Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gilberto Medina-Jasso, Petitioner v. Georgia

APPENDIX

Appendix A:

Appendix B:

Appendix C:

Appendix D:

Appendix E:

Appendix F:

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Opinion of the Georgia Court of Appeals .......... ......... la

Order of Gwinnett Superior Court denying motion for new trial . . 14a

Order of the Georgia Court of Appeals denying rehearing. ...... 15a

Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia denying petition for writ

of certiorari... cc ec cc ce een nec e nee eeees 16a

State v. Medina-Jasso, Case No. 14B-00543-6, Gwinnett Superior

Court, Jury trial transcript (excerpt) ............ 02.0 eee eee 17a

State v. Medina-Jasso, Case No. 14B-00543-6, Gwinnett Superior

Court, Sentencing hearing transcript (excerpts)................ 19a

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A: Pet. App. la

SECOND DIVISION

MILLER, P. J.,

RICKMAN and REESE, JJ.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be

physically received In our clerk’s office within ten

days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.

http:/Awww.gaappeals.us/rules

February 12, 2020

NOT TO BE OFFICIALLY

REPORTED

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

A19A1768. MEDINA-JASSO v. THE STATE.

REESE, Judge.

Gilberto Medina-Jasso! (the “Appellant”) seeks review of an order of the

Superior Court of Gwinnett County, which denied his amended motion for new trial

after a jury found him guilty of sexual battery (as a lesser included offense of

ageravated sexual battery) and child molestation.” The Appellant argues that his trial

counsel was ineffective in failing to object to hearsay testimony, to present expert

testimony to challenge the reliability of the child victim, to raise a continuing-witness

' Although the Appellant testified that his name is “Gildardo Medina-Jasso LJ]

he explicitly waived any defect with regard to the spelling of his first name.

2 See OCGA §§ 16-6-22.1 (b); 16-6-22.2 (b); 16-6-4 (a) (1).

Pet. App. 2a

objection, and to request a jury instruction of sexual battery as a lesser included

offense of child molestation. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,’ the evidence shows the

following facts. In July 2013, X. D., who was ten years old, disclosed to a friend’s

mother that “a bad man,” who was a friend of X. D.’s mother, would get in X. D.’s

bed and do “ugly things” that hurt her. When the friend’s mother asked where it hurt,

X. D. pointed to her vagina.

The friend’s mother reported the outcry to the police, and met with then-

Lieutenant Bill Grogan. According to Grogan, the friend’s mother stated that X. D.

had said the man’s name was something along the lines of “Hill.” Grogan interviewed

X. D. at the police station the same night as the outcry, and the videotaped interview

was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.

Grogan had not had any training in conducting forensic interviews of suspected

child assault victims, and no one from the Gwinnett Sexual Assault Center was

available to assist him. During the interview, X. D. told Grogan that “Hill” had

touched her “all over,” inside and outside of her clothing and had penetrated her

vagina with his finger.

3 See Batten v. State, 295 Ga. 442, 443 (1) (761 SE2d 70) (2014).

2

Pet. App. 3a

Grogan spoke with X. D.’s mother “about who potentially Gil was[.]” X. D.’s

mother reported that both her ex-husband and the family’s babysitter were friends

with a man named “Gilberto.” X. D.’s mother identified the Appellant from a

photographic lineup as the man she knew as “Hill” or | “Gil.” X. D. separately

identified the Appellant from a photo lineup. The audio recording of the second

interview with X. D. and showing of the photo lineup was admitted into evidence and

played for the jury.

_ Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Kathy Carter met with X. D.’s mother a few

days later to obtain background information before conducting a forensic medical

exam on X. D. Carter testified that X. D.’s mother reported that X. D. had told a

friend’s mother that she had been “molested” by “Gilberto.” Carter further testified

that X. D. had been touched on multiple occasions by an individual whose name she

spelled as “H-e-y” and pronounced as “Hill.”

The Appellant testified that he had rented a room from X. D.’s mother several

times, but denied that he had ever touched X. D. After the jury found him guilty of

sexual battery and child molestation, appellate counsel filed an amended motion for

new trial, alleging that the Appellant was denied effective assistance of counsel at

trial. The trial court denied the motion after a hearing, and this appeal followed. -

3

Pet. App. 4a

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,

appellant must show counsel’s performance was deficient and that the

deficient performance prejudiced him to the point that a reasonable

probability exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the trial

would have been different. A strong presumption exists that counsel’s

conduct falls within the broad range of professional conduct. A

defendant who contends a strategic decision constitutes deficient

performance, must show that no competent attorney, under similar

circumstances, would have made it.’

“[A] court need not address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes

an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether

counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the

defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.”

In reviewing the denial of a motion for new trial, “we review de novo the trial

court’s decision as to any questions of law, while applying the clearly erroneous

standard of review to any factual findings made by that court, and we defer to the trial

* Davis v. State, 290 Ga. 584, 585-586 (2) (723 SE2d 431) (2012) (citations and

punctuation omitted). .

5 Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886, 891 (4) (700 SE2d 399) (2010) (citing Strickland

y. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 697 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984)) (punctuation

omitted).

Pet. App. 5a

court’s credibility determinations.”® With these guiding principles in mind, we turn

now to the Appellant’s specific claims of error.

1. The Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to

Nurse Carter’s hearsay testimony at trial when: Carter testified that, according to

X. D.’s mother, X. D. had told a friend’s mother that she had been molested (“double

hearsay”) and when Carter testified that X. D. told Carter that a man named “Hey”

had offered her money to go into his room. The Appellant also complains that counsel

should have objected to Detective Grogan’s testimony and to the admission and

publication of his video interview with X. D.

Specifically, the Appellant contends:

[T]he child hearsay statute, regardless of its form [either OCGA § 24-8-

820 or former OCGA § 24-3-16], is not an independent evidentiary rule

for cases tried under the new Georgia Evidence Code. Neither form of

the child hearsay statute states that child hearsay evidence shall be

admitted; it merely says that child hearsay is admissible or shali be

admissible, or capable of being admitted.

§ Sarat-Vasquez v. State, 350 Ga. App. 322, 323 (1) (829 SE2d 394) (2019)

(citations and punctuation omitted).

_ Pet. App. 6a

The Appellant concludes that “[t]he witness or witnesses to whom X. D. made a

statement describing sexual contact or physical abuse must be permitted to testify

about the hearsay statement in the first place.”

As an initial matter, we note that the new Evidence Code applies to this case

because the Appellant was tried in 2015, after the January 1, 2013 effective date of

the new Code.’ However, the version of the Child Hearsay Statute that applies is

OCGA § 24-3-16 (2012), which was in effect at the time the Appellant committed the

offenses.* |

Former OCGA § 24-3-16 provided:

A statement made by a child under the age of 14 years describing any act

of sexual contact or physical abuse performed with or on the child by

another or performed with or on another in the presence of the child is

admissible in evidence by the testimony of the person or persons to

whom made if the child is available to testify in the proceedings and the

court finds that the circumstances of the statement provide sufficient

indicia of reliability.

7 See Ga. L. 2011, pp. 99-100, § 1.

® See Ga. L. 2013, pp. 222, 243, § 21; Laster v. State, 340 Ga. App. 96, 99 (1),

n, 2 (796 SE2d 484) (2017). |

Pet. App. 7a

In his request for oral argument, the Appellant urged this Court to “decide

whether ‘is admissible’ in former OCGA § 24-3-16 means ‘must be admitted’

irrespective of the meaning of hearsay[.]” The Appellant noted, “[v]jery rately has this

Court addressed the statutory interaction between former OCGA § 24-3-16 and

evidence rules addressing hearsay and the prior statements of a testifying witness[.]

Instead, this Court has generally concluded that former OCGA § 24-3-16 is an

exception to the hearsay rule or the prior consistent statement rule[.]”

We agree with this characterization. As we held in Laster v. State (with regard

to former OCGA § 24-3-16):?

‘Generally speaking, unless a witness’s veracity has affirmatively been

_ placed in issue, the witness’s prior consistent statement is pure hearsay

evidence, which cannot be admitted merely to corroborate the witness,

or to bolster the witness’s credibility in the eyes of the jury. The Child

Hearsay Statute, however, is a legislatively-created exception to the

general rule prohibiting such hearsay evidence and provides that, so

long as certain conditions are met, a statement made by a child

describing any act of sexual contact is admissible in evidence by the

person to whom the statement was made. As such, the Child Hearsay

Statute actually contemplates testimony from both the child and those

° Laster, 340 Ga. App. at 98-99 (1).

7

_ Pet. App. 8a

witnessing the child’s later reaction, even if the hearsay may be

“bolstering.”

The Appellant does not argue that the evidence did not meet the requirements

of former OCGA § 24-3-16, only that the trial court erred in considering the child

hearsay statute in isolation and that the State needed some other evidentiary rule to

support the admission of the evidence. However, as discussed above, we have held

that former OCGA § 24-3-16 created an exception to the hearsay and prior consistent

statement rules. Although the Appellant may disagree with this construction of the

Evidence Code, “trial counsel’s performance cannot be deemed deficient for not

raising an unsettled question of law.”"' Accordingly, this claim of error fails."

2. The Appellant contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to present

expert testimony to challenge the reliability of X. D.’s statements to Detective

Grogan. At the motion for new trial hearing, the Appellant presented the testimony

of an expert in psychology, forensic psychology, and interviewing children. The

© Tq. (citations and punctuation omitted).

1 Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 482 (IV) (a) (807 SE2d 350) (2017).

2 See Grier v. State, 339 Ga. App. 778, 782 (2) (b) (792 SE2d 737) (2016) (“A

meritless argument provides no basis for an ineffectiveness claim”).

8

Pet. App. 9a

expert witness criticized, inter alia, the overall atmosphere of the interview room,

Grogan’s use of yes-or-no and other closed and/or leading questions, his pervasive

self-disclosure during the interview, and his use of statements encouraging X. D. to

“help” him.

Trial counsel also testified at the motion for new trial hearing regarding why

he did not ask for funds for an expert witness to review the forensic interview: “In my

31 years being a lawyer and 26-plus years being a defense attorney, I really have not

found too many reliable expert witnesses in this field. And when there’s an alleged

child victim testifying, it’s been my experience if you bring in a hired gun to pull

apart the child’s interview, it can do more damage than good for your client.” Trial

counsel added that he was “comfortable enough with [his] ability to cross-examine

[Grogan] as to his deficiencies.”

“The decision whether to call an expert witness is a matter of trial strategy |

within the broad range of professional conduct afforded trial attorneys.”"’ In fact, as

outlined above, trial counsel’s testimony demonstrates that his decision was a

3 Davis, 290 Ga. at 586 (2) (a).

Pet. App. 10a

strategic one.'* Because the Appellant has failed to show that “no competent attorney,

under similar circumstances, would have made” this strategic decision, he has failed

to show deficient performance.” This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel thus

fails.'®

3. The Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a

_continuing-witness objection to prevent State’s Exhibits 2 and 5 from going out with

the jury. |

Exhibit 2 consists of one page of instructions in Spanish and a second page

containing a lineup of six photographs. X. D.’s mother circled “Photo 4,” a

photograph of the Appellant, and signed the instruction page. On the instruction page,

someone other than X. D.’s mother handwrote “ID of child molestation suspect[.]”

'4 See Winfield v. State, 278 Ga. App. 618, 620-621 (2) (629 SE2d 548) (2006)

(rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim where trial counsel testified that he

did not think an expert witness was necessary to testify about the unreliability of

eyewitness identifications based upon photographic lineups, although counsel later

admitted that on “hindsight,” an expert may have pointed out problems with the

lineup a little more convincingly).

'5 See Davis, 290 Ga. at 585-586 (2).

6 See Long, 287 Ga. at 891 (4).

10

Pet. App. ila

Grogan testified that X. D.’s mother identified the photo as the man she knew as “Gil.”

Exhibit 5 is the English version of the instructions and lineup, which was

shown to X. D. X. D. also circled the photo of the Appellant. The instruction page,

which has partially been filled in by hand, states: “I, [X. D.,] having been shown 6

photographs by Lt. Bill Grogan, hereby identify photograph number 4 as being the

perpetrator in the crime of child molestation.”

The photo lineup documents in this case do not contain statements of the

witnesses, but rather are “tools to explain the photograph lineup display which was

shown to the witnesses before trial.””’ “{T]he challenged exhibits were not written

testimony and did not derive their evidentiary value solely from the credibility of their

makers. Instead, they were original documentary evidence, and were properly allowed

. 7 Kenney v. State, 196 Ga. App. 776, 777 (2) (397 SE2d 776) (1990) (citation

and punctuation omitted); see also Rainwater v. State, 300 Ga. 800, 803-804 (2-3)

"(797 SE2d 889) (2017) (To the extent that handwritten statements on photo lineup

forms describing the defendant’s actions went beyond identification, allowing the

forms to go back with the jury violated the continuing witness rule. However, the

defendant failed to show prejudice from any deficient performance in counsel’s

failure to object in light of the greater emphasis placed upon one of the statements at

trial and the strong evidence that the defendant was a party to the crimes.).

11

Pet. App. 12a

to go out with the jury.”* Thus, the Appellant has failed to show deficient

performance.”

4, The Appellant contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object

to the trial court’s failure to charge the jury with sexual battery as a lesser included

offense of child molestation.

The evidence at trial established that the Appellant repeatedly touched X. D.

outside and inside her clothing, that he penetrated his vagina with his finger, that this

contact was painful for X. D., and that the Appellant offered her money to go into his

‘room. This evidence supported an inference that the Appellant attempted to conceal

his behavior and that he acted with the intent to arouse or satisfy his own or the

victim’s sexual desires.”° In contrast, the Appellant testified unequivocally at trial that

he had never touched X. D. “[W]Jhere, as here, the evidence establishes either the

18 Davis v. State, 285 Ga. 343, 348 (8) (676 SE2d 215) (2009).

19 See Grier, 339 Ga. App. at 782 (2) (b). _

20 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (1); see also Eubanks v. State, 332 Ga. App. 568,

571-572 (3) (774 SE2d 146) (2015) (holding that the evidence was sufficient to

support child molestation conviction where the defendant attempted to conceal his

behavior by ensuring the victim would be in his own bedroom and by stopping when

interrupted by another household member awakening and where the defendant did not

heed the victim’s protests). —

12

Pet. App. 13a

commission of the completed offense as charged, or the commission of no offense,

the trial court is not authorized to charge the jury on a lesser included offense.””’

Accordingly, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request the charge,” and

this claim of error also fails.

Judgment affirmed. Miller, P. J., and Rickman, J., concur.

21 Rainey v. State, 261 Ga. App. 888, 891 (2) (584 SE2d 13) (2003) (citation

and punctuation omitted).

22 See Greene v. State, 295 Ga. App. 803, 809 (5) (673 SE2d 292) (2009)

(Where the State presented evidence sufficient to establish all the elements of

kidnapping with bodily injury, and no evidence was presented raising only the lesser

offense of kidnapping, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a charge

on kidnapping).

. 13

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B: Pet. App. l4a

-LERK SUPERIOR COURT

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GWINNETT COUNTY SWIRRETT COUNTY. Ga

STATE OF GEORGIA 219SEF 19 PH 2:29

STATE OF GEORGIA, * RICHARD ALEXANDER. CLERK

vs. * CRIMINAL INDICTMENT NO.:

GILBERTO MEDINA-JASSO, * 14-B-00543-6

| Defendant. *

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, AS AMENDED

Defendant's Motion for New Trial in the above-styled action having come on for

hearing, and the Court having considered the motion, as amended, argument of

counsel, transcript, and all other matters of record, and having considered the

applicable and controlling law, it is hereby ORDERED |

That Defendant's Motion for New Trial, as amended, is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED, this LL. day of September, 2018.

C= é. Gr

RONNIE K. BATCHELOR, Judge

Superior Court of Gwinnett County

cf:

Frances Kuo, Esq.

Marlene Zekser, Assistant District Attorney

APPENDIX C |

APPENDIX C: Pet. App. 15a |

Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, March 20, 2020

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A19A1768. GILBERTO MEDINA-JASSO v. THE STATE.

| Upon consideration of the Motion for Reconsideration, filed in the abovestyled case on behalf of the Appellant, the motion is hereby DENIED.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,__ 03/20/2020

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

APPENDIX D

APPENDIX D: Pet. App. l6a

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA

Case No. $20C1161

October 19, 2020

The Honorable Supreme Court met pursuant to

adjournment.

The following order was passed.

GILBERTO MEDINA-JASSO v. THE STATE.

The Supreme Court today denied the petition for certiorari

in this case.

All the Justices concur, except Warren, J., not participating.

Court of Appeals Case No. A19A1768

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA

Clerk's Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true extract from the

minutes of the Supreme Court of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto

affixed the day and year last above written.

APPENDIX E

APPENDIX E: Pet. App. l7a

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GWINNETT COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

THE STATE OF GEORGIA,

-VS- : CASE NO. 14-B-0543-6

GILBERTO MEDINA-JASSO,

Defendant.

JURY TRIAL TRANSCRIPT

VOLUME 3 OF 5

PAGES 342 THROUGH 487

THURSDAY, APRIL 30, 2015

COURTROOM 3-C, GWINNETT CO. COURTHOUSE, LAWRENCEVILLE, GA

THE HONORABLE RONNIE K. BATCHELOR, Presiding

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:

For the State: MARLENE ZEKSER, Assistant D.A.

Gwinnett County District Attorney

75 Langley Drive

Lawrenceville, GA 30046

For the Defendant: ROBERT GREENWALD, Attorney at Law

485 S. Perry Street, Suite D

Lawrenceville, GA 30046

SPANISH INTERPRETER: Ms. Stella Kirkpatrick

Lagena O. Hill, CVR-CM-M, RVR

Certified Court Reporter

P.O. Box 116

Grayson, GA 30017

(770) 822-8635

Pet. App. 18a

cause her pain?

A Correct.

Q And that is normal in children that are her age at

that particular Tanner stage; is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q If we could go back to your interview with her, if

you would read what she told you from your report.

A Just beginning at the top of the page?

Q Yeah, underneath the general case number, underneath

where it says "Supplemental Narrative."

A Okay. "The first contact occurred at age 8 in her

home and that it hurt but denies bleeding. The patient states

that the 'Hey' touched her under her clothes. She denied

feeling any type of digital penetration. The patient states

this type of contact occurred multiple times, the last contact

at age 9. Quote, unquote, 'It was really raining hard."

"Quote, unquote, 'I can't remember exactly when it

happened.' The patient states on a couple of occasions ‘'Hey'

asked her to sit next to him and she said no, and told her that

he would give her $20 if she would go into his room. 'I said

no.! The last possible exposure the patient had to 'Hey' was

in January of 2013."

Q So she told you that it hurt?

A Correct. |

Q When you examined her, when you touched the outside

352

APPENDIX F

APPENDIX F: Pet. App. 19a

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GWINNETT COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

THE STATE OF GHORGIA,

-vVs- : CASE NO. 14-B-0543-6

GILBERTO MEDINA-JASSO,

Defendant.

JURY TRIAL TRANSCRIPT

VOLUME 5 OF 5

#e** SENTENCING ****

PAGES 529 THROUGH 535

FRIDAY, MAY 8, 2015

COURTROOM 3-C, GWINNETT CO. COURTHOUSE, LAWRENCEVILLE, GA

THE HONORABLE RONNIE K. BATCHELOR, Presiding

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:

For the State: MARLENE ZEKSER, Assistant D.A.

Gwinnett County District Attorney

75 Langley Drive

Lawrenceville, GA 30046

For the Defendant: ROBERT GREENWALD, Attorney at Law

485 S. Perry Street

Lawrenceville, GA 30046

SPANISH INTERPRETER: Ms. Stella Kirkpatrick

Lagena O. Hill, CVR-CM-M, RVR

Certified Court Reporter

P.O. Box 116

Grayson, GA 30017

(770) 822-8635

24

25

Pet. App. 20a

PROCEEDINGS

(In open court, 10:24 AM)

(The defendant was brought into the courtroom.)

THE COURT: Let's set up the record.

MS. ZEKSER: This is Case 14-B-0543-6, the State of

Georgia vs. Gilberto Medina-Jasso. Would you raise your

right hand, please.

(Interpreter sworn.)

MS. ZEKSER: Would you state your name for the

record, please.

THE INTERPRETER: Stella Kirkpatrick.

MS. ZEKSER: Your Honor, as the Court recalls, Mr.

Medina-Jasso was found guilty by a jury of one count of

child molestation and one count of sexual battery, a

misdemeanor. The child molestation charge carries a

sentence of between five and 20 years. And the sexual

battery is up to 12 months.

MR. GREENWALD: It's a felony, because she's under

16. |

MS. ZEKSER: Oh, because she's under 16. So it'sal

to 5. But in this case because of the nature of the

sexual battery charge and because of the child

molestation, I would agree with Mr. Greenwald that it

would merge. So the maximum sentence in this case, Your

Honor, would be 20 years.

529

24

25

Pet. App. 2la

The State is requesting a sentence of 15 years to

serve, Your Honor. Mr. Medina-Jasso took advantage of a

small child who was alone and left alone by her mother

that we know of and molested her while he was intoxicated

on more than one occasion. Your Honor, what he did toa

child who even at the date that she took the stand who was

11 is reprehensible. Mr. Medina-Jasso -- I do not believe

Mr. Medina-Jasso is a citizen of the United States; is

that correct, Mr. Greenwald?

MR. GREENWALD: That's correct. And he has an

immigration hold.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. ZEKSER: The State understands that he will be

deported. However, the State does want him to be

responsible for what he did to a small child, and that's

why we're asking for 15 years.

THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr. Greenwald?

MR. GREENWALD: Judge, I concur for sentencing

purposes, Your Honor, under 16-1-6, that because of the

way the nature of the count was indicted and the jury

verdict of sexual battery as opposed to the indicted

charge of aggravated sexual battery, it does merge for

sentencing purposes with Count 2 the way it's indicted,

Judge. So I would agree with Ms. Zekser, the maximum

punishment is 20 years.

530

Adeeb escumdcreieaele

cbta ide Bebra pedis laden Looms pata cod lay ae nee

Pet. App. 22a

THE DEFENDANT: No.

MR. GREENWALD: Have you understood everything that

Ms. Kirkpatrick has been translating for you?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Greenwald. All right, I'm

going to follow the State's recommendation. I'm going to

sentence him to 15 years to serve.

MR. GREENWALD: With the credit, I assume, Judge?

THE COURT: Yes, he gets credit for the time he has

been in confinement.

MR. GREENWALD: Thank you. Do you want me to file a

skeleton motion for new trial, Judge?

THE COURT: I need to advise him. I need to advise

him myself that he has 30 days to appeal his conviction.

He may do so by either filing a motion for new trial or

notice of appeal within 30 days. I understand, Mr.

Greenwald, you're going to help him initially if he

decides he wishes to appeal?

MR. GREENWALD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: He also has a right to challenge his

conviction and sentence by means of a writ of habeas

corpus. If he wishes to do that, then he must do it

within four years. Do you understand, sir?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: If you'll go back with the deputy,

533