Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Mark Anthony Jenkins, Petitioner v. Timothy O'Rourke, et al.

Supreme Court briefJul 17, 2020

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Text

No.

3n tl)E Supreme Court of tfje (Huiteb States

Mark Anthony Jenkins,

Petitioner,

TIMOTHY O’ROURKE, Jefferson Parish Assistant District Attorney, Jefferson

Parish Juvenile Court; ROBERT M, MURPHY, Former Judge of the Louisiana

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal; KRISTYL TREADAWAY; BARRON

BURMASTER, Judge

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Mark Anthony Jenkins, pro se

3303 Hwy. 1 South

Donaldsonville. Louisiana 70346

P.O. Box 1402

504-610-8147

July 17, 2020

RECEIVED

JU1 22 20M

aEMS"*4®-

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The federal district and circuit courts failed to conduct a de novo review and

incorrectly denied jurisdiction to this 42 U.S.C.* sec. 1983 lawsuit. It complains of the

conspiracy of a state appellate judge to protect the Department of Child and Family

Services, and the ADA representing it in juvenile court, from liability for negligence or

fraud. The appellate judge was alerted to the trial set in juvenile court against DCFS

and the payee, and he directed payee’s attorney and the juvenile court judge to

pretend that the district court had already decided the issue. The judge refused to

rule, and the attorney presented the issue to the court of appeal on a writ application

due to be filed from a unrelated district court judgment.

1. Whether the federal fifth circuit erred in not reviewing de novo this

independent action and in dismissing it under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine?

2. Whether the federal courts should have found the 2015 state appellate-court

judgment was made without subject matter jurisdiction, and is void ah initio) and by a

conspiracy to prevent a stipulation in juvenile court from being considered in deciding

the legal paternity issue.

3. Whether the Louisiana Fifth Circuit’s 2017 affirmation of the granting of

exceptions of no cause of action and res judicata and dismissal with prejudice of the

petition to nullify the 2015 judgment bars this complaint from federal district court

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: and whether the void ah initio

exception to Rooker Feldman is necessary and proper?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

All parties to the proceedings are listed in the caption.

RULE 14.1 (iiO List

The proceedings in state trial, appellate, and supreme courts, and in federal

district and circuit courts identified below are directly related to the above'captioned

case.

State ofLouisiana Dept, of Children & Family Services, In the Interest ofMark

Jenkins Jr. v. Mark Jenkins Sr., Docket No. 2003-NS-1371, Jefferson Parish Juvenile

Court, Order in Minutes of July 7, 2014.

State ofLouisiana Dept, of Children & Family Services In the Interest ofMark

Jenkins Jr. v. Mark Jenkins Sr., Docket No. 2003'NS'1371, Jefferson Parish Juvenile

Court, Minutes of September 15, 2014.

Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No. 7.11*419, 24th judicial District

Court for the Parish of Jefferson, State ofLouisiana, Judgment signed on Feb. 4, 2015.

State ofLouisiana Dept, of Children & Family Services In the Interest ofMark

Jenkins Jr. v. Mark Jenkins Sr., Docket No. 2003-NS-1371, Jefferson Parish Juvenile

Court, State ofLouisiana, Minutes of April 27, 2015.

Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No. 15-CA* 293, Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeal, State ofLouisiana, Order of May 26, 2015.

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Latasha Jackson, No. 2015'CA 399, Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeal, State ofLouisiana, Disposition handed down on July 31, 2015.

Ill

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Latasha Jackson, No. 2015'CA-399, Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeal, State of Louisiana! rehearing denied Sept. 2, 2015.

Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No. 2015*CJ*1622, Supreme Court

of the State of Louisiana, denied writ of certiorari, with one dissent, Sept. 4, 2015.

Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No. 711*419, 24th Judicial District

Court, State of Louisiana, denied motion to rebut finding of a judicial confession,

judgment signed Feb.l, 2016.

Mark Anthony Jenkins Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No.'711-419, 24th Judicial District

Court, judgment on May 24, 2016! amended to add dismissal of petition Nov. 7, 2016.

Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha. Jackson, No. 16-CA-482, Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeal, State of Louisiana, affirmed dismissal of petition to nullify, Feb. 22, 2017.

Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No. 16*CA*482, Fifth Circuit Court

of Appeal, State of Louisiana, denied request for rehearing March 22, 2017.

Mark Anthony Jenkins, Sr. v. Latasha Jackson, No. 2017-C-0652, Supreme Court

of the State of Louisiana, denied writ ofcertiorari with “one who would grant,” Sept. 6,

2017.

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Robert M. Murphy et al., United States District Court,

Eastern District of Louisiana, Civil Action No. 2*18*cv*3l22, dismissed complaint with

prejudice Nov, 27, 2018.

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Robert M. Murphy et al., Civil Action No. 2*18*3122, U.

S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, denied new trial, Jan. 14, 2019.

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Timothy O’Rourke, Jefferson Parish Assistant District

Attorney, Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, et al, United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit, No. 19*30112, affirmed district court, Jan. 10, 2020, designated “not

to be reported.” .

Mark Anthony Jenkins v. Timothy O’Rourke, Jefferson Parish Assistant District

Attorney, Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court, etal, United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit, No. 19*30112, denied rehearing en banc without poll, Feb. 21, 2020.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

LIST OF PARTIES

RULE 14. l(iii) LIST,

ii to*iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iv to v

APPENDIX

v to ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ix*to xi

OPINIONS BELOW

l*to 2

JURISDICTION

2 to 3

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

3*to 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4 to* 13

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

I. If the federal courts had reviewed this 42 U.S.C, Sec. 1983 complaint de novo, it

would have recognized it is an independent action alleging conspiracy to deny Mark

Anthony Jenkins the right to atrial, and corruption of the judicial process; and

the fact that in the course of that conspiracy the state appellate court made a void

ab infto judgment in 2015;, and in 2017 another judgment tried to ratify the

earlier judgment, does not bar this action from federal district court

A, The Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the void ab initio exception,,.

13 to-24

...14 to 19

B, If the federal courts had reviewed the 2015 state court judgment de novo,

they would have found that the cause of the denial of due process complained

of by Mark Anthony Jenkins was that the judgment was made without subject

matter jurisdiction and in the absence of his evidence

19 to-22

C. If the federal courts had reviewed the 2017 judgment de novo to determine

if it blocked federal jurisdiction, it would have found that it was not the cause

of the injury complained of by Mark Anthony Jenkins, and therefore does not

bar this complaint from federal court,

22 to*24

II. The void ab initio exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is proper and

necessary to give access to federal district court for a 42 U.S.C.: Sec. 1983 action

requesting damages and nullification of the state-court judgment, when the state

supreme court denied writ of certiorari.

24 to-27

APPENDIX....,

.v to-ix

A. Judgments on Review

Appendix Al_United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit,

Opinion of Jan. 10, 2020

l.to-3a

Appendix A2_U. S. District Court for the Eastern District

4 to 16a

of Louisiana, Order & Reasons, Nov. 27, 2018,

B. State Cburt Judgments

Appendix Bl__ Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court,

17a

Minutes of July 7, 2014, sealed

Appendix B2__Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court,

,..,18a

Minutes of the September 15, 2014, sealed ...........

Appendix B3_24th Judicial District Court, State of

Louisiana, Judgment of February 4, 2015—.........

.19 to 20a

Appendix B4_Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court,

Minutes of April 27,2015. sealed ................................

21a

Appendix B5_ Louisiana Fifth Circuit, Order of May 26, 2015

.22 to 23a

Appendix B6__Jefferson Parish Juvenile Court,

24a

Louisiana, Minutes of June 15, 2015, sealed..... .......

Appendix B7__Louisiana Fifth Circuit, Disposition, July 31,

25-to-30a

2015

Appendix B8

24th Judicial District Court, Louisiana

31a

Judgment, February 1, 2016............................................. .

Appendix B9__ 24th Judicial District Court for the State of Louisiana

Judgment of May 24, 2016....... ...............................

...32a

Appendix B10_Louisiana Fifth Circuit, Order, Nov. 1, 2016

33 to-34a

Vll

Appendix Bll_24th Judicial District Court, State of Louisiana,

Amended Judgment, Nov. 7, 2016

.'35 a

C. Orders Denying Rehearing

Appendix Cl__ U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied

en banc rehearing. February 21, 2020............................. •

.36 to-37a

Appendix C2_ U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of

Louisiana, January 15, 2019, denied new trial—...........

38 to-40a

Appendix C3_Louisiana Fifth Circuit, rehearing denied

September 2, 2015

41a

Appendix C4_Louisiana Supreme Court, writ of certiorari

denied w. Dissent on September 4, 2015

42 to-43a

Appendix C5_Louisiana Fifth Circuit, rehearing denied March 2,

44a

2017

Appendix C6_Louisiana Supreme Court, writ of certiorari

denied w. J. Hughes “would grant” September 6, 2017

45a

46 to-47a

D. Mandate

E. Pleadings That Raised the Issue

Appendix El_excerpts from Application for Rehearing, Aug. 14,

48 to 49a

2015.

Appendix E2

excerpts from Application for Writ of Certiorari,

August 28, 2015

50 to-53a

Appendix E3__excerpts from Petition to Nullify, March 10;

54a

2016,

Appendix E4_Request for Reconsideration March 9, 2017.........

55 to 56a

Appendix E5 Application for Writ of Certiorari, April 20, 2017

.57-to 60a

F. Other Essential Material

Appendix FI__excerpt from Memo of July 9, 2012.....................-

61a

Appendix F2__Jenkins’ Rule to Show Cause, Oct. 17, 2014-----

62 to-65a

Appendix F3_.Excerpt from Exception of Prescription, Nov. 20, 2014

66a

Appendix F4_Motion to Amend and excerpt from Third

Amendment to petition in 24th Judicial District Court ....67-to 70a

Appendix F5_ excerpts of transcript of June 15, 2015

hearing in Juvenile Court, sealed

71to 73a

Appendix F6_ Excerpt from Jackson’s Application for Supervisory Writ,

June 23, 2015...................... .................................

74 to 75a

Appendix F7_Jenkins’ Brief in Opposition to Writ

Application, June 30, 2015 (excerpt)................ -

76 to77a

Appendix F8_ excerpt from transcript of May 16, 2016 on exceptions

to petition to nullify......................

78-to 81a

Appendix F9__Fourteenth Amendment

82a

42U.S.C.:sec. 1983 .......... .

82 to 83a

84a

La. C.C. Art. 203

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

Fourteenth Amendment

13, 20

28 U.S.C.: 1257(a)

14, 15

28 U.S.C.: § 1738

42 U.S.C.: § 1983.

12,13

OTHER SOUCES

Federalist No. 51, Jams Madison...................................

Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 70 cmt. a (1982)

.27

FEDERAL CASES

Adams v. Mcllhany, 764 F.2d 294, (5* Cir.1985), cert.denied,

474 U.S. 1101, 106 S.Ct.883, 88 L.Ed.2d 918 (1986)........

Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (l Wall.) 223, 17 L.Ed. 531(1864)........

Burciaga v. Deutsche Bank Natl Trust, 871 F.3d 80,

(5th Cir, 2017)..........................................................................

16, 19, 26

Buckley v. Valeo, 434U.S.1, 122-123 (1976)............................ .

District of Columbia Court ofAppeals v. Feldman et al,

460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206, 1983).........

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. at 284,

15, 16, 17, 18

125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed 454 (2005)

GASH Assoc, v. Village ofRosemont, Ill., 995 F.2d 726,728 (7th Cir. 1993)

Gersh, 137 Ill. 2d, Ill Dec 767, 553 N.E. .2d 282.............................................

Great Western Mining & Mineral Company v. Fox Rothschild,

LLP, 615 F.3d 159 (3rd c*- 2010)

.: .

Green v. Lindsey, 456 U.S.444, 1102.S.Ct 1874, 72 L.Ed 246 (1982)........

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800; 73 L,Ed.2d 396; 102 S.Ct. 2727 (1982)........... ..27

Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Election, 422 F.3d 77, 87*88.

.....23, 24

In re Lake, 202 B.R. 751,758 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996)... ...................

In re James, 940 F.2d 46, (3rd Cir. 1991).........................................

Kovadc v. Cuy. County Dep’t of Children and Family

Services, 606 F.3d 301,308 (6th Cir.2010).............................

Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,? 1100 S.Ct. 2502, 2504,

65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980)............................................... ..............

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306;

70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865,873 (1950)...... .................... ........

Noel v. Hall, 341 F3d 1148...................................................

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S.425, 6L.Ed.178 (1886)

17,*28

Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518.

Perlstein v. Wolk, 844 N.E.2d 923, 218 I11.2d 48, 300 Ill. Dec. 480 (111.2006)

Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923)....

Target Media Partners v. Specialty Marketing Corp., 881 F.3d 1279

(11th Cir. 2018)............................................................................

11, 16, 17

Truong v. Bank ofAmerica, N.A., 717 F.3rd.377 (5th Cir., 2013).........

LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION

Art. 5, §§ 10 and 16...

.21

LOUISIANA CASES

Church Point Wholesale Beverage Co., Inc. v. Tarver, 614 So.2d 698. (La.1993)..........21

Jean Boudreaux et al. v. The State ofLouisiana, DTD,

La. LEXIS 177, 815 So.2d 7, (La. 02/26/02).....................,................

,21

Jenkins v. Jackson, 216 So.3d 1082, (5th Cir. 2017)...................................

8, 23, 24, 25

League Central Credit Union v. Gagliano, 261 So.2d 715 (La.App., 972)

Woolley v. Lucksinger, 14 So.3d 311, (La. 2008).........................................

20, 21

LOUISIANA STATUTES

La. C.C.P. 1841,

La. C.C.P. Art. 2002

20-21

La. C.C.P. Art 2005,

.22

La. R.S. 13: 4231

La. C.C. art. 2005

Mark Anthony Jenkins respectfully petitions fora writ of certiorari to United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The United States Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished Opinion of January 10, 2020

(App. A1 at l-3a), affirmed the November 27, 2018 Order & Reasons of the U. S.

District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, (App. A2 at 4-16a), and the denial

of a Request for a New Trial denied (January 14, 2019.) (App. C2 at 40-42a). The Fifth

Circuit then denied a request for rehearing en banc on February 21, 2020, treating it

as a Petition for Panel Rehearing (App. Cl at 38*39a). As a result, Jenkins’s 42 U.S.C.:

§1983 Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

The following are relevant opinions of the courts in chronological order.

(App. Bl, at 17a sealed) Minutes of July 7, 2014 in Juvenile court show the court

ordered the Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) to produce all

acknowledgments it had for Jenkins.

(App. B2 at 18a sealed) Minutes of September 14, 2014. Juvenile Court: the ADA

stated that DCFS had no authentic act by Mark Jenkins, but his statement was not

reported in the minutes.

(B3 at 19-20a) Judgment of February 4, 2015 of 24th JDC, State of Louisiana

denied an exception of prescription to amending the birth certificate! admitted

the paternity test results, and ruled that Jenkins was not the father of Jacksons son.

(App. B4, at 21 sealed) Juvenile Court Minutes of April 27, 2015: attorney Kristyl

Treadaway stipulated that there was no authentic act of acknowledgment by Jenkins,

and the court set a hearing on legal paternity for June 15, 2015.

(App. B5 at 22- 23a) May 26, 2015 Order of Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal

denied Jackson’s appeal but gave her time to file a writ application.

(App. B6 at 24a sealed) Juvenile court Minutes of June 15, 2015' the court refused

to rule on legal paternity; claimed the district court had ruled on legal paternity and

that the issue would be decided by the court of appeal.

(App. B7 at 25- 30a) Disposition of July 31, 2015: the La. Fifth Circuit ruled that

Jenkins judicially confessed to signing an authentic act of acknowledgment.

(App. B8 at 31a) February 1, 2016 judgment of 24th Judicial District Court:

denied a motion to rebut the ruling on legal paternity by the fifth circuit.

(App . B9 at 32a) May 24, 2016 judgment of the 24th JDC granted exceptions of no

cause of action and res judicata to the Petition to Nullify.

(App. B10 at 33*34) Order of La. Fifth Circuit, 11/1/16 to amend judgment.

(App. Bll at 35a). Amended Judgment of 24th JDC, November, 7, 2016 added

“dismissed with prejudice” to the Judgment of May 24, 2016.

Jenkins v. Jackson, 216 So.3d 1082, (5th Cir. 2017) affirmed the district court

judgment of May 24, 2016.

JURISDICTION

The Opinion of the fifth circuit court of appeals (App. A1 at l*3a) was

entered on January 10, 2020. A timely petition for rehearing en banc was denied on

February 21, 2020 (App. Cl at 36*37a). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to

the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein

they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States! nor shall any State deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law! nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,

the provisions of this article.

Title 42 United States Code §1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought

against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial

capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory decree I’elief was unavailable. For the purposes of this

section any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall

be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner Mark Anthony Jenkins and Latasha Jackson were not married

when her son was conceived and born in 1997. He signed the birth certificate

believing he was the biological father. Under Louisiana law at that time, neither

their subsequent marriage nor his signing of the birth certificate made him the

legal father. Only an authentic act of acknowledgment could have made Jenkins the

legal father. (App. F9 at 84). They divorced in 2003.

The Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) obtained an order for him

to pay support based on a signed agreement. It did not establish legal or biological

paternity as the law required. A paternity test would have prevented DCFS from

obtaining agreement to pay support. Jenkins learned in May 2011 that he might not

be the father of Ms. Jackson’s son. He could not recall if he had signed any other

document at the hospital besides the birth certificate. The Department of Health

and Hospitals (DHH) produced a copy of the birth certificate and a separate

statement that an original acknowledgment was destroyed during Hurricane

Katrina. It did not give the form of that document. Undersigned counsel did not

realize at that time that the acknowledgment lost during Katrina was the original

of the birth certificate.

Jenkins’ petition, filed in district court, asked for revocation of “an

acknowledgment” with no identification of its form, a court-ordered paternity test,

and damages including repayment of child support from Ms. Jackson. (Complaint,

p. 5) In discovery, Ms. Jackson stated she had no authentic act, and DCFS, a

.necessary party, refused to answer discovery requests claiming the information was

“confidential.”

Despite having no proof of an authentic act of acknowledgment, Jackson filed

an exception of prescription to revocation of an authentic act of acknowledgment.

The prescriptive period had been enacted 11 years after Jackson s son was born.

The district court found prescription did not apply and ordered a paternity test. On

review, the court of appeal found the prescriptive period would apply, but affirmed

the right to a court-ordered paternity test. There was no ruling on whether there

was in fact an authentic act that would make him the legal father. Undersigned

counsel failed to file for writ of certiorari timely.

Paternity test results proved Jenkins was not the biological father. He then

filed to nullify the order for support in juvenile court. He learned that DCFS

received copies of every executed acknowledgment from DHH. With that

information, juvenile court ordered DCFS to produce all acknowledgments by

Jenkins. (App. Blatl7a ). In the following hearing, the assistant district attorney

reported there was no authentic act bv Jenkins. However, that was not reported in

the minutes. (App. B2 at 18a). Petitioner requested a correction of the minutes to

report what the ADA had stated. The court set another hearing for that. In the

meantime, petitioner filed for a hearing in district court to obtain a ruling on

biological paternity. (App. F2 at 62-65 a) Jackson filed an exception of prescription

to correcting the birth certificate. (App. F3 at 66). District court denied the

exception; admitted the DNA Test Report, and ruled that petitioner Jenkins was

not the father. Judgment was signed on February 4, 2015. (App. B3 at 19-20).

Jackson gave notice of intent to appeal.

On April 27, 2015, in the juvenile court hearing to correct the minutes,

Jackson’s attorney, defendant attorney Treadaway, stipulated there was no

authentic act of acknowledgment by Jenkins. The court looked at the February 4,

2015 judgment of the district court and noted that the district court had decided

that Jenkins was not the biological father. Juvenile court then set a hearing to

decide legal paternity on June 15, 2015, as shown by the minutes. (App. B4 at 21).

Jackson filed an appeal from the district court’s judgment. Petitioner opposed

the appeal because the district court judgment on biological paternity did not go to

the merits of the petition for damages. On May 26, 2015, the fifth circuit dismissed

the appeal without prejudice and allowed 30 days to “file an appropriate writ

application seeking review of the interlocutory ruling contained in the February 4,

2015 judgment.” (App. B5 at 22). On May 28, 2015 petitioner Jenkins amended the

petition for damages in district court to name DCFS as a defendant and alleged

negligence or fraud in failing to establish either biological or legal paternity as the

basis for the support order. (App.F4 at 67‘70). He also added the claim of fraud in

the contract for support against Jackson.

Events of June 15, 2015 • June 23, 2015

When the hearing set in juvenile court to determine legal paternity started on

June 15, 2015, Treadaway claimed that the district court had decided that Jenkins

was not the legal father and that her appeal was pending. (App.F5 at 72a sealed)

The juvenile court judge would not listen to a correction of that statement. He

refused to rule on legal paternity (App. F5 at 72a sealed) and stated that the court

of appeal had to decide legal paternity. (App. B6 at 24a sealed). He mentioned that

he did not have the court record in front of him because the fifth circuit had

requested it. (Ann. F5 at 73a sealed). Treadaway filed her writ application from the

interlocutory ruling on June 23, 2015, and claimed that the district court had erred •

in ruling that Jenkins was not the legal father. (App. F at 75).

Petitioner’s opposition brief pointed to the district court record to prove that

only biological paternity was decided in the February 4, 2015 Judgment. (App. F7 at

77a). Petitioner Jenkins’ Rule to Show Cause that resulted in the Judgment of

February 4, 2015 did not raise the issue of legal paternity in district court. It asked

for rebuttal of the birth certificate acknowledgment, which is not in authentic form,

and. which creates a presumption of biological paternity, and not legal paternity.

The DNA test report presented into evidence rebutted the presumption that

petitioner Jenkins was the biological father. (App. F9 at 84a) The rule to show

cause had mentioned that in juvenile court an ADA had stated that there was no

authentic act of acknowledgment by Mark Jenkins. The July 31, 2015 appellate

court’s disposition “dismissCed) with prejudice what it called “respondent’s [Mark

Jenkins’s] claim to revoke or rebut his acknowledgment of legal paternity of M.J.,

Jr.“ (App.B7 at 30)

La. Civil .Code Article 203 (App.F9 at 84) shows that only an authentic act of

acknowledgment establishes legal paternity; registration of the birth certificate

creates a presumption of biological paternity. The Disposition deliberately confused

the two types of acknowledgment to pretend legal paternity was established by a

birth certificate. Since lack of subject matter jurisdiction is the basis for

nullification of Judge Murphy’s judgment, and was the cause of the denial of due

process, it is not necessary to explain all of the errors Judge Murphy deliberately

made in the disposition. It is enough that the ruling is void ab inito and was the

cause of the constitutional tort complained of in the federal complaint.

Request for reconsideration was denied, despite pointing out that the ruling

on legal paternity was beyond the scope of supervisory review. On application for

writ of certiorari, Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Hughes, in the only dissent to

denying writ, summed up the disposition:

Respectfully, the seemingly untimely review and

intervention of the Court of Appeal to decide an issue not

addressed in the trial court’s judgment, based on the concept of

a “judicial confession,” is clearly wrong given the DNA evidence,

the multiple pleadings and amendments thereto, the

stipulation of the parties, and the inability of DCFS to produce

an authentic act of acknowledgment. This is not justice but

judicial “gotcha.” These matters are best left to the trial court

for trial on the merits and development of a full record.”

The continued efforts of DCFS given the DNA results in the

record are also questionable. (App. C4 at 43 a).

On March 10, 2016, petitioner Jenkins filed a petition to nullify the ruling on

legal paternity for lack of jurisdiction and violation of due process. (App.E3 at 54)

Treadaway filed exceptions of no cause of action and res judicata. In the hearing on

May 16, 2016, the district court judge admitted he had not ruled on legal

paternity. (App F8 at 79) Despite that admission, the judge granted the exceptions

of res judicata and no cause of action. Significantly, he did so without giving any

reason. (App B9 at 32) On appeal, defendant Judge Murphy, who wrote the

judgment deciding legal paternity, was on the panel to review whether he had

jurisdiction to rule oh legal paternity. Before issuing a decision, the state appellate

Court ordered the district court to add “decretal language” to its judgment. (App.

BIO at 34) The district court added “dismissed with prejudice” (App. Bll at 35),

which added a ruling that was not requested or given. The appellate court

produced Jenkins v. Jackson, 16 So.3d 1082 (La. App. 2017). In it, the state

appellate court gave its version of supervisory review;

The district court has the jurisdiction to determine both the legal

and biological paternity of Mark, Jr. in its review of Mr. Jenkins’

petition to revoke. Because the 24th Judicial District court is a

district court within our circuit, this Court had the supervisory

jurisdiction to render determinations relevant to Mr. Jenkins’

petition, which included legal and biological paternity. (App. A2

at 12a) and (App. A1 at 2a) also Jenkins v. Jackson, 216 So.3d

1080, 1090.

The state appellate court did not pretend that legal paternity had been

decided in the district court. Its rendition of supervisory jurisdiction eliminated the

heed for a trial. Petitioner filed for reconsideration, arguing lack of subject matter

jurisdiction on supervisory review and denial of due process. (App. E4 at 56a) It

was denied. (App .C5 at 44a) Petitioner filed for writ of certiorari and argued the

same. (App. E5 at 58 to-60a). It was denied, with Justice Hughes alone as a “would

grant.” (App. C6 at 45a).

On February 9, 2017 petitioner’s attorney listened to a recording of a juvenile

court hearing in October, 2015. It was played from the technician’s office while

undersigned counsel sat in a separate office at the courthouse. It did not contain the

statement she remembered ADA O’Rourke made that indicated the purpose of

defendants’ actions was to protect DCFS. She encountered ADA O’Rourke as she

exited the room. That day court was not in session, and few people were in the

courthouse. She reported to the District Attorney’s Office that the recording she was

allowed to hear had been altered. The office reported their inquiry did not find the

system’s recording had been touched. (Complaint p.14 tol6, ROA 10).

On March 22, 2018 petitioner filed the 42 U.S.C.: §1983 complaint in federal

court. (ROA 10) For the first time he brought suit against the state actors and made

* *

the first allegations of conspiracy to deprive him of due process rights under the

U.S. Constitution. The complaint also alleged corruption of the judicial process

to obtain a favorable decision. (Complaint p.17) The actions of the conspirators

from June 15, 2015 through June 23, 2015, as given on pages 7 to-8 supra, were

recited. Court records proving the allegations were included in the Amendment to

the Complaint. Petitioner Jenkins requested damages and nullification of the void

ab initio ruling on legal paternity. He stated that the state district court suit was

still pending because claims against Jackson and DCFS for fraud had not yet been

decided. (Complaint p.19) Defendants filed exceptions of no cause of action,

prescription, judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity, domestic relations

abstention, and lack of jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

The federal courts did not review the judgments.

The district court’s Order & Reasons of November 27, 2018 (A2 at 4-16a)

quoted Jenkins v, Jackson exclusively and did not mention the state court records.

There was no de novo review to ensure that the court was not dismissing a

compliant that was “properly within the cognizance of the federal courts.” Target

Target Media Partners v. Specialty Marketing Corp., 881 F.3d 1279,1279

Essentially, it ruled that the court of appeal had subject matter jurisdiction to rule

on legal paternity in 2015 because Jenkins v. Jackson claimed that it did. It did not

take notice that there was no ruling on legal paternity at trial. It accepted and

quoted as determinative the incorrect and self-serving version of supervisory

jurisdiction composed by the Louisiana Fifth Circuit. The federal district court

decided it was unnecessary to determine the circuit court’s position on the void ab

initio exception because the state appellate court had subject matter jurisdiction,

and it dismissed with prejudice all motions. Petitioner filed for a new trial on

December 21, 2018 arguing that the ruling was manifestly erroneous in finding the

state fifth circuit had subject matter jurisdiction. The motion pointed out that the

state appellate court had decided an issue that was never tried, and it pointed out

that the Jenkins version of jurisdiction dispensed with a trial before a review. The

Motion was denied on January 14, 2019 (App.C2 at 38-40a) for failure to state a

manifest error.”

Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal on February 11, 2019. Review of a district

court’s subject matter jurisdiction is to be de novo. Truong v. Bank ofAmerica, N.A.,

111 F.3d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 2013). Instead, the circuit court also deferred entirely to

the state appellate court’s decision. The Opinion (A1 at l-3a) quoted only Jenkins v.

Jackson. The circuit court relied on the state appellate court’s version of

supervisory jurisdiction (App A1 at 2a) that dispensed with the need for a trial

before the appellate court could review the issue.

The Circuit court listed the Exxon Mobil requirements to make a state court

judgment immune from lower court review, but failed to recognize that the cause of

the injury to Jenkins’ right to due process of law was ruling without subject matter

jurisdiction, not the 2015 judgment itself. It quoted Jenkins v. Jackson but did not

notice that under Exxon Mobil, that judgment did not cause petitioner’s injury

either. As a result of those failures, the circuit court affirmed the dismissal with

prejudice of the 42 U.S.C.: sec. 1983 complaint and its independent actions for

conspiracy and corruption. A petition for rehearing en banc was filed on January 24,

2020, and denied on February 21, 2020. (App. Cl at 38‘39a) Mandate issued on

March 2, 2020. (App D at 48-49a)

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRITS

I. The 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 complaint is an independent action alleging

conspiracy to deny Mark Anthony Jenkins the right to a trial and corruption of the

judicial process. The fact that in the course of that conspiracy the state appellate

court made a void ab inito judgment in 2015; and in 2017 another judgment tried to

ratify the earlier judgment, does not bar this action from federal district court.

“... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law...” Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV, Section 1.

(App.F9 at 82) ...“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate

legislation, the provisions of this article.” Constitution of the United States,

Amendment XIV, Section 5. (App.F9 at 82). 42 U.S.C.: Sec.1983 was enacted to

enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,100 S.Ct. 2502,

2504, 65 L,Ed.2d 555 (1980). 42 U.S.C.: Sec.1983 states-'

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen

of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof

to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress. App. F9 at 82.

There is no doubt that state district court had not decided if there was an

authentic act of acknowledgment or whether petitioner Jenkins was the legal father

in its February 4, 2015 judgment. The state appellate court did not attempt to

dispute that fact in Jenkins v. Jenkins. Yet it claimed supervisory jurisdiction to

decide those issues on the writ application from the February 4, 2015 judgment.

The juvenile court judge himself set the legal paternity issue for a hearing on June

15, 2015. However, on the day of the trial he and opposing counsel pretended that

the district court had decided legal paternity. Opposing counsel, defendant

Treadaway, falsely presented the issue to the appellate court in her writ

application. Judge Murphy wrote the disposition on legal paternity as was planned.

This civil rights action for denial of a trial was dismissed with prejudice as

being barred from federal district court jurisdiction by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine without consideration of the court records and de novo review of either of

the appellate court’s judgments. The following shows that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine does not bar either state court ruling from review by the district court and

that dismissal of this action was improper.

A. Exxon Mobil pointed out that federal courts had been giving an overbroad

interpretation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and as a result, cases that they had

a duty to hear were incorrectly dismissed.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine arose from two court decisions interpreting 28

U,S.C.§ 1257(a); which was “designed to prohibit end-runs around state court

judgments that might occur when parties go to federal court essentially seeking

review of a state-court decision.” Kovacic v. Cuy. County Dept, of Children and

Family Services, 606 F.3d 301,308 (6th Cir. 2010). 28 U.S.C. - §1257(a) limits

review of final judgments or decrees by the highest court of the State to certiorari by

the United States Supreme Court. “Rooker-Feldman eliminates federal court

jurisdiction over those cases that are essentially an appeal by a state court loser

seeking to re litigate a claim that has already been decided in a state court.”

Target Media Partners at 1279. In Roolcer v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct,

149, 68 LEd. 362 (1923), the Supreme Court affirmed denial of district court

jurisdiction to review a state court judgment. Exxon Mobil explained that in

Rooker, the state court had acted within its jurisdiction tit was not an action to

nullify the state court judgment. Exxon Mobil at 284. Also, in Rooker “the parties

in federal court were the same parties who had litigated in state court.” Target at

1285. That indicates preclusion in Rooker that does not pertain to Mr. Jenkins' case.

In D. C Court ofAppeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S: 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206

(1983) the complaint essentially “invited federal courts of first instance to review

and reverse unfavorable state court judgments.” Exxon Mobil at 283. In Feldman,

there was no allegation that the state court judgment was void ab initio or obtained

by corruption as in this action.

While finality of the state court judgment is emphasized in the above, states

have different definitions of what is a final judgment. In Louisiana, the law

provides- “A judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part is a final

judgment.” La. C.C.P. art. 1841. As the jurisprudence on void ab initio judgments

will show below, a final judgment is not required for a void ab initio judgment to be

reviewable by federal court.

l) Exxon Mobil Corp. limited the Rooker-Feldman doctrine under state

preclusion law and four additional requirements..

Nor does § 1257 stop a district court from exercising subject. matter jurisdiction simply because a party attempts to litigate in

federal court a matter previously litigated in state court. If a federal

plaintiff “presentts] some independent claim, albeit one that denies

a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to he was

a party. *•) there is jurisdiction and state law determines whether the

defendant prevails under principles of preclusion." GASH Assoc, v.

Rosemont, 995 F. 2d 726,728 (CA7 1993); accord Noel v. Hall, 341

F.3d 1148,1163-1164 (CA9 2003). Exxon Mobil at 293. (Emphasis

added.)

[A] suit may be brought in federal court, and the federal court cannot avoid

jurisdiction under RookerFeldman, so long as the federal claim that is raised is

independent of any claim raised in state court.” Target Media Partners at 1289.

Exxon Mobil explained that “Under 28 U.S.C.§1738, federal courts must “give

the same preclusive effect to a state-court judgment as another court of that State

would give. Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U S. 518, 523.

“Preclusion is not a jurisdictional matter. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c).” Exxon

Mobil at 293. Burciaga stated: “We generally do not apply Rooker~Feldmanto state

decisions that would not be given preclusive effect under doctrines of res judicata or

collateral estoppel.” M at 387. Under La. R.S. 13: 4231,

a valid and final

judgment is conclusive between the same parties.” Besides not ruling on the issue of

subject matter jurisdiction, as will be shown, the parties in Jenkins v. Jackson are

not the same as the parties to this lawsuit. Jenkins v. Jackson does not preclude a

ruling on subject matter jurisdiction in the lower federal courts in this case.

Exxon Mobil provided four requirements for Rooker Feldman to bar. federal

district court jurisdiction to review a state court judgment: "(l) The federal

plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff “complaints] of injuries caused by [the]

state-court judgments”; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit

was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the

state judgments.” Exxon Mobil at 281. “The second and the fourth requirements

are the key to determining whether a federal suit presents an independent, nOhbarred claim:” Great Western Mining & Mineral Company v. Fox Rothschild, LLP,

615 F.3d 159,166 (3rd Cir. 2010).

2) Jenkins’ independent claims

Petitioner Jenkins’ claims in this 42 U.S.C.: § 1983 action are conspiracy to

deny due process of law and corruption of the judicial process to obtain a favorable

judgment. Those claims are not the same as the claims in state court against

Latasha Jackson and DCFS for reimbursement of child support due to fraud. Also,

as events in state court proved, bringing a claim for conspiracy against the state

court judges and the ADA in state court would have been futile. This cause of action

only had a chance in federal court. The documented facts showing planning and

coordination among the defendants have been listed supra. In addition, statements

of attorney Treadaway and the juvenile court judge in the transcript of June 15,

2015 show they knew the appellate court would take up the issue without

jurisdiction, and they agreed to tell the same lie. Most revealing is the juvenile

court judge’s statement that he did not have the court record because the court of

appeals had “requested “it. That proves that a judge, obviously Judge Murphy, had

requested the record before the June 15, 2015 hearing to plan what had to be done

for him to decide the issue. (App F5 at 73a sealed)

More than a year after the 2015 judgment was rendered defendant ADA 0!

Rourke was still doing the work of the conspiracy, as described supra on page 9. He

had an altered recording of a juvenile court hearing prepared for my attorney to

hear and have transcribed.

3) The Void Ab Initio Exception

Jenkins’ argued that Rooker-Feldman did not apply to the 2015 judgment

because it is void ab initio. Under that exception to Rooker-Feldman a federal court

may review a case entered in a state court if the state court proceedings are a legal

nullity and void ab initio.” In re James, 940 F.2d 46, 52, (3d.Cir. 1991). “The

underlying concept is that “[a] state court judgment is subject to collateral attack if

the state court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, or the

judgment was procured through extrinsic fraud.” In re Lake, 202 B.R. 751,758

(B.A.P.9th Cir.1996). In B urciaga v. Deutsche Bank Nat’t Trust Co., 871 F.3d 380

(5th Cir. 2017) the federal fifth circuit adopted the void ab initio exception.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is inapplicable to Deutsche

Bank’s counterclaims for two, independent reasons. First, the

Vacating Order was not a final judgment.... Second, the

Vacating Order is void under Texas Law, and we have said the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine would likely not bar federal court

review of void state court judgments). Id. at 386.

According to Burciaga, if the state court ruling is void ab initio under state law, it

need not be a final judgment for it to be reviewable by the federal district court. .

B. It was not the 2015 judgment itself that caused the constitutional injury

complained of by petitioner Mark Anthony Jenkins, but the denial of the right to be

heard in trial court.

The court records on the 2015 ruling on legal paternity shew that there is no

question of fact or law that the 2015 ruling on legal paternity was made without

subject matter jurisdiction, and is void ab initio. When the state appellate court

took up and decided the issue it violated federal and state constitutions and

jurisprudence. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: “...nor shall any State deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Due process

means that “(P)ersons whose rights may be affected by State action are entitled to

be heard, and in order that they may enjoy that right, they must First be notified.”

Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (l Wall.) 223, 17 L.Ed, 531(1864). The right to notice

means that:

(P)rior to an action which will affect an interest in life, liberty or

property protected by the Due Process Clause, a State must provide

notice reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise

interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them

an opportunity to present their objections. Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306, 314; 70 S.Ct.652; 94 L.Ed.

865, 873 (1950); see also Green v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444,449-450;

102 S.Ct.1874; 72 L.Ed.249 (1982).

Louisiana law provides: “A final judgment shall be annulled if it is rendered:

(2) Against a defendant who has not been served with process as required by law

(3) By a court which does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the matter of the

suit,” La. C.C.P. art 2002. The Louisiana Supreme Court dealt with violation of the

right to notice by a court of appeal in Wooley v. Lucksinger, 3 So.3d 311, (La. 2008).

In that case, the trial court made a ruling on choice of law, and the parties agreed to

it. However, on appeal, and with no assignment of error regarding the choice of law

issue, the court of appeal re-decided the ruling. The Supreme Court stated:

Even had there been justification for the court of appeal’s re

determination of the choice of law decision, the appellate court

committed error in failing to give the litigants notice of its sua sponte

determination or to provide the litigants with an opportunity to be

heard on the issue....The court of appeal’s failure to provide notice to

the parties was especially egregious. Wooley at 364-5

The Louisiana Constitution divided jurisdiction^ giving district courts

original jurisdiction (Art. 5§16): and courts of appeal, appellate and supervisory

jurisdiction. (Art. 5§10). “Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the

parties or waived! a judgment rendered by a court which has no jurisdiction over

the subject matter of the action or proceeding is void.” Jean Boudreaux et al. v.,The

State ofLouisiana, DTD, La. LEXIS 177, 815 So.2d 7,12 (La. 02/26/02). In Church

Point Wholesale Beverage Co., Inc. Tarver, 614 So.2d 698 (La. 1993), the Louisiana

Supreme Court ruled on whether it would decide issues not yet tried in conjunction

with a ruling on the constitutionality of a statute, as permitted by Article 5, § 5(F)

of Louisiana Constitution. The Court held- “We do not, however, interpret Article 5,

§ 5(F) to mean that we have appellate jurisdiction over all issues raised in the

plaintiffs petition but only those which have been ruled on by the trial court.” Id. at

701.

However, in spite of the clear law, the state appellate court, ruled on an issue

that had not been decided in the trial court. A supervisory writ correctly reporting

the trial court’s error and a trial on the issue that gave all parties the opportunity to

have their evidence on record provides notice and the right to be heard in the court

of appeal. If a party misrepresents the trial court’s judgment, the court of appeal

must refuse to take up the issue, and the attorney should face sanctions.

La. C.C.P. art 2005 requires that an action to nullify an appellate court’s

ruling can only succeed “if the ground for nullity did not appear in the record of

appeal or was not considered bv the appellate court.” In this case, the grounds for

nullity were on the face of the record and argued in the opposition brief and on

request for reconsideration. However, the state appellate court ignored its lack of

supervisory subject matter jurisdiction, and its judgment is "Void ab initio.

. Also, the void ab initio 2015 judgment is not protected from federal court

review by Rooker-Feldman under Exxon Mobil, which requires that the state court

judgment must itself be the cause of the injury complained of. In this case, it was

the lack of jurisdiction and usurpation of the issue that caused petitioner’s injury.

The 2015 judgment does not bar federal court jurisdiction of this action requesting

annulment. Also, federal court jurisdiction of this civil rights action is

not precluded under the Louisiana law as res judicata because none of the

defendants in this federal complaint were parties to the state court litigation, and

the issues of conspiracy and corruption were not presented in state court.

C. Exxon Mobil's causation requirement for Rooker-Feldman to apply shows

that Jenkins v. Jackson is also not protected from review .

The judgment in Jenkins v. Jackson was not the cause of the injury complained .

of in this civil rights action. Hoblock v. Albany County Board of Election, 422 F.3d

77,87-88 ( 2nd Cir. 2005) explained that a ruling that “simply ratified, acquiesced in,

or left unpunished by it” the constitutional injury inflicted by a prior ruling did not

cause the injury. It gave the example of a plaintiff in state court who lost in a

discrimination claim against his employer and brought the same suit in federal

court, “he will be seeking a decision from the federal court that denies the state

court’s conclusion that the employer is not liable, but he will not be alleging injury

from the state court judgment. Instead, he will be alleging injury based on the

employer’s discrimination.” When a litigant is not “complaining of an injury caused

by a state-court judgment,” it is an independent claim. Jenkins v. Jackson refused

to correct the injury caused by its 2015 ruling without subject matter jurisdiction.

Under Exxon Mobil, the requirement that the state court judgment itself caused the

constitutional injury to petitioner to protect the judgment from review is not met by

Jenkins v. Jackson.

Review shows that Jenkins v. Jackson ‘s dicta is not a ruling on whether the

state appellate court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide legal paternity. The

district court granted the exceptions of ho cause of action and res judicata without

giving a reason. (App B9 at 32a) The transcript of the 2016 hearing on the

exceptions (App F8 at 79a) shows that the district court judge admitted that he had

not ruled on legal paternity. He then immediately changed the subject to

prescription, and stated that the action to nullify had prescribed. He went on to

grant the exceptions without mentioning whether the court of appeal had subject

matter jurisdiction to decide legal paternity. (App.F8 at 81a) By not ruling oh.

whether the state appellate court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide legal

paternity, the district court deprived the court of appeal of the right to review the

subject matter jurisdiction issue. Jenkins v. Jackson’s defense of the court of

appeal’s jurisdiction in 2015 is dicta.

On page 1090, in its dicta five pages before it rendered its decree, Jenkins

stated: “We find that the trial court properly sustained Ms. Jackson’s exception of

no cause of action on the claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction raised in Mr.

Jenkins’ petition for nullification” The decree itself on page 1095 made no mention

of subject matter jurisdiction.

Review also shows that Jenkins v. Jackson deliberately misrepresented the law

on supervisory jurisdiction to justify its 2015 ruling ab initio. It stated:

In the instant matter, this court reviewed supervisory writ

applications arising from Mr. Jenkins’ petition for revocation of

acknowledgment of paternity.... The district court had the

jurisdiction to determine both the legal and biological paternity of

Mark, Jr. in its review of Mr. Jenkins’ petition to revoke. Because

the 24th Judicial District court is a district court within our circuit,

this Court had the supervisory jurisdiction to render

determinations relevant to Mr. Jenkins’ petition, which included

legal and biological paternity of Mark, Jr . (App. A2 at 12 a) and

(App. A1 at 2a) Jenkins at 1090. Emphasis added.

The expression “arising from' the petition” refers to issues on an appeal; not

to issues on a supervisory writ from an interlocutory judgment. League Central

Credit Union v. Gagliano, 261 So.2d 715 (La. App. 1972), In the above statement,

the state appellate court actually claimed it had jurisdiction to decide any issue

related to the petition before a trial court ruled on it. The district court and circuit

court did not take notice of that misrepresentation.

II. The void ab initio exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is proper and

necessary to give access to federal district court for a 42 U.S.C.: §1983 action

requesting damages and nullification of a state-court judgment, when the state

supreme court denied writ of certiorari.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine by itself does not distinguish between state

court judgments and decrees that are valid and those that are void ab initio. That is .

why the void ab initio exception is needed to complement Rooker-Feldman. It would

give notice to state court judges that ruling without jurisdiction can make them

liable for damages under 42 U.S.C.:Sec.l983 in federal court. A litigant should have

recourse to federal lower court when the state courts will not void a judgment made

without subject matter jurisdiction.

There is a split in the circuits on the void ab initio exception to RookerFeldman. It applies to this complaint because the federal fifth circuit adopted it in

Burciaga. The fifth circuit’s position on the void ab initio was not clear before

Burciaga, when the Louisiana appellate judge decided legal paternity. But it is clear

now: “Rooker -Feldman does not preclude review of void state court judgments.” Id.

at 385.

Rooker-Feldman without the void ab initio exception can be misinterpreted to

protect from a 42 U.S.C.-' §1983 action, and thereby gives legal effect to a

constitutionally repugnant void ab initio ruling. Rooker-Feldman should be

narrowly interpreted, with special attention to the causation requirement, so as not

to thwart the purpose of 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 that protects Fourteenth Amendment

rights. Petitioner’s case demonstrates that a powerful appellate judge can usurp

original jurisdiction and go uncorrected in state court. The void ab initio exception

removes “great protections to the most devious parties,” and a “powerful incentive

to use... fraudulent tactics in obtaining a judgment.” Restatement (Second) of

judgments § 70 cmt. a (1982). “The 42 U.S.C.- §1983 “action for damages offers the

only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald\ 457 U.S. 800, 814, 73L.Ed 2d 396, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2736. (1982). It

supplies “by opposite and rival interests the defect of better motives” upon which

our government was designed. Buckley v. Valeo, 434 U.S.l, 122-123 (1976) quoting

Federalist No. 51.

The void ab initio exception concurs with Exxon Mobil, judicial immunity,

and the concept of nullification. Judges are rightfully accorded judicial immunity

from every judicial act except ruling without subject matter jurisdiction. Adams v:

Mcllhany 764 F.2d 294,297 (5th Cir.1985), cert, denied, 474 U.S. 1101, 106

S.Ct.883,-88 L.Ed.2d 918(1986). Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S.425, 6 L.Ed.178

(1886), recognized that “An unconstitutional act is not a law; ...it is in legal

contemplation, as inoperative as though it "had never been passed.” Id. at 442.

Perlstein v. Wolk, 844 N.E.2d 923, 218 I11.2d 448, 300 Ill.Dec. 480 (111.2006) stated:

A constitutionally repugnant enactment suddenly cuts off rights

that are guaranteed to every citizen, ... perverts the duties owed to

those citizens. To hold that a judicial decision that declared a statute

unconstitutional is retroactive would forever prevent those injured

<■*

under the unconstitutional legislative act from receiving a remedy for

the deprivation of a guaranteed right.” Gersh, 135 Ill.2d at 397-98,

142 IH.Dec.767, 553 N.E.2d 281.

That also applies to a ruling that is void ab initio.

Wherefore, Petitioner, Mark Anthony Jenkins, respectfully requests that this

Honorable Court grant writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Mark Anthony Jenkins, pro Se

3303 Hwy. 1 South

Donaldsonville. Louisiana 70346

P.O. Box 1402

504-610-8147

Drafted by Cecelia Farace Abadie , La. Bar

19874, 20 White Drive,, Hammond, Louisiana

70401, 985-542-7859, cfabadie@gmail.com.

This action to prescribe on July 19, 2020;

unable to obtain another counsel of record; Abadie

not admitted to bar due to pending disciplinary action

on a complaint by the defendant attorney

whom Abadie accused of collusion with the judges.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.