Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ryan K. Sumlin, Petitioner v. United States

Supreme Court briefJul 17, 2020

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No.

Supreme Court of tfje »ittte& States;

RYAN SUMLIN,

Petitioner,

vs.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

APPENDIX

COMES NOW PETITIONER Ryan Sumlin and submits the attached appendix

pursuant to Supreme Court Rules.

Ryaxraumlin

Petitioner

62250-060

RO. Box 2068

Inez, KY 41224

Date:

i I

APPENDIX A

ORDER & JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

DATED 4-21-20

ft I

United States v. Sumiin

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

April 21,2020, Decided; April 21,2020, Filed

No. 18-3819

Reporter

956 F,3d 879 *; 2020'U.S. App, LEXIS 12744 **; 2020 FED App. 0120P (6th Cir.) •**; 112 Fed. R. Evid, Sen,-.

(Callaghan) 257

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PlaintiffAppellee, v. RYAN K. SUMLIN, DefendantAppellant.

|*882i 1***1] JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge.

Ryan Sumiin appeals his conviction for distribution

of drugs that caused the death of Carrie Dobbins, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C),

which carries enhanced penalty provisions. Sumiin

argues that the district court should have excluded

Prior History: (**1] Appeal from the United

evidence obtained from a search of his residence

States District Court for the Northern District of

because the affidavit supporting the search warrant

Ohio at Akron. No. 5:15-er~00319-3—Donald C.

was invalid. He also contends that Amanda Kelly

Nugent. District Judge.

(Carrie's sister and Sumlin's ex-girlfriend who had

United States v. Sumiin, 2017 U.S. Dlst. LEXIS

bought drugs from him) should not have been

139906 (N.D. Ohio, Aug. 29, 2017)

allowed to

provide certain testimony about

his past relationship with Carrie.1 Finally. Sumiin

claims that there was insufficient evidence to show

that he distributed the drugs that caused Carrie's

Counsel: ON BRIEF: Mark Weitle. Louisville,

death,

Kentucky, for Appellant.

For the reasons outlined below, we find that (1) the

district court properly denied Sumlin's suppression

Matthew B. Kail, UNITED STATES

motion, given that the affidavit established a

ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, Cleveland, Ohio, for

sufficient |**2| nexus between his drug trafficking

Appellee.

activity and residence; (2) the court properly

admitted Kelly's testimony, as it was intrinsic proof

that was relevant for providing background

information and contextualizing the government's

Judges; Before: GiBBONS, KETHLEDGE,

case

against Sumiin; and (3) sufficient evidence

BUSH, Circuit Judges.

supported the jury's verdict that Sumiin distributed

the drugs that caused Carrie’s death. Therefore, we

AFFIRM.

Opinion by: JOHN K. BUSH

Opinion

1 We refer by fiitn name to Carrie Dobbins and her mother, ltd if

Dobbins, to distinguish between them,

Sumiin Exhibit A1

Page 2 of I!

656 F,3d 679, *882; 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 12744. “2; 2020 FED App. 0120P (6th Cir,), ***2

This case arises from the fatal drug overdose of

Carrie Dobbins in Akron, Ohio, on March 28,2015.

Carrie's mother, Julie Dobbins, found her

daughter's lifeless body in the basement of her

home. For years. Carrie had struggled with heroin

addiction, bn the day of her death, Carrie had

ingested a lethal level and combination |*8S3J of

drugs. It was a mixture that has tragically become

far loo common—heroine and fen t any I.

The chain of events leading to the overdose began

in the early morning hours of that day. Specifically,

.at 6:09 a.m., Carrie texted the telephone number

(330) 815-4534, asking if ”TJ" could come "see"

her. The number that Carrie texted was Sumlin’s

cellphone number, according to her sister, Amanda

Kelly, who later cooperated with the police

investigation. Kelly also identified "TT as

Surnlin, |**3| a heroin dealer who employed this

alias when dealing drugs. Kelly recounted that ”T.r

had used a Facebook account under the name

”RYO Boyer" and that the "About" section of this

account listed "facebook.comfn-ansumlm" as the

contact email. Kelly knew this information about

Surnlin because she was his ex-girlfriend and had

purchased heroin from him. She also told police

that Sumiin had dealt heroin to Carrie in the past.

was parked in the driveway. Upon entering the

house, Kelly saw Sum tin with Carrie in the living

room,

Following Carrie's death, and between the span of

April 24, 2015 and April 27. 2015, Akron Police

Department Detective Mike Schmidt visited an

address believed to be Sumlin’s residence on

Firestone Boulevard in Akron. Detective Schmidt

saw a Chrysler 300—the same model of car seen by

Amanda Kelly and Julie Dobbins on the morning of

March 28, 2015—parked in the driveway of the

Firestone Boulevard address. Although the car was

registered to Sumlin's mother, police records

confirmed that Sumiin had been arrested while

driving the vehicle in 2014. Further investigation

revealed that the utilities of the Firestone Boulevard

residence were paid for by Sumlin's then-current

girlfriend. Also, according to a police report

stemming from an unrelated assault complaint filed

in April 2015, Surnlin was identified as living there

with this girlfriend. Additional police records from

prior years, relating to Sumlin's arrests for the

possession of heroin, the possession of cocaine,

parole violations, failure to comply with police, and

willful fleeing, further connected him to the J**5|

Firestone Boulevard property.

In response to Carrie's text, Sumiin texted back

"how much," to which she responded "35." (R. 177:

Schmidt Trans., PagelD 1404-14 & Exhibit 140,

PagelD 1655). Sumiin texted his agreement,

notifying Carrie that he was "onjj [his] way” to her

mother’s house. (/</.). Carrie [

3| then texted

for Sumiin to wait until iter mother had left for

work, which would be around 6:45 a.m. Carrie also

-instructed hint to park on the side street next to the

house to avoid detection.

Aware of these facts, the police turned their focus

on Sumiin as a suspect. Based on his personal

experience and training.2 Detective Schmidt

prepared an affidavit using the information

obtained from the police investigation, including

interviews with Julie Dobbins, Amanda Kelly,

Dr. George Sterbenx/ and Akron Detective

Benjamin Surblis/ to obtain a search warrant

When Julie Dobbins left for work that morning, she

noticed a dark-colored Chrysler, matching the

description of Sumlin's car, parked on the side

street next to her house. At approximately 8:45 a.m.

that same morning, Kelly arrived at her mother's

house, A vehicle that Kelly identified as Sumlin's

car-—a Chrysler 300 [**4] with tinted windows—

experience wish the Akion Police Dcponmem. At the time of the

2 Detective Schmidt’s qualifications included eighteen veai-s of

victim's death. Detective Schmidt was assigned to the Akron

Narcotics Detail.

?Dr, Stcrhenz is the Chief Deputy Medical Examiner with the

Summit County Medical Examiner's Office. On March 2ft, 2015. he

perforated an autopsy on Dobbins.

* Detective Surblis was; die second of She Akron detectives so arrive

al the scene of Carrie's death on Maivh 25, 2018. At i)k scene, he

found evidence of Carrie's recent dmg use, including a hypodermic

Sumiin Exhibit A2

* I

Page 3 ofl I

&56 :-'.3d 679, *883; 2020 U,S. App. LEXIS 12744, ”5; 2020 FED App. 0120P (6th Cif ), ***4

1*884] for the Firestone Boulevard residence,

August 30, 2017, Finding the search |***5|

warrant valid, the district court concluded that the

The affidavit soughs authority to search for any government’s supporting affidavit established

evidence relating to drag trafficking, which could a 1**7] sufficiently strong nexus between Sumlin's

include heroin, currency, records and documents, residence and the drug activities being investigated

and cellular telephones. Detective Schmidt was by the police. Because the government had shown

particularly focused on locating the (330) 815-4524 probable cause for the search warrant, the district

telephone, which Sutniin used to communicate with court held that Sumlin’s rights tinder the Fourth

Dobbins on the morning of March 28, 2015. On Amendment, as applied to the states by the

April 27. 2015, the warrant was approved by Akron Fourteenth Amendment, had not been violated.

Municipal Court Judge deny K. Larson. The Alternatively, the court held that even if the

following day. the Akron police executed the affidavit had not provided a sufficient basis for

search warrant. Officers seized a number of items, probable cause, the evidence should not be

including approximately 190 grams of then- excluded based on United States v, Leon, 468 U.S,

suspected cocaine (which upon further testing, was 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).

determined to be fentonyl), 48 grams of suspected becat)se it s(ill wouJd have been reaso„a6>,e for the

heroin; drug trafficking paraphernalia (i.e. multiple police to rely on the warrant in good faith.

scales, a press, a grinder, glassware J**6| with

residue): $11,920 cash in one location; S2.482 in Following the district court’s denial of Sumlin’s

another location; and eight cellular telephones.

motion to suppress. Sumltn was tried on April 2430, 2017. and a jury convicted him of all three

On August 26, 2015, a grand jury initially indicted counts charged on the indictment. On May 24,

Sutniin for drug trafficking. On August 17, 2016, a 2017, the district court sentenced Sumltn to a term

grand jury returned a superseding indictment of life imprisonment, as well as a six-year term of

against Sumltn and several others. After Sumlin's supervised release. In accordance with the courts

co-defendants pleaded guilty, the grand jury rulings, an amended judgment was entered on May

returned a supplemental indictment against Sumltn. 26,2017. This timely appeal followed.

This indictment charged Sumltn with the following:

(1) distribution of drags on March 28, 2015 that

caused Carrie's death, in violation of 21 U.S.C. 11.

§§841(a)(1) and (b)( 14(C), which also triggered the

enhanced penalty provision for drug distribution

causing death: (2) possession of fentanyl with the

intent to distribute on April 28, 2015 , in violation A, Validity of the Search Warrant

of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B); and (3)

possession of heroin with the intent to distribute on Sumltn challenges the search warrant as inadequate

October 9, 2015, in violation of 21 U.S.C. under the Fourth Amendment, which provides that

"no Warrants [*885] shall issue, but upon

§§84 1(b)(1) and (b)(1)(B).

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.

On June 18, 2017. Sumltn fded a motion to and particularly |**8] describing the place to be

suppress the government's evidence that provided searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

the foundational basis for these charges. After U S, Const, amend, IV. This constitutional

Sutniin waived a hearing on his suppression protection, applicable here through the Fourteenth

motion, the district court denied the motion on Amendment, requires that a warrant to search a

residence be supported by an application showing

probable

cause. The affidavit supporting the

net-tiic ami $poofj ami a small paper eimiattier v-< insistent whh n

warrant must contain facts that demonstrate "a fair

bindle.

Sumlin Exhibit A3

» I

Page 4 of H

658 F.3d 879. *688; ,2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 12744, **8; 2020 FED App 0120P (6th Cir.), *‘*5

probability that evidence of a crime will be located

on the premises of the proposed search." United

States v. Jenkins, 396 F.3d 751, 760 {6th Cir.

2005); United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526. 531

(6th Cir. 2005). If "a government agent fails to

support his application with this showing of

probable cause, a judge should refuse to issue the

warrant" Untied Stares v. McCoy* 905 P.3d 409.

415 (6th Cir, 2018), "Our review of the sufficiency

of the evidence supporting probable cause is

limited to the information presented in the fourcomers of the affidavit}.]'* Frazier, 423 F.3d at 531.

Nonetheless, because "the probable cause standard

is a J***6j 'practical, non-technical conception’

that deals with the 'factual and practical

considerations of everyday life," Frazier, 423 F.3d

at 531 (citation omitted), a finding that probable

cause exists can "depend[] on the totality of the

circumstances," Id

the affidavit established probable cause to believe

that the evidence would be found at the place

ciled." United States v. Radrigttez-Sttazo, 346 F.3d

637, 643 (6th Cir. 2003) {internal quotation marks

omitted).

magistrate’s probable cause

determination is entitled to "great deference," id.

and "the evidence must be viewed in a light most

likely to |**10J support the decision of the district

court." Frazier, 423 F.3d at 531 (citation omitted);

see United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 528 (6th

Cir. 2001).

We agree with the district court that Detective

Schmidt's affidavit established a sufficient nexus

between Sumlin’s drug-trafficking activity and his

Firestone Boulevard residence to justify’ the

magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause. The

probable cause analysts involves several

components. The govern mem's affidavit needed to

demonstrate probable cause (1) that Sumiin was

trafficking drugs: (2) that Sumiin lived at the

Firestone Boulevard residence; and (3) that

evidence of drug trafficking would be found at

Sumtin's residence. The government accomplished

all three tasks in sufficient detail.

Sumiin challenges the finding of probable cause on

the grounds that Detective Schmidt's affidavit

failed to include facts establishing a sufficient

nexus between his residence and his suspected

drug |*~9] distribution activities. In particular, he

compares the instant affidavit with the one at issue

In United States y; Brown, 828 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 1***7} First, as Sumiin appears to concede, the

2016), which this court ultimately determined affidavit set forth probable cause to show he was in

lacked a sufficient nexus. Specifically, referencing the Illegal drug trade. Related ly, the affidavit,

Brown, Sumiin argues that the affidavit in this case which includes information 1*886} and medical

"lackJed] any mention of any illicit activity" at the confirmation of Carrie's death, shosvs that she died

Firestone Boulevard residence. (Appellant Sumiin on March 28, 2015 of a drug overdose. Connecting

Br, at 15-19), Sumiin also argues that this omission these pieces, evidence on Carrie’s cellphone

bars the application of the Leon good-faith established that she had exchanged text messages

exception in the alternative. We need not address with "TJ"—Sunt tin’s confirmed drug alias—early in

the Lean exception here because, as discussed the morning of March 28, 2015. Though the two

below, we hold that the search warrant complied used coded language, it is reasonable to

believe |**111 that during this conversation,

'with the Fourth Amendment.

Sumiin agreed to bring drugs to Carrie. The

When evaluating a district court’s ruling on a affidavit also includes witness testimony'of the

motion to suppress evidence, "we review she trial decedent’s sister, Amanda Kelly, who not only had

court’s factual findings for clear error and Sts legal purchased drugs from Sumiin, but also had been his

conclusions de novo." Frazier. 423 F.3d at 531. girlfriend. Based on her past involvement with

"The standard of review for determining the Sumiin, Kelly confirmed that he was in fact a drug

sufficiency of the affidavit is whether the dealer. Furthermore, according to Kelly, she saw

magistrate had a substantial basis for finding that Sumiin in the living room of her mother’s residence

Sumiin Exhibit A4

Page 5 of I!

958 F 3d 879, *886; 2020 U.S, App. LEXiS 12744, **11; 2020 FED App, 0120P <6th Glr.), *‘*7

with her sister at approximately 8:45 a.m. on the

morning of March 28, 201$, and his car was in the

driveway of her mother's residence. The affidavit

also outlines that "TJ’s" cellphone number,

Faeebook account, automobile, and picture were all

connected to Sumiin. Collectively, these facts in the

affidavit establish probable cause to believe that

Sumiin trafficked drugs.

sufficient to demonstrate a nexus between the

criminal activity and the suspect residence to

validate the warrant—even "when there is

absolutely no indication of any wrongdoing

occurring at that residence. . ,

United States v,

Coward, 188 F. App’x 355, 358-50 (6th Cir. 2006).

In fact, we have even gone so far to determine the

existence of "a nexus between a defendant's

residence and illegal drue activity with no facts

Secondly, we agree with the government and the indicating ,hat the defendant was dealing drugs

district court that the affidavit showed specific from his residence." McCoy. 905 F.3d at 418

detail to establish probable cause that Sumiin lived (emphasis added). Instead, we determined that a

at the Firestone Boulevard residence. Sumlin's car "defendant’s record of past drug convictions

(registered to his mother), which had been seen at couplcd with rccem> re|iab)c evidence of drug

the residence of Julie Dobbins (Carrie's mother) on

is suftlcknt to establish the nexus. Id: see

the morning of March 28, 2015, was subsequently also United States v. Miggitis, 302 F,3d 384, 393

observed by police to have been parked in the (6th Cir. 2002) (finding probable cause existed to

driveway

of the Firestone Boulevard support search of defendant's residence based on

property on multiple days following Carrie's death. affidavit's outlining of defendant’s prior cocaineThe utilities at the residence were under the name related convictions coupled with officers' same-day

of Sumlin's then-girlfriend. Moreover, earlier that observations of him signing for a package

month, police had responded to a domestic containing j*8S7| a large amount of cocaine

disturbance at the residence relating to a fight delivered at someone else's residence).

between Sumiin and his then-girlfriend. And

finally, the mother of Sumlin’s then-girlfriend told Based on this authority, the government's affidavit

police that Sumiin lived in the Firestone Boulevard established the requisite nexus. It provided facts

residence. Collectively, this evidence not only showing that Sumiin was a drug trafficker and that

seems sufficient, but appears overwhelming in its he resided at Firestone Boulevard. As

support of the probable cause determination that Detective 1**14) Schmidt related in the affidavit.

Sumiin lived at the subject property of the search he knew from his personal experience and training

warrant

that drug dealers like Sumiin routinely keep drugrelated items (i.c. records of their drug transactions,

Given these facts in the affidavit, we also agree equipment, supplies, and weapons) at their

with the government and the district court that the residences. Akron police officers also observed

affidavit established probable cause to believe that Sumlin's car—the same one seen by witnesses

evidence of Sumlin's drug trafficking would be parked next to the home of Carrie's mother on the

found at the Firestone Boulevard residence. "j!]n morning of March 28, 2015—parked at the

the case of drug dealers, evidence is |***8| likely Firestone Boulevard residence multiple times

to be found where the dealers live." United States v. following Carrie’s death. We agree with the

Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 975 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal emphasis placed by the district court on the timing

quotation omitted). Therefore, "an affidavit of the text messages exchanged between Carrie and

containing credible, verified allegations of drug Sumiin, Namely, the back-and-forth exchange,

trafficking, verification that said defendant lives at which occurred within a span of twenty-nine

a particular residence, combined with the affiant minutes.5 suggested that |***9j Sumiin was at his

officer’s experience that j**13J drug dealers keep

evidence of dealing at their residence," etui be

* KdIc th»il Carrie's reijwcst lor tlntgs arr4 SumHnV

Sumiin Exhibit A5

Page 6 of II

956 F,3d 879, *887; 2020 U S. App. LEXIS 12744, "14; 2020 FED App. 0120P (8th Cir.). **‘9

home when Carrie texted that morning, and then

necessarily was leaving from his home to deliver

the drugs to Carrie. Finally, the Akron police were

aware of recent evidence that Sumlin was drug*

dealing, as stated in the affidavit. Connecting the

pieces of this analysis, there was a sufficient nexus

existing between Sumlin's drug trafficking-related

activity and his residence.

Julie Dobbins on the morning of Carrie's death in

that house was the same car parked [**16} later

that day at the Firestone Boulevard property.

Consequently, the police had probable cause that

additional evidence of Sumlin’s drug trafficking,

including the cellular telephone linked to the (330)

815-4515 number used to text Dobbins, would be

found at the Firestone Boulevard property.

Furthermore, we agree with the district court that

Sumlin’s reliance on United States v. Brown. 828

F.3d 375. 383-84 (6th Cir. 2016) is

misplaced. j**J5j In Brawn, wc found the

government's search warrant on defendant's

residence to be invalid, given that the affidavit

"contained no evidence that {defendant] distributed

narcotics from his home, that he used it to store

narcotics, or that any suspicious activity' had taken

place there." Id. at 382. (emphasis added). The

affidavit also lacked any evidence showing that

defendant had sold drugs in the recent past, that he

had a car directly tied to his drug trafficking

activities, that such car was parked at his suspected

residence, or in fact, that there were any' suspicious

communications tying his criminal activities to the

suspect residence.

|*888) The district court properly denied Sumlin’s

motion to suppress the search warrant for his

residence, because it is clear that the "four corners

of the search warrant affidavit" establish a

sufficient nexus between Sumlin’s residence and his

criminal activity of drug dealing, id. at 380.

|***10| Because Detective Schmidt's affidavit

established a sufficient nexus between Sumlin's

residence and the criminal activity, there was no

Fourth Amendment violation.

Here, by contrast with Brown, there was evidence

showing a connection between Sumlin's alleged

drug trafficking and the Firestone Boulevard

property. We agree with the district court that the

timing of the text message exchange between

Sumlin and Carrie suggested that Sumlin was

coming from the Firestone Boulevard residence.

Equally, there was substantial reason to believe that

Sumlin lived at the Firestone Boulevard property

and that the car that was spotted at the residence of

Sumlin appeals the district court's decision to admit

Amanda Kelly's testimony relating to the scope of

her past relationship with him. He argues that the

testimony was not intrinsic to the case because it

showed no connection to his alleged drug dealings

with Carrie Dobbins. Furthermore, Sumlin argues

that the testimony should have been evaluated and

found inadmissible under a Federal Rule of

Evidence 404(b) analysis, given that the

evidence |**17j was not probative of a material

issue in the case, but instead, was inadmissible

character evidence. Rebutting these claims, the

government advances that Kelly's testimony related

to her past use of drugs and her purchases from

Sumlin was proper background evidence and

inextricably intertwined with the rest of her

testimony. In the alternative, the government argues

that such evidence would be properly admitted

even under Rule 404(b). The government has the

better of the argument.

response liras he would bring Iwr dings, nceumd between 6:09 a m.

and'6:18 a m. Also, at precisely 6:14 a m. Sumlis: texted "on.my |sit|

way." Co which Dobbins responded that be should wait unlit her

mother had departed for worth (.it. 177: Schmidt Trans.. Pagein

f 404-14 & l:\hiblt 140, S’sjtt'tD 16S5). At 6:24 a tn. ami 6:57 a m..

Currie received two short telephone calls from Stmltn, finally. ,11

6:58 a m.. she sem Itim one last message indicating that her mother

would be leaving in a couple of minutes. Ai approximately 6:45 a

in . as she left for wort, Julie Dobbins saw a car matching Sumlin's

ear description partied on the side of her home with its lights off,

B. The Admission of Amanda Kelly ’s Testimony

I. "Relevancy” under FRE 401 and FRE 402

Sumlin Exhibit A6

< I

Page 7 of 11

956 F.3d 879, ‘888; 2020 US App. LEXIS 12744, **17; 2020 FED App. 0120P (6th Cir,), *“10

We review a district court's decision to admit

testimony and other evidence under an abuse of

discretion standard. United States v. Toccn, 200

F.3d 401, 414 (6th Cir. 2000); see United States v.

Bonds, 1'2 FJd 540, 554 (6th Cir. 1992). "An abuse

of discretion exists where the reviewing court is

firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.”

United States r, Whittington* 455 F.3d 736. 738-39

(6th Cir. 2006); see United States v. Williams, 952

F.2d 1504, 1518 (6th Cir. 1991), "An erroneous

admission of evidence that does not affect the

‘substantial rights' of a party is considered harmless,

•and should be disregarded.** United States v. Cope,

312 F.3d 757, 775 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Gibson

v. United States. 271 F.3d 247, 254 (6th Cir.2001)).

Furthermore, "[tjhe standard for relevancy is

extremely liberal." United States v. Whittington,

455 F.3d 736, 738-39 (6th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotations omitted). "jEJvidence having am

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of

consequence to the determination of the action

more probable or less probable titan it would be

without the evidence* is relevant." Robinson v,

Runyon, 149 F.3d 507, 512 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting

Fed. R. f***U| F.vid.

401). ’jE'jvcn if a

district court believes the evidence Is insufficient to

prove Use ultimate point for which it is offered, it

may not exclude the evidence if it has the slightest

probative words." DXS, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Svs.,

Jttc., 100 F.3d 462, 475 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal

quotations omitted).

Given these directives, we deem Amanda Kelly’s

testimony about her past drug-related and personal

relationship with Sumlin, to be relevant, Kelly was

Carrie's sister, Sumlin's former client, and also his

former girlfriend. Kelly testified that she saw her

sister with Sumlin at her mother's residence at

approximately 8:45 a.m. on March 28. 2015. Kelly

also testified that Carrie had abused drugs in the

past and continued to do so, and that Sumlin was a

drug dealer, who had routinely delivered drugs to

her at her mother's same residence in the past. Prior

to the introduction of this testimony. Sumlin’s

attorney objected to the line of questioning on

1*8891

relevancy grounds. However, the

government offered a strong foundation for the

testimony’s relevance, explaining that this evidence

was necessary both to contextualize the relationship

between Kelly and .Sumlin. and to explain hovv

Kelly could identity "T.T” the drug dealer, as

Sumlin.

The

government

also

explained

that

the evidence was relevant to Kelly's

motives for testifying. After Sumlin's attorney

eventually conceded that her client was a drug

dealer and had had past relationships with both

Carrie and Kelly,6 the district court determined that

Kelly's testimony was relevant. Nonetheless, the

court also agreed to give the jury a limiting

instruction as to how to consider the testimony at

the beginning of Kelly's testimony and during its

jury charge,

Furthermore, even if Kelly’s testimony alone would

havc bcen insufficient to prove Sumlin’s conviction

l!ndcr ^.1 U;S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (h)(1)(C), as

discussed above, this court’s ’’relevance threshold is

very low under Rule 401, |a]nd ... the government

is permitted to build an incremental ease."

W'tom/igroH, 455 F.3d 736, 739. And here, simply

because Kelly's !***«) testimony may or may

no1 Prove Sum,»n,s crime* ”does nM mean,

necessarily" that the contextualizing evidence Kelly

provides |**20| is irrelevant. Id. Therefore.. we

conclude that the district court did not abuse its

discretion in admitting Kelly’s testimony,

m tt,,- aionct ovri coisetudmg ihai Kciiy*x testimony was

relevant, the fotkming exchange occurred between the judge and

SumUn’s defense counsel:

THE COURT; Whafti the defense hew. Kh$nd»?

MS. KOTNJK: 1:or lhat witness or *

THE COURT: In general I mean, lisicned to the opening

statements, fan *

MS. KOTSNIK: Ihe drugs tha* he provided cue not the drugs

that killed hci.

THE COURT: So you're not disptflmg the feet that they hail a

relationship with a drug deafer?

MS, KOi KIK: ( <ht£hi. Correct.

(R. 175: Trial Trans,. EagciD 1114-15)

Sumlin Exhibit A7

“>-----------------------

Page 8 of 11

056 F,3d 879, ‘880: 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 12744, "20; 2020 FED App, 0120P (6th Clr,), ”*12

2. ’'Intrinsic" versus ’’Extrinsic" Evidence

In light of our above assessment, we disagree with

Sumlin’s characterization of Kelly's testimony as

barred by Rule 404(b). Rule 404(b) "docs not apply

to evidence- that itself is probative of the crime

Charged!.]" United States v. Price, 329 F.3d 903.

906 (6th Cir. 2003). Such probative proof includes

"intrinsic acts" evidence that relates to those acts

that "were necessary preliminaries to the crime

charged.” United States v. Daultan, 266 F. App’x

381, 384 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).

Furthermore, even if the evidence at issue relates to

a defendant’s uncharged criminal conduct, the

evidence still is admissible if the conduct "arises

from the same events as" and "is directly probative

-of [defendant's] charged offense). 1" United States v.

Clay. 667 F.3d 689.698 (6th Cir. 2012).

the charged offense., arises from the same

events as the charged offense, forms an integral

pari of a witness's testimony, or completes the

story o f the charged offense.

United States v. Hardy (Martondo), 228 F.3d 745,

748 (6th Cir, 2000).

!***I3| In light of this authority, we find that

Amanda Kelly’s testimony, in which she reveals her

previous drug use and past drag purchase history'

from Sunil in, constituted both proper res gestae

evidence, as well as evidence that is "inextricably

intertwined" with evidence of Sumlin’s conviction

under 21 U.S.C. jt§ 841(a)(1) and (bKD(C). At a

foundational level, Kelly’s historic drug dealings

with Sumlin help contextualize (1) how she knew

Sum (in was TJ ," (2) how she recognized Sumlin’s

Car in her mother's driveway on the morning of her

To demarcate the scope of admissible "intrinsic sister's death, and (3) how she 1**22] identified

evidence” from proof that falls under the scope of Sumlin as the individual in the living room with her

Rule 404(b)’s exclusion, our circuit uses the sister at S;45 a.m. on the same rooming.

following framework:

Kelly’s previous interactions with Sumlin also help

Rule 404(h) does not apply where the de-code the text messages in which Carrie Dobbins

challenged

evidence

"inextricably appears to request drugs and Sumlin agrees to drop

intertwined" with evidence of the crime them off. Without any level of background

charged in the indictment. When the other knowledge of Sumlin’s past drug dealings with

crimes or wrongs occurred at different times Kelly and Carrie, the texts, in isolation, could

and under different circumstances from the appear cryptic. There were no explicit references to

offense charged, the deeds are termed drugs, or even popular drug code words in the

"extrinsic." j**21 J "Intrinsic" acts on the other conversation, which would have aided in

hand, are those that are part of a single criminal confirming that the text message exchange was

indeed, about a drug deal. Without any background

episode.

knowledge, the number ’’35” (Carrie’s response to

United States v, Barnes, 49 F.3d 1144, 1149 (6th Sumlin’s question of "how much") could have been

Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Torres, 685 F.2d referring to "35" units of any type of commodity.

921, 924 (5th Cir. 1982)). Note as well, that (R. 177: Schmidt Trans,, PagelD 1404-14 &

evidence relating to the background of the charged Exhibit ,40> PageID 1655) However, as the

offense, |*890] known as "res gestae evidence," is government argues, and as we agree, Kelly's

also considered "intrinsic" and admissible, meaning testimony as to her past relationship and dealings

the court would not undertake a Rule 404(b) with Sumlin is "integral,” in that it completes the

analysis:

store of Sumiin’s charged offense under 21 U.S.C.

Proper background evidence has a causal, §§ g41(aXl> and (bH 1 MC>—namely, that those

temporal or spatial connection with the charged „3S» units dlscusscd jn the text exchange couid

offense. Typically, such evidence is a prelude reasonably havc bcen interpreted as ”35" units of

to the charged offense, is directly probative of

Sumlin Exhibit A8

Page 9 of 11

966 F.36 879, ‘890; 2020 U,S. App. LEXIS 12744, *'22; 2020 FS0 App. 0120P-(6th Cir.}, ‘**13

fentanyl or heroin, which was |®*23| Use quantity

of drugs that Sumlin, operating under the alias

"TJ,” distributed to Carrie and that ultimately led to

her death. Moreover, as Kelly explained, because

Sumlin had prior dealings with both her and her

sister, when he asked Carrie "how much" following

her request to "come over," he did not have to ask

where to deliver the drugs, (Id).

Significantly as well, we find the testimony to

represent both "intrinsic" and proper background

evidence In clarifying Kelly's motives for

testifying, as well as revealing any potential' bias

she harbored against Sumlin, which could have

prejudiced his case. The Supreme Court

characterizes bias as "the relationship between a

party and a witness which might lead the witness to

slant, unconsciously or otherwise, [her] testimony

in favor of or against a party.” j***f4J United

States v. Aha!, 469 U.S. 45, 52, 105 S. Ct 465, 83

L. Ed, 2d 450 (1984), "Bias is always relevant in

assessing a witness's credibility.'* Sehkdwitz v.

United'States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1015 (6th Cir. 1999).

Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 607 permits

a party to proactively introduce potential

impeachment evidence during direct examination

prior to the defense having the opportunity to

present the same evidence during crossexamination. Kelly's testimony relating to her past

drug use and prior sexual relationship |*8911 with

Sumlin was directly relevant [**24] to her

credibility',7 The district court, therefore, did not

abuse its discretion when it allowed the government

to inform the jury of impeachment facts through

Kelly's direct testimony, rather than wait for them

to be introduced in her cross-examination.

Given this holding, we need not analyze Sumlin's

alternative argument regarding the testimony's

applicability under a Rule 404(b) analysis.

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Finally, Sumlin challenges the sufficiency of the

government's evidence supporting count three of

the indictment—that be distributed drugs to Carrie

Dobbins, and that those drugs caused her death,*1

Specifically, Sumlin argues that there was

insufficient evidence to show beyond a reasonable

doubt, that he was the one who distributed the

drugs that caused the death, because on the

morning of March 28, 2015, Carrie made attempts

10 contact several other drug dealers,

Reiaiedly, he contends that although Kelly saw him

in the living room with Carrie, Kelly never actually

saw him giving her drags.

"[A] defendant claiming insufficiency of the

evidence beats a heavy burdenUnited States v.

MaiiszewskL 161 F.3d 992, 1005 (6th Cir. 1998);

see United States v. Wright, 16 F.3d 1429, 1439

(6th Cir. 1994). In evaluating such claims, "we

examine the evidence in the light most favorable to

the government and draw all inferences in the

government's favor in order to determine whether

any rational trier of fact could have found the

dements of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt." Maliszmvski, 161 F,3d at 1005 (citing

United States v. Riffe, 28 F.3d 565, 567 (6th

Cir. 1994)); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S. Ct 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).

^ Sumlin does not contest that he was a drag dealer, and

For she aforementioned reasons, we classify Kellys consequently. concedes his guilt under counts two and three. Indeed,

evidence as both "intrinsic’* and relevant, and during closing argument*. defense counsel gave "permission" to the

therefore, properly admitted by the district court jury convict on those counts:

* Namely. Kelly was an admitted recovering drug addict, who had

pftrvtmidy purvhnstfd drugs from Strrolift and had experienced great

diftlculry in her attempts to stop her heroin abuse. Importantly as

•well, Kelly had known Sumlin for years as a drug dealer, classmate,

and girlfriend. At the time of Carrie's death* Kelly mainfemed n

social relationship with some of Sumlin's family members.

f YfmTvc heard that Ryan sells illegal [**25! drugs, and that

probably doesn’t sit wei! with you right now. On April 28lh and

October 9th, both of tltot* times, he was caught with different

And hc‘s taken

quantities and different types of drugs,

responsibility for those actions. And you have permission to

hold him ncemromhle for those counts in Count 2 and 3,

(R, 1??; Sumlm Closing. I’agelO 157b)

Sumlin Exhibit A9

»1

Page I Oof H

0S6E.3d 879, *891; 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 12744, **25; 2020 FED App. 0120P (61h Cir***15

"We draw all available inferences and resolve all notable external or internal injury documented on

issues of credibility in favor of the jury’s verdict, her body was a small puncture wound in her inner

and it is not necessary for ns to exclude every arm—a puncture that was consistent with recent

reasonable hypothesis but guilt." U.S- v. Avery* 128 drug use. Additionally, aside from showing that

Carrie had recently used heroin and fentanyl. the

F.3d 966, 971 (6th Cir. 1997).

forensic toxicology results revealed that she had a

The charge as to which Sumlin contends there was »,etha| |cvcr 0f fentanyl in her bloodstream at the

insufficient evidence—count three—indicted him time of death. Assessing these results. Dr. Sterbenz,

for possessing herein with the intent to distribute, jhe Chief Depu(y Medical Examiner with the

in violation of 21 U.S.C, § 841(a)(1), with the summit County Medical Examiner's Office who

enhanced sentencing penalty of 21 U.S.C. § pcrfonTlcd the'autopsy following Carrie's death.

841 (b)(1)(B). To establish illegal narcotics tcsti(k,d lhat »lo a reasonable degree of' medical

distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), the certainty . . . Carrie died due to her active illicit

government had to prove that Sumlin P*26] (1) dn)g abuse>*' and Vcrv likely died on March 28,

knowingly or intentionally distributed fenianyl and 2Q15 bec,lUSe of ,he amount of fentanyl and heroin

heroin, and (2) at the time of such distribution, sb{, j)ad ingested. Adding external validity to these

Sumlin knew that the substances were fentanyl and claims, the Akron police officers who found

heroin. See United States v. Colon, 268 F,3d 367, Carrie's body in her bedroom on the morning of

376 (6th Cir. 2001). To sustain the March 28. 2015, reported that she died near a

enhanced 1*892] penalty of 21 U.S.C. § hypodermic needle, spoon, and a paper bindfe—all

841(b)(1)(B) related to this charge, the government paraphernalia used for the ingestion of drugs like

had so prove Sum 1 in's knowing or intentional fentanyl and heroin.

distribution of an illicit drug, and that another’s

death resulted from the use of that drug. Barrage v. The government also introduced substantial

United States571 U.S. 204. 210, 134 S. €t. 881. evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Sumlin |**28| provided the drugs that caused

187 L. Ed. 2d 715 (2014).

Carrie’s fat*al overdose. Again, the text message

As noted, Sumlin does not contest that he was a evidence revealed the back-and-forth exchange

drug dealer. Therefore, the only question we are between Catrie and sumlin that led to the drug

faced with is whether there was sufficient evidence deal.

Despite

Sumlin’s

contentions, this

to support the jurys finding of count three--that conversation was neither cryptic nor vague.

Sumlin distributed the particular drugs that killed Dctcctivc Schmidt testified that based on his

Carrie Dobbins on March 28.2015.

extensive training and experience, he interpreted

Breaking down this inquiry into sub-elements, we the conversation as referring to a drug transaction.

Also, Kelly testified regarding Carrie's ongoing

conclude initially that the government introduced

drug addiction, Sumlin’s drug distribution activities,

substantial evidence supporting the fact beyond a

reasonable doubt that drogs killed the victim. First, and past incidents in which both sisters bought

the government’s presented proof from the autopsy drugs from Sumlin. Based on this evidence, it

and toxicology screening 1*** 16} performed on would have been reasonable lor the jury to

conclude that Carrie's text exchange with Sumlin

Carrie following her death, which demonstrated to

a medical certainty that a fentanyl overdose caused referred to a drug transaction. This conclusion is

her death. In this regard, not only did the autopsy also underscored by the fact that Carrie then

fail to show evidence of trauma, injury, stroke, requested that Sumlin wait to arrive until after her

heart attack, or any other cause as |**27| mother left for work, and to park his car on the side

responsible for Carrie’s death, but, in fact, the only of her house.

Sumlin Exhibit A10

p.-igf i i of i (

956 F.3U 879. *892; 2020 US. App. LEXIS 12744, **28; 2020 FED App, 0120P (6th Cif.). ***16

Also, as noted. Amanda Kelly and Julie Dobbins

identified a vehicle that matched Sumiin's Chrysler

300 at Julie's home on the morning her daughter

died there. Kelly saw him in the living room with

Carrie around 8:45 a.m„ and within three hours,

p**j7j

Dr. Sterhcnz

Carrie was dead,

testified J**29j that Dobbins died of a fentanvl

overdose at sometime between 9:00 a,m.—the time

when Kelly Jell her mother’s house—and noon, in

light of these temporal facts, a reasonable jury

could have concluded that |*893| Sumlin was the

last person to have seen the victim before she died

and that his delivery' of drugs to her caused her

death.

Finally, Sumiin's behavior following Carrie's death

could also reasonably be interpreted as suggesting

his involvement. According to the testimony of

Detective Schmidt, after searching online and

confirming Carrie’s death, Sumlin immediately

changed his telephone number and instructed his

contacts to ’’lose'' the old number. Additionally,

during his interview with officers, Sumlin made a

number of false statements, denying that he: (1)

knew' Carrie: (2) ever sold her drugs: (3) had ever

sold drugs at all; (4) lived at the residence on

Firestone Boulevard; and (5) drove a Chiyslcr 300.

Also, according to Detective Schmidt, during

recorded telephone calls between Sumlin and his

girlfriend and relatives, Sumlin indicated that his

life was "over" and slated that he should have run

from the police upon his apprehension.

Choosing not to respond to any of the government's

evidence, |**30| Sumlin instead references the fact

that Carrie made several attempts on the morning of

March 28, 2015 to contact other drug dealers in

likely pursuit of drugs. And indeed, there were text

messages from Carrie to several other drug dealers.

In addition to Sumlin, on that morning. However,

her contact with these other dealers was prior to her

texts with Sumlin, at the end of which Sumlin

appeared to agree to bring her drugs. Furthermore,

an analysis of Carrie's phone records from that

morning fails to reveal any indication that the other

suspected dealers whom she contacted, actually

agreed to deliver her drugs, liqualty. there is no

evidence that any drug dealer other than Sumlin

actually met with Dobbins on the morning of

March 28. 20!5. Nor is there evidence that another

drug dealer supplied Dobbins with fentanyl.

Consequently, based upon our review of this

collective evidence in the light most favorable to

the government, wc hold that the government

submitted sufficient proof for count three, and in

particular Sumiin’s enhanced sentencing penalty,

demonstrating that Carrie died from a fentany!

overdose and that Sumlin knowingly supplied her

with the drugs that produced her death.

P^ISJ [**311 111,

In light of the above, (1) wc AFFIRM the district

court’s finding of the search warrant's validity

because the government’s affidavit showed a

sufficient nexus between Sumiin's criminal activity

and the Firestone Boulevard residence: (2) we

AFFIRM the district court’s admission of Kelly’s

testimony regarding her past relationship with

Sumlin and his past drug transactions, given its

intrinsic nature and relevance to the government’s

ease; and (3) wc AFFIRM the jury's verdict that

Sumlin distributed the fentanyi that ultimately

caused the death of Carrie, as the government

submitted sufficient evidence in support of both

elements of the enhanced statutory1 penalty.

J'ttjf of Itaramci}!

Sumlin Exhibit A11

APPENDIX B

JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

ENTERED 8-31-18

».»■

Case: 5:15-cr-00319-DCN Doc ft: 154 Filed: 08/31/18 1 of 8. PagelD #: 835

United States District Court

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

RYAN K. SUMLIN

Case Number: 5:15-CR-0O319-DCN(3)

USM Number: 62250-060

Rhonda L. Kotnik

Dcfcndiml's Auorncs

THE DEFENDANT:

□ pleaded guilty to count! s)

guilty to counts) before a U.S. Magistrate

□ pleaded

Fudge, which was accepted by the court.

______

pleaded nolo contendere to c«um(s) which was

o accepted

by the court

_______________ _

13 was found guilty on counts) after a plea of not guilty Coants One, Two and Three

The defendant is adjudicated guilty of these offenses:

Tide & Section / Nature of Offense

21:841 (a)( i) and (t>K 1 )f C) and! 8:2.21 ‘-85 i Distribute Fenbnvt/f leroin With Enhanced Penally

C-aasing Death Or Serious

Injury

21 :R-1 i(a)(i) and (bX I)(B>aid IK2.21:851 Possess With Intent To Distribute Femanyi

21:84ifis)< i) and fb){ 1 ){C) and 18:2.21:851 Possess Willi intent To Distribute t leroin

Offense Ended

in/oaTois

11!•092015

|fl.OW2H|5

Count

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 8 of this judgment. Hie sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing

Reform Act of 1984.

□

The defendant has been found not guilty on couMfs)

Ceunt(s)

O is □ are dismissed on the motion of the United States

It is ordered that die defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district whhin 30 days of any change of name,

residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid, li

ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of material changes in economic

circumstances.

Atii»itsi23,.2ftlJ-------DdK ofimpositiim of Judgment

of Jildfe

DONALD C NUGENT, United States District Judge

Ksrfti 3mi1 hfc ofyudec

tee

/iHfaJ

Sumlin Exhibit B1

)

2o]€

Case; 5:15-cr-0031§-DCN Doc#; 154 Filed: 08/31/18 2 of 8. PagelD a; 836

Judgment - Page 2 of 1

AO 243B (Rev. 2/18) Judgment in a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

RYAN K. SUMLIN

5:15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:

Life as to Countland Count 2 and 30 years as to Count 3 to run concurrent

The court makes the following recommendations to the Bureau of Prisons:

Credit for time served

A facility as near to Akron, OH

□

The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal.

The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

□

as notified by the United States Marshal.

a.m.

p.m.

The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

□

before 2 p.m. on

as notified by the United States Marshal.

as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on

j with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

Sumlin Exhibit B2

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

Case: 5:15~cr-00319*DCN Doc#: 154 Filed: 08/31/18 3 of 8. PagelD#:837

Judgment — Page 3 of 1

AO 245B (Rev. 2/18) Judgment in a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

RYAN K. SUMLIN

5:15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a term of: Six (6) years as to Count One and

Count Three and Eight (8) years as to Count Two terms to run concurrent.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

1. You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.

2. You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.

3. You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of

release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by the court

Q The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you

pose a low risk of future substance abuse, (check ifapplicable)

4. E9 You must make restitution in accordance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3653 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence

of restitution (check ifapplicable)

5. B You must cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer, (check Ifapplicable)

<5, Q You must comply with the requirements ofthe Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, et

seq.)

as directed by die probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in which you

reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense, (check ffapplicable)

7. □ You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (check ifapplicable)

You must comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any other conditions on the

attached page.

Sumlin Exhibit B3

Case: 5:.t5-cr-00319-DCN Doc #: 154 Filed: 08/31/18 4 of 8. PagelD #: 838

Judgment - Page 4 of 8

AO 24SB (Rev. 2/18) Judgment In a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

RYAN K. SUMLIN

5:15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are

imposed because they establish the basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed

by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

1. You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours of your

release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time

2. After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions horn the court or the probation officer about how and

when you must report to die probation officer, and you must report to die probation officer as instructed.

3. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from

the court or the probation officer.

4. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.

5. You must live at a place approved by die probation officer. If you plan to change where you live or anything about your living

arrangements (such as the people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before die change. If notifying

the probation officer in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72

hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

6. You must allow die probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer

to take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.

7. You must work frill time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from

doing so. If you do not have full-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses

you from doing so. Ifyou plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job

responsibilities), you must notify die probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10

days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of

becoming aware of a change or expected change. If not in compliance with the condition of supervision requiring full-time

occupation, you may be directed to perform up to 20 hours of community service per week until employed, as approved or directed by

the pretrial services and probation officer.

8. You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged, in criminal activity. If you know someone has been

convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the

probation officer.

9. Ifyou are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.

10. You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.e., anything that

was designed, or was modified for, the specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or

tasers).

11. You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant

without first getting the permission ofthe court.

12. As directed by the probation officer, you shall notify third parties who may be impacted by the nature of die conduct underlying

your current or prior offenses) of conviction and/or shall permit the probation officer to moke such notifications, and/or confirm your

compliance with this requirement.

13. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a

written copy of this judgment containing these conditions. I understand additional information regarding these

conditions is available at the www.uscourts.gov.

Date

Defendant’s Signature

Sumlin Exhibit B4

Case: 5:15-cr-00319-DCN Doc #: 154 Fifed: 08/31/18 5 of 8. PagelD #: 839

Judgment - Page S of 8

AO 245B (Rev. 2/18) Judgment in a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

RYAN K. SUMLIN

S:15-CR-00319-DCN(3) -

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

Special Assessment - The defendant shall pay to the United States a special assessment of $300.00, which shall be due

immediately.

Mandatory/Standard Conditions - While on supervision, the defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime,

shall not illegally possess a controlled substance, shall comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this

Court, and shall comply with any additional conditions.

Firearms and Dangerous Weapons - The defendant shall not posses a firearm, destructive device or any dangerous weapon.

DNA Collection - The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the U.S. Pretrial Services and

Probation Officer.

Restitution - The defendant must pay restitution in the amount of $4,639.85 through the Clerk of the U.S. District Court.

Restitution due and payable immediately. The defendant must pay at least 25% of gross monthly income, through the Federal

Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. If a restitution balance remains upon release, payment is to

commence no later than 60 days following release from imprisonment during supervised release in monthly payments of at

least 10% of gross monthly income. Nothing shall prohibit the U.S. government from executing or levying upon property

discovered before or after the date of this judgment Interest is waived.

Sumlin Exhibit B5

Case: 5:15-cr-OG319-OCf4 Doe#: 154 Filed: 08/31/18 6of 8. PageiD #: 840

Judgment - Page 6 of 8

AO 245B (Rev. 2/18) Judgment in a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

RYAN K. SUMLIN

5:15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

Assessment 1 JVTA Assessment* ______________ Fine______

$.00

$300.00

TOTALS

Restitution

$4,639.85

An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case (A024SC) will be entered

The determination of restitution is deferred until

after such determination.

El The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in the amount listed below.

□

$4,639.85 to J. D. Akron, Ohio through die Clerk of Court

Ifthe defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3664(iX all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.

j ]

□

Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement $

Tiie defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine of more than $2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in fiill before

the fifteenth day after die date ofthe judgment, pursuant to 18U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be

subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it is ordered that:

□ restitution

□ the interest requirement is waived for die

p fine

p restitution is modified as follows:

□ the interest requirement for the

□ fine

* Jusdce for Victims of Trafficking Act of2015. Pub. L. No. 114-22

»* Findings for the total amount oflosses are required under Chapters I09A, 110,110A, and II3A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after

September 13,1994, but before April 23,1996.

Sumlin Exhibit B6

Case: 5:15-cr-0031§-DCN Doc #: 154 Filed: 08/31/18 7 of 8. PagelD #: 841

Judgment -- Page 7 of 8

AO 245B (Rev. 2/18) Judgment in a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

RYAN K. SUMLIN

5:15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant’s ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

due immediately, balance due

□ Lump sum payments of S

■ or

□ not later than

□ in accordance

□

E, or

□

F below; or

□

D,or

□

F below); or

□ Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with

_ over a period of

□ Payment in equal ___ ;______ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $______

(e.g„ 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment;

(e.g., months or years), to commence

over a period of

Q Payment in equal 20 (e.g„ weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

(e.g„

days)

after release from

____________(e.g., months or years), to commence

imprisonment to a term of supervision; or

□ Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within__________ (e.g„ 30 or 60 dqys) after release

from imprisonment. The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of die defendant’s ability to pay at that

time; or

El Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

It is ordered that the Defendant shall pay to the United States a special assessment of $300.00 for Counts 1,2 and

3, which shall be due immediately. Said special assessment shall be paid to the Clerk, U.S. District Court

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is

due during imprisonment All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons’

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

□

Joint and Several

See above for Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and

Several Amount, and corresponding payee, if appropriate.

□ Defendant shall receive credit on his restitution obligation for recovery from other defendants who contributed to the same

loss that gave rise to defendant's restitution obligation.

□ The defendant shall pay the cost oF prosecution.

□ The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

□ The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest in the following property to the United States:

Payments shall be applied in the following order: (I) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest, (4) fine principal,

(5) fine interest, (6) community restitution, (7) JVTA Assessment, (8) penalties, and (9) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

Sumlin Exhibit B7

Case:5:15-cf-00319-DCN Doc#: 154 Filed: 08/31/18 8of8. PagelD#:842

Judgment - Page 8 of 8

AO 245B (Rev. 2/18) Judgment in a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

RYANK. SUMLIN

S: 15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

DENIAL OF FEDERAL BENEFITS

(For Offenses Committed On or After November 18,1988)

FOR DRUG TRAFFICKERS PURSUANT TO 21 U.S.C. § 862

IT IS ORDERED that the defendant shall be:

□

ineligible for all federal benefits for a period of

Ineligible for the following federal benefits for a period of

(specify benefit(s))

Having determined that this is the defendant’s third or subsequent conviction for distribution of controlled substances, IT IS

ORDERED that the defendant shall be pemtanently ineligible for all federal benefits.

FOR DRUG POSSESSORS PURSUANT TO 21 U.S.C. § 862(b)

□

IT IS ORDERED that the defendant shall:

be ineligible for all federal benefits for a period of

be ineligible for the following federal benefits for a period of

(specify benefits))

successfully complete a drug testing and treatment program.

perform community service, as specified in the probation and supervised release portion of this judgment

IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall complete any drug treatment program and community service specified in

this judgment as a requirement for the reinstatement of eligibility for federal benefits.

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 862(d), this denial of federal benefits does not include any retirement, welfare, Social Security,

health, disability, veterans benefit, public housing, or other similar benefit, or any other benefit for which payments or services

are required for eligibility. The clerk Is responsible for sending a copy of this page and the first page of this judgment to:

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Washington, DC 20S31

Sumlin Exhibit B8

APPENDIX C

JUDGMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

ENTERED 9-11-18

Case: 5:15-cr-00313-DeN Doc#: 156 Filed: 09/11/18 l ots. PagelD#: 84?

United States District Court

■NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

§ AMENDED JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE

Case Number: 5:15-CR-00319-DCN{3)

Dntc of Original Judgment: 800/2018

Reason for Amendment:

USM Number: 62250-060

Rhonda L. Kofwik

Dcfimcirsn:'s Aiionxy

Correction of sentence on reuuunl (18 U.S.C. 3742(i)< S > and (2))

□

Reduction of Sentence for Changed Circumstances

(Fed. R .Crim.P-35 (b) t

Correction of Sentence by Sentencing Court (Fed.R.Crim.P.36)

Correction of Sentence for Clerical Mistake |Fed.R.CrirsU’.3&3

□

Modificfilton oi'Supcr\’isior4{.T'UuiUon? (IS U.S.C. 3563(c)or

3583(c))

Modification of imposed Term of Imprisonment for Extraordinary and

Convening Reasons (18 U.S.C. § 3582(e)(0)

Modification of Imposed Term of imprisonment for Retroactive

Amcttdm«u(s) top the Sentencing Guidelines (IS U.S.C § 35S2(cX2})

Direct Motion to District Court Pursuant O 28 U.S.C. § 2255 or

□ 18 U.S.C. §3339(0(7)

Modification of Restitution Order (IS U.S.C. § 3664)

RYAN K. SUM UN

□

THE DEFENDANT:

□

pleaded guilty to coimt(s)

pleaded guilty to cotmKs) before a U.S.

Magistrate Judge, which was accepted by the

court.

pleaded nolo contendere to eauni(s) which was

accepted by the court

was found guilty on counts) after a plea of twt

guilty

Counts One, Two and Three

The defendant is adjudicated guilty ofthese offenses:

Title £ Section / Nature of Offense

21 :S41 (:t)( t) ond (b)( t)(Ci trnd 18:2, 21:851 Disrtibutc pcntunyM ieroin With Enhanced Penalty

Causing Death Or Serious Ihxlily Injury

2t;84!(,».)(Ijand (bid )(B)nnd 18:2,21:851 Possess With. Intent To Distribute Frahmyl

21:841(a)(1) and (MOMO and 18:2.21:851 Possess With intent To Distribute Heroin

Offense Ended

UWW/20IS

Count

HM)9/2ms

hmmqois

The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 tl trough S of this judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing

Reform Act of 1984,

The defendant has been found not guilty on countfs)

Count/s)

D is

□ are dismissed on the motion of the United States

It is ordered that the defendant must notify the United States attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name,

residence, or mailing address until ail fines, restitution, costs, and special assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid. If

ordered to pay restitution, the defendant must notify the court and United States attorney of materia! changes in economic

cireiinistanccsAnatist 23,20.18

Date cifttwifitMe of Jndsmem

SigDatiiffe* of J«d$e

DONALD C NUGENT, United Statc*jDte(rict Judge

N*rnc Jttd *1 life qt Judge

Owe

Sumlin Exhibit C1

(/, 20<i

Case: 5:15-cr-00319-DCN Doc#: 156 pled: 09/11/18 2of8. PagelD #: 848

Judgment ~ Page 2 of 3

AO 24SC (Rev. 2/18) Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

RYAN K. SUMLIN

5:15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total term of:

Life as to Count land Count 2 and 30 years as to Count 3 to run concurrent

13 The court makes the following recommendations to fee Bureau of Prisons:

Credit for time served

A facility near Akron, Ohio

13 The defendant is remanded to the custody of fee United States Marshal.

□ The defendant shall surrender to the United States Marshal for this district:

□ a.m.

□ at

□ p.m.

n as notified by the United States Marshal.

□ The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:

□ before 2 pun. on

□ as notified by the United States Marshal

□ as notified by fee Probation or Pretrial Services Office.

RETURN

I have executed this judgment as follows:

Defendant delivered on

j with a certified copy of this judgment.

UNITED STATES MARSHAL

DEPUTY UNITED STATES MARSHAL

Sumlin Exhibit C2

Case: 5:15-er-00319-DCN Doc#: 156 Filed: 09/11/18 3 of 8. PagelD #: 849

AO Z45C (Rev. 2/18) Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case

DEFENDANTCASE NUMBER:

Judgment - Page 3 of 8

RYAN K. SUMI.1N

5:15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release ftom imprisonment, the defendant shall be on supervised release for a termof: Six (6) years as to Count One and Count

Three and Eight (8) years as to Count Two terms to run concurrent.

The defendant must report to fee probation office in the district to which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release

from the custody of the Bureau of Prisons.

MANDATORY CONDITIONS

1. You must not commit another federal, state or local crime.

2. You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance.

3. You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of

release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter, as determined by fee court

□ The above drug testing condition is suspended, based on the court's determination that you

pose a low risk of future substance abuse. (check ifapplicable)

4. |g| You must make restitution in accordance with i 8 U.S.C. §§ 3663 and 3663A or any other statute authorizing a sentence

of restitution (check Ifexplicable)

5. |3 You must cooperate in fee collection of DNA as directed by the probation officer, (check ifapplicable)

6. Q You must comply with the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (34 U.S.C. § 20901, et

seq.)

as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in which you

reside, work, are a student, or were convicted of a qualifying offense. (check ifapplicable)

7. □ You must participate in an approved program for domestic violence. (check ifapplicable)

The defendant must comply wife the standard conditions that have been adopted by this court as well as with any

additional conditions on the attached page.

Ifthis judgment imposes a fine or restitution, it is a condition of supervised release feat the defendant pay in accordance with

fee Schedule of Payments sheet of this judgment.

Sumlin Exhibit C3

Case: 5:15-cr-00319-DCN Doc #: 156 Filed: 09/11/18 4 of 8. PagelD #: 850

Judgment - Page 4 of 8

AO 24SC (Rev. 2/18) Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

RYAN K. SUMLIN

5:15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

As part of your supervised release, you must comply with the following standard conditions of supervision. These conditions are

imposed because they establish die basic expectations for your behavior while on supervision and identify the minimum tools needed

by probation officers to keep informed, report to the court about, and bring about improvements in your conduct and condition.

1. You must report to the probation office in the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside within 72 hours ofyour

release from imprisonment, unless the probation officer instructs you to report to a different probation office or within a different time

frame.

2. After initially reporting to the probation office, you will receive instructions from the court or the probation officer about how and

when you must report to the probation officer, and you must report to the probation officer as instructed.

3. You must not knowingly leave the federal judicial district where you are authorized to reside without first getting permission from

the court or the probation officer.

4. You must answer truthfully the questions asked by your probation officer.

5. You must live at a place approved by the probation officer. Ifyou plan to change where you live or anything about your living

arrangements (such as die people you live with), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before die change. If notifying

the probation officer in advance Is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72

hours of becoming aware of a change or expected change.

6. You must allow the probation officer to visit you at any time at your home or elsewhere, and you must permit the probation officer

to take any items prohibited by the conditions of your supervision that he or she observes in plain view.

7. You must work foil time (at least 30 hours per week) at a lawful type of employment, unless the probation officer excuses you from

doing so. Ifyou do not have foil-time employment you must try to find full-time employment, unless the probation officer excuses

you from doing so. If you plan to change where you work or anything about your work (such as your position or your job

responsibilities), you must notify the probation officer at least 10 days before the change. If notifying the probation officer at least 10

days in advance is not possible due to unanticipated circumstances, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours of

becoming aware of a change or expected change. If not in compliance with the condition of supervision requiring foil-time

occupation, you may be directed to perform up to 20 hours of community service per week vmtil employed, as approved or directed by

the pretrial services and probation officer.

8. You must not communicate or interact with someone you know is engaged in criminal activity. If you know someone has been

convicted of a felony, you must not knowingly communicate or interact with that person without first getting the permission of the

probation officer.

9. Ifyou are arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer, you must notify the probation officer within 72 hours.

10. You must not own, possess, or have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous weapon (i.c-, anything that

was designed, or was modified for, die specific purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as nunchakus or

lasers).

11. You must not act or make any agreement with a law enforcement agency to act as a confidential human source or informant

without first getting the permission of the court

12. As directed by the probation officer, you shall notify third parties who may be impacted by the nature of die conduct underlying

your current or prior offense(s) of conviction and/or shall permit the probation officer to make such notifications, and/or confirm your

compliance with this requirement.

13. You must follow the instructions of the probation officer related to the conditions of supervision.

U.S. Probation Office Use Only

A U.S. probation officer has instructed me on the conditions specified by the court and has provided me with a

written copy of this judgment containing these conditions. I understand additional information regarding these

conditions is available at the www.uscourts.gov.

Date

Defendant’s Signature

Sumlin Exhibit C4

Case: 5:15-cr-00319-DCN Doc #: 156 Filed: 09/11/13 5 of 8. Page!D#:851

AO 243C (Rev. 2/18) Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

Judgment — Page 5 of 8

RYAN K. SUMLIN

5:15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

Special Assessment - The defendant shall pay to the United States a special assessment of $300.00, which shall be due

immediately.

Mandatory/Standard Conditions - While on supervision, the defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime,

shall not illegally possess a controlled substance, shall comply with the standard conditions that have been adopted by this

Court, and shall comply with any additional conditions.

Firearms and Dangerous Weapons - The defendant shall not possess a firearm, destructive device or any dangerous weapon.

DNA Collection - The defendant shall cooperate in the collection of DNA as directed by the U.S. Pretrial Services and

Probation Officer.

Restitution - The defendant must pay restitution in the amount of $4,639.85 through the Clerk of the U.S. District Court.

Restitution due and payable immediately. The defendant must pay at least 25% of gross monthly Income, through the Federal

Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program. If a restitution balance remains upon release, payment is to

commence no later than 60 days following release from imprisonment during supervised release in monthly payments of at

least 10% of gross monthly income. Nothing shall prohibit the U.S. government from executing or levying upon property

discovered before or after the date of this judgment. Interest is waived.

Sumlin Exhibit C5

Case: 5:15-cr-G0319-DCN Doc #; 156 Filed: 09/11/18 6 of 8. PagelD #: 852

Judgment — Page 6 of 8

AO 245C (Rev. 2/18) Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

RYAN K. SUMLIN

5:15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

The defendant must pay the total criminal monetary penalties under the schedule of payments on Sheet 6.

Fine

JVTA Assessment*

Assessment

$.00

$300.00

TOTALS

□

Restitution

$4.639.85

An Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case

The determination of restitution is deferred until

(A024SC) will be entered after such determination.

The defendant must make restitution (including community restitution) to the following payees in die

amount listed below.

$4,639.85 to J.D. Akron, Ohio through the Clerk of Court.

Ifthe defendant makes apartial payment, each payee shall receive an approximately proportioned payment. However, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3664(0, all nonfederal victims must be paid before the United States is paid.

□ Restitution amount ordered pursuant to plea agreement $

defendant must pay interest on restitution and a fine ofmore than $2,500, unless the restitution or fine is paid in full before

□ The

die fifteenth day after fee date of fee judgment, pursuant to i 8 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options on Sheet 6 may be

subject to penalties for delinquency and default, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).

feat:

□ The court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to pay interest and it □is ordered

restitution

□

fee interest requirement is waived for the

fee interest requirement for the

□

fine

□ fine

□

restitution is modified as follows:

* Justice fcr Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-22

** Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapters 109A, 110,110A, and 113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after

September 13,1994, but before April 23,1996.

Sumlin Exhibit C6

Case: 5:15-cr-00319-DCN Doc #: 156 Filed: 09/11/18 7 of 8- PagelD #: 853

Judgment -- Page 7 of 8

AO 245C (Rev. 2/18) Amended Judgment In a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

RYAN K. SUMLIN

5:15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

Having assessed the defendant's ability to pay, payment of the total criminal monetary penalties is due as follows:

due immediately, balance due

□ Lump sum payments of $

.or

□ not later than

□ in accordance

□

E,or

□

F below; or

□

D, or

□

F below); or

□ Payment to begin immediately (may be combined with

_ over a period of

□ Payment in equal __________ (e.g., weekly, monthly, quarterly) Installments of $

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after the date of this judgment;

(e.g„ months or years), to commence

over a period of

□ Payment in equal 20 (e.g.. weekly, monthly, quarterly) installments of $

(e.g., 30 or 60 days) after release from

____________(e.g., months or years), to commence

Imprisonment to a term of supervision; or

Q Payment during the term of supervised release will commence within______ _

(e &> 30 w 60 dqys) after release

from imprisonment The court will set the payment plan based on an assessment of the defendant's ability to pay at that

time; or

El Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary penalties:

It is ordered that the Defendant shall pay to the United States a special assessment of $300.00 for Counts 1,2 and

3, which shall be due immediately. Said special assessment shall be paid to the Clerk, U.S. District Court.

Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties is

due during imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalties, except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons’

Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are made to the clerk of the court

The defendant shall receive credit for all payments previously made toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.

□

Joint and Several

See above for Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers (Including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and

Several Amount, and corresponding payee, if appropriate.

□ Defendant shall receive credit on his restitution obligation for recovery from other defendants who contributed to the same

loss that gave rise to defendant's restitution obligation.

□ The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

□ The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):

El The defendant shall forfeit the defendant’s interest in the following property to the United States:

$16,599.00 In U.S. Currency

Payments shall be applied in the following order (1) assessment, (2) restitution principal, (3) restitution interest. (4) fine principal,

(S) fine interest, (6) community restitution. (7) JVTA Assessment, (8) penalties, and (9) costs, including cost of prosecution and court costs.

Sumlin Exhibit C7

Judgment -- Page 8 of 8

AO 24SC (Rev. 2/18) Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case

DEFENDANT:

CASE NUMBER:

RYAN K. SUMLIN

5:15-CR-00319-DCN(3)

DENIAL OF FEDERAL BENEFITS

(For Offenses Committed On or After November 18,1988)

FOR DRUG TRAFFICKERS PURSUANT TO 21 U.S.C. § 862

IT IS ORDERED that the defendant shall be:

□

ineligible for all federal benefits for a period of

ineligible for the following federal benefits for a period of

(specify benefits))

□

Having determined feat this is fee defendant’s third or subsequent conviction for distribution of controlled substances, IT IS

ORDERED that fee defendant shall be permanently ineligible for all federal benefits.

FOR DRUG POSSESSORS PURSUANT TO 21 U.S.C. § 862(b)

□

IT IS ORDERED feat the defendant shall:

be ineligible for all federal benefits for a period of

be ineligible for fee following federal benefits for a period of

(specify benefits))

successfully complete a drug testing and treatment program.

perform community service, as specified in the probation and supervised release portion of this judgment

IS FURTHER ORDERED that fee defendant shall complete any drug treatment program and community service specified in

this judgment as a requirement for the reinstatement of eligibility for federal benefits.

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C § 862(d), this denial of federal benefits does not include any retirement, welfare, Social Security,

health, disability, veterans benefit, public housing, or other similar benefit, or any other benefit for which payments or services

are required for eligibility. The clerk is responsible for sending a copy of this page and the first page of this judgment to:

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Washington, DC 20331

Sumlin Exhibit C8

APPENDIX D

USDC ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SUPPRESS

ENTERED 8-30-17

United States v. Surnlin

United States District Court for the Northern District of Oh io, Eastern Di vision

August 29, 2017, Decided; August 30, 2017, Filed

CASE NO. 5:1 SCR 319

Reporter

2017 U.S, Dist, LEXIS 139906 *; 2017 WL 3732002

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v.

RYAN K. SUMUN, Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Subsequent History: Affirmed by United States v,

Surnlin, 2020 U.S, App. LEXIS 12744 (6th Cir.

Ohio, Apr. 21,2020)

This matter is before the Court on Defendant, Ryan

K, Sumlin’s Motion to Suppress Evidence. (ECF

#84), The Government filed an Opposition to

Defendant's Motion, (ECF #85), No Reply was

filed. Defendant waived a formal hearing on his

Motion, with both parties agreeing that the Court

should rule based solely upon the written briefing.

(ECF #86).

Counsel: |*1) For Ryan K. Surnlin, also known as

T.J., Defendant: Rhonda L. Kotnik, Akron, OH.

For United States of America, Plaintiff: Linda H.

Barr, LEAD ATTORNEY, Office of the U.S.

Attorney - Akron. Northern District of Ohio,

Akron, OH; Elliot D. Morrison, Office of the U.S.

Attorney - Cleveland, Cleveland, OH; Phillip J.

Tripi, Office of the U.S. Attorney * Cleveland.

Northern District of Ohio, Cleveland. OH.

Judges; DONALD C. NUGENT. United States

District Judge.

Opinion by: DONALD C. NUGENT

Opinion

LEGAL STANDARD

The Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that "the right of the people

to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

effects against unreasonable searches and seizures,

shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue,

but upon probable cause, supported by oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing, the place to

be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized. |*2| U.S. Const. Amend IV. There is no

Fourth Amendment violation when a search is

conducted pursuant to a search warrant, issued

upon a finding of probable cause which is

supported hy an affidavit.

A supporting affidavit must show a fair probability,

or likelihood that contraband or evidence of a crime

will be located on the premises of the proposed

search. /({tools v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct.

2317. 76 L Ed. 2d 327 (1983): Untied States v.

Jenkins. 396 FJd 751, 760 (6th Cir. 2005): United

States r. Church. 823 FJd 351, 355 (6th Cir.

2016), The affidavit must point to some "nexus

Surnlin Exhibit D1

Page 2 of 5

201? U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139906, *2

between the place to be searched and the evidence good faith in conducting the search. United States

sought.” United Suites v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, v. Moss, 456 U.S. 798, 823, n, 32, 102 S. Ct. 2157,

594 (6th Cir. 2004)(cn banc). Reliance on hearsay 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982); lean, 468 U.S. at 922.

is entirely proper. United States v. Gunter. 551 F.3d "(Wjhere officers rely in an objectively reasonable

fashion on a search warrant issued by a neutral

472,479 (6th Cir. 2009).

magistrate that is subsequently found to be invalid,

A review of the sufficiency of the evidence the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rale does not

presented in support of a search warrant is limited require suppression of the fruits of the search,"

to the information contained in the four comers of United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 931 (6th

the supporting affidavit. United Slates v. Berry, 565 Cir. 1990). The United States Supreme Court has

F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir. 2009). The affidavit must recognized four grounds for Finding extraordinary

be judged based on a totality of the circumstances, circumstances that could override the good faith

using eommonsense, and taking into consideration presumption. In this case, Mr. Sumtin claims that

that the they are "normally drafted by stonlawyers one of these grounds applies, that being that the

in the midst and haste of an on-going criminal affidavit is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause

investigation. United States v. Waosley, 361 F,3d as to render official belief in its existence entirely

924, 926 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Pelham, unreasonable.” Lean, 468 U.S. at 922-923.

801 F,2d 875, 877 (6th Cir. 1986): United States v.

Brooks, 594 F.3d488, 490 (6th Cir. 2610).

ANALYSIS

A judicial determination of probable cause, once

made, "is entitled to ‘great deference’ and must not Defendant contends that the 1*4] search warrant

reversed in the absence of clear error." United permitting the search of 926 Firestone Boulevard

States v. Calloway, 116 F.3d 1129, 1132 (6th Cir. was not supported by probable cause because the

1997)(citation omitted): see also, e.g, United States affidavit submitted in support of the warrant did not

v. Mclevain, 310 F.3d 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2002). demonstrate a fair probability that evidence of a

"(T]he task of the reviewing court is not to conduct crime would be located there. (ECF #84). He

a de novo determination of probable cause, but only claims that because the affidavit contained no

to determine whether there is substantial j*3| allegation of illicit activity occurring at the

evidence in the record supporting the [judicial searched residence, there was no nexus between the

officer’s] decision to issue the warrant." property' and the sought after evidence. Defendant

Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728. 104 S. cites United States v. Pinson, 321 F.3d 558 (6th

Ct. 2085, 80 1,. fid. 2d 721 (1984); see also, e.g.. Cir. 2003), and United States v. Brown. 828 F.3d

United States v. Rodriguez-Suaza, 346 F.3d 637, 375 (6th Cir. 2014), for the proposition that without

643 (6th Cir. 2003).

more, a drug dealers place of residence is not

searchable based solely on a general expectation

Further, even if a search warrant is not supported

that drug dealers tend- to keep drugs, money, guns

by probable cause, a reviewing court cannot

and'or records of transactions at their homes. In

suppress the evidence uncovered during the search

those cases, the court found no nexus between the

unless it finds that the affidavit was so deficient

suspect’s residence and the alleged criminal

that the officers executing the warrant were not

activity, hi Even under the good faith standard for

acting in good faith. See. United States v. Leon, 468

an officer’s execution of a search warrant, which is

U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405,82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984).

significantly less demanding that the standard for

Except in extraordinary circumstances, the

finding probable cause, the Brown court found that

existence of a search warrant issued by a magistrate

the affidavit must still draw on some "plausible

suffices to show that the executing officer acted in

connection” between the criminal activity and the

Sumlin Exhibit D2

Page 3 of 5

2017 U.S. D!st. LEXIS 130908, *4

residence 10 be searched. A connection between the receiving Ms. Dobbins' early morning test, and the

alleged criminal and the residence is not. in Chrysler was seen parked near her home some time

and | *5} of itself, sufficient to support either before 7:00 a.m.

standard. See, Brown, 828 F.3d at 385*86.

(8) The officer's personal experience shows that

In this ease the affidavit attests to the following individuals involved in drug trafficking use

firearms and weapons, keep large quantities of

facts;

cash, maintain records and documents, and use

(1) A 200? Chrysler 300, registered to the equipment for the processing and packaging of

Defendant’s mother was parked in the driveway of drugs for sale.

920 Firestone Boulevard ("the subject property) on

The government agrees that the search warrant

multiple days.

affidavit does not mention any evidence of illicit

(2) The utilities for the subject property are in the activity related to the current charges, occurring at

name of the Defendant's girlfriend.

the searched residence. However, they contend that

(3) There are notes from prior recent police reports, there was evidence that Mr. Sumlin resided in the

indicating that the Defendant resides at the subject property that was searched. This fact alone

distinguishes the instant case from the facts in

property.

United States v. Pinson. 32i F.3d 558 (6th Cir.

(4) A month prior to the warrant request, the 2007 2003). and undercuts the application of its

Chrysler 300, which had been parked at the subject rationale. In Pinson, the court held that in the

property, was seen, in the morning, at a residence absence of any other |*?| indicia of criminal

where Carrie Dobbins died of a heroin overdose activity at the location of the search, "there should

later that day.

be evidence that the trafficker actually owns or

resides at Lite property to be searched." This criteria

(5) There is evidence indicating that this car was is satisfied in Mr. Stun tin's case. There is, indeed,

known to be used by the Defendant, that he had evidence contained in the affidavit that would tend

previously been arrested while driving that car. and to show that be resides at the subject property.

that he was known to be Ms, Dobbins' heroin Therefore, Pinson, one of the two eases relied on

denier.

by the Defendant, does not apply under the

(6) There were cell phone test communications circumstances of this case.

between the Defendant and Ms. Dobbins' beginning

at 6:09 a.m. on the day she died wherein she asked

hint to come and see her, to bring “35," and to

arrive at her house after her mother left in the

morning. There was also a text message sent from

Ms. Dobbins to the f*6| Defendant telling hint to

arrive at 6:45 a.m., and "park on the side of the

street with the lights off because "her mother's

friend is on the way to the house to pick her mother

up.” Ms. Dobbins' mother sow a Chrysler parked on

the side street near her home when she was picked

up that morning.

As Pinson does not support the Defendant's

position in this case, the Defendant's entire

argument rests on the holding of United States v,

Brnwn, The Defendant’s interpretation of Brown

would require this Court to ignore the Sixth

Circuit's long-standing position that "an issuing

judge may infer that drug traffickers use their

homes to store drugs and otherwise further their

drug trafficking.’’ United States v. Williams, 544

F.3d 683, 687-88 (6th Cir. 2008)(collecting cases).

Brown did not, however, overrule Williams, Rather,

Brown recognized that this inference has been the

(7) The Defendant communicated that he was on type of evidence that established the required nexus

his way at 6:14 a.m.. within six minutes of with an alleged dealer’s residence. Brown, at 383.

Sumlin Exhibit D3

Page 4 of 5

2017 U,S. DiS!. LEXIS 138908, “7

in its own analysis. Brown emphasD-Jed] the fact activity and the subject property. The affidavit sets

intensive nature of the probable cause inquiry'" and forth facts that would show not only that Mr.

rejected "rigid rules, bright-line tests, and Sumiin lived at the subject property, but that the car

mechanistic |*8| inquiries in favor of a more he used to conduct drug transactions had been seen

flexible, ali-ibings-conxkiered approach." Id. at 384 parked at the subject property. Further, when Ms.

(quoting Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244. 133 Dobbins contacted him at 6:09 a.m. seeking drugs,

S. Ct, 1050, 185 L, Ed. 2d 61 (2053)), Although he responded that he was on his way within six

Bmwn found that "as a general matter" the affidavit minutes, and arrived at her property in

should "include facts that directly connect the approximately one half hour to forty-five.minutes.

residence with the suspected drug activity'," it did It is likely, or fairly probable, that at 6:09 a.m. he

not claim that this was a hard and fast rule, or that a would have been at his residence, |*I0J and that he

''connection" to the residence meant that there must would not have had time to leave home, travel to a

he evidence of illegally drug activity actually different location to retrieve drugs, and make it to

Ms. Dobbins* home within that time frame. Under

taking place at the residence.

the totality of the circumstances, including the fact

in making its own factual determination, based on a that he was Ms. Dobbin's drug dealer, he drove the

totality' of the circumstances, the Brown court found Chrysler to visit her after she requested drugs the

that Brown's place of residence was not searchable morning of her death, the connection between his

because the affidavit in his case "contained no ear and his residence, the early morning time frame,

evidence that Brown distributed narcotics from his and the short span of time between receiving the

home, that he used it to store narcotics, or that any call from Ms, Dobbins' and arriving at her home,

suspicious activity had taken place there" ... or there was a sufficient probability or likelihood that

"that a reliable confidential informant had at least some evidence of his alleged drug

purchased drags there, that the police had ever trafficking would be found at the subject property.

conducted surveillance at Brown's home, or that the Therefore, based on Williams, and the cases cited

recorded drug conversation linked drug trafficking therein, and accounting for the factual differences

to Brown’s residence." Brown at 382-83. Also between Mr. Sumtin’s affidavit and the Brown

missing in the Brown case was any evidence that affidavit, this Court cannot say that the issuing

Brown had recently sold drugs, that his car was judge committed clear error in finding probable

directly tied to the investigation, that his ear had cause to issue the search warrant.

been parked at his residence, or |*9| that there

were any suspicious communications tying him to In addition, even if the nexus between the conduct

the crime being investigated. The only facts upon being investigated and Mr. Sumlm's residence was

which any suspicion was founded were that he was not sufficiently strong to establish probable cause

found with two cell phones, and $4813 in cash; his to search, the officers executing the search warrant

car was at the house of another dealer: the drug were entitled to rely on its validity', once it |*TI|

dogs alerted on his ear, though no drugs were found was signed by the issuing judge. United States v.

in the vehicle; and, he had a past conviction for Boss, 456 U.S. 798, 823, n. 32, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72

distribution of marijuana, and an acquittal on L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982); Leon. 468 U.S. at 922.

another drug charge. There was literally no Therefore, this court cannot suppress the evidence

information in that case that raised an inference that uncovered during the search unless it finds that the

he might have evidence related to the crime being affidavit was so deficient that the officers executing

investigated at his residence.

the warrant were not acting in good faith. See,

United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897. 104 S. Ct,

Hie facts of this case, however, do show a 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984); United States v.

connection between the Defendant's alleged drug Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 931 (6th Cir. 1990).

Sumiin Exhibit D4

Page 5 of5

201? U S. Dtst LEXiS 13S906, “11

Although Mr. Sumliit claims that the affidavit is "so

Jacking in indicia of probable cause as to render

official belief in its existence entirely

unreasonable,1' thereby rendering its execution an

act of had faith, the evidence does not support such

a finding. Leon, 468 U.S, at 922-923. As set forth

above, based on the evidence that die Defendant

was Ms. Dobbin's drug dealer, he drove the

Chrysler to visit her after she requested drugs the

morning of her death, the connection between his

car and his residence, the early morning time frame,

and the short span of time between receiving the

call from Ms. Dobbins' and arriving at her home, an

officer executing the warrant would have no

objective reason to doubt its validity'. Therefore,

even if the affidavit did not provide a sufficient

basis upon which the judge could hnvc found

probable cause, neither was it so deficient that a

reasonable officer would have reason to believe

that the issuance of the warrant was ’’entirely 1*121

unreasonable," and doubt the validity of the judge's

decision.

CONCLUSION

For all of the reasons set forth above, Mr. Sumlin’s

Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED. IT IS SO

ORDERED.

fs? Donald C. Nugent

DONALD C, NUGENT

United States District Judge

DATED: August 29, 2017

f’»nt nl Ihrt

Sumlin Exhibit D5

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.