Opposition Brief — Alfred Flores, III, Petitioner v. California

No. 20-5734

In the Supreme Court of the United States

ALFRED FLORES III,

Petitioner,

v.

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

XAVIER BECERRA

Attorney General of California

MICHAEL J. MONGAN

Solicitor General

LANCE E. WINTERS

Chief Assistant Attorney General

JAMES WILLIAM BILDERBACK II

Senior Assistant Attorney General

RYAN B. MCCARROLL

Deputy Solicitor General

HOLLY D. WILKENS

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

CHRISTINE Y. FRIEDMAN*

Deputy Attorney General

P.O. Box 85266

San Diego, CA 92186-5266

(619) 738-9050

Christine.Friedman@doj.ca.gov

*Counsel of Record

i

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Constitution requires that a California jury that has already

found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

committed first-degree murder and that the murder involved a special

circumstance that renders the crime eligible for the death penalty must also,

in order to render a verdict of death, unanimously find beyond a reasonable

doubt that specific aggravating factors exist, that the aggravating factors

outweigh the mitigating factors, and that the aggravating circumstances are

so substantial in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that they

warrant death as opposed to life without parole.

ii

DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS

California Supreme Court:

People v. Flores, No. S116307, judgment entered May 4, 2020 (this case

below).

San Diego County Superior Court:

People v. Flores, No. FVA-015023, judgment entered May 19, 2003 (this

case below).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Statement ........................................................................................................1

Argument .........................................................................................................2

Conclusion......................................................................................................11

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Apprendi v. New Jersey

530 U.S. 466 (2000) ........................................................................................ 6

Becerrada v. California

No. 17-5287, cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 242 (2017) ............................................ 3

Bell v. California

No. 19-5394, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 120 (2019) ........................................... 3

Blacksher v. California

No. 11-7741, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1209 (2012) ........................................... 3

Boyce v. California

No. 14-7581, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1428 (2015) ......................................... 3

Bramit v. California

No. 09-6735, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1031 (2009) ........................................... 3

Brooks v. California

No. 17-6237, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 516 (2017) ........................................... 3

Capers v. California

No. 19-7379, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2532 (2020) ......................................... 3

Case v. California

No. 18-7457, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1342 (2019) ......................................... 3

Cook v. California

No. 07-5690, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 976 (2007) ............................................. 3

Cunningham v. California

No. 15-7177, cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 989 (2016) ............................................ 3

Dalton v. California

19-5977, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 505 (2019) .................................................. 3

DeBose v. California

No. 14-6617, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1051 (2014) ........................................... 3

Erskine v. California

No. 19-6235, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019) ........................................... 3

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

Gomez v. California

No. 18-9698, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 294 (2019) ........................................... 3

Harrison v. California

No. 05-5232, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 890 (2005) ............................................. 3

Henriquez v. California

No. 18-5375, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 261 (2018) ........................................... 3

Huggins v. California

No. 06-6060, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 998 (2006) ............................................. 3

Hurst v. Florida

136 S. Ct. 616 (2016) .................................................................................. 6, 7

Jackson v. California

No. 16-7744, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1440 (2017) ......................................... 3

Johnson v. California

No. 15-7509, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1206 (2016) ......................................... 3

Jones v. United States

526 U.S. 227 (1999) ........................................................................................ 8

Kansas v. Carr

136 S. Ct. 633 (2016) .................................................................................. 8, 9

Landry v. California

No. 16-9001, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 79 (2017) ............................................. 3

Lucas v. California

No. 14-9137, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2384 (2015) ......................................... 3

Mendez v. California

No. 19-5933, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 471 (2019) ........................................... 3

Mickel v. California

No. 16-7840, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2214 (2017) ......................................... 3

Mitchell v. California

No. 19-7429, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2535 (2020) ......................................... 3

Morgan v. California

No. 07-9024, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1286 (2008) ........................................... 3

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

Penunuri v. California

No. 18-6262, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 644 (2018) ........................................... 3

People v. Brown

46 Cal. 3d 432 (1988) ..................................................................................... 8

People v. Gonzales

52 Cal. 4th 254 (2011) .................................................................................... 5

People v. Moon

37 Cal. 4th 1 (2005) ........................................................................................ 7

People v. Prince

40 Cal. 4th 1179 (2007) .................................................................................. 6

People v. Romero

62 Cal. 4th 1 (2015) ........................................................................................ 5

Prieto v. California

No. 03-6422, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1008 (2003) ........................................... 4

Rangel v. California

No. 16-5912, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 623 (2017) ........................................... 3

Rauf v. State

145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) .......................................................................... 9, 10

Ring v. Arizona

536 U.S. 584 (2002) .................................................................................... 6, 7

Smith v. California

No. 03-6862, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1163 (2004) ........................................... 4

Taylor v. California

No. 10-6299, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1013 (2010) ........................................... 3

Thompson v. California

No. 17-5069, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 201 (2017) ........................................... 3

Tuilaepa v. California

512 U.S. 967, 975 (1994) ................................................................................ 6

Wall v. California

No. 17-9525, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 187 (2018) ........................................... 3

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

Woodward v. Alabama

134 S. Ct. 405 (2013) .................................................................................... 10

Zant v. Stephens

462 U.S. 862 (1983) ........................................................................................ 7

STATUTES

Delaware Code Title 11

§ 4209(c)(3) ..................................................................................................... 9

§ 4209(d)(1) ..................................................................................................... 9

California Penal Code

§ 187(a) ........................................................................................................... 1

§ 190(a) ........................................................................................................... 4

§ 190.1 ............................................................................................................. 4

§ 190.2 ......................................................................................................... 4, 6

§ 190.2(a) .................................................................................................... 4, 7

§ 190.2(a)(3) .................................................................................................... 1

§ 190.3 ................................................................................................... 4, 5, 10

§ 190.4 ............................................................................................................. 4

§ 190.4(a) ........................................................................................................ 4

§ 190.4(b) ........................................................................................................ 4

§ 190.5 ............................................................................................................. 4

§ 190.6 ............................................................................................................. 4

§ 190.7 ............................................................................................................. 4

§ 190.8 ............................................................................................................. 4

§ 190.9 ............................................................................................................. 4

Florida Statute

§ 921.141(3) .................................................................................................... 6

§ 921.141(5) .................................................................................................... 6

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

United States Constitution

Fifth Amendment ........................................................................................... 2

Sixth Amendment .......................................................................................... 2

Fourteenth Amendment ............................................................................ 2, 5

1

STATEMENT

1. In March 2001, the bodies of 15-year-old Ricardo Torres, 18-year-old

Jason Van Kleef, and 17-year-old Alexander Ayala were discovered in separate

locations in San Bernardino County. Pet. App. B 1-3. All of them had been

shot to death. Id. at 1-3. A police investigation uncovered evidence that

Petitioner Alfred Flores III, a member of the El Monte Trece gang, had killed

Torres for failing to attend his gang initiation ceremony. Id. at 7. Flores then

killed Van Kleef and Ayala, who were friends of Torres, to keep them from

implicating him. Id.

The State charged Flores with three counts of first-degree murder, and

alleged as a special circumstance that Flores committed multiple murders.

Pet. App. B 1; 3 CT 783-786; see Cal. Penal Code §§ 187(a), 190.2(a)(3).1 At the

trial’s guilt phase, the jury convicted Flores of the first-degree murders of

Torres, Van Kleef, and Ayala, and also found true beyond a reasonable doubt

the special circumstance allegation that Flores had committed multiple

murders. Pet. App. B 1, 7; 5 CT 1185-1191.

At the trial’s penalty phase, the jurors were instructed that, in deciding

whether Flores would be punished by death or life in prison without parole,

they were to “consider, take into account and be guided by” various aggravating

and mitigating circumstances that might apply; that the “weighing of

1 “CT” refers to the trial court’s Clerk’s Transcript.

2

aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere mechanical

counting of factors”; that they were “free to assign whatever moral or

sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors”;

and that to “return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that

the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the

mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole.”

6 CT 1485-1486, 1553-1554; 23 RT 5092-5094, 5166-5167.2 The jury returned

verdicts of death. Pet. App. B 1.

2. The California Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death

sentence. Pet. App. B 1. As is relevant here, the court rejected Flores’s claim

that California’s capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional because it does

not require findings beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating

circumstance has been proved, that the aggravating factors outweigh the

mitigating factors, or that death is the appropriate sentence. Id. at 86.

ARGUMENT

Flores argues that California’s capital-sentencing scheme violates his

right to due process guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and

his right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, because state law

does not require the penalty-phase jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that

an aggravating factor exists, that the aggravating factors outweigh the

2 “RT” refers to the Reporter’s Transcript.

3

mitigating factors, and that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial

in comparison to the mitigating circumstances that they warrant death instead

of life without the possibility of parole. Pet. 12-15. Flores further suggests

that, under the same constitutional principles, any aggravating factor must be

found unanimously. Id. at 6-7. This Court has repeatedly denied review in

cases presenting the same or similar questions, and there is no reason for a

different result here.3

3 See, e.g., Mitchell v. California, No. 19-7429, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2535

(2020); Capers v. California, No. 19-7379, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2532 (2020);

Erskine v. California, No. 19-6235, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 602 (2019); Dalton

v. California, 19-5977, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 505 (2019); Mendez v. California,

No. 19-5933, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 471 (2019); Bell v. California, No. 19-5394,

cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 120 (2019); Gomez v. California, No. 18-9698, cert.

denied, 140 S. Ct. 294 (2019); Case v. California, No. 18-7457, cert. denied,

139 S. Ct. 1342 (2019); Penunuri v. California, No. 18-6262, cert. denied,

139 S. Ct. 644 (2018); Henriquez v. California, No. 18-5375, cert. denied,

139 S. Ct. 261 (2018); Wall v. California, No. 17-9525, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.

187 (2018); Brooks v. California, No. 17-6237, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 516

(2017); Becerrada v. California, No. 17-5287, cert denied, 138 S. Ct. 242 (2017);

Thompson v. California, No. 17-5069, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 201 (2017);

Landry v. California, No. 16-9001, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 79 (2017); Mickel v.

California, No. 16-7840, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2214 (2017); Jackson v.

California, No. 16-7744, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1440 (2017); Rangel v.

California, No. 16-5912, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 623 (2017); Johnson v.

California, No. 15-7509, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1206 (2016); Cunningham v.

California, No. 15-7177, cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 989 (2016); Lucas v. California,

No. 14-9137, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2384 (2015); Boyce v. California, No. 147581, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1428 (2015); DeBose v. California, No. 14-6617,

cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1051 (2014); Blacksher v. California, No. 11-7741, cert.

denied, 565 U.S. 1209 (2012); Taylor v. California, No. 10-6299, cert. denied,

562 U.S. 1013 (2010); Bramit v. California, No. 09-6735, cert. denied, 558 U.S.

1031 (2009); Morgan v. California, No. 07-9024, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1286

(2008); Cook v. California, No. 07-5690, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 976 (2007);

Huggins v. California, No. 06-6060, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 998 (2006); Harrison

4

1. A California death sentence depends on a two-stage process prescribed

by California Penal Code Sections 190.1 through 190.9. The first stage, the

guilt phase, involves determining whether the defendant committed firstdegree murder. That crime carries three potential penalties under California

law: a prison term of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole, a prison

term of life without the possibility of parole, or death. Cal. Penal Code § 190(a).

The default sentence is a prison term of 25 years to life. The penalties of death

or life without parole may be imposed only if one or more statutorily

enumerated special circumstances “has been found under Section 190.4 to be

true.”

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a).

A defendant is entitled to a jury

determination of such a special circumstance, and the jury’s finding of a special

circumstance must be made unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. Cal.

Penal Code § 190.4(a), (b). During the guilt phase of Flores’s trial, the jury

found him guilty of first-degree murder, and found true the multiple-murder

special circumstance. Pet. App. B 1; 5 CT 1185-1191. The jury’s findings were

unanimous and made under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. 4 CT

1121, 1142-1144, 1161.

The second stage of California’s death penalty trial process, the penalty

phase, proceeds under California Penal Code section 190.3. During the penalty

v. California, No. 05-5232, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 890 (2005); Smith v.

California, No. 03-6862, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1163 (2004); Prieto v. California,

No. 03-6422, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1008 (2003).

5

phase, the jury hears evidence which it is allowed to consider “as to any matter

relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence, including but not limited to”

certain specified topics. Cal. Penal Code § 190.3. “In determining the penalty,”

the jury must “take into account any” of a list of specified factors “if relevant”—

including “[a]ny . . . circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime

even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.” Id. The jury need not agree

unanimously on the existence of a particular aggravating circumstance, nor

must it find the existence of such a circumstance, with the exception of prior

unadjudicated violent criminal activity and prior felony convictions, beyond a

reasonable doubt. See People v. Romero, 62 Cal. 4th 1, 56 (2015); People v.

Gonzales, 52 Cal. 4th 254, 328 (2011).

If the jury “concludes that the

aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances,” then it

“shall impose a sentence of death.” Cal. Penal Code § 190.3. If it “determines

that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances,”

then it “shall impose a sentence of confinement in state prison for a term of life

without the possibility of parole.” Id.

2. Flores contends that the Constitution does not permit him to be

sentenced to death unless the jury during the penalty phase unanimously

found beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular aggravating factor existed.

Pet. 7. That is incorrect.

Flores primarily relies (Pet. 10) on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment

rule that, “[i]f a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized

6

punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how the

State labels it—must be found, by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ring v.

Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) (applying rule to Arizona death penalty); see

also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). But under California

law, once a jury finds unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that a

defendant has committed first-degree murder with a special circumstance, the

maximum potential penalty prescribed by statute is death.

See People v.

Prince, 40 Cal. 4th 1179, 1297-1298 (2007); see generally Tuilaepa v.

California, 512 U.S. 967, 975 (1994) (a California defendant becomes “eligible

for the death penalty when the jury finds him guilty of first-degree murder and

finds one of the § 190.2 special circumstances true”). Imposing that maximum

penalty on a defendant once these jury determinations have been made

unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt thus does not violate the

Constitution.

In arguing to the contrary, Flores relies on Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct.

616, 619-622 (2016). Pet. 10-12. Under the Florida system considered in

Hurst, after a jury verdict of first-degree murder, a convicted defendant was

not “eligible for death,” 136 S. Ct. at 622, unless the judge further determined

that an enumerated “aggravating circumstance[] exist[ed],” Fla. Stat.

§ 921.141(3). The judge was thus tasked with making the “‘findings upon

which the sentence of death [was] based,’” 136 S. Ct. at 622 (quoting Fla. Stat.

§ 921.141(3))—determinations that were essentially questions of fact, see Fla.

7

Stat. § 921.141(5) (listing aggravating circumstances, such as whether the

crime was committed with a purpose of pecuniary gain). This Court held that

Florida’s system thus suffered from the same constitutional flaw that Arizona’s

had in Ring: “The maximum punishment” a defendant could receive without

judge-made findings “was life in prison without parole,” and the judge

“increased” that punishment “based on [the judge’s] own factfinding.”

136 S. Ct. at 621.

In California, however, a defendant is eligible for a death sentence only

after the jury finds true at least one of the special circumstances in California

Penal Code section 190.2(a). That determination, which the jury must agree

on unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, is part of how California

fulfills the “constitutionally necessary function” of “circumscrib[ing] the class

of persons eligible for the death penalty.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878

(1983).

The jury’s subsequent consideration of aggravating and mitigating

factors at the penalty phase fulfills a different function: that of providing an

“individualized determination . . . at the selection stage” of who among the

eligible defendants deserves the death penalty. Zant, 462 U.S. at 879; see

People v. Moon, 37 Cal. 4th 1, 40 (2005) (“The penalty jury’s principal task is

the moral endeavor of deciding whether the death sentence should be imposed

on a defendant who has already been determined to be ‘death eligible’ as a

result of the findings and verdict reached at the guilt phase.”).

Such a

8

determination involves a choice between a greater or lesser authorized

penalty—not any increase in the maximum potential penalty. See Jones v.

United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999).

Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016), effectively forecloses Flores’s

argument (Pet. 7, 15) that determinations concerning the existence of

aggravating or mitigating factors at the penalty-selection phase must be made

beyond a reasonable doubt. As Carr reasoned, it is possible to apply a standard

of proof to the “eligibility phase” of a capital sentencing proceeding, “because

that is a purely factual determination.” Id. at 642. In contrast, it is doubtful

whether it would even be “possible to apply a standard of proof to the

mitigating-factor determination (the so-called ‘selection phase’ of a capitalsentencing proceeding),” because “[w]hether mitigation exists . . . is largely a

judgment call (or perhaps a value call):

what one juror might consider

mitigating another might not.” Id.; see, e.g., People v. Brown, 46 Cal. 3d 432,

456 (1988) (California’s sentencing factor regarding “[t]he age of the defendant

at the time of the crime” may be either a mitigating or an aggravating factor

in the same case: The defendant may argue for age-based mitigation, and the

prosecutor may argue for aggravation because the defendant was “old enough

to know better”).

Carr likewise forecloses Flores’s argument that the jury’s final weighing

of aggravating versus mitigating factors should proceed under the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard. Pet. 12-15. In Carr, this Court observed that “the

9

ultimate question of whether mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating

circumstances is mostly a question of mercy,” and “[i]t would mean nothing . . .

to tell the jury that the defendants must deserve mercy beyond a reasonable

doubt.” 136 S. Ct. at 642. That reasoning leaves no room for Flores’s argument

that such an instruction is required under the Constitution.

3. Flores points to the Delaware Supreme Court’s fractured decision in

Rauf v. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016), as reason for this Court to consider

whether the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard should apply at California’s

selection stage. Pet. 14. Rauf’s various opinions hold that a determination as

to the relative weight of aggravating and mitigating factors in the application

of Delaware’s death penalty must be made beyond a reasonable doubt. See

145 A.3d at 434 (per curiam); id. at 481-482 (Strine, J., concurring); id. at 487

(Holland, J., concurring); but see id. at 487 (Valihura, J., dissenting). The

rationale of those opinions is not clear, and they fail to cite or discuss this

Court’s reasoning on the issue in Carr. In any event, the most notable feature

of the Delaware law invalidated in Rauf was that the jury’s choice between a

life sentence and death was completely advisory: The judge could impose a

sentence of death even if all jurors recommended against it, as long as the jury

had unanimously found the existence of a single aggravating factor. See Del.

Code tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3), (d)(1); Rauf, 145 A.3d at 457 (Strine, J., concurring)

(under Delaware law the judge “has the final say in deciding whether a capital

defendant is sentenced to death and need not give any particular weight to the

10

jury’s view”). Under California law, the death penalty may be imposed only if

the jury has unanimously voted for death. See Cal. Penal Code § 190.3. It is

by no means clear from the opinions in Rauf that the Delaware Supreme Court

would have reached the same result if it had been analyzing California’s quite

different statute. 4

4 Similar shortcomings undercut Flores’s reliance on the opinion dissenting

from the denial of certiorari in Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 410-411

(2013). Pet. 14. The statute at issue in Woodward allowed a judge to impose

the death penalty even where the jurors voted against it. See Woodward,

134 S. Ct. at 406, 410-412 (jury’s decision as to whether the defendant should

be executed was merely an “advisory verdict”). The Woodward dissent

suggests that a trial judge’s view should not replace that of the jury—not that

the death penalty may not be imposed without the jury finding beyond a

reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors.

134 S. Ct. at 410-411.

11

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted

XAVIER BECERRA

Attorney General of California

MICHAEL J. MONGAN

Solicitor General

LANCE E. WINTERS

Chief Assistant Attorney General

JAMES WILLIAM BILDERBACK II

Senior Assistant Attorney General

RYAN B. MCCARROLL

Deputy Solicitor General

HOLLY D. WILKENS

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

/S/ Christine Y. Friedman

CHRISTINE Y. FRIEDMAN

Deputy Attorney General

October 15, 2020