Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Craig B. Snoddy, Petitioner v. United States

Case No.___________

____________

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

___________

CRAIG B. SNODDY,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

__________

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Dennis J. Clark

Supreme Court Bar No. 130830

Attorney for Petitioner

Craig B. Snoddy

Clark Law Firm PLLC

645 Griswold, Suite 2200

Detroit, MI 48226

djclarklaw@gmail.com

313-962-2233

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Should certiorari be granted to determine whether the court of appeals’

decision not to suppress the evidence found in a warrantless vehicle search,

when the search was actually done for the purpose of investigation and not as

an inventory search, conflicts with this Court’s decisions in South Dakota v.

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976), Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.

367, 107 S.Ct. 738 (1987), and Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632

(1990)?

i

LIST OF RELATED PROCEEDINGS

•

United States v. Craig B. Snoddy, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District

of Tennessee, No. 4:18-cr-00009. Judgment entered on September 26, 2019.

•

United States v. Craig B. Snoddy, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,

No. 19-6089. Judgment entered on September 24, 2020.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

Question Presented for Review...................................................................... ....................i

List of Related Proceedings.................................................................................................ii

Table of Contents..............................................................................................................iii

Table of Authorities............................................................................................................iv

Opinion Below......................................................................................................................1

Jurisdictional Statement ....................................................................................................1

Constitutional Provision Involved.....................................................................................1

Statement of the Case..........................................................................................................1

Reasons for Allowance of the Writ......................................................................................7

THE WARRANTLESS VEHICLE SEARCH WAS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE IT

WAS ACTUALLY DONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION, AND

NOT AS AN INVENTORY SEARCH, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS’

DECISION NOT TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE SEARCH

CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S DECISIONS IN SOUTH DAKOTA V.

OPPERMAN, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976), COLORADO V. BERTINE,

479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738 (1987), and FLORIDA V. WELLS, 495 U.S. 1, 110

S.Ct. 1632 (1990).......................................................................................................7

Conclusion and Relief Requested......................................................................................16

Appendix

Opinion in United States v. Craig B. Snoddy, U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit, No. 19-6089, issued September 24, 2020

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page Nos.

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009).......................................................7

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011)................................................11

Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738 (1987)............................7, 8, 10, 14, 16

Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632 (1990)..........................................7, 8, 10, 16

Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 103 S.Ct. 2605 (1983).................................................9

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976).......................7, 8, 9, 16

United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1999)......................................................12

United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633 (10th Cir. 2001).................................................12

United States v. Johnson, 889 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018).................................................11

United States v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800 (6th Cir. 2001)......................................................10

United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2012)................................................12

United States v. Orozco, 858 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2017)....................................................11

United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2003)...................................................12

United States v. Snoddy, 976 F.3d 630, No. 19-6089 (6th Cir. 2020).......................passim

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996)...................................9, 10

Constitutional Provision

U.S. Const. Amend. IV.................................................................................................1, 2

Statutory Provisions

18 U.S.C. §924......................................................................................................................1

iv

21 U.S.C. §841......................................................................................................................1

28 U.S.C. §1254(1)...............................................................................................................1

Court Rule

Supreme Court Rule 10.......................................................................................................7

v

OPINION BELOW

The Opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is

United States v. Craig B. Snoddy, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, No.

19-6089, R. 36-2 (6 th Cir. 2020). The Opinion is made part of the appendix hereto.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

In the district court, Snoddy filed a suppression motion which was denied.

Subsequently, he entered a plea of guilty to possession of methamphetamine with

intent to distribute (in violation of 21 U.S.C. §841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)) and possessing a

firearm in furtherance of the drug offense (in violation of 18 U.S.C. §924(c)),

conditioned on retaining his right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion.

On September 24, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth

Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and the denial of Snoddy’s

suppression motion.

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1254(1) to review the court of

appeals’ decision on petition for a writ of certiorari.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

U.S. Const. Amend. IV:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,

and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In the district court, Snoddy filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as

1

a result of the stop of the vehicle he was driving, his arrest and the subsequent

search of the vehicle. He alleged that the warrantless search was unconstitutional

in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. (Motion to

Suppress, R. 19, Page ID#39-45). This motion was denied. (Order on R&R

Suppress, R. 44, Page ID#143-149).

The parties entered into a Plea Agreement whereby Snoddy agreed to plead

guilty to the drug and firearm offenses, with the condition that he retained the right

to appeal the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. (Plea Agreement, R.

49, Page ID#157-158, ¶¶1-2). In accord with the Plea Agreement (Plea Agreement,

R. 49, Page ID#160, ¶6), Snoddy was sentenced to be imprisoned for a total term of

212 months of incarceration, to be followed by supervised release for a term of 8

years. (Tr. Sent. Hrg., R. 74, Page ID#456-473; Judgment, R. 70, Page ID#440-446).

After the filing of an appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s

denial of the suppression motion.

Factual Sequence of Police Activity and Conduct as to the Stop, Arrest, Search

and Seizure1

About 1:00 a.m. on November 9, 2017, in a rural area on Route 64 in

Franklin County, Tennessee, a Highway Patrol Officer (Malone) stopped a vehicle

1

This factual recitation is based on both the testimony at the suppression

hearing (Tr. Suppress. Hrg., R. 75, Page ID#474-546), and the video of the event

which was taken by the camera positioned in the police cruiser at the scene

(Defendant’s Exhibit 2 to appellant brief). The video camera recorded the entire

incident from the stop of the vehicle through Snoddy’s arrest and then the search of

the vehicle and seizure of items from it.

2

driven by Snoddy for speeding; Snoddy pulled over and parked entirely on the

shoulder of the highway, not obstructing traffic in either direction. (Tr. Suppress.

Hrg., R. 75, Page ID#478-480, 499). One minute later, the officer approached the

driver’s side door and spoke to Snoddy, who said he was traveling to his girlfriend’s

house in Manchester; the officer told Snoddy that he was approximately 25 minutes

away from there. (Id., Page ID#500; Video Part 1, 2:34). The officer then returned

to his cruiser with Snoddy’s license and the vehicle’s registration and insurance

information. (Id., Page ID#502; Video Part 1, 4:52).

At 6 ½ minutes after the vehicle stop, the police officer – while sitting in the

cruiser – was told by “dispatch” that Snoddy had outstanding warrants out of

Georgia; one of the warrants was “for a drug charge”. (Id., Page ID#481, 502; Video

Part 1, 8:00). Approximately 5 ½ minutes later, the officer was told the warrants

were “full extradition” (Video Part 1, 13:50); at that point, he determined to arrest

Snoddy. (Tr. Suppress. Hrg., R. 75, Page ID#481-482). After being told about the

warrants, the officer said that “somewhat raised my suspicion that there might be

something else going on as well.” (Id., Page ID#483).

The officer sat in his cruiser for approximately another 13 ½ minutes waiting

for “back-up” to arrive; Snoddy remained seated in his vehicle for the entire time

(since the vehicle stop). During this interval, while speaking to dispatch, the officer

said: “I could tell something was up whenever I stopped him”. (Id., Page ID#502;

Video Part 1, 20:40). Two minutes later, the officer told the dispatcher: “I’ll try to

search when the county gets here or see if I can.” (Id., Page ID#503; Video Part 1,

3

23:00).

Four minutes later, after another police officer arrived at the scene, both

officers approached the Snoddy vehicle and directed Snoddy to exit it, whereupon he

was arrested / handcuffed. (Video Part 1, 27:25). About one minute later (at the

29:00 - 30:00 mark of Video Part 1), the state officer (Malone) began a 12 minute

period in which he asked Snoddy 21 times if he could search the vehicle or if Snoddy

would tell him what was inside the vehicle. (Tr. Suppress. Hrg., R. 75, Page

ID#503). The officer repeatedly told Snoddy that if he didn’t agree to let the police

search the vehicle, it would be inventoried. (Id., Page ID#504; Video Part 1, 29:55).

Each time, Snoddy declined to consent. The officer tried to persuade Snoddy to

consent to a search, and he threatened to conduct the search unless Snoddy told

him the location of drugs the officer supposed were there. For example, he said at

one point: “Don’t make me tear apart this car. Just tell me where it’s at.” (Id., Page

ID#507, Video Part 1, 33:35). Both officers continued to ask Snoddy to tell them

what was in the car, with one of them speculating aloud that it was “meth”. (Video

Part 1, 34:30-35:00). Receiving no consent from Snoddy, the officer ordered a tow

truck at about 36 minutes after the stop. (Video Part 1, 36:25). Nonetheless, he

continued to seek Snoddy’s permission to search; otherwise he “was going to do an

inventory”. (Video Part 1, 37:00).

After about another minute, the officer (Malone) began to look inside the

vehicle through the windows using a flashlight, (Tr. Suppress. Hrg., R. 75, Page

ID#508; Video Part 1, 38:00), and he said to Snoddy that if he had “to tear it up,

4

that’s on you”. (Id., Page ID#507-508, Video Part 1, 38:15). At that point, the backup officer began to search Snoddy’s person by emptying his personal property from

the pockets of his clothing. (Id., Page ID#508, Video Part 1, 39:20).

At approximately 41 minutes after the vehicle stop, the officer informed

Snoddy that the “wrecker” was en route and that he was going to go ahead and

inventory the vehicle. (Id., Page ID#509, Video Part 1, 41:00). About 1 minute

later, the officer entered the vehicle, and began a search of the entire vehicle and all

of its contents, including the passenger compartment and trunk; he opened the

glove box, console, luggage and any other area or item which could contain property.

(Id., Page ID#489-490). After another 1 ½ minutes, when the officer again asked

Snoddy whether there was anything illegal in the car, he said: “Where is it?” (Video

Part 1, 43:35). Continuing to search, the officer appeared to retrieve an object and

asked Snoddy what was in it. The officer then opened it and said: “I told you I was

going to find it anyway. How much meth is it?” (Video Part 1, 45:00). A few

moments later, the officer remarked: “I was going to find it either way”. (Video Part

1, 46:50).

Continuing to search inside the vehicle, the officer found a gun. (Video Part

1, 47:40). The back-up officer briefly joined the search. Then, the officer (Malone)

opened the trunk and, along with the back-up officer, searched it and a suitcase was

found inside (Video Part 1, 53:10-54:00; Video Part 2, 2:00). The suitcase was

opened, the contents were searched and then it was placed in the back seat of the

vehicle. (Tr. Suppress. Hrg., R. 75, Page ID#512-513).

5

After a few more minutes, Snoddy (who had been standing, handcuffed

outside the vehicle throughout the arrest and search process) was walked back to

the police cruiser and placed inside. At about 12 minutes into part 2 of the video,

the wrecker arrived and eventually the vehicle was lifted onto it and the wrecker

pulled away. A few minutes later, the officer put items into what appears to be

evidence bags. (Video Part 2, 20:30). Thereafter, the officer (Malone) left the scene

and drove his cruiser with Snoddy inside to the police station. (Video Part 2, 24:0042:00).

At the suppression hearing, the officer (Malone) testified that he decided to

have the vehicle towed rather than leaving it on the side of the road or allowing

Snoddy’s girlfriend (the vehicle’s owner) to retrieve it. (Tr. Suppress. Hrg., R. 75,

Page ID#482, 491, 500-501). Since the vehicle was to be towed, he said he had to

inventory all the contents of the entire vehicle per state police policy. (Id., Page

ID#484; Govt. Ex. 1, R. 80-1, Page ID#582-584). In doi ng so, he did not list every

item; he wrote on the inventory that “there were clothes, suitcases, and things of

that nature in the vehicle”, which were left in the vehicle and not taken to police

custody for safekeeping; the inventory section of the tow-in report indicates the

items found in the vehicle were clothing, CDs, suitcases and a cellphone. (Tr.

Suppress. Hrg., R. 75, Page ID#488-489, 513-515; Govt. Ex. 2, R. 80-2, Page

ID#589). The only thing the officer took out of the car were drugs

(methamphetamine), two guns and scales. (Id., Page ID#489, 515; Govt. Ex. 3, R.

80-3, Page ID#590).

6

REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE OF THE WRIT

This petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted for the compelling

reason that a “United States court of appeals ... has decided an important federal

question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.” Supreme

Court Rule 10 (c).

The court of appeals’ opinion conflicts with Supreme Court law on a

significant Fourth Amendment issue. Consequently, the case presents an

opportunity for this Court to clarify the correct legal analysis, and, in doing so,

instruct the courts below to ensure systematic fairness when this issue arises in like

circumstances.

THE WARRANTLESS VEHICLE SEARCH WAS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE

IT WAS ACTUALLY DONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION,

AND NOT AS AN INVENTORY SEARCH, AND THE COURT OF

APPEALS’ DECISION NOT TO SUPPRESS THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN

THE SEARCH CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S DECISIONS IN

SOUTH DAKOTA V. OPPERMAN, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976),

COLORADO V. BERTINE, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738 (1987), and

FLORIDA V. WELLS, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632 (1990)

The warrantless vehicle search, according to the police, was undertaken as

an inventory search, which is an exception to the general rule that warrantless

searches of vehicles “are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment...”

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009). In reality, the search

was a ruse to rummage through the entire vehicle and its contents for investigatory

purposes unrelated to the vehicle stop or Snoddy’s arrest. Labeling it an inventory

search was a pretext to look for drugs (as evidence of another crime), which the

7

police suspicioned would be found. Therefore, it was unlawful and violative of the

Fourth Amendment.

When the court of appeals arrived at a different conclusion, it did so by using

an incorrect legal analysis, i.e., one that conflicts with what this Court has

established as the applicable law. But, the circuit court did acknowledge the lesson

of South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 375–76, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976), by

stating: “...officers cannot hide an investigative search under the pretext of an

inventory search.” (Op. at 5). Specifically, that case held that a warrantless

inventory search is not constitutionally violative provided that the search is not a

“pretext concealing an investigatory police motive”. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376.

In its opinion, the circuit court also referenced Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4,

110 S.Ct. 1632 (1990), for the proposition that the inventory exception only applies

when the police follow “standardized criteria” or “established routine” governing the

scope of the inventory search. (Op. at 5). But, the Wells Court also said:

“...standardized criteria, ibid., or established routine, Illinois v. Lafayette,

462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L.Ed.2 d 65 (1983), must regulate

the opening of containers found during inventory searches is based on the

principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a general

rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence. The policy or practice

governing inventory searches should be designed to produce an inventory.

The individual police officer must not be allowed so much latitude that

inventory searches are turned into ‘a purposeful and general means of

discovering evidence of crime,’ Bertine, 479 U.S., at 376, 107 S.Ct., at 743

(BLACKMUN, J., concurring).”

Wells, 495 U.S. at 4. In Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S.Ct. 738 (1987),

this Court declared:

8

“Nothing in Opperman or Lafayette prohibits the exercise of police discretion

so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on

the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.”

479 U.S. at 375, 107 S.Ct. at 743 (emphasis added), citing South Dakota v.

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (1976) and Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S.

640, 103 S.Ct. 2605 (1983).

Despite this legal requirement, the court of appeals went on to find the

instant inventory search to be objectively reasonable “regardless of [the police

officer’s] motivations and beliefs...” (Op. at 7). The court said:

“‘The Fourth Amendment permits impoundment decisions and inventory

searches that are objectively justifiable . . . regardless of an officer’s

subjective intent.’ Kimes, 246 F.3d at 805 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 812). In

these circumstances—where the arrestee is the sole occupant of the car and

the car would be left on the side of the road in the middle of the

night—impounding the car reasonably could be seen as objectively

justifiable.’”

(Id.). In making this finding and affirming the denial of the suppression motion,

the circuit court has contravened the above recited Supreme Court law and failed to

apply the correct legal standard.

As noted, the court of appeals cited to Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,

812, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996), which is distinguishable on its facts because it did not

involve an inventory search; rather, it involved the reasonableness of a traffic stop

and temporary detention of a motorist who was observed (after the stop) to have

drugs in his hands. Nonetheless, Whren is instructive here because this Court said:

“Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or

administrative inspection (discussed above), that an officer's motive

invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but

9

we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary.”

517 U.S. at 812 (emphasis added). The “discussed above” in Whren, as to the

inventory search, were the decisions in Florida v. Wells, supra, and Colorado v.

Bertine, supra, which clearly prohibit an inventory search being a ruse for the

purpose of investigation.

The court of appeals’ opinion eviscerates this principle by essentially saying

that subjective intent or motive does not matter in the context of an inventory

search. Thus, it contravenes this Court’s definitive pronouncements on how this

issue is to be analyzed.

Interpreting what these rules mean, in the face of clear subjective

investigatory intent, has been challenging for the Circuits. In the instant case, the

court of appeals held that “regardless of [the officer’s] motivations and beliefs, [he]

was going to have the car towed no matter what” and therefore, any investigatory

motive was rendered irrelevant. Snoddy, 976 F.3d at 636. The Snoddy Court based

its ruling on prior Sixth Circuit law in which the decisional process turns entirely

on whether objective reasons exist for the inventory search, regardless of

motivation: “The Fourth Amendment permits impoundment decisions and

inventory searches that are objectively justifiable ... regardless of an officer's

subjective intent.” Id., citing United States v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, 805 (6 th Cir.

2001) citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 812.

In the Ninth Circuit, however, that court has found that what it termed

admissions by police officers as to their investigatory intent was enough to

10

invalidate an inventory search of an otherwise valid stop and impoundment of a car.

In United States v. Johnson, 889 F.3d 1120 (9 th Cir. 2018), the court first rejected

defendant’s argument that the impoundment of his car was erroneous. “...Johnson

has failed to show that the officers' decision to pull him over and to impound his car

‘would not have occurred in the absence of an impermissible reason.’” Id., 11261127, citing United States v. Orozco, 858 F.3d 1204, 1213 (9 th Cir. 2017). Yet, the

court said that “actual motivations do matter”. Id., 1125 quoting Orozco, 858 F.3d

at 1210 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011) )

(emphasis added in Orozco), and referenced this Court’s concern that inventory

searches not be used as a pretext. Subjective intent proven otherwise by officers’

testimony was enough to invalidate the search.

“Thus, the officers' statements directly admitting that they searched and

seized items from Johnson's car specifically to gather evidence of a suspected

crime (and not to further such permissible caretaking motives) are

‘sufficient to conclude that the warrantless search of the car was

unreasonable.’ Hellman, 556 F.2d at 444; see also Orozco, 858 F.3d at 1213

(‘[W]e have found pretext where the police officers admitted that their

subjective purpose was to find evidence of crime.’). In the face of such

evidence, it is clear to us that the officers' decision to seize the money, bags,

and cellphones from Johnson and his car would not have occurred without an

improper motivation to gather evidence of crime.

In light of our decision in Orozco, we conclude that the officers' search and

seizure of such evidence cannot be justified under the inventory-search

doctrine.”

Id., 1128.

The Eighth Circuit has said a vehicle inventory search can be found to be

pretextual (albeit harmless for other reasons) even when standardized procedures

11

are in place, but not followed.

“In sum, law enforcement had standardized procedures in place but failed to

follow them here. Such failure, coupled with the fact the officers disregarded

items without evidentiary value, even though they were of questionable

monetary value, suggests they did not search the vehicle in order to

safeguard the vehicle's contents from loss, or to protect law enforcement

personnel from harm, or even to guard the department and county against a

possible lawsuit. Marshall, 986 F.2d at 1175–76. Rather, it appears law

enforcement sifted through the vehicle's contents searching only for and

recording only incriminating evidence; something law enforcement may not

do. See id. at 1175 (‘The requirement that standardized criteria or

established routine exist as a precondition to a valid inventory search ‘is

based on the principle that an inventory search must not be a ruse for a

general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence.’’) (citation

omitted).”

United States v. Rowland, 341 F.3d 774, 782 (8 th Cir. 2003).

The Tenth Circuit will also find an inventory search to be invalid when

officers admit investigatory motive.

“[The officer] also admitted on cross-examination that he was “searching

for evidence of the crime.” In addition, the decision to impound the car was

not made until after the search revealed incriminating evidence against

Edwards, which makes it exceedingly difficult to believe that this was an

inventory search conducted to protect the police from liability after the

decision was made to impound the car.”

United States v. Edwards, 632 F.3d 633, 644 (10 th Cir. 2001).

But, the Fifth Circuit, like the Sixth Circuit, does not believe that subjective

intent matters in this inquiry. In United States v. McKinnon, 681 F.3d 203, 210 (5 th

Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Castro, 166 F.3d 728, 734 (5 th Cir. 1999), the

court said:

“In light of well-established case law:

the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is an

12

objective one, wholly divorced from the subjective beliefs of police

officers. [S]o long as police do no more than they are objectively

authorized and legally permitted to do, their motives in doing so are

irrelevant and hence not subject to inquiry.”

Here, the Snoddy court found that a decision to tow Snoddy’s car “no matter

what” was the end of the constitutional inquiry. Even though the standard

procedures are noted in the court’s Opinion, there is very little discussion of

whether the officer followed them. The “objectively justifiable” decision to tow the

car was enough to affirm the denial of suppression. Snoddy, 976 F.3d at 636. This

decision by the court of appeals – saying motivation or subjective intent doesn’t

matter – is contrary to Supreme Court law.

When motivation or subjective intent does matter as part of the analysis – as

this Court requires – and the instant case is reviewed in that light, it is plain what

actually occurred. The police officer repeatedly announced his intention to execute

a search for drugs and in fact carried through with it, as clearly depicted by the

police cruiser’s video camera recording. The search was not really for the purpose of

listing an inventory; rather, it was a pretext to look for and discover incriminating

evidence of criminal activity not related to the traffic stop (for speeding) or to the

arrest (for out-of-state outstanding warrants).

Once the police officer was told by dispatch about Snoddy’s warrants, he was

determined to search for and find drugs; he told the dispatcher that he “could tell

something was up” and he was going to “try to search” whenever backup arrived.

(Tr. Suppress. Hrg., R. 75, Page ID#502-503; Video Part 1, 20:40-23:00). Later,

13

after the other officer arrived, the arresting officer (Malone) repeatedly tried to

obtain Snoddy’s consent to search the vehicle. He also demanded to know the

location of the drugs he believed were in the vehicle. He said to Snoddy: “Don’t

make me tear apart this car. Just tell me where it’s at.” (Id., Page ID#507; Video

Part 1, 33:35). The officer announced that he believed it was “meth”. (Video Part 1,

34:50). A little while later, while looking into the vehicle with a flashlight, the

officer told Snoddy that if he had “to tear it up, that’s on you”. (Tr. Suppress. Hrg.,

R. 75, Page ID#507-508; Video Part 1, 38:15). After the officer entered the vehicle

and proceeded to search throughout, he said: “Where is it?” (Video Part 1, 43:35).

About 1 ½ minutes later, while opening an object during the search, the officer said:

“I told you I was going to find it anyway. How much meth is it?” (Video Part 1,

45:00). And then, tellingly, the officer remarked: “I was going to find it either way.”

(Video Part 1, 46:50).

All of this police conduct clearly shows that this was no more than a “ruse”

and a pretext to search for drugs and not for any reason connected to the stop or

arrest. The police officer believed Snoddy had drugs in the vehicle and he was

determined to find them. The best evidence of it – aside from the video depicting

the officer’s words and actions – was the fact that at the conclusion of the search

he only removed the drugs (and guns). Trying to excuse this activity as an

allowable inventory search was purely pretextual.

As the Court held in Bertine, the exercise of police discretion (in an inventory

search) must be in accord with “standard criteria and on the basis of something

14

other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.” 479 U.S. at 375, 107 S.Ct. at

743 (emphasis added). This dual requirement was not met here; the police activity

was really based on such “suspicion”. There can be no question that the police were

actually searching for evidence of criminal activity, i.e., drug law violations, which

had nothing to do with the traffic stop for speeding or subsequent arrest of

defendant for out-of-state warrants.

Furthermore, lest it be thought that the conduct of the search was consistent

with police department policy, a review of the video alone shows that the search

was not proper and not in accordance with the policy. General Order 513 of the

Tennessee Department of Safety, ¶VI. A. Vehicle Inventory Procedures, states: “[a]n

inventory is an administrative care-taking procedure conducted when a vehicle is

towed in order to protect the member and property left in the vehicle.” (Govt. Ex. 1).

Here, the officer only listed “[c]lothes, CD’s, suit cases [sic], cell phone” on the

Vehicle Tow-In Report (other items are crossed out). (Govt. Ex. 2, R. 80-2, Page

ID#589). If this was a proper administrative process, the list would have been more

extensive and specific. But, it was not. Consequently, this minimal listing was

violative of General Order No. 513, specifically ¶VI. E, “Vehicle Inventory

Procedures”, which states in pertinent part:

E.

Any/all containers, suitcases, or attacheÌ cases encountered during an

inventory which do not allow members to externally view the

contents contained therein shall be opened and the contents

listed...”

(Govt. Ex. 1, R. 80-1, Page ID#583) (emphasis added). As evident, the Vehicle

15

Tow-In Report (Govt. Ex. 2, supra) fails to comply with this requirement, further

demonstrating that an “inventory” was not really what was going on here.

This search did not conform to police department policy; it was done for

investigative rather than administrative purposes. The real time / real life video

depiction of the vehicle search vividly proves that this search was not an

“administrative care-taking procedure”; it was a series of police actions to

completely go through the vehicle and its contents to find drugs or – as the

arresting officer put it – to “tear apart this car” to find “where it’s at”. (Tr.

Suppress. Hrg., R. 75, Page ID#507; Video Part 1, 33:35).

In summary, when motivation or subjective intent does matter – as this

Court requires – a review of the police conduct clearly shows that this was no more

than “a ruse for a general rummaging in order to discover incriminating evidence,”

Florida v. Wells, supra, 495 U.S. at 4, of illegal activity other than that for which

Snoddy was stopped and other than that for which he was arrested. The

combination of the police testimony at the suppression hearing and the cruiser

dashcam video depict what actually occurred here, i.e., a search for drugs. It had

little or nothing to do with ensuring against liability for lost items.

Had the court below applied the correct analytical standard (per Opperman,

Wells, Bertine) and considered the police officer’s motives and subjective intent, this

litigation would have had a different outcome.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

For all the above reasons, Petitioner Craig B. Snoddy requests this Court to

16

grant his petition for a writ of certiorari.

Respectfully Submitted,

By: s/ Dennis J. Clark

Dennis J. Clark

Attorney for Petitioner

Craig B. Snoddy

Dated: December 22, 2020

17