Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Louisiana, Petitioner v. Tazin Ardell Hill

No. _______

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________________

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

v.

TAZIN ARDELL HILL,

__________________

Petitioner,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Louisiana Supreme Court

__________________

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

__________________

JEFF LANDRY

Attorney General

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

SHAE MCPHEE

Deputy Solicitor General

JOSIAH M. KOLLMEYER

Assistant Solicitor General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE

1885 N. Third Street

Baton Rouge, LA 70802

(225) 326-6766

murrille@ag.louisiana.gov

mcphees@ag.louisiana.gov

TYLER R. GREEN

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC

222 S. Main Street, Suite 500

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

(703) 243-9423

tyler@consovoymccarthy.com

DONALD D. LANDRY

District Attorney

15th JDC, Lafayette Parish

800 South Buchanan St.

6th Floor

Lafayette, Louisiana 70501

(337) 232-5170

Counsel for Petitioner

Becker Gallagher · Cincinnati, OH · Washington, D.C. · 800.890.5001

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1)

May a State require convicted sex offenders to

obtain and carry a state identification bearing

the words “sex offender” without facially

violating the First Amendment’s prohibition on

compelled speech?

(2)

Does a convicted sex offender have a First

Amendment right not to be prosecuted for

fraudulently altering a state identification card

after scratching off a statutorily required sexoffender designation?

ii

RELATED PROCEEDINGS

Louisiana v. Hill, 141 S. Ct. 1232 (2020);

State v. Hill, 2020-0323 (La. 10/1/20), 2020 WL

6145294;

State v. Hill, La. 15th Jud. Dist. Ct., no. 160634,

Division “K” (10/30/2019).

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

RELATED PROCEEDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . 1

OPINIONS BELOW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . . . 6

I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THIS

COURT’S HOLDINGS THAT THE FIRST AMENDMENT

DOES NOT LIMIT STATE SPEECH OR PROTECT

FRAUDULENT SPEECH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

A. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Decision

Conflicts with this Court’s GovernmentSpeech Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

1. The Sex-Offender Designation on Hill’s

State ID Constitutes State Speech that

Falls Outside the Ambit of the First

Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

iv

2. Even If Louisiana’s Sex-Offender

Designation on State IDs Amounts to

Compelled Speech, the Challenged Laws

Survive Strict Scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

B. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Decision

Conflicts with This Court’s Jurisprudence

Holding that the First Amendment Does Not

Protect Fraud. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

1. The First Amendment Allows a State to

Criminalize the Fraudulent Alteration of

an ID with a Sex-Offender Designation . 16

2. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s

Severability Analysis Does Not Cure the

Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

3. Nor Does the Fact that the State Can

Prosecute Hill Under Other Statutes Cure

the Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

II. THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

UNSETTLES FEDERAL AND STATE SEX-OFFENDER

REGISTRY REQUIREMENTS AND EXACERBATES A

SPLIT AMONG LOWER COURTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

A. The Lower Court’s Expansion of the First

Amendment’s Compelled-Speech Doctrine

Threatens Federal Sex-Offender Notification

Requirements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

B. The Louisiana Supreme Court Widened

Burgeoning Splits Between Lower Courts . . 21

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

v

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A: Denial of Motion for Stay of

Judgment

(December 10, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 1

APPENDIX B: Denial of Motion for Rehearing in

Supreme Court of Louisiana

(December 9, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 4

APPENDIX C: Supreme Court of Louisiana Opinion

(October 20, 2020) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 6

APPENDIX D: District Court Transcript from

Hearing on Motion to Quash

(October 30, 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 46

APPENDIX E: Bill of Information

(April 10, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . App. 64

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Benson v. Fischer,

No. 16-CV-509-DWF-TNL, 2019 WL 3562693

(D. Minn. Aug. 6, 2019) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Carney v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety,

875 F.3d 1347 (10th Cir. 2017). . . . . . . . . . . 11, 24

Doe 1 v. Marshall,

367 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (M.D. Ala. 2019) . . . . . . . 23

Doe v. Kerry,

No. 16-CV-0654-PJH, 2016 WL 5339804

(N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 23

Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc.,

333 U.S. 178 (1948). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17, 25

Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm.,

489 U.S. 214 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Glossip v. Gross,

576 U.S. 863 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing

Associates, 538 U.S. 600 (2003) . . . . . . . 16, 17, 25

Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n,

544 U.S. 550 (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 10

McKune v. Lile,

536 U.S. 24 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart,

427 U.S. 539 (1976). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

vii

Oregon v. Ice,

555 U.S. 160 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

People v. Minnis,

67 N. E. 3d 272 (Ill. 2016). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum,

555 U.S. 460 (2009). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 8

Reed v. Long,

No. 5:19-CV-385 (MTT), 2020 WL 7265693

(M.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2020). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Reed v. Town of Gilbert,

576 U.S. 155 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Repub. Party of Minn. v. White,

536 U.S. 765 (2002). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc.,

487 U.S. 781 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 19

Rosario v. Rockefeller,

410 U.S. 752 (1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Sable Commc’ns of Calif., Inc. v. F.C.C.,

492 U.S. 115 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Schneider v. New Jersey,

308 U.S. 147 (1939). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17, 20, 25

Smith v. Doe,

538 U.S. 84 (2003). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Spallone v. United States,

493 U.S. 265 (1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

viii

State v. Perez,

464 So. 2d 737 (La. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

United States v. Arnold,

740 F.3d 1032 (5th Cir. 2014). . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 24

United States v. Fox,

286 F. Supp. 3d (D. Kan. 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

United States v. Kebodeaux,

570 U.S. 387 (2013). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

United States v. O’Brien,

391 U.S. 367 (1968). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 17

United States v. Sindel,

53 F.3d 874 (8th Cir. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 24

Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assocs.,

650 So. 2d 712 (La. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,

319 U.S. 624 (1943). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate

Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200 (2015) . . . . . . . . 8, 10

Wallmuth v. Rapides Par. Sch. Bd.,

813 So. 2d 341 (La. 2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Wilkinson v. United States,

365 U.S. 399 (1961). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar,

575 U.S. 433 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15

Wooley v. Maynard,

430 U.S. 705 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

ix

CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES

U.S. Const. amend. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

34 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 21

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3825 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-13-901 et seq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Del. Code tit. 11, § 4120 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 152/120 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

La. Rev. Stat. 14:70.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 20

La. Rev. Stat. 14:80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

La. Rev. Stat. 14:313 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

La. Rev. Stat. 14:313.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

La. Rev. Stat. 15:540 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10, 11

La. Rev. Stat. 15:540(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 15

La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 22

La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1.4(C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim

La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 22

La. Rev. Stat. 15:553 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

La. Rev. Stat. 29:726(E)(14)(c)(i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

La. Rev. Stat. 32:410(A)(3)(a)(ix)(c). . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

x

La. Rev. Stat. 40:1131 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 20

La. Rev. Stat. 40:1321(E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

La. Rev. Stat. 40:1321(J) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1, 2, 3, 4

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.056 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

RULES

Supreme Court Rule 10(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Supreme Court Rule 13.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Supreme Court Rule 30.1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

OTHER AUTHORITIES

1 J. Story, Equity Jurisprudence § 186 (1870) . . . . 16

Dep’t of Justice, Sex Offender Registration and

Notification Act (SORNA), https://www.justice.

gov/criminal-ceos/sex-offender-registration-and

-notification-act-sorna. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, P.

Langan, E. Schmitt, & M. Durose, Recidivism of

Sex Offenders Released in 1994 (Nov. 2003) . . . 14

La. Dep’t Pub. Safety Office of Motor Vehicles,

Identification Requirements, https://www.power

dms.com/public/LADPSC/documents/368154 . . . 3

Lori McPherson, The Sex Offender Registration and

Notification Act (Sorna) at 10 Years: History,

Implementation, and the Future, 64 Drake L.

Rev. 741 (2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The State of Louisiana respectfully petitions the

Court for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of

the Louisiana Supreme Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The district court’s oral ruling declaring Louisiana

Revised Statute 15:542.1.4(C) and Louisiana Revised

Statute 40:1321(J) unconstitutional is unreported, but

it is reproduced in the Appendix at App. 60–62. The

Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion affirming the

district court’s order is reported at State v. Hill, 20200323, 2020 WL 6145294 (La. 10/1/20), and is

reproduced at App. 6–45. The Louisiana Supreme

Court’s opinion denying rehearing is reported at State

v. Hill, 2020-00323, 2020 WL 7234459 (La. 12/9/20),

and is reproduced at App. 4–5. The Louisiana Supreme

Court’s denial of the State’s motion to stay the

judgment pending a disposition of a petition for a writ

of certiorari in this Court is not reported and is

reproduced at App. 1–3.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This Court has jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257(a). The Supreme Court of Louisiana issued the

ruling below on October 20, 2020. The State later

moved for rehearing, which was denied on December 9,

2020. This Court issued an order on March 19, 2020,

automatically extending the time to file any petition for

a writ of certiorari to 150 days from the date of the

lower-court judgment, order denying discretion review,

or order denying a timely petition for rehearing. This

2

petition is thus timely filed under this Court’s Rules

13.3 and 30.1.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Louisiana Supreme Court struck down two

state statutes—Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1321(J)

and 15:542.1.4(C)—under the First and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution.

The First Amendment provides, in relevant part,

“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom

of speech.” U.S. Const. amend. I.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant

part, “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of

the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

Louisiana Revised Statute 40:1321(J) provides, in

relevant part, “[a]ny person required to register as a

sex offender with the Louisiana Bureau of Criminal

Identification and Information, as required by R.S.

15:542 et seq., shall obtain a special identification card

issued by the Department of Public Safety and

Corrections which shall contain a restriction code

declaring that the holder is a sex offender. This special

identification card shall include the words ‘sex offender’

in all capital letters which are orange in color and shall

be valid for a period of one year from the date of

issuance. This special identification card shall be

carried on the person at all times by the individual

required to register as a sex offender.”

3

Louisiana Revised Statute 15:542.1.4(C) provides,

in relevant part, “[a]ny person who . . . is in possession

of any document required by . . . R.S. 40:1321(J) that

has been altered with the intent to defraud . . . shall,

on a first conviction, be fined not more than one

thousand dollars and imprisoned at hard labor for not

less than two years nor more than ten years without

benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

When he was 32 years old, Defendant Tazin Hill

repeatedly had sex with a 14-year-old girl. He pleaded

guilty in 2010 to the crime of “felony carnal knowledge

of a juvenile.” La. Rev. Stat. 14:80. Upon Hill’s release

from custody, Louisiana law required him to obtain and

carry a State-issued identification card bearing the

words “SEX OFFENDER” in capital letters.1 La. Rev.

Stat. 40:1321(J).

In late 2016, Hill reported to the Lafayette Parish

Sheriff’s office to update his address information.

During Hill’s visit, an officer observed that the words

“SEX OFFENDER” had been removed from Hill’s ID.

Hill claimed the letters simply “came off”—but close

inspection revealed that visible transparent tape had

been placed over the spot where the designation was

supposed to appear. App. 74.

1

The identification card is identical to a driver’s license, but it is

available to individuals who do not wish to or cannot drive. See La.

Rev. Stat. 40:1321(E); La. Dep’t Pub. Safety Office of Motor

Vehicles, Identification Requirements, https://www.powerdms.com

/public/LADPSC/documents/368154 (providing administrative

Guidance on Identification Requirements).

4

The State charged Hill with altering his ID to

conceal the sex-offender designation. Louisiana law

carries special penalties for those who fraudulently

alter a State ID with a sex-offender designation.2 La.

Rev. Stat. 15:542.1.4(C).

Hill moved to quash the bill of information, arguing

that two separate state statutes are facially

unconstitutional: (1) the prohibition on fraudulently

altering a sex offender’s ID, La. Rev. Stat.

15:542.1.4(C); and (2) the predicate requirement that

sex offenders carry an ID bearing the sex-offender

designation in the first place, La. Rev. Stat. 40:1321(J).

He contended that requiring him to carry an ID with

the words “SEX OFFENDER” on it constituted

compelled speech forbidden by the First Amendment.

The District Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial District

of Louisiana and the Louisiana Attorney General

opposed Hill’s motion.

The district court held a hearing and orally granted

Hill’s motion to quash. The district court explained that

the sex-offender designation was “not the least

restrictive way to further the State’s legitimate interest

of notifying law enforcement.” App. 62. The court

suggested that Louisiana could use a more discreet

designation. At the end of the hearing, the court

declared both Louisiana Revised Statute 40:1321(J)

and Louisiana Revised Statute 15:542.1.4(C) facially

unconstitutional under the First Amendment. App. 62.

2

Other Louisiana laws also penalize fraudulently altering State

IDs. See La. Rev. Stat. 14:70.7; La. Rev. Stat. 40:1131.

5

Because the State district court struck down two

Louisiana statutes, the State could appeal directly to

the Louisiana Supreme Court. After briefing and oral

argument, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the

district court’s judgment in a split decision, holding

that the “SEX OFFENDER” designation “constitutes

compelled speech and does not survive a First

Amendment strict scrutiny analysis.” App. 7. One

Justice dissented, reasoning that the sex-offender

designation was “not First Amendment protected

speech,” but rather was “the embodiment of

government speech.” App. 42.

The State moved the Louisiana Supreme Court for

rehearing, pointing out that the Court had failed to

grapple adequately with the State’s argument that the

First Amendment does not protect fraud, among other

arguments. On December 9, 2020, the Louisiana

Supreme Court denied the State’s motion for rehearing

over the dissent of two Justices. That same day, the

State moved the Louisiana Supreme Court for a stay

pending disposition in this Court. The Louisiana

Supreme Court denied the State’s request for a stay on

December 10, 2020. App. 1.

Louisiana then petitioned Justice Alito for an

emergency stay on December 11, 2020. The stay

application was referred to the full Court, and denied,

on December 30, 2020.3

3

This Court has repeatedly granted review of an issue due to its

importance or a split in the lower courts, even after denying a stay.

See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 957 (2015) (Sotomayor, J.,

dissenting); Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 273 (1990);

Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546 (1976); Rosario v.

6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision below

conflicts with this Court’s First Amendment compelledspeech and government-speech jurisprudence, widens

splits among lower courts, and threatens to disrupt the

State’s ability to comply with the Sex Offender

Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34

U.S.C. § 20901 et seq. Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme

Court’s holding that Hill—a convicted sex

offender—has a First Amendment right not to be

prosecuted for fraudulently altering his ID directly

interferes with the State’s ability to “administ[er]” its

“criminal justice system[],” which “lies at the core of

[its] sovereign status.” Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 170

(2009). The decision below cries out for plenary review.

I. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH THIS

COURT’S HOLDINGS THAT THE FIRST AMENDMENT

DOES NOT LIMIT STATE SPEECH OR PROTECT

FRAUDULENT SPEECH.

The Louisiana Supreme Court invoked the First

Amendment when striking down two laws: (1) a law

requiring convicted sex-offenders to obtain and carry a

State ID bearing a sex-offender designation; and (2) a

statute prohibiting fraudulent alteration of such an

ID.4 Those holdings squarely conflict with two lines of

this Court’s precedent.

Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 (1973).

4

The statute says: “Any person . . . who is in possession of any

document required by . . . [La. Rev. Stat.] 40:1321(J) that has been

altered with the intent to defraud . . . [shall be punished].” La. Rev.

Stat. 15:542.1.4(C) (emphasis added).

7

First, it conflicts with this Court’s governmentspeech cases. The First Amendment does not bar a

State from speaking on its own behalf. Pleasant Grove

City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009). And a

State ID contains only State speech. The State did not

make Hill an “instrument” for public messaging by

indicating his status as a convicted sex offender on an

ID. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). The

Louisiana Supreme Court strayed from this Court’s

jurisprudence by concluding otherwise.

Second, the decision below conflicts with this

Court’s repeated holdings that the First Amendment

does not protect fraudulent speech or conduct. The

criminal statute that the State charged Hill with

violating makes intent to defraud a necessary element

of the offense. La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1.4(C). The

Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding that the First

Amendment protected Hill from prosecution for

fraudulently removing the sex-offender designation

from his ID cannot be reconciled with this Court’s

cases.

Plenary review is necessary to correct the Louisiana

court’s deviations from both lines of this Court’s

longstanding precedent.

8

A. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Decision

Conflicts with this Court’s GovernmentSpeech Cases.

1. The Sex-Offender Designation on Hill’s State

ID Constitutes State Speech that Falls

Outside the Ambit of the First Amendment.

“[W]hen government speaks [on its own behalf], it

is not barred by the Free Speech Clause from

determining the content of what it says.” Walker v. Tex.

Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200,

207 (2015) (citing Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 467–68).

And “’persons who observe’ designs on IDs

‘routinely—and reasonably—interpret them as

conveying some message on the issuer’s behalf.’” Id. at

212 (quoting Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 471)

(emphasis added) (alteration punctuation omitted).

That makes the sex-offender designation on Hill’s ID

card State speech—not Hill’s speech.

The Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that the

designation on Hill’s ID card was compelled speech

because “if the government compels private persons to

regularly convey its chosen speech, the government

forfeits the deference it is normally afforded under the

government speech doctrine.” App. 28–29.

That reasoning directly conflicts with this Court’s

cases explaining that the government impermissibly

compels a private person to be “an instrument” of its

message only when (1) the speech is publicly displayed,

like a “billboard,” Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715, 717 n.15;

and (2) a speaker is “closely linked with the expression

in a way that makes them appear to endorse the

9

government message,” Johanns v. Livestock Mktg.

Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 565 n.8 (2005) (emphasis added).

Some members of the Court have also considered

whether “essential operations of government may

require” the speech “for the preservation of an orderly

society[]—as in the case of compulsion to give evidence

in court.” W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.

624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring). Under any of

those three factors, the sex-offender designation does

not amount to impermissible compelled speech.

First, Hill’s ID card is not a billboard-like public

display. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 n.15. Its contents

are revealed only occasionally—and even then, merely

in circumstances likely to further the critical publicsafety interests that motivated the Louisiana

Legislature to pass the underlying law: interactions

with law enforcement, potential landlords, employers,

or volunteer organizations. The ID card differs

markedly from the New Hampshire automobile license

plates bearing the words “Live Free or Die” that this

Court deemed to be compelled speech because “New

Hampshire’s statute in effect requires that [drivers]

use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard.’” Id. at

715. The sex-offender designation is more akin to the

“In God We Trust” inscription on currency—which this

Court suggested does not violate the compelled speech

doctrine because currency “is generally carried in a

purse or pocket and need not be displayed to the

public.” Id. at 717 n.15.

Second, there is no reason to think Hill endorses the

sex-offender designation, so this fact is not “readily

associated” with him. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 n.15;

10

accord Johanns, 544 U.S. at 565 n.8. Contrary to the

lower court’s reasoning, simply because speech is

connected to a private speaker does not make it

impermissibly compelled. See App. 24. The question is

whether private parties “are closely linked with the

expression in a way that makes them appear to endorse

the government message.” Johanns, 544 U.S. at 565 n.8

(emphasis added). Sex offenders do not “endorse” the

sex-offender designation any more than people with

driver’s licenses endorse their weight, height, or other

information listed on those IDs. In fact, Hill’s

deliberate alteration of his ID card confirmed his desire

to disassociate himself from that speech, not endorse it.

As discussed, an ID card generally conveys

information on behalf of the issuer, not the bearer.

Walker, 576 U.S. at 212. Indeed, all Louisiana drivers’

licenses are required by law to include the phrase:

“DON’T DRINK AND DRIVE; DON’T LITTER

LOUISIANA.” La. Rev. Stat. 32:410(A)(3)(a)(ix)(c). The

State need not survive a strict-scrutiny analysis to

place those slogans on its IDs any more than it must

survive a strict-scrutiny analysis to place a person’s

height, or weight, or eye color, or hair color, or sexoffender status on them; in each case, this message

reflects the State’s priorities, not the priorities of the

individual carrying the ID. See Doe v. Kerry, No. 16CV-0654-PJH, 2016 WL 5339804, at *18 (N.D. Cal.

Sept. 23, 2016).

Finally, including factual information on a State ID

and protecting the public from sex offenders are both

essential operations of government, as the Louisiana

Legislature has expressly recognized. See La. Rev. Stat.

11

15:540 (“Persons found to have committed a sex offense

or a crime against a victim who is a minor have a

reduced expectation of privacy because of the public’s

interest in public safety and in the effective operation

of government.”). Federal courts have echoed this

sentiment. See, e.g., Carney v. Okla. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety, 875 F.3d 1347, 1354 (10th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he

license requirement does not stray from what state

governments do each and every day: communicate

important information about its citizens on state-issued

IDs.”); United States v. Arnold, 740 F.3d 1032, 1035

(5th Cir. 2014) (“When the government, to protect the

public, requires sex offenders to register their

residence, it conducts an essential operation of the

government, just as it does when it requires individuals

to disclose information for tax collection.” (cleaned up));

United States v. Sindel, 53 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir.

1995) (concluding that IRS summons that compel

certain speech are essential operations of government).

Thus, all three factors confirm that Louisiana law

does not impermissibly compel Hill to “be an

instrument” of state messaging by requiring him to

carry an ID bearing the sex-offender designation.

Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715. And so, the ID card falls

outside the ambit of First Amendment protections. By

re-characterizing information on a State ID as

compelled speech, the Louisiana Supreme Court

dramatically expanded the scope of the First

Amendment’s protections in a way that conflicts with

this Court’s precedents establishing a State’s right to

speak for itself and to conduct essential operations.

12

It is difficult to overstate the detrimental

consequences of the Louisiana court’s expansion of the

compelled-speech doctrine. The decision unsettles

Louisiana’s statutory scheme to monitor sex offenders

and protect the public from them. When a sex offender

is released from custody, he must provide “his name,

residential address, a description of his physical

characteristics[,] . . . and a photograph” to “every

residence or business” near his residence. La. Rev.

Stat. 15:542.1; see also La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1.5.

The Louisiana Supreme Court failed to provide any

rationale that would explain why the First Amendment

allows the State to require sex offenders to provide

registration information to their neighbors and publish

information in the local newspaper, but does not allow

the State to place a sex-offender designation on a State

ID. Many other States have similar requirements—

requiring an offender either to mail notices directly or

to provide information so that a State agency can mail

notices. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3825; Colo. Rev.

Stat. § 16-13-901 et seq.; Del. Code tit. 11, § 4120; 730

Ill. Comp. Stat. 152/120; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art.

62.056. The decision below jeopardizes all of those laws.

Every State maintains a public sex-offender

registry. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s reasoning

puts Louisiana out of step with every other jurisdiction

in the Nation, endangers Louisiana’s and other States’

residents, and provides a rationale for challenging

other States’ sex-offender notification laws. If the

decision below stands, the status of sex-offender

registries in general will be imperiled, hampering the

ability of States to protect their citizens from sexual

13

predators. If the First Amendment really threatens the

States’ sex-offender laws in those ways, this Court—not

a State supreme court—should be the one to say so.

The Court should grant review.

2. Even If Louisiana’s Sex-Offender Designation

on State IDs Amounts to Compelled Speech,

the Challenged Laws Survive Strict Scrutiny.

Even if the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly

concluded that the designation on Hill’s license

constitutes compelled speech, the First Amendment

inquiry does not end there. The Court “must also

determine whether the State’s countervailing interest

is sufficiently compelling” to require Hill to comply

with the law. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716 (citing United

States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968)). The

Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding that the

designation fails strict scrutiny portends troubling

consequences for critical Federal and State lawenforcement and public-safety interests.

This Court has explained that “[m]andating speech

that a speaker would not otherwise make necessarily

alters the content of the speech.” Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of

the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988). The

Court considers such laws “a content-based regulation

of speech.” Id. “Content-based laws—those that target

speech based on its communicative content—are

presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified

only if the government proves that they are narrowly

tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Reed v.

Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163 (2015).

14

To be sure, “it is the rare case in which a State

demonstrates that a speech restriction is narrowly

tailored to serve a compelling interest.” Williams-Yulee

v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433, 444 (2015) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “But those cases do arise.”

Id. (emphasis added). This is one of those rare cases.

The Louisiana Legislature has declared its sexoffender registration laws to be of “paramount”

importance. La. Rev. Stat. 15:540(A). And this Court

has noted that sex offenders pose a high risk of

recidivism. See, e.g., United States v. Kebodeaux, 570

U.S. 387, 395–96 (2013) (citing Dep’t of Justice, Bureau

of Justice Statistics, P. Langan, E. Schmitt, & M.

Durose, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released in 1994,

1 (Nov. 2003) (reporting that compared to non-sex

offenders, released sex offenders were four times more

likely to be rearrested for a sex crime)); McKune v. Lile,

536 U.S. 24, 33–34 (2002) (plurality op.); Smith v. Doe,

538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003) (“The legislature’s findings are

consistent with grave concerns over the high rate of

recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their

dangerousness as a class.”). The compelling nature of

the State’s interest in protecting the public from

recidivistic sex offenders cannot be seriously disputed.

Beyond that, the sex-offender designation is the

least restrictive means of protecting the public. Sable

Commc’ns of Calif., Inc. v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126

(1989); see Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489

U.S. 214, 228 (1989); Repub. Party of Minn. v. White,

536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002). “The First Amendment

requires that [a State’s law] be narrowly tailored, not

15

that it be perfectly tailored.” Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S.

at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Placing a sex-offender designation on a State ID

does not compel too much speech (assuming it compels

speech at all). The Louisiana Legislature concluded

that the public, and not merely law enforcement, needs

to know of a sex offender’s status under limited

circumstances. La. Rev. Stat. 15:540(A). For example,

a property manager needs to know a sex offender’s

status when leasing an apartment—or the manager

might incur liability if a tenant is raped on the

premises. See Veazey v. Elmwood Plantation Assocs.,

650 So. 2d 712 (La. 1994); see also Wallmuth v. Rapides

Par. Sch. Bd., 813 So. 2d 341 (La. 2002) (reaffirming

Veazey after statutory amendments to the comparative

fault doctrine under Louisiana law). A church or Red

Cross facility may need to know a person’s status as a

sex offender when providing shelter from a storm. See

La. Rev. Stat. 29:726(E)(14)(c)(i) (prohibiting sex

offenders from knowingly being sheltered with other

evacuees). People trick-or-treating on Halloween may

need a quick way to verify that their children are safe

from predators. See La. Rev. Stat. 14:313.1 (prohibiting

sex offenders from distributing candy or gifts on

Halloween or other public holidays). See also, e.g., La.

Rev. Stat. 15:553 (prohibiting employment for certain

sex offenders); La. Rev. Stat. 14:313 (prohibiting

wearing of masks, hoods, or other facial disguises in

public places).

Under the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision, the

public will lack an essential tool for identifying sex

offenders in the community. Online registries are

16

insufficient to protect the State’s interests because

people can easily give a false name and deny their

status. During storms and other emergencies, power

outages and interrupted internet connections may

make it impossible to check the online registry. The

Louisiana Supreme Court’s suggestion that the

legislature put a less-conspicuous mark identifying sex

offenders on State IDs is insufficient because such

marks are, by design, less likely to be noticed or clearly

understood by the public.

B. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Decision

Conflicts with This Court’s Jurisprudence

Holding that the First Amendment Does

Not Protect Fraud.

1. The First Amendment Allows a State to

Criminalize the Fraudulent Alteration of an

ID with a Sex-Offender Designation.

“[T]he First Amendment does not shield fraud.”

Illinois, ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates,

538 U.S. 600, 612 (2003) (explaining that fraudulent

charitable solicitation is unprotected speech). The

government’s power “to protect people against fraud”

has “always been recognized in this country and is

firmly established.” Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc.,

333 U.S. 178, 190 (1948). “Frauds may be denounced as

offenses and punished by law.” Schneider v. New

Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939). Justice Story defined

“fraud” as “any cunning, deception, or artifice used to

circumvent, cheat, or deceive another.” 1 J. Story,

Equity Jurisprudence § 186, pp. 189–90 (1870).

17

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding conflicts

with that First Amendment jurisprudence. Now, in

Louisiana, the First Amendment protects fraudulently

defacing government property. Worse yet, the

Louisiana Supreme Court never cited this Court’s

controlling precedent in Telemarketing Associates,

Donaldson, or Schneider—even though the State

expressly relied on those cases—and thus did not even

try to reconcile its holding with them. See App. 33–35.

Even when the State pointed out that shortcoming in

its motion for rehearing, the Louisiana court did

nothing about it.

Instead, the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the

State’s arguments based on its view that Wooley v.

Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), and United States v.

O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), control here. Not so.

Neither of those cases has anything to do with fraud.

Rather, the defendants in both cases altered or

destroyed government property through open and overt

attempts to convey or reject the government’s message.

See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713 (refusing to display a

message on a vehicle license plate); O’Brien, 391 U.S.

at 369 (burning a draft card publicly on the steps of a

courthouse). For example, by covering the “Live Free or

Die” inscription on his license plate for religious

reasons, the defendant in Wooley did not intend to

deceive anybody. And by climbing the courthouse steps

and burning his draft card for all to see, the defendant

in O’Brien was not committing fraud (and, in any

event, this Court upheld his conviction).

Wooley and O’Brien thus contrast sharply with the

facts here. Hill did not climb up on the courthouse

18

steps when he removed the sex-offender designation

and replaced it with transparent tape. The State

charged Hill with altering his ID with fraudulent

intent.5 That takes Hill’s action outside of the ambit of

any First Amendment protection.

2. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s Severability

Analysis Does Not Cure the Conflict.

The Louisiana Supreme Court reasoned that it

could strike the fraudulent-alteration provision under

the First Amendment because (1) the fraudulent

alteration provision “cannot be severed from the rest of

the statute,”6 including the predicate provision

requiring sex offenders to obtain and carry an ID card

bearing the required notation; and (2) the obtain-andcarry provision violated the First Amendment’s

compelled-speech doctrine. App. 35–36. In the

Louisiana Supreme Court’s view, if the two provisions

are inseverable, then striking the obtain-and-carry

provision under the First Amendment necessarily

required striking the fraudulent-alteration provision.

This does not eliminate the conflict with this Court’s

decisions for two reasons.

As an initial matter, and as explained above, the

obtain-and-carry provision does not violate Hill’s First

5

For purposes of the motion to quash, this Court “must accept as

true the facts contained in the bill of information.” State v. Perez,

464 So. 2d 737, 739 (La. 1985).

6

The Court concluded that the provisions are inseverable because

the fraudulent alteration provision—La. Rev. Stat.

15:542.1.4(C)—expressly references the provision requiring sex

offenders to carry marked ID cards in the first place. App. 10–14.

19

Amendment rights. And so the lower court’s ruling is

wrong right out of the gate.

But even if the obtain-and-carry provision is

unconstitutional, that still provides no basis for

striking the fraudulent-alteration provision under the

First Amendment. To see why, consider this Court’s

opinion in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of

North Carolina, Inc., which struck down a North

Carolina statute that governed the solicitation of

charitable contributions by professional fundraisers.

487 U.S. 781, 784–85 (1988). Riley held that requiring

professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors

the gross percentage of revenues retained in prior

charitable solicitations amounted to compelled speech

forbidden by the First Amendment. Id. at 797–98.

But if a professional fundraiser reported fraudulent

numbers to potential donors under the North Carolina

statute before this Court declared it unconstitutional,

the State still could have punished that conduct even

after the Court struck down the law. See id. (“North

Carolina has an antifraud law, and we presume that

law enforcement officers are ready and able to enforce

it.”). This Court observed that, “[i]n striking down this

portion of [North Carolina’s law], we do not suggest

that States must sit idly by and allow their citizens to

be defrauded.” Id. at 795. Striking down a statute

because it compels speech does not immunize any

fraudulent conduct or speech from criminal

prosecution.

The State alleges that Hill fraudulently removed

the sex-offender designation from his ID before any

lower court struck down Louisiana’s fraudulent-

20

alteration provision. This means that, when everyone

in the State understood that convicted sex offenders

were required to have a designation on their licenses,

Hill was misrepresenting his sex-offender status to

those who viewed his State ID. Even assuming it was

unconstitutional for the State to place the designation

on the ID in the first place, Hill has no First

Amendment right to commit fraud with impunity.

3. Nor Does the Fact that the State Can

Prosecute Hill Under Other Statutes Cure the

Conflict.

Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court justified

striking the fraudulent-alteration provision by noting

that the fraudulent alteration of ID cards generally, as

opposed to sex-offender IDs specifically, is separately

criminalized under other state statutes. See App. 37,

La. Rev. Stat. 14:70.7; La. Rev. Stat. 40:1131. But this

is no justification at all. States remain broadly free to

penalize fraud as they see fit, including by classifying

certain forms of fraud as worse than others. See

Schneider, 308 U.S. at 164. Because the First

Amendment does not protect fraud in any way, there is

no constitutional bar on Louisiana’s imposing a greater

penalty on certain forms of fraud than on others.

The safety risks to potential victims of sex predators

make it reasonable for the State to impose a greater

penalty on sex offenders who hide their status than, for

example, teenagers who alter their IDs to buy alcohol

or tobacco. The Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinion

failed to grapple with this Court’s teaching that the

First Amendment does not protect fraud. This Court

21

should grant certiorari and reverse the judgment below

striking down Louisiana Revised Statute 15:542.1.4(C).

II. THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT’S DECISION

UNSETTLES FEDERAL AND STATE SEX-OFFENDER

REGISTRY REQUIREMENTS AND EXACERBATES A

SPLIT AMONG LOWER COURTS.

A. The Lower Court’s Expansion of the First

Amendment’s Compelled-Speech Doctrine

Threatens Federal Sex-Offender

Notification Requirements.

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision provides a

roadmap for calling into question the legality of the Sex

Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),

34 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq., and every State’s sex-offender

registry. Under SORNA, every State must include as

part of its public sex-offender registry “a thorough

community notification system . . . so that other law

enforcement agencies, community organizations, and

the public at large are aware of any new or changed

registrations.” Lori McPherson, The Sex Offender

Registration and Notification Act (Sorna) at 10 Years:

History, Implementation, and the Future, 64 Drake L.

Rev. 741, 761 (2016); See Dep’t of Justice, Sex Offender

Registration and Notification Act (SORNA),

https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/sex-offenderregistration-and-notification-act-sorna (“[E]ach

jurisdiction is required to comply with the federal

standards outlined in [SORNA]”); see also People v.

Minnis, 67 N. E. 3d 272, 290 (Ill. 2016) (upholding

Illinois statute requiring sex offenders to disclose to the

public—and periodically update—information

regarding their internet identities and websites). In

22

Louisiana, for example, when a sex offender is released

from custody, he must provide “his name, residential

a d d r e s s , a d e s c r i p t ion of his p h y s i c a l

characteristics[,] . . . and a photograph” to “every

residence or business” near his residence. La. Rev.

Stat. 15:542.1.; see also id. La. Rev. Stat. 15:542.1.5.

If the Louisiana Supreme Court’s expansion of the

First Amendment’s compelled-speech doctrine is

allowed to stand, it will mark the path for future

litigation challenging the legality of every State’s

SORNA registration program. For if (as the Louisiana

Supreme Court held) the First Amendment forbids a

State from placing a sex-offender designation on its

own ID cards, can the State legally require sex

offenders to issue mailers to every residence near their

homes as required by SORNA and Louisiana law?

What about newspaper advertisement notifications?

Those questions are surely coming. Reversing the

Louisiana Supreme Court now will eliminate those

uncertainties and save federal and state courts

significant time and resources.

Other state and federal interests are also at stake.

The federal government has recently placed a sexoffender designation on passports. See App. 25. The

Louisiana Supreme Court’s position that the First

Amendment tolerates sex-offender designations on

passports but not State IDs is untenable. There is no

meaningful distinction between the two forms of

identification: They both contain language that the

government requires and that is essential for

governmental operations. Granting this petition and

reversing the decision below will obviate this flawed

23

basis for challenging a materially identical federal

requirement.

B. The Louisiana Supreme Court Widened

Burgeoning Splits Between Lower Courts.

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision also

deepens to 3-2 a lower-court split on whether forced

disclosure of sex-offender status violates the First

Amendment’s prohibition on compelled speech. In 2019,

a federal district court in Alabama struck down an

Alabama statute because it required sex offenders to

obtain and carry an ID card with the words “criminal

sex offender.” See Doe 1 v. Marshall, 367 F. Supp. 3d

1310, 1324–26 (M.D. Ala. 2019). The Louisiana

Supreme Court relied heavily on that Alabama decision

when striking Louisiana’s laws.

By contrast, three other lower-court decisions have

reached opposite conclusions. A federal district court in

California considering a sex-offender identifier placed

on passports concluded that “the U.S. passport itself is

not speech, and the passport identifier does not suggest

or imply that the passport-holder has adopted or is

sponsoring an ideological or political point of view.” Doe

v. Kerry, No. 16-CV-0654-PJH, 2016 WL 5339804, at

*18 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016); see also, e.g., Benson v.

Fischer, No. 16-CV-509-DWF-TNL, 2019 WL 3562693,

at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 2019) (rejecting a First

Amendment challenge to a sex-offender civil

commitment program, which among other things

required participants to wear badges labelled

“Minnesota Sex Offender Program.”); Reed v. Long, No.

5:19-CV-385 (MTT), 2020 WL 7265693, at *12 (M.D.

Ga. Dec. 10, 2020) (rejecting a First Amendment

24

challenge to prominent signs put up by law

enforcement in front of sex offenders’ homes around

Halloween).7

Beyond that, the Louisiana Supreme Court’s

decision creates a square split with the Tenth Circuit

about whether communicating factual information on

a government ID is essential for government

operations. See Carney, 875 F.3d at 1354 (concluding

that a sex-offender designation on a license “does not

stray from what state governments do each and every

day: communicate important information about its

citizens on state-issued IDs”); cf. Arnold, 740 F.3d at

1035; Sindel, 53 F.3d at 878.

There is no need for further percolation on these

square splits. The opinions cited here fully air both

sides of the respective arguments. Waiting any longer

to resolve these splits will only threaten additional

public safety harms.

And resolving those square splits is not the only

reason to grant certiorari. This Court grants plenary

review to preserve the rule of law if a lower courtdecision directly conflicts with this Court’s precedent.

See Sup. Ct. R. 10(c); see also Wilkinson v. United

States, 365 U.S. 399, 401 (1961) (granting certiorari “to

consider the petitioner’s claim that the Court of

Appeals had misconceived the meaning” of the

controlling Supreme Court decision). As discussed, the

7

Cf. United States v. Fox, 286 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 1224 (D. Kan.

2018) (concluding that, although “SORNA compelled [a sex

offender] to speak,” the law was still constitutional because it

“serve[d] a compelling government interest and d[id] so in a

narrowly tailored fashion.”).

25

Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision directly conflicts

with this Court’s holdings that the First Amendment

does not protect fraudulent speech—much less

fraudulent conduct like altering a State ID to conceal

sex-offender status. See e.g., Telemarketing Associates,

538 U.S. at 612; Donaldson, 333 U.S. 190; Schneider,

308 U.S. at 164.

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the State’s petition for a

writ of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Jeff Landry

Attorney General

ELIZABETH B. MURRILL

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

SHAE MCPHEE

Deputy Solicitor General

JOSIAH M. KOLLMEYER

Assistant Solicitor General

LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF

JUSTICE

1885 N. Third Street

Baton Rouge, LA 70802

(225) 326-6766

murrille@ag.louisiana.gov

mcphees@ag.louisiana.gov

TYLER R. GREEN

CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC

222 S. Main Street, Suite 500

Salt Lake City, UT 84111

(703) 243-9423

tyler@consovoymccarthy.com

DONALD D. LANDRY

District Attorney

15th JDC, Lafayette Parish

800 South Buchanan St.

6th Floor

Lafayette, Louisiana 70501

(337) 232-5170

Counsel for Petitioner