Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Michael A. Bruzzone, Petitioner v. Intel Corporation, et al.

Supreme Court briefAug 6, 2020

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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AUGMichael Alan Bruzzone, Petitioner

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And

Intel Corporation and ARM Inc., and pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3) the parent

Japanese headquartered and United Kingdom domicile Softbank ARM Holdings

Respondents

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS for the NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Michael Alan Bruzzone

Civic Servant of the Federal Trade Commission

Advocate for “lawful class” at 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)

U.S. Attorney designate; 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) at (c)(3)

(FCA) Relator Original Source

Acting individually in pro se

3766 Via Verdi

Richmond, California 94803

(415)250-4652

RECEIVED

AUG 17 2020

©FFICE or THE OLFRksupreme court iVy

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

In a 15 U.S.C. § 1 controversy claiming industry, law, attorney, group

boycott, can District and Appellant Courts, one after the next, deny a

citizen retained by Congress to investigate at 15 U.S.C. §§ 5, 15 and

recover theft U.S.C. §§ 3729, 3730(b)(l)(c)(3) his U.S. Constitution 14th

guarantees of administrative and procedural due process, confrontation,

hearing and searching examination, privileges and equal protection to

protect himself from the opposition’s associates network retaliation?

II.

In same civil controversy can District and Appellant Courts deny 14

amendment guarantee to quash speech? Thereby conceal defendant’s

reliance on California anti-SLAPP too libel a federal agent, reversing

T-

who is harming whom, to cover up defendant’s concealing enterprise

organized crime infiltration detrimental to United States, States of the

United States, Citizens of United States and commerce on affirmative

antitrust determinations; Federal Trade Commission v Intel Corporation

Docket 9341 & EUCC 37.990 v Intel Corp., and on federal and State

agent discovery 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 cognizable § 15 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241,

242, 1371, 1512, 1513, 1516, 1519, 1957, 1962c cognizable § 1964c.

III.

At the appellate level can Ninth Circuit Judges deny confrontation on

appeal negating too address an indigent Appellant’s legitimate Motion

to proceed in forma pauperis? And thereby do dismiss said appeal?

IV.

Administratively, appellant having revealed to a Ninth Circuit Docket

Clerk his intention to pay $505 District Court filing fee [to expedite the

appeal] can Judges then expedite too Dismiss said Appeal pursuant 28

USC § 1915 (e)(2) while a) filing fee is transiting in the mail and, b) on

judgment Entered the day following District Court Entry of Payment?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF PERTINENT AUTHORITIES

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES, PROCEDURES

NOTICE OF PENDANT MOTION at 9th CIRCUIT

JURISDICTION

CASE STATEMENT

FACTS OF THE CONTROVERSY

LAW ARGUMENTS

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

CONCLUSION

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FORM AND WORD COUNT

EXHIBITS Petition for (re)HEARING FRAP 40(a)(1)

Relief Sought

Petitioner Statement that Appeal Should Go Forward

Ninth Circuit General Docket Report Appeal 20-15326

Ninth Circuit ORDER dismissing Appeal 20-15326

Proofs of $505 Appeal filing fee payment and receipt

Eastern District of California Minute Order; “renew

request to proceed forma pauperis upon filing appeal”

Eastern District of California Case Summary 2:18-cv-00865 KJM DB

Eastern District General Docket Report

Eastern District Order dismissing case matter

Eastern District Magistrate Judge recommendations

Appellant Objections to Magistrate Judge recommendations

Certificate of Service

88-128

129

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - CORE CASE PRECEDENT

Page

Ackermann v United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197-202 (1950)

Alexander v. Fulton County, 207 F.3d 1303, 1326 (11th Cir. 2000)

Batzel, 333 F.3d 1024

Bivens v Six (Un)known Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)

18, 26

Boyce vAHzaduh, 595 F.2d 948, 951-52 (4th Cir. 1979)

Carr Carriers, 745 F.2d at 1106; quoting

Poller v Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464,373 (1962)

Concrete Pipe and Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust,

508 U.S. 602, 623 (1993)

Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991) quoting

Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821)

Cherry St., LLC, v Hennessee Group LLC, 573 F.3d 98

(2nd Cir. N.Y. 2009)

Conley v Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957)

Continental Ins. Co. v Pierce County. Wash., 690 F.Supp. 930

(W.D. Wash 1987)

Crawford v Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)

15,17, 20, 22,27

16, 19

Davis v Welchler U.S. 22, 24

Denton v Hernandez, 505 U.S. 25 (1992)

Dixon vPitchford, 843 F.2d 268,270 (7th Circuit 1988)

15, 27

Dowdy v Hawfield, 189 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1950)

Flemming v Huebsch Laundry 159 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1947)

Franklin v Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221,1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984)

FTC v Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Giordana v McCartney, 385 F.2d 154 (3rd Cir. 1967)

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc,, v SEB S.A., Supreme Court of United States

Griffin v Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,18 (1956)

Hayden v Rumsey Products, 96 F. Supp 988 (W.D.N.Y. 1951)

Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944)

Hilton v Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (2010)

Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, (1955)

Jenkins v McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969)

Kapp v National Football League, 586 F.2d 644, 648-49 (9th Circuit 1978)

KehrvA.O. Smith Corp.521 US. 179 (1979)

Kush v Ruteledge, 460 U.S. 719,103 S Ct at 1487 (1983)

Klapprottv United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949)

Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Iric, 359 U.S. 207 (1959)

Lawrence v U.S., 482 a.2d 374, 377 (DC 1984)

16,19

Magouirk, 693 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1982)

Malcolm vNational Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350, 354, (2d. Cir. 1993)

Medina v California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992)

Monell v Department of Social Services of the City ofNew York,

436 U.S. 658 (1978)

18, 27

Monroe v Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961)

NAACP v Alabama, 375 U.S. 449

Neitzke v Williams, 490 U.S. 325 (1989)

22,23,27

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

;

Tellis v United States Fidelity & Guarantee Co., 805 F.2d 741, 748

(7th Cir. 1986) '

United States v Throckmorton 98 U S. 6i [25 L. Ed .93] quoting

Clark y Clark, California Appellate, 4th District, September 5,1961

23,26

Watson v Ault, 525 F.2d 886,891-92 (5th Cir. 1976) ,

Weinberg v Feisel, 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 385, 392 (2003)

28,29

West Virginia Oil and Gas Co., v George E. Beece Lubler Co. ,

g213F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1954)

Wilson v Garcia 471 U.S. 261 (1985)

Woodall v Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1981)

Woods v Severson 9, F.R.D. 84 (D. Neb 1948)

¥'

pondering if the reviewing law clerk dismissed the appeal? This would also be

difficult for Appellant, an outsider, thought despised by local BAR, too establish.

However, I cannot excuse Ninth Circuit failing to notice appellant mandate

pending, thinking I would move for (re)H earing, Reconsideration, Alter or Amend

sans Motion to Stay Mandate? Thus to quash this Petition for Writ of Certiorari

too the United States Supreme Court. And of course that Motion to reconsider

would have been denied while time to stay mandate passed. Appellants suspicion

of chicanery, skullduggery inside Ninth Circuit where I have previously advised

Justice Thomas “management problems requiring oversight”, stands clear to me,

Justice review and reinstatement of appeal No. 20-15326 subject 28 U.S.C. §

455(a)(b)(l)(5) (iv) at FRCP 60(b)(6) on deprivation of civil rights under the color

of law 42 U.S.C § 1981 (a)(b), in-State at §1983 subject 42 USC § 1985(1)(2)(3).

The Related Intel Inside price fix matters for two decades, mine and other plain

tiffs, have never not been any other way, subject to interference including; FRCP

60(d)(3) 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,3,241, 242,371, 1001, 1341, 1503, 1505, 1510, 1511,

1512, 1513, 1516, 1519, 1956, 1958, 1961, 1962c cognizable 1964c, 1831 and

2382 questions, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 theft from federal government, States and

citizens, industry and commerce.

JURISDICTION

As of this Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ninth Circuit has not responded to

Petitioner’s pendant Motion to re-instate and HEAR 20-15326 pursuant FRAP 59e

Chief Judge Muller and Magistrate Judge Barnes issue a minute ORDER

March 13, 2020 stating “Plaintiffs Motion is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff

may renew request in circuit court upon filing appeal.”

Appellant hands Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis at Ninth Circuit on

March 16, 2020, waits in mail room probably a week suspect back dated said filed

March 19, 2020.

On April 22, 2020, Ninth Circuit issues an ORDER stating “A review of the

records reflects that the appeal may be frivolous. Court may dismiss a case at any

time, if court determines the case is frivolous, See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Question

arises, 1) what facts reflect the appeal may be frivolous? Facts are unaddressed by

Eastern District and by Ninth Circuit within both case dismissals.

Continuing, “within 35 days after the date of this order, appellant must (1)

dismiss the appeal, or (2) file a statement why the appeal is not frivolous and should

go forward.”

On May 14, 2020 Appellant files at Ninth Circuit “Petitioner Statement that

Appeal Should Go Forward”, and is exactly as it should be, in form and content an

amended complaint that could have been sought by Eastern District. Bruzzone claims

in matter are both cognizable and meritorious. Bruzzone fails to comprehend how his

claims are frivolous non examined, unheard at Eastern District and at Ninth Circuit

subject FRCP 60(b)(l)(3)(6) on Bivens v Six (Un)known Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S.

388 (1971) and Monell v Department ofSocial Services of the City ofNew York, 436

U.S. 658 (1978) given the history in these v Intel Corp. matter’s of Constitution 1st

(association primarily) 5th and 14lh amendment denials; contract, due process, equal

protection, searching examination, confrontation denials prejudicing this PlaintiffAppellant who is a federal and states witness in the Intel Corp. antitrust, industry,

corporate and consumer Intel Inside® ‘price fix’ robberies and espionage matters

retained by Congress Constitution 9th, Federal Trade Commission at 15 U.SC. §§ 5,

15 and U.S. Attorney Northern California District and Department of Justice at 31

U.S.C. 3729, 3730(b)(l)(c)(3).

“Confrontation clause is violated when a trial court precludes a meaningful

degree of cross examination (Springer v U.S., 388 A.2d 846, 854, D.C. 1978). The

curtailment of cross examination is rendered more severe when a government witness

is involved; under such circumstances, extensive cross examination ... [is] required

to satisfy the confrontation guarantee {Lawrence v U.S., 482 a.2d 374, 377 DC 1984).

Under the Confrontation Clause “testimonial” out of court statements and other

hearsay is not admissible if the accused did not have the opportunity to cross examine

the accuser or the accuser is unavailable at trial”, Crawford v Washington, 541 U.S.

36, 2004.

Here is where the situation becomes suspect at 28 USC § 455(a)(b)(l)(5)(iv)

subject FRCP 60(b)(l)(3)(6). Statement and Motion sit in excess of 100 days and on

June 29, 2020 this Appellant contacts Docket Clerk for Status, not the receptionist,

the DOCKET CLERK and asks if any decision has been made on Appellant’s motion

pursuant forma pauperis and judicial review Appellants Statement for continuation.

Docket Clerk informs this appellant those answers are no. Appellant informs the

female voice on the phone he will pay the filing fee. She responds “do what ever you

feel is the right decision for your case”. $505 cashiers check is secured June 30th,

placed in U.S. priority mail service to Clerk of Court Eastern District, first attempted

deliver July 3, actual delivery and Entry July 7,2020. The filing fee is paid.

Still on the July 2nd dismissal paying the fee is not the issue, “Upon review

of record, and response to court’s April 22, 2020 order, we conclude this appeal is

frivolous”. Again, “how is the appeal frivolous? If appeal is frivolous Judges Graber,

R. Nelson, Vandyke must be able to substantiate in their decision, ‘why frivolous’ but

they have not. So why not? Is it because Appellant’s right to appeal is being denied?

Appellant has stated specific claims, persons, and is capable as a discovery paralegal.

And there is another question. Motion for fee waiver and this Petitioners

statement sits up until the day he informs Docket Clerk he will pay the filing fee and

then miraculously a Ninth Circuit decision is expedited and case is dismissed within

the week on July 2, 2020, lacking any clarification why the appeal is frivolous that is

not the appeal question: “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no sets of facts in

support of his claims for relief’; Conley v Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45 (1957) Iqbal

quoting Twombly. Raises questions at FRCP 59(a)(1) subject FRCP 60(b)(l)(3)(6)

and for Ninth Circuit Chief Justice Thomas management oversight on continuing best

practice questions occurring inside Ninth Circuit causes law and justice concern.

Did reviewing appellate law clerk simply write up a dismissal and authorize it?

Write it up and pass it through with no judicial review? In Northern District, I have

observed Judges law clerk’s interfering in the procedures of administrative clerks.

An analysis made by the late Judge Jacob Henry Friendly (1903 - 1986) of

United States Court of Appeals for Second Circuit, 1959 through 1974, including

Chief Judge 1971 through 1973, in his "Some Kind of Hearing," generated a list to

the content and relative priority of address Bruzzone has rarely experienced pursuant

conffonation, examination, equal protection;

1. An unbiased tribunal.

2. Notice of the proposed action and the grounds asserted for it.

3. Opportunity to present reasons why proposed action should not be taken.

4. The right to present evidence, including the right to call witnesses.

5. The right to know opposing evidence.

6. The right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.

7. A decision based exclusively on the evidence presented.

8. Opportunity to be represented by counsel4

9. Requirement that the tribunal prepare a record of the evidence presented.

10. Requirement written findings of fact and reasons for decision.

Raises a crucial question; was appeal 15326 expeditiously dismissed at 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a) to prevent Petition, a Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court

skirting around non payment of fees? Associate frauds on corporate placement is an

epidemic across Northern California District pursuant Intel Corp. and the Softbank

ARM Holding pic and ARM Inc. case matters, the Intel Inside® price fix federal and

State and the general consumer recoveries. Opposing network pays off, whether job

placement and or promotion within this corporate political network, or other means.

A fact of Intel network includes shoeing in and maintaining the marginally capable.

4 On interference by defendants falsely portraying Petitioner-Plaintiff “Not a [qui tarn}relator” and

“vexatious litigant of frivolous claims”, creates question promoting legal service market boycott.

Whereas (false) evidence defendants plant into case record does crush the truth.

LAW ARGUMENTS

Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits state a frivolous claim is without arguable

substance in law or fact, Franklin v Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 1984);

Woodall v Foti, 648 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1981); Boyce v Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948,

951-52 (4th Cir. 1979); Watson v Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 891-92 (5th Cir. 1976).

Addressing the contention frivolous, “a complaint is legally frivolous when

it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact; “Neitzke v Williams, 490 U.S. 325 (1989).

Rather, Plaintiff and Appellant succinctly detail’s the cognizable nature of his factual

claims on Constitution, statute, case law and federal discovery. On Conley v. Gibson

355 U.S. 41 (1957), “a complaint should not be dismissed ... unless it appears

beyond doubt the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of a claim that entitle

him to relief’. All ambiguities or doubts must also be resolved in the plaintiffs favor.

See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). Complaint cannot be dismissed

“simply because the court finds the plaintiffs allegations unlikely” noting the “age

old insight allegations might be strange but true”, said Supreme Court Justice Sandra

O’Conner in Denton v Hernandez, 505 U.S. 25 (1992) (from Ninth Circuit). In a one

page dissent, “Henderson should be allowed to pursue his case” said Justice Stevens

and Blackman. Bruzzone has made similar claims as Hernandez reporting to Federal

Bureau of Investigation, and Congress, drugged, phasing in and out of sedation, being

interrogated, hit, grabbing his attacker’s arm coming with a syringe, rapped inside his

home, transported; 1997 into 2001, by suspects thought to be corporate and or private

detectives. Previously Bruzzone is suspect framed in corporate secure data theft and

larcenies associated Advanced Micro Devices employment. The “Court can dismiss a

complaint as factually frivolous only if the allegations conflict with noticeable facts

and that it was impossible to take judicial notice that none of the alleged rapes [facts]

occurred”, “in forma pauperis complaint is frivolous [under § 1915(d)] where it lacks

an arguable basis either in law or in fact”, Neitzke v Williams, 409 U.S. 319 at 325.

Jurisdiction of court to reform a judgment on the grounds of extrinsic fraud

has never been questioned. “Where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from

exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent(s),

as by [examples cited] these, and similar cases which show that there has never been a

real contest in [any] trial or hearing of any [Bruzzone] case [matter], are reasons for

which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the (former) judgment or

decree, and open the case for a new and fair hearing”; United States v Throckmorton

98 U.S. 61 [25 L. Ed .93] quoting Clark v Clark, California Appellate, 4th District,

September 5, 1961. “In all these cases and many others which have been examined,

relief has been granted, on the ground that, by some fraud practiced directly upon the

party seeking relief against the judgment or decree, that party has been prevented

from presenting all of his case [which is also a nation’s case] to the court” id.

Rule 60, like all the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “is to be liberally

construed to effectuate the general purpose of seeing that cases are tried on the

merits”; Rodgers v Watt, 722 F.2d 456,459 (9th Cir. 1983). In determining Rule 60(b)

applicability, courts should be mindful that rules are to be construed to achieve just

determination of every action, Fed.R.Civ.P.l, “to effectuate the general purpose of

seeing cases are tried on merit and to dispense with technical procedural problems”.

Staren v American National Bank & Trust Company of Chicago, 529 F.2d 1257, 1263

(7th Cir. 1976); “[S]peaking generally, [the considerable body of federal decisions

has] been in marked harmony with the proposition that 60(b) is a remedial rule to be

liberally construed,” 7J, Moore & J. Lucas, Moore’s Federal Practice 60.22[2] at

247 (2d ed. 1982). In re Magouirk, 693 F.2d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 1982), “Under Rule

60(b), excusable neglect is liberally construed, especially in instances where order or

judgment forecloses a trial on the merits of a claim. See Schwab v Bullock’s Inc., 508

F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1974) and Patapoffv Vollstedt’s, Inc., 267 F.2d 863, 865 (9th

Cir. 1959).

All circuits have made clear relief is broadly available at Rule 60(b)(6) when

justified by extraordinary circumstances, even if one element of extraordinary circum

stance is a [long time] ground specified in clauses (b)(1) through (b)(5). Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 60 provides, in relevant part: (b) Grounds for Relief from Final

Judgment, Order, or Proceeding: On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a

party or its legal representative from final judgment, order, or proceeding for follow

ing reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly dis

covered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in

time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (intrinsic or extrinsic),

misrepresentation, or misconduct by opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the

judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on earlier judgment

that is reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable; (6) for

any other reason that justifies relief. ‘“If parties are allowed to manipulate, and other

wise make a mockery of “the temple of justice” through acts of fraud and unnecessary

delay, the public will lose faith in the court’s ability to settle disputes based on the

facts and substantive law.’” Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 46 (1991),

quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821). Fraud upon the court is extended

to officers of the court, and when an attorney exerts improper influence on the court

“the integrity of the court and its ability to function impartially is directly impinged”;

R.C. by Ala. Disabilities Advocacy Program, 969 F. Supp. at 691 citing Broyhill

Furniture Industries Inc. v. Craft Master Furniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1085-86

(Federal Circuit 1993).

On setting aside judgment on misrepresentation of evidence, Hazel-Atlas

Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), “a court may at anytime set

aside a judgment after discovered fraud upon the court... the inherent power of a

court to investigate whether a judgment was obtained by fraud is beyond question”.

“Power to unearth such a fraud is the power to unearth it effectively”, Root Refining

Co., v Universal Oil Products Co., 169 F.2d 514 (3rd Cir 1948). On issues of merit “to

vacate judgments whenever action is appropriate to accomplish justice”; Klapprott v

United States, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266 (1949) and where the

situation could not be “fairly or logically classified as mere ‘neglect’ on (petitioners)

part.” Bruzzone has never not defended from defendant fraud whatever the institution

of (injustice including Ninth Circuit; subject only to “a reasonable time” Ackermann

v United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197-202 (1950). On newly discovered evidence

Bruzzone is always denied “must be of material nature and so controlling as probably

to induce a different result”, Giordana v McCartney, 385 F.2d 154 (3rd Cir. 1967); and

“whenever action is appropriate to accomplish justice”; Pierre v Bemuth. Lembeke

Company, 20 F.R.D. 1156 (S.D.N.Y)

Jurisdiction of a court in an independent suit to reform a judgment on grounds

of extrinsic fraud has never been questioned Throckmorton. “Extrinsic fraud induces

one not to present a case in court, deprives one of the opportunity too be heard or

prevents discovery or obtaining information”; Cornell Law School LII Wex. Pursuant

Marshall, relief from intrinsic fraud has also been granted; “ West Virginia Oil and

Gas Co., v George E. Beece Lubler Co., g213 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1954). Distinction

between fraud on the court and fraud relieved by independent action is ambiguous.

See, Moore & Rogers, at 692 n266. Cases under the Amended rule of March 1946

have not distinguished between the two types; E.g., Dowdy v Hawfield, 189 F.2d 637

(D.C. Cir. 1950); Hayden v Rumsey Products, 96 F. Supp 988 (W.D.N.Y. 1951)

(suppression of defense). Relief has been granted where consent order was based on

erroneous representations by law officials; Flemming v Huebsch Laundry 159 F.2d

581 (7th Cir. 1947). Impoverished party attempting too proceed without counsel, filed

an answer that did not comply with the rules; Woods v Severson 9, F.R.D. 84 (D. Neb

1948).

Attempting to free himself from defamation Bruzzone is subject continuous

denial of his 14th amendment guarantee to expose, through discovery and extensive

examination defendant fraud(s) subject 15 U.S.C. § 1, 18 U.S.C. 1962c, 42 U.S.C.

1981 (a)(b), in-state §1983 proximate concert acts 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1)(2)(3) subject

Bivens v Six (Un)known Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Cherry St., LLC, v

Hennessee Group LLC, 573 F.3d 98 (2nd Cir. N.Y. 2009), Continental Ins. Co. v

Pierce County. Wash., 690 F.Supp. 930 (W.D. Wash 1987); Davis v Welchler U.S.

22, 24; Global-Tech Appliances, Inc., v SEB S.A., Supreme Court of United States,

Certiorari to U.S. Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit No 10-6; argued February 23,

2011; Int’l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, (1955); Kapp v National Football League, 586

F.2d 644, 648-49 (9th Circuit 1978); KehrvA.O. Smith Corp. 521 U.S. 179 (1979);

Klor’slnc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Monell v Department

ofSocial services of the City ofNew York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Monroe v Pape, 365

U.S. 167, 196 (1961); Radovich v Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 455 (1957),

Sedima S.P.R.L v Inrex Co., 105 S.Ct 3275, 3285 (1985), Stern v United States

Gypsum, 547 F.2d 1329, Stromberg v California, 28 U.S. 359; NAACP v Alabama,

375 U.S. 449; Ostrofe v H.S. Crocker Company, 740 F.2d 739 (9th Circuit 1984);

Spurr v United States, 174 U.S. 728, 735; Tellis v United States Fidelity & Guarantee

Co., 805 F.2d 741, 748 (7th Cir. 1986); Wilson v Garcia 471 U.S. 261 (1985). Denied

relief, “defendants have not established beyond doubt plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of [Bruzzone] claim[s] for relief’; Conley v Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45

(1957). Nor can defendants prove Bruzzone claims are frivolous; Neitzke v Williams,

Dixon v Pitchford. Let them try to prove “no merit” - send this case to discovery.

In cases involving public figures or matters of public concern, the burden is on

the plaintiff to prove falsity in a defamation action. Nizam-Aldine v City of Oakland,

47 Cal. App. 4th 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). In cases involving matters of purely

private concern, the burden of proving truth is on the defendant. Smith v Maldonado,

72 Cal.App.4th 637, 646 & n.5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).

Intel defamatory use of SLAPP in federal court and ARM Inc. defamatory

furtherance in Califiomia State exhibit their concert reliance CCP §§ 391(b), 425.16,

425.17, 425.18 for their purpose of slandering to libel, in these matters, Federal Trade

Commission discovery aid Bruzzone who is 42 U.S.C. §1981 (a)(b) Intel Inside®

recovery “lawful” class advocate verse Intel Corp. lawless associates have no ground

[too stand] on Anti-SLAPP, Bruzzone speech is protected enlisted in federal and state

agency; Hilton v Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894 (2010); New.Net Inc. v Lavasoft 355

F.Supp. 2d 1090, 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2004); at Clayton and in California Cartwright Act.

California Anti-SLAPP provides if a motion under statute is granted, pursuant

ARM Inc., and the moving respondent demonstrates that Petitioner Intel brought the

cause of action for purpose of harassment, or delay, too inhibit respondent’s public

participation, to defame, to interfere with respondent movement to exercise protected

constitutional rights, or expose wrongful injure to plaintiff and lawful class, the court

shall award moving party for actual damages; $6.6 B price fix recovery proposed.

California, like other states, discourages “strategic lawsuits against public

participation [where] anti-SLAPP [can] masquerade as ordinary suits but are brought

too deter citizens from exercising their political or legal rights or to punish them for

doing so.” Batzel, 333 F.3d 1024.

California appellate courts have developed multiple tests to determine whether

a defendant’s activity is in connection with a public issue. California Appellate for

First District surveyed appellate cases and divined from three categories of public

issues: (1) statements “concerning] a person or entity in the public eye”; (2) “conduct

that could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct participants”; (3)

“or a topic of widespread, public interest” Id. at 89. In Weinberg v. Feisel the Third

District articulated a more restrictive test designed to distinguish between issues of

“public, rather than merely private, interest”, 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d

385, 392 (2003). First, “public interest” does not equate to mere curiosity. Second, a

matter of public interest should be something of concern to a substantial number of

people. Third, there should be closeness between the challenged statements and the

asserted public interest. Fourth, the focus of speaker’s conduct should be in the

public interest rather than a mere effort to gather ammunition for another round of

private controversy. Finally, [a] person cannot turn private information into a matter

of public interest by communicating it to a large number of people; Id. at 392-93.

Two categories of conduct to which anti-SLAPP statute applies are “any

written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to public or public forum in

connection with an issue of public interest ”, and “any other conduct in the furtherance

of the exercise of the constitutional right of a petition, or the constitutional right of

free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. ” § 425.16,

subd. (e)

In Weinberg v Feisel, 110 Cal App 4thm 1122, 2 Ca; Rptr, 3d 385 at

California Court of Appeal, (2003) “causes of action arising out of [false] allegations

of criminal conduct, made under circumstances like those alleged in this case, are not

subject to anti-SLAPP. Otherwise, wrongful accusations of criminal conduct, which

are among the most clear and egregious types of defamatory statements, automatically

would be accorded the most stringent protections provided by law, without regard to

circumstances in which they were made - a result that would be inconsistent with the

purpose of the anti-SLAPP and would unduly undermine protection accorded by

paragraph 1 of Civil Code § 46, which includes as slander any false and unprivileged

communication charging a person with a crime, and the California rule that false

accusations of crime are libel per se (Civ. Code, § 45a; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal.

Law (9th ed. 1988) Torts, § 482, p. 566). Where Intel Corporation, ARM SoftBank

and ARM Inc. cannot demonstrate Bruzzone makes criminally wrong accusations

therefore vex, misrepresent to unknowing law enforcement, secure FBI and Secret

Service affiliate fixer, detectives, hooligans and informants to SWAT Bruzzone, place

in false or hateful light while Bruzzone is engaged in protected activity, on 1) federal

discovery enlistment, 2) federal investigative contract, 3) on inter-nation, federal and

state discovery, including California Department of Justice investigative assignment

affirming Intel Corp. antitrust violations, 4) on Bruzzone knowledge and witness to

civil racketeering, 5) to criminal racketeering, 6) on witness to his own marking,

targeting, retaliatory defamation, denied confrontation explicitly meant to punish and

make a crime ring’s example, including for not playing ball with Intel Corp. engaged

in cartel sales operations, interstate commerce violation, competitor theft including by

employees, media operatives, business agents some of whom recruit Bruzzone to aid

them in secure data theft; 1991 through 1996. Bruzzone first reports to FBI July 1996.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Northern California District and Ninth Circuit are caught in defendant network

sophistry unable to substantiate, on fact and law, Bruzzone is anything other than a

federal agent and patriot whose 14th amendment guarantee too free himself on the

merit of his claims exposing defendant’s concert six year defamatory fraud, and 29

year retaliatory targeting by associate actors including jurists disabling mechanic’s of

justice process furthers harm to Bruzzone professional, financially, in reputation and

makes both nation and industry crime example irregularly “rendered contrary to the

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE FORM AND WORD COUNT

Petitioner declares under penalty of perjury this writ has been formatted

pursuant rule 33.2 in acceptable type face and font. The processing system word

count the body of this declaration sans cover, table of contents and table of

authorities is 6,230 words.

Date: August

,2020

MichaerBruzzOTie, inpro se

Michael A. Bruzzone

Representing Self, Campmkting@aol.com

In UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Michael A. Bruzzone

)

Ninth Circuit No. 20-15326

)

from ECAD 2:18-cv-0865 KJM DB PS

)

Petitioner - Appellant

)

Petition for (re)HEARING FRAP 40

MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND

JUDGMENT PURSUANT FRCP

59(a)(1)(b) subject FRCP 60(b)(l)(3)(6)

and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)(b)(l)(5)(iv)

)

Intel Corporation, in concerted action with )

)

ARM Holdings pic and ARM Inc.

)

executives and their attorneys; et al

)

Defendants - Appellee

)

Appellant seeks reinstatement of Appeal

at FRCP 4 on interference to disable the

mechanics of justice process, Dismissal is

not an inadvertent mistake on the history

of Intel Corp. and ARM Inc. related case

matters but the denial of Justice process

on extrinsic fraud, associate network at

18 U.S.C. § 1962c and the extra judicial

chicanery cognizable 18 U.C.C. § 1964c

at Bivens

)

Defendants

Appeal is meritorious, “beyond doubt”

)

Originating Eastern District supports

Petitioner right to appeal; filing fee is

paid

)

Judge Graber bias contested Oregon

Judge Nelson bias contested BYU

)

Seeking management oversight from

Chief Justice Thomas in a case matter

said reviewed Judges Graber, R. Nelson,

and Vandyke. Appellant ponders whether

that is true on potential manipulation by

the reviewing Clerk to quash this appeal

advising “frivolous” and generating said

dismissal for Judge’s rubber stamp.

RELIEF SOUGHT

Justice Thomas; appellant seeks reinstatement of appeal 20-15326 for panel

hearing and cautions at 28 USC § 455(a)(b)(l)(5)(iv) not just assignment or draw of

Ninth Circuit Judges pursuant review, but of any law Clerk assigned to make a case

recommendation for judicial consideration the merits of this appeal. Appeal is

meritorious, Eastern District has never opposed and supports [all] Plaintiffs right to

appeal; the appeal filing fee is paid.

Filed with Clerk of Ninth Circuit, served July 12, 2020

/s/

Mienaef Bruzzone£rep£@senting self

FBI Original Source of Intel Network RICO in 1996

FTC Invited Field Report Docket 9288; 1998 - 2000

CDOJ and NYDOJ First to Report Intel Section 1 Violation in 1998

CDOJ Lettered to Work Report, Intel Section 15 USC 1 Violation in 2000

SEC Notice INTC Stock Market Rig, Accounts Fraud; 2007 through current

U.S. Attorney Northern California District FCA Relator; 2008 & current

FTC Witness Analysts v Intel Corp. Docket 9341 now consent order monitor

Court of Appeals Federal Circuit Acknowledge 31 USC § 3730 Relator; 2014

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.