Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ruth McLean, Petitioner v. 800 DC, LLC, et al.

S3

No.

3fn tfje

filed

APR IS 2021

Supreme Court of tlje ®ntteti i§>tate£

I ?MolPJ^Fr^E'CLERK

Ruth McLean

Petitioner

v.

800 DC LLC

Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

Third Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Ruth McLean

P.O. Box 137

Plainsboro, NJ 08536

(973) 222-4928

ruthtmcle an@yahoo .com

Pro Se Petitioner

RECEIVED

MAY - 7 2021

I

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

Ruth Thompson el- McLean, the Petitioner, requests this

Petition for Writ of Certiorari be granted given the

salient issues of a Sui juris litigant objecting to the

application of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine where there

was fraud within the process and a violation of the due

process notice requirement.

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

federal district courts lack jurisdiction to hear cases

seeking review of judgments issued by state courts. In

this case, the purported foreign state-court judgment was

rendered without service and without given the

Petitioner the opportunity to defend her interest in the

suit, in a jurisdiction that originally lacked personal

jurisdiction. The underlying judgment was obtained by

fraudulent measures. The question presented, on which

the circuits are split, is: Whether the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine applies when the underlying state-court

judgment is void ab initio.

Petitioner respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment and decision of the

District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Third

Circuit. The Petition is ripe and the Court must address

the issues as to entering decision's that departed from the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, as to

call for an exercise of this Court's supervisory power. An

injustice has occurred and the remedy provided is

unconscionable based upon the circumstance regarding

the standard thereof.

I.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT CASE

AND

APPEAL

WERE

WRONGFULLY

DISMISSED

UNDER

THE

ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE WHEN

II

THE ORIGINAL FOREIGN JUDGMENT

WAS

VOID

AND

FRAUDULENTLY

RENDERED

IN

VIOLATION

OF

PETITIONER’S DUE PROCESS THEREBY

CREATING A CONFLICT AMONG THE

CIRCUIT

COURTS

AS

TO

THE

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE AND

CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE

DOCTRINE?

Ill

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Ruth T. McLean - Petitioner

Respondents DBA 800DC, LLC dba Bizzie and

1800DryClean - (collectively referred to as the

“Respondents”)

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The Petitioner and Respondents have no parent

companies, non-wholly owned subsidiaries, or affiliates

that have issued shares to the public.

STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES

None

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question(s) Presented

i

Parties to the Proceeding

in

Corporate Disclosure Statement

iii

Statement of Related Cases

hi

Table of Authorities

v

Opinions Below

l

Jurisdiction

1

Relevant Provisions Involved

2

Statement

4

Reasons for Granting the Petition

7

Conclusion

16

Appendix

Sur Petition for Rehearing, filed March 16,

2021 .....................................................................

Notice of Appeal, filed January 31, 2020 .........

Judgment, filed January 7, 2020.......................

Judgment, filed January 13, 2021.....................

Entry of Judgment, filed January 13, 2021......

Attachment to Briefin Support of Defendant’s

Motion for Summary Judgment, filed October

18, 2019.................................................................

Docket Entries, filed April 28, 2019..................

Complaint, filed August 28,2019......................

la

3a

5a

7a

9a

12a

24a

28a

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009)......

11

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570

(2007)....................................................................

11

Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367,376 (5th Cir. 1995)....12

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)..................................

9

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.

544 U.S. 280,283-84 (2005)........................................ 8,10

Fontana Empire Center v. City of Fontana,

307 F.3D 987,995(9™ ClR. 2002)................................ 12

Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,

233-34 (3d Cir. 2006).................................................. 13

Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422

F.3D 77,84 (2d ClR. 2005).......................................... 13

IN RE KNAPPER, 407 F.3D 573,580 (3D ClR. 2005).....

9

Jones v. Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006)................ 13

Ky. Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454

(1989).......................................................................... 14

Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459 (2006)......................

7

Long v. Shorebank Development, 182 F.3d 548,

558(1999).................................................................. 12,16

Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,560,

112 S.Ct. 2130,119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)...................

10

Malhan v. Secretary United States

Department of State, 938 F.3d 453 (3d Cir.

2019)........................................................................... 14

Marrese v. American Academy of

Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,386 (1985)......7

Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v.

Nudell, 363 F.3d 1072,1076 (10TH ClR. 2004)

13

VI

Midnight Sessions, Ltd., v. City of Phila., 945

F.2D 667,680 (3d ClR. 1991); REV'D ON OTHER

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust

Co., 339 U.S. 306,314, 70 S.Ct. 652,657,94 L.Ed.

865 (1950).................................................................

13

Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148,1163-64 (9th Cir.

2003).........................................................................

10

Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224,

234-35 (3d Cir. 2008)...............................................

11

Port Authority Police Benev. Ass'n Inc. v.

Port Authority of New York and New

Jersey Police Dept., 973 F. 169,177 (3d Cir.

1992)......................................................................... 8,9

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413

(1923)........................................................................

9

Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521,532 (2011)....... 11,15

Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910 F.3d 639,

644 (2d Cir. 2018)....................................................

13

Taylor v. Federal National Mortgage

Association, 374 F. 3d 529, (2004)

11,12,15

Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III,

L.P., 449 F.3d 542,547-48 (3d Cir. 2006)................

15

United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp.

of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003).

13

Whiteford v. Reed, 155 F.3d 671,674 (3d Cir.

1998).........................................................................

13

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1254

28U.S.C. § 1257.

28 USC §1332....

15 USC §1692...,

28 U.S.C. §1738,

1

4

1

3,8

7,10

Vll

Const. Provisions

U.S. Const. XIV

13

Rules

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12........

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e)(1)

2

4

1

OPINIONS BELOW

The case is presented to this Honorable Court

from an appeal from a decision of Third Circuit Court of

Appeals, which decision is dated January 13, 2021. (7a8a). The Third Circuit denied the Petitioner's Petition

for Panel Rehearing on March 16, 2021. (la-2a). The

Third Circuit granted the Petitioner’s request to

extend the time to file a Petition for Rehearing En

Banc on March 5,2021.

The Petitioner had filed an appeal from a

decision of the United States District Court for the

District of New Jersey dated January 7, 2020 granting

dismissal of the Petitioner’s Complaint in favor of the

Respondents. (5a-6a).

This Writ for Certiorari is timely filed.

JURISDICTION

The statutory provision for this Court’s

jurisdiction is 28 U.S.C. Section 1254. The Third

Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a final decision on

January 13,2021. (la-2a, 7a-8a).

The District Court of the District of New Jersey

had original subject matter jurisdiction under 28 USC §

1332.

This Petition in the Nature of a Writ of

Certiorari has been timely filed.

2

RELEVANT PROVISIONS INVOLVED

a)

Fourteenth

Constitution:

Amendment,

United

States

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment provides that no State "shall ...

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law...."

b) Rules of Civil Procedure

i)

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12

Defenses and

Objections: When and How Presented;

Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings;

Consolidating Motions; Waiving Defenses;

Pretrial Hearing

...(b) How to Present Defenses. Every defense

to a claim for relief in any pleading must be

asserted in the responsive pleading if one is

required. But a party may assert the following

defenses by motion:

(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction;

(2) lack of personal jurisdiction;

(3) improper venue;

(4) insufficient process;

(5) insufficient service of process;

3

(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted; and

(7) failure to join a party under Rule 19.

A motion asserting any of these defenses must

be made before pleading if a responsive pleading

is allowed. If a pleading sets out a claim for relief

that does not require a responsive pleading, an

opposing party may assert at trial any defense to

that claim. No defense or objection is waived by

joining it with one or more other defenses or

objections in a responsive pleading or in a

motion.

c) Statutes

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

(FDCPA) (15 USC 1692 et seq.)

It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate

abusive debt collection practices by debt

collectors, to insure that those debt collectors

who refrain from using abusive debt collection

practices are not competitively disadvantaged,

and to promote consistent State action to protect

consumers against debt collection abuses.

4

STATEMENT

Procedural History

On August 28, 2019, the Petitioner filed a

Complaint in the United States District Court of New

Jersey, against 800DC, LLC dba Bizzie and

1800DryClean, the Respondents, alleging fraud, lack of

notice, alleging harassment, invasion of privacy, lack of

an enforceable foreign judgment, violations of due

process, and violations of federal statutes and the

Constitution. (28a-38a).

In response, Respondents filed a Motion to

Dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6) on

October 19, 2019. The Respondents alleged defense

protections under Title 28 U.S.C. § 1257 RookerFeldman Doctrine.

A Writ of Petition for Extraordinary Relief was

filed November 14, 2019. On January 7, 2020, the

District Court granted the Respondents’ Motion to

dismiss with prejudice. (5a-6a). The Petitioner filed a

Notice of Appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeal

on January 31, 2020. (3a-4a). The decision was affirmed

on January 13, 2021. (7a-8a). Rehearing En Banc was

denied on March 16,2021. (la-2a).

This Writ for Certiorari is timely filed.

Factual Background

The Petitioner resides in Plainsboro, New

Jersey. The Respondents are a Michigan company. The

Petitioner, her ex-husband (Conrad Mclean), and

Respondents executed a franchise agreement

commencing for a dry cleaning pick up and delivery

service; the contract date was from January 13, 2005

5

with an expiration date January 13, 2015. Ex-husband

terminated the contract by 2009. . The Petitioner

terminated the agreement August 20, 2013, due to the

Respondents’ failure to comply with the terms of the

agreement as well as infringement.

In April 2015, the Respondents filed a lawsuit

against the Petitioner, her ex-husband and her New

Jersey business, C2 Group LLC, in the State of

Michigan 44th Judicial District alleging breach of

contract of the Franchise Agreement and unfair

competition. The Respondents’ Michigan lawsuit

alleged that the ex-husband was driving a van for a

business he did not own and breach of contract for early

termination. The ex-husband did not work since May

2010 and the Petitioner since August 2013 - years

before the lawsuit was filed. Petitioner made special

appearances to Michigan court under threat, duress,

and coercion to object to the notice of default. The

Petitioner only appeared after her ex-husband

informed her of the Michigan default judgment. Until

that time, Petitioner had never succumbed to the

jurisdiction of Michigan. Appearances to object to lack

of notice and void judgment were unsuccessful, thus, a

fraudulent judgment was entered against the

Petitioner and her C2 company for $11,967.00, plus

costs. The claim against ex-husband was dismissed,

since he had moved an hour away from the territory.

The case should have dismissed at this point, since it

was built on hearsay of someone seeing the ex-husband

driving a van. However, the Respondents continued to

pursue to case, despite objections. The Respondents

were also awarded $5,000.00 in attorneys’ fees on

August 7, 2017. The Respondents did not attend any

trial prior to a judgment being rendered in Michigan.

6

The Petitioner was never served a copy of the

Michigan complaint, as admitted by the process server,

Anabela Pinto. All court documents evidenced that the

Petitioner was not served and not provided notice of

the Michigan lawsuit rendering the decision void ab

initio. The Petitioner never domiciled, never went,

never operated a business in Michigan, and thus, the

foreign court’s unproven jurisdiction competency to

render a judgment against a New Jersey resident was

questionable.

In July 2018 the Respondents filed the foreign

Michigan judgment in New Jersey Superior Court.

Once again the Petitioner objected to the validity of the

foreign judgment by filing a Motion to Dismiss,

however, the objections were dismissed on September

25, 2018. The Petitioner’s Motion to Reconsider was

also denied. The Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate the

Foreign Judgment was denied on December 7, 2018.

The Petitioner began to receive notices along with an

information subpoena to submit social security number,

all bank accounts and assets -with threats of jail time to

comply from “Wuguft” collection agency regarding the

Michigan judgment. The Petitioner sought to object to

the validity and enforceability of the Michigan Court’s

jurisdiction over the Petitioner, to no avail.

The Petitioner was forced to seek protection in

the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of New

Jersey on November 21, 2018. The Respondents filed an

Objection to the Bankruptcy. The Petitioner voluntarily

dismissed the bankruptcy in September 2019. The

Petitioner refers to the procedural history set forth

above.

7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CASE AND

APPEAL WERE WRONGFULLY DISMISSED

UNDER THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE

WHEN THE ORIGINAL FOREIGN JUSGMENT

WAS VOID AND FRAUDULENTLY RENDERED

IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER’S DUE

PROCESS THEREBY CREATING A CONFLICT

AMONG THE CIRCUIT COURTS AS TO THE

APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE AND

CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE

DOCTRINE.

The most important point for Rooker-Feldman

purposes is that it allows an original action in equity to

attack a prior judgment, which appears consistent with

general federal equity practice. Whether the

substantive bases for equitable relief are met is a

matter wholly separate from jurisdiction. This Court

has acknowledged the possibility of circumstances

federal courts would be justified in creating exceptions

and not affording state court judgments as much

preclusive effect as would the state courts. See Marrese

v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470

U.S. 373, 386 (1985). Though the Court has expressly

limited the doctrine’s application, Lance v. Dennis, 546

U.S. 459 (2006), and though the Court has warned that

overextending the doctrine risks “overriding Congress'

conferral of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with

jurisdiction exercised by state courts, and superseding

the ordinary application of preclusion law pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1738,” lower courts have nevertheless

continued to apply the doctrine “beyond the contours of

the Rooker and Feldman cases.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v.

8

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. 544 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005).

This is precisely what the district court and the Third

Circuit have done in Petitioners’ case.

According to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to

engage in appellate review of state court

determinations or to evaluate constitutional claims that

are inextricably intertwined with the state court's

decision in a judicial proceeding. Port Authority Police

Benev. Ass'to Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and

New Jersey Police Dept, 973 F. 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992).

The policy underlying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is

based on the concept that a litigant should not be able

to challenge state court orders in federal courts as a

means of relitigating matters that already have been

considered and decided by a court of competent

jurisdiction. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also applies

where a lower federal court is asked to conduct a

review of a state court judgment for errors in

construing federal law or constitutional claims that are

inextricably intertwined with, or impacts the validity

of, the state court judgment. The litmus test that a

federal court must apply is whether the relief

requested in the federal action would effectively

reverse the state court decision or void its ruling,

There must be clarification among the Circuit to discuss

when'the original foreign state decision was obtained

by fraud without notice, and is, thus, void.

Further, after the voidable judgment was

entered, the Petitioner claimed violations of fair debt

collection practices.

It is undisputed that the

Respondents’ violations of the federal statute under

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) (15

USC 1692 et seq.), were never addressed. FDCPA was

designed to eliminate abusive, deceptive, and unfair

9

debt collection practices in order to protect consumers

from abuses in debt collection. In her complaint, the

Petitioner alluded to the harassment and improper

treatment by the collection agency in violation of the

federal statute - none of which were presented in the

Michigan courts.

Further, redress for fraud as for lack of the

jurisdiction has no expiration date. The Petitioner’s

complaint filed at the District Court is not an appeal of

the Michigan case, instead, it is a complaint that seeks

to redress an injury caused by extrinsic fraud upon the

court and violation of due process by failing to comply

with the rules of personal service, and thus the Motion

to Dismiss was erroneously entered.

According to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to

engage in appellate review of state court

determinations or to evaluate constitutional claims that

are inextricably intertwined with the state court's

decision in a judicial proceeding. District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) and

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).Port

Authority Police Benev. Ass'n Inc. v. Port Authority of

New York and New Jersey Police Dept., 973 F. 169,177

(3d Cir. 1992). The purpose of this doctrine is to

"prevent^ 'inferior' federal courts from sitting as

appellate courts for state court judgments." In re

Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 2005).

The Supreme Court’s observation that “the

lower federal courts have variously interpreted the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine to extend far beyond the

contours of the Rooker and Feldman cases, overriding

Congress’ conferral of federal-court jurisdiction

concurrent with jurisdiction exercised by state courts,

and superseding the ordinary application of preclusion

10

law under 28 U.S.C. § 1738.” Exxon, at 283. Exxon and

its progeny are instructive with regard to the proper

application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In Exxon,

the United States Supreme Court clarified the reach of

the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by narrowing its

application to its original intent: The Rooker-Feldman

doctrine is confined to cases of the kind from which the

doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by statecourt judgments rendered before the district court

proceedings commenced and inviting district court

review and rejection of those judgments. RookerFeldman does not otherwise override or supplant

preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed

doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss

proceedings in deference to state-court actions. Id. at

284. However, “[i]f a federal plaintiff presents] some

independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal

conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to

which he was a party . . . then there is jurisdiction and

state law determines whether the defendant prevails

under principles of preclusion.” Exxon, 544 U.S. at 293

(quoting Gash Assocs. v. Village of Rosement, 995 F.2d

726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)); accord Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d

1148,1163-64 (9th Cir. 2003).

There are three well-recognized elements of

Article III standing: First, an "injury in fact," or an

"invasion of a legally protected interest" that is

"concrete and particularized." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,

504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351

(1992). Second, a "causal connection between the injury

and the conduct complained of[.]" Id. And third, a

likelihood "that the injury will be redressed by a

favorable decision." Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The

Petitioner had standing to bring her causes of action

11

against the Respondents. "To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.1" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009), quoting Bell All. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6),

a complaint must provide "enough factual matter" to

allow the case to move beyond the pleading stage of

litigation; the pleader must "'nudge his or her claims

across the line from conceivable to plausible.'"

Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d

Cir. 2008).

The Supreme Court has instructed that, if "a

federal plaintiff presents] [an] independent claim, it is

not an impediment to the exercise of federal

jurisdiction that the same or a related question was

earlier aired between the parties in state court."

Skinner v. S-uMz&r, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011). Therefore,

although a state court decision is not reviewable by

lower federal courts, a statute or rule governing that

decision may be challenged in an independent federal

action. Id. at 532-33. In Skinner, the Supreme Court

held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar a

separate claim that Texas's DNA access statute, as

construed by the Texas courts, was unconstitutional.

Id. At minimum, the unfair debt collection allegations

were never addressed in any court.

The Petitioner alleged independent claims

separate from the state cases, claims that could never

have been presented in the Michigan case: unfair debt

collection practices, fraud, violations of the long arm

statute, full faith and credit, and due process. See

Taylor v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 374

F. 3d 529, (2004), that held that

12

“[while the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bar federal

subject matter jurisdiction over issues raised in

state court, and those inextricably intertwined

with such issues, ‘an issue cannot be inextricably

intertwined with a state court judgment if the

plaintiff did not have a reasonable opportunity to

raise the issue in state court proceedings/” Id.

The “reasonable opportunity” inquiry focuses

not on ripeness, but on difficulties caused by

“factor[s] independent of the actions of the

opposing parties] that precluded” a plaintiff from

bringing federal claims in state court, such as

state court rules or procedures.

Long v. Shorebank Development, 182 F.3d 548, 558

(1999). Thus, the Petitioner has raised separate and

distinct causes of action that have not been adjudicated.

Other Circuit Courts would render an opposite

decision than this jurisdiction. In Davis v. Bayless, 70

F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 1995) and Fontana Empire

Center v. City of Fontana, 307 F.3d 987, 995(9th Cir.

2002), held that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear

a collateral attack on a state-court judgment if the trial

courts of that state would have jurisdiction to hear the

collateral attack. In our facts, the Petitioner is not

appealing the Michigan case to the federal courts.

Instead, she is complaining on the fraud of the process,

constitutional violations, and the scrupulous acts for the

collection of the debt. The substance of the Petitioner’s

federal complaint has not been addressed.

Moreover, since Michigan entered a default

judgment, then according to other Circuits, the

substance of the state court complaint have never been

reviewed, and thus, the federal court had proper

jurisdiction. See Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910

13

F.3d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 2018); Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd.

of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005)). Circuits

have concluded that Rooker-Feldman does not bar

federal complaints where the state court decision "did

not pass on the merits of the case”. Merrill Lynch Bus.

Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell, 363 F.3d 1072, 1076 (10th

Cir. 2004); Whiteford v. Reed, 155 F.3d 671, 674 (3d Cir.

1998).

The United States Supreme Court has stated

that the fundamental right protected by the due

process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment is the

right to adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard

before any state action depriving one of life, liberty or

property. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust

Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865

(1950); U.S. Const. XIV. To succeed in an action

alleging a denial of procedural due process, in violation

of a property interest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that

he had a protected property interest, that he was

deprived of that interest, and that she was afforded less

procedure than was due; Mullane, supra Jones v.

Flowers, 126 S. Ct. 1708 (2006).

In order to establish a procedural due process

claim, a plaintiff must establish that "(1) she was

deprived of an individual interest that is encompassed

within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of'life,

liberty, or property,’ and (2) the procedures available to

him did not provide 'due process of law."1 Hill v.

Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 233-34 (3d Cir.

2006) (quoting Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d

Cir. 2000)); see also Midnight Sessions, Ltd., v. City of

Phila., 945 F.2d 667, 680 (3d Cir. 1991); rev'd on other

grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp.

of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003).

Therefore, to state a proper claim, a plaintiff must

14

possess a property interest that is interfered with, and

the process afforded to him must be inadequate. Ky.

Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989).

The issue of having a voided judgment has not

been addressed - a judgment based on a procedural

violation of the constitution. Lack of jurisdiction and

due process violation of lack of proper notice entail an

unlawful venue in Michigan - the Michigan Court

judgment was void and did not deserve full faith and

credit in the New Jersey courts. Nonetheless, the

federal issues of fraud upon the courts must be

addressed.

The public policy implications of the

underlying case are serious as to due process and

defense of foreign judgments.

In our facts, the Michigan case was not

effectively final due to fraud upon the court, lack of

service, and violations of due process. The lower courts

failed to appreciate that the Petitioner presented

independent claims, not the defense of a breach of

contract of a franchise agreement. Instead the Courts

within the Third Circuit have broadened the

applicability of the Doctrine resulting in a deprivation

of Petitioner’s ability to present merits of her claim. In

the matter is withheld, there would be no scrutiny of

foreign judgments where there was a lack of personal

jurisdiction.

See also Malhan v. Secretary United States

Department of State, 938 F.3d 453 (3d Cir. 2019), which

held that "Rooker-Feldman does not apply when state

proceedings have neither ended nor led to orders

reviewable by the United States Supreme Court." Id.

The Supreme Court has instructed that, if "a federal

plaintiff presents] [an] independent claim, it is not an

impediment to the exercise of federal jurisdiction that

the same or a related question was earlier aired

15

between the parties in state court." Skinner v. Switzer,

562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011). Therefore, although a state

court decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts,

a statute or rule governing that decision may be

challenged in an independent federal action. Id. at 53233. In Skinner, the Supreme Court held that the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar a separate claim

that Texas's DNA access statute, as construed by the

Texas courts, was unconstitutional. Id. To the extent

that the federal action presents "some independent

claim," i.e., one that does not implicate the validity of

the state court judgment, the doctrine does not apply.

Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449

F.3d 542, 547-48 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280,

292,125 S. Ct. 1517 (2005)).

The Petitioner has alleged independent claims

separate from any state cases. Similar to our case, the

Petitioner claims of fraud upon the court: violations of

the long arm statute for jurisdiction, full faith and

credit, and constitutional due process. See Taylor v.

Federal National Mortgage Association, 374 F. 3d 529,

(2004), that held that “[while the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine bar federal subject matter jurisdiction over

issues raised in state court, and those inextricably

intertwined with such issues, ‘an issue cannot be

inextricably intertwined -with a state court judgment if

the plaintiff did not have a reasonable opportunity to

raise the issue in state court proceedingsId. The

“reasonable opportunity” inquiry focuses not on

ripeness, but on difficulties caused by “factor[s]

independent of the actions of the opposing parties] that

precluded” a plaintiff from bringing federal claims in

state court, such as state court rules or procedures.

Long v. Shorebank Development, 182 F.3d 548, 558

16

(1999). Thus, the Petitioner has raised separate and

distinct causes of action that have not been adjudicated.

The seriousness of Petitioner’s constitutional

rights and the violation thereof must be considered to

be circumstances to warrant a grant of this Writ. Given

the nature and purpose of the rules of civil procedure

and the constitutional requirements embedded therein,

the Petitioner’s complaint was wrongfully dismissed

and the appeal should have been allowed to proceed.

The Petitioner pleas with this Court to grant the Writ

given salient public policy issues. The Rooker Feldmen

Doctrine has been overly abused to infringe on

plaintiffs’ pursuit of valid claims.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, RUTH T. MCLEAN,

the Petitioner, respectfully request that this Honorable

Court grant this Petition for Writ for Certiorari or in

the alternative vacate the dismissal, remand the case to

the trial court, and allow the underlying matter be

reviewed by a trier of facts or under authority of

28U.S.C §1631(2006)(stating that "the court shall, if it is

in the interest of justice, transfer[a case over which it

lacks jurisdiction] to any other court in which the action

could have been brought at the time it was filed or

notice").

Respectfully Submitted:

RUTH T. MCLEAN

Pro Se Petitioner

P.O. Box 137

Plainsboro, NJ

(973) 222-4928