Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Solomon Manamela, Petitioner v. Warden, Fort Dix FCI

Supreme Court briefOct 13, 2020

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No.

RIGINAL

FILED

OCT 1 3 2020

°jPREEM(EFOOIjRTLMlj:K

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

SOLOMON MANAMELA

— PETITIONER

(Your Name)

vs.

UNITED STATES "et al."

— RESPONDENT(S)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

(NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

SOLOMON MANAMELA

(Your Name)

MOSHANNON VALLEY CORR. CENTER

(Address)

555 CEO DRIVE

(City, State, Zip Code)

PHILIPSBURG > PA 16866

(Phone Number)

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

1) Whether affirmative evidence exists to establish Congress' intention

under 18 USCS §24(b) to find City of Philadelphia-contracted non

medical family support service provider, under Article VII of Pennsy

lvania Public Welfare Code Title 55 of the Pennsylvania Code 55 PA

Code §3130.12(c)(1) guilty of health care fraud(18 USCS Sec.1347).

2) Whether. Manamela is liable for the death of DK(a minor) under MEBHI's

supervision pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann §6302; whereas, the

Civil Court ruled that under Pennsylvania and Third Circuit StateCreated-danger doctrine, Manamela and MEBHI were not culpable.

3) Whether New Jersey District Court erred by failing to. review doucume-.

nts(authentic documents such as Contract(s)) declared under penalty

of perjury pursuant to Title 28 USCS §1746; and allowing dismissal of

Manamela's Actual Innocent Petition as 2255 under disguise of 2241

under Rule 12(b)(6), and claiming "Lack of Jurisdiction."

LIST OF PARTIES

[x] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.

[ ] All parties do not appear in the caption of the case on the

cover page.

A list of all parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgement

is the subject of this petition is as follows:

1) New Jersey District Court (Third Circuit)

2) The District Court (EDPA) (Third Circuit)

RELATED CASES

1) Kelly exrel. Gafni v. Multiethnic Behavioral Health, Inc. (herein

after MEBHI)

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82385, Civil Action No. 08-3700 (ED PA

Sep. 9, 2009).

2) United States v. Manamela

(2012 CA 3 PA), 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 2694, 463 F. App'x 127, 130

(3d Cir. 2012).

3) United States v. Manamela

612 Fed. Appv. 151; 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 14465 No. 13-3676

(Judgement August 18, 2015).

4) Manamela v. Warden, Fort Dix, FCI

(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-18-CV-09292) (Judgement Nov. 27, 2019).

STATE-RELATED

5) Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Multiethnic Behavioral Health, Inc.

(2008) Mickael Kamuvaka and Julius Muraay were indicted for the

same crimes cited in this case; sentenced months after the criminal

court convictions of both including Manamela and Coulibaly.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

3-4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5-36

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

37-38

CONCLUSION

INDEX TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

APPENDIX B

Opinion of the United States District Court

APPENDIX C

Sur Petition for Rehearing

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES

Page Number

• Ashcroft v. Iqbal

556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)...31

• Alston v. Parker

363 F. 3d 229; 2004 liJ.S. App. LEXIS 6425 (3d Cir. 2004)

• Bailey v. United States

516 U.S. 13/, 166 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995)

• Bailey v. United States

133 S. Ct. 1031, 185 L. Ed. 2d 19 (2013)

• Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tombly

S30 U.S. 544, 555, 12/ S. CtS 1955 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)....31

• Bennett v. City of Philadelphia

No. 03-5685, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2389'7, 2003 WL 2309884 (3d

Cir. 2003)............................................

28, 36

• Bennett v. City of Philadelphia

499 F.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2007)....

28, 37

• Bond.vij-.iUnited States

564 U.S. 2ll, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 180 L. Ed. 2d 269 (2011)

• Bowyer v. United States

(1980) (Dist. Col. App.) 422 A 2d 973

• Bouie v. City of Columbia

378 U.S. 34/, 84 S. Ct. 1697, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1964)

17, 32

* Brady v. Maryland

373 U.S. 83, 87, 88 S. Ct. 1194 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963)...330, 31

• Bridges v. United States

346 U.S. 209, 9/ L. Ed. 1557, 73 S. Ct. 1055 (1953)

• Bright v. Westmoreland County

443 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2003)

• Bruce v. Warden, Lewisburg USP

868 F.3d 1/0 (3d Cir. 2017)

333^334'j,, 35

• Burrage v. United States

571 ,-134 S. Ct. 187 L. Ed. 2d 715, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 797 (2014)..25

• Calder v. Bull

3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 386, 390 (1798)

• Carmell v. Texas

529 U.S. 513, 146 L. Ed. 2d 577 (2000)

• Castle Rock v. Gonzalez

545 U.S. 748, 125 S. Ct. 2797, 162 L. Ed. 2d 658 (2005)

• Chew v. United States

8 Cir. 9 E.2d 348 U925)

• Cleveland v. United States

531 U.S. 12, 26 (2000)

19, 20

• Collins v. Youngblood

497 U.S. 8/, 41 (1990)

• Cummings v. Missouri

4 Wall 217, 18 L. Ed. 356 (1867)

• Davis v. United States

417 U.S. 333, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 41 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1974)

• Dennis v. United States

384 U.S. 855, 861, 16 L. Ed. 2d 973, 86 S. Ct. 1840 (1966)

* Deshaney v. WinnebagoiCounty Department of Social Services

489 U.S. 189, 109 S. Ct. 998, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1989)

27, 28

• Douglas v. Buder

412 U.S. 430, 93 S. Ct. 2199, 37 L. Ed. 2d 52 (1973)

• In re Dorsainvil

119 F. 3d 245 (,3d Cir. 1997)

33, 34

• D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech School

972 F.2d 1364, 1369 (3d Cir. 1992)

• Felker v. Turpin

518 U.S. 651, 116 S. Ct. 2333, 135 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1996)

• Foretich v. United States

U003 App. DC; 359 U.S. App. DC 54, 351 F.3d 1198 (2003)

• Fowler v. UPMC, Shadyside

578 F. 3d 203, 211 (,3d Cir. 2009)......................

* Castobile Fulginity v. City of Philadelphia

719 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 20l0)....

• Fry v. United states

421 U.S. 542, 44 L. Ed. 2d 363, 95 S. Ct. (1975)

• Gammon v. United States

"8 Cir. 12 F. 2d 226 (.1926)

• Ex parte Garland

4 Wall 333, 18 L. Ed. 366 (1867)

12)

• Glasser v. United States

3l5 U.S. 60, 66, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S. Ct. 457 (1942)

• Goldstein v. United States

8 Cir. 63 F.2d 609 (1933)

• Haas v. Henkel

216 U.S. 462, 479, 54 L. Ed. 569, 30 S. Ct. 249 (1910)

• Haas, et al. v. United States

93 F.2d 427, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 2830

• Hammerschraidt v. United States

265 U.S. 182, 188, 68 L. Ed. 968, 44 S. Ct. 511 (1924)

• Hughey v. United States

49 U.Sr 411, 109 L. Ed. 2d 408, 331 F.3d 4483 110 S. Ct. 1979

(1990)

• James v. United States

366 U.S. 213, 247-248, 81 S. Ct. 1052, 1070-1071, 6 1. Ed. 2d at

246, 269-270 (1961) (1974 U.S. App. LEXIS 8)

• Imbler v. Pachtman

424 U.S. 409, 418, 47 L. Ed. 2d 128, 96 S. Ct. 984 (1976)

• In re Jones

226 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000)............................................

• Estate of Kelly exrel Gafni v. MEBHI, Inc.

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82385 (EDPA Sep./9, 2009)....................

passim

• Kelly v. United States, et al.

No. 18-1059 (.May 7, 2020) {3d Cir. 2020)...................................

.passim

• Landgraft v. US 1 Filmprods

511 U.S. 244, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1994)..

• Maio v. Aetna, Inc.

221 F.3d 472, 481 C3d Cir. 2000)........... .........................................

• Manamela v. Warden, Fort Dix, FCI

Case No. 19-3924 Dist. Court No. l-18-cv-09292 (2019)....

• Marshall v. Garrison

659 F. 2d 440' (1961 CA 4 VA)..................................... ..........................

• Martin v. Perez

319 F. 3d 799, 804-05 (6th Cir:.- 2003)........................

• McBoyle v. United States

283 U.S. 25, 75 L. Ed. 816, 51 S. Ct. 340 (1931)

• McNally v. United States

483 U.S. 350, 360......... .. .....................................................

• Miller v. Florida

482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987)

• Mooney v. Holohan

294 U.S. 103, 79 L. Ed. 791, 55 S. Ct. 340, 98 ALR 406 (1935)..31

• Morse v. Lower Marion SSchool District

132 F.3d 902, 907 (3d Cir. 1997)

• Myers v. United States

8 Cir. 15 F.2d 977 (1926)

• Nicini v. Morra

2l2 F.3d /98 (,3d Cir. 2000)

’ City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al.

508 F. Supp. 211; 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12046, Civ. A. No.

79-3833..............................................................................

7if 13, 23

• Rude v. United States

10 Cir., 74 F.2d 673, 677 (1936, 1937)

• Sanfordrv. Stiles

456 F.3d 298, 304 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006)

* Joseph George Sherman v. United States of America

356 U.S. 369, 2 L. Ed. 2d 848, 78 S. Ct. 819 (1958)

• Spencer.~v. Kemna

523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S. Ct. 978, 140 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1998)

• Strickland v. Washington

466 U.S. 668 (1984)

• Townsend v. Sain

373 U.S. 293, 319 (1963)

• Weaver v. graham

450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981)

• Weston v. City of Philadelphia

3d Cir. EDPA May 16, 2014.........

• Yates v. United States

(Interpretation of Statutes) 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081-82 (2015)...38

• Ye v. United States

484 F.3d 634, 638 (3d Cir. 2007)

• Yeaman v. United States

326 F.3d 293, 319 (1963)

• United States v. Addonizio

442 U.S. 178, 186>87., 99 S. Ct. 2235, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979)..35

• United States v. Argurs

427 U.S. 97 96 S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976)

• United States v. Benoit

543 F. App'x l/l, 1/3 (3d Cir. 2013)

• United States v. Carol Anne Bond

581 F.3d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 2009)

• United States v. Brandt

913 F. 2d 201, 203 (,5th Cir. 1990)

• United States v. Burkley

(June 11, 1978)............ .

• United States v. Cotton

535 U.S. 625, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L. ed. 2d 860 (2002)

• United States v. Gaudin

515 U.S. 506, 510, 132 L. Ed. 444, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995)

• United States v. Gelin

712 F.3d 612 (1st Cir. 2013)

• United States v. Hayman

342 U.S. 205, 96 L. Ed. 232, 72 S. Ct. 263 (1952)

• United States v. Hickman

282 F. Supp. 2d 528, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15946 (SD Tex. 2003)

• United States v. Hill

444 F.2d 115 (1971, CA 10 Okla.)

• United States v. Jones

299 F. App'x 187, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2008)

• United States v. Jones

471 F.3d 478 479, 481, n.4 (3d Cir. 2006)

14, 15

• United States v. Jones

2007 EL 24644 78 at 3-4 (EDPA Aug. 17, 2007) Aff'd 299 F. App'x

187, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2008).................................................................... 15

• United States v. Louthian

756 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2003)

• United States v. Lucien

347 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2003)

• United States v. Malinsky

391 F. App'x 200, 201 (3d Cir. 2010)

• United States v. Manamela

(EDPA June 7, 2010)

5, 18

• United States v. Manamela

(2012 CA 3 PA)

• United States v. Manamela

^T5-TeT-5pp5Tr-T5T7—?I5T5~TJ.S. LEXIS 14465 No. 13-3676 (2015).21,27

• United States v. Manamela

463 F. Appx. 127, 130

• United States v. Marcus

130 S. Ct. 2159, 176 L. Ed. 1012, 560 U.S. 258, 20100U.S. LEXIS

4163 (2010 U.S.).................................................................................................... 32

• United States v. Martins

648 F. 2d 367 (.1981)

• United States v. McCoy

_4i0 F.3d 124, 131 (3d' Cir. 2005)

• United States v. Miller

(1985 CA 31- PA)

• United States v. Natale

719 F.3d 719, 733 (7th Cir. 2013)

• United States v. Payne

63 F.3d 1200 (2d Cir. 1995)

• United States v. Quackenbush

938 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991)

• United States v. Si

343 F.3d 116, 1112 (9th Cir. 2003)

• United States v. fanner

483 U.S. 107, 129-30 (1987)

passim

• United States v. Travillion

759 F.3d 281, 289 (3d Cir. 2014)

• United States v. Tyler

732 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2013)

• United States v. Vasquez

319 F.2d 381, 384 (3d Cir. 1963)

21, 23

• United States v. Wayland

549 F.3d 526, 527 (7th Cir. 2008)..

• United States v. Whited

3li F.3d 259, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2002)

• United States v. Williams

113 F.3d 243 (1997) Dist. Columbia

• United States v. Wiltberger

5 LED 37, WHEAT 76 (1820)

TABLE OF STATUTES AND RULES CITED

STATUTES

Page Number

8 U.S.C.A. §237(a)(2)(iii)....

8 U.S.C.S. §1101(a)(43)(m)....

8 U.S.C.S., §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)

18 U.S.C. §16...................................

18 U.S.C. §24(a)............................

passim

18 U.S.C. §24(b)............................

passim

18 U.S.C. §371.................................

passim

18 U.S.C. §666(a)(1)(A).............

19, 20

18 U.S.C. §924(c)(1)....................

18 U.S.C. §1343...............................

passim

18 U.S.C. §1347...............................

passim

18 U.S.C. §3363......................

18 U.S.C. §3363(A)........................

28 U.S.C. §1331...............................

28 U.S.C. §1746...

28 U.S.C. §2241...

passim

28 U.S.C. §2241(a)

28 U.S.C. §224l(c)

28 U.S.C. §2242...

• 28 U:;S.C. §2243. . .

• 28 U.S.C. §2254...

• 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)

• 28 U.S.C. §2255...

passim

• 28 U.S.C. §2255(e)

• 28 U.S.C. §2255(h)

• 42 U.S.C. §201....

42 U.S.C. §299b

42 U.S.C. §391

42 U.S.C. §601..

passim

42 U.S.C.S. §620

9, 13

42 U.S.C. §621..

9, 13

42 U.S.C. §622 ..........

9, 14

42 U.S.C. §629..........

9, 14

42 U.S.C. §629(a)(2)

passim

42 U.S.C. §670..........

42 U.S.C. §1320d-2..

42 U.S.C. §1395x

42 U.S.C. §1396

42 U.S.C. §1397

passim

42 U.S.C. §1397aa

42 U.S.C. §1397bb

42 U.S.C. §1397f.

42 U.S.C. §1397jj

42 U.S.C. §5611..

9, 14

42 CFR §440.70...

42 CFR §441.15.

42 CFR §483.460

45 CFR §260.10.

45 CFR §260.20

45 CFR §260.30

45 CFR §260.31

• 45 CFR §1355.25

• 45 CFR §1357.10

• Rule 8 Evid. Hearing

Rule 12(b)(6)

passim

Rule 16(a) ...

Rule 52(b)...

STATE STATUTES

23 Pa C.S. §6315(a)(l)

Title 33 P.S. §1-8. . . .

Title 40 P.S. §part 1-5....

42 PA Cons. Stat. Ann §6302

passim

42 PA C.S. 6324.(1)..................

passim

Title 53 P.S. §Part 1-4. ...

Title VII PA Welfare Code

passim

55 PA Code §3130.12(c)(1)

passim

55 PA Code §3490.53(b)...

passim

62 P.S. §701-708 ..................

passim

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,

110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996) (HIPAA).......................................... passim

Pennsylvania Medical Practice Act of 1985, 63 P.S. §422.10

OTHER AUTHORITIES

U.S. Cons. Art. 1 §9, Cl. 3.

passim

U.S. Cons. Art. 1 §10, Cl. 1

passim

U.S. Cons. Art III §2.............

U.S. Cons. Amendment V

3, 28, 37

U.S. Cons. Amendment VI

....3, 28

U.S. Cons. Amendment VII

3, 28

• U.S. Cons. Amendment X

passim

• U.S. Cons. Amendment XIV

passim

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to

review the judgement below.

OPINIONS BELOW

[x] For cases from federal courts:

The opinion of the United States court of appeals appears

at Appendix

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at ________________

; or,

[x] has been designated for publication but is not yet

reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the United States district court appears

at Appendix

to : the petition and is

[ ] reported at ______________________________; or,

[x] has been designated for publication but is not yet

reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The opinion of the highest state court to review the

merits appears at Appendix

to the petition and is

[ ] reported at ______________________________; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet

reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

The opinion of the

at Appendix ______ to the petition and is

court appears

[ ] reported at _________ ____________________; or,

[ ] has been designated for publication but is not yet

reported; or,

[ ] is unpublished.

JURISDICTION

[X] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court of Appeals decided my case

was JUNE 11. 2020__________

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[xl A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

Appeals on the following date: JULY 15 f 2020

, and a copy of the

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix C

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including______

(date) on

(date)

in Application No.__ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[ ] For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was

A copy of that decision appears, at Appendix______

[ 3 A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

to and including____

(date) on

(date) in

Application No.__ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

FIFTH AMENDMENT: Due process of Law and Just Compensation Clauses

. .

Nb person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, un

less on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land

or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public dan

ger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put.in jeopardy

of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against .

himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

SIXTH AMENDMENT: Rights of the Accused

. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and pub

lic trial, by an impartial jury of the State and District wherein the crime shall have

been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses

against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have

the assistance of counsel for his defense.

SEVENTH AMENDMENT: Trial by Jury in Civil Cases

In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,

the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be

otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of

common law.

TENTH AMENDMENT:

The. powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited

by it to the States, are reserved to. the States respectively, or to the people.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: Due Process of Law/Equal Protection

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the States wherein they reside. No

State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property, without Due Process of Law; nor deny to any person within the jurisdiction

the equal protection of the laws.

SECTION 24(b) of HIPAA DEFINES A HEALTH CARE BENEFIT PROGRAM AS:

Any public or private plan or contract, affecting commerce, under which any medical

benefit, item, or service is provided to any individual, and includes any individual

or entity who is providing a medical benefit, item, or service for which payment may

be made under the plan or contract.

18 USCS § 24(b) (emphasis added).

THE STATUTES UNDER WHICH THE PETITIONER WAS PROSECUTED:

Section 1347 specifically outlaws health care fraud. It provides that:

(a) Whoever knowingly and willingly executes, or attempths to execute, a scheme or arti

fice -

(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or

(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,

any of the money or property owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care

benefit program, in connection with delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items,

or services, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.

If the violation results in serious bodily injury... such person shall be fined under this

title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; and if the violation results in death,

such person shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life,

or both.

WIRE FRAUD [18 USCS §1343]:

The federal wire fraud statute makes it a crime to effect (with the use of wires) "any

scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraud

ulent pretenses, representations, or promises."

THE GENERAL FEDERAL CONSPIRACY STATUTE [18.USC §371] provides:

If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the

United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner

or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do act to effect the object of the cons

piracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

If, an offense or to defraud the United States are simply two alternative ways to commit

the single §371 offense.

28 USCS §2241 ’> provides that:

"Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the US Supreme Court, any justice thereof,

the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. 28 USCS

§2241(a). A §2241 petition should name as respondent the person who has custody over a

prisoner. 28 USCS §2242; 28 USCS §2243. These provisions contemplate a proceeding against

some person who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with the power to produce

the body of such party before the court or judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient

reason is shown to the contrary." This "immediate custodian rule" is the default, and is

generally applicable to habeas petitions challenging physical custody. The rule governing

jurisdiction naturally follows from the "immediate custodian rule": a district court properly

exercises jurisdiction over a habeas petition whenever it has jurisdiction over the peti

tioner's custodian.

28 USCS §2255 provides that:

A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress... may

move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.

Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner

is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the United

States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of

fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto. Habeas petitions are usually filed under

28 USCS §2255 in the court that imposed a prisoner's sentence. When §2255 appears inadequate

or. ineffective however, a federal prisoner may seek habeas relief from the court in the

district of his confinement under 28 USCS §2241.

42 USCS §629. SUBPART 2. PROMOTING SAFE AND STABLE FAMILIES

Purpose: " to enable states to develop and establish, or expand, and to operate co

ordinated programs of community-based family support services, family preservation services,

time-limited family reunification services, and adoption promotion and support services..."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1998, Solomon Manamela and three other principals co-founded Multi-Ethnic Beha

vioral Health, Inc. (MEBHI hereafter), a family support service provider under Article

VII of Pennsylvania Public Welfare Code,Title 55 of Pennsylvania Code 55 PA. Code

§3130.12(c)(1) [Cf. Title IV-B Subpart 2, 42 USCS §629(a)(2) under the Act]; and pur

suant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann §6302; a non-medicare/medicaid/CHIP serviceable child

welfare service provider to at-risk children in the City of Philadelphia/County. MEBHI

apart from the above-cited PA Statutes, operated under the City of Philadelphia Children and Youth Department (CYD) and Department of Human Services (DHS) auspices pursuant

to 62 PS §§701-708 Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services Agreement Contract between the

City of Philadelphia and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Manamela served as MEBHI's Services to Children in their own homes (SCOH) prog

ram supervisor; SCOH Liason to DHS; Director of Staff Development and Training; Human

Resources; and Treasurer of Board of Directors. See Memorandum Opinion, United States

v. Manamela, (EDPA June 7, 2010). The "Behavioral Health: component was based on the

"Holistic approach" to amelioration of family dysfunctions prevalent in low-income atrisk children's homes the principals had hoped to focus on, had all plans of establish

ing an institution of that nature succeeded - a "One-stop Shop" kind of social agency.

This assessment was also based on already identified endless DHS-SC0H failures in

addressing psychological, mental, and substance abuse inherent in many families referred

to SCOH social service providers in the City of Philadelphia. The principals had hoped

that one day MEBHI as a Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) member, will be able to raise

sufficient funds and support and apply for licenses in those areas/fields in order to

operate and provide services in the City of Philadelphia through other programs mention

ed infra.

In and around 1999, MEBHI was awarded a Comprehensive Family Based Services Contract

by the City of Philadelphia, which was effective July 1, 2000. MEBHI contract with DHS/

, -t? P^ovi^e servlces to at-risk children. CYD is a DHS unit that is directly

responsible for SCOH activities - "child .pendency-related issues" under Pennsylvania Child

Welfare Services Laws pursuant to 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann §6302. MEBHI's contract with the

City was to "monitor" children and their families compliance as to Family Service, Plan

(FSP) or known as Child and Family Service Plan (CFSP) under Administration of Child and

Families (ACF), see 55 PA Code §3130.12(c)(1); cf. 42 USCS §§621 et seq.; 622; and 42 USCS

§629. See also "Brady materials" having a bearing on this very case, which the government

filed a Motion to Seal all these documents in 2013, and motion was granted by the lower

court (EDPA), all documents in government's possession since October 2006.

Initially, MEBHI was established to provide the following services:

(i).Employee Assistance Program (EAP).

(ii) Wraparound Services.

(iii) Drug and Alcohol including DUI Services.

(iv) Home Health Care Services.

(v) Mental Health Outpatient Services.

(vi) Services to Children in their Own Homes (SCOH).

However, due to lack of start-up funds and no sponsors or donors for such services/

programs, all good intentions of establishing a "One-stop Shop" failed; but SCOH as a

children welfare social services program did survive. See "Brief History of MEBHI" in NJ

Dist. Court's possession; see also hard and soft copies regarding "Home healthcare; mental

health outpatient; EAP; Wraparound Services; and Drug and Alcohol including DUI services"

programs in government's possession since October 2006, submitted to US Attorney's Office

by Manamela.

A. MEBHI IS A FAMILY SUPPORT SERVICE PROGRAM UNDER PENNSYLVANIA STATE CHILD

WELEARE LAWS

MEBHI is a community-based family support service under Philadelphia DHS and CYD Com

prehensive Family Based Services Contract in compliance with Pennsylvania Child Welfare

Services Agreement Contract pursuant to 62 PS §§701-708. See Subpartl. Stephanie Tubbs Jones

Child Welfare Services Program... 42 USCS §§ 621 et seq.; Subpart2. Promoting Safe and Stable

Families... 42 USCS §§629; State-Plans for Child Welfare Services... 42 USCS §§622; State

Services program under Subtitle 1 of Title XX • • • 42 USCS §§1397; 42 USCS §670 et seq.; under

part E; and SCOH program funded under Part A • • • 42 USCS §§601.

The City and County of Philadelphia DHS is a political subdivision of the State or

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania under the auspices of the then Pennsylvania Department of Public

Welfare, now, Pennsylvania Department of Human Services (DHS). Philadelphia as both City

and County, has entered into a Child Welfare Services Agreement Contract with the State of

Pennsylvania.

"Pursuant to this Contract, the City agreed to provide protective and Foster Care Ser

vices to children found eligible by the County board of assistance while DPW agreed to pro

vide technical consultation and assistance to the City, review periodically the City's deli

very of these services and reimburse it for • • • carrying out the program." See City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania et al., 508 F. Supp. 211; 1981 US Dist. LEXIS

12046, Civ. A. No. >9-3833.

As per Contract agreement with Commonwealth of' Pennsylvania to provide Child Welfare

Services to children in Philadelphia County, the City of Philadelphia DHS then entered into

a Comprehensive Family Based Services Contract with private community-based social services

agencies under SCOH program, in order to provide services to low-income at-risk children

and their families, a contract which MEBHI became one of those agencies that were chosen to

partake after applying and selected for the Contract. First, MEBHI*applied for SCOH Contract

in 1998; but because of MEBHI's inclusion of Mental Health Component in the Request for

Proposal (RFP) SCOH services application, the City's Contract Division rejected the appli

cation noting that DHS was not a "Health Care Program". See 1998 SCOH RFP rejection letter

in Government's possession since October 2006. However, after second attempt in 1999, MEBHI

was awarded the SCOH contract • • • meaning MEBHI officially became a SCOH provider to lowincome at-risk children in the City. See Service Description and Contract Requirements for

Comprehensive Family Based Services Contracts - 1999, 2004 and 2006 in Government and Courtis

possession.

B. MEBHI AS A TITLE IV B FAMILY SUPPORT SERVICES PROVIDER UNDER CONTRACT WITH

DHS IS A STATE AGENT PURSUANT TO PENNSYLVANIA CHILD WELFARE SERVICES LAWS

[42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN §6302]

Manamela and MEBHI SCOH social workers were charged with monitoring at-risk children

and advocating for third-party community-based program services on their behalf under

DHS-SC0H Contract whose focal point was safety, well-being, prevention and protection from

abuse, neglect, and abandonment. MEBHI was also charged with advocating for at-risk children

and their families in the following areas: housing, vocational training, parenting education

skills, medical, mental health, drug and alcohol inpatient and outpatient programs, monitor

school attendance (including truancy issues), general academic performance; and make, sure

that children were well cared-for or supervised, and that families were compliant with

Family Service Plan (FSP) goals of requirement as per agreement with DHS/CYD and both Family

Division and Truancy Prevention Courts.

MEBHI provided SCOH services to at-risk children in the City and throughout Philadelphia

County as the "Supplier of the means without mandate" (emphasis mine) for DHS in implement

ing Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services Laws, and as part of Contract Requirements for ComprehensiverFamily Based Services. As a contractor with the City of Philadelphia DHS and CYD,

MEBHI was also bound by Pennsylvania Child Welfare Laws such as Juvenile Act [42 PA. CS

§6324(1)]; Child Protective Services.Act [23 PA CS §6325(a)(l)]; see also 55 PA Code §3490,.

53(b) ("The County agency shall protect the safety of the subject child and other children

in the home... and shall provide or arrange appropriate services when necessary during the

investigation period.") in carrying out its contract obligations with the City.

Manamela and the entire SCOH social workers in the City of Philadelphia were State-agents

because of their connection with the DHS and CYD. Manamela and MEBHI SCOH workers were requi

red by Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services laws to. report the at-risk children and their

families' progress or:lack of it to the DHS/CYD through a mechanism called Indirect/Collateral

services (by mail/fax/email/phone), family Division and Truancy Prevention Courts (in person

with caregivers in court) because a great number of these families were Court mandated.

Hence, the appearance of SCOH social workers in courts was a must. The judges wanted an up

date from SCOH social workers about compliance with Family Service Plan (FSP) or family's

reluctance to comply or recommendation as to permanency issues. However, DHS/CYD ultimately

had the authority to continue services, close the case, or transfer family cases to for exam

ple, Family Preservation Program (FPP). Also, DHS had the authority to remove and place c;

child(ren) with relatives or into Foster Care Homes after careful review of each individual

family situation. MEBHI's role was

just to recommend to DHS/CYD or the courts what was in

the best::interest of the child(ren) and thats all.

C. THE NEXUS BETWEEN MEBHI AND PHILADELPHIA DHS IS THE COMPREHENSIVE FAMILYY

BASED SERVICES CONTRACTS OF 1999, 2004 AND 2006 WHICH DO NOT REQUIRE ANY

HEALTH CARE PROVISIONS FROM SCOH PROVIDERS AS PER ARTICLE VII OF PA PUBLIC

WELFARE CODE AND TITLE 55 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CODE §3130.12(c)(1) AND

42 PA CONS. STAT. ANN §6302

"The goal of Comprehensive Family Based Services is the preservation of the family. The

goal reflects the premise that the family should be the first and best resource for nurturing

the. continued growth and development of its children and that removal of a child or children

from the setting should be done as a last resort and then for the shortest period of time

needed to restore the family." See Service Description and Contract Requirements for Compre

hensive Family tBased Services: 1999; 2004; and 2006 SCOH Contracts, pages 2 and 3 respect

ively .

The language expressed in these Contracts is reflected in the Federal Child Welfare Ser

vices Statutes and regulations cited below. The language of the Comprehensive Family Based

Services Contracts is a true reflection of the Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services Laws; and

above all, of social work service delivery practice and policies in general, and concerned

with the Safety and Well-being of at-risk low-income children and their families, not health

care services provision superimposed on MEBHI by the Government, and contrary to clearly

stated requirements in Contracts.

In support of this fact, the following Federal Child Welfare Services Statutes and Reg

ulations: 42 USCS.-§§601; §§620; §§621 et seq.; 42 USCS §§622; §§629 et seq.; 42 USCS §670

et seq.; and 42 USCS §1397 et seq.; 45 CFR §260.10; CFR §260.20; §260.30; §260.31; 45 CFR

§2355.25; 45 CFR §1357.10; and 42 USC §5611 to mention a few, are the Core Foundation of

Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services Laws. All these Federal Statutes and Regulations are

products of the Children's:Bureau established in 1912 by Congress now under Administration

of Children and Families Division within the Department of Health*'and’ Hemari Services (DHHS).

D. UNDER PENNSYLVANIA CHILD WELFARE SERVICES AGREEMENT CONTRACT PURSUANT TO

62 PS §701-708; ARTICLE VII OF PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC WELFARE CODE AND TITLE

55 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CODE 55 PA CODE §3130.12(c)(l); AND FEDERAL CHILD

WELFARE SERVICES STATUTES PURSUANT TO 42 USCS §§601; §§620; §§621; §§622;

§§629; §670; 42 USCS §1397; AND 5611, CITY OF PHILADELPHIA SCOH PROGRAM

IS NOT A HEALTH CARE BENEFIT PROGRAM AND SO IT IS A MEBHI SCOH PROGRAM

"The Philadelphia Department of Human Services' mission is to provide and promote Safety

and permanency for children and youth at-risk of abuse; neglect; and delinquency. Core values

include: Safety; Permamnency; Well-being; Respect; Competence; team Work; Accountability;

Transparency/Communication; and Trust." See Draft: City of Philadelphia, • • • Needs-based and

Budget for Fiscal Year 2009-2010 and Implementation PLan and Budget for Fiscal Year 2008-2009,

July 14, 2008 pg. 35 of 63.

Also, "The City and State are jointly responsible under Article VII of the Public Welfare

Code and Title 55 of the Pennsylvania Code 55 PA Code §3130.12(c)(1) for the achievement of

State children and youth performance goals and for assuring the availability of adequate

r; “

children and youth social services for children at-risk for abuse, dependency, and delin

quency. These partners are jointly responsible for assuring that children are properly super

vised and attend school regularly." See page 21 of 63, Id.

The DHS Mission has been the guiding principle of all SGOHiproviders in the City of

Philadelphia such as MEBHI. This very mission statement takes its cue from the above-cited

federal Child Welfare Services Statutes including Regulations mentioned herein this case

before this Highest Court in the.-land, the only Court that is Constitutionally charged with

the task of clearing Constitutional and Statutory interpretation of Federal Laws and contro

versies emanating from Federal Circuit Courts (conflicts between Circuits) and Federal Courts

and States.

Manamela asks this Honorable Court, the United States Supreme Court, which has juris

diction over this case to review, Manamela v. Warden, Fort Dix, FCI, Case No.19-3924,

District Court Case No.: l-18-cv-09292. He asks the Supreme Court to review this case for

what it is, and remove the politics inherent in it; because this very case issa fruit of an

already poisoned tree - City of Philadelphia's DA's Office, Philadelphia Police Department,

and City of Philadelphia Department of Human Services, which resulted in Manamela's conviction

for

a Federal Health Care Fraud [18 USCS §1347]; Wire Fraud [18 USCS §1343]; and Conspiracy

to Commit an Offense against the United States Government, to be specific, [18 USCS §371].

A conviction that has violated his Constitutional and Substantial Rights, based on deliberate

misinterpretation of Federal Statute(s) and Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services Laws, mischaracterization of MEBHI's function and role in the lives of at-risk children and their

families, which Manamela views as ex post facto clause violation under US Constitution Art.

1, §9, Cl. 3; and Art. 1, §10, Cl. 1. Manamela is convinced and confident that this very

court, the highest in the land, will ultimately remove the politics.jand prejudice inherent

in this case for conviction's case.

A. HEALTH CARE FRAUD

On June 10, 2010, Manamela was sentenced to 168 months prison term; he was charged with

6 counts of health care fraud [18 USC §1347], a federal felony crime he assertively and veheiTl

10.

raently danies. He argues that he was and still is innocent of this very crime; because under

the Contract with the City of Philadelphia, MEBHI was not required to provide health or

medical care services to low-income at-risk children and their families. Manamela argues

that service Description and Contract Requirements for Comprehensive Family Based Services

contradicts the Government's assertion that MEBHI was/is a health care benefit service pro

vider under federal law, and implies that it is too under Pennsylvania Child Welfare services

laws.

MEBHI, Manamela argues, was never a health care provider from inception. MEBHI was a

private community-based family support service provider under PA Child Welfare Services Laws

pursuant to Article VII of the Public Welfare Code and Title 55 of the Pennsylvania Code 55

PA Code §3130.12(c)(1); 42 PA Cons. Stat. Ann §6302; Juvenile Act 42 PA CS §6324(1); Child

Protective Services Act 23 PA CS §6315(a)(l) under Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services

Agreement Contract between City of Philadelphia and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 62 PS §§701708.

In support of his Actual Innocence Claim, Manamela argues that the Government has deli'r

berately ignored the ''AuthenticcDocuments" in its possession - SCOH Comprehensive Family

Based Services Contracts of 1999 which was effective/July!1, 2000; 2004 effective July 1,

same year; and 2006 effective July 1, same year, submitted to US Attorney's office and spe

cifically to AUSA Barbara/,Rowland by Manamela in and around October 2006, after Government

ordered MEBHI leadership to surrender Clients Charts/Files from 2005 to 2006, and all MEBHI

SCOH-related documents.

Ihe following is the excerpt from Service Description and Contract Requirements for Com

prehensive Family Based Services addressing:: the most "crucial" element at the center of Mana

mela and co-defendants' alleged crime "Health Care Fraud" - a felony charge imposed on Mana

mela, and MEBHI SCOH Social Workers by the Government. Although page 2 of 1999 Contract is

valuable, page 3 is extremely valuable in that it helps distinguish MEBHI as a family support

service provider from the alleged health care benefit/service provider to at-risk children

and their families as claimed by the Government:,

11.

All Comprehensive Family Based Services are required to include five service components:

1) Family Assessment.

2) Counselling, intervention, and direct social services for members of client families.

3) Structured interventions that promote life skills development by members of client families.

4) Advocacy for acquiring, coordinating and monitoring the use of other community resources

needed to meet family needs.

5) Service management that plans, coordinates, monitors, documents, and reports on the client

family participation in the total array of services and other community resources.

Illustrations of the required components 3 and 4 of Comprehensive Family Based Services

include:

• Structured interventions that promote life skills development by member(s)tof client

families:

• Parenting Skills.

•Family Planning.

• Resource Management.

• Consumerism.

• Meal Planning.

•Preventive Health. • Vocational Planning.

• Advocacy for acquiring, coordinating, and monitoring the use of other community resources

needed to meet family needs:

• Housing.

• Food.

>, Clothing.

• Education and Special Education.

• Vocational Counselling and Training. • Vocational Rehabilitation.

• Health.

• Mental Health.

• Drug and Alcohol. • Legal.

• Employment. • Child Care.

• Homemaker.

Comprehensive Family Based Services does not include direct Services delivery of any of the

above illustrations of advocacy.

The language used in Services Description and Contract Requirements for Comprehensive

Family Based Services

clearly excludes any health care provision service delivery to at-risk

children and their families by MEBHI. The language of the Contract contradicts the Govern

ment and its cooperating witnesses in this very case, the claim that MEBHI was required and

to ensure that MEBHI provides medical care to at-risk children and their families. Also, it

contradicts the Government's assertion and its unproven "beyond a reasonable doubt" claim

that MEBHI was a health care benefit service provider.

The duties and obligations

of the Pennsylvania counties to provide child welfare ser

vices are set forth in 62 PS §§701-708. And it is that very law that brought about connection

between the City of Philadelphia and MEBHI via 1999; 2004; and 2006 Contracts, whose language

exclude any Direct Services of health care service delivery because under

the State Contract

Agreement with City of Philadelphia, both Mental and Medical Health care are non-reimbursible

because DHS is not a health care benefit entity.

SCOH "monitored" services as:to compliance of families to already established Family

Service Plan, and provide "oversight" regarding families' participation in third-party com12.

munity based service providers such as health centers/clinics/hospitals; schools, mental

health in/outpatient treatment programs, parenting skills, education programs, etc. connected

to at-risk children and their families - and all these programs including religious organ

izations (churches) and extended family or relatives were considered collaterals or indirect

services on their own - meaning that without child or guardian being present during visits

with these relatives or institutions, there will be no payment.

42 USCS §601 states that the purpose of IV-A (Aid to Families with Dependent Children)

is to encourage "the care of such dependent children in their own homes or in the homes of

relatives by enabling each State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other

services, as far as practicable under the conditions in each State, to needy dependent child

ren and the parents or relatives with whom they are living to help maintain and strengthen

family life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for maximum

self-support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of continuing parental

care and protection there is hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sum

sufficient to carry out the purpose of this part. The sums made available under this Section

shall be used for making payments to States which have submitted, and had approved by the

Board (Secretary), State plans for aid and services to needy families with children." See

City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., 508 F. Supp. 221 (1981).

42 USC §620 states that the purpose of Title IV-B is to "enable the United States, .

through the Secretary, to cooperate with the State public welfare agencies in establishing,

extending and strengthening Child Welfare Service..." Id.

The purpose of Title XX is defined in 42 USC §1397 as being to encourage each state, as

far as practicable under the conditions in that State, to furnish services directed at the

goal of

1) Achieving or maintaining economic self-support to prevent, reduce, or eliminate dependency,,

2) Achieving or maintaining self-sufficiency, including reduction or prevention of

dependency,

3) Preventing or remedying neglect, abuse, or exploitation of children and adults unable to

protect their own interests or preserving, rehabilitating, or reuniting families,

4) Preventing or reducing inappropriate institutional care by providing for community-based

care, home-based care, or other forms of less intensive care, or

5) Securing referral or admission for institutional care when other forms of care are not

appropriate, or providing services to individuals in institutions.

Furthermore, 42 USCS §621 et seq. principles of child welfare services are further proof

that MEBHI is not a health care benefit provider:

1) Protecting and promoting the Welfare of all children.

2) Preventing the neglect, abuse or exploitation of children.

3) Supporting at-risk families through services which allow children, where appropriate, to

remain safely with their families or return to their families in a timely manner.

4) Providing training, professional development and support to ensure a well qualified child

welfare work-force.

The Federal Child Welfare Services Statutes cited above, clearly are reflected in the

Commonwealth of Pensylvania Child Welfare Services Laws; and in particular, 55 PA Code

§3130.12(c)(1) which binds DHS and MEBHI SCOH directly. 42 USCS §601, §620, and Title XX

13.

[42 USC §1397] including 42 USCS'§622, and 42 USCS §629, address both Child Welfare Service

delivery and the financial components of Child Welfare Services Laws to the State(s), and

making it clear that money allocated to the States is for the States to use based on their

Child Welfare needs - and in essence, that very money should be viewed as State money not

federal government's. Hence, all alleged health care fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy charges

should be viewed through the States prism -in this case, Pennsylvania State Laws, and that

State based on the separation of powers in the Tenth Amendment, has the authority to pro

secute MEBHI and Manamela, not the Government because the crimes alleged have nothing to do

with any Federal Government Agencies or Institutions.

"The fact that federal grants ultimately finance a large part of these welfare services

or that federal laws and regulations permit a State, as one of its options, to establish

a system whereby political subdivisions of the State deliver the services funded by the

federal grant does not mean that every dispute regarding these welfare services necessarily

involves an interpretation of federal law by the federal courts. Indeed, the instant suit

as between the Commonwealth and the City raises factual legal issues governed by State Law

and should be resolved in State Court proceedings." See also Kelly v. United States, et al.,

18-1059 (2020); and United States v. Tanner, 483 US 107, 129-30 (1987).

The history of Child Welfare Services as Federal Law under Title 42 Public Health and

Welfare §391, begins in 1912, with the establishment within the Department of Commerce and

Labor as Children's Bureau [now DHHS], see April 9, 1912, ch 73 §1, 37 Stat. 79. As a result,

the Federal States in support of Social Services or Child Welfare services were established:

42 USCS §601 [Title IV-A]; Subpart 1. Stephanie Tubbs Jones Child Welfare Services Program

[§§621 et deq., Purpose]; Subpart 2. Promiting Safe and Stable Families [42 USCS §629]; State

Plans for Child Welfare Services [42 USCS §622]; Child Abuse Prevention and Protection Ser

vices [42 USC §5611]. MEBHI as a State-agent is guided by State Child Welfare Services Laws,

whose foundation is based on the above-cited Federal Child Welfare statutes.

The Government in its claim argues that "the defendants were paid to make sure these

children were seeing the doctor." Also argues that MEBHI was charged with collecting "medical

and immunization records of at-risk children", and because of that reason, MFRHT is a health

care benefit service provider. The Government's position was supported by the District Court

(EDPA)_by comparing MEBHI to Gelin and Lucien. See United States v. Gelin, 712 F.3d 612 (1st

Cir. 2013); United States v. Lucien, 347 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2003); see also United States v.

14.

Jones, 471 F.3d 478 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Jones, 2007 WL 246478, at 3-4 (WDPA

Aug. 27, 2007) afff'd 299 F.App'x 187, 189-90 (3d Cir. 2008); and United States v. Whited,

311 F.3d 259, 263-64 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining the statute only covers defrauding a "health

care benefit program"). See United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 478, 479, 481 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006);

United States v. Natale, 719 F.3d 719, 733 (7th Cir. 2013) ("[T]he government must prove a

link to a health care benefit program to secure conviction under §1035 and

care offenses");

other health

United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 297 (4th Cir. 2014) (identifying

Medicare as a health care benefit program); United States v. Malinsky, 391 F.App'x 200, 201

(3d Cir. 2010) (noting defendants caused submission of "fraudulent claims for reimbursement

to health insurance companies."); United States v. Wayland, 549 F.3d 526, 527 (7th Cir. 2008)

(identifying medicaid as a health care benefit program); and United States v. Benoit, 545

F. Appi'.x 171, 173 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting bills for fraudulent services were submitted "to

several insurance companies!.')'.

The Government's argument "stretched the statute to cover activity beyond its plain

words" because there was "simply no type of misrepresentation made in connection .with delivery

of or payment for health care benefits." See Jones, 471 F.3d 478.

MEBHI as a family service provider was never a health care program under Contract with

the City of Philadelphia.

Manamela argues that under the Federal Health Care Programs, and to be specific, 42 USCS

§201 et seq.; 42 USCS §299b;-21; §1320d; §1320a-7; §§1395x; §§1396; §§1397aa; §§1397bb; §1397jj;

and as indicated in.its Contract with CYD/DHS, Comprehensive Community Based Family Service

Contracts, MEBHI is not a health care provider as purported by the Government and qualified

by the Third Circuit. Above all, MEBHI does not meet the 42 CFR §483.460; 42 CFR §440.70;

42 CFR §441.15 [Home Health Care Services], and the Pennsylvania Medical Practice Act of 1985,

63 PS §422.10 required conditions for participation in health care services as a communitybased family support service provider pursuant to Article VII of Pennsylvania Public Welfare

Code Title. 55 of the Pennsylvania Code 55 PA Code §3130.12(c)(1); and 42 PA Cons. Stat. Ann

§6302.

18 USCS §1347 makes it a crime to defraud a health care benefit program. A "health care

15.

benefit program" is defined as "any public or private plan or contract, affecting commerce,

under which and medical benefit, item or service is provided to any individual'..', 18’,USCS

§24(b). However, the health care fraud claim against Manamela et at., fails considerably.

It does not meet any of the Third Circuit Criminal Jury Instruction 6.18.1347 Instruction

44-14 Elements of the Offense. The Government did not prove its health care fraud claim beyond

reasonable doubt; because proof beyond reasonable doubt Standard bar was lowered due to

politics inherent in this case for conviction's sake.

The United States Constitution forbids Congress and State Legislatures from passing ex

post facto laws. See US Cons. Art. 1, §9, Cl. 3 (applicable to Congress); US Cons. Art. 1,

§10, Cl. 1 (applicable to States). Manamela's case applies to both prohibition laws because

it Originates from the State of Pennsylvania via the Philadelphia DA's Office in conjunction

with Philadelphia Police Department and was prosecuted by the Government as a "health care

fraud case" as opposed to what the DHS Contracts stipulated as being "Comprehensive Family

based Services" pursuant to Article VII of Public Welfare Code and Title 55 of the Pennsyl

vania Code - 55 PA Code §3130.12(c)(1); 42 PA Cons. Stat. Ann §6302; Juvenile Act - 42 PA

CS §6324(1); and 62 PS §701-708.

The Classic definition of ex post facto law was set forth in Justice Chase's opinion in

Calder v. Bull, 3 US (3 Dali.) 386, 390 (1798):

"1st every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was

innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates the

Crime, or makes it greater than it was, when commited. 3d. Every law that changes the punish

ment, and inflicts a greater punishment, that the law annexed to the crime, when committed.

4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different tes

timony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to

convict the offender."

"A law violates ex post facto clause if it: (1) punishes a crime an act previously com

mitted which was not a crime when done; (2) makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime

after it has been committed; or (3) deprives a defendant of any defense available according

to the law at the time the charged act was committed. The ex post facto prohibition has two

principal purposes. First, it seeks to prevent legislatures from "enacting arbitrary or vin

dictive legislation." Miller v. Florida, 482 US 423, 429 (1987). Second, it .endeavors "to

assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely

on their meaning until explicitly changed." Weaver v. Graham, 450 US 24, 28-29 (1981). Two

elements must exist for there to be a violation of ex post facto clause violation (emphasis

mine). First, the law "must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occuring

before its enactment." Weaver, 540 US at 29. Second, the law must be a penal statute that

16.

disadvantages those affected by it." See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 US 37, 41 (1990).

SUFFICIENCY-OF-THE-EVIDENCE STANDARD

"Law restrospectively reducing quantum of evidence required to convict offender is in

violation of Constitution's ex post facto prohibitions (Art. 1, §9, Cl. 3; Art. 1, §10, Cl.

l))as are laws retrospectively eliminating elements of offense, increase, punishment for ex

isting offense, or lowering burden of proof, for in each of these instances, government sub

verts presumption of innocence by (l) reducing number of elements that government must prove

to overcome that presumption, (2) threatening such severe punishment so as to reduce plea to

lesser offense or lower sentence, or (3) making it easier to meet threshold for overcoming

presumption..." Carmell v. Texas, (2000). "Judicial Opinion which changes necessary proof by

requiring less testimony than law required at the time of commission of offense may have

effect of ex post facto law." Bowyer v. United States, (1980) Dist. Col. App., 422 A26 973.

"A defendant is entitled to have all essential elements of a charged offense submitted

to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt." See United States v. Gaudin, 515 US 506,

510, 132 L. ed. 444, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995). However, in this very case, the Government was

never required to prove its case-in-chief beyond a reasonable doubt. The Jury was made to

presume the Manamela et al., health care fraud scheme was to submit false claims to health

insurers (emphasis mine). The Government failed to prove that the "scheme" primarily targeted

medicare/medicaid which could have been problematic, in that MEBHI SCOH Contract with City

of Philadelphia CYD/DHS as reflected in 1999; 2004; and 2006 Contracts has/had nothing to do

with health care service delivery but dependency-related. See United States v. Hickman, 282

F. Supp, 2d 528, 2003 US Dist. LEXIS

15496 (SD Tex. 2003) (ex post facto clause violation

claim). Furthermore, "the government must provide proof of some effect on interstate com-,

merce" to show that defendants' actions violated a Statute that has an "Affecting Commerce"

like requirements, 282 F. Supp. 2d 528, 2003.

Also, the District-Court ordered Manamela to pay restitution for his crimes in the amount

of $1,216,000 pursuant to 18 USC §3363A. This amount of restitution included $1,900 for

counts 1 to 19 of indictment. In Hughey,v. United States, 495 US 411, 109 L. Ed. 2d 408, 331

F.3d 4483 110 S.Ct. 1979 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the.Victim and Witness Protection

Act of 1992, which is the Statutory basis of §3363, authorized and award restitution "only

for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction."

Id. at 413; see also United States v, Brandt, 913 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1990) [2003 US

App. LEXIS 23] (remanding a case for proper calculation of restitution under Hughey when the

17.

district court improperly sentenced the defendant to an amount of restitution that was broader

than the offense for which the defendant was convicted). See United States v. Quackenbush,

938 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that imposition of restitution for losses not

related to the crime of conviction was plain error.) Therefore, the health care fraud charges

under 18 USCS §24(b) and 1347; 1343, and 371 must be reversed because they are based on ex

post facto laws in violation of US Cons. Art. 1, §9, Cl. 3;.'and Art. 1, §10, Cl. r,all alleged

Federal Statute laws violations against Manamela based on false premise; ard political in

nature, and ignorer. the„MEBHI-DHS SCOH Contracts and City of Philadelphia in implementing

Commonwealth of Pensylvania Child Welfare Services laws.

The ex post facto error in this case before the Court, has affected Manamela's substan

tial and Constitutional rights; because it affected the outcome of the district court pro

ceedings, and thus Manamela's conviction in violation of ex post facto clause constituted

plain error. ^Federal R. Crim. P. 52(b) permits and Appellate Court..to recognize a plain

error that affects substantial rights even if the claim of error was not brought to the

district court's attention. The language of the Contracts, in the light of both legal and

general usage, shows conclusively that health care services provision were not intended to

be embraced therein.

B. WIRE FRAUD [18 USCS §1343]

Manamela was charged with 12 counts of Wire Fraud [18 USCS §1343]. In essence, Manamela

was literally charged with the "scheme to defraud the United States Government", which is a

federal felony charge that helped increase his prison term to 168 months. It is a crime

which Manamela vehemently denies.

In his opening remarks as to this case, the presiding US District Court Judge (EDPA),

Judge Steward Dalzell, made a very strong and prejudiced statement against MEBHI without

full grasp of the facts surrounding this case at bar:

Multiethnic is a big scheme, it was not founded on the principle of providing services

to at-risk children but to defraud the Government [Federal Government]... MEBHI was not

about service delivery from its inception; but to create jobs in order to milk the Government

to the tune of $3.6 million." See both pretrial and trial court transceipts in United States

v. Manamela, (2010).

18.

In Kelly v. United States, et al., No. 18-1059 (May 7, 2020), it is clearly stated

during US Supreme Court deliberations that:

"The Federal wire fraud statutes make it a crime to effect (with the use of wires) "any

scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraud

ulent pretenses, representations, or promises. 18 USCS §1343.

Also, the Court states that federal program fraud statute bars "obtaining by fraud" the

"property" (including money) of a federally funded program or entity. §666(l)(l)(A). These

statutes the Court argued that are "limited in scope to the protection of property rights;;,"

and do not authorize federal prosecutors to "set [] standards of disclosure and good govern

ment for local and state officials." McNally v. United States, 483 US 350, 360. So under

either provision, the government had to show not only that Baroni and Kelly engaged in decep

tion, but that an object of their fraud was money or property. Cleveland v. United States,

631 US 12, 26.

"The crime denounced by the statute is mailing, telephoning, and faxing false information,

misrepresenting, mischaracterization of SCOH social workers in executing or attempting the

scheme. If the scheme was devised prior to the time MEBHI was awarded a. contract and the

notices of the scheme were mailed in execution of it, the crime was then complete whether

those to be defrauded were actively defrauded or not." See Haas et al. v. United States,

93 F.2d 427; 1973 US App. LEXIS 2830.

------------------------------------------In this instant case before the Court, the Government claims that: (l) Manamela and MEBHI

SCOH social workers failed to ensure that at-risk children receive medical care.

"It would be dangerous, indeed, to carry the principle, that a case which is within the

reason or mischief of statute, is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not

enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or kindred character, with those

which are enumerated. If this principle has ever been recognized in expunding criminal law,

it has been in cases of considerable irritation which it be unsafe to consider as precedents

forming a general rule for other cases," (quoting Justice Marshall when delivering opinion

of the Court in 5 LED 37, WHEAT 76, United States v. Wiltberger).

This is exactly what the Philadelphia DA and the Government did out of desperation and

irritation to punish MEBHI and Manamela et al.; because the State was unable to indict Mana

mela in DK's case. Hence, the health care fraud was used to prosecute and convict him based

on false Federal Statute and Mischaracterization of MEBHI's Function and Role in the lives

-? :-o£_.?at^fisk- children, including using false evidence to boost their case-in-chief.

"The rule that the penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not so much less

old than Construction itself. It is founded on tenderness of the law for the rights of indi

viduals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative,

19.

not the court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.” Id.

Also see Rule of Construction; 1 USCS §4; An "Airplane is not a Motor Vehicle” in

McBoyle:-V. United States, 283 US 25, 75 L.Ed 816, 41 S. Ct. 340 (2931). As per Contract

between City of Philadelphia and MEBHI, the Comprehensive Family Based Services Contract

pursuant to Article VII of the Public Welfare Code and Title 55 of Pennsylvania Code 55

PA Code §1330.12(c)(1), MEBHI is not a health care provider.

Two of MEBHI members/employess, Dr. Kamuvaka (supervisor in DK's case) and J. Murray

(the social worker, charged with monitoring Kelly family) were indicted on August 5, 2008 at

State-level, and sentenced to 13% years for DK's death, while serving time in Federal

Prison for the same reasons charged with in Federal Criminal Court.

Furthermore, Manamela argues that Government has failed to show: "(1) the name(s) or

descriptions of the person or persons who made false pretenses; (2) how, that is what manner,

by oral, printed, or written statement or statements, the alleged false and fraudulent pre

tenses, representation, and promises were made or caused to be made by the defendants;

(3) what false and fraudulent pretenses, representation, and promises were made or caused to

be made by the defendants in lieu of the conclusion that said alleged false and fraudulent

pretenses, representations and premises were "to the effect” of certain matters and [1937

US APP. LEXIS 17] things as alleged in the indictment." See Myers v. United States, 8 Cir.,

15 F.2d 977, 985; Goldstein v. United States, 8 Cir. 63 F.2d 609, 612.

"It follows that one must be convicted, if at all, on the scheme alleged and if the

scheme is not substantially established by the proof he cannot be convicted." See Gammon v.

United States, 8 Cir. 12 f.2d 266; Rude v. United States, 10 Cir. 74 F.2d 673, 677 (1936,37);

and Kelly v. United States, et al.i, No: 18-1059. (3d Cir. 2020).

"Unless the scheme to defraud existed prior to the dates of the mailing of the notice

scheme-related materials, the mailing, wiring of them could not constitute a misuse of the

mails under section [1937 US App. LEXIS 273] 215 Criminal Code 18 USCA 338." Chew v. United

States, 8 Cir. 9 F.2d 348, 352; Gammon v. United States, 8 Cir. 12 f.2d 226, IW.

The wire fraud statutes thus prohibits only deceptive "scheme to deprive [the victim of]

money or property." Kelly v. United States, et al., (2020), at 356. Similarly, the federal

program fraud statute bars "obtaining] by fraud" the property

(including money) of a

federally funded program or entity like the Port Authority. §666(a)(l)(A). So under either

provision, the Government had to show not only that Manamela [whom the Government acknowledged

in their assessment or claim.that "they know he visited clients"] and MEBHI et al. engaged

in deception, but that an "object of the[ir] fraud [was] 'property'". Cleveland v. United

States, 531 US 12, 26 (2000). Manamela as SC0H supervisor was not required to visit by the

20.

Contract; but he visited so he could see for himself what was actually happening in these homes.

The Government in this very case does not specify exactly "the object of fraud". However,

it does throw around almost everything to justify federal fraud under 18 USCS §1343. The

question arises whose money and property Manamela and MEBHI SCOH workers were after? Was it

the Federal Government's or City or Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, or private donors' contri

bution money to DHS at-risk children's issues? The other question is since the case-in-chief

[health care fraud], who;- were Manamela and MEBHI's SCOH victims, Federal health care program(s), State of Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services, or City of Philadelphia CYD, DHS, or

at-risk children and their families under MEBHI supervision? Definitely the object of the

fraud cannot be both child welfare services (SCOH) or healthcare services; because that would

clearly indicate double-dipping h that would imply that MEBHI as an agency was providing i

both family support and health care services at the same time to at-risk children and their

families under DHS Contract, a prohibited and illegal practice in the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania. Sadly enough, that is what the Government has done in this case - killing two

birds with one stone.

C. CONSPIRACY TO OBSTRUCT A MATTER WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF A FEDERAL

AGENCY [18 USC::§371]

The Supreme Court held in United States v. Tanner, 483 US 107, 129-30 (1987), that "a

conspiracy to defraud a third party that merely received financial assistance and some super

vision from the United States was not itself a conspiracy "to defraud the United States"

except under unusual circumstances," see Bridges v. United States, 346 US at 215, 224. Fraud

is an essential element of the offense. See also United States v. Vasquez, 319 f.2d 381, 384

(3d Cir. 1963).

The general conspiracy section of the criminal code 18 USCS condemns two types of cons

piracies: "one, to commit substantive offenses against the. United States specified other sta

tutes. The other to defraud the United States. The latter conspiracy isritself the substantive,

offense, and a count of indictment drawn under it need to refer to no other statute other

than §371. It is not restricted to acts that cheat the United States in:,a pecuniary manner or

in a manner concerning property. It is broad enough to encompass the interfering with, obs

tructing or the depriving it of one of its lawful administrative functions by deceptive means

or means that are at least dishonest, except under unusual circumstances." See 319 f.2d 381.

The. essence of the conspiracy charge in this particular case is that Manamela as a MEBHI

co-founder and SCOH supervisor was engaged in falsification of SCOH records, backdating/back

tracking of reports intended for City of Philadelphia DHS and CYD. See United States v. Manamela, (2012 CA 3 PA). See also United States v. Manamela, 615 Fed.Appx. 151, 2015 US App.

LEXIS 14465 No. 13-3676.

21.

In Tanner 97 L. Ed. 2d 90, 107 S. Ct. 2739, the Supreme Court held that: "a conspiracy

to defraud a corporation owned and operated by several rural distribution cooperatives is not

itself a conspiracy to defraud the United States so as to support a criminal conviction under

18 USCS §371, even though the corporation receives financial assistance and some supervision

from the United States, because (l) §371 covers conspiracies "to defraud the United States,

or any agency thereof", a phrase which fails to describe the corporation; (2) the Federal

Government, rather than seeking a particular interpretation of ambiguous statutory language,

is asking the United States Supreme Court to expand the reach of a criminal provision by

reading new language into it, which the Supreme Court cannot do; (3) even if the Federal Government s interpretation of §371 could be pegged to some language of §371, the government has

presented nothing to overcome the Supreme Court's rule-.that any ambiguity concerning the

ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity; (4) no aid in support of

the Federal Government's interpretation can be wrestled from the legislative history of §371;

and (5) the Federal Government's proposed test - based upon a substantial ongoing Federal

Supervision of a defrauded intermediary - is unable to provide any real guidance, given

(a) the immense variety of ways the Federal.-Government provides financial assistance, and

(b) the fact that such assistance is always accompanied by restrictions on its use."

See historical background of case in 483 US 107, 129-30.

As indicated in this very case, Manamela's company had a contract with City of Philar

delphia as per Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services Agreement Contract between City and

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 5and because of that very fact, Manamela and entire MEBHI SCOH

social workers were state-agents. In addition, dependency proceedings clearly serve "as ad

vocate for the State", Prbler, 424 US at 430-3 in 33, in a capacity that is "intimately asso

ciated with the judicial phase of the [child protection] process." 424 US at 430. Manamela

' a ^asialsocialrworker, supervisor, and co-founder of MEBHI, his role in at-risk children's lives

should be viewed as Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's state agent, who was charged as per Con

tract, with the responsibility of implementing Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services laws and

policies; and not health care services.

Manamela argues that the Government in its endeavor to bolster its case-in-chief against

MEBHI et al., entrapped him using Sukunthea Chen by wire tapping him and this was around

April 2009, about 2 weeks before Manamela, Kamuvaka and Coulibaly were indicted. Chen called

Manamela asking him to meet him regarding some documents he had [no description] from Dr.

QP, and Manamela asking him whether he has consulted a lawyer as to these documents. April

30, 2009, Manamela was indicted. See Court transcripts as to this matter.

The attempted scheme to entrap Manamela did not succeed; and what the FBI intended to do

with the help of Chen was not agreed upon and did not materialize. Hence, the concocted

"conspiracy" was incomplete. See Joseph George Sherman v. United States of America, 356 US

22.

369, 2 L.Ed 2d 848, 78 S. Ct. 819 (1958); United States v. Hill, 444 F.2d 115 (1971) CA 10

Okla.; See also United States v. Barkley, (1978) [indictment |; investigating false charges:

Bailey v. United States, 516 US 137, 166 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed 2d 472 (1995); Entrapment:

United States v. Williams, 113 F.3d 243 (1997) (United States Court of Appeals of the District

of Colombia); Bailey vTUnited States, 133 S. Ct. 1031, 185 L. Ed. 2d 19 (2013); United

States v. Argurs, 427 US 97, 96 S. Ct. 1392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976); United States v. Payne,

63 F.3d 1200 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Cotton, 535 US 625, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 152 L. Ed.

2d 860 (2002); and United States of America v. Vasquez, 319 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1963).

In City of Philadelphia v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, et al., (1981), City of Phila

delphia filed a suit alleging violations of Title IV-B and Title XX of the Social Security

Act, 42 USCS §620-626, 1397-, 1397f. The City filed suit when Pennsylvania Department of

Public Welfare failed to reimburse the City for its expenditures related to a social service

program as required by the parties' child welfare service agreement. The Court granted def

endants (Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Governor of Pennsylvania, Secretary of Pennsylvania

Department of Public Welfare, Tceasurer of Pennsylvania, and Secretary of Health and Human

Services) Motion to Dismiss, finding that the language of the federal statutes defendants

allegedly violated did not create a private cause of action by the City, and such a cause of

action could not be implied because it was those in need of welfare services, rather than

the City that comprised the class of people for whose benefit the statutes were enacted.

"The faettthat Federal grants ultimately finance [1981 US Dist. LEXIS 16] a large part

of these welfare services or that federal laws and regulations permit a state as one of its

options, to establish a system whereby political subdivisions of the State deliver the ser

vices funded by the Federal grant does not mean that every dispute regarding these welfare

services necessarily involves interpretation of federal law by the Federal Courts. Indeed,

the instant suit as between the Commonwealth and the City raises factual and legal issues

governed by State law and should be resolved in State Court proceedings." Id.

In Tanner, the Court argued that: "to the extent the evidence established a conspiracy

by petitioners to defraud Seminole, their action did not violate §371, which prohibits conspiracies to "defraud the United States, or any agency thereof." The Government's argument

that Seminole, as the recipient of federal financial assistance, and the subject of federal

supervision, must be treated as "the United States" under §371 is untenable, in light of the

statute's plain and unambiguous language and the Government's concession that Seminole is not

an "agency" thereunder, and in the absense of any indication in the legislative history that

§371 should be expanded to cover conspiracies to defraud those acting on behalf of the United

States. Given the immense variety of federal assistance arrangements, the Government's

suggested requirement that there be "substantial ongoing federal supervision" of the defrau

ded non-governmental intermediary before a crime against the United States occurs fails to

provide any real guidance. However, to the extent that the evidence is sufficient to estab

lish that petitioners conspiraced. to cause Seminole to make misinterpretations to the REA,

petitioners' §371 conviction may stand. On remand, the Court of Appeals must consider the

sufficiency of evidence on this charge."

Title 18 USC §371 [18 USCS §371] provides,^-in relevant part:

23.

"If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against On-itediStates or

to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one

or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be

fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."

Furthermore, the Court stated that "Section 371 is the descendant of and bears a strong

resemblance to conspiracy laws that have been in the Federal Statute books since 1867." See

Act of, arch 2, 1867, Ch 169, §30, 14 Stat. 484 (prohibiting conspiracy to "defraud the Uni

ted States in any manner whatever."). Neither the original 1867 provision nor the subsequent

reincarnations were accompanied by any particularly illuminating legislative history. This

case has been preceeded, however, by decisions of this Court interpreting the scope of the

phrase "to defraud... in any manner or for any purpose." In these cases we have stated re

peatedly that the fraud covered by the statute "reaches any conspiracy for the purpose of

impairing, obstructing or defeating the lawful function of any department of Government."

Dennis v. United States, 384 US 855, 861, 16 L. Ed. 2d 973, 86 S. Ct. 1840 (1966), quoting

Haas v. Henkel, 216 US 462 54 L. Ed. 569 30 S. Ct. 249 (1910); see also Glasser v. United

States, 315 US 60, 66, 86 L. Ed. 680, 62 S. Ct. 457 (1942); Hammerschmidt v. United States,

265 US 182, 188, 68 L. Ed. 968, 44 S. Ct. 511 (1924).

We do not reconsider that aspect of the scope of §371 in this case. Therefore, if peti

tioner's actions constituted a conspiracy to impair the functioning of the REA, no other form

of injury to the Federal Government need be established for the conspiracy to fall under §371.

The indictment against Manamela and co-defendant (Kamuvaka) charged them with having

conspired "to defraud the United States by impeding, impairing, obstructing and defeating

the lawful functions of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Health Care Program in its adminis

tration and anfbecanait.of its federal agents, in this case, 42 USCS §601 Title IV-A and

§1397-1397f Federal Block Grants." Manamela argues that if the evidence adduced at trial es

tablished a conspiracy to defraud, then the target of that conspiracy was Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania State Child Welfare Services Program or City of Philadelphia, and

a conspiracy to defraud a State political subdivision receiving financial assistance from

the Federal Government via State in this case, does not constitute a conspiracy to defraud

the United States. [Under separation of powers, State of Pennsylvania is not United States

Agency nor Federal Government department]. Also, for the fraud §371 to stand, it must be

linked to the case-in-chief health care fraud [18 USCS §1347 and §1343] reflecting wire fraud

activities connecting to health care service delivery; because as alleged in the Government

case against Manamela and MEBHI, health care is the target of the fraud - "the scheme to

defraud the United States Government." Therefore, the Court must reject the Government's

interpretation of §371 fraud charge against him; because it has nothing to do with federal

health care program(s) but Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services Program.

24.

WHETHER MANAMELA IS LIABLE FOR DK'S DEATH, WHEREAS THE CIVIL COURT RULED

THAT UNDER PENNSYLVANIA AND THIRD CIRCUIT STATE-CREATED DANGER DOCTRINE

MEBHI AND MANAMELA WERE NOT CULPABLE

The Criminal Court, District Court (EDPA) ruled on 6/10/2010 that Manamela and MEBHI

co-defendants were liable for DK's death because of "failure to ensure that at-risk child

ren receive medical care and collect immunization records, and file notes in the charts':"

See United States v. Manamela, 463 F. Appx 127, 130. However this claim was refuted by thed

Civil Court within the same Third Circuit earlier on September 9, 2009, and it is discussed

herein infra.

These very at-risk children within the City of Philadelphia/County presented serious

social behavioral problems that led to placement for some of them outside their homes, and

some given up for adoption. As a result, a greater number, if not some of these children's

families were mandated by Philadelphia Family Division and Truancy Prevention Courts to par

ticipate in SC0H for a better outcome. These children or cases were viewed as "pendency

cases" pursuant to 42 PA Cons. Stat. Ann §6302.

However, in this instant case before this Honorable Court, the government brought in

two medical experts as witnesses to bolster its case-in-chief, that is the health care

fraud claim. In their presentation [the experts] of their medical analysis of DK's death,

they failed to show SCOH and health care services, and show Manamela's direct role in her

death. Also, failed to show or link other MEBHI social workers to her death. All they had to

say was that she died of starvation, neglect, including bed-sores that were infested with

maggots.

Furthermore, the two medical experts failed in their expert testimony to "prove beyond

a reasonable doubt" (emphasis mine), that MEBHI SCOH social workers assigned to Kelly/Washington Family case [Julius Murray and Christian Nimpson] and Manamela were responsible for

DK's death.

See Brief Volume II Pretrial Motions (2010) pg. 78. In this very case, the

Government argues that "but-for" failure to provide medical care and collect immunization

records and file in the charts [family charts] MEBHI is culpable for her death. See Barrage

fibnfca i.1£4 S./

------25.

V. United States, 571, 134 S. Ct. 187 L. Ed. 2d 715, 2014 US LEXIS 797 (Jan 27, 2014).

The government according to Manamela, was bold in its assertion that "This is homicide

on the party of MEBHI. This is the core of the case. We will treat it as such." See Appendix

to Brief Volume II Pretrial Motions, pg. 47-48. Further, the government argued that "her

[Danieal Kelly] death is not our whole case as the Court points out, its a very significant

core of the case" (emphasis mine). Id. In essence,si,the Government was charging Manamela, et

al. with murder or homicide under 18 USCS §1111 without proving its claim beyond a reasonable

doubt. In this very case, the District Court lowered the "beyond a reasonable doubt standard"

so that the Government could obtain a conviction.

In this instant case before the Court, the Government murder/homicide claim against Mana

mela, et al. was based on erronous legal assumptions that: (l) because of MEBHI being charged

with "Monitoring Kelly/Washington family", MEBHI therefore had custody of DK and all other

at-risk children under its SCOH program; (2) because of that erronous reasoning and assump

tion, MEBHI was in DK's life due to her medical condition - cerebral palsy - meaning MEBHI

was contracted to provide medical care; and (3) because of MEBHI charged with monitoring

compliance as to medical care, collecting immunization records both from

school and health

care centers/primary care physicians, among many indirect services or advocacy-related tasks,

MEBHI was culpable forrher death and above all, was a health care provider program.

MEBHI*S CUSTODIAL ROLE TO AT-RISK CHILDREN

MEBHI as a state-agent pursuant to Title 555PA Code §3130.12(c)(1) and 42 PA Cons,. .Stat.

Ann

§6302, had no custody of all at-risk children under comprehensive family based services

contract with DHS/CYD. Therefore, MEBHI had no special relationship with all clients under its

supervision!sincluding DK or Kelly/Washington family. tThe special relationship exception app

lies "when the state enters intooa special relationship with a particular citizen [and] fails,

under sufficiently culpable circumstances, to protect the health and safety

of the citizen

to whom it owed an affirmative duty." Morse v. Lower Merrion School District, 132 F.3d 902,

907 (3d Cir. 1997). Quoting DR Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech School, 972 f.2d 1364, 1369

(3d Cir. 1992). Ihe Third Circuit has pbserved that:."[tjhe affirmative duty to protect arises

not from the state s knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of in26.

tent to help [her], but from the limitation which it has imposed on [her] freedom to act on

[her] own behalf." _______

Deshaney, 489 US at 200. The special relationship exception requires the

existence of custodial relationship. Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 304 n.4 (2d Cir. 2006)

("A deprivation of liberty through, for example, incarceration or institutionalization is

required.") (internal quotation marks omitted).

INCONGRUENT RESULTS: IN SAME CASE WITHIN SAME CIRCUIT

In the Appeals Court opinion filed 8/18/2015, in United States . Manamela, 615 Fed. Appx.

151 (3d Cir. 2015), the Court [criminal case] held that: "We concluded that SCOH service

providers..,"made available" a medical item, benefit, or service because they were integral

to ensuring that at-risk children received medical care by acquiring proof of such care

(immunization records and records of visits to doctors) and providing reports of that medical

care-to the city." Furthermore, "the fraud committed by Manamela resulted in at-risk child

ren not receiving the medical care that MEBHI represented the children as having received,

including the care to the 14-year old girl whose death triggered the initial investigation

of MEBHI. Manamela's actions are an example of the quintessential type of fraud that is often

the bases for conviction under §1347." Honestly, Manamela had no direct contact with Kelly/

Washington family, he was not a case worker or supervisor on this case, and this case was not

a health care/medical care one under DHS/MEBHI SCOH contract.

The opinion of the Appeals Court for the Third Circuit on this case is contrary to the

opinion in the Estate of Kelly exrel Gafni v. MEBHI, (2009), where the civil court held that

"DHS's decision to involve MEBHI in their supervision of the Kelly family did little to pro

tect Danieal from neglect and abuse in her mother's home.. Nevertheless /the objectors have

alleged no fact which shows that the appointment of MEBHI "created" the danger which caused

Danieal's death or rendered [her] more vulnerable to danger."

The civil court made it clear that "Aside from contracting with MEBHI to monitor the

Kelly family, no action was taken by DHS to ensure that Danieal received necessary care and

medical attention", emphasis added. See Estate of Kelly exrel Gafni v. MEBHI, 2009 US Dist.

LEXIS 82385 (EDPA 9/9/2009 3d Cir.). This simply means that,..MEBHI as a state-agent and family

support services provider under the Contract with City of Philadelphia had no capability to

provide health care services, and was not responsible for providing medical care to Kelly/

Washington family and other at-risk children under Contract.

The Third Circuit had held that foster children have a special relationship with the

State because the State takes legal custody. Nicini, 212 F.3d at 808. Conversely, "where the

State takes only temporary custody of a child, no special relationship exists." Castobile

Fulginity v. City of fhiladelphia, 719 F. Supp. 2d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2010). (Noting that there

was no court order transfering custody of the child to DHS). MEBHI SCOH had no custody of atrisk children under its supervision.

27.

In this civil case, the Third Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that "liability under

state-created danger doctrine "requires affirmative state action"; mere failure to protect

an'individual against violence, does not violate.the Due Process clause." Bright, 443 F.3d

at 284 (quoting Deshaney, 489 US at 197); see also Ye v. United States, 484 t°3d 634, 638

(3d Gir. 2007). The Third Circuit "has read Deshaney primarily as setting out a test for

physical custody." Also, the Third Circuit concluded that Dk was never removed from her

parents' custody and that she was in her mother's custody at the time of her death. See

Bennett v. City of Philadelphia, No. 03-5685, 2003 US Dist. LEXIS 23897, 2003 WL 2309884, at

6 (EDPA Dec. 2003) (dismissing the plaintiff's special relationship claims because the facts

did not allege physical custody by the Government).

The fact that DK was under the supervision of DHS and MEBHI does not change this find

ing. LtiOurt reiteratedj. bee Estate ot Kelly exrel Gatm v. MEBHI, (.2009); Bennett v. City

of Philadelphia, 499 f.3d 281 (3d Cir. 2007); Deshaney v. Winnibago County Department of

Social Services, 489 US 189, 109 S. Ct. 998, 103 L. Ed. 2d 249 (1959); Bright v. Westmore

land County, 443 F.3d 276. (3d Cir. 2003); and Weston v. City of Philadelphia, (3d Cir. EDPA

5/16/2014); See also Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 748 (2005)

MEBHI and SCOH social workers [Murray and Nimpson] have made efforts in scheduling a

meeting with DHS social worker.* on this case - Laura Sommerer. The meeting was about Reco

mmended Family Preservation Program (FPF) - transfering the Kelly/Washington family care

to FPP for more intense intervention because of multiple problems family was faced with. The

DHS social worker was a no-show for this meeting. Also, Laura Sommerer failed to take Ms.

Kelly (mother) and DK for a scheduled medical appointment - did not show up and never explain

ed why she was a no-show.

The claim that Manamela is culpable for DK's death including other MEBHI SCOH social

workers must be rejected by this Honorable Court. The fact that the Third Circuit has dis

missed this claim in a separate Federal Court civil lawsuit against MEBHI and City after

testing for physical custody under Deshaney, Pennsylvania and Third Circuit state-created

danger doctrine proves that the Government's claim is flawed because MEBHI is not a health

care service provider. Therefore, Manamela asks this Court to.correct this "manifest injus

tice" inherent in this case.

Manamela argues that it is because of this very case that the health care fraud charge/

claim was trumped up; and ex post facto clause violation of his Fifth,- Sixth, Seventh, Tenth,

and Fourteenth Amendment Rights; and ultimately his Constitutional and Substantial Rights.

28.

A violation that places him squarely in the hands of Immigration and Nationality Services

(INS) pursuant to 8 USCS §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 8 USCA §1101(a)(43)(m); 18 USC §16, and removal

under 8 USCA §237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (because the Government's

claim that "this is a homicide on the part of MEBHI" without proof beyond a reasonable

doubt) and ultimately deportation based on ex post facto clause violation of US Cons. Art.

1, §9, Cl. 3; and Art. 1, §10, Cl. 1; distortion of MEBHI-DHS SCOH Contract; and mischaracterization of its role and function as a Pennsylvania State-agent pursuant to Pennsylvania

Child Welfare Services Agreement Contrast with City of Philadelphia/County.

Ill

DISTRICT COURT'S FAILURE TO REVIEW EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE DECLARED AS HAVING A

BEARING ON THIS CASE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY PURSUANT TO TITLE 28 USC §1746

AND CLAIMED "LACK OF JURISDICTION", IS EX POST FACTO CLAUSE VIOLATION AND

ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Manamela has presented three service descriptions and contract requirements for Compre

hensive Family Based services and other documents to the NJ District Court pursuant to 28

USC §1746 as evidence and proof that MEBHI [pursuant to Title VII of PA Welfare Code; Title

55 PA Code §3130.12(c)(l); and 42 PA Cons. Stat. Ann §6302, in compliance with Pennsylvania

Child Welfare Services Agreement Contract - 62 PS §701-708 between the City of Philadelphia

and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania] was not a health care provider - challenging the health

care fraud [18 USC §1347] state imposed on it as a Title IV-B non-medicare/medicaid service

able family support service provider to at-risk children and their families.

The Court granted Manamela's Motion and ordered the Government to release all relevant

documents indicated by Manamela as "Brady Materials" having a bearing on his case, indicated

in the Declaration/Affidavit presented to the Court pursuant to 28 USC §1746. However, the

Court in accomodating the Government's Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12 (b)(6), struck a compromise with the government at M&namela's expense not to release these very documents. Hence,

the District Court, denied him Evidentiary Hearing. The Government's argument was that Mana

mela has been found guilty by the District Court (EDPA) and Court of Appeals for

the Third

Circuit, therefore, his Actual Innocent 2241 Petition must be viewed as a 2255 disguise. A

Ruling in contrast with Felken v. Turpin, 518 US 651, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed. 2d 827 (1996).

29.

Under Fed. R. Crim. P.: Rule of Proceedings under 28 USC §2254, Rule 8 Evidentiary Hear

ing, if dismissal has not been ordered, the Court must determine whether an evidentiary hear

ing is required. This determination is not to be made upon review of the answer, the trans

cript and record.; of State Court proceedings, and if there is no one, the expanded record.

As the United States Supreme Court noted in Townsend v. Sain, 372 US 293, 319 (1963):

"Ordinarily [the complete state-court] record - including the transcripts of testimony

(or if unavailable, some adequate substitute, such as a narrative record), the pleadings,

court opinions, and other pertinent documents - is indispensible to determining whether the

habeas applicant received a full and fair state court evidentiary hearing resulting in rel

iable findings."

In this instant case before this Honorable Court, Manamela did not receive a full and

fair evidentiary hearing because most of the documents having a bearing on this case were

witheld from the District Court (EDPA)__that sentenced him to 168 months in prison. When Mana

mela filed a Motion for Discovery, the Government filed a Motion to Seal Evidence, and was

granted its wishes-;- that no documents were released to Manamela. Had these very documents

listed in "Brady Materials?1 and "Narrative of Brady Material" (Appendices E and F) including

the three contracts had been reviewed (especially fairness contract), there is a great pro

bability that the Government's case-in-chief (health care fraud), wire fraud and conspiracy

charges would have been, rejected by the jury, and Manamela et al. would.have been acquited.

See Brady v. Maryland. 363 US 87, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963).

"Subdivision(a) comtemplates that all of these materials if available, will be taken

into account. This is especially important in view of the standard set down in Townsend for

determining when a hearing-in the federal habeas proceeding is mandatory. The appropriate

standard... is this: where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus must

hold an evidentiary hearing. If the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair eviden

tiary hearing.in a state court, either at the time of trial or in collateral proceeding."

3/3 US at 312.

The circumstance under which a federal hearing is mandatory are now specified in 28 USC

§2254(d). The 1996 amendment places the burden on the petitioner, when there has already been

a state hearing, topshow that it was not fair or adequate hearing for one or more of the

specifically enumerated reasons, in order to force a federal evidentiary hearing. Since the

function of an evidentiary hearing is to try issues of fact (372 US at 309), such a hearing

is unnecessary when only issues of law are raised, see eg., Yeaman v. United States, 325 F.2d

293 (9th Cir. 1963).

30.

Under the Act of Congress of 1867(14 Stat. 385), now incorporated in 28 USC §2241 et

seq., "United States District Courts have jurisdiction to determine whether a prisoner has

been deprived of liberty in violation of Constitutional Rights, although the proceedings resulting in incarceration may be unassailable on the face of the record. Under the Act, a variety of allegations have been held to permit challenge of convictions on facts - dehors the

record." See United states v. Hayman, 342 US 205, 96 L. Ed. 232, 72 S. Ct. 263 (1952).

In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 US 103, 79 L. Ed. 791, 55 S. Ct. 340, 98 ALR 406 (1935)

(knowing use of perjured testimony by prosecution), the Supreme Court stated that "The denial

by a State of any judicial process by which a conviction obtained through the admitted or

proved use by the state, knowingly or unknowingly, of perjured testimony, and the suppression

of impeaching evidence, may set aside, is deprivation of liberty without due process of law

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." ]

.i in.

In this instant case, the use of Brian Clappier and Trina Jenkins, both DHS workers

claiming MEBHI was charged with providing medical care/services for at-risk children was

false/perjury and contrary to DHS Contract requirements, including Nikia Chambers' already

discredited false allegations against her former employer, MEBHI, by City Auditorsofrom

Contract Administration and Program Evaluation (CAPE) in 2003 is blatant prosecutorial

misconduct.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We exercise plenary review over an order’granting a motion to dismiss under Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)", Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 f.3d 472 481 (3d Cir. 2000). To

survive a motion to dismiss the plaintiff must plead "factual content that allows the defen

dant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US 662, 678, 129 S. Ct.

1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). A complaint must do more than allege a plaintiff's entitle

ment to relief, it must "show" such an entitlement with facts, Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578

F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). "Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level", see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Tombly, 550 US 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed.

2d 929 (2007). See factual documents considered by Manamela impeaching evidence witheld from

the Court by the Government and listed in "Brady Materials" and "Narrative of Brady Materials"

presented to NJ District Court including authentic documents - Contracts and others describ

ing SCOH and DHS/CYD functions, including those documents in Government possession since

October 2006 submitted to AUSA Barbara Rowland by defendant in person. Rule 16(a) requires

the Government to disclose documents favorable to defense/or defendant; but in this case, the

Government chose not to provide them - for fear of losing the case. See Brady v. Maryland,

and see United States v. Si, 343 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003). ("To prove a Brady violas

tion, defendant must show that the Government witheld material exculpatory evidence.") "Fai

lure of the Government to disclose information useful only for impeachment however mandates

reversal only if defendants demonstrate that undisclosed evidence probably would have resul

ted in acquital." See United States v. Martins, 648 F.2d 367 (6/19/1981).

Manamela has demonstrated many times that MEBHI SCOH program had nothing to do with .

31.

health care services; he even provided the courts with City Contracts with his company, but

because of politics inherent in this case, the courts ignored him. The City of Philadelphia's

DA's office under Attorney Seth Williams is responsible for fabricating the health care fraud

charges against Manamela, MEBHI, et al. with the help of DHS Commissioner Cheryl RandomGarner, et al., including Philadelphia Police Department.

"A State act which deprives defendants of an existing right, for past misconduct and

without judicial trial, partakes of the nature of a bill of pains and penalties, and is sub

ject to the Constitutional inhibition against the passage of bills of attainder." Cummings

v. Missouri, 4 Wall 217, 18 L. Ed. 356, and ex parte Garland, 4 Wall 333, 18 L. Ed. 366.

"To ascertain whether statute imposes punishmnet, US Supreme Court has instructed that

Court should pursue three-part inquiry, that is: (l) whether challenged statute falls within

historical meaning of legislative punishment, (2) whether statute, viewed in terms of the

type and severity of burden imposed, reasonably can be said to further non-punitive legis

lative purposes, and (3) whether legislative record evinces Congressional intent to punish;

Court had applied each of these criteria as independent, though not necessarily decisive in

dicator of punitiveness." Foretich v. United States, (2003 App DC) 359 App. DC 54, 351 f.3d

1198 (2003).

"Ihe policy considerations which support a prohibition against ex post facto application

of a criminal statute are also applicable to judicial decisions which effect the interpreta

tion of a criminal statute. In both cases, it is clearly undesirable to punish individuals

for act which, at the time they were performed, were not within the reach of a criminal

statute." See James v. United United States, 366 US 213, 247-248, 81 S. Ct. 1052, 1070-1071,

6 L. Ed. 2d at 246, 269-270 (1961) (1974 US App. LEXIS 8); See also Bouie v. City of Columbia,

378VUS 347 84 S. Ct. 1697, 12 L. Ed. 2d 894 (1964); Douglas v. Buder, 412 US 430, 93 S. Ct.

2199, 37 L. Ed 2d 52 (1973); and United States v. Marcus, (2010 USj 130 S. Ct. 2159, 176 L.

Ed. 1012, 560 US 258, 2010 US LEXIS 4163.

"Judicial opinion which changes necessary proof by requiring less testimony than law

requires at the time of offense may have effect of ex post facto law", Bowyer v. United States,

(1980 Dist. Col. App.) 422 A 2d 973.

Manamela's case did indeed violate ex post facto clause, because it did alter definition

of the statute applicable to MEBHI's functions and role in at-risk children's lives, from

Comprehensive Family Based Services to health care service provider without sufficient evi

dence - and the courts did not even care about reading the language of the Contracts, which

in this case are nexus between City of Philadelphia CYD/DHS and MEBHI.

"A district court in deciding a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), is required to

accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences from the facts

alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Moreover, in the event a complaint

fails to state a claim, unless amendment would be futile, the district court must give a

plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint. The Standard of Review for a dismissal

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is de novo. This standard requires an appellate court to review

the district court's order anew and without any deference." See Alston, 363 F. 3d 229; 2004

US App LEXIS 6345 (3d Cir. 2004).

--------- --32.

On a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, the facts alleged must be taken as true and a com

plaint may not be dismissed merely because it appears unlikely that the plaintiff can prove

those facts or will ultimately prevail on the merits. However, in this very case, the Dis

trict Court granted the Government's Motion to Dismiss without ever giving Manamela an oppor

tunity to amend his complaint. Also, the Court failed to convene evidentiary hearing given

the inconsistent facts presented against MEBHI.

"A district court abuses its discretion when it fails to apply the appropriate legal

standard, follows improper proceedings or relies upon clearly erronous findings of facts."

See United States v. Miller, (1985 CA 3 PA). See Marshall v. Garrison, 659 F.2d 440 (1981 CA

4- VA); United States v. McCoy, 410 F. 3d 124, 131 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Travillion,

759 F. 3d 281, 289 [3d Cir. 2014).

----------------------------------------Given'the facts in this case before the Court, regarding the Contract - Comprehensive

Family Based Services Requirements between the DHS and MEBHI in compliance with Pennsylvania

Child Welfare services Agreement Contract - 62 PS §701-708 between the City of Philadelphia

and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Manamela asks this Honorable Court to reverse the Third

Circuit rulings regarding his case; because this has nothing to do with health care fraud it is based on deliberate misinterpretation of Title IV-B statute under state laws for con

viction's sake. Also, it violates the Tenth Amendment as to separation of powers.

The Supreme Court has stated that: "powers not delegated to the United States by Cons

titution nor prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States or to the people."

72 L. Ed. 2d 956. See United States v. Carol Anne Bond, 581 F. 3d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 2009)

180 L. Ed. 269, 564 US 211 Bond v. United States. This is an ex post facto clause violation

of the United States Constitution.!, US Cons. Art. 1, §9, Cl. 3; and Art. 1, §10, Cl. 1.

See Fry v. United States, (1975) US 542, 44 L. Ed. 2d 363, 95 S. Ct. 1792.

"A defendant's challenge to a conviction and sentence satisfies the case-or-controversy

requirement, because incarceration constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the'.conviction

and redressable by invalidation of the conviction." L. Ed. Digest: Courts §237; See also,

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 US 1, 7, 118 S. Ct. 978, 140 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1998).

In its recent decision in Bruce v. Warden, Lewisburg, USP, 868 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2017),

the Third Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the two conditions that, a federal prisoner with

in the Third Circuit must satisfy post-Dorsainvil in order to have his case fall within

§2255’s saving clause.

"First, a prisoner must assert a 'claim of actual innocence' on the theory that "he is

being detained for conduct that has subsequently been rendered non-criminal by an intervening

Supreme Court decision" and our own precedent construing intervening Supreme Court decision -

33.

in other [2019 US Dist. LEXIS 12] words, when there is a change in statutory case law that .

applies retroactively in case on collateral review." Bruce, F.3d at 180 (emphasis added)

(quoting United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir. 2013). which quoted Dorsainvil.

119 F.3d at 252).

--------------."[S]econd, the prisoner must 'otherwise barred from challenging the legality of the con

viction under §2255."' Id. (quoting Tyler, 732 F.3d at 246). "Stated differently, the priso

ner has 'had no earlier opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an inter

vening change in substantive law may negate.'" Id. (quoting Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d at 251).

In its landmark decision in Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997), the Third Circuit

Court of Appeals recognized the one circumstance under which it has found §2255's remedy to

be inadequate of ineffective since AEDPA amended §2255 in 1996 to include a one year statute

of limitations and prohibition against the filing of second or successive motions. The peti

tioner in Dorsainvil was convicted inter alia of using a gun in connection with a gun crime

under 18 USC §924(c)(l). He was convicted notwithstanding that he did not "use" the gun. It

was merely present in the car from which the drugs were to be bought. After he had exhausted

his appeals and litigated his first §2255 Motion, the Supreme Court in Bailey v. United States,

516 US 137, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995) construed the criminal statute under

which Dorsainvil was convicted (18 USC §924(c)(l)) to exclude from ambit of the statute mere

presence of a gun at a drug crime, thus arguably rendering him actually innocent of the

crime of using a gun in connection with a drug offense,

r f.After the Supreme Court issued Bailey, Dorsainvil applied to the Court of Appeals for

authorization to file in the District Court a second or successive §2255 Motion. The Court

had no choice but to deny his request because he could not satisfy AEDPA's [2019 US Dist.

LEXIS 9] gatekeeping requirements for the filing of a second successive §2255 Motion. That

was because the decision in Bailey was one of statutory construction and, therefore, did not

constitute "a new rule of constitutional law... that was previously unavailable[.]" Dorsainvil,

119 F.3d at 247-48 (quoting 28 USC §2255 (now at §2255(h)). Under these circumstances, the

Court of Appeals determined that Dorsainvil had established that §2255 was "inadequate, or

ineffective" to test the legality of his detention and as a result, he could bring his claim

in a §2241:habeas corpus petition.

A similar case

involv[ing] the availability of collateral relief from a federal criminal

34.

conviction based upon an intervening change in subatantive law" came before the Supreme

Court in Davis v. United States, 417 US 333, 334, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 42 L. Ed. 2d 109 (1974).

In that case, the Court stated that a Supreme Court decision interpreting a criminal statute

that resulted in the imprisonment of one whose conduct was not prohibited by law "presents

exceptional circumstances where the need for remedy afforded by the writ of habeas corpus is

apparent." Id. at 346 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The Court held that "if [petitioner's] contention is well taken, then [his] conviction

and punishment are for an act that the law does not make criminal. There can be no [2019 US

Dist. LEXIS 10] room for doubt that such a circumstance inherently results in a complete

miscariage of justice and present(s) exceptional circumstances that justify collateral relief

under §2255." Id. at 346-47 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also, United States v.

Addonizio, 442 US 178, 186-87, 99 S. Ct. 2235, 60 L. Ed. 2d 805 (1979) (discussing Davis

and observing that a refusal to have vacated his sentence "would surely have been a 'complete

miscarriage of justice' since conviction and sentence were no longer lawful").

A §2241 petition for habeas corpus on behalf of a sentenced prisoner attacks the manner

in which his sentences is carried out or the prison authorities' determination of its dura

tion [which was the position the Third Circuit held before Bruce]. To prevail,

§2241 peti-

tioner must show that he is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties

of the United States." See 28 USC §2241(c)(2012). By contrast, a Motion to Vacate or correct

a sentence pursuant to 28

USC §2255, provides the primary means of collateral attack on a

federal sentence.

In filing a "2241 petition", Manamela was well aware that section 2255 does contain

"savings, clause" in subsection(e), which acts as a limited exception to these general rules.

It provides that "Court may entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging

Federal criminal conviction if it concludes that filing a motion to vacate, set aside, or

correct sentence pursuant to §2255 is inadequate to challenge a prisoner's detention." See

28 USC §2255(e). However, he may invoke the "savings clause" to address errors occuring at

trial or sentencing in a petition filed pursuant to §2241.

In consideration of the aforementioned and the claims raised by the petitioner in this

case, §2255 is inadequate and ineffective to test the legality of conviction due to:

"(l) at the time of the conviction, settled law of the Circuit or Supreme Court estab

lished the legality of the conviction; (2) subsequent to the prisoner's direct appeal and

first §2255 motion, the substantive law changed such that the conduct of which the prisoner

was convicted is deemed not to be criminal; and (3) the prisoner cannot satisfy, gate-keeping

provisions of §2255 because of the new rule is not one of constitutional law." See In re

Jones, 225 F.3d 328, 333-34 (4th Cir. 2000).

As indicated above in Bruce, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals set forth the two condi35.

tions that a federal prisoner confined within the Third Circuit must satisfy post Dorsainvil

in order to have his case fall within §2255's saving clause. In this instant case as to the

above cited criteria set, specifically (1), Manamela also relied on this law because while

he was undergoing trial in his criminal case, the Estate of Kelly Family filed a civil action

suit in the matter concerning the deceased, DK. See Estate of Kelly exrel Gafni v. MEBHI,

2009 US Dist. LEXIS 82385, Civil.Action No. 08-3700 (EDPA 9/9/2009). In this civil action

suit, the District Court held that "aside from contracting with MEBHI to monitor the Kelly

family, no action was taken by DHS to ensure that DK (name redacted) received necessary care

and medical attention" (emphasis mine). This simply means under Contract with City of Phila

delphia pursuant to Title VII of PA Welfare Code; Title 55 PA Code §3130.12(c)(1); 42 PA Cons.

Stat. Ann §6302, in compliance with Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services Agreement Contract 62 PS §701-708 and pursuant to Title 40 PS (Health care statute), MEBHI was not a health care

provider, and that is also reflected in the Contract(s).

Furthermore, the District Court [civil action] held in its findings and conclusion that:

"Manamela's company MEBHI of no wrong-doing or contributed to the death of DK".,“Specifically,

the Court-'held that "according to the facts alleged, DHS's decision to involve MEBHI in

their supervision of the Kelly family did little to protect [the deceased] from neglect and

abuse in her mother's home."

Nevertheless, the objectors [Kelly family members] have alleged no fact which shows that

the appointment of MEBHI "created" the danger which caused the deceased's death or rendered

her more vulnerable to danger, (quoting Bennet v. City of Philadelphia, 499 F. 3d 281, 287

(3d Cir. 2007)).

According to Manamela, due to the facts in this case, the civil case was settled during

the commencement of his trial in the criminal court, and subsequently because of Circuit

Law [which the criminal court undermined], the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus

pursuant to Title 28 USCS §2241 appeared to be the proper avenue to raise the instant com

plaint under "Actual. Innocence Clause". See Martin v. Perez, 319 F.3d 799, 804-05 (6th Cir.

2003).

36.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has decided an important federal

question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court. In fact, the United

States Court of Appeals, in its denial of Manamela's Actual Innocent Motions, has virtually

perpetuated ex post facto laws, laws prohibited by the United States Constitution. Appeals

Court (Third Circuit) has failed to correct the "manifest injustice" inherent in this case

the Government's claim that Manamela's company MEBHI is a "health care benefit, item, or services provider", whereas under Pennsylvania Child Care Welfare Services Laws indicates that

it was not, but was a family support service under Contract with City of Philadelphia. See

Landgraft v. US 1 Filmprods, 511 US 244, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed. 2d 299 (1994).

The United States Court of Appeals in its review of Manamela's Petition(s) post-convic

tion in 2010, 2012, 2015, and 2020, has continued to ignore, avoid, and look into the nexus

between City of Philadelphia DHS and MEBHI. The. nexus which in this case is the Contracts

(emphasis mine) which the sentencing court (EDPA) and NJ District Courts have in their possessions but considered irrelevant. The failure to read and review these Contracts and interpret as written was in itself a plain error under 52(b).

The Courts misconstrued the Con-

tracts between the City and MEBHI as a health care service provider, a reversible wrong based

on misinterpretation of State and federal Statutes regulating MEBHI SCOH.

Under Pennsylvania Child Welfare Services Laws pursuant to Article VII of PA Public Wel

fare Code and Title 55 of the Pennsylvania Code 55! PA Code §3130.12(c)(1) and 42 PA Cons.

Stat. Ann §6302, MEBHI is and was never a health care benefit item, service provider to atrisk -children under its supervision. MEBHI was neither a Home Health Care Services provider

pursuant to 42 USC §201 et seq.; 1320d-2; and 299b. Manamela believes that if State of Penn

sylvania wanted to convict him for the crimes alleged by the Government supra, the State

would have done so under Title 40 P.S. § Part 1 to 5; Title'133 P.S. §1-8; and Title 53 P.S.

§ Part 1-Part 4 respectivelyy The Federal Government's involvement in this case usurped the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's authority/power and violated the United States Constitution.

Also, this very case, violated Manamela's Due Process under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

37.

See Yates v„.United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081-82 (2015) (interpretation of Statutes).

MEBHI.'had no custody of all at-risk children under its supervision. The Third Circuit

tested this case (civil action court) for state-created-danger purposes; and the outcome of

its findings was that MEBHI had no custody over DK and other at-risk children under its

supervision, and that DK died at home in her mother's custody. However, the Criminal Court

charged Manamela with "homicide" without applying the [18 USCS §1111] statute, and this was

to boost its case-in-chief claim and for conviction's sake. The death of DK and health care

fraud given her medical condition - cerebral palsy, helped sway the juries' minds.

The New Jersey District Court claim that it lacked jurisdiction in this case clearly

does contradict US Const. Art. Ill Section 2, and 28 USC §1331 because all issues in Mana

mela 's case derive from Federal Laws and Statutes and State Laws. The Court's claim is a

dereliction of judicial duty and abuse of discretion. Also, it is a way of avoiding answer

ing Constitutional questions posed in this case.

The impact of this case on social work service delivery is frightening and vast. For the

mere fact that faith-based and non-medicare/medicaid family support programs are charged

with collecting medical records and immunization records from treatment centers and by that

very fact become health care service providers is terrifying and un-Gonstitutional. This

case passed Strickland-test without a doubt - ineffective assistance assistance of counsel

(IAC). See Strickland v. Washington,- 466 US 668 (1984).

38.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Manamela respectfully asks this Honorable

Court to reject the Government's claims against him and MEBHI; and reverse

and remand for the District Court to permit discovery, and hold evidentiary

hearing to determine whether Manamela was a health care service provider

and if the Constitutionality of his conviction was ex post facto Clause

Violation of the United States Constitution Article 1, Section 9, Clause 3;

and Article 1, Section 10, Clause 1.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Solomon Manamela

Reg. No.: 63850-066

Date: OeWoe-v ^3., 2.0^0.

39.

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