will not appear in the Federal offender

search engine database. Only Jurisdictions maintain

offender registries 34 U.S.C. §20911(9) and the term

Jurisdiction as defined in 34 U.S.C. §20911(10) does

not include the Federal Government.

Citing 34 U.S.C. §20911 (1) The U.S. Sixth

Circuit Court of Appeals has held there exists an

independent obligation to register under SORNA, even

if an offender (as was Petitioner) is removed from a

State sex offender registry in Federal Court.

The position of the Sixth Circuit conflicts with

this Court’s ruling in Carr v. U.S., 560 U.S. 438, 446

(2010) which ruled, absent an 18 U.S.C. §2250

violation, it would be illogical for the Federal

Government to retain an interest in punishing State

offenders.

The Sixth Circuit Opinion also conflicts with

this Court’s rulings in regard to the noted oversight

difference between State and Federal offenders

(Reynolds v. U.S., 565 U.S. 432 (2012), Nichols v. U.S.,

136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016) U.S. v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387

(2013)) warranting a grant of certiorari.

ARE STATE OFFENDERS ONLY REQUIRED TO

AS DEFINED IN 34 U.S.C. 20911(9)(10)?

DOES 34 U.S.C. 20911 (1) AND 20913 (a) IMPOSE AN

INDEPENDENT OBLIG ATION ON STATE

OFFENDERS TO REGISTER WITH THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT?

-iiIF

AN INDEPENDENT OBLIGATION DOES EXIST,

DOES IT END WHEN A REGISTRANT IS NO

LONGER REQUIRED TO REGISTER WITH THEIR

STATE/JURISDICTION VIA COURT ORDER?

AND

IS SUCH AN ORDER ENTITLED TO ARTICLE IV,

FULL FAITH AND CREDIT?

II.

IN THE ABSENCE OF A NEW SEX OFFENSE

CONVICTION, WOULD IT VIOLATE THE 8TH

AMENDMENT AND OTHER RIGHTS SECURED BY

THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO PLACE A FORMER

REGISTRANT ON A REGISTRY, IF THEY HAVE

ALREADY BEEN LEGALLY REMOVED VIA

STIPULATION AND ORDER IN FEDERAL COURT?

III.

ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF RES JUDICATA

APPLICABLE TO SORNA?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

The names of all the parties before the United

States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals are contained

within the case caption. Petitioner M.S. Willman

pursuant to S.Ct Rule 29.6, states there is no parent or

subsidiary company to be listed.

The Respondent before the Sixth Circuit and

this Court is the Attorney General of the United

States. Suit was brought against the Office of

Respondent and the Offices of three State of Michigan

defendants seeking declaratory relief and attorney

fees. The State of Michigan Offices were dismissed via

Stipulation and Order (appendix 31a).

-iiiTABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS AND

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii-xvi

OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND

STATUTORY PROVISIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

DOES THERE EXIST AN INDEPENDENT DUTY

FOR STATE OFFENDERS TO REGISTER WITH

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? IF SO DOES THAT

OBLIGATION END WHEN ANY REGISTRANT IS

NO LONGER REQUIRED TO REGISTER WITH

THEIR STATE/JURISDICTION VIA A COURT’S

ORDER? AND IS SUCH AN ORDER ENTITLED TO

ARTICLE IV, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT?

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

-ivTABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

II.

IT WOULD VIOLATE THE 8TH AMENDMENT OF

THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO THREATEN A

FORMER REGISTRANT WITH PLACEMENT ON A

JURISDICTION’S REGISTRY WHEN THEY HAVE

ALREADY BEEN LEGALLY REMOVED VIA

STIPULATION AND ORDER IN FEDERAL COURT.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

III.

RESPONDENT WAS WELL AWARE OF THE

CONSEQUENCES THAT REMOVAL FROM A

JURISDICTION’S REGISTRY ALSO RESULTS IN

REMOVAL FROM THE SORNA DATABASE. SORNA

IS A CIVIL STATUTE. FAILURE BY AN ADVERSE

PARTY TO THE LITIGATION, TO OBJECT TO

REMOVAL IS RES JUDICATA.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

IV.

ALLOWING ENFORCEMENT OF A SORNA

PROVISION WHICH WAS NEVER DELEGATED

AND DOES NOT EXIST IS INDEED AN EX POST

FACTO VIOLATION.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

PETITIONER’S 1 AND 14th AMENDMENT RIGHTS

ARE SUFFICIENTLY THREATENED.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

-vTABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

VI.

THIS CASE IS CAPABLE OF REPETITION YET

EVADING JUDICIAL REVIEW.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37

APPENDIX

OPINION AND ORDERS

Page

Final Opinion

of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Filed 8/26/20202 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1a

Opinion

United States District Court Eastern District

of Michigan dismissing Petitioner’s case

Filed 10/01/2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15a

Stipulation and Order

Removing Petitioner from

The State of Michigan Offender Registry SORA

and Dismissing State of Michigan Defendants

Filed 04/04/2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31a

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

Article 1 § 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34a

Article 1 § 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34a

-viTABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

Page

Article VI, Section 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34a

Article VI, Section 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35a

1st Amendment (I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35a

8th Amendment (VIII) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35a

14th Amendment Sec 1. (XIV). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36a

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 2250 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36a

34 U.S.C. §20911 (1)(9)-(13) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37a

34 U.S.C. §20913 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38a

34 U.S.C. §20921 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40a

34 U.S.C. §20922 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40a

42 U.S.C. §1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41a

42 U.S.C. §1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42a

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

F.R.C.P. 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42a

-viiTABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

Page

Other

DOJ SMART-OFFICE- 2018

Registration Statement

2018, https://smart.gov/caselaw.htm . . . . . . . . . . .. .43a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

U.S. Supreme Court

Albright v. Oliver,

510 U.S. 266 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

Arizona v. California,

460 U.S. 605 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

Beazell v. Ohio,

269 U.S. 167 (1925). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

Calder v. Bull,

3 U.S. 386 (1798) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Caminetti v. U.S.,

242 U.S. 470 (1917) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Carr v. U.S.,

560 U.S. 438 (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Chevron. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

467 U.S. 837 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13, 24

-viiiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

U.S. Supreme Court-continued

Cleveland Board. of Education. v.

Loudermill,

470 U.S. 532 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

Collins v. Youngblood,

497 U.S. 37 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,

503 U.S. 249 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

County of Sacramento v. Lewis,

523 U.S. 833 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp.,

486 U.S. 800 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31

Crist v. Bretz,

437 U.S. 28 (1978). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

Currier v. Virginia,

138 S.Ct. 2144 (2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13,31

Daniels v. Williams,

474 U.S. 327 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

Doe v. Bolton,

410 U.S. 179 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11,24

Eastern Enterprises v. APFEL,

524 U.S. 498 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

-ixTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

U.S. Supreme Court-continued

Escondido Mut. Water. v.

La Jolla Band of Mission Indians,

466 U.S. 765 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21

Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35

Friends of The Earth v. Laidlaw,

528 U.S. 167 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

Furman v. Georgia,

408 U.S. 238 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Gibson v. Mississippi,

162 U.S. 565 (1896) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32

Gideon v. Wainwright,

372 U.S. 335 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27-28, 35

Globe v. Norfolk,

457 U.S. 596 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

Green, v. U.S.,

355 U.S. 184 (1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Gwaltney. v. Chesapeake,

484 U.S. 49 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Hensley v. Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

-xTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

U.S. Supreme Court-continued

Iselin v. U.S.,

270 U.S. 245 (1926) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8,23,29

Lambert v. California,

355 U.S. 225 (1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Marbury v. Madison,

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25, 36

Mesquite v. Aladdin,

455 U.S. 283 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36

McKune v. Lile,

536 U.S. 24 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Muskrat v. U.S.,

219 U.S. 346 (1911) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Nichols v. U.S.,

136 S. Ct. 1113 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11, 23, 25

O'Dell v. Netherland,

521 U.S. 151 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Packingham, v. North Carolina,

137 S.Ct. 1730 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27-28

Parklane Hosiery.,

439 U.S. 322 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31-32

-xiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

U.S. Supreme Court-continued

Poe v. Ullman,

367 U.S. 497 (1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections

v. Yeskey,

524 U.S. 206(1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi,

326 U.S. 88 (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Reynolds v. U.S.,

565 U.S. 432 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Robinson v. California,

370 U.S. 660 (1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Saffle v. Parks,

494 U.S. 484 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Sebelius v. Cloer,

569 U.S. 369 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Smith v. Doe,

538 U.S. 84 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Southern Pacific Terminal v. I.C.C.,

219 U.S. 498 (1911) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Stanley v. Georgia,

394 U.S. 557 (1969) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

-xiiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

U.S. Supreme Court-continued

Tellabs, v. Makor,

551 U.S. 308 (2007) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Timbs v. Indiana,

586 U.S. --, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). . . . . . . . .3, 13, 26, 29

U.S. v. Kebodeaux,

570 U.S. 387 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

U.S. v. Lanier,

520 U.S. 259 (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

U.S. v. Lopez,

514 U.S. 549 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 21, 33

U.S. v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co.

278 U.S. 269 (1929) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8, 11, 24

U.S v. Morrison,

529 U.S. 598 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 21, 33

U.S. v. Nixon,

418 U.S. 683 (1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Weaver v. Graham,

450 U.S. 24 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32-33

Weems v. U.S. ,

217 US 349 (1910) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29

-xiiiTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

Circuit Cases

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Swann,

27 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir.1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Amini v. Oberlin College,

259 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Bell v. Commissioner,

928 F.2d 901(9th Cir.1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law,

597 F.3d 812 (6th Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Cutshall v. Sundquist,

193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Does v. Snyder,

834 F.3d 696 6th Cir. 2016),

cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . .4-5, 30

Fleishman v. Cont’l Cas.,

698 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Gutierrez v. Lynch,

826 F.2d 1534 (6th Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Kennedy v. Allera,

612 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

Springfield Armory, v. City of Columbus,

29 F.3d 250 (6th Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21, 25

-xivTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Page

Circuit Cases-continued

Tyson Foods v. McReynolds,

865 F.2d 99 (6th Cir.1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 41

U.S. v. Felts,

674 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

U.S. v. Gould,

568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir.2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

U.S. v. Del Valle-Cruz,

785 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

U.S. v. Pendleton,

636 F.3d 78 (3rd Cir. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7

U.S. v. Shenandoah,

595 F.3d 151(3rd Cir. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

U.S. v. Todd,

920 F.2d 399 (6thCir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Other Federal Cases

U.S.v. Benevento,

633 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. FNev. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Unpublished Circuit Cases

U.S v. Paul,

718 F. App’x 360 (6th Cir. 2017). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 10

-xvTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

U.S. Constitution

Article I Section 9 . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4, 26, 32

Article I Section 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 32

Article III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Article IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3, 9, 14, 25, 36

Article VI . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2, 25, 36

1st Amendment (I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 31

8th Amendment (VIII) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

14th Amendment Sec 1. (XIV). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 29, 34

Federal Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 2250 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

34 U.S.C. §20911 (1),(9)-(10). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

34 U.S.C. §20913 (a)(c)(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

34 U.S.C. §20921 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3,8, 12, 17

34 U.S.C. §20922 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3,8, 12, 17

42 U.S.C. §1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 37

-xviTABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Supreme Court Rules

S.Ct Rule 13 (1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

F.R.C.P. 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Other

DOJ SMART-OFFICE- 2018

Registration Statement

2018, https://smart.gov/caselaw.htm . . . . . . . . . . .. .43a

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner M.S. Willman seeks a writ of

certiorari to review an opinion and order of the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed

an opinion and order by the U.S. District Court for the

Eastern District of Michigan, which dismissed

Petitioner’s claims seeking declaratory relief and

attorney fees.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Opinion and Order of the Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit dated August 26, 2020, is

reprinted in the appendix at 1a.

The Opinion and Order of the U.S. District

Court of the Eastern District of Michigan dated

October 1, 2019 dismissing Petitioner’s Case is

reprinted at 15a.1

JURISDICTION

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1) jurisdiction is

vested with this Court. Filing of this Petition is within

150 days from the Sixth Circuit’s August 26, 2019

Order and this Court’s March 19, 2020 Order

extending the Rule 13.1. deadline for filing any petition

for a writ of certiorari.

The 6 Circuit does not require a Joint Appendix or Excerpts of

Record, the Court uses the District Court EFC record numbers

accompanied by a description for reference. In this Petition EFC

PageID numbers indicate District Court docket entry number.

Sixth Circuit and District Court Opinions, and District Court

Stipulation and Order are reproduced in attached appendix

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS

This Court has proper Jurisdiction under Article

I, Article III, Article IV, Sec 2, Clause1 Sec 1, Article

VI , the 1st, 4th, 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments to the

U.S. Constitution and 28 U.S.C. §1331, 42 U.S.C.

§1988, 34 U.S.C. §20901, 34 U.S.C. §20913, 18 U.S.C.

§2250 and other SORNA sections reproduced in

pertinent part 36a.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner was legally removed from the State of

Michigan sex offender registry (SORA) via Stipulation

and Order (31a) in Federal Court, which as a

consequence removed Petitioner from the Federal

offender search engine database (SORNA).

Despite the above, in this matter the U.S. Sixth

Circuit Court of Appeals held that there exists an

independent federal obligation to register under

SORNA. The Sixth Circuit pinned its findings on the

belief that 34 U.S.C. §20911 (1) which defines who is

a sex offender, and 34 U.S.C. §20913 (a) are ‘THE’

controlling elements, essentially mandating a

perpetual independent obligation to register with the

Federal Government, even though the Federal

Government only maintains a database and does not

have an actual registry, infra. The Court also held

sister circuits have reached the same conclusion.

At every level of proceedings Petitioner has

squarely presented that registration is a local activity

and that the Federal Government is not a registering

jurisdiction (SORNA sections 34 U.S.C. §20911 (9)(10),

§20921 and §20922). The SORNA database only

compiles and links the information of every

jurisdiction’s (state, territory and tribe) registries so

that it can be queried. If a party is required to be on a

Jurisdiction’s registry, then and only then, is the

information pertaining to that registrant forwarded to

the National database for inclusion per 34 U.S.C.

§20921, a fact duly noted by the DOJ SMART OFFICE,

infra.

Since Petitioner’s change in legal status from an

active to a former registrant, he has consistently

asserted that there does not exist an independent duty

under SORNA to register with the Federal

Government. Trying to intimidate a former registrant

into re-registering, in order to satisfy an obligation

that does not exist, violates the Plain Language

doctrine (Carr v. U.S., 560 U.S. 438 (2010) and also

amounts to Cruel and Unusual punishment and/or an

excessive fine under the 8th Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution (Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019)

as well as a violation of other rights cited infra.

Petitioner also asserted Respondent was a party

to the litigation and had a duty to object to removal

earlier and that their failure to do so was ‘in fact’ res

judicata.

Petitioner is no longer an active registrant and

as this Court noted in Carr v. U.S., 560 U.S. 438, 446

(2010) the Federal Government has zero interest

and/or authority to punish any State offender unless

there is a 18 U.S.C. §2250 violation demonstrated by a

sequential nexus of actions. Absent the required nexus,

requiring federal registration would lead to ‘illogical

result[s].’

For the reasoning within, Petitioner at the

minimal seeks an Opinion and Order holding SORNA

no longer applies to him or any other similarly situated

individual and that such a finding is entitled to Article

IV, Full Faith and Credit

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Background Facts of

Petitioner’s Conviction

On the night of the allegations leading to his

conviction, Petitioner went out for the night with

another party, his co-defendant. According to the

victim she was ordered into a car by one of the two

defendants. Eventually the victim was let out of the

car and within minutes was able to call the police,

leading to a traffic stop and arrest. The victim was

never physically touched by either defendant.

On November 2, 1993 Petitioner was convicted

and sentenced under M.C.L. 750.520 G1 - Criminal

Sexual Conduct Assault with Intent to Commit Sexual

Penetration and robbery. (Appendix in support of

Compliant EFC.1.1 PageID 235). At the time of

Petitioner’s conviction, SORNA did not exist.

Petitioner served 10 yrs and successfully completed

parole (Complaint EFC.1 PageID 10, also Opinion and

Order of Dismissal EFC.23 PageID 563).

Stipulation State of Michigan

On April 4, 2019 Petitioner was legally removed

from the State of Michigan SORA registry 2 (EFC.16,

PageID 406, Stipulation and Order, also reproduced at

31a) in Federal Court, and claims against three State

of Michigan Defendants were dismissed with prejudice.

The stipulation held in part:

In Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016) the Court held

that Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), MCL

28.721 et seq., was retroactive punishment in violation of Article

1 §10 Ex post facto clause of the U.S. Constitution.

In light of the Sixth Circuit decision in

Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 6th Cir.

2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 55 (2017),

and considering the undisputed facts

underlying Plaintiff’s claims, the parties

wish to avoid further litigation and

expense and consent to entry of this

order.

The State Defendants, as well as their

officers, agents, servants, and employees,

shall not enforce the 2006 and 2011

SORA amendments against Plaintiff.

Under the SORA statutes applicable to

Plaintiff, Plaintiff was subject to a 25year registration, and the duration of his

registration has ended. As a result,

Plaintiff shall no longer be subject to any

registration or verification requirements

of SORA.

Per the above Stipulation and Order, Petitioner

achieved his two objectives, removal from the Michigan

SORA registry, which as a consequence removed

Petitioner from the Federal registry/database (NSOPW

(National Sex Offender Public Website) which is only

a ‘search engine similar to a Google search that

compiles/links and can query the registries of

Jurisdictions noted in 34 U.S.C. §20911(9)(10), 37a.

Since the matter had become moot, Petitioner

reached out to Respondent to seek a stipulation for

dismissal.

Motion to Dismiss

On May 30, 2019, rather then agree to a

stipulation or even discuss the matter, Respondent

filed a Motion to dismiss under F.R.C.P. 12 (EFC.18,

PageID 451). Relying on an unpublished Sixth Circuit

opinion U.S v. Paul, 718 F. App’x 360 (6th Cir. 2017),

for the first time in the case at hand, Respondent

asserted in passing that Petitioner still had an

obligation to register with the Federal Government

(EFC.18, PageID 460). Respondent also asserted that

all of the grounds for relief cited in Petitioner’s

Complaint had been presented by plaintiffs in other

U.S. Courts and rejected.

The District Court adopted the position of

Respondent and dismissed Petitioner’s case, 20a. The

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted similar

findings.

Sixth Circuit Opinion

The Sixth Circuit pinned its findings on the

belief that 34 U.S.C. §20911 (1) which defines who is

a sex offender, and 34 U.S.C. §20913 (a) as ‘THE’

controlling elements mandating an independent

obligation to register with the Federal Government ( 56a, 11-12a) even though the Federal Government does

not have a registry, supra. The Court also held sister

circuits have reached the same conclusion (7a).

Active v. Former Registrant

The cases the Sixth Circuit cited from sister

circuits can be easily distinguished from the case at

hand, all of those cases were applied to active

registrants (not a former registrant legally removed in

Federal Court). The registrants in question had either

a federal3 conviction, were still mandated to register

with their State/Jurisdiction4, or their state was

lagging in implementation of SORNA but still

possessed some form of a registration system5. All had

changed residence by moving to another state or

another country with the intent of evading detection,

resulting in federal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 2250.

As this Court noted in Carr v. U.S., 560 U.S.

438, 447 (2010) the Federal Government has zero

interest and/or authority to punish any State offender

In Kennedy v. Allera, 612 F.3d 261 (4th Cir. 2010) the defendant,

a former boarder patrol agent, was convicted in a California

Federal Court for the rape and murder of an undocumented

immigrant. The defendant served time in Maryland. Upon release,

the defendant stayed in Maryland and later failed to register while

still in Maryland, resulting in a §2250 conviction. Also see U.S. v.

Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387 (2013) the Defendant was courtmartialed by the U.S. Military for a sex crime. Upon release the

defendant settled in the State of Texas and then later moved

(intrastate) within Texas and then failed to update his

registration, which resulted in a §2250 conviction.

In U.S. v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78 (3rd Cir. 2011) the defendant was

convicted in the District of Columbia, for multiple interstate and

international moves. In U.S. v. Del Valle-Cruz, 785 F.3d 48 (1st

Cir. 2015) the defendant was convicted originally in State court in

Oklahoma and was on Federal Probation for a 18 U.S.C. §2250

violation. While on probation, the defendant moved to Florida and

then to Puerto Rico.

See U.S. v. Felts, 674 F.3d 599 (6th Cir. 2012).U.S. v. Gould, 568

F.3d 459 (4th Cir.2009), U.S. v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151(3rd Cir.

2010).

unless there is a 18 U.S.C. §2250 violation.

In the absence of a 34 U.S.C. §2250 violation

and sequential nexus, federal prosecution of State

offenders would lead to ‘illogical result[s]’ Carr at 446.

Petitioner has consistently, prominently and

squarely presented the above controlling position at

every level of proceedings. Not once did the lower

Courts acknowledge the holding of Carr.

The Sixth Circuit Opinion completely ignored

the Plain Language of controlling SORNA sections,

which were squarely presented at every level of

proceedings by Petitioner, which clearly affirm that the

Federal Government is not a registering jurisdiction.

(37a). 34 U.S.C. §20911 (9)(10), §20921 and §20922.

If a party is required to be on a Jurisdiction’s

registry, then and only then, is the information

pertaining to that registrant forwarded to the National

database for inclusion per 34 U.S.C. §20921, a fact

even duly noted by the DOJ SMART OFFICE, infra.

For the reasoning within, application of the

position of the Sixth Circuit would lead to ‘illogical

result[s],’Carr, “absurd or impracticable” consequences.

U.S. v.Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929)

and would in fact be an enlargement of SORNA, that

transcends judicial function. Iselin v. U.S., 270 U.S.

245, 251 (1926).

Travel

The one section of the Sixth Circuit Opinion that

Petitioner does agree with is the Court’s findings in

regard to travel by active registrants (12a) as the Court

noted:

SORNA requires a sex offender to update

his registration information if he moves

to a new residence, place of employment,

or educational institution. 34 U.S.C. §

20913(c). But those obligations do not

prohibit plaintiff from exercising his

liberty to go to different places, and they

do not even require him to obtain

permission first. See United States v.

Benevento, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1210 (D.

FNev. 2009) (observing, in a discussion of

SORNA and the right to travel, that

“[s]ex offenders traveling from state to

state may still do so freely without first

seeking permission from authorities”).

For the reasoning above and within, Petitioner

at the minimal seeks an Opinion and Order holding

SORNA no longer applies to him or any other similarly

situated individual and that such a finding is entitled

to Article IV, Full Faith and Credit.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court held in Carr v. U.S., 560 U.S. 438,

452 (2010) that the Federal Government has zero

interest and/or authority to punish any State offender

unless there is a 18 U.S.C. §2250 violation. A §2250

violation must demonstrate a sequential nexus

between being required to register with a Jurisdiction,

travel outside of the Jurisdiction, followed by a failure

to update a registration if the offender traveled for the

purposes of a change in residency, employment or to

attend school.

On April 4, 2019 Petitioner was removed from

the State of Michigan sex offender registry SORA via

Stipulation and Order (between Petitioner and State of

Michigan Defendants) in Federal Court (31a). In a

passing comment in a later motion to dismiss,

Respondent asserted that Petitioner was still obligated

to register with the Federal Government, based on a

ruling of an unpublished Sixth Circuit opinion, U.S v.

Paul, 718 F. App’x 360 (6th Cir. 2017). The District

Court adopted the same position.

On appeal the Sixth Circuit held there was an

independent federal obligation to register under

SORNA and pinned its findings on the belief that 34

U.S.C. §20911 (1)6 which defines who is a sex offender,

not who is required to register, as essentially a standalone controlling provision mandating a perpetual

obligation to register with the Federal Government.

The Court also held sister circuits have reached the

same conclusion.

All of the cases from sister circuits (supra),

relied upon by the Sixth Circuit, involved federal or

active state registrants in the early stages/years of

registration or whose registering jurisdiction had not

yet fully implemented SORNA, but already had some

form of a pre-existing registry. All of the offenders in

question also sought to evade state detection.

The Court also suggested that Petitioner could

have an “affirmative defense to a prosecution

predicated on failure to register if he offered to register

in Michigan and the State declined his offer . . . . After

that, there is nothing else for plaintiff to do (from the

perspective of SORNA) unless at least one relevant

circumstance changes.” 7a.

The Court left vague what it considered a

relevant change in circumstances, although under the

Plain Language of 18 U.S.C. §2250 and Carr at 446, a

§2250 violation by an active registrant must occur in

And 34 U.S.C. §20913 (c)

sequential order showing an offender 1. Is required to

Knowingly fails to update a registration seeking to

evade a State’s reach, not the reach of the Federal

Government.

Minus a §2250 violation the “affirmative

defense” suggestion by the Sixth Circuit is not required

or mandated, indeed the Federal Government’s

interest in punishing such state offenders would be “an

illogical result.” Carr at 446.

As Petitioner asserted in the lower courts, the

above position is not only “absurd”, it is not required or

mandated by the Plain Language of SORNA (one of the

most comprehensive statutes ever passed by Congress

and signed into law) U.S. v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. 278

U.S. 269 (1929). A party "should not be required to

await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole

means of seeking relief." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,

188 (1973).

This Court has had multiple occasions to rule on

various challenges to SORNA. Not once has this Court

ever ruled, suggested nor inferred in any way, shape or

form, that SORNA gives the Federal Government

jurisdiction to control State registries. In fact, the

opposite has been noted on several occasions, Carr,

Nichols, Reynolds, Kebodeaux, infra.

Plain Language of SORNA

Registration Is a Local Activity

Most States have had registries which predate

SORNA by decades. Congress was mindful of this fact

and took great care to avoid serious Constitutional

concerns when crafting SORNA, infra. The Plain

Language of Federal and State sex offender

registration laws have expressly stated and relied on

state-level enforcement from inception, Carr v. U.S.,

560 U.S. 438, 452 (2010). “[T]he Federal Government

has prosecuted a sex offender for violating SORNA only

when that offender also violated state-registration

requirements” Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 398 (2013).

In fact, the only Federal SORNA enforcement

provision against individuals is found within the plain

text of 18 U.S.C. §2250, which subjects State sex

offenders to Federal prosecution if they intentionally

try to evade a “State's reach” Carr v. U.S., 560 U.S.

438, 452 (2010).

At every level of proceedings Petitioner has

squarely presented that if a party is required to be on

a Jurisdiction’s registry, then and only then, is the

information pertaining to that registrant forwarded to

the National database for inclusion per 34 U.S.C.

§20921, because registration is a local activity and the

Plain Language of SORNA which is framed in a

‘consistent use of the present tense’ makes clear the

Federal Government is not a registering jurisdiction

(SORNA sections 34 U.S.C. §20911 (9)(10), §20921 and

§20922).

The SORNA database only compiles and links

the information of every jurisdiction’s (state, territory

and tribe) registry so that it can be queried much like

a Google search engine. The above facts were duly

noted by the DOJ SMART OFFICE (infra), and

squarely presented at every level of proceedings, yet

not once did the lower courts or Respondent address

the SMART OFFICE admission.

Change in Status

Active v. Former Registrant

During the District Court filings, Petitioner’s

status changed from an active registrant to a former

registrant. To date there is not one documented case of

a former registrant being legally removed from a

registry in Federal Court and then being forced to reregister under SORNA (absent a new sex offense

conviction, post-dating removal from a registry).

Petitioner has since consistently asserted that

making a former registrant, legally removed from a

registry in Federal Court, re-register to satisfy an

obligation that does not exist violates the Plain

Language doctrine (Carr v. U.S., 560 U.S. 438 (2010)

and would be cruel and unusual punishment and/or an

excessive fine under the 8th Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution (Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. --, 139 S. Ct.

682 (2019).

Under any reasonable interpretation (Chevron)

of SORNA, the rule which the Sixth Circuit Opinion

infers exists simply does not exist. Allowing

Respondent to enforce a non-existent provision against

a former registrant that was never delegated to them

(Reynolds), would be an Ex Post Facto violation as well

as a violation of other rights cited by Petitioner infra.

SORNA is a civil statute to which the principles

of Res Judicata a.k.a. claim preclusion and issue

preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, apply.

Because Respondent had clear notice of the

ramifications of Petitioner’s removal from the Michigan

SORA registry, reasonable diligence would dictate that

if they had any objections to the Stipulation and Order,

those objections should have been raised at that time.

Their failure to do so was in fact res judicata.

As a matter of law, Respondent could have

obtained further review (Currier v. Virginia, 138 S.Ct.

2144 (2018) yet did not, this lack of diligence should

not be rewarded. The actions complained of here are

also capable of repetition yet evading judicial review.

Petitioner is not an active registrant, he is no

longer subject to SORNA, and there is no authority to

the contrary. There simply does not exist such a rule

within the clear, unambiguous, Plain Language of

SORNA.

For the reasoning above and within, Petitioner

at the minimal seeks an Opinion and Order holding

SORNA no longer applies to him or any other similarly

situated individual and that such a finding is entitled

to Article IV, Full Faith and Credit.

ARGUMENT

DOES THERE EXIST AN INDEPENDENT DUTY

FOR STATE OFFENDERS TO REGISTER WITH

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT? IF SO DOES

THAT OBLIGATION END WHEN ANY

REGISTRANT IS NO LONGER REQUIRED TO

VIA A COURT’S ORDER? AND IS SUCH AN

ORDER ENTITLED TO ARTICLE IV, FULL

FAITH AND CREDIT?

The Federal Government has zero interest

and/or authority to punish any State offender unless

there is a 34 U.S.C. §2250 violation. A §2250 violation

must demonstrate a sequential nexus between being

required to register with a Jurisdiction, travel outside

of the Jurisdiction, culminated by an intentional

failure to update a registration if the offender traveled

for the purposes of a change in residency, employment

or to attend school.

As this Court noted in Carr v. U.S., 560 U.S.

438, 446 (2010) absent the proceeding requirements, a

federal prosecution would lead to ‘illogical result[s].’

Petitioner has consistently, prominently and squarely

presented the above controlling position of Carr at

every level of proceedings. Not once did the lower

Courts acknowledge the holding of Carr.

The Sixth Circuit Opinion 1a completely

ignored Carr and instead asserts that all State

offenders are subject to an independent duty to register

with the Federal Government and that sister circuits

have made similar findings supra. (The Sixth Circuit

position also conflicts with a DOJ SMART OFFICE

statement which was also squarely presented at every

level of proceedings, infra).

The Court’s opinion does not take into

consideration or make any distinction between State

and Federal registrants or active and former

registrants, most notably registrants who have been

removed from registries via judicial process in Federal

or State court.

The reasoning of the Court is based on the

misconception that 34 U.S.C. §20911 (1) which defines

what is a sex offender and 34 U.S.C. §20913 (a) (keep

registration information current section) are ‘THE’

controlling elements essentially mandating a

perpetual, independent obligation to register with the

Federal Government, even though the Federal

Government does not have a registry, supra, infra.

When Congress enacted SORNA it did so to tie

together a patchwork of State registries, to close

loopholes and deficiencies Reynolds v. U.S., 565 U.S.

432, 435 (2012) to enable states/jurisdictions to keep

track of active offenders who seek to evade a “State's

reach” Carr v. U.S., 560 U.S. 438, 452 (2010).

Since the passage of SORNA in 2006, this Court

has had multiple occasions to rule on various

challenges to SORNA. Not once has this Court ever

ruled, suggested nor inferred in any way, shape or

form, that SORNA gives the Federal Government

jurisdiction to control State registries. In fact the

opposite has been noted on several occasions, infra.

When crafting SORNA Congress was mindful of

U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) and U.S. v.

Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) where thoughtfully

intended, yet Constitutionally defective, legislation7

was nullified. In both cases the Court held the

legislation in question infringed upon 10th Amendment

State Police Powers.

It is clear Congress took great care to avoid the

serious Constitutional concerns raised in Lopez and

Morrison when crafting SORNA. It was against this

backdrop and our Nation’s system of dual sovereignty,

that SORNA was written in clear, unambiguous terms,

as was noted Carr v. U.S. 560 U.S. 438, 452 (2010):

“Congress instead chose to handle federal and state

sex offenders differently.”

Required and Juridiction Defined

The plain language of SORNA clearly defines

who is required to register, what constitutes a registry

and what constitutes a registering jurisdiction.

Under 34 U.S.C. §20921(a) The Attorney

General shall maintain a national database . . . for

each sex offender and any other person required to

The goal sought in Lopez was to give an extra layer of protection

to school children by having gun-free school zones (No guns within

1000 ft.). Congress later passed legislation with the same intent

which withstood Constitutional Muster Citation omitted. The goal

in Morrision was to provide an additional/supplemental Federal

civil remedy to women victimized by gender violence.

Under 34 U.S.C. §20911:

(9) Sex offender registry-The term "sex

offender registry" means a registry of sex

offenders, and a notification program,

maintained by a jurisdiction.

(10) Jurisdiction-The term "jurisdiction"

means any of the following: (A) A State.

(B) The District of Columbia. (C) The

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. (D) Guam.

(E) American Samoa. (F) The Northern

Mariana Islands. (G) The United States

Virgin Islands. (H) To the extent provided

and subject to the requirements of section

20929 of this title, a federally recognized

Indian tribe.

Per the above, individuals on the Federal sex

offender website are there only because they are

required, by a Jurisdiction, to be on that Jurisdiction’s

registry. Then and only then, is the information

pertaining to that registrant forwarded to the National

Offender database for inclusion 34 U.S.C. §20921.8

Yet the rationale of the Sixth Circuit Opinion

held otherwise citing 34 U.S.C. §20913 (a)9 as

controlling “As we explained above, SORNA’s

applicability to plaintiff turns on whether he is a “sex

offender.” 34 U.S.C. §20913 (a) (“A sex offender shall

Also see 40a. 34 U.S.C. §20922: (b) . . . The Website shall include

relevant information for each sex offender and other person listed

on a jurisdiction's Internet site.

Along with 34 U.S.C. §20911 (1)

Without explanation the Court dismissed the

rest of the subsections of §20913, in particular sub

section (e) infra.

Registration is a Local Activity

[I]t is notable that the federal sex-offender

registration laws have, from their inception, expressly

relied on state-level enforcement Carr v. U.S., 560 U.S.

438, 452 (2010). The fact that registration is a local

activity has even been acknowledged by the DOJ

SMART-Office :

Every one of these systems has its own

nuances and distinct features. Every

jurisdiction (state, territory and tribe)

makes its own determinations about who

is required to register, what information

offenders must provide, which offenders

are posted on the jurisdiction’s public

registry website, and so forth. 10

State Requirements

34 U.S.C. §20911 and §20913

The Sixth Circuit Opinion held: “[I]f Congress

meant for sex offenders’ SORNA requirements to

depend on state registration requirements, the Act

would specifically say so.”7a-8a.

DOJ(https://smart.gov/caselaw.htm. Office of Sex Offender

Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking

March 2018.Complaint Appendix EFC.1.1 PageID 100. 34 U.S.C.

§20945)

The Act does clearly ‘say so’ via 34 U.S.C.

§20913 (e) which makes failure to comply with

registration requirements a state penalty not federal

and instructs states/jurisdictions to enact at least a 1

year penalty for non-compliant offenders required to be

on that jurisdiction’s registry. Under Section §20913

(e) there is no mention of a federal penalty because a

failure to comply under §20913 (a) results in state

punishment under §20913 (e) because it is 100% a local

matter. 34 U.S.C. §20913 and its subsections only

apply for a failure to meet the requirements of a

registering “jurisdiction” under 34 U.S.C. §20911 (10),

and the Federal Government is not a registering

jurisdiction and does not maintain a registry, it only

maintains a database.

Federal Requirements

18 U.S.C. § 2250

The only Federal (SORNA) enforcement

provision against individuals is found within the plain

text of 18 U.S.C. §2250, which subjects State sex

offenders to Federal prosecution under SORNA only if

they travel in interstate or foreign commerce and then

fail to register (new residence, school, or place of work)

under 34 U.S.C. §20913 (e). Seeking to evade a

“State's reach” Carr v. U.S., 560 U.S. 438, 452 (2010).

A §2250 violation by an active registrant must occur in

sequential order (Carr at 446): Showing an offender:

1. Is required to register

2. Travels in interstate commerce and

3. Knowingly fails to update a registration.

Before 4-4-2019 Petitioner was required to

of Michigan registry. The term required is clearly

defined in the present tense and placement on a

registry is left to the Jurisdiction in which a registrant

resides.

Resides & Required

Clearly Defined In The Present Tense

The terms “resides” in 18 U.S.C. §2250 was an

important topic of discussion in Carr where this Court

noted the clear language of §2250 and its use of the

term ‘resides’ is stated in the present tense. “A

statute's "undeviating use of the present tense" is a

"striking indic[ator]" of its "prospective orientation."

Carr, at 449 citing Gwaltney. v. Chesapeake , 484 U.S.

49, 59 (1987).

In fact, it was noted in its entirety that the Plain

Language of §225011 was stated in the present tense,

which includes the phrase “whoever is required,”

“elements of a §2250 violation are similarly set forth in

the present tense.” Carr at 449.

As cited supra, infra, this Court has noted the

distinction between a State and a Federal sex offender

on multiple occasions.

Federal v. State Conviction

Reynolds v. U.S., 565 U.S. 432 (2012) noted

there is a distinction between a Federal and a State

conviction: “Although a state pre-Act offender could not

be prosecuted until he traveled interstate, there is no

interstate requirement for a federal pre-Act offender”

The SORNA sections beginning at 34 U.S.C. § 20911 are also

written in the present tense.

at 441.

Thus based on the above, an active State

registrant, as opposed to an active Federal registrant,

as in U.S. v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387 (2013), cannot

be guilty of a §2250 violation unless they travel

interstate and then fail to register (new residence,

school, or place of work) under 34 U.S.C. § 20913 (e)

seeking to evade a “State's reach” Carr v. U.S., 560

U.S. 438, 452 (2010).

Reynolds

Delegation & Exceptions

While Reynolds is most noted for its patchwork

language, it also dealt with the applicability of

delegating to the U.S. Attorney General the decision

whether the 2006 SORNA Act could be applied

retroactively to pre-act offenders. ( The purpose of the

act was and is to coordinate State registries, not control

them). While the Court found authority was properly

delegated, that delegation was narrowly tailored to the

applicability of the Act and did not confer the power to

make exceptions to the Act, at 440.

The ability to make exceptions is reserved for

the States, who control the enforcement of their own

registries consistent with our system of dual

sovereignty, which is clear from the crafting of SORNA

and the absence of any language12 holding otherwise.

Congress did not want to repeat the missteps noted

supra in Lopez and Morrison. "[W]e will interpret a

Escondido Mut. Water . v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466

U.S. 765, 772 (1984), [absent] a clearly expressed legislative

intention to the contrary, [statutory] language must ordinarily be

regarded as conclusive.

statute to preserve rather than destroy the States'

"substantial sovereign powers." Pennsylvania Dept. of

Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209 (1998).

Prior to SORNA and the Federal laws which

preceded it, nearly every State had a registration

system which handily predated the Federal system and

in fact some State statutes had been around for “close

to half a century” U.S. v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 397

(2013).

Congress instead chose to handle federal

and state sex offenders differently. There

is nothing "anomal[ous]" about such a

choice . . . . It is similarly reasonable for

Congress to have given the States

primary responsibility for supervising

and ensuring compliance among state sex

offenders and to have subjected such

offenders to federal criminal liability only

when, after SORNA's enactment, they

use the channels of interstate commerce

in evading a State's reach. Carr at 452.

In support of the above, as noted in Kebodeaux,

“the Federal Government has prosecuted a sex

offender for violating SORNA only when that offender

also violated state-registration requirements” at 398.

Plain Language

The plain language doctrine has been an

unwavering bedrock of American jurisprudence, as

defined by the U.S. Supreme Court: “Where the

language is plain and admits of no more than one

meaning the duty of interpretation does not arise,”

Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). "[u]nless

otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally

interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning"

Also see Sebelius v. Cloer 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013).

The starting point for Statutory interpretation

is the statute itself. Statutory language must

ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."[I]n interpreting

a statute a court should always turn to one cardinal

canon before all others . . . [C]ourts must presume that

a legislature says in a statute what it means and

means in a statute what it says there." Connecticut

National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254

(1992).

While there have been many Constitutional

challenges to SORNA there are few challenges to its

textual interpretation and such textual challenges

have focused on the use of past and present tense.

As noted supra, SORNA is framed in a

“consistent use of the present tense” Nichols v. U.S.,

136 S. Ct. 1113, 1118 (2016) the plain language of

SORNA clearly defines who is required to register,

what constitutes a registry and a registering

jurisdiction.

The Sixth Circuit Opinion infers a rule that

simply does not exist by treating sections 34 U.S.C.

§90211 (1) and 34 U.S.C. §90213 (a) as stand-alone

provisions essentially resulting in the creation of a

residual clause to one of the most comprehensive

statutes the U.S. Congress has ever passed and would

be an enlargement of SORNA that transcends judicial

function. Iselin v. U.S., 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926).13

"Congress is presumed to act intentionally and purposely when it

includes language in one section but omits it in another." Estate of

Bell v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1991).

The Sixth Circuit also suggested that Petitioner

could have an “affirmative defense to a prosecution

predicated on failure to register if he offered to register

in Michigan and the state declined his offer . . . . After

that, there is nothing else for plaintiff to do (from the

perspective of SORNA) unless at least one relevant

circumstance changes.” 7a.

The Court left vague what it considered a

relevant change in circumstances, although under the

Plain Language of §2250 and Carr a §2250 violation by

an active registrant has three (3) elements which must

occur in sequential order (Carr at 446), supra.

Minus a §2250 violation the “affirmative

defense” suggestion by the Sixth Circuit is not required

or mandated, indeed the Federal Government’s

interest in punishing such state offenders would be “an

illogical result.” Carr at 446.

“A party"should not be required to await and

undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of

seeking relief." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188 (1973).

The above “affirmative defense” suggestion is “absurd”

and (U.S. v. Missouri Pac. 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929) is

not required by the Plain Language of SORNA.

There is zero ambiguity Chevron. v. Natural Res.

Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) the position of the

Sixth Circuit is unsupported by the Plain Language of

SORNA and allowing the Opinion to stand would

usurp other sections of SORNA including 18 U.S.C.

§2250 which is the only Federal penalty provision, thus

creating the type of rule/power which Chief Justice

Roberts warned about in his concurrence in

Kebodeaux, at 399-403, the rule the Sixth Circuit

insists is real and inferred simply ‘does not exist.’

Petitioner’s change in status must be recognized,

accepted by the Courts and Respondent, he is no longer

an active registrant but a former registrant. Even if

Petitioner were to change residence to go to school or

be employed in another State/Jurisdiction, his status

is entitled to Article IV, Full Faith and Credit.

There is not one case or SORNA section cited

by the Court’s Opinion which can point to direct Plain

Language or a Constitutional provision supporting the

notion that there exists an independent duty to

construction applies to resolve or eliminate ambiguity

in a criminal statute but “only to conduct clearly

covered” U.S. v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).

As this Court noted in Nichols v. U.S., 136 S. Ct.

1113, 1119 (2016).“ We interpret criminal statutes, like

other statutes, in a manner consistent with ordinary

English usage". . . even the most formidable argument

concerning the statute's purposes could not overcome

the clarity we find in the statute's text.”14

The Court’s Opinion relies on a rule which does

not exist, ignores controlling rulings of this Court, and

is an impermissible reach.

For all of the above reasoning, this Petition and

the issues within deserve to be granted certiorari by

this Court.

18 U.S.C. §2250 is a criminal statute Reynolds v. U.S., 565 U.S.

432 (2012) . “When criminal penalties are at stake . . . a relatively

strict test is warranted,” Springfield Armory, v. City of Columbus,

29 F.3d 250, 252 (6th Cir. 1994).

II.

IT WOULD VIOLATE THE 8TH AMENDMENT OF

THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO THREATEN A

FORMER REGISTRANT WITH PLACEMENT

ON A JURISDICTION’S REGISTRY WHEN THEY

HAVE ALREADY BEEN LEGALLY REMOVED

VIA STIPULATION AND ORDER IN FEDERAL

COURT.

The Sixth Circuit Opinion held SORNA did not

violate the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual

punishment prohibition, because a sanction must be a

punishment. The Court relied in part on prior analysis

noted in Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 477 (6th

Cir. 1999), which held a Tennessee state registration

law was not punishment for purposes of the Ex Post

Facto Clause and “It follows, therefore, that SORNA

is not punishment for purposes of the Eighth

Amendment either.” 9a-10a

The Sixth Circuit Opinion treats/confuses the Ex

Post Facto Clause15 and the 8th Amendment as one and

the same. The Ex Post Facto Clause deals with the

unfair imposition of a retroactive rule, which in and of

itself equals punishment. The 8th Amendment deals

with punishment that is so out of the norm that it is

indeed cruel and unusual or excessive (fine) to impose.

In Timbs v. Indiana, 586 U.S. --, 139 S. Ct. 682

(2019) the Petitioner was arrested for dealing a de

minimis amount of an illegal narcotic substance. As

a result of his arrest, law enforcement officials used

The Court did not make any distinction between an Ex Post Facto

law under Article 1 § 9 or Article 1 § 10, while Petitioner’s Brief in

the Sixth Circuit and here is based on Article 1 § 9.

state forfeiture laws to confiscate/seize Petitioner’s

luxury auto, even though Petitioner was able to prove

that the vehicle was purchased directly with funds

from an inheritance (life insurance policy). This Court,

in a watershed16 9-0 decision, held that the forfeiture

was indeed disproportionate and excessive in violation

of the 8th Amendment.

In the unanimous decision in Packingham v.

North Carolina, 137 S.Ct. 1730 (2017) this Court dealt,

in part, with the imposition of excessive internet

restrictions placed on registered offenders under state

law. This Court held that those restriction in fact

violated the 1st Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

While Packingham did not directly challenge

SORNA Justice Kennedy, the author of McKune v. Lile

536 U.S. 24 (2002) and Smith v. Doe 538 U.S. 84

(2003)17 (of which all offender cases are the progeny),

felt the necessity to opine his observations18 about its

‘Watershed rules implicate’ “the fundamental fairness and

accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,

495 (1990). See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) as the

example of a ‘ watershed rule, which was so essential to the

fairness of a proceeding that it altered the understanding of

bedrock procedural elements,’ O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151,

167 (1997).

In McKune and Smith the original intent of offender statutes was

to create a database to protect children from sexual predators, the

act was even called the Child Protection Act (citations omitted).

Echoing J. Stevens dissent at 113.“No matter how often the Court

may repeat and manipulate multifactor tests that have been

applied in wholly dissimilar cases involving only one or two of

these three aspects of these statutory sanctions, it will never

restrictions:

the “troubling fact” SORNA has grown to

impose severe restrictions “on persons

who already have served their sentence

and are no longer subject to the

supervision of the criminal justice

system” at 1737.

The one major difference in circumstances

between Petitioner’s case and the observations of

Justice Kennedy in Packingham, is that Petitioner is

no longer an active registrant and the position of the

Sixth Circuit and Respondent is not just troubling, it

in fact equals cruel and unusual, excessive punishment

and is based on a rule that simply does not exist but is

imposed by arbitrary fiat.

The restrictions imposed on registrants are the

most sweeping obstacle to the rights of an accused or

convicted individual since Gideon v. Wainwright, 372

U.S. 335 (1963) and a prior state conviction, by itself,

does not give the Federal Government a freestanding,

independent, and perpetual interest supra, in tracing

former offenders who are no longer subject to the

supervision of the criminal justice system.

Not One Documented Case

For Petitioner to go through the proper

channels for removal and be removed, only to be told at

a later date that there is a new duty to register, a duty

which does not exist, is indeed the epitome of cruel and

persuade me that the registration and reporting obligations that

are imposed on convicted sex offenders and on no one else as a

result of their convictions are not part of their punishment.”

unusual punishment and/or an excessive fine in

violation of the 8th Amendment

to the U.S.

Constitution.

“[T]he Framers also knew that there could be

exercises of cruelty by laws other than those which

inflicted bodily pain or mutilation.” Furman v. Georgia,

408 U.S. 238, 271 (1972). Indeed “[A] punishment may

be degrading simply by reason of its enormity” Furman

at 273. Also see Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 35 (1978).

At the heart of this case and Timbs, supra, is the

8th Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual

punishment, the “precept of justice that punishment

for crime should be graduated and proportioned to [the]

offense.” Weems v. U.S. , 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).

The Sixth Circuit Opinion is an enlargement of

SORNA, which transcends judicial function.’ Iselin v.

U.S., 270 U.S. 245, 251 (1926). No party has the right

to enforcement of an unconstitutional law, Tyson Foods

v. McReynolds, 865 F.2d 99,103 (6thCir.1989) especially

one that does not exist.

There is not one documented case of a former

registrant, who was legally removed from a registry,

being forced back on a registry because of a SORNA

mandate which does not exist.

It would be cruel and unusual punishment in

complete violation of the 8th Amendment19 to require an

individual to comply with restrictions which a Federal

Court has already Ordered are no longer required.

For all of the above certiorari should be granted.

The 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states: “Excessive

bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel

and unusual punishments inflicted.” The 8th Amendment is

applicable on the states via the 14th Amendment, Robinson v.

California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

III.

RESPONDENT WAS WELL AWARE OF THE

CONSEQUENCES THAT REMOVAL FROM A

JURISDICTION’S REGISTRY ALSO RESULTS IN

REMOVAL FROM THE SORNA DATABASE.

SORNA IS A CIVIL STATUTE. FAILURE BY AN

ADVERSE PARTY TO THE LITIGATION, TO

OBJECT TO REMOVAL IS RES JUDICATA.

In Does v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2016),

the Court ruled that Michigan’s SORA was unjust and

violated the Ex post facto clause (Article 1 § 10) of the

U.S. Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court denied

cert, thus affirming Snyder, and making the decision

controlling and binding for the states that comprise the

U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, a fact stated by

the DOJ: https://smart.gov/caselaw.htm. (Appendix in

Support of Complaint EFC1.1 PageID 100). Per

Snyder, Petitioner was legally removed from the

Michigan registry which as a consequence also

removed him from the Federal SORNA registry.

Not once did the lower courts or Respondent

address the undisputable DOJ Smart Office

admission/ruling, which noted and accepted the fact

that registration is conducted at the local level. Issues

not clearly raised or challenged in the briefs are

considered abandoned. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Swann,

27 F.3d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir.1994), Fleishman v. Cont’l

Cas., 698 F.3d 598, 608 (7th Cir. 2012) (rules “prevent

parties from getting two bites at the apple”).

Petitioner was removed from Michigan’s SORA

registry via Stipulation between himself and all State

of Michigan Defendants and a proper Order was

entered in the District Court (Stipulation & Order

(EFC.16 PageID 406). Because Respondent had clear

notice, reasonable diligence would dictate that, if they

had any objections to the Stipulation and Order, those

objections should have been raised at that time.

Res judicata

Except for sections 18 U.S.C. §2250 and 34

U.S.C. §20913 (e) SORNA is a civil statute to which

double jeopardy does not apply, but to which the

principles of Res Judicata a.k.a. claim preclusion and

issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, do

apply Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 n.1 (6th

Cir. 1987).

Not once did Respondent ever object to the

Stipulation. As a matter of law, Respondent could have

obtained further review (Currier v. Virginia, 138 S.Ct.

2144 (2018) yet did not, their silence on the subject

and their own prior SMART OFFICE statement noted

above are in fact a declaration against interest,

punctuated by deafening acquiescence equaling waiver.

The doctrine of the law of the case provides that "a

decision on an issue made by a court at one stage of a

case should be given effect in successive stages of the

same litigation." Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating

Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1988). Also see Arizona v.

California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983), U.S. v. Todd, 920

F.2d 399, 403 (6th Cir. 1990):

Historically, both claim and issue

preclusion have sought to "promot[e]

judicial economy by preventing needless

litigation." Currier at 2156 citing

Parklane Hosiery., 439 U.S. 322, 326

(1979).

The matter has been decided, the failure to

obtain further initial renew is in fact res judicata

Parklane Hosiery. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). Buck

v. Thomas M. Cooley Law, 597 F.3d 812, 817 -818 (6th

Cir. 2010).

IV.

ALLOWING ENFORCEMENT OF A SORNA

PROVISION WHICH WAS NEVER DELEGATED

AND DOES NOT EXIST IS INDEED AN EX POST

FACTO VIOLATION.

To date there is not one documented case of a

former registrant being legally removed from a registry

in Federal Court and then subsequently being forced to

re-register under SORNA, absent a new sex offense

conviction post-dating removal from a registry.

The Sixth Circuit Opinion held SORNA did not

violate the Ex Post Facto Clause (Article 1 § 9 ) of the

U.S. Constitution. The Court’s reasoning (8a) rested on

cases which involved active registrants only a few

years removed from conviction and/or parole, who

moved to other states or out of the country with clear

intent to evade detection, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§2250.

Applying SORNA to a former registrant (absent

a new sex conviction post-dating removal from a

registry) is in essence an ex post facto violation and

“subtle ex post facto violations are no more permissible

than overt ones.” Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,

46 (1990)20. [N]eed not impair a "vested right." Weaver

Also see Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 590 (1896), Beazell v.

Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925)."[R]etrospective laws are, indeed,

generally unjust." Eastern Enterprises v. APFEL, 524 U.S. 498,

533, (1998).

v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1981).

The Court had a duty to recognize Petitioner’s

change in status, and ‘documents incorporated into the

complaint by reference, and matters of which a court

may take judicial notice.’ Tellabs, v. Makor, 551 U.S.

308, 322 (2007). (See Amini v. Oberlin College, 259

F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001) Orders, exhibits in the

record).

Under any reasonable interpretation (Chevron)

of SORNA, the rule the Court insists exists, does not,

and was never delegated (Reynolds) because of the

concerns raised in Lopez and Morrison (all four cases

supra).

A prior state conviction, by itself, does not give

the Federal Government a freestanding, independent,

and perpetual interest supra, in tracing former

offenders thereby subjecting them to embarrassment,

expense and ordeal and compelling them to live in a

continuing state of anxiety and insecurity. Green, v.

U.S. 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).

SORNA no longer applies to Petitioner, he is

now an average member of the community and

applying a law which does not exist to punish “conduct

which would not be blameworthy in the average

member of the community would be too severe for that

community to bear.” Lambert v. California, 355 U.S.

225, 229 (1957).

Applying SORNA restrictions to a former

registrant, legally removed from a jurisdiction’s

registry in Federal Court, is in fact punishment, Calder

v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).

PETITIONER’S 1 AND 14th AMENDMENT

RIGHTS ARE SUFFICIENTLY THREATENED.

The right to be let alone is a most cherished

right and for someone who has lost that right, the hope

and opportunity to regain their anonymity is

immeasurable. In accessing the courts and exercising

his due process rights, Petitioner followed all of the

proper procedures and channels, and did regain his

privacy. To have his privacy taken away after

following the rules, because of a rule which simply does

not exist, would indeed violate his rights under the 1st

and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

In dismissing Petitioner’s 14th Amendment

claim the Court held (13a):

“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause is a directive to the states.

. . . SORNA, however, is a federal law.

Therefore, this claim fails from the start.”

Petitioner is not required to register under 34

U.S.C. §20911 (9)(10) and as a consequence he is not

subject to criminal liability under 34 U.S.C. §20913 (e)

and 18 U.S.C. §2250 (supra). Any contrary assertion

that he could be forced to re-register is a sufficient

threat of a loss of his liberty (actual injury21) "right to

privacy," to be let alone Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.

557, 564 (1969) and invokes the 14th Amendment,

Art. III, Sec.2 Cl. 1 U.S. Constitution. case or controversy. See

Railway Mail Assn. v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945). Muskrat v.

U.S., 219 U.S. 346 (1911).

because it would require having the State of Michigan

violate Petitioner’s due process rights (which he has

already exercised without objection), to fulfill an

obligation which does not exist.

Substantive due process applies to the right a

plaintiff has been denied, life, liberty or property.

County of Sacramento v. Lewis 523 U.S. 833 (1998)

Daniels, v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), Cleveland

Board. of Education. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532

(1985). Furthermore:

The Fourteenth Amendment requires due

process of law for the deprival of "liberty,"

just as for deprival of "life," and there

cannot constitutionally be a difference in

the quality of the process based merely

upon a supposed difference in the

sanction involved. Gideon v. Wainwright,

372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963).

"[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the

Due Process Clause . . . is not a series of isolated points

. . . . It is a rational continuum which, broadly

speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial

arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . ."

Justice Souter, concurring22 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.

266, 287 (1994). "[o]ne does not have to await the

consummation of threatened injury to obtain

preventive relief." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

845 (1994).

Citing J. Harlan. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961)

(dissenting opinion).

VI.

THIS CASE IS CAPABLE OF REPETITION YET

EVADING JUDICIAL REVIEW.

Not reaching a decision in this case could lead to

countless Federal and State filings.

A ruling in this case would impact every

registry and every registrant in every jurisdiction who

holds any glimmer of hope that they can be lawfully

removed from their jurisdiction’s registry, which in

turn would remove them from the SORNA database.

Based on all of the above, this case is capable of

repetition yet evading judicial review. Even

“[V]oluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not

deprive a federal court of its power to determine the

legality of the practice. . . . "[I]f it did, the courts would

be compelled to leave '[t]he defendant . . . free to return

to his old ways.'"Friends of The Earth v. Laidlaw, 528

U.S. 167, 189 (2000). See Mesquite v. Aladdin, 455 U.S.

283, 289 (1982), U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),

Globe v. Norfolk, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). Southern Pacific

Terminal v. I.C.C., 219 U.S. 498 (1911).

CONCLUSION

Petitioner seeks an Opinion and Order holding

that SORNA no longer applies to him or any other

similarly situated individual and that such a finding is

entitled to Article IV, Full Faith and Credit.

As final the arbiter (Article VI) Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) and for all of the

above reasoning, this Petition and the issues within

deserve to be granted certiorari by this Court.

REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

AND

OTHER RELIEF

If any of the above requested relief is granted, it

would amount to success on a significant issue in

litigation warranting recovery of attorney fees.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).2 3

If this Petition is granted certiorari, Petitioner

respectfully requests that the Court allow for paperless

filings, except for the copies noted in the Court’s April

15, 2020 Order requiring one copy on 8 ½ x 11 paper.

Dated: November 24, 2020

Respectfully Submitted,

s/Daniel C. Willman

Daniel C. Willman

Attorney for Petitioner

42 U.S.C. 1988

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