Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gregory Shawn Mercer, Petitioner v. E. A. Vega

Supreme Court briefJul 2, 2020

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Sn mje

Supreme Court of tfje Itntteb g>tate£

GREGORYS. MERCER,

Petitioner,

vs.

E. A. Vega, ef a/.

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The United

States Court Of Appeals for The Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Gregory Shawn Mercer,

Petitioner, pro se

3114 Borge Street

Oakton, Virginia 22124

202-431-9401

RECEIVED

SEP 1 5 2020

©FFICE OF THE OLERK

SUPREME COURT. U.S.

ZBZO SEP 11 P * SS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

SCOTUS Rule 10(a) - Whether or not a Circuit

Split has arisen between the Fourth Circuit and other

Circuits over the interpretation of whether crimes

allegedly “committed on occasions different from one

another” [See 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(l)] become

simultaneous crimes if the directly-associated arrest

warrants for those sequential alleged crimes were

sworn out and/or served simultaneously.

SCOTUS Rule 10(a) - Whether or not a Circuit

Split has arisen between the Fourth Circuit and both

this SCOTUS and the Fourth Circuit itself over the

Federal Court Practice (FRCP Rule 56; U.S.

Amendment VII Right to Trial by Jury) of viewing all

facts in a Summary Judgment Proceeding and

drawing any justifiable inferences from those facts in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party when

deciding if there exists genuine issues as to any

material fact requiring a Trial by Jury.

SCOTUS Rule 10(c) - [Petitioner] moves this

[SCOTUS] as he did the [VAED & Fourth Circuit] for

a Declaratory Judgment that Virginia is in violation of

the U.S. Guarantee Clause so [the U.S.] Congress

might act by applying the U.S. Guarantee Clause

against Virginia’s 1971 Constitution of Virginia,

Article VI which establishes an Unrepublican Form of

Government because Sections 1 & 2 are in violation of

the U.S. Supremacy Clause and Section 7 is in

violation of Duncan v. McCall. 139 U.S. 449, 461, 11

S.Ct. 573, 577 (1891).

SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS FAIRLY INCLUDED

(FOURTH CIRCUIT DOCUMENT #10 - Pgs. 1, 3)

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - Whether or not the [VAED]

Abused its Discretion in granting Summary Judgment

on the entire case after discussing Summary

Judgment on only one of the two police officers [VSP

Trooper Houtz & VSP Sergeant Allander] and only one

of the three [6/1/15 false] warrants.

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - Whether or not an Evasive

Defendant State Police Officer is unlawful using the

County Criminal Justice System and his State Police

Force to effect an advantage in a Federal Civil Action

simply because [Plaintiff / Appellant] had him

privately served a Summons with Complaint [in a

3/6/15-filed VAED Civil Action].

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - [Plaintiff / Appellant] moves

this [Fourth Circuit] as he did the [VAED] for a

Declaratory Judgment that Virginia is in violation of

the U.S. Guarantee Clause so [the U.S.] Congress

might act by applying the U.S. Guarantee Clause

against Virginia’s 1971 Constitution of Virginia,

Article VI which establishes an Unrepublican Form of

Government because Sections 1 & 2 are in violation of

the U.S. Supremacy Clause and Section 7 is in

violation of Duncan v. McCall. 139 U.S. 449, 461, 11

S.Ct. 573, 577 (1891).

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - Whether or not the VAED’s

5/24/19 Order was Unconstitutional because it

annulled Appellant’s indefeasible Constitution of

iii

Virginia, Article I, Section 3 Right to reform, alter, or

abolish the Virginia Government(s).

(VAED DOCUMENT #35 - Pages 5-6, 49)

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - Plaintiffs 4/16/18 First

Amended Complaint has two errors in Paragraph 16

which he moves this [VAED] for Leave to [C]orrect

through Amendment herein which, also by Leave of

[VAED], refers back to the original Complaint’s

3/28/18 filing date:

“16. Defendant knew that Plaintiffs attempts

to effect service on the elusive litigant in the

unrelated previous civil matter were not

violations of any law, nor could they reasonably

be construed as such, and thus Defendant did

not have probable cause to believe that Plaintiff

[not ‘Defendant’] committed any criminal

offense when Defendant [not ‘he’] made

statements that probable cause existed for

warrants on the above-referenced charges.”

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - Plaintiff moves this [VAED]

for a Declaratory Judgment that Virginia is in

violation of the U.S. Guarantee Clause so [the U.S.]

Congress might act by applying the U.S. Guarantee

Clause against Virginia’s 1971 Constitution of

Virginia, Article VI which establishes an

Unrepublican Form of Government because Sections 1

& 2 are in violation of the U.S. Supremacy Clause and

Section 7 is in violation of Duncan u. McCall, 139 U.S.

449, 461, 11 S.Ct. 573, 577 (1891).

SCOTUS Rule 14.1(a) - Plaintiff moves this

[VAED] for Sanctions against defendant Vega in the

amount of $145,505.48 (Virginia Taxes paid since

12/03) or $25,924.56 (Virginia Taxes paid since

6/1/15) at the [VAED’s] discretion [add to each

amount another year of Real Estate Taxes since

5/22/19 or $5,887].

LIST OF PARTIES

1) Gregory Shawn Mercer, Petitioner, pro se, is a

citizen and resident of Virginia living at 3114

Borge Street, Oakton, Virginia, 22124,

gregorysmercer@gmail.com, 202-431-9401.

2) Eliezel A. Vega, Respondent, is a citizen and

resident of Virginia to the best information of

Petitioner on or about 4/16/18 and is

represented by the Virginia Attorney General.

Herein, E.A. Vega is referred to as

“Respondent” or “Respondent Vega.” E. A.

Vega is a Respondent in his individual capacity

based on serving as a Virginia State Police

(herein and hereafter “VSP”) Special Agent on

or about 6/1/15.

Respondent’s Attorney in the VAED

(after a 6/14/18 Appearance) and in the Fourth

Circuit was Sandra Snead Gregor, Esquire

(VSB No. 47421), Assistant Attorney General,

Office of the Virginia Attorney General, 202

North 9th Street, Richmond, Virginia, 23219,

sgregor@oag.state.va.us,

(804)-786-1586

(Telephone), (804)-371-2087 (Facsimile).

3) Dawson, P.L.C. Respondent, is the firm

Petitioner contracted with for representation on

3/6/18 with what became VAED Case No. 1:18cv-346-LO-TCB on and after 3/28/18. Herein,

Dawson, P.L.C. is referred to as “Dawson,

P.L.C.” Petitioner paid SW Dawson who works

at Dawson, P.L.C. $22,500 on 3/6/18 for

Dawson, P.L.C. to “put forth its best effort for a

successful resolution of [Petitioner’s] pending

legal matters.” Herein, SW Dawson is referred

to as “SW Dawson.” The Appendix has in

Fourth Circuit DOCUMENT #10 on pages 6673 an “Affidavit of Appellant Gregory Shawn

Mercer” with attachments including the 3/6/18

“Fee Agreement” which further explain that

Dawson, P.L.C. through SW Dawson did not

“put forth its best effort for successful

resolution of’ VAED Case No. l:18-cv-346-LOTCB.

After losing in a Summary Judgment

Proceeding on 4/24/19 where Petitioner’s

complete Disputed Statement of Facts was not

presently timely in the VAED by Dawson

P.L.C., Petitioner was forced to ask SW Dawson

to withdraw on 5/22/19 in order that Petitioner

could file his pro se FRCP Rule 59 Motion that

SW Dawson refused to file while representing

Petitioner. SW Dawson described Petitioner’s

FRCP Rule 59 Motion as “rife with irrelevant

and demonstrably incorrect information” and

impeached it as “objectively frivolous” thus “not

a pleading counsel would be ethically permitted

to file.” SW Dawson encouraged Petitioner to

file his FRCP Rule 59 Motion on the 29th day

which would have been untimely by one day.

Petitioner’s legal malpractice action against

Dawson, P.L.C. with vicarious liability or other

liability theory to reach SW Dawson accrues if

Petitioner wins this appeal in the SCOTUS.

Justice demands SW Dawson explain

himself to Petitioner or face Sanctions of some

sort. Petitioner herein moves this SCOTUS for

Sanctions against Dawson, P.L.C.. Petitioner

paid $7,000 (for a 7/5/07 Forensic Tape

Examination Expert’s Report), $2,625 (for a

5/4/16 Forensic Tape Examination Expert’s

Certified Report); plus $22,500 (for the 3/6/18

Fee Agreement); plus $505 (5/24/19 Fourth

Circuit fee); plus $1,762.50 (August of 2019

Professional Investigation of the 3/26/07 to

3/27/07 Jury for Fairfax County Circuit Court

Case No. MI-2006-2302); plus $300 (SCOTUS

fee); plus copying/printing fees still being

determined

(approximately

$2,500)

$37,192.50. During the delay, experts have

retired/died and been or might need to be

replaced.

SW Dawson’s office appears on VAED

DOCUMENT #27-1 as 999 Waterside Drive,

Suite 2525, Norfolk, Virginia 23510 but

DAWSON, P.L.C. has a P.O. Box, Norfolk,

Virginia,

23501,

swd@dawsonplc. com,

757.282.6601 (Telephone), and 757.282.6617

vii

(Fax). Petitioner will have or already has

served three copies of this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari on Dawson, P.L.C. by Private Process

Server on or about 7/2/20. If this SCOTUS

dismisses this Respondent, Petitioner moves

this SCOTUS dismiss “without prejudice” so

that Petitioner doesn’t have issues pursuing

any legal malpractice cause of action he has at

the conclusion of this appeal in lieu of

reasonable Sanctions herein moved which this

SCOTUS may or may not grant.

4) The Honorable Mark Herring, Respondent, 202

North 9th Street, Richmond, Virginia, 23219,

mailoag@oag.state.va.us, (804)-786-2071. In

accordance to SCOTUS Rules 14.1(e)(v) &

29.4(c), Petitioner states, “28 U.S.C. §2403(b)

may apply.” Petitioner states in accordance

with SCOTUS Rule 29.4(c) and the definition of

“any Court of the United States” from 28 U.S.C.

§451 that neither the U.S. District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia (herein and

hereafter “VAED”) nor the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (herein and

hereafter “Fourth Circuit”) certified to the

Virginia Attorney General the fact that the

constitutionality with

respect to

the

Constitution of the United States of the 1971

Constitution of Virginia, Article VI, Sections 1,

2, & 7 were drawn into question previously in

either court for Mercer u. Vega, VAED, Case No.

l:18-cv-346-LO-TCB

Fourth

(5/24/19);

Circuit, Case No. 19-1584 (2/3/20).

viii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Petitioner’s previous DOCUMENT #12 filed

7/22/19 (Disclosure of Corporate Affiliations) in Mercer

v. Vega. Fourth Circuit, Case No. 19-1584 (2/3/20)

stated that there is no parent corporation nor any

publicly held company that owns 10% of anything

associated with pro se Petitioner. But Petitioner has

a mortgage. Petitioner spoke with a SCOTUS Clerk on

4/20/20 for further direction. Since Petitioner is not a

corporation, he has no corporate disclosures to make.

DIRECTLY RELATED FEDERAL COURT

INFORMATION

(• - SEE APPENDIX FOR FULL TEXT)

Gregory S. Mercer v. E. A. Veen. VAED.

CASE NO. l:18-cv-346-LO-TCB (5/24/19)

DOCUMENT #1 filed 3/28/18:

COMPLAINT

•DOCUMENT #3 filed 4/3/18:

ORDER (RE: Dismissed Dkt. #1 Without

Prejudice)

•DOCUMENT #4 filed 4/16/18:

FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT (Filed within

30 days after Dkt. #3)

•DOCUMENT #15 filed 7/16/18:

ORDER (Set Virginia Limitations Precedent)

DOCUMENT #19 filed 3/15/19:

MOTION for SUMMARY JUDGMENT (MS J)

DOCUMENT #20 filed 3/15/19:

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MS J

•DOCUMENTS #27 filed 3/27/19:

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MS J

•DOCUMENTS #27-1 filed 3/27/19:

12/12/18 DEPOSITION OF E.A. VEGA

DOCUMENT #28 filed 4/2/19:

REPLY BRIEF SUPPORTING MS J

•DOCUMENT #29 filed 4/24/19:

MEMORANDUM OPINION (RE: MSJ)

•DOCUMENT #30 filed 4/24/19:

ORDER (RE: MSJ)

•DOCUMENT #31 filed 4/25/19:

JUDGMENT (RE: #30)

•DOCUMENT #34 filed 5/22/19:

ORDER GRANTING MOTION to WITHDRAW

DOCUMENTS #35, #35-1, #35-2, & #35-3 filed

5/22/19:

FRCP RULE 59 MOTION (RE: #29 to #31)

THREE ADDITIONAL MOTIONS

•CASE LAW CITED IN FRCP RULE 59

MOTION / THREE ADDITIONAL

MOTIONS

•DISPUTED STATEMENT OF FACTS

(VAED Dkt. #35 on PAGES H6-49)

•AFFIDAVITS AND OTHER VERIFIED

0CERTIFIED) EVIDENCE

DOCUMENT #39 filed 5/24/19:

MOTION/ERRATA SHEET (RE: #35)

•DOCUMENT #40 filed 5/24/19:

ORDER (RE: #35)

DOCUMENT #41 filed 5/24/19:

NOTICE OF APPEAL (RE: #29 to #31)

DOCUMENT #48 filed 6/3/19:

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL (RE: #40)

Gregory S. Mercer v. E. A. Vesa. FOURTH

CIRCUIT. CASE NO. 19-1584 (2/3/20)

DOCUMENT #3 filed 5/31/19:

INFORMAL BRIEFING ORDER

DOCUMENT #8 filed 6/10/19:

MOTION to EXTEND DEADLINE / CLARIFY

IF ALL ISSUES IN VAED WERE COVERED

BY VAED’S FINAL ORDER (VAED Dkt. #40)

DOCUMENT #10 filed 7/15/19:

INFORMAL OPENING BRIEF & AFFIDAVIT

•CASE LAW USED FOR JUSTIFYING VAED

ORDER

AND

MEMORANDUM

OPINION (RE: VAED #29 to #31)

(PAGES J3-4, 17-18, 33-34, 36, 46-54,

62)

•AFFIDAVIT OF APPELLANT MERCER

(PAGES J66-73)

DOCUMENT #12 filed 7/22/19:

DISCLOSURE

AFFILIATIONS

CORPORATE

DOCUMENT #13 filed 7/24/19:

ERRATA SHEET (RE: #10)

DOCUMENT #14 filed 7/30/19:

INFORMAL RESPONSE BRIEF

DOCUMENT #15 filed 8/1/19:

OBJECTION / MOTION for ENLARGEMENT

OF TIME

DOCUMENT #17 filed 8/30/19:

INFORMAL REPLY BRIEF (Restricted ??)

•CASE LAW CITED IN BRIEF

•NEWLY DISCOVERED AUGUST-OF-2019

EVIDENCE THAT HUSBAND OF

JUROR IN FCCC CASE NO. MI-20062302 ON 3/26-27/2007 WAS A

CONGRESSIONALLY-RECOGNIZED

CIA SOURCE WORKING FOR THE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

IN PARAPSYCHOLOGY AND MIND

CONTROL (PAGES L22-24)

•DISPUTED STATEMENT OF FACTS (From

VAED Dkt. #35 on PAGES L24-54)

•ARGUMENT THAT VIRGINIA DOES NOT

HAVE NEUTRAL NOR DETACHED

MAGISTRATES ISSUING WARRANTS

TO VIRGINIA POLICE BECAUSE

VIRGINIA HAS A CONFEDERATE

POLICE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS

XII

NOT A REPUBLICAN FORM OF

GOVERNMENT VIOLATING THE U.S.

GUARANTEE CLAUSE (PAGES L5461)

•ARGUMENT THAT VSP OFFICER’S HIGH

SCHOOL DIPLOMA REQUIREMENT

CLEARLY

ESTABLISHES

PETITIONER’S U.S. AMENDMENT IV

& XIV RIGHTS BASED ON NATIONAL

AND VIRGINIA HIGH SCHOOL

DIPLOMA STANDARDS DESPITE

VIRGINIA’S SYSTEMATIC LACK OF

ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AND

FEDERAL CITIZENS’ RIGHTS (PAGES

L62-77) INCLUDING:

America - Pathways to the Present by

Andrew Cayton, Elisabeth Israels

Perry, Linda Reed, and Alan M.

Prentice Hall, Pages 12-13, 120121, 161-162

Government in America - People,

Politics, and Policy by George C.

Edwards,

Martin

HI,

Wattenberg, and Robert L.

Lineberry, AP Edition, Copyright

2011, Pearson Education, Inc.,

Pages 19, 32-33, 47-49

8/2/19 LETTER TO CONGRESS SEEKING

BILL SPONSORS TO VIRGINIA’S 13CONGRESSIONAL

MEMBER

xiii

DELEGATION OF SENATORS AND

REPRESENTATIVES (LAST 23 OF 24

PAGES

EXHIBITS

DOCUMENT L & See H49, Lll, & L54)

•8/7/19 LETTER FROM CONGRESSMAN

DENVER

RIGGLEMAN

PETITIONER (LAST PAGE OF

EXHIBITS IN DOCUMENT L)

DOCUMENT #18 filed 9/10/19:

ERRATA SHEET (RE: #17)

DOCUMENT #19 filed 9/27/19:

INFORMAL REPLY BRIEF (Corrected)

•CASE LAW CITED IN BRIEF

•NEWLY DISCOVERED AUGUST-OF-2019

EVIDENCE THAT HUSBAND OF

JUROR IN FCCC CASE NO. MI-20062302 ON 3/26-27/2007 WAS A

CONGRESSIONALLY-RECOGNIZED

CIA SOURCE WORKING FOR THE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

IN PARAPSYCHOLOGY AND MIND

CONTROL (CORRECTED PAGES L2224)

•DISPUTED STATEMENT OF FACTS (From

VAED Dkt. #35 on PAGES L24-54)

•ARGUMENT THAT VIRGINIA DOES NOT

HAVE NEUTRAL NOR DETACHED

MAGISTRATES ISSUING WARRANTS

TO VIRGINIA POLICE BECAUSE

VIRGINIA HAS A CONFEDERATE

xiv

POLICE GOVERNMENT WHICH IS

NOT A REPUBLICAN FORM OF

GOVERNMENT VIOLATING THE U.S.

GUARANTEE CLAUSE (PAGES L5461)

•ARGUMENT THAT VSP OFFICER’S HIGH

SCHOOL DIPLOMA REQUIREMENT

CLEARLY

ESTABLISHES

PETITIONER’S U.S. AMENDMENT IV

& XIV RIGHTS BASED ON NATIONAL

AND VIRGINIA HIGH SCHOOL

DIPLOMA STANDARDS DESPITE

VIRGINIA’S SYSTEMATIC LACK OF

ENFORCEMENT OF STATE AND

FEDERAL CITIZENS’ RIGHTS (PAGES

L62-77) INCLUDING:

America - Pathways to the Present by

Andrew Cayton, Elisabeth Israels

Perry, Linda Reed, and Alan M.

Prentice Hall, Pages 12-13, 120121, 161-162

Government in America - People,

Politics, and Policy by George C.

Edwards,

Martin

HI,

Watte nberg, and Robert L.

Lineberry, AP Edition, Copyright

2011, Pearson Education, Inc.,

Pages 19, 32-33, 47-49

8/2/19 LETTER TO CONGRESS SEEKING

BILL SPONSORS TO VIRGINIA’S 13CONGRESSIONAL

MEMBER

DELEGATION OF SENATORS AND

REPRESENTATIVES (LAST 23 OF 24

EXHIBITS

PAGES

DOCUMENT L & See H49, Lll, & L54)

•8/7/19 LETTER FROM CONGRESSMAN

DENVER

RIGGLEMAN

PETITIONER (LAST PAGE OF

EXHIBITS IN DOCUMENT L)

DOCUMENT #20 filed 10/30/19:

INFORMAL SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

10/29/19 10-PAGE E-MAIL TO THE 13VIRGINIA

MEMBER

CONGRESSIONAL

DELEGATION

TITLED

“A

CASE

FOR

APPLICATION

THE

U.S.

GUARANTEE CLAUSE AGAINST

VIRGINIA

•DOCUMENT #21 filed 11/21/19:

UNPUBLISHED PER CURIUM OPINION

•DOCUMENT #22-1 filed 11/21/19:

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

•DOCUMENT #22-2 filed 11/21/19:

JUDGMENT

DOCUMENT #23 filed 12/12/19:

PETITION FOR REHEARING (Restricted)

• CASE LAW USED FOR CONTRADICTING

xvi

VAED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM

OPINION (RE: VAED #29 to #31) (Dkt.

#26 on PAGES Oil, 17, 19-24, 27-29, 32,

35, 38-40, 46-50)

•CONGRESSIONAL APPLICATION OF THE

CLAUSE

GUARANTEE

U.S.

FOLLOWING THE U.S. CIVIL WAR

BETWEEN 1866 AND 1870 (Dkt. #26 on

PAGES 033-34)

•SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

STATES

CASELOADS,

1880-2015

GRAPH (LAST PAGE OF EXHIBITS

IN DOCUMENT O)

DOCUMENT #25 filed 12/16/19:

ERRATA SHEET (RE: #23)

DOCUMENT #26 filed 12/16/19:

PETITION FOR REHEARING (Corrected)

•CASE LAW USED FOR CONTRADICTING

VAED ORDER AND MEMORANDUM

OPINION (RE: VAED #29 to #31)

(PAGES Oil, 17, 19-24, 27-29, 32, 35,

38-40, 43, 46-50)

•CONGRESSIONAL APPLICATION OF THE

U.S.

GUARANTEE

CLAUSE

FOLLOWING THE U.S. CIVIL WAR

BETWEEN 1866 AND 1870 (PAGES

033-34)

•SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED

xvii

STATES

CASELOADS,

1880-2015

GRAPH (PAGES 036-37 & LAST PAGE

OF EXHIBITS IN DOCUMENT O)

DOCUMENT #27 filed 12/26/19:

SUPPLEMENTAL ERRATA SHEET (RE: #26)

•DOCUMENT #28 filed 2/3/20:

ORDER (RE: #26 & #27)

DOCUMENT #29 filed 2/11/20:

MANDATE [SCOTUS Rule 13.1 begins 2/3/20]

SCOTUS COVID-19 EXTENSION (3/19/20):

[SCOTUS Rule 13.5 has 7/2/20 Deadline]

SCOTUS COVID-19 FILINGS UPDATE (4/15/20):

Use 8V2 x 11 inch Paper

TABLE OF CONTENTS

“A” means Appendix to this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari to the Fourth Circuit;

“B” means 4/16/18 VAED Document #4 - “First

Amended Complaint;”

“C” means 3/15/19 VAED Document #20 “Defendant E. A. Vega’s Memorandum in

Support of Motion for Summary Judgment;”

“D” means 3/27/19 VAED Document #27 “Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment;”

“E” means 3/27/19 VAED Document #27-1 “12/12/18 Deposition of E. A. Vega;”

xviii

“F” means 4/2/19 VAED Document #28 - “Reply

Brief imSupport of Defendant E. A. Vega’s

Motion for Summary Judgment;”

“G” means 4/24/19 VAED Document #29 “Memorandum Opinion;”

“H” means 5/22/19 VAED Document #35 cor

rected with Document #39 - “FRCP Rule 59

Motion for New Trial; Altering or Amending a

Judgment / Three Additional Motions on Pages

5-6 and Paragraphs 188 & 189;”

“I” means 5/24/19 VAED Document #40 - “Order;”

“J” means 7/15/19 Fourth Circuit Document #10

corrected with Document #13 - “Informal

Opening Brief and Affidavit;”

“K” means 7/30/19 Fourth Circuit Document #14

- “Informal Response Brief of Appellee E. A.

Vega;”

“L” means 8/30/19 Fourth Circuit Document #17

corrected with Document #18 and

reprinted as Document #19 - “8/30/2019

Informal Reply Brief of Appellant to Response

Brief of Appellee E. A. Vega with Errata

Corrected for Congress on 9/26/2019;”

“M” means 10/30/19 Fourth Circuit Document

#20 - “Informal Supplement to Informal

Opening and Reply Briefs of Appellant:

Argument for Congressional Re-Application of

U.S. Guarantee Clause Against Virginia Being

Distributed to 535 Members of the U.S.

Congress;”

xix

“N” means 11/21/19 Fourth Circuit Document

#21 - “Unpublished Per Curium Opinion;”

“O” means 12/12/19 Fourth Circuit Document #23

corrected with Document #25 and

reprinted as Document #26 further

corrected with Document #27 “12/12/2019-Filed Informal Petition for

Rehearing with Errata Corrected;”

“P” means 2/3/20 Fourth Circuit Document #28 “Order.”

“Q,” “R,” & “S” are VAED Documents #35-1, #35-2,

& #35-3, respectively.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS FAIRLY

INCLUDED

LIST OF PARTIES

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

viii

DIRECTLY RELATED FEDERAL COURT

INFORMATION

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xvii

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

XXX

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

JURISDICTION

CONGRESSIONAL ACTS,

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,

STATUTES, ORDINANCES,

REGULATIONS, RULES, &

RECENT NEWS:

8/11-12/17 - Unite the Right Rally

in Charlottesville, Virginia

A281, H46, L51, 052

5/25/20 Police Killing of George Floyd

in Minneapolis, Minnesota

A283

6/12/20 Police Killing of Ray shard

Brooks in Atlanta, Georgia

A284

CONSICE STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner’s 6/28/20 “Application to the Circuit

Justice (Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.) for a Rule

33.1(d) Expansion of the Rule 33.1(g) Word Limit in

Excess of 9,000 Words in a Petition for Writ of

Certiorari Due on 7/2/20 in Compliance with Rule

33.1(d) Due to Hardship” was denied on 7/13/20.

Petitioner was given 60 days to comply with the 9,000Word Limit by 7/14/20 letter from the Clerk of the

Court or until 9/12/20. Petitioner rewrites without

new argument only this Page 12 with Subsequent

Pages 13 through 61 adding Documents: “Q” (means

5/22/19 VAED Document #35-1); “R” (means 5/22/19

VAED Document #35-2); and “S” (means 5/22/19

VAED Document #35-3) to the Tables of Contents on

Previous Pages xvii to xix and also Subsequent

Pages A-l to A-3 such that all other Roman Numeral

Pages and Appendix Pages with (A-#’s) at the top of

the Appendix Pages remain unchanged. Petitioner’s

9/12/20 Corrected Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

consists of Replacement Pages to his original 7/2/20

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit already served

on Respondents in triplicate but will be filed as one

complete original copy in the SCOTUS on or before

9/12/20.

As Petitioner did in his 7/15/19 “Informal

Opening Brief and Affidavit” on Page [J12], he adopts

by reference and incorporates herein as if rewritten

verbatim all Summary Judgment Proceeding

Documents from VAED Case No. l:18-cv-346 hereat:

the following Appendix attached hereto in its entirety,

U.S District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia

(herein “VAED”) Documents, and U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (herein “Fourth

Circuit”) Documents. VAED Documents: #1, #3, #4,

#15, #19, #20, #27, #27-1, #28, #29, #30, #31, #33, #34,

#35, #35-1, #35-2, #35-3, #39, #40; Fourth Circuit

Documents: #3, #8, #10, #12, #13, #14, #15, #17, #18,

#19, #20, #21, #22-1, #22-2, #23, #25, #26, #27, #28,

#29.

Petitioner assigns letter codes to 19 of these

Appendix (is “A”), VAED, and Fourth Circuit

Documents: VAED Documents: #4 is “B,” #20 is “C,”

#27 is “D,” #27-1 is “E,” #28 is “F,” #29 is “G,” #35 is

“H,” #35-1 is “Q,” #35-2 is “R,” #35-3 is “S,” and #40 is

“I.” Fourth Circuit Documents: #10 is “J,” #14 is

“K,” #17-19 are “L,” #20 is “M,” #21 is “N,” #23, 26-27

are “O,” and #28 is “P.” Petitioner thinks he only

refers to thirteen Documents: D, E, G, H, I, J, K, L,

O, Q, R, and S.

Life has a few bright lines that when crossed

create new governments. U.S. Amendments IV & V

were adopted in response to the abuse of the Writs of

Assistance, a type of general Search Warrant issued

by the British Government, and a major source of

tension in pre-Revolutionary America.

History repeats itself. Herein, the Virginia

State Police (herein and hereafter “VSP”) violated

Petitioner’s U.S. Amendments IV, V, & XTV Rights

with three 6/1/15 False Warrants associated with

sequential alleged and false crimes assumed to occur

on 3/3/15, 5/15/15, & 5/31/15 [A294-295, 308, 321,324328, 331-335, 353-364, C9, Dl, E4, 17, 19-23, 26-30,

H17-25, J30-32, L32-38, 55-57], These three 6/1/15

False Warrants were sworn without Probable Cause

in vindictive retaliation for Petitioner following FRCP

Rule 4 during a 3/6/15-filed VAED Civil Action (VAED

Case No. l:15-cv-302) against two VSP Officers.

These two VSP Officers (a Trooper and a Sergeant)

were served Summonses with Complaints on 5/22/15

[A359, 531-534, 544-549, H21-22, L35, R32-33, 4042] and 5/31/15 [A359-363, 528-531, 535-544, H2224, L35-37, R30-31, 34-39], The latter VSP Sergeant

evaded a Professional Process Server on 5/27/15

contrary to Code of Virginia §18.2-409 so Petitioner

accompanied a Private Process Server on 5/31/15 in

order to identify this VSP Sergeant to the Private

Process Server [A358-360, 550-557, 581-582, C9

(Paragraph 47), H3-5, 21-22, J68-69 (includes

Petitioner’s e-mail for an adequate response to

C9 Paragraph 47 sent by Petitioner to his

attorney SW Dawson, Esquire working for

Respondent Dawson, P.L.C.), L35-36, R43-47].

Petitioner had all these Summonses with his

Complaints served in accordance with FRCP Rule 4

[A260-262].

Respondent Vega has argued that

Petitioner did not serve the two VSP Officers in the

specific manners preferred, suggested, or ordered by

VSP Personnel which FRCP Rule 4 did/does not

require of Petitioner when having his VSP Federal

Defendants served Summonses with Complaints. The

as-of-5/31/15 VSP Federal Defendants tried to

intercept the Proof of Service Paperwork for the

5/31/15 Service of the evading VSP Sergeant before

that VAED paperwork reached the VAED. The

Private Process Server with his Private Process

Server’s Affidavit filed the VAED Proof of Service

Paperwork in the VAED on 6/2/15 [A360-363, 535544, H22-24, L36-37, R34-39],

After a hasty VSP investigation which included

the same two VSP Trooper and Sergeant involved in

both Fairfax County Case No. MI-2006-2302 (6/1/07)

and VAED Case No. l:15-cv-302 (2/11/16) [A296-297,

321-324, CIO, D2-3, E17-19, H23, J16-17, 20-22,

L36] and which included, by justifiable inference,

physical possession of the two 5/22/15-served &

5/31/15-served

Summonses

with

Petitioner’s

Complaints from the latter of the two cases alleging

Fraud by the two VSP Officers in the first case,

Respondent Vega swore three 6/1/15 False Warrants

for Identity Theft (x2) [R6-9] and Stalking [R10-11]

(the Fourth 6/1/15 False Warrant was later Nolle

Prosequied [R4-5]) without Probable Cause violating

Petitioner’s U.S. Amendment IV & XIV Rights in

order to intercept the VAED Service Paperwork by

Falsely Arresting then Unlawfully Imprisoning

Petitioner from 6/6/15 to 6/9/15 in the Fairfax County

Adult Detention Center (hereafter “FCADC”).

Additionally, during Petitioner’s false arrest and

unlawful imprisonment, the VSP unconstitutionally

seized Petitioner’s phones/computers from his car on

6/6/15 and townhouse on 6/8/15 without supplying him

with a necessary 6/6/15 Inventory List (Due Process)

required for the return of his electronics in accordance

with U.S. Amendments V & XTV [A360-364, H2325, L36-38].

Petitioner was tried in Fairfax County General

District Court and was acquitted of the 3/3/15, 5/15/15,

& 5/31/15 alleged crimes on 3/31/16. Petitioner sued

Respondent Vega (VAED Case No. l:18-cv-346), the

VSP Special Agent who swore the three 6/1/15 False

Warrants, in his individual capacity in a 3/28/18-filed

VAED Civil Action alleging U.S. Amendment IV &

XIV Violations [A286-293, Bl-6, H2]. The VAED

contrary to the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth

Circuits made an ABUSE OF DISCRETION by

treating the three sequential alleged crimes

“committed on occasions different from one another

(See 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(l) [A218-219])” associated with

three 6/1/15 simultaneously-sworn then 6/6/15

simultaneously-served Warrants as simultaneous

alleged crimes not sequential alleged crimes.

Assumed Probable Cause for any one of the three

alleged 3/3/15, 5/15/15, & 5/31/15 simultaneous

crimes then destroyed all three of Petitioner’s claims

and Potential Jury Questions of U.S. Amendment IV

& XTV Rights Violations. This was not Equal

Justice Under Law.

The VAED justified its erroneous 4/24/19

GRANT of Summary Judgment for the entire case

[Gl-9] as follows. Smith v. McCluskev. 126 F. App’x

89, 95 (4th Cir. 2005) (Simultaneous violation of a

state statute prohibiting pedestrians from walking in

a roadway where a sidewalk is provided and a Myrtle

Beach disorderly conduct ordinance [A137-140, G6-7,

J41, 46-47, 55-56, 60, L5-9, 014]); Sturdivant u. Dale.

2016 WL 11410292, at *4 n.5 (D.S.C. May 31, 2016),

report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL

3514451 (D.S.C. June 28, 2016) (Simultaneous

violation of reckless driving, failure to give proper

signal, and resisting arrest [A141-144, G7, J41, 4849, 56-57, L6-9, 014]); McMillian v. LeConev. 2011

WL 2144628, at *8 (E.D.N.C. May 31, 2011), aff’d, 455

F. App’x 295 (4th Cir. 2011) (Simultaneous violation

of unlawful begging, being intoxicated and disruptive,

and unlawful resisting, delaying, or obstructing a

police officer [A105-110, G7, J41, 49-52, 57-58, L6-9,

014-15]); see also Wells v. Bonner. 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th

Cir. 1995) (Simultaneously not following the

directions of Officer Harris and resisting a search

[A181-185, G7, J41, 52-54, 58-59, L7-9, 015]).

Compare U.S. v. Hudspeth. 42 F.3d 1015, 102324 (7th Cir., 1994); 1994 WL 592706, 10/28/1994

(“Hudspeth committed three separate crimes, at three

separate times [over approximately 35 minutes],

against three separate victims, in three separate

locations. Under the plain language of § 924(e)(1). . .,

Hudspeth committed his crimes on three ‘occasions

different from one another.’”) [A165-167, 06, 19-20,

26]. U.S. v. Brady. 988 F.2d 664, 668-69 (en banc),

cert, denied 510 U.S. 857, 114 S.Ct. 166, 126 L.Ed.2d

126 (1993)(from 6th Cir.) (“. . . Consistent with the

holdings of our sister circuits, we believe that offenses

committed by a defendant at different times and

places and against different victims, although

committed within less than an hour of each other, are

separate and distinct criminal episodes and that

convictions for those crimes should be counted as

separate predicate convictions under § 924(e)(1). . . .

Thus, seen from either an objective or subjective point

of view, defendant Brady's crimes were separate

episodes. Therefore, he was properly taxed with both

at his sentencing.”) [A154-157, 021]. U.S. v. Elliott.

703 F.3d 378, 383-84, 388 (7th Cir., 2012) (“Therefore,

we concluded, a court's inquiry as to the timing of the

prior offenses ‘is simple: were the crimes simultaneous

or were they sequential?’ Id. at 1021 (emphasis in

original).”) [A158-161, 06, 20-21, 26], U.S. v. Petty.

828 F.2d 2 after remand from SCOTUS, 481 U.S. 1034,

107 S.Ct. 1968, 95 L.Ed.2d 810 (1987) (from 8th Cir.)

(“six counts of armed robbery in New York stemming

from his simultaneous robbery of six individuals at a

restaurant . . . characterization of Petty's convictions

in New York as more than one conviction, for purposes

of the enhanced sentencing statute, was error.”)

[A172-173, 020]. U.S. v. Tisdale. 921 F.2d 1095, 1099

(10th Cir., 1990), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 986, 112 S.Ct.

596, 116 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991) (“Defendant contends

that his three burglary convictions arose out of a

single criminal episode ... burglarizing three separate

businesses inside the mall, on the same night, . . . we

find that the trial court properly enhanced the

defendant's penalty under Sec. 924(e) (1).”) [A177180, 021], U.S. v. Van. 543 F.3d 963, 966 (2008); 2008

WL 4445756, (8th Cir., 10/3/2008) (“. . . convictions for

separate drug transactions on separate days are

multiple ACCA predicate offenses, even if the

transactions were sales to the same victim or

informant. Id. at 1058 . . .”) [A180, 06, 19, 25-26].

Petitioner presented the fact that “... on more

than one occasion [one] engages in conduct ...

[A242-245]” is language found in the Virginia

Stalking Ordinance (Code of Virginia, §60.3) chosen by

Respondent Vega for an alleged charge against

Petitioner. Similar language is found in 18 U.S.C.

§924(e)(l) “... committed on occasions different

from one another ... [A218-219].”

Petitioner

presented on Pleading Page [D7] the following: “’On

this evidence alone, [a] prudent person would not have

believed that Plaintiff had committed or was

committing a violation of [the Code of Virginia, §] 18.260.3, as this code section clearly states that, “on more

than one occasion [one] engages in conduct directed at

another person with the intent to place, or when he

knows or reasonably should know that the conduct

places that other person in reasonable fear of death,

criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury.’ Va. Code

Ann. 18.2-60.3 [A242-245].”

This ABUSE OF DISCRETION by the VAED

led the VAED to accept Respondent’s Totality of the

Circumstances Argument based on Fraudulent

Probable Cause [A340-352, 364-371, 400-518, H6-16,

26-31, L24-30, 38-41, Q4-43] for one of the three

6/1/15 False Warrant (the False Stalking Warrant)

then GRANT Respondent’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (herein and hereafter “MS J”) on all three of

Petitioner’s potential Jury Questions concerning U.S.

Amendment IV & XTV Violations [A32-45, Gl-9 and

specifically G6]. The Footnote 1 on Page G8 states,

“Because the analysis may end after determining

there was probable cause to support the stalking

charge, this Court does not reach the merits of

probable cause on the other charges [A42, G8].” But

these three sequential alleged crimes were separable

alleged crimes concerning three (not one) Potential

Jury Questions. If one Jury Question failed, the other

two Jury Questions still needed to be decided at a Trial

by a Jury. In Cooley u. Leung. 637 Fed. Appx 1005 (9th

Cir., 2/4/2016) (“Jury question existed as to whether

police officers reasonably believed motorist, . . ., could

have been armed and dangerous, as would justify pat

search, precluding summary judgment in favor of

officers on basis of qualified immunity with respect to

pat search in motorist’s § 1983 action.”) [A83]. The

VAED’s 4/24/19 Memorandum Opinion [Gl-9] was not

equal Justice Under Law.

After initiating this first “Circuit Split,” the

VAED contrary to the SCOTUS and Fourth Circuit

made CLEAR ERROR by failing to view Petitioner’s

complete, belated, fairly-presented-as-an-Affidavit-ofPlaintiff-Gregory-Shawn-Mercer Disputed Statement

of Facts in Petitioner’s pro se “FRCP Rule 59 Motion

for New Trial; Altering or Amending a Judgment /

/ Three Additional Motions on Pages 5-6 and

Paragraphs 188 & 189 [VAED Document #35 -

A339-399, H6-49, L24-54]” then drawing any

justifiable inferences from those facts in the light most

favorable to the Petitioner in the 2019 Summary

Judgment Proceeding when deciding if there existed

genuine issues as to any material fact requiring a

Trial by Jury. The VAED had denied Petitioner’s U.S.

Amendment VII Right to a Trial by Jury (not

Bench) initiating the second “Circuit Split” in an act

of Manifest Injustice which accepted the VSP’s

Fraudulent Probable Cause used against Petitioner

for one of the three 6/1/15 False Warrants, the False

Stalking Warrant. The VAED had even footnoted its

Erroneous Judgment [A42, G8] that made three

sequential alleged crimes sworn/served with three

simultaneous Warrants into three simultaneous

alleged crimes ignoring the sequential nature of two

of those alleged crimes. The VAED’s ABUSE OF

DISCRETION clearly justified review of Petitioner’s

FRCP Rule 59 Motion for New Trial; Alterins or

Amendins a Judgment because it might have

corrected the VAED’s Abuse of Discretion. The VAED

even reviewed then DENIED that FRCP Rule 59

Motion on 5/24/19 [A188-189, 11] just before

Petitioner filed his 5/24/19 Notice of Appeal [VAED

Document #41]. Petitioner had to file his 6/3/19

Amended Notice of Appeal [VAED Document #48] to

include this 5/24/19 VAED Order [VAED Document

#40 — II] in his Fourth Circuit Appeal. This was not

Equal Justice Under Law.

The Fourth Circuit and this SCOTUS have

already ruled about procedures in Summary

Judgment Proceedings. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby.

Inc.. All U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d

202 (1986) (“A fact is material when proof of its

existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of

the case, and an issue is genuine if a reasonable jury

might return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party

on the basis of such an issue.”) [A58-59, D3, 024],

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. u. Zenith Radio Coro.. 475

U.S. 585-88 n. 10 & 11, 586-87, 106 S.Ct 1348, 89

L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) “A party moving for summary

judgment has the initial burden of establishing the

basis for its motion and identifying the evidence which

demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Id. Once the moving party satisfies its

initial burden, the opposite party may show, by means

of affidavits or other verified evidence, that there

exists a genuine dispute of material fact.”) [A102-103,

D3, G5, H5, J40, 023-24].

U.S. v. Carolina

Transformer Co.. 978 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir., 1992)

(“In reviewing a summary judgment motion, the court

must “draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party.”) [A157-158, G5-6, H5, 32, 50, J40,

L42, 024],

In the Fourth Circuit and in August of 2019,

Petitioner investigated the Jury from Mercer u.

Commonwealth of Virginia. Fairfax County Circuit

Court Case No. MI-2006-2302, which is the basis of

Respondent Vega’s Fraudulent Probable Cause used

to justify the third 6/1/15 False Warrant (the False

Stalking Warrant). This Fairfax County Circuit Court

Case Falsely Convicted Petitioner on 3/27/07 of

Assaulting and Battering one of the two VSP Officers

and the VSP Trooper which Petitioner sued in his

3/6/2015-filed VAED Case No. l:15-cv-302. In the twoday Fairfax County Circuit Court Jury Trial with

seven Jurors beginning on 3/26/07, Juror Esther S.

Verona (after learning the full names of the other six

Jurors) went home to her husband Dr. Jack Verona

who on 10/11/11 was recognized in the U.S. House of

Representatives by Representative Gerry Connolly for

his work in the DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) as

a CIA Source for psychic spying, psychokinesis,

parapsychology, weapons research, and mind control

[A594-598, L22-24], Dr. Jack Verona had been used

as a Jury Tampering Expert against Petitioner on

3/26/07 & 3/27/07. This New Evidence of a Jury

Tampering Expert used against Petitioner in his

Fairfax County Circuit Court Case along with the

Edited and Obstructed 3/26/07 Appellate Record from

that Mercer v. Commonwealth of Virginia. Fairfax

County Circuit Court Case No. MI-2006-2302 being

relied upon by Petitioner in his subsequent appeals

was an act of Manifest Injustice against Petitioner

furthered in his failed appeals to the Court of

Appeals of Virginia, Record No. 0828-07-4 (decided

2/18/09); Supreme Court of Virginia, Record No.

090536 (decided 9/22/09); and SCOTUS, Case No. 098206, certiorari denied (decided 6/7/10).

Respondent Vega has pled in the Fourth Circuit

and Petitioner fully accepts, “A Rule 59(e) motion [the

denial of which is reviewed for abuse of discretion]

may only be granted in three situations: (1) to

accommodate an intervening change in controlling

law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at

trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent

manifest injustice.” Melendez v. Sebelius. 611 Fed.

App’x. 762 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Mayfield v. Nat’l

Ass’n for Stock Car Auto Racins. Inc.. 674 F.3d 369,

378 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks

omitted)) [K28].” Herein, Petitioner has pled: (1) New

Evidence; (2) Clear Error; and (3) Preventing a

Manifest Injustice when moving the VAED, Fourth

Circuit, and/or now the SCOTUS to GRANT his

5/24/19 FRCP Rule 59 Motion for New Trial; Altering

or Amending a Judgment / / Three Additional Motions

on Pages 5-6 and Paragraphs 188 & 189 [VAED

Document #35 - A337-574, Hl-53, Ql-43, Rl-58,

Sl-44].” The use of Jury Tampering Experts is an

authoritarian act when perpetrated by the Fairfax

County and/or Virginia governments. The criminal

trials of the Officers who through Police Misconduct

killed George Floyd [A283-284] and Rayshard Brooks

[A284-286] along with more recent deaths involving

Police Misconduct depend on this SCOTUS to prevent

Jury Tampering Experts like Dr. Jack Verona from

succeeding in perpetrating this kind of Manifest

Injustice. There must be Equal Justice Under Law.

Please note the following typos were found in

Petitioner’s Disputed Statement of Facts [VAED

Document #35 - A339-399, H6-49, L24-54]. There

were three minor corrections made to Petitioner’s

Disputed Statement of Facts as it moved through the

Fourth Circuit and arrived in the SCOTUS which are

identified in Paragraphs/Sections 33, 120, & 134. See

[A347, 369, & 374] for details. Also “Posequied”

became P[r]osequied (Paragraph #38 on [A349]) and

“Sergeznt” became Serge[a]nt (Paragraph #137 on

[A374]).

Question of Exceptional Importance

Life has a few bright lines that when crossed

create new governments. This Petition presents just

this situation. A Police Officer swears out a Warrant

before a Magistrate who, in turn, decides if Probable

Cause exists then, if so, issues the Police Officer a

Warrant to be served on the Defendant. It is implied

that the Magistrate is a Judge acting with the interest

of protecting the Civil Rights of that Defendant.

However, Respondent Vega swore out 6/1/15 Warrants

against Petitioner two of which were for Identity Theft

Warrants for violating the Code of Virginia, § 18.2186.3 [A245-248]. He extremely clearly was without

Probable Cause. This needs further analysis.

To have Probable Cause for one of these

Identity Theft Warrant against Petitioner,

Respondent Vega had to swear before the Fairfax

County Magistrate that Petitioner gained Identifying

Information about the specific Victim of the Identity

Theft and that this Victim suffered a financial loss as

a result of that Identity Theft. Fairfax County

Magistrate Wilson Talavera issued Respondent Vega

two 6/1/15 Identity Theft Warrants to be served on

Petitioner.

However, Respondent Vega was

subsequently deposed on 12/12/18 about what

Probable Cause he had presented to Fairfax County

Magistrate Wilson Talavera on 6/1/15 in order to be

issued the two 6/1/15 Identity Theft Warrants against

Petitioner by Fairfax County Magistrate Wilson

Talavera [A598-607, L54-61].

What becomes quickly apparent after reading

the pages referred to in [A598-607, L54-61] is that

Fairfax County Magistrate Wilson Talavera never

heard Respondent Vega swear sufficient Probable

Cause for these two 6/1/15 Identity Theft Warrants

because Respondent Vega never had any Probable

Cause for these two Identity Theft Warrants. Here is

how extremely clearly Respondent Vega described his

Probable Cause for the Identity Theft Warrant with

Victim VSP Trooper Houtz and for which Fairfax

County Magistrate Wilson Talavera issued a Warrant

to Respondent Vega to serve on Petitioner which

occurred 6/6/15:

Respondent Vega - “For that one, it would

have been trooper Houtz.”

SW Dawson - “And what was Trooper Houtz’s

financial loss as a result of that?”

Respondent Vega - “I don’t believe he

suffered any.”

SW Dawson - “And what information did Mr.

Mercer obtain in that event?”

Respondent Vega - “None.”

SW Dawson - “He obtained no information?”

Respondent Vega - “Correct.”

For the second Identity Theft Warrant with

Victim Ibrahim Fetterolf, Respondent Vega testified,

“He did. What he obtained was that Sergeant

Allander wasn’t working at the time” Knowing

information about VSP Sergeant Allander for an

Identity Theft Charge with Victim Private Process

Server Fetterolf is not valid for Probable Cause. In

accordance with Virginia Code §18.2-186.3 (“It shall

be unlawful for any

person, without the

authorization or permission of the person or

persons who are the subjects of the identifying

information”) [A245-248].

Fairfax County

Magistrate Wilson Talavera issued two 6/1/15 Identity

Theft Warrants to Respondent Vega against

Petitioner simply because Respondent Vega was a

VSP Special Agent and Respondent Vega as a Police

Officer

requested these

6/1/15 Identity Theft

Warrants. This is what demonstrates that Virginia

and Fairfax County have Unrepublican Governments!

History

explains more

about this Virginia

Unrepublican Form of Government.

Virginia has a Confederate Police Government

which can be traced back through history [A381-399,

H39-49, L46-54],

There have been seven

Constitutions of Virginia (1776, 1830, 1850, unratified

1864, 1870, unratified 1902, and 1971) [A212]. Only

one of these Constitutions allowed the People to elect

State, County, and City Judges, the 1850 Constitution

of Virginia. This is important. In a Democracy,

People are protected from Government with Rights.

When one Person violates another Person’s Rights in

a Democracy, the second Person can sue the first

Person in a Court of Law where a Judge decides

whether or not to enforce the specified Right. Judges

protect Rights in a Democracy or Constitutional

Republic and the People’s ability to select their own

Judges is paramount to protecting the Democracy or

Constitutional Republic. Otherwise, Government is

protected from the People by Denying Rights which is

a Confederacy.

This was decided by the SCOTUS in Duncan

v. McCall. 139 U.S. 449, 461, 11 S.Ct. 573, 577 (1891).

“By the constitution, a republican form of government

is guarantied (sic. - guaranteed) to every state in the

Union, and the distinguishing feature of that form is

the right of the people to choose their own officers for

governmental administration, ... [A85-86].” With the

exception of the 1850 Constitution of Virginia, the

Virginia General Assembly has always chosen

Virginia State, County, and City Judges. Virginia has

become Unrepublican in Form as will be further

explained.

When the U.S. Civil War broke out in 1861,

Virginia’s western 50 counties separated to become

West Virginia whose 1863 Constitution of West

Virginia, Article I, Section 1 stated, “The State of

West Virginia shall be and remain one of the United

States of America. The Constitution of the United

States, and the laws and treaties made in pursuance

thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land [A193].”

West Virginia defined what a Confederacy in America

is by its lack of respect for the U.S. Supremacy

Clause.

American Confederacies do not respect the U.S.

Supremacy Clause (Compare the following with the

previous paragraph), “This Constitution, and the

Laws of the United States which shall be made in

Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which

shall be made, under the Authority of the United

States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the

Judges of every State shall be bound thereby, any

Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the

Contrary notwithstanding [A218].”

The 1864 Constitution of Virginia was not

ratified by the People. Virginia lost the U.S. Civil War

on 4/9/1865. The U.S. Congress applied the U.S.

Guarantee Clause to the 11 previously Confederate

States so at least all males could vote instead of all

white males could vote [A643-646].

The U.S.

Guarantee Clause states, “The United States shall

guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican

Form of Government, and shall protect each of them

against Invasion; and on Application of the

Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature

cannot be convened) against domestic Violence [A217218].”

Lincoln Emancipated the African American

Slaves in a Proclamation made on 1/1/1863 [A193194], U.S. Amendment XTV was ratified on

7/28/1868 [A214-216], and U.S. Amendment XV was

ratified on 2/3/1870 which states, “The right of citizens

of the United States to vote shall not be denied or

abridged by the United States or by any state on

account of race, color, or previous condition of

servitude [A216].”

The 1870 Constitution of Virginia was not

Confederate because it had a restatement of the U.S.

Supremacy Clause as Article I, Section 3, “That the

constitution of the United States, and the laws of

congress passed in pursuance thereof, constitute the

supreme law of the land, to which paramount

allegiance and obedience are due from every citizen,

anything in the constitution, ordinances, or laws of

any state to the contrary notwithstanding [A646647].”

As presented in The Two Reconstructions by

Richard M. Valelly [A147-153, 392-396, H46-48, L5153], the previously Confederate States re

disenfranchised African American males without the

words “black” or “white” in new State Constitutions

ratified between 1885 and 1908 using Poll Taxes

against the Poor and Literacy Tests against the

Uneducated.

The racially-discriminatory 1902

Constitution of Virginia which was not ratified by the

People abandoned the 1870 Constitution of

Virginia, Article I, Section 3 restatement of the

U.S. Supremacy Clause [A646-647] and empowered

the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia with the

ability to interpret the Constitution of the United

States with its U.S. Bill of Rights [A217] containing

the Federal Rights of the People (1902 Constitution

of Virginia, Article VI, Section 88 [A203-205]).

Also, the Virginia General Assembly chose all Virginia

State, County, and City Judges (1902 Constitution

of Virginia, Article VI, Sections 91, 96, & 99

[A205-206]).

The NAACP was founded in 1908 and helped

elect Truman (1948) and Kennedy (1960). Kennedy’s

Voter Registration Campaign of the 1960’s meant the

end of Poll Taxes and Literacy Tests in State

Constitutions.

The racially-inspired

1971

Constitution of Virginia abandoned Poll Taxes and

Literacy Tests but the Supreme Court of Virginia was

still empowered with the ability to interpret the

Constitution of the United States with its U.S. Bill of

Rights containing the Federal Rights of the People

(1971 Constitution of Virginia, Article VI,

Sections 1 & 2 [A209-211]). The Virginia General

Assembly chose all Virginia State, County, and City

Judges (1971 Constitution of Virginia, Article VI,

Section 7 [A211-212])

After 1902, the Supreme Court of Appeals of

Virginia (1902-1971) then the Supreme Court of

Virginia (after 1971) became the Gatekeeper of

Federal Rights of People in Virginia because the

SCOTUS reviewed less than 1% of cases from

Virginia’s highest court [A647, 035-37]. Meanwhile,

the Virginia Police currently endorse Virginia General

Assembly Representatives in General Elections

[A573-574] contrary to the 1971 Constitution of

Virginia, Article I, Section 5 [A207-208]. These

General Assembly Representatives choose all Virginia

State, County, and City Judges in accordance to the

1971 Constitution of Virginia, Article VI, Section

7 [A211-212],

Today in a Virginia Courtroom, there are the

Defendant, Judge, Prosecutor, and Police Witness for

the Prosecution. The Judge is supposed to have

ALLEGIANCE to the Defendant protecting the

Defendant’s Virginia and Federal Rights. The 1971

Constitution of Virginia, Article I, Section 2

states, “That all power is vested in, and consequently

derived from, the people, that magistrates are their

trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to

them [A206-207].” But the Police Witness if angered

might go to his Police Lobby which, in turn, lobbies the

Virginia General Assembly Representatives who, in

turn, consider the re-election of the Judge to the same

Bench or to a higher Bench.

The ALLEGIANCE of the Virginia Judges

changed to the Virginia Government and the Virginia

Police. And a Magistrate is a Judge. Fairfax County

Magistrate Wilson Talavera issued the two 6/1/15

Identity Theft Warrants to Respondent Vega without

examining Respondent Vega’s Probable Cause

because Respondent Vega was a VSP Special Agent

and moreover a Virginia Police Officer requesting

from a Virginia Magistrate Warrants against

Petitioner. This case distinguishes Messerschmidt v.

Millender. 565 U.S. 535, 546-47, 132 S.Ct. 1235, 182

L.Ed.2d 47 (2012) (“[T]he fact that a neutral

magistrate had issued a warrant is the clearest

indication that the officers acted in an objectively

reasonable manner.”) [A112-120, G8-9, H39-49, J3,

30-31, 42, L53-57, 016-17, R6-11]. Magistrates are

not neutral in Virginia!

There is no consequence for Police Misconduct

in Virginia.

Virginia Rights complicate the

enforcement actions of the Virginia Police. Virginia

Judges do not enforce Virginia Rights because

Virginia Judges’ ALLEGIANCE is to the Virginia

Police. Federal Rights are denied by the Gatekeeper

of Federal Rights in Virginia, the Supreme Court of

Virginia, with little fear that SCOTUS will overturn

the Supreme Court of Virginia.

What can one expect in a State with a raciallyinspired Constitution? On 8/11/17 to 8/12/17, Unite

the Right held a Rally in Charlottesville, Virginia

which attracted White Supremacists [A281-282],

Virginia needs a Constitutional Convention to rewrite

the 1971 Constitution of Virginia, Article VI, Sections

1, 2, and 7 at a minimum so that the People elect their

own Judges and the Supreme Court of Virginia

ALWAYS (within reason) enforces Virginia and

Federal Rights. The current Virginia Judicial Branch

ought to be decapitated for gross incompetence.

Likewise, the current Virginia Police Forces ought to

be decapitated for incompetence and abuse of the

People. Virginia Judicial General Elections should be

held as soon as possible. The SCOTUS should grant

Petitioner a Declaratory Judgment for Congress via

his Question of Exceptional Importance. Luther v.

Borden. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 45, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849)

states, “Unquestionably a military [or police]

government, established a[s] the permanent

government of the State, would not be a republican

government, and it would be the duty of Congress to

overthrow it [A96]

Alternatively, the SCOTUS could enforce

Petitioner’s 1971 Constitution of Virginia, Article

I, Section 3 indubitable, inalienable, and indefeasible

right to reform alter, or abolish the Virginia

Governments [A207] which Petitioner invoked [A397,

H48, L53-54]. How is Petitioner supposed to prove

that U.S. Amendments IV, V, & XIV are “clearly

established” in Virginia where Virginia and Federal

Rights are unenforced? Pearson u. Callahan. 555 U.S.

223, 231, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Harlow u.

Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Petitioner has

written the Police Officer Education Requirements

Defense complete with the Magna Carta [A607-635].

The above analysis of the Virginia Confederate

Police Government is consistent with the fact that

Virginia Police Reports are not Public Documents

provided to the Accused when Police Misconduct is

alleged in accordance with Code of Virginia, § 2.23706(B)(1):

Disclosure of law enforcement and criminal

records; limitations

“B. Discretionary releases. The following

records are excluded from the mandatory

disclosure provisions of this chapter, but may

be disclosed by the custodian, in his

discretion, except where such disclosure is

prohibited by law: ...

1. Criminal investigative files, defined as

any documents and information,

including ... reports [A237-242].”

DIRECT AND CONCISE ARGUMENT FOR

GRANTING WRIT

Petitioner adopts and incorporates the entire

previous Concise Statement of the Case Section herein

as if rewritten verbatim hereat.

U.S. Amendment XTV [A214-216] gives

Petitioner who was born in Houston, Texas and a U.S.

Citizen “equal protection of the laws.” Because

Petitioner is a U.S. Citizen, the argument that follows

does not have to figure out how non-Citizens are

entitled to equal protection of the laws but Petitioner

recognizes there is likely such argument. Petitioner’s

equal protection of the law is regardless of his race

(U.S. Amendment XV [A216]) or his sex (U.S.

Amendment XIX [A217]). By the Constitution of the

United States, the U.S. Congress makes Federal Laws

(Article I, Section 7) for every Citizen in the United

States. By the Constitution of the United States, the

U.S. President is tasked with enforcing the Federal

Laws (Article II, Section 3) on every Citizen in the

U.S. Federal Laws are enforced in Federal Courts

inferior to the SCOTUS established by the U.S.

Congress (Article I, Section 8). The SCOTUS has

appellate jurisdiction over all inferior Federal Courts

(Article III, Section 2). By the Constitution of the

United States inclusive of U.S. Amendment XIV, the

SCOTUS interprets all Federal Laws equally for every

Citizen in the United States (Article III, Section 2).

When two inferior Federal Courts interpret a Federal

Law in conflicting fashions, the SCOTUS is required

at its discretion to resolve the conflict. See Supreme

Court Rule 10 [A267-268].

The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits

in U.S. u. Brady [A154-157], U.S. v. Hudspeth [A165167], U.S. v. Elliott [A158-161], U.S. u. Petty [A172173], U.S. v. Van [A180], and U.S. v. Tisdale [A177180] on pages 17-19 above have interpreted that

sequential crimes are separable and distinct criminal

episodes while simultaneous crimes are a single

criminal episode. The Ninth Circuit in Cooley v. Leuns

[A83] on page 20 above has interpreted that each

separable episodes of conduct creates a Potential Jury

Question.

The VAED affirmed by the Fourth Circuit

interpreted three sequential alleged crimes that

“occurred” on 3/3/15, 5/15/15, and 5/31/15 as

simultaneous crimes that are a single criminal

episode because Respondent Vega swore and served

Warrants

for

these

three

alleged

crimes

simultaneously. Footnote 1 on Page G8 states,

“Because the analysis may end after determining

there was probable cause to support the stalking

charge, this Court does not reach the merits of

probable cause on the other charges [A42, G8]The

VAED affirmed by the Fourth Circuit interpreted

three sequential, separable, and distinct episodes of

conduct as simultaneous creating only one Jury

Question that was defeated in a Summary Judgment

Proceeding by what Petitioner argues with affidavits

and verified certified evidence was Fraudulent

Probable Cause.

There exists a “First Circuit Split” herein that

the SCOTUS ought to resolve in accordance with

Supreme Court Rule 10(a) and in the interest of Equal

Justice Under Law between the Sixth through Eighth

& Tenth Circuits versus the Fourth Circuit as to

whether or not there was ABUSE OF DISCRETION

by the VAED when it interpreted whether crimes

allegedly “committed on occasions different from one

another” [See 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(l)] become

simultaneous crimes if the directly-associated arrest

warrants for those sequential alleged crimes were

sworn out and/or served simultaneously.

This is a new case for the SCOTUS where roles

are reversed from those in U.S. u. Petty [A172-173].

The VAED ruled the alleged crimes were

simultaneous while the Petitioner argues the alleged

crimes were sequential.

Petitioner has presented affidavits and other

verified, certified evidence in VAED Documents #35,

#35-1, #35-2, #35-3, with Fourth Circuit

Documents #17, #18, & #19 that his 3/26/07 to

3/27/07 Criminal Trial which left him Falsely

Convicted was controlled by a Jury Tampering Expert

working for the Commonwealth of Virginia against

the interests of the Petitioner leaving Petitioner with

a 3/26/07 Edited Appellate Record that Obstructed

Petitioner’s subsequent three appeals including an

appeal to this SCOTUS. This was a Manifest

Injustice involving New Evidence of a Jury

Tampering Expert where Manifest is defined by

FindLaw Legal Dictionary and in the light most

favorable to the Petitioner being truthful as clearly

evident, obvious, and indisputable.

Petitioner’s

affidavits and other verified, certified evidence

presented to the VAED and Fourth Circuit via a FRCP

Rule 59 Motion with attachments was in accordance

with Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corv.. 475 U.S. 585-88 n. 10 & 11, 586-87, 106 S.Ct

1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) “A party moving for

summary judgment has the initial burden of

establishing the basis for its motion and identifying

the evidence which demonstrates the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Id. Once the moving

party satisfies its initial burden, the opposite party

may show, by means of affidavits or other verified

evidence, that there exists a genuine dispute of

material fact.”) [A102-103, D3, G5, H5, J40, 023-24],

This SCOTUS ought to GRANT Petitioner’s

5/22/19 “FRCP Rule 59 Motion for New Trial;

Altering or Amending a Judgment / / Three

Additional Motions on Pages 5-6 and Paragraphs 188

& 189 (VAED Documents #35, #35-1, #35-2, and

#35-3) ” because the VAED’s 4/24/19 Memorandum

Opinion, 4/24/19 Order, and 4/25/19 Judgment (VAED

Documents #29, #30, and #31) were erroneous not

being Equal Justice Under Law.

Petitioner presented his complete Disputed

Statement of Facts in the VAED Summary Judgment

Proceeding begun on 3/15/19 via his 5/22/19 FRCP

Rule 59 Motion for New Trial; Altering or Amending a

Judgement (VAED Document #35).

Therein,

Petitioner made the Justifiable Inference that

Respondent Vega had “sworn” the three 6/1/15 False

Warrants in a vindictive attempt to intercept 5/31/15

Proof of Service Paperwork heading to the VAED

concerning the VSP Sergeant who had previously

evaded Service on 5/27/15 and before that Paperwork

was filed in the VAED which it was on 6/2/15. In

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Cory.. 475

U.S. 585-88 n. 10 & 11, 586-87, 106 S.Ct 1348, 89

L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (See previous page 37). In U.S.

v. Carolina Transformer Co.. 978 F.2d 832, 835 (4th

Cir., 1992) (“In reviewing a summary judgment

motion, the court must “draw all justifiable inferences

in favor of the nonmoving party.”) [A157-158, G5-6,

H5, 32, 50, J40, L42, 024]. In Anderson u. Liberty

Lobby. Inc.. All U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S.Ct 2505, 91

L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (“A fact is material when proof of

its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome

of the case, and an issue is genuine if a reasonable jury

might return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party

on the basis of such an issue.”) [A58-59, D3, 024].

The VAED affirmed by the Fourth Circuit GRANTED

Respondent Vega’s 3/15/19 Summary Judgment

Motion concerning sequential alleged crimes treated

as simultaneous alleged crimes without drawing all

justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the

Petitioner where there existed a justifiable inference

that was a genuine issue and material fact.

There exists a “Second Circuit Split” herein

that the SCOTUS ought to resolve in accordance with

Supreme Court Rule 10(a) and in the interest of Equal

Justice Under Law between the SCOTUS & Fourth

Circuit versus the Fourth Circuit itself as to whether

or not there was CLEAR ERROR by the VAED over

the Federal Court Practice (FRCP Rule 56; U.S.

Amendment VII Right to Trial by Jury) when it failed

to view all facts in a Summary Judgment Proceeding

and draw any justifiable inferences from those facts in

the light most favorable to the Petitioner when

deciding if there existed genuine issues as to any

material fact requiring a Trial by Jury.

The 1971 Constitution of Virginia, Article VI,

Sections 1, 2, and 7 together with the Code of Virginia,

§ 2.2-3706(B)(l) [A237-242] and similar Code Sections

have created the Virginia Confederate Police

Governments which are historically Unrepublican

Forms of Government in violation to the U.S.

Guarantee Clause [A217-218] by allowing the

Virginia General Assembly endorsed for Public Office

by the Virginia Police [A573-574] to elect/choose all

Virginia State, County, and City Judges [A211-212]

contrary to Duncan v. McCall, 139 U.S. 449, 461, 11

S.Ct. 573, 577 (1891) [A85-86],

The U.S. Supremacy Clause states, “This

Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which

shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties

made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of

the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the

Land; and the Judges in every State shall be

bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or

Laws

of any

State

the

Contrary

notwithstanding. [A218]

The 1971 Constitution of Virginia, Article VI,

Section 1 states,

the Supreme Court shall, by

virtue of this Constitution, have appellate

jurisdiction

cases

involving

the

constitutionality

of a

law

under

this

Constitution or the Constitution of the United

States and in cases involving the life or liberty of

any person. ... [A209-211].”

The 1971 Constitution of Virginia, Article VI,

Section 2 states,

no law shall be declared

unconstitutional under either this Constitution

or the Constitution of the United States except

on the concurrence of at least a majority of all

justices of the Supreme Court [of Virginia].

[A211].”

The 1971 Constitution of Virginia, Article VI,

Sections 1 & 2 violate the U.S. Supremacy Clause

as the 1902 Constitution of Virginia, Article VI,

Section 88 did,

The assent of at least three of

the judges shall be required for the court to

determine that any law is, or is not, repugnant

to the Constitution of this State or of the United

States; ... [A203-205] ”

This SCOTUS ought to issue a Declaratory

Judgment that Virginia is in violation of the U.S.

Guarantee Clause, U.S. Supremacy Clause, and

Duncan v. McCall. 139 U.S. 449,461,11 S.Ct. 573, 577

(1891) [A85-86] and that Virginia has been in

violation of these three Clauses/Case Law since 1902.

In the wise words on U.S. President Donald Trump,

this SCOTUS ought to “Make America Great Again.”

See cases related to the U.S. Supremacy

Clause: Cohens v. Virginia. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 5

L.Ed. 257 (1821) [A66-67]; Coover v. Aaron. 358 U.S.

1, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 3 L.Ed.2d 5 (1958) [A83-85]; Edsar v.

MITE Coro.. 457 U.S. 624, 102 S.Ct. 2629, 73 L.Ed.2d

269 (1982) [A86-87]; Marburv v. Madison. 5 U.S. 137,

1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) [A98-100]; Martin v.

Hunter’s Lessee. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) [A100102]; McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316

(1819) [A103-105]; Obereefell v. Hodses. 576 U.S. 644,

125 S.Ct. 2584 (2015) [A120-124] ; “Restrictions on the

Authority of the Several States,” Federalist Papers,

No. 44, 1/25/1788 [A128-132]; Texas v. White. 74 U.S.

(7 Wall.) 700 (1869) [A144-145]; U.S. v. Peters. 9 U.S.

(5 Cranch) 115 (1809) [A170-172]; and Ware v. Hylton.

3 U.S. 199, 3 Dali. 199,1 L.Ed. 568 (1796) [A180-182],

CONCLUSION

Petitioner seeks Equal Justice Under Law

appealing with two Circuit Splits and a Question of

Exceptional Importance. While Luther v. Borden. 48

U.S. (7 How.) 1, 45, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849) [H48-49, J4,

L54, 042-43] states, “Unquestionably a military [or

police] government, established a[s] the permanent

government of the State, would not be a republican

government, and it would be the duty of Congress to

overthrow it,” Petitioner has invoked his Constitution

of Virginia, Article I, Section 3 indubitable,

inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter or

abolish all Virginia Governments [A397, H48, L5354] without requiring the U.S. Congress to reform,

alter, or abolish.

Legal Costs: Respondent Vega’s 6/1/15 False

Warrants cost Petitioner $6,610 and Respondent

Dawson, P.L.C.’s malpractice, which was not fatal due

to the VAED’s 4/24/19 Erroneous Judgment, cost

Petitioner $37,192.50.

28 U.S.C. §1746 DECLARATION / SIGNED

. I certify under penalty of perjury under the

laws of the United States of America that the

foregoing is true and correct.

Respectfully Submitted,

On the 10th day of September, 2020

GRE'

MERCER, pro se

3114 Borge Street

Oakton, Virginia 22124

202-431-9401

This odd-numbered ending page matches Petitioner’s

previous 7/2/20 Petition for Writ of Certiorari which

ended with page 61.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.