Amicus Curiae Brief — Harold Shurtleff, et al., Petitioners v. City of Boston, Massachusetts, et al.

No. 20-1800

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________________

HAROLD SHURTLEFF, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

CITY OF BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, et al.,

Respondents.

__________________

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

__________________

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE LIBERTY, LIFE

AND LAW FOUNDATION IN SUPPORT OF

PETITIONERS

__________________

DEBORAH J. DEWART

Counsel of Record

ATTORNEY AT LAW

111 Magnolia Lane

Hubert, NC 28539

(910) 326-4554

lawyerdeborah@outlook.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

Becker Gallagher · Cincinnati, OH · Washington, D.C. · 800.890.5001

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

I.

Courts Should Be Wary of Using the

Government Speech Doctrine to Chill Private

Expression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

II.

Factors Considered in Other Contexts

Compel the Conclusion That the Flags Are

Private Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

A. History does not require that flags

always be c har ac t er i zed as

government speech. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

B. The City has intentionally opened

a public forum for diverse

viewpoints and retained a strictly

administrative role. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

C. The messages are transmitted by

means consistent with private

speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

D. Private speakers bear ultimate

responsibility for the messages

conveyed by the flags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

E. Observers would readily recognize

the flags as private speech. . . . . . . . . . . . 21

ii

III.

The Establishment Clause Cannot Salvage

the City's Policy. This Court Must Zealously

Guard the Right to Religious Speech . . . . . . 22

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

ACLU v. Tata,

742 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 18

Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Bredesen,

441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Arizona Life Coalition v. Stanton,

515 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 19

Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes,

523 U.S. 666 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Berger v. ACLU,

135 S. Ct. 2886 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens,

496 U.S. 226 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System

v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n,

564 U.S. 786 (2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd.

v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) . . . . . . . . . 2, 15, 23

Choose Life of Ill., Inc., v. White,

547 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 2008). . . . . . . . . . 18, 21, 22

Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,

508 U. S. 520 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and

Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985) . . . . . . 2, 11

iv

Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of

Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,

483 U.S. 327 (1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Galloway v. Town of Greece,

681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Graff v. City of Chicago,

9 F.3d 1309 (7th Cir. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and

Bisexual Grp. of Boston,

515 U.S. 557 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 8, 12

International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.

v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Johanns v. Livestock Mkgt. Ass’n,

544 U.S. 550 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty.,

653 F.3d 341 (4th Cir. 2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Kaplan v. California,

413 U.S. 115 (1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the

Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000) . . . . 6

Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free

Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). . . . . . . . . . . 11, 25

Leake v. Drinkard,

2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 29323

(11th Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 19, 22

Lee v. Weisman,

505 U.S. 577 (1992). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

v

Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,

531 U.S. 533 (2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5, 12

Lewis v. Wilson,

253 F.3d 1077 (8th Cir. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 10

Lubavitch Chabad House v. City of Chicago,

917 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Lynch v. Donnelly,

465 U.S. 668 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Marsh v. Chambers,

463 U.S. 783 (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 26

Matal v. Tam,

137 S. Ct. 1744 (2018). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

McCreary County v. ACLU,

545 U.S. 844 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,

524 U.S. 569 (1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Page v. Lexington County School District One,

531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,

460 U.S. 37 (1983). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v. Rose,

361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir. 2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,

555 U.S. 460 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Reed v. Town of Gilbert,

135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

vi

Regan v. Time, Inc.,

468 U.S. 641 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Roach v. Stouffer,

560 F.3d 860 (8th Cir. 2009). . . . . . . . . . 10, 18, 19

Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va.,

515 U.S. 819 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc.,

547 U.S. 47 (2006). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Rust v. Sullivan,

500 U.S. 173 (1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 5, 12

Salazar v. Buono,

559 U.S. 700 (2010). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Doe,

530 U.S. 290 (2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,

452 U.S. 61 (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Shurtleff v. City of Boston,

986 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r

of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles,

288 F.3d 610 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of

Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles,

305 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Spence v. Wash.,

418 U.S. 405 (1974). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

vii

Stromberg v. California,

283 U.S. 359 (1931). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans

v. Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2014) . . . 18

Town of Greece v. Galloway,

572 U.S. 565 (2014). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Tucker v. City of Fairfield,

398 F.3d 457 (6th Cir. 2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc.,

539 U.S. 194 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Van Orden v. Perry,

545 U.S. 677 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate

Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200,

135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

Walz v. Tax Comm’n,

397 U.S. 664 (1970). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 24, 25

Wells v. City & County of Denver,

257 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette,

319 U.S. 624 (1943). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Widmar v. Vincent,

454 U.S. 263 (1981). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Wooley v. Maynard,

430 U.S. 705 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

viii

Zorach v. Clauson,

343 U.S. 306 (1952). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 27

STATUTES

17 U.S.C. 201(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

OTHER AUTHORITIES

R. Bezanson & W. Buss, The Many Faces of

Government Speech, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1377 (2001)

........................................ 4

Emily Fitch, An Inconsistent Truth: The Various

Establishment Clause Tests As Applied in the

Context of Public Displays of (Allegedly)

“Religious” Symbols and Their Applicability

Today, 34 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 431 (2014). . . . . . . . 23

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1

Liberty, Life and Law Foundation (“LLLF”), as

amicus curiae, respectfully urges this Court to reverse

the decision of the First Circuit.

LLLF is a North Carolina nonprofit corporation

established to defend religious liberty, sanctity of

human life, liberty of conscience, family values, and

other moral principles. LLLF is gravely concerned

about the growing hostility to religious expression in

America and the related threats to liberty and

conscience. LLLF’s counsel, Deborah J. Dewart, is the

author of a book, Death of a Christian Nation, and

many amicus curiae briefs in this Court and the federal

circuits, including amicus curiae briefs in Pleasant

Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) and

Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans,

Inc., 576 U.S. 200 (2015).

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE

ARGUMENT

This is an easy case. Or at least it should have been.

By its own admission, the City of Boston designated its

City Hall Flag Poles as one of several public forums for

private expression. But the First Circuit employed the

government speech doctrine to justify its refusal to

1

The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Amicus

curiae certifies that no counsel for a party authored this brief in

whole or in part and no person or entity, other than amicus, its

members, or its counsel, has made a monetary contribution to its

preparation or submission.

2

permit the temporary display of a Christian flag by

Camp Constitution, a private organization.

The first question is whether a flag displayed in

Boston’s designated forum should be characterized as

government speech or private speech. That distinction

is critical when religious speech is involved, as it is

here. “There is a crucial difference between government

speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment

Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,

which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses

protect.” Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v.

Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 765 (1995), citing Bd. of Educ. v.

Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (emphasis added).

This case easily falls within this Court’s three-step

framework to analyze restrictions of private speech on

government property—first, determine whether the

speech is protected by the First Amendment, then

identify the forum (public or nonpublic), and finally,

evaluate the reasons for exclusion. Cornelius v. NAACP

Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797

(1985). The key to the first step is characterizing the

speech as either government or private speech. “Under

our First Amendment cases, the distinction between

government speech and private speech is critical.”

Walker, 576 U.S. at 221 (Alito, J., dissenting). The First

Amendment restraints on government apply only to

private speech—“government regulation may not favor

one speaker over another.” Rosenberger v. Rector and

Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995). When

the government itself is speaking, it may “select the

views that it wants to express.” Pleasant Grove City v.

Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467-468 (2009).

3

The First Circuit asked the right threshold question

but got the wrong answer.

ARGUMENT

I.

COURTS SHOULD BE WARY OF USING

THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH DOCTRINE

TO CHILL PRIVATE EXPRESSION.

The First Circuit’s analysis hinges on the

government speech doctrine. This developing doctrine

should be carefully restrained to prevent the power and

machinery of government from being used to stifle

private expression or distort debate on matters of

public concern.

Since America is a nation governed by consent of

the people, “the democratic process . . . provides a check

on government speech.” Walker, 576 U.S. at 207; see

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth,

529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000); Summum, 555 U.S. at

467-468; Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1757 (2018).

The government may “represent its citizens” by taking

a position, promoting a program, or implementing a

policy. Walker, 576 U.S. at 208. Government may

directly fund its own message (e.g., Johanns v.

Livestock Mkgt. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005)) or

“disburse[] public funds to private entities to convey

[its] message.” Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833 citing Rust

v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). Funding may be

distributed to private speakers to assist indigent

citizens, as in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531

U.S. 533 (2001).

The line between government and private speech

may not be easy to draw. Some overlap is inevitable,

4

raising constitutional concerns and “present[ing]

heightened risks that the government may displace or

monopolize private speech by inserting its voice in the

speech marketplace.” R. Bezanson & W. Buss, The

Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 Iowa L. Rev.

1377, 1381 (2001). In some contexts, government and

private speech overlap or blend in a unique manner.

Legislative prayer is a unique blend (Sect. III). License

plates are perhaps “the quintessential example of

speech that is both private and governmental.” Sons of

Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of

Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 245 (4th Cir. 2002).

There is no rigid formula for every context, although

past cases suggest helpful criteria. As this Court

cautioned in Matal v. Tam, “Walker . . . likely marks

the outer bounds of the government-speech doctrine.”

137 S. Ct. at 1760. Matal recounted the key criteria

used in Walker, including the longstanding use of

license plates to convey state messages, public

identification of license plates with the government,

and the state's manufacturing, ownership, design, and

direct control over the plates. Id. These and other

factors help shape the analysis.

II.

FACTORS CONSIDERED IN OTHER

CONTEXTS COMPEL THE CONCLUSION

THAT THE FLAGS ARE PRIVATE

SPEECH.

Characterization of speech is relevant in a wide

range of contexts: monuments on public property

(Summum); license plates (Walker);

government-sponsored program (Johanns);

government-funded legal services for the indigent

5

(Velazquez); government-funded childbirth (Rust);

student groups (Rosenberger); trademark registration

(Matal); parades (Hurley); libraries; museums; art

displays; public television stations; competitive grant

programs; legislative invocations. A careful look at

various contexts reveals a wealth of factors to consider:

• History

• The government’s role, purpose, intent, and funding

• Government role - sponsor, patron, regulator,

revenue raiser, or administrator

• Government funds its own message

• Government funds a favored viewpoint or

solution to a problem

• Transmission of the message

• Permanence v. portability

• Ownership of the means of communication

• Number of speakers and ability to accommodate

• Responsibility for the message

• Editorial control

• Who originates the message?

• Who designs the message?

• Who organizes and/or promotes the event?

• What is the government's application process for

participation?

• Who is the literal speaker?

• How would observers understand the message?

The First Circuit considered only two contexts, the

monuments in Summum and license plates in Walker,

and extracted only three factors from those cases—

history, an observer’s perspective, and control of the

message. Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 986 F.3d 78,87 (1st

Cir. 2021). These factors overlap the four-factor license

6

plate test developed by the Eighth Circuit in Knights of

the Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of the Univ. of Mo., 203

F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000) (primary purpose, editorial

control, literal speaker, ultimate responsibility). The

First Circuit relied on Walker, which in turn relied in

Summum. License plates (1) “long have communicated

messages from the States”; (2) are reasonably

interpreted “as conveying a message on the state’s

behalf”; and (3) convey messages “effectively controlled”

by the state, which retains “final approval authority.”

Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 88.

Courts should be cautious about importing legal

tests developed for a unique context (e.g., license

plates) into other dissimilar settings. License plates are

not analogous to flags. The flags, unlike license plates,

are not owned by the City and bear no seal of

government approval. The application process is

largely invisible to the general public. The state

manufactures license plates, retains ownership, and

places its name on them, although the vehicles are

privately owned and operated, potentially implicating

private speech concerns. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.

705, 715 (1977) (state could not require citizens to use

their private property as a “mobile billboard” for the

“State’s ideological message”). The plates serve an

important government function—vehicle identification.

The private speakers’ agreement with the message (if

there is one) does not supersede the state’s role.

License plate schemes vary widely from state to state,

or even within one state. Texas had three schemes, and

only one of them was before this Court in Walker. 135

S. Ct. at 2244. Some, as in Walker, require a level of

government editorial control that renders them

7

government speech. See also Berger v. ACLU, 135 S. Ct.

2886 (2015), vacating and remanding ACLU v. Tata,

742 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 2014) (North Carolina “Choose

Life” and other specialty license plates require

legislative authorization). Individualized vanity

plates—which were not before this Court in

Walker—present compelling arguments for private

speech. See Lewis v. Wilson, 253 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th

Cir. 2001).

A flag is neither a license plate nor a permanent

monument. Both government entities and private

organizations use flags to communicate messages. A

person observing a private event would not reasonably

attribute the message on a temporarily displayed flag

to the City. The City has neither editorial control nor

authority to approve or disapprove the message—its

approval is focused strictly on administrative criteria

such as scheduling conflicts.

A. History does not require that flags always

be characterized as government speech.

There is no question that “governments have used

flags throughout history to communicate messages and

ideas.” Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 88. Flags identify nations,

states, and other political divisions. But the

government does not corner the market.

For First Amendment purposes, “speech” sweeps in

a wide range of private expression, including artwork,

motion pictures, photographs, music2 —and flags. “The

2

Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984) (photography);

Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) (“pictures, films,

8

Court for decades has recognized the communicative

connotations of the use of flags.” Spence v. Wash., 418

U.S. 405, 410 (1974), citing Stromberg v. California,

283 U.S. 359 (1931). In Spence, where a privately

owned flag was used to protest the Viet Nam War,

communication occurred “not only [through] the flag

but also the superimposed peace symbol.” Spence, 418

U.S. at 410. A flag is a “primitive but effective way of

communicating ideas” and “a short cut from mind to

mind.” West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.

624, 632 (1943). Walker was about a flag design on a

license plate. “The Confederate battle flag is a

controversial symbol” that to some observers

“symbolizes slavery, segregation, and hatred.” 576 U.S.

at 234 (Alito, J., dissenting).

History is not an isolated factor. The monuments in

Summum were placed in a public park, a classic

traditional public forum for private speech, but because

of their permanence and other factors they were

characterized as government speech. In Walker, this

Court noted that “license plates are not traditional

public forums for private speech.” 576 U.S. at 214. But

the Court was far from unanimous on this factor—or

the opinion itself, which split 5 to 4. “The contrast

between the history of public monuments, which have

been used to convey government messages for

paintings, drawings, engravings”); Schad v. Borough of Mount

Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981) (motion pictures, music,

dramatic works); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian &

Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (art, music,

literature); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790

(2011) (books, plays, films, video games).

9

centuries, and the Texas license plate program could

not be starker.” Id. at 230 (Alito, J., dissenting). In the

very different context of legislative invocations, history

is a pivotal factor. Legislative prayer is “part of the

fabric of our society.” Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,

795 (1983). “[A]n unbroken practice...is not something

to be lightly cast aside.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S.

664, 678 (1970).

B. The City has intentionally opened a public

forum for diverse viewpoints and retained

a strictly administrative role.

Government involvement is a key consideration—its

purpose, intent, funding, and overall role. Here, the

City’s association with the private flags is tangential

and its role is administrative. The City does not create,

own, or control the private flags temporarily displayed

in the forum it created. The City has no financial

investment in the flags. The private owner creates the

flag, applies to use the forum, retains ownership, and

sponsors a private event. Flags convey a vast array of

diverse messages. The City could not possibly endorse

every message without “babbling prodigiously and

incoherently.” Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. at 1758. The

purpose of Boston’s application process is purely

administrative, e.g., to avoid scheduling conflicts.

Purpose. The government may facilitate or fund

expression for many purposes—to raise revenue,

identify vehicles, encourage an activity in the public

interest, or facilitate diverse private expression. The

government may fund its own program, as in Johanns

(beef program implemented a “federal policy of

promoting the marketing and consumption of beef and

10

beef products, using funds raised by an assessment”).

544 U.S. at 553.

In Summum, the City’s purpose was to create a

display about its local history. Walker involved a

license plate program—a context where the state’s

purpose varies widely. See, e.g., Lewis v. Wilson, 253

F.3d at 1079 (“to give vent to the personality, and

reveal the character or views of the plate's holder”);

Arizona Life Coalition v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 966

(9th Cir. 2008) (raise revenue); Roach v. Stouffer, 560

F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (to “allow private

organizations to promote their messages” and “allow

private individuals to support [them]”).

The purpose of the government property may (or

may not) implicate private expression. The purpose of

a public airport terminal is “facilitation passenger air

travel,” not “the promotion of expression.” International

Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S.

672, 682 (1992). Government-issued license plates

identify vehicles and raise revenue, but modern

specialty plates may facilitate private speech.

Here, Boston created “an environment in the City

where everyone feels included, . . . to foster diversity and

build and strengthen connections among Boston’s many

communities.” Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 83 (emphasis

added). The City’s own language thus reveals that its

purpose is “to encourage a diversity of views from

private speakers” rather than to speak for itself.

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834.

Intent. Boston intentionally designated the “City

Hall Flags Poles” as one of several public forums to

11

facilitate private events and expression. See Perry

Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S.

37, 45-46 (1983); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. Speakers

cannot be excluded absent a compelling state

interest—and never to suppress the speaker's

viewpoint. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at

799. Even in a limited nonpublic forum, viewpoint

discrimination, an “egregious form of content

discrimination,” is impermissible and restrictions

reasonable in light of its purpose. Rosenberger, 515

U.S. at 829-830; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; Lamb’s

Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508

U.S. 384, 390 (1993). The government “must respect

the lawful boundaries it has itself set.” Rosenberger,

515 U.S. at 829. Boston's explicit intent contrasts with

“Texas’s policies and the nature of its license plates” in

Walker, where this Court concluded the state did not

intend to designate its specialty license plate program

as a forum for private expression. Walker, 576 U.S. at

216.

Funding. The government's role may include

funding. In Johanns, the government funded its own

message and policy created by statute (The Beef

Promotion and Research Act of 1985), which authorized

raising funds through an assessment on cattle sales

and importation. 554 U.S. at 553. In Matal, this Court

cited an example from World War II, when “the Federal

Government produced and distributed millions of

posters to promote the war effort” but was not required

to produce and distribute posters discouraging that

effort. 137 S. Ct. at 1758.

12

When the government sponsors and funds its own

message, it may use private participants. Leake v.

Drinkard, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 29323, *14 (11th Cir.

2021) (annual parade). But private parade organizers

have comparable rights to craft a message, as in

Hurley, 515 U.S. 557. The government may selectively

fund one viewpoint “dedicated to advance certain

permissible goals, because the program in advancing

those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals.”

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991). Government

may provide funds to encourage a diversity of views

from private speakers, but must not engage in

viewpoint discrimination. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 834;

see Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (purpose was to help

indigent people by facilitating private speech, not to

promote a government message).

Here, Boston is not funding its own message or a

favored viewpoint. On the contrary, the City has

opened a wide door for diverse private expression.

Role. There are many roles the government may

assume, with varying degrees of discretion. Nat’l

Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998)

(patron of the arts with discretion to award grants);

Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666

(1998) (public television); United States v. Am. Library

Ass’n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (library books);

Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (compilation of monuments for

historical display). In these cases, the government

retained editorial control over the selections without

endorsing the private message embedded in any

particular item. Here, however, Boston has no editorial

control over the message a private entity conveys

13

through its flag and is not selecting items as part of a

collection. Public monuments, libraries, and television

stations are not analogous.

Matal cautions against “a huge and dangerous

extension of the government speech doctrine” to

contexts where the government has a solely

administrative role, as it did in that case (registration

of trademarks). 137 S. Ct. at 1760. This doctrine is

“susceptible to dangerous misuse” because “government

could silence or muffle the expression of disfavored

viewpoints.” Id. at 1758. Therefore, this Court “must

exercise great caution before extending our

government-speech precedents.” Id.

As Petitioners correctly contended, “the City’s

permitting process for the raising of third-party flags

vests in government officials unbridled discretion to

approve and deny protected speech.” Shurtleff, 986

F.3d at 85. In cases involving nonpublic or limited

public forums, a policy that does not provide sufficient

criteria to prevent viewpoint discrimination generally

will not survive constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Reed

v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2229 (2015) (a Sign

Code compliance manager who disliked the Church’s

teachings could potentially deploy the Code to make it

more difficult for the Church to advertise the location

of its services).

In Matal, the purpose of trademark registration was

not expressive but administrative, although a

particular mark could be created for expressive

purposes. The line between government and private

speech was not blurred. The same is true here. The

City opened a wide door for private expression,

14

reserving a purely administrative role, but then

arbitrarily slammed the door in the face of an applicant

who submitted a flag with religious content. The result

is blatant viewpoint discrimination.

C. The messages are transmitted by means

consistent with private speech.

Permanence. Permanent means of transmission

on government property suggests government speech,

because it is “not common for property owners to open

up their property for the installation of permanent

monuments that convey a message with which they do

not wish to be associated.” Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 89,

quoting Summum, 555 U.S. at 471. “Speakers, no

matter how long-winded, eventually come to the end of

their remarks . . . monuments, however, endure.” Id. at

479. Objects that are permanent or not easily moved

generally do not qualify as protected private speech.

Graff v. City of Chicago, 9 F.3d 1309, 1314 (7th Cir.

1993) (no right to erect newsstands on a public

sidewalk); Lubavitch Chabad House v. City of Chicago,

917 F.2d 341, 346-348 (7th Cir. 1990) (no right to

display freestanding Chanukah menorah in public area

of airport).

But even if “the Walker Court explicitly disavowed

any suggestion that permanence is a prerequisite for

finding government speech” (Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 90),

private speech on public property is typically transient,

e.g., oral communication or literature distribution.

Summum, 555 U.S. at 464. The use of portable,

temporary, non-obstructive props is often entitled to

First Amendment rights on public property. Tucker v.

City of Fairfield, 398 F.3d 457, 462 (6th Cir. 2005)

15

(balloons); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761 (cross erected for 16

days on public property that had been opened up for

similar temporary displays).

Although a flag could remain in place indefinitely,

it is not a permanent structure. It is portable, easily

moved after being temporary displayed. Flags are

much more analogous to transitory communication and

portable props than the permanent monuments in

Summum. This factor is a strong indication that the

flags are private speech.

Ownership of the means of communication. In

Summum, the City took ownership of [the donated]

monument” and Texas owned the license plates in

Walker. Shurtleff, 786 F.3d at 91. See also Wells v. City

& County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir.

2001) (city owned and maintained holiday display). In

this case, private organizations own the flags they

display at their events, and Boston “does not require

[them] to surrender ownership . . . nor does it require

that a flag bear any particular design or logo.”

Shurtleff, 786 F.3d at 91. This factor cuts in favor of

private speech.

Ability to accommodate many speakers—time

and space limitations. A forum for private expression

is commonly open to a large number of speakers, but

“public parks can accommodate only a limited number

of permanent monuments.” Summum, 555 U.S. at 478.

The City of Boston can accommodate many private

groups who hold private events and briefly display

their own flags.

16

Spatial limitations “played a prominent part” in this

Court’s Summum analysis. Walker, 576 U.S. at 228

(Alito, J., dissenting). Large structures “monopolize the

use of the land on which they stand and interfere

permanently with other uses of public space.”

Summum, 555 U.S. at 479. “[M]onuments can last for

centuries and are difficult to move,” unlike “small,

light, mobile” license plates. Walker, 576 U.S. at 232

(Alito, J., dissenting). “[A] State could theoretically

offer a much larger number of license plate designs,

and those designs need not be available for time

immemorial.” Id. at 214.

Boston can accommodate many private

organizations who hold flag raising events—not

simultaneously but scheduled in advance for brief

periods of time. The City explicitly designated it as one

of several public forums and extended an open

invitation to private speakers. The lack of space and

time limitations drive the conclusion that Boston’s

“City Hall Flag Poles” is a forum for private speech.

D. Private

speakers

bear

ultimate

responsibility for the messages conveyed

by the flags.

Responsibility for the message requires a broad

examination of editorial control. Who originates the

message? See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tenn.

v. Bredesen, 441 F.3d 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2006)

(“government determines an overarching message and

retains power to approve every word disseminated”).

Who designs the message? If an event is involved, who

organizes and promotes it? What is the government's

application process for participation? Who is the literal

17

speaker? The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Johanns

merely “distilled” the Eighth Circuit’s four-factor test

for license plate cases by focusing on “the government’s

establishment of the message” and its “effective control

over the content and dissemination of the message.”

Page v. Lexington County School District One, 531 F.3d

275, 281 (4th Cir. 2008), citing Johanns, 544 U.S. at

560-562 (emphasis added). These are certainly key

factors.

Origin and design. In Walker, Texas exercised

final authority over each specialty plate. This Court

concluded that private parties’ participation in “the

design and propagation” of the messages “d[id] not

extinguish the governmental nature of the message.”

Walker, 576 U.S. at 217.

In Summum, the City crafted a message about its

pioneer history, selecting monuments based on

historical relevance and the donor's ties to the

community. The display, comprised of diverse

elements, resembled a museum or library; the City did

not parrot the words on the monuments. The final

display was analogous to a collective whole under

copyright law, where the works of several authors are

collected and a new work is created. 17 USC 201(c).

Boston has no role in the origin or design of the

privately owned flags displayed in its forum. It does not

select specific flags to include in a compilation that

conveys a single message. Its only “message” is all

about inclusiveness and diversity—a message that is

undercut by its selective rejection of Camp

Constitution’s flag merely because it is described as a

Christian flag.

18

Literal speaker. This factor is tricky with license

plates. Private vehicle owners display the message, so

private speech concerns are implicated, but the state

owns the plates. Planned Parenthood of S.C., Inc. v.

Rose, 361 F.3d 786, 794 (4th Cir. 2004) (“the literal

speaker of a bumper sticker message is the vehicle

owner, not the producer of the bumper sticker”); Roach

v. Stouffer, 560 F.3d 860, 867 (8th Cir. 2009) (“a

reasonable and fully informed observer would consider

the speaker to be the organization that sponsors and

the vehicle owner who displays the specialty license

plate”); Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans v.

Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388, 393 (5th Cir. 2014)

(“individual driving the car”). Cf. Choose Life of Ill., Inc.

v. White, 547 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 2008) (license

plates are “reasonably viewed as having the State’s

stamp of approval . . . owned and issued by the State”);

Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Comm’r of Va.

Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 621 (2002)

(“Virginia continues to own the special plates”).

The license plate factors are “instructive but neither

exhaustive nor always uniformly applicable.” ACLU v.

Tata, 742 F.3d at 569. These cases are readily

distinguished from Summum. In Summum, the City

was “speaking” through the display although private

donors created the messages on the monuments. When

a monument is donated to a city, the government

assumes legal title, possession, and control. and

therefore ultimate responsibility. Like a library or

museum, the City does not adopt every message on

every monument.

19

Control. In Summum, the City's control was

evident in its criteria for approval of monuments,

including historical significance and the donor

organization’s connection to the community. Summum,

555 U.S. at 466.

License plate schemes vary widely. In Roach, the

Missouri legislature could pass a bill creating a plate or

a private organization could submit an application

proposing one. Roach, 560 F.3d at 862. Missouri’s

process was found constitutionally deficient because it

granted officials unbridled discretion to decline an

application. Id. at 870. In Arizona, a statute provided

that “[t]he [C]ommission shall authorize a special

organization plate if the organization” met certain

minimal general requirements, such as serving the

community. Stanton, 515 F.3d at 961. The Texas

statutory scheme (Walker) included a process that

invited public comment, but state law provided that

Texas retained “sole control over the design, typeface,

color, and alphanumeric pattern for all license plates,”

including its specialty plates. Walker, 576 U.S. at 213.

A recent Eleventh Circuit case illustrates editorial

control in the context of an annual “Old Soldiers”

parade organized and funded by a city. Participation

required an application that “expressly required

applicants to describe the kinds of messages they

intended to convey at the Parade.” Leake, 2021 U.S.

App. LEXIS 29323 at *15. The City exercised control

“as the Parade’s organizer by excluding organizations

with whose speech the City disagreed.” Id. at 15-16; see

Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rts., Inc., 547

20

U.S. 47, 64 (2006) (“[A] parade organizer’s choice of

parade contingents . . . is . . . inherently expressive.”).

The First Circuit falls short in its efforts to describe

Boston’s alleged control over the messages

disseminated by the private speakers it has invited into

what it has characterized as a public forum. As

detailed in the Petition for Certiorari, the City has

expressed its intent to create a broadly inclusive

environment where “everyone feels included” and is

“treated with respect.” Pet. 5-6; App. 143a. This is

apparently “the City’s desired image.” See Shurtleff,

986 F.3d at 92 (“The record, taken as a whole, plainly

shows a city conscious of the message that it flies on

the third flagpole and an accompanying selectivity to

tailor that message to the City's desired image.”

(emphasis added)) The City’s policies enumerate

content-neutral reasons for denial, such as scheduling

conflicts, illegality, danger to health and safety,

procedural defects—contrary to the First Circuit’s

assertion that the procedures are designed to ensure

“that such flags display approvable messages.”

Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 90. A new policy, written after

the City denied Camp Constitution’s request, leaves

final approval decisions to “the City’s sole and complete

discretion” (Pet. 20), raising serious concerns about

unbridled discretion.

The City contends that its disapproval of the Camp

Constitution flag “allows it more appropriately to

celebrate the diversity and varied communities within

Boston.” Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 94. It is strange indeed

that exclusion of a particular community—indeed, a

religious one—would be called a celebration of

21

diversity. The City essentially says it disapproves of

Christianity. That is anathema to the First

Amendment.

E. Observers would readily recognize the

flags as private speech.

The “reasonable observer” would no doubt

understand both the City’s essential role in scheduling

private flag raising events and the private

organization’s selection of a particular flag. But the

First Circuit concludes that both close and faraway

observers would attribute the private flags’ messages

to the City. The close observer would “see a city

employee replace the city flag with a third-party flag”

whereas the “faraway observer . . . would see those

three flags waiving in unison, side-by-side, from

matching flagpoles.” Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 88. The

First Circuit also posits a “symbolic unity of the three

flags.” Id. But a reasonably informed observer would

understand the flags in terms of the City’s broad goals

of inclusion and diversity—not “symbolic unity.” Such

an observer would also be familiar with the application

process, where the government retains a solely

administrative role using content-neutral factors.

When private speech occurs in a context where the

government is involved, there is a risk of mixed

messages. In Summum, the Fraternal Order of the

Eagles, a private organization, was responsible for the

message on the Ten Commandments monument it

donated—but the final compilation “spoke” on behalf of

Pleasant Grove City. In a license plate case, the

Seventh Circuit asked whether, “[u]nder all the

circumstances, would a reasonable person consider the

22

speaker to be the government or a private party?”

Choose Life of Ill., 547 F.3d at 865. To answer that

question, the Court proposed three inquiries

reminiscent of the Eighth Circuit’s four-factor test: “the

degree to which the message originates with the

government, the degree to which the government

exercises editorial control over the message, and

whether the government or a private party

communicates the message.” Id (emphasis added). As

discussed in Sect. IID, the flags originate with private

speakers who retain editorial control and communicate

through events they privately sponsor and fund. This

case contrasts with Leake, where “observers would

interpret a parade promoted, organized, and funded by

the government” as a government message. 2021 U.S.

App. LEXIS 29323, *14 (emphasis added). The private

flag raising events in Boston’s public forum are

“promoted, organized, and funded” by private

organizations.

III.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CANNOT

SALVAGE THE CITY'S POLICY. THIS

COURT MUST ZEALOUSLY GUARD THE

RIGHT TO RELIGIOUS SPEECH.

This Court’s decision in Summum, which hinged on

the distinction between government and private

speech, was litigated “in the shadow” of the

Establishment Clause. Summum, 555 U.S. at 482

(Scalia, J., concurring); see id. at 486 (Souter, J.,

concurring) (“litigated . . . with one eye on the

Establishment Clause”). The Establishment Clause

was not expressly at issue but lurked beneath the

surface and sparked comments from several concurring

23

Justices. Monuments on government land are

presumably government speech, but in certain

contexts—“[s]ectarian identifications on markers in

Arlington Cemetery come to mind”—there is a common

understanding that a display with religious symbolism

does not represent the government’s chosen view. Id. at

487 (Souter, J., concurring). “And to recognize that is to

forgo any categorical rule at this point.” Id. “The city

ought not fear that today’s victory has propelled it from

the Free Speech Clause frying pan into the

Establishment Clause fire.” Id. at 482 (Scalia, J.,

concurring).

The Religion Clauses are complementary sides of

the same coin. Together they form a shield guarding

religious liberty from government intrusion. A more

principled approach would focus on whether liberty is

threatened by the challenged practice. The City

advances a policy that intentionally stifles religious

speech, which is not only “as fully protected . . . as

secular private expression,” but historically,

“government suppression of speech has so commonly

been directed precisely at religious speech that a

free-speech clause without religion would be Hamlet

without the prince.” Pinette, 515 U.S. at 760 (internal

citations omitted).

A temporary flag display does not bind the

conscience or coerce support for religion. “[I]t is

important to distinguish between governmental

authorization . . . and governmental advocacy.” Emily

Fitch, An Inconsistent Truth: The Various

Establishment Clause Tests As Applied in the Context

of Public Displays of (Allegedly) “Religious” Symbols

24

and Their Applicability Today, 34 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 431,

455 (2014) (emphasis added). A temporary, passive flag

display creates no obligation. Objectors are free to

disregard it but have no iron-clad right to be free of all

exposure to America’s religious heritage.

The City does not advocate its own message, but

merely accommodates a transitory message by

authorizing a private group to briefly use its property.

The government may acknowledge or accommodate

religion without transgressing the Establishment

Clause. Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of

Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.

327, 338 (1987) (religious employers are exempt from

religious discrimination law); Walz, 397 U.S. at 673

(church property tax exemption); Zorach v. Clauson,

343 U.S. 306, 308 (1952) (public school students

allowed time off-campus for religious instruction). The

government sometimes must accommodate religious

belief and practice, and the Establishment Clause is no

excuse for the failure to do so. Widmar v. Vincent, 454

U.S. 263, 271 (1981) (university could not exclude

religious student group; its “equal access” policy was

not incompatible with Establishment Clause);

Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839 (religious speakers must

be included in neutral, “broad-reaching government

programs”).

A long line of unbroken authority in this Court

affirms that the Constitution “mandates

accommodation” and “forbids hostility” toward religion.

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). Officials

must scrupulously avoid hostility toward religion or

discrimination against religious viewpoints. Church of

25

Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 532

(1995) (“The First Amendment forbids an official

purpose to disapprove of a particular religion, or of

religion in general.”); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394

(expression could not be excluded because it dealt with

a subject from a religious standpoint). In spite of other

distinctions and nuances, landmark Establishment

Clauses cases over the past sixty years are consistent

on this point: Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 719

(2010) (“The Constitution . . . leaves room to

accommodate divergent values within a

constitutionally permissible framework.”) “Benevolent

neutrality” is what the Constitution requires. Walz, 397

U.S. at 669. There is nothing “benevolent” about

Boston’s actions. The City's policy, conveniently

reduced to writing only after refusing a religious flag,

“bristles with hostility” toward religion. Santa Fe

Independent School Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318

(2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).

The First Circuit misunderstands this Court’s

precedents about hostility, adopting instead the

mistaken notion that government “neutrality” demands

not only neutrality between one religion and another,

but “between religion and nonreligion.” Shurtleff, 986

F.3d at 94. The First Amendment itself rejects this

counterfeit “neutrality”—it respects all views but

protects religion. The Religion Clauses were “written

by the descendants of people who had come to this land

precisely so that they could practice their religion

freely.” McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881

(2005). “Despite Justice Stevens’ recitation of

occasional language to the contrary . . . we have not,

and do not, adhere to the principle that the

26

Establishment Clause bars any and all governmental

preference for religion over irreligion” Van Orden v.

Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 684 n.3 (2005). The First

Amendment grants heightened protection to religious

faith, “too precious to be either proscribed or prescribed

by the State.” Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589

(1992). The corollary is not true in every respect.

Nonbelievers are entitled to deference, but the Religion

Clauses protect religion. Id. at 589.

Legislative Prayer. The Constitution restricts

government ties to religion while guarding private

religious expression. These complementary concepts

intersect in legislative prayer, a time-honored tradition

this Court affirmed in Marsh, based on historical

practice. In this unique context, private citizens pray in

a government setting. Long before the government

speech doctrine emerged, this Court described

legislative prayer as “a tolerable acknowledgment of

beliefs widely held among the people of this country.”

Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. Like the legislative prayer

cases, the City Flag Poles forum implicates the

government-private speech dichotomy in a context that

involves religious expression.

Prior to this Court's ruling in Town of Greece, lower

courts created a confusing “shorthand” distinguishing

sectarian and non-sectarian references that would

either thrust courts into forbidden theological territory

or squelch the liberties of citizens who volunteer to

pray for their governments. Such a classic Catch-22

violates both Establishment Clause and Free Speech

principles. The government becomes enmeshed in

religion if the prayers are government speech but risks

27

viewpoint discrimination if they are private speech.

The Fourth Circuit plunged government into a

theological abyss by limiting legislative invocations to

“nonsectarian prayers.” Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653

F.3d 341, 342 (4th Cir. 2011). The Second Circuit left

municipalities in a twilight zone of confusion

where—despite their best intentions and efforts to be

inclusive—they would “still have trouble preventing

the appearance of religious affiliation.” Galloway v.

Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 34 (2d Cir. 2012).

This Court cleared much of the confusion by

rejecting “[a]n insistence on nonsectarian or ecumenical

prayer as a single, fixed standard.” Town of Greece v.

Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 578 (2014). Such a

nonsectarian mandate “would force the legislatures

that sponsor prayers and the courts that are asked to

decide these cases to act as supervisors and censors of

religious speech.” Id. at 581. Moreover, modern prayer

policies have become more inclusive, using a neutral

selection process to invite a broad spectrum of private

speakers to pray according to conscience.

Like the legislature prayer cases, this case

implicates private religious speech in a context where

the government is involved. The City—and the First

Circuit—clearly rejected Camp Constitution’s flag

because of its religious description in the application,

even though “some of the flags that the City had raised

contained religious imagery,” e.g., the Turkish and

Portuguese flags. Shurtleff, 986 F.3d at 84. The City

explained its denial by referencing the Establishment

Clause (id.), but as with the legislative invocations and

other cases that acknowledge or accommodate religion,

28

that explanation falls flat and is constitutionally

unacceptable. Americans “are a religious people whose

institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” Zorach, 343

U.S. at 313. This Court must zealously guard their

right to religious speech.

CONCLUSION

Amicus curiae urges this court to reverse the First

Circuit ruling.

Respectfully submitted,

DEBORAH J. DEWART

Counsel of Record

ATTORNEY AT LAW

111 Magnolia Lane

Hubert, NC 28539

(910) 326-4554

lawyerdeborah@outlook.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae