Amicus Curiae Brief — Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., et al., Petitioners v. Clare E. Connors, Attorney General of Hawaii

No. 20-1149

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO., et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

CLARE E. CONNORS,

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF HAWAII,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of A ppeals for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE THE

AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

Sherman H. Joyce

Lauren Sheets Jarrell

A merican Tort

Reform A ssociation

1101 Connecticut Avenue,

NW, Suite 400

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 682-1163

Vincent Levy

Counsel of Record

Brian T. Goldman

Holwell Shuster

& Goldberg LLP

425 Lexington Avenue

New York, NY 10017

(646) 837-5151

vlevy@hsgllp.com

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

303060

A

(800) 274-3321 • (800) 359-6859

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE............................. 1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF THE

ARGUMENT................................................................ 1

ARGUMENT................................................................ 3

I. The Ninth Circuit’s Abstention Decision Finds

No Basis In Its Foundation. ............................. 3

A. Abstention Requires That a Civil

Proceeding Resemble a Criminal

Prosecution. ................................................. 3

B. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Flouted

Sprint and Creates a Clear Circuit Split. .. 6

II. Litigants Should Be Able to Challenge the Use

of Private Counsel by State Attorneys General

in Federal Court. .............................................. 8

A. Courts Should Carefully Evaluate State

Interests if Private Counsel Is Involved. .... 9

B. Civil Cases Prosecuted by Private Counsel

Raise Constitutional Concerns That

Federal Courts Must Be Able to Review .. 11

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 14

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Berger v. United States,

295 U.S. 78 (1935) .................................................... 9

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Connors,

979 F.3d 732 (9th Cir. 2020) ...................... 2, 7, 8, 11

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Connors,

No. 20-1149 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2021) ..................... 10, 12

Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield,

235 P.3d 21 (Cal. 2010) .......................................... 12

Cohens v. State of Virginia,

19 U.S. 264 (1821) ................................................ 2, 3

Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United

States,

424 U.S. 800 (1976) .................................................. 3

Heath v. Alabama,

474 U.S. 82 (1985) .................................................... 6

Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,

420 U.S. 592 (1975) ............................................ 4, 13

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,

446 U.S. 238 (1980) ............................................ 2, 11

iii

Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

Ass’n,

457 U.S. 423 (1982). ................................... 1, 5, 9, 10

Moore v. Sims,

442 U.S., 415 (1979) ................................................. 4

New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of

New Orleans,

491 U.S. 350 (1989) ................................ 3, 4, 5, 7, 10

PDX N., Inc. v. Comm’r New Jersey Dep’t of Lab. &

Workforce Dev.,

978 F.3d 871 (3d Cir. 2020). ................................ 2, 8

Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n,

951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008)......................................... 12

Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs,

571 U.S. 69 (2013) .......................................... passim

Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,

481 U.S. 787 (1987) .......................................... 10, 11

Younger v. Harris,

401 U.S. 37 (1971) .......................................... passim

STATUTES

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 28-8(b) ............................................ 9

iv

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers

and Public Power: Constitutional and Political

Implications,

18 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 77 (2010) ............................. 9

Protecting American Taxpayers from Payment of

Contingency Fees,

Exec. Order No. 13433, 72 Fed. Reg. 28441 (May

16, 2007) ................................................................. 12

1

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1

The American Tort Reform Association (“ATRA”)

is a broad-based coalition of businesses, corporations,

municipalities, associations, and professional firms

that have pooled their resources to promote reform of

the civil justice system to ensure fairness, balance,

and predictability in civil litigation. ATRA is especially focused on pockets of the American judicial system where corporate defendants are subject to unfair

and irrational treatment, as routinely occurs in the jurisdiction from which this case arises. For more than

three decades, ATRA has filed amicus briefs highlighting these concerns.

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

In Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, this Court

stressed that cases “fitting within the Younger doctrine” are “exceptional.” 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013). Parallel state proceedings permit federal-court abstention

despite the “virtually unflagging” obligation to exercise jurisdiction, id. at 77, only where “vital state interests are involved,” Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v.

Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).

Here, private counsel litigated from soup-to-nuts

in the name of the State of Hawaii: it conducted the

pre-suit investigation, signed and filed the complaint

and every motion, presented all arguments, and paid

1 Counsel of record for all parties received timely notice of and

consented in writing to this filing. Amicus curiae certifies that no

party or party’s counsel authored this brief in whole or in part

and that no party or party’s counsel made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.

No person other than amicus curiae, their members, or their

counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.

2

all the bills. Yet the Ninth Circuit, in affirming the

district court’s abstention decision, never asked

whether the State of Hawaii had made a showing that

the suit implicated “vital state interests.”

Indeed, the Ninth Circuit dispensed with the idea

of making a “case-specific inquiry,” focusing instead

on Hawaii’s general interest in the “classes of proceedings.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Connors, 979 F.3d

732, 737 (9th Cir. 2020). But this general-interests approach conflicts with the approach of other Circuits

and flouts this Court’s decision in Sprint, all of which

carefully assess the particular state interests implicated in the particular suit. E.g., PDX N., Inc. v.

Comm’r New Jersey Dep’t of Lab. & Workforce Dev.,

978 F.3d 871, 883 (3d Cir. 2020).

This case is all the more important because the use

of private counsel by State Attorneys General is a

growing practice that is fraught with due-process and

fairness concerns. Private counsel, after all, has a pecuniary motive to sue, unlike public officials – thus

risking a misalignment of incentives. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1980) (“A scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into

the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision”

and thus may “raise serious constitutional questions.”).

The Ninth Circuit’s approach, by ignoring the particular case and training its attention on generalized

state interests, ignores this critical issue. Yet only the

interests of the State matter – due respect for sovereign interests is the basis for Younger abstention. Because a state and its citizens cannot count on private

counsel to prioritize systemic interests – such as adjudicatory fairness – over profiteering, it is imperative

3

that federal courts scrutinize the state interests implicated by a particular case when private counsel is at

the helm.

Thus, the Court should grant the petition to resolve the Circuit split and to clarify how Younger applies in the context of private-counsel-directed enforcement proceedings.

ARGUMENT

I. The Ninth Circuit’s Abstention Decision

Finds No Basis In Its Foundation.

A. Abstention Requires That a Civil Proceeding Resemble a Criminal Prosecution.

For two hundred years, the Supreme Court has

recognized that federal courts “have no more right to

decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than

to usurp that which is not given.” Cohens v. State of

Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821). Federal courts thus

have a “virtually unflagging obligation” to “exercise

the jurisdiction given them.” Colorado River Water

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817

(1976).

Abstention doctrines are a narrow exception to this

rule. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72

(2013). Under one of these doctrines, Younger, a federal court may abstain because of (1) an ongoing state

criminal prosecution, (2) “certain ‘civil enforcement

proceedings’” that are “‘akin to a criminal prosecution’

in ‘important respects,’” or (3) “civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely in furtherance of

the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 77-79. But even then, “only

exceptional circumstances” justify abstention. New

Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans (NOPSI), 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989).

4

Younger recognized the authority of federal courts

to abstain given parallel state criminal proceedings

and hinged on what Justice Black called “Our Federalism.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). This

“vital consideration,” the Court explained, inheres in

our system of government, “in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National Governments,” and in which “the National Government, anxious though it may be to vindicate and

protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere

with the legitimate activities of the States.” Ibid.

This justification for Younger abstention was crystallized in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592

(1975). There, the Court extended Younger to civil proceedings that were “in aid of and closely related to”

criminal enforcement. “Central to Younger,” the Court

held, was a “proper respect for state functions,” and

abstention in the context of civil proceedings in aid of

criminal enforcement was therefore appropriate. Id.

at 601. Though Huffman extended Younger beyond

criminal proceedings (while rejecting a bight-line division between civil and criminal matters), the doctrine

remained rooted in the interests of the States: “The

propriety of federal-court interference with an Ohio

nuisance proceeding must . . . be controlled by application of those same considerations of comity and federalism.” Id. at 607.

The Court also emphasized that not all state proceedings warrant abstention, as “[s]uch a broad abstention requirement” would “make a mockery of the

rule that only exceptional circumstances justify a federal court’s refusal to decide a case in deference to the

States.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368; see also Moore v.

Sims, 442 U.S., 415, 423 n.8 (1979) (“[W]e do not re-

5

motely suggest ‘that every pending proceeding between a State and a federal plaintiff justifies abstention unless one of the exceptions to Younger applies.’”

(citation omitted)).

Instead, particularly as to parallel state civil proceedings, abstention is warranted only where the case

implicates “important state interests.” Middlesex Cty.

Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423,

432 (1982). In that event, respect for state sovereignty

displaces the federal courts’ “virtually unflagging” jurisdiction obligations.

As to how to discern whether a case implicates “vital state interests,” the Court explained in Middlesex,

“[t]he importance of the state interest may be demonstrated by the fact that the noncriminal proceedings

bear a close relationship to proceedings criminal in

nature.” Ibid. That, in turn, requires an exacting look

at the state’s proffered interests in the particular case.

See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 369 (1989) (assessing whether

“the Council proceeding [is] the sort of proceeding entitled to Younger treatment” (emphasis in original));

Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 433 (assessing New Jersey’s

particular state interest in state bar disciplinary hearings).

Sprint, this Court’s latest pronouncement, refined

the point. Younger’s extension to civil proceedings,

Sprint explained, stems from the State acting in a

“sovereign capacity.” 571 U.S. at 79-80. In that respect, Sprint homed in on three indicia bearing on fitness for abstention. First, a state civil enforcement

proceeding brought in a sovereign capacity typically

involves a “state actor” “initiat[ing] the action,” much

as a state launches a criminal proceeding, so the identity of the party bringing suit is relevant. Id. at 79.

Second, a state typically acts in a sovereign (and

6

quasi-prosecutorial) capacity when it “sanction[s]” a

party. Ibid. Finally, state civil actions fit for abstention under Younger usually begin with investigations

and proceed with “a formal complaint or charges,”

much like their criminal counterparts. Id. at 79-80. In

reversing in Sprint, this Court observed that none of

the indicia it identified was present: “[1] A private corporation, . . . initiated the action . . . . [2] No state authority conducted an investigation into Sprint’s activities, and [3] no state actor lodged a formal complaint

against Sprint.” Id. at 80.

In sum, the requirement that a state act in a sovereign capacity represents the core connection – and

doctrinal justification – for extending Younger’s criminal-prosecution based abstention to civil actions

“akin to a criminal prosecution in important respects.”

Id. at 79 (quotation marks omitted). After all, a State’s

“power[] to undertake criminal prosecutions derive[s]

from separate and independent sources of power and

authority originally belonging to them before admission[.]” Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985). This

inherent sovereign power and authority is what justifies abstention under Younger and its progeny – and

courts must identify it when abstaining from jurisdiction because of a state civil suit. Otherwise, abstention

will no longer be “exceptional,” but will instead permit

deference anytime a state civil enforcement proceeding takes place. Sprint, 571 U.S. at 73.

B. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Flouted

Sprint and Creates a Clear Circuit Split.

The Ninth Circuit departed from clearly established law by skirting the sovereign interests implicated by the civil proceeding at issue. In so departing,

moreover, the Ninth Circuit split with the approach

taken by other circuits.

7

1. In this case, the Ninth Circuit declined to assess

Hawaii’s sovereign interests in the actual underlying

state proceeding. Indeed, it ruled it would only look to

the “classes of proceedings, not [the State’s] interest

in specific cases.” Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Connors, 979 F.3d 732, 737 (9th Cir. 2020). The Ninth Circuit quoted NOPSI for support, but in the passage the

Ninth Circuit quoted, NOPSI was addressing the argument that Younger does not apply anytime there is

a preemption claim. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 365. Moreover, Sprint’s careful analysis of the proceeding there

(a proceeding before the Iowa Utilities Board) shows

the need to scrutinize the proceeding at issue – rather

than take a passing glance at the “class” of cases to

which it belongs – to ensure the proceeding is “akin to

a criminal prosecution in important respects.” Sprint,

571 U.S. at 79 (quotation marks omitted); id. at 81 (declining to “extend Younger to virtually all parallel

state and federal proceedings, at least where a party

could identify a plausibly important state interest.”).

2. Making matters worse, the Ninth Circuit took

the rationale that underlies the abstention doctrine

and forms its contours – federalism, and the important state interests implicated by criminal and

quasi-criminal state proceedings – and turned it on its

head. Thus, the Ninth Circuit observed that federal

courts should defer to states’ decisions to permit private persons to prosecute cases, because “[c]onducting

litigation on behalf of a State is a core sovereign function.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 979 F.3d at 736. That ruling, however, directly contravenes Sprint’s instruction

(and indeed, Younger’s ruling) that abstention depends on a state proceeding being “akin to a criminal

prosecution.” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 77-80.

The Ninth Circuit also observed that probing the

particular facts of a state enforcement proceeding

8

would “offend the principles of comity at the heart of

the Younger doctrine.” Bristol-Myers Squibb, 979 F.3d

at 737. But that puts the cart before the horse, because it presupposes that any state proceeding implicates the federalism concerns at the heart of Younger.

Instead, the state must have interests like those at

stake in criminal prosecutions before abstention is

warranted.

3. Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s approach creates a

clear split with the approach taken by other courts of

appeals. For example, in PDX N., Inc. v. Comm’r New

Jersey Dep't of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 978 F.3d 871,

883 (3d Cir. 2020), the Third Circuit went through

each of the Sprint factors for the specific civil proceeding at issue – not the “class of proceedings” to which

the civil proceedings belonged, contra Bristol-Myers

Squibb, 979 F.3d at 737 – and concluded that the enforcement proceeding reflected the sovereign interests

of New Jersey. See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari,

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Connors, No. 20-1149

(U.S. Feb. 17, 2021) at 22-26.

II. Litigants Should Be Able to Challenge the

Use of Private Counsel by State Attorneys

General in Federal Court.

The Ninth Circuit’s failure to consider whether the

civil proceeding here implicates Hawaii’s sovereign interests is particularly troubling because Hawaii itself

did not litigate this case. And Hawaii’s lack of involvement suggests the underlying civil proceeding did not

involve state interests so important that they warrant

abstention. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s decision

will effectively immunize state civil enforcement proceedings from challenge in federal court – even though

the relationship between private counsel and State

9

Attorneys General implicate due-process and constitutional concerns that should be subject to federalcourt review.

A. Courts Should Carefully Evaluate State

Interests if Private Counsel Is Involved.

By holding that the inquiry into whether a civil

proceeding is “quasi-criminal,” Sprint, 571 U.S. at 81,

may be satisfied by recourse to generic assessments

and not case-specific inquiries, there will be no meaningful federal-court check on the important and sometimes curious relationship between State Attorneys

General and private counsel.

Hawaii, like other states, permits the hiring of private, contingency-fee lawyers to prosecute civil actions – not criminal ones – in the State’s name. See

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 28-8(b). These engagements represent a “dangerous trend” in state-level civil enforcement. Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: Constitutional and Political

Implications, 18 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 77, 81-83 (2010).

Most notably, it drives the state’s use of legal

power away from “democratic and constitutional principles,” because the private-attorney arrangement foments “an ominous mixture of public power and private motivation” – i.e., the pursuit of a payday. Id. at

77. This runs directly into the deeply held belief that

the government, including its lawyers, are “the representative[s] not of an ordinary party to a controversy,

but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at

all.” Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

And infusing the profit motive into a sovereign’s enforcement authority scrambles these incentives. Compare Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S.

787, 814 (1987) (“[W]e must have assurance that those

10

[prosecutors] who would wield this power will be

guided solely by their sense of public responsibility for

the attainment of justice.”).

Thus, to disregard the fact that private counsel is

prosecuting a civil enforcement proceeding in the

name of the State, as the Ninth Circuit did here, is to

implicitly equate the sovereign interests traditionally

at the core of Younger – respect for a state’s prosecutorial power – with the private interest in capturing

profit. But this Court’s teachings in Younger and

Sprint counsel that not all state interests justify abstention – only the “vital” ones that resemble the

state’s interest in criminal cases. Middlesex, 457 U.S.

at 432. So the Ninth Circuit’s blurring of the various

interests at play – state versus private and enforcing

versus profiteering – ignores Younger’s instructions

and limitations. See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 364 (“[T]he

prerequisite of Younger abstention” is that “the State”

– not a private party – have a “legitimate, substantial

interest” in the proceeding. (emphasis added)).

Consider this case. Hawaii conducted no pre-suit

investigation of Plavix. Instead, it appears undisputed

that only private counsel investigated. See Petition for

Writ of Certiorari, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Connors, No. 20-1149 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2021), App.6a. The

record suggests Hawaii never received a single patient

or physician complaint about Plavix or its label. Id. at

App.30a, 48a. And private attorneys controlled the

lawsuit from start to finish – they pitched the suit to

the Attorney General of Hawaii, signed every single

filing (including the complaint) and argued every motion. Id. at App.49a, 63a.

As a result, whether the civil action litigated by

these private attorneys vindicates the type of state in-

11

terests rooted in criminal prosecutions requires, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, careful assessment of the State’s “interest in [the] specific case[],”

and not just a gesture to a “class[] of proceedings,”

Bristol-Myers Squibb, 979 F.3d at 737. Otherwise,

looking only to the latter and not the former fails to

appreciate the distinct lack of a sovereign interest in a

suit conceived, prosecuted, and paid for by private

counsel.

B. Civil Cases Prosecuted by Private Counsel Raise Constitutional Concerns That

Federal Courts Must Be Able to Review

The failure to assess the State’s sovereign interest

in specific cases will tend to favor abstention precisely

when federal-court intervention is most relevant, as

civil actions brought in the name of the State by private counsel implicate serious due-process and other

constitutional concerns.

1. “The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an

impartial and disinterested tribunal in both civil and

criminal cases.” Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S.

238, 242 (1980). Marshall thus rejected the argument

“that the Due Process Clause imposes no limits on the

partisanship of administrative prosecutors,” id. at

248-49; instead, “they too must serve the public interest,” id. at 249. As the Court observed, “[a] scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into

the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial decision”

and thus may “raise serious constitutional questions.”

Id. at 249–50; see Young, 481 U.S. at 811 (“[The] appointment of an interested prosecutor creates an appearance of impropriety . . . whose effects are pervasive [and] calls into question . . . the conduct of the

entire prosecution[.]”).

12

Although the Court in Marshall faced a situation

in which “[n]o governmental official st[ood] to profit

economically,” 446 U.S. at 250, precisely the opposite

is true here. The party suing in the name of the government – private, contingency-fee counsel – is by design motivated by pecuniary gain in bringing a case to

the State’s attention (and in prosecuting it). See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.

Connors, No. 20-1149 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2021), App.48a,

49a (detailing how private firm pitched the case to

state officials, how the state conducted no independent investigation of the facts, and how the State and

private counsel agreed to a 20% contingency fee).

Not only is the right to due process implicated. Creating these structurally misaligned incentives heightens the risk of abuse of a litany of constitutional

rights, such as the rights protected by the First

Amendment (as this case shows). All in all, once prosecutorial decision-making is subject to pecuniary influence, the State’s interest in protecting the constitutional rights of citizens will play second fiddle to chasing cases that will generate profit for private counsel.

Unsurprisingly, other jurisdictions have acknowledged the perils of these relationships and sought to

cut them back. For instance, it is the policy of the federal government “that organizations or individuals

that provide such services to or on behalf of the United

States shall be compensated in amounts that are reasonable, not contingent upon the outcome of litigation

or other proceedings.” The written purpose of this policy is “[t]o help ensure the integrity and effective supervision” of legal services provided to the federal government. Protecting American Taxpayers from Payment of Contingency Fees, Exec. Order No. 13433, 72

Fed. Reg. 28441 (May 16, 2007). Similarly, several

13

state supreme courts have restricted the use of contingencies in like settings. Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield, 235 P.3d 21, 38-39 (Cal. 2010); Rhode Island v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 951 A.2d 428, 469-70 (R.I.

2008). The federal judiciary thus stands as an important bulwark in remedying any constitutional infirmities posed by these relationships.

2. To be sure, these constitutional concerns may

differ among cases and across states. The Ninth Circuit’s decision, however, will effectively immunize

these issues from federal-court review, because the

civil cases in which they arise necessarily belong to a

“class[] of proceedings” that the State could always

characterize as implicating some generic state interest.

This runs right into this Court’s caution that

“Younger, and its civil counterpart . . . do of course

allow intervention in those cases where . . . the state

proceeding is motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith.” Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611. But

despite this express instruction, any constitutional

right implicated in cases such as the one here will be

rendered a parchment guarantee with no right of review by a federal court.

14

CONCLUSION

The Court should grant the petition for a writ of

certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

SHERMAN H. JOYCE

LAUREN SHEETS JARRELL

AMERICAN TORT

REFORM ASSOCIATION

1101 Connecticut Avenue

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 682-1163

lsheetsjarrell@atra.org

VINCENT LEVY*

BRIAN T. GOLDMAN

HOLWELL SHUSTER

& GOLDBERG LLP

425 Lexington Avenue

New York, NY 10017

(646) 837-5120

vlevy@hsgllp.com

*Counsel of Record

March 24, 2021