Amicus Curiae Brief — VBS Distribution, Inc., et al., Petitioners v. Nutrivita Laboratories, Inc., et al.

Supreme Court briefSep 23, 2020

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No. 20-220

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------VBS DISTRIBUTION, INC., a California corporation,

also known as VBS HOME SHOPPING, and

VBS TELEVISION, INC., a California corporation,

Petitioners,

NUTRIVITA LABORATORIES, INC.,

a California corporation, et al.,

Respondents.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AND BRIEF OF

AMICUS CURIAE BY THE LAW OFFICE

OF J. EDWARD NIEHAUS AND BRIEF OF

AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------J. EDWARD NIEHAUS (#291968)

Counsel of Record

BODKIN NIEHAUS DORRIS & JOLLEY PLLC

6021 Morriss Rd., Suite 111

Flower Mound, TX 75028

(972) 704-1368

Jason@BNDJlegal.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

================================================================================================================

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.2(b), J. Edward Niehaus, Counsel for Amicus Curiae, the Law Office of J. Edward Niehaus, respectfully moves for leave

to file the accompanying brief as amicus curiae. The

consent of Petitioners was provided by James S. Azadian, Counsel for Petitioners, on September 9, 2020.

See USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.2(a). Mr. Azadian consented to participation by Amici. Notice of Amicus

Briefing was provided to R. Joseph Trojan, Counsel for

Respondents, on September 9, 2020. Mr. Trojan refused

consent via email on September 9, 2020. See USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.2(a).

No counsel for a party authored the brief in whole

or in part. See USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.6. No counsel

or party made a monetary contribution intended to

fund the preparation or submission of this brief. Id.

This brief was prepared pro bono; no financial contributions of any kind were made.

Leave to file this brief as amicus curiae should be

granted because the broad scope of Article III considerations raised in the Second Question Presented apply equally to civil and criminal cases. Counsel’s

amicus brief will touch on an issue of particular import: systemic problems with use of non-binding memorandum opinions in the context of excessive force

cases.

Respectfully submitted,

J. EDWARD NIEHAUS (#291968)

Counsel of Record

BODKIN NIEHAUS DORRIS & JOLLEY PLLC

6021 Morriss Rd., Suite 111

Flower Mound, TX 75028

(972) 704-1368

Jason@BNDJlegal.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Dated: September 23, 2020

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The questions presented in the Petition for Certiorari are:

1. Whether a plaintiff in a false-advertising case

must demonstrate “actual injury” to state a claim under the Lanham Act.

2. Whether the Ninth Circuit’s decision to apply

an aberrant and erroneous legal standard to this case

through a non-binding memorandum disposition is

consistent with Article III and the Due Process Clause.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE BRIEF OF

AMICUS CURIAE ............................................

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ......................

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................

ARGUMENT ........................................................

This case presents an opportunity for the Court

to address the use of non-binding memorandum opinions as they relate to insulation of

peace officers from Section 1983 liability for

excessive force and how that practice increases distrust of the judicial system. ............

Brief History of Qualified Immunity for

Excessive Force ..........................................

History of Non-binding Opinions ..............

Non-binding opinions are particularly

problematic in the subset of cases that implicate both Section 1983 and the Fourth

Amendment. .............................................. 11

The Non-binding Paradox.......................... 12

1) Non-binding opinions do not make

law. ....................................................... 13

2) Non-binding opinions cannot alter the

law. ....................................................... 13

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

Page

3) Non-binding opinions are used because the propositions for which the

case stands are settled already. .......... 14

4) Even though only used when the law

is both settled and clear, non-binding

opinions form no basis for a finding of

“clearly established” rights. ................. 18

5) Application of the Non-binding Paradox to Petitioner’s Case ....................... 18

Non-binding memorandum opinions are

unnecessary and are particularly problematic in the context of excessive force

cases that implicate both the Fourth

Amendment and Section 1983. .................. 20

1) Entitlement to Immunity .................... 21

2) Ignorance and Immunity ..................... 22

3) Specificity and Immunity .................... 22

4) Rules allowing for summary disposition negate the need for non-binding

opinions................................................ 23

CONCLUSION..................................................... 25

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994)

(Rehnquist, J. Plurality op.) ....................................21

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). ..............21

Anderson v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2001) ......... 7

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) .............. 21, 23

Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)........ 20

Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020)

(Thomas, J. Dissenting from denial of certiorari) ............................................................................8

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) ............................11

Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th

Cir. 1981) .................................................................24

Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006)..............20

Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) ..........................8

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) ............. 20, 23

Carroll v. Carman, 574 U.S. 13 (2014) .......................23

Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003) ....................20

City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600

(2015) .......................................................................20

City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope

Found., 538 U.S. 188 (2003) ....................................20

City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500

(2019) .......................................................................22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, 468 F. App’x 491

(6th Cir. 2012) (unpublished and not precedential) ......................................................................7

Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286 (1999) .........................20

Cty. of L.A. v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017) ............20

Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998) ......20

Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) ...................12

Estate of Kirby v. Duva, 530 F.3d 475 (6th Cir.

2008) ..........................................................................7

Gilmore v. Hodges, 738 F.3d 266 (11th Cir. 2013) ....... 18

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) ... 11, 12, 20, 23

Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158

(5th Cir. 1969)..........................................................24

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) ...................9

Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889

F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1989) ...........................................19

Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898 (10th Cir. 1996) ....... 13

Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 135 S. Ct.

530 (2014) ................................................................22

Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) ..................7

Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am. v. Bd. of Governors

of the Fed. Res. Sys., 338 U.S. App. D.C. 413,

195 F.3d 28 (1999) ...................................................13

Justice v. Dennis, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989) ......................21

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) ........................20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015) ............20

Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1148

(2018) ................................................................. 20, 22

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) ..................21

L.A. Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007) ......................20

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) .........................21

Mather v. Mundelein, 869 F.2d 356 (7th Cir.

1989) ........................................................................24

McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002 (4th Cir.

1994) ..........................................................................7

Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2005) ..........................20

Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015) ......... 20, 22, 23

Mumford v. Zieba, 4 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1993) ............18

Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019) ............. 12, 20

O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) ...............8

Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass’n v. Seiter, 858

F.2d 1171 (6th Cir. 1988) .........................................18

Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) ..............................8

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765 (2014) ..................20

Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000) ......................20

Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).................8

Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1991)...........7

Ryburn v. Huff, 565 U.S. 469 (2012) ...........................20

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Salazar-Limon v. City of Hous., 137 S. Ct. 1277

(2017) (Sotomayor, J. Dissenting from denial

of certorari) ..............................................................20

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)..................... 20, 23

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) ........................8

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)............................20

Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) ................11

Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56 (1992).......................21

State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. Crim. App.

2018) ........................................................................22

Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t

of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702 (2010) .........................20

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694,

85 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985) ........................................... 7, 11

Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) ...................8

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ..................................11

Texaco, Inc. v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 995 F.2d 43

(5th Cir. 1993)..........................................................13

Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650 (2014)..................... 20, 23

TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d

820 (9th Cir. 2011) ...................................................19

United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003) ................20

United States v. Harris, 846 F.2d 50 (9th Cir.

1988) ........................................................................24

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp.,

402 U.S. 558 (1971) .................................................22

United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop.,

510 U.S. 43 (1993) ...................................................21

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997) .............20

United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) .............20

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)................11

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) .........12

United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259

(1990) .......................................................................21

VBS Distrib. v. Nutrivita Labs., Inc., 2020 U.S.

App. LEXIS 18632 (9th Cir. Cal., June 12,

2020) ........................................................................19

VBS Distribution v. Nutrivita Labs., Inc., 811 F.

App’x 1005 (9th Cir. 2020) ......................................18

White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017)..........................20

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) ..........................20

Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) ..........................21

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017) (opinion

of Thomas, J.).............................................................8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Clarence M. Hanson, Judicial Administration:

The Avalanche of Appellate Court Opinions,

33 A.B.A. J. 426 (1947) ..............................................9

Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures,

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (2019) .............................24

https://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/06/23/time

line-freddie-grays-arrest-to-his-fatal-spinalcord-injury/ ................................................................6

https://cocoakeeks.com/blm-say-their-names/ .............2

https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2019/10/11/chineduokobi-death-san-mateo-sheriff-millbrae-internalaffairs/........................................................................6

https://www.cato.org/policy-report/mayjune-2019/

our-broken-justice-system ........................................7

https://www.reneeater.com/ ..........................................2

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/

2020/06/01/george-floyd-independent-autopsyfindings-released-monday/5307185002/ ...................6

https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/

06/05/tacoma-mayor-manuel-ellis/ ...........................6

Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished

Opinions in the United States Court of Appeals,

3 J. App. Prac. & Process 199 (2001) .......................... 9

Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Criminal Justice Codification, Revision

and Reform Act of 1974, Vol. II, p. 94 .....................22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Statement by Alito, J., Unpublished Judicial

Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on

Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of

the Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 107th Cong. at 7 (2002) .................... 9, 10

William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The

Non-Precedential Precedent – Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United

States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV.

1167 (1978) ..............................................................10

RULES

USCS Ct App 1st Cir. IOP IX. B............... 10, 14, 19, 23

USCS Ct App 1st Cir. R. 27.0 .....................................24

USCS Ct App 1st Cir. R. 32.1.0 ..................................10

USCS Ct App 1st Cir. R. 36.0 .....................................10

USCS Ct App 1st Cir. R. 36.0(b)(2) ................ 14, 19, 23

USCS Ct App 2nd Cir. R. 32.1.1 ........................... 10, 24

USCS Ct App 3rd Cir. IOP 5.2 ...................................14

USCS Ct App 3rd Cir. IOP 5.3 ....................... 10, 14, 23

USCS Ct App 3rd Cir. IOP 6.2 ...................................10

USCS Ct App 3rd Cir. R. 27.4.....................................24

USCS Ct App 4th Cir. IOP 36.3 .................................10

USCS Ct App 4th Cir. R. 27(f ) ...................................24

USCS Ct App 4th Cir. R. 32.1.....................................10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

USCS Ct App 4th Cir. R. 36(a) ............................. 15, 23

USCS Ct App 4th Cir. R. 36(a)(i) ................................19

USCS Ct App 5th Cir. R. 47.5.....................................10

USCS Ct App 5th Cir. R. 47.5.1............................ 15, 23

USCS Ct App 5th Cir. R. 47.5.1(b) .............................19

USCS Ct App 5th Cir. R. 47.6............................... 10, 24

USCS Ct App 6th Cir. IOP 32.1 ............................. 7, 10

USCS Ct App 6th Cir. IOP 32.1(b)(1) ................... 16, 23

USCS Ct App 6th Cir. IOP 32.1(b)(1)(D)....................19

USCS Ct App 6th Cir. R. 32.1................................. 7, 10

USCS Ct App 6th Cir. R. 36.............................. 7, 10, 24

USCS Ct App 7th Cir. R. 2..........................................24

USCS Ct App 7th Cir. R. 32.1.....................................10

USCS Ct App 8th Cir. IOP IV. B ................................10

USCS Ct App 8th Cir. R. 32.1A ..................................10

USCS Ct App 8th Cir. R. 47B .....................................24

USCS Ct App 9th Cir. Gen. Ord. IV ...........................10

USCS Ct App 9th Cir. R. 27-3 ....................................24

USCS Ct App 9th Cir. R. 36-2 .............................. 16, 23

USCS Ct App 9th Cir. R. 36-2(g) ................................19

USCS Ct App 9th Cir. R. 36-3 ....................................10

USCS Ct App 10th Cir. R. 27.3 ...................................24

USCS Ct App 10th Cir. R. 32.1 ...................................10

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

USCS Ct App 11th Cir. IOP .......................................17

USCS Ct App 11th Cir. IOP 7 ....................................10

USCS Ct App 11th Cir. R. 2-1 ....................................24

USCS Ct App 11th Cir. R. 36-2 ..................................10

USCS Ct App D.C. Cir. R. 27(g) ..................................24

USCS Ct App D.C. Cir. R. 32.1(b) ...............................10

USCS Ct App D.C. Cir. R. 36(c)(2) ........................ 17, 23

USCS Ct App Fed. Cir. IOP 10 ...................................10

USCS Ct App Fed. Cir. R. 32.1 ...................................10

USCS Ct App Fed. Cir. R. 32.1(b) ......................... 17, 23

USCS Ct App Fed. Cir. R. 36 ......................................24

USCS Fed Rules App. Proc. R. 32.1 ............................13

USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.2(a) ......................................1

USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.3(b) ......................................1

USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.6 ...........................................1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Amicus files in his professional capacity as an appellate practitioner. Counsel has no financial interest

in the outcome of the case and writes solely to express

opinion on what Counsel views to be a problematic

practice with the use of non-binding memorandum

opinions. Counsel calls this the “non-binding paradox.”

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Resolution of the Article III question presented

provides the Court with the opportunity to address the

problematic use of non-binding memorandum opinions

and how non-binding opinions create systemic inefficiencies in the law as applied to excessive force cases.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

Notice of Amicus Briefing was provided to James S. Azadian, Counsel for Petitioners, on September 9, 2020. See USCS

Supreme Ct. R. 37.2(a). Mr. Azadian consented to participation by

Amici. Notice of Amicus Briefing was provided to R. Joseph Trojan, Counsel for Respondents, on September 9, 2020. Mr. Trojan

refused consent on September 9, 2020. See USCS Supreme Ct. R.

37.2(a). Accordingly, motion for leave to file is included. USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.3(b).

No counsel for a party authored the brief in whole or in part.

See USCS Supreme Ct. R. 37.6. No counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission

of this brief. Id. This brief was prepared pro bono; no financial

contributions of any kind were made.

ARGUMENT

This case presents an opportunity for the Court to

address the use of non-binding memorandum opinions

as they relate to insulation of peace officers from Section 1983 liability for excessive force and how that

practice increases distrust of the judicial system.

There is no greater excessive force than the killing

of an innocent civilian. Faith in the justice system has

been shaken by the repeated killing of African Americans by the police, often (though not always) without

any repercussions for the officer. Since the beginning

of the year 2000, one hundred and twenty-seven unarmed persons of color have been killed by a police officer.2 The vast majority, 114 of them, were shot.

See https://www.reneeater.com/on-monuments-blog/tag/

Police+brutality (last visit Sept. 16, 2020); https://cocoakeeks.com/

blm-say-their-names/ (last visit Sept. 16, 2020). That list includes:

1. David McAtee, June 1, 2020

2. George Perry Floyd, May 25, 2020

3. Dreasjon “Sean” Reed, May 6, 2020

4. Michael Brent Charles Ramos, April 24, 2020

5. Breonna Taylor, March 13, 2020

6. Manuel “Mannie” Elijah Ellis, March 3, 2020

7. Atatiana Koquice Jefferson, October 12, 2019

8. Emantic “EJ” Fitzgerald Bradford Jr., November 22, 2018

9. Charles “Chop” Roundtree Jr., October 17, 2018

10. Chinedu Okobi, October 3, 2018

11. Botham Shem Jean, September 6, 2018

12. Antwon Rose Jr., June 19, 2018

13. Saheed Vassell, April 4, 2018

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

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24.

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32.

33.

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40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

Stephon Alonzo Clark, March 18, 2018

Aaron Bailey, June 29, 2017

Charleena Chavon Lyles, June 18, 2017

Unborn child of Charleena Chavon Lyles (14-15 weeks),

June 18, 2017

Jordan Edwards, April 29, 2017

Chad Robertson, February 15, 2017

Deborah Danner, October 18, 2016

Alfred Olango, September 27, 2016

Terence Crutcher, September 16, 2016

Terrence LeDell Sterling, September 11, 2016

Korryn Gaines, August 1, 2016

Joseph Curtis Mann, July 11, 2016

Philando Castile, July 6, 2016

Alton Sterling, July 5, 2016

Bettie “Betty Boo” Jones, December 26, 2015

Quintonio LeGrier, December 26, 2015

Corey Lamar Jones, October 18, 2015

Jamar O’Neal Clark, November 16, 2015

Jeremy “Bam Bam” McDole, September 23, 2015

India Kager, September 5, 2015

Samuel Vincent DuBose, July 19, 2015

Sandra Bland, July 13, 2015

Brendon K. Glenn, May 5, 2015

Freddie Carlos Gray Jr., April 19, 2015

Walter Lamar Scott, April 4, 2015

Eric Courtney Harris, April 2, 2015

Phillip Gregory White, March 31, 2015

Mya Shawatza Hall, March 30, 2015

Meagan Hockaday, March 28, 2015

Tony Terrell Robinson, Jr., March 6, 2015

Janisha Fonville, February 18, 2015

45.

46.

47.

48.

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51.

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55.

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70.

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72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

Natasha McKenna, February 8, 2015

Jerame C. Reid, December 30, 2014

Rumain Brisbon, December 2, 2014

Tamir Rice, November 22, 2014

Akai Kareem Gurley, November 20, 2014

Tanisha N. Anderson, November 13, 2014

Dante Parker, August 12, 2014

Ezell Ford, August 11, 2014

Michael Brown Jr., August 9, 2014

John Crawford III, August 5, 2014

Eric Garner, July 17, 2014

Dontre Hamilton, April 30, 2014

Victor White III, March 3, 2014

Gabriella Monique Nevarez, March 2, 2014

Yvette Smith, February 16, 2014

McKenzie J. Cochran, January 29, 2014

Jordan Baker, January 16, 2014

Andy Lopez, October 22, 2013

Miriam Iris Carey, October 3, 2013

Barrington “BJ” Williams, September 17, 2013

Jonathan Ferrell, September 14, 2013

Carlos Alcis, August 15, 2013

Larry Eugene Jackson Jr., July 26, 2013

Kyam Livingston, July 21, 2013

Clinton R. Allen, March 10, 2013

Kimani “KiKi” Gray, March 9, 2013

Kayla Moore, February 13, 2013

Jamaal Moore Sr., December 15, 2012

Johnnie Kamahi Warren, February 13, 2012

Shelly Marie Frey, December 6, 2012

Darnisha Diana Harris, December 2, 2012

Timothy Russell, November 29, 2012

77. Malissa Williams, November 29, 2012

78. Noel Palanco, October 4, 2012

79. Reynaldo Cuevas, September 7, 2012

80. Chavis Carter, July 28, 2012

81. Alesia Thomas, July 22, 2012

82. Shantel Davis, June 14, 2012

83. Sharmel T. Edwards, April 21, 2012

84. Tamon Robinson, April 18, 2012

85. Ervin Lee Jefferson, III, March 24, 2012

86. Kendrec McDade, March 24, 2012

87. Rekia Boyd, March 21, 2012

88. Shereese Francis, March 15, 2012

89. Jersey K. Green, March 12, 2012

90. Wendell James Allen, March 7, 2012

91. Nehemiah Lazar Dillard, March 5, 2012

92. Dante’ Lamar Price, March 1, 2012

93. Raymond Luther Allen Jr., February 29, 2012

94. Manual Levi Loggins Jr., February 7, 2012

95. Ramarley Graham, February 2, 2012

96. Kenneth Chamberlain Sr., November 19, 2011

97. Alonzo Ashley, July 18, 2011

98. Derek Williams, July 6, 2011

99. Raheim Brown, Jr., January 22, 2011

100. Reginald Doucet, January 14, 2011

101. Derrick Jones, November 8, 2010

102. Danroy “DJ” Henry Jr., October 17, 2010

103. Aiyana Mo’Nay Stanley-Jones, May 16, 2010

104. Steven Eugene Washington, March 20, 2010

105. Aaron Campbell, January 29, 2010

106. Kiwane Carrington, October 9, 2009

107. Victor Steen, October 3, 2009

108. Shem Walker, July 11, 2009

Others, including George Floyd, whose death during

the coronavirus pandemic set off protests nation-wide,

were asphyxiated.3 A few were beaten to death or electrocuted.4 The nationwide protests following Mr.

109.

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127.

Oscar Grant III, January 1, 2009

Tarika Wilson, January 4, 2008

DeAunta Terrel Farrow, June 22, 2007

Sean Bell, November 25, 2006

Kathryn Johnston, November 21, 2006

Ronald Curtis Madison, September 4, 2005

James B. Brissette Jr., September 4, 2005

Henry “Ace” Glover, September 2, 2005

Timothy Stansbury, Jr., January 24, 2004

Ousmane Zongo, May 22, 2003

Alberta Spruill, May 16, 2003

Kendra Sarie James, May 5, 2003

Orlando Barlow, February 28, 2003

Timothy DeWayne Thomas Jr., April 7, 2001

Ronald Beasley, June 12, 2000

Earl Murray, June 12, 2000

Patrick Moses Dorismond, March 16, 2000

Prince Carmen Jones Jr., September 1, 2000

Malcolm Ferguson, March 1, 2000

https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/06/01/

george-floyd-independent-autopsy-findings-released-monday/5307

185002/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2020); https://www.washington

post.com/nation/2020/06/05/tacoma-mayor-manuel-ellis/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2020)

https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2019/10/11/chinedu-okobideath-san-mateo-sheriff-millbrae-internal-affairs/ (last visited

Sept. 14, 2020); https://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/06/23/timeline-freddie-grays-arrest-to-his-fatal-spinal-cord-injury/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2020)

Floyd’s death were, and are, illustrative of the widely

held belief that the justice system is broken.5

Amicus posits that the use of non-binding memorandum opinions, as they relate to whether a constitutional right is ‘clearly established’ for sustaining a civil

rights lawsuit, accounts for a significant portion of the

problem. The right to be free from excessive (lethal)

force should have been ‘clearly established’ in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 85

L. Ed. 2d 1 (1985). See Estate of Kirby v. Duva, 530 F.3d

475, 482 (6th Cir. 2008). However, subsequent decisions allowing police officers to kill non-violent persons

continued and have muddied the waters regarding excessive force liability. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct.

2003, 2005 (2017) (no liability for border guard killing

child standing on Mexican side of Rio Grande). See also

Cockrell v. City of Cincinnati, 468 F. App’x 491, 491 (6th

Cir. 2012) (unpublished and not precedential, see

USCS Ct App 6th Cir. R. 32.1; USCS Ct App 6th Cir. R.

36; USCS Ct App 6th Cir. IOP 32.1) (qualified immunity granted to officer who shot jaywalker); McLenagan

v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1007 (4th Cir. 1994) (qualified

immunity for shooting unarmed bystander); Anderson

v. Russell, 247 F.3d 125, 132 (4th Cir. 2001) (qualified

immunity for killing unarmed occupant of vehicle);

Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 1991)

(same).

https://www.cato.org/policy-report/mayjune-2019/our-brokenjustice-system (last visited Sept. 15, 2020)

A) Brief History of Qualified Immunity for Excessive Force

After the Civil War, Congress sought to respond to

“the reign of terror imposed by the Klan upon black

citizens and their white sympathizers in the Southern

States.” Baxter v. Bracey, 140 S. Ct. 1862 (2020)

(Thomas, J. Dissenting from denial of certiorari), citing

Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337 (1983). They did so

by passing a statute variously known as the Ku Klux

Klan Act of 1871, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and the

Enforcement Act of 1871. Id. Under any of those

names, Section 1, now codified, as amended, is 42

U.S.C. § 1983. Id.

The text of § 1983 “ma[kes] no mention of defenses

or immunities.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870

(2017) (opinion of Thomas, J.). However, by the 1950s,

the Court considered and applied common law defenses. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376

(1951) (legislative immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.

547, 557 (1967) (good faith immunity for peace officers).

This approach was abandoned in favor of a more

categorical approach to immunity in Scheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (application of qualified

immunity doctrine to state executive officials, National

Guard members, and a university president). Any kind

of context-dependent analysis was largely abandoned

by the end of the 1970s. See O’Connor v. Donaldson,

422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (hospital superintended

granted qualified immunity); see also Procunier v.

Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978) (prison officials and

officers).

By 1982, any subjective inquiry was removed. See

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). A public official is entitled to qualified immunity for conduct in

performing discretionary functions so long as that conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer

would have known. Id. Whether a right is clearly established is a question of local law, the determination

of which is aided by this Court’s, and the Circuit

Court’s, precedent.

B) History of Non-binding Opinions

The use of non-binding opinions dates to the Judicial Conference in 1964 and was largely a result of the

significant increase in litigation, a trend that continues to this day. See Statement by Alito, J., Unpublished

Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on

Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the

Comm. on the Judiciary, House of Representatives,

107th Cong. at 7 (2002); see also Michael Hannon, A

Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United

States Court of Appeals, 3 J. App. Prac. & Process 199,

200 (2001) (noting that the Fifth and Third Circuits

were examining “the need to reduce the number of published opinions” in 1947). See, e.g., Clarence M. Hanson, Judicial Administration: The Avalanche of

Appellate Court Opinions, 33 A.B.A. J. 426 (1947).

By 1972, the Conference requested development of

a written plan to restrict publication of judicial decisions. Id. at 7. By 1974, each Circuit Court of Appeals

had a plan in place. Id. By 1990, the Federal Courts

Study Committee recommended reviewing whether

technological changes should require reexamination of

the non-binding opinion rules. Id. Neither Petitioner

nor Amicus contends that the use of non-binding memorandum opinions should be entirely eliminated.

William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The

Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited Publication and

No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978) provides a detailed history of the adoption of non-publication rules.

Currently, every federal appellate court has at least

one rule regarding non-binding memorandum opinions. See USCS Ct App 1st Cir. R. 32.1.0; USCS Ct App

1st Cir. R. 36.0; USCS Ct App 1st Cir. IOP IX. B; USCS

Ct App 2nd Cir. R. 32.1.1; USCS Ct App 3rd Cir. IOP

5.3; USCS Ct App 3rd Cir. IOP 6.2; USCS Ct App 4th

Cir. R. 32.1; USCS Ct App 4th Cir. IOP 36.3; USCS Ct

App 5th Cir. R. 47.5; USCS Ct App 5th Cir. R. 47.6;

USCS Ct App 6th Cir. R. 32.1; USCS Ct App 6th Cir. R.

36; USCS Ct App 6th Cir. IOP 32.1; USCS Ct App 7th

Cir. R. 32.1; USCS Ct App 8th Cir. R. 32.1A; USCS Ct

App 8th Cir. IOP IV. B; USCS Ct App 9th Cir. R. 36-3;

USCS Ct App 9th Cir. Gen. Ord. IV; USCS Ct App 10th

Cir. R. 32.1; USCS Ct App 11th Cir. R. 36-2; USCS Ct

App 11th Cir. IOP 7; USCS Ct App D.C. Cir. R. 32.1(b);

USCS Ct App Fed. Cir. R. 32.1; and USCS Ct App Fed.

Cir. IOP 10.

C) Non-binding opinions are particularly problematic in the subset of cases that implicate

both Section 1983 and the Fourth Amendment.

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that the right to make an arrest or investigatory

stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some

degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); see also

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22–27 (1968). “The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application

[. . . .]” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)

(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).

Proper application of the Graham factors requires

careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each

particular case, including the severity of the crime at

issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat

to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he

is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8–11

(1985) (shooting unarmed suspect in back was excessive).

Determining whether the force used to effect a

particular seizure is “reasonable” under the Fourth

Amendment requires a careful balancing of “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s

Fourth Amendment interests” against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. See Graham v.

Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (quoting United

States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). Where the use

of force is not reasonable, liability may arise. See Scott

v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (citing United

States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)) (an officer’s evil

intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor

will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional); Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1725 (2019) (“A particular officer’s

state of mind is simply ‘irrelevant,’ and it provides ‘no

basis for invalidating an arrest.’ ” (quoting Devenpeck

v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153, 155 (2004))). Because of

this fact-specific inquiry, these cases would generally

present an ideal vehicle for “clearly establishing”

rights.

Graham illustrates part of the problem with nonbinding opinions in excessive force cases: the fact-specific nature of the cases is exactly the type of case that

is not ideal for making long-term, binding law, and is

accordingly the type most often disposed of via nonbinding memorandum opinions. The second part of the

problem, the use of these Local Rules in the context of

excessive force cases, highlights what Counsel calls the

‘non-binding paradox,’ which exists where a non-binding memorandum opinion is the only authority for a

proposition of law.

D) The Non-binding Paradox

A right recognized in a non-binding memorandum

opinion cannot form the basis of Section 1983 liability

without regard to whether the memorandum opinion

is an intra-Circuit or inter-Circuit opinion.

The non-binding paradox is Counsel’s term for the

concept that non-binding opinions cannot “clearly establish” a right, yet non-binding opinions should be

used only when the law is well-settled. This paradox is

based on the following observations:

1) Non-binding opinions do not make law.

Non-binding opinions do not establish precedent

because non-binding opinions are intended for use only

where the law is settled. See USCS Fed. Rules App.

Proc. R. 32.1. Where the law is not settled, the varied

but consistent rules across the entirety of the federal

judiciary compel the conclusion that a non-binding

opinion is inappropriate.

2) Non-binding opinions cannot alter the

law.

Additionally, non-binding memorandum opinions

cannot change the law and should not differ from existing precedent. See generally Indep. Cmty. Bankers of

Am. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., 338 U.S.

App. D.C. 413, 195 F.3d 28, 34 (1999) (In the event of

conflicting panel opinions from this court, the earlier

one controls, as one panel of this court may not overrule another.); Haynes v. Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 900 n.4

(10th Cir. 1996) (same); Texaco, Inc. v. La. Land & Expl.

Co., 995 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1993) (same).

3) Non-binding opinions are used because

the propositions for which the case stands

are settled already.

Existing internal procedures and circuit rules define when non-binding memorandum opinions are permissible. While the Second, Seventh, Eighth, and

Tenth Circuits do not have specific criteria they consider, the remaining Courts do.

In the First Circuit, opinions should be published

unless “an opinion does not articulate a new rule of law,

modify an established rule, apply an established rule

to novel facts or serve otherwise as a significant guide

to future litigants.” USCS Ct App 1st Cir. R. 36.0(b)(2);

USCS Ct App 1st Cir. IOP IX. B.

The Third Circuit uses Chapter Five of its internal

operating procedure to determine whether to publish

an opinion. See USCS Ct App 3rd Cir. IOP 5.2 (opinion

designated as precedential when it has precedential or

institutional value); USCS Ct App 3rd Cir. IOP 5.3

(non-binding if case has value only to the trial court or

the parties).

The Fourth Circuit rule is to publish only if the

opinion satisfies one or more of the following standards:

i. It establishes, alters, modifies, clarifies, or

explains a rule of law within this Circuit; or

ii. It involves a legal issue of continuing public

interest; or iii. It criticizes existing law; or iv.

It contains a historical review of a legal rule

that is not duplicative; or v. It resolves a

conflict between panels of this Court or creates a conflict with a decision in another circuit.

USCS Ct App 4th Cir. R. 36(a).

The Fifth Circuit rule is to publish if a case:

(a) Establishes a new rule of law, alters or

modifies an existing rule of law, or calls attention to an existing rule of law that appears to

have been generally overlooked; (b) Applies

an established rule of law to facts significantly

different from those in previous published

opinions applying the rule; (c) Explains, criticizes, or reviews the history of existing decisional or enacted law; (d) Creates or resolves

a conflict of authority either within the circuit

or between this circuit and another; (e) Concerns or discusses a factual or legal issue of

significant public interest; or (f ) Is rendered

in a case that has been reviewed previously

and its merits addressed by an opinion of the

United States Supreme Court.

USCS Ct App 5th Cir. R. 47.5.1.

The Sixth Circuit operating procedure to determine publication includes whether the decision:

(A) Establishes a new rule of law, modifies an

existing rule of law, or applies an established

rule to a novel factual situation; (B) Creates

or resolves a conflict of authority within this

circuit or between this circuit and another;

a concurring or dissenting opinion; (E) Reverses the decision below, unless: (i) the reversal was because of an intervening change in

law or fact; or (ii) the reversal is a remand to

the lower court or agency—without further

comment—of a case reversed or remanded by

the United States Supreme Court; (F) Addresses a published lower court or agency decision; or (G) Has been reviewed by the

United States Supreme Court.

USCS Ct App 6th Cir. IOP 32.1(b)(1).

The Ninth Circuit rule to determine publication

includes whether the decision:

(a) Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a

rule of federal law, or (b) Calls attention to a

rule of law which appears to have been generally overlooked, or (c) Criticizes existing law,

or (d) Involves a legal or factual issue of

unique interest or substantial public importance, or (e) Is a disposition of a case in

which there is a published opinion by a lower

court or administrative agency, unless the

panel determines that publication is unnecessary for clarifying the panel’s disposition of

the case, or (f ) Is a disposition of a case following a reversal or remand by the United

States Supreme Court, or (g) Is accompanied

by a separate concurring or dissenting expression, and the author of such separate expression requests publication of the disposition of

the Court and the separate expression.

USCS Ct App 9th Cir. R. 36-2.

The Eleventh Circuit practice is to allow for a majority of the panel to determine whether an opinion

will be published. See USCS Ct App 11th Cir. IOP. The

Federal Circuit issues non-binding opinions when nonbinding, it is determined by the panel that issuing a

published opinion does not add significantly to the

body of law. See USCS Ct App Fed. Cir. R. 32.1(b).

The District of Columbia Circuit considers:

(A) with regard to a substantial issue it resolves, it is a case of first impression or the

first case to present the issue in this court; (B)

it alters, modifies, or significantly clarifies a

rule of law previously announced by the court;

that appears to have been generally overlooked; (D) it criticizes or questions existing

law; (E) it resolves an apparent conflict in decisions within the circuit or creates a conflict

with another circuit; (F) it reverses a published agency or district court decision, or affirms a decision of the district court upon

grounds different from those set forth in the

district court’s published opinion; (G) it warrants publication in light of other factors that

give it general public interest for publication.

USCS Ct App D.C. Cir. R. 36(c)(2).

4) Even though only used when the law is

both settled and clear, non-binding opinions form no basis for a finding of “clearly

established” rights.

“[O]nly binding precedent can clearly establish a

right for qualified immunity purposes.” Gilmore v.

Hodges, 738 F.3d 266, 279 (11th Cir. 2013). In order to

determine whether a right is “clearly established,” a

district court must look to the then-existing binding

precedent from the Supreme Court, the governing Circuit, or itself. Mumford v. Zieba, 4 F.3d 429, 432 (6th

Cir. 1993) (citing Ohio Civil Serv. Employees Ass’n v.

Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1177 (6th Cir. 1988)).

5) Application of the Non-binding Paradox

to Petitioner’s Case

Petitioner’s request for certiorari squarely presents the problem of the non-binding paradox. On direct appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary

judgment in a non-binding memorandum opinion with

Judge Bybee dissenting in part. VBS Distribution v.

Nutrivita Labs., Inc., 811 F. App’x 1005 (9th Cir. 2020).

Judge Bybee, dissenting, notes a conflict between this

case and prior published decisions.

Whereas in this case the panel majority held that

a lack of proof of damages entitled the defendants to

summary judgment under the Lanham Act, Judge

Bybee pointed out that prior published decisions were

resolved in favor of the plaintiffs even when no evidence of damages was presented. VBS Distribution v.

Nutrivita Labs., Inc., 811 F. App’x 1005, 1011 n.2 (9th

Cir. 2020) (Bybee, J. Dissenting) (citing Harper House,

Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 210 (9th Cir.

1989), and TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653

F.3d 820, 831 (9th Cir. 2011)).

Rehearing was denied. VBS Distrib. v. Nutrivita

Labs., Inc., 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 18632 (9th Cir. Cal.,

June 12, 2020).

The disagreement over interpretation of existing

precedent would call for publication under the First,

Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits’ rules. See

USCS Ct App 1st Cir. R. 36.0(b)(2); USCS Ct App 1st

Cir. IOP IX. B; USCS Ct App 4th Cir. R. 36(a)(i); USCS

Ct App 5th Cir. R. 47.5.1(b); USCS Ct App 6th Cir. IOP

32.1(b)(1)(D); and USCS Ct App 9th Cir. R. 36-2(g) (if

requested by Justice Bybee).

Use of a non-binding memorandum opinion in this

instance highlights the functional problem of nonbinding opinions. There is now a secondary line of legal

authority, binding only on the parties, that applies a

different standard for injury than the “binding” law of

the Circuit.

This problem is also evident in other contexts,

such as excessive force cases.

E) Non-binding memorandum opinions are unnecessary and are particularly problematic

in the context of excessive force cases that

implicate both the Fourth Amendment and

Section 1983.

Within the confines of excessive force cases,

“clearly establishing” a right has proven almost

unutterably problematic. This Court’s 1989 decision in

Graham, the cornerstone case for excessive force

causes of action, has been cited over 21,500 times, including 36 times (averaging more than once a year) by

this Court since its decision.6

See Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1725 (2019); Kisela

v. Hughes, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018); Cty. of L.A.

v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539, 1542 (2017); Salazar-Limon v. City of

Hous., 137 S. Ct. 1277, 1281 (2017) (Sotomayor, J. Dissenting

from denial of certorari); White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551

(2017); Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 316 (2015) (Sotomayor,

J. Dissenting from grant of summary reversal); Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397 (2015); City & Cty. of S.F. v. Sheehan,

575 U.S. 600 (2015); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 766

(2014); Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014); Ryburn v. Huff,

565 U.S. 469, 477 (2012); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 466

(2011); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl.

Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 721 (2010); L.A. Cty. v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609,

614 (2007); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007); Brigham

City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006); Muehler v. Mena, 544

U.S. 93, 95 (2005); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004);

United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 640 (2004); United States

v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 39 (2003); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S.

760, 773 n.5 (2003); City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope

Found., 538 U.S. 188, 200 (2003); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

197 (2001); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001);

Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 74 (2000); Wilson v. Layne, 526

U.S. 603, 605 (1999); Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 293 (1999);

Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998); United

1) Entitlement to Immunity

A government official sued under Section 1983 is

entitled to qualified immunity unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was

clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011).

A right is clearly established only if its contours are

sufficiently clear that “a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

Non-binding memorandum opinions do not

“clearly establish” a right. A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time

of the challenged conduct, “[t]he contours of [a] right

[are] sufficiently clear” that every “reasonable official

would [have understood] that what he is doing violates

that right.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741, quoting Anderson

v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The Court does

not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional

question beyond debate. See al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741;

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).

States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997); Koon v. United

States, 518 U.S. 81, 103 (1996); Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,

268 (1994) (Rehnquist, J. Plurality op.); United States v. James

Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 46 (1993); Soldal v. Cook

Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 70 (1992); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299

(1991); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274

(1990); and Justice v. Dennis, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989).

2) Ignorance and Immunity

“The prevailing general rule for criminal responsibility is that, unless the legislature indicates its intention to make it so, ignorance or mistake of law is no

defense.” Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Criminal Justice Codification, Revision and Reform Act of 1974, Vol. II, p. 94. “The principle that

ignorance of the law is no defense applies whether the

law be a statute or a duly promulgated and published

regulation.” United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem.

Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971). This rule is applied

laxly, if at all, to peace officers. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61, 135 S. Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (ignorance of law not a basis for suppressing evidence); cf.

State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)

(refusing to adopt Heien for interpretation of the Texas

Constitution). “Reasonable” ignorance completely immunizes police officers from Section 1983 liability. See

Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (a right is

only “clearly established” if every reasonable official

would have understood that what he is doing violates

that right).

3) Specificity and Immunity

“This Court has repeatedly told courts . . . not to

define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” City of Escondido v. Emmons, 139 S. Ct. 500, 503

(2019) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. ___, 138

S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The requirement of specificity has resulted in

the dismissal of multiple Fourth Amendment (including excessive force) cases on qualified immunity

grounds. See Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309

(2015) (excessive [lethal] force); Carroll v. Carman, 574

U.S. 13, 17 (2014) (Fourth Amendment); Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 654 (2014) (Fourth Amendment); alKidd, 563 U.S. at 735 (Fourth Amendment); Brosseau

v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (Fourth Amendment); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 207 (2001) (Fourth

Amendment); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)

(excessive force and Fourth Amendment).

These requirements of specific, binding law directly on point make the continued use of non-binding

memorandum opinions in this context problematic

since the non-binding opinion should never have issued unless the law was already clear. See USCS Ct

App 1st Cir. R. 36.0(b)(2) and USCS Ct App 1st Cir. IOP

IX. B (publication criteria versus non-binding opinion);

USCS Ct App 3rd Cir. IOP 5.3 (same); USCS Ct App

4th Cir. R. 36(a) (same); USCS Ct App 5th Cir. R. 47.5.1

(same); USCS Ct App 6th Cir. IOP 32.1(b)(1) (same);

USCS Ct App 9th Cir. R. 36-2 (same); USCS Ct App

Fed. Cir. R. 32.1(b) (same); USCS Ct App D.C. Cir. R.

36(c)(2) (same).

4) Rules allowing for summary disposition

negate the need for non-binding opinions.

The workload problem “solved” by non-binding

memorandum opinions is more easily solved by wider

use of the existing summary disposition or summary

affirmance rules adopted in every Circuit. See USCS

Ct App Fed. Cir. R. 36; USCS Ct App 1st Cir. R. 27.0;

USCS Ct App 2nd Cir. R. 32.1.1; USCS Ct App 3rd Cir.

R. 27.4; USCS Ct App 4th Cir. R. 27(f ); USCS Ct App

5th Cir. R. 47.6; USCS Ct App 6th Cir. R. 36 (disposition

in open court); USCS Ct App 7th Cir. R. 2 (see Mather

v. Mundelein, 869 F.2d 356, 357 (7th Cir. 1989)); USCS

Ct App 8th Cir. R. 47B; USCS Ct App 9th Cir. R. 27-3

(see United States v. Harris, 846 F.2d 50, 50 (9th Cir.

1988)); USCS Ct App 10th Cir. R. 27.3; USCS Ct App

11th Cir. R. 2-1 (see Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,

406 F.2d 1158, 1161 (5th Cir. 1969)). See also Bonner v.

City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981)

(after the Fifth Circuit split and the Eleventh Circuit

was established, the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down before the

close of business on September 30, 1981); USCS Ct App

D.C. Cir. R. 27(g) (see Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures, United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit, at 28 (2019)).

The law is either settled, or it is not. If the law is

settled, existing rules and practices provide for a methodology for disposition of the case. Where, as here,

there is disagreement over whether the law is settled,

publication would settle the law and should be required.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari and this amicus curiae brief, this Court

should grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

J. EDWARD NIEHAUS (#291968)

Counsel of Record

BODKIN NIEHAUS DORRIS & JOLLEY PLLC

6021 Morriss Rd., Suite 111

Flower Mound, TX 75028

(972) 704-1368

Jason@BNDJlegal.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Dated: September 23, 2020

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.