Amicus Curiae Brief — David Carson, as Parent and Next Friend of O. C., et al., Petitioners v. A. Pender Makin
Supreme Court briefOct 29, 2021
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No. 20-1088
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------DAVID AND AMY CARSON, AS PARENTS AND NEXT
FRIENDS OF O.C., AND TROY AND ANGELA NELSON,
AS PARENTS AND NEXT FRIENDS OF A.N. AND R.N.,
Petitioners,
v.
A. PENDER MAKIN, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY
AS COMMISSIONER OF THE
MAINE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Writ Of Certiorari To The
United States Court Of Appeals
For The First Circuit
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF OF THE FREEDOM FROM RELIGION
FOUNDATION AND CENTER FOR INQUIRY AS
AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT
---------------------------------♦--------------------------------PATRICK ELLIOTT
Counsel of Record
SAMUEL T. GROVER
FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, INC.
P. O. Box 750
Madison, WI 53701
(608) 256-8900
pelliott@ffrf.org
Counsel for Amici Curiae
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COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................
ii
INTEREST OF AMICI .........................................
1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT .....................
2
ARGUMENT ........................................................
5
I.
The Founders wrote the First Amendment
to ensure that taxpayers are not compelled to subsidize a religion that is not
their own ....................................................
5
A. The “no aid” principle—that the government must not subsidize religious
teaching or worship—is fundamental
to the U.S. Constitution .......................
6
B. The “no aid” principle dates to America’s founding and was uniformly accepted after years of experience .......... 10
II.
The “no aid” principle avoids government
entanglement with religious education and
the government oversight that must necessarily be coupled with state funding ........... 14
CONCLUSION..................................................... 20
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Eulitt v. Maine Dept. of Educ.,
386 F.3d 344 (1st Cir. 2004) ......................................5
Everson v. Board of Education of
Ewing Township,
330 U.S. 1 (1947) ............................................. 8, 9, 15
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& Sch. v. E.E.O.C.,
565 U.S. 171 (2012) .................................................15
Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) .................................................14
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71,
333 U.S. 203 (1948) ............................................... 8, 9
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) ...................................................9
Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488 (1961) ...................................................9
Trinity Lutheran Church of
Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017) .............................................11
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y.,
397 U.S. 664 (1970) .................................................10
STATUTES
20–A M.R.S. § 2951(2) .............................. 2, 4, 5, 11, 15
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
OTHER AUTHORITIES
1 ANNALS OF CONG.
729–31 (1789) ............................................................8
1 JAMES MADISON, Detached Memoranda, Ca. 31
January 1820, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, RETIREMENT SERIES, 4 MARCH 1817—31
JANUARY 1820 (David B. Mattern et al. eds.,
2009) ..........................................................................3
2 THOMAS JEFFERSON, 82. A Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom, 18 June 1779, in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Julian P. Boyd
ed., 1950) ......................................................... 3, 7, 13
8 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance
against Religious Assessments, [ca. 20 June]
1785, in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 10
MARCH 1784—28 MARCH 1786 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1973).............. 4, 6
Chris Ford, Stephenie Johnson, and Lisette Partelow, “The Racists Origins of Private School
Vouchers,” Center for American Progress (July
12, 2017), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/
content/uploads/2017/07/12184850/Voucher
Segregation-brief2.pdf .........................................12
David Nevin & Robert E. Bills, The Schools That
Fear Built: Segregationist Academies in the
South (1976) ............................................................13
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Erin Richards, Former Employees Cast Doubt
on Voucher School’s Operations, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL (Dec. 15, 2014), available
at https://bit.ly/2n7I9Nf ....................................... 18
Erin Richards, Leaders of closed Milwaukee
voucher school are now in Florida, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL (Jan. 15, 2014), available
at https://bit.ly/32nQT0m .......................................17
Frances Paterson, Building a Conservative
Base: Teaching History and Civics in VoucherSupported Schools, 82 THE PHI DELTA KAPPAN, 150 (2000), www.jstor.org/stable/20439835 .......18
Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another Country:
Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton Univ. Press, 2021) ......................13
Milwaukee voucher school LifeSkills Academy
closes ‘in the dead of the night’, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL (Jan. 14, 2014), available
at https://bit.ly/2oAnm5b ........................................16
Molly Beck, State paid $139 million to schools
terminated from voucher program since 2004,
WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL (Oct. 12, 2014),
available at https://bit.ly/2NlL9zI ..........................16
Robert P. Jones & Daniel Cox, America’s Changing
Religious Identity, Public Religion Research Institute (Sept. 6, 2017), www.prri.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/09/PRRI-Religion-Report.pdf ................1
v
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Sarah Carr, Who cleans up problem choice
schools?, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Sept.
15, 2003), https://goo.gl/zoCc45 ...............................17
1
INTEREST OF AMICI1
The Freedom From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”)—
a national educational nonprofit organization based in
Madison, Wisconsin—is the largest association of freethinkers in the United States, representing more
than 35,000 atheists, agnostics, and other nonreligious
Americans. FFRF has 21 local and regional chapters
across the country, including an FFRF Maine chapter. Today nearly one in four U.S. adults identifies as
religiously unaffiliated.2 Founded nationally in 1978,
FFRF has members in every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. FFRF’s two primary purposes
are to educate the public about nontheism and to defend the constitutional principle of separation between
state and church.
The Center for Inquiry (“CFI”) is a nonprofit educational organization dedicated to promoting and defending science, reason, humanist values, and freedom
of inquiry. Through education, research, publishing, social services, and other activities, including litigation,
CFI encourages evidence-based inquiry into science,
pseudoscience, medicine, health, religion, and ethics.
1
All parties consented to the filing of this amicus brief. No
party’s counsel in this case authored this brief in whole or in part.
No party or party’s counsel contributed any money intended to
fund preparing or submitting this brief. No person, other than
amicus, its members, or its counsel contributed money that was
intended to fund preparing or submitting this brief.
2
Robert P. Jones & Daniel Cox, America’s Changing Religious Identity, Public Religion Research Institute (Sept. 6, 2017),
www.prri.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/PRRI-Religion-Report.
pdf.
2
CFI advocates for public policy rooted in science, evidence, and objective truth, and works to protect the
freedom of inquiry that is vital to a free society.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Maine has adopted a limited program to allow
private educational institutions to receive direct
grants of taxpayer money in certain communities that
lack equivalent public schools due to low student
population. To qualify for these grants, Maine requires,
among other things, that the private schools be “nonsectarian.” See 20–A M.R.S. § 2951(2). Section 2951(2)’s
“nonsectarian” requirement protects and fosters the
religious freedom of all citizens. It does so by ensuring
that the State does not wield its taxing power to benefit
religious schools or fund religious education. In this
way, no taxpayer is compelled to financially support
any religious ideology that runs counter to their personal beliefs.
This most basic religious liberty protection has
been drowned out in this case by three families of
Maine Christians—who are members of the state’s
majority religion—claiming discrimination. Their attempts to secure government funding to subsidize religious education are a direct assault on the very right
to religious liberty they claim to support. The constitutional prohibition on states taxing citizens for the
benefit of religion, directly or indirectly, guarantees religious liberty for all. As Thomas Jefferson explained
3
in the Virginia Statute on Religious Freedom, “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical. . . .” 2 THOMAS JEFFERSON, 82. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 18
June 1779, in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 545–
53 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). James Madison called the
statute “a true standard of Religious liberty.” 1 JAMES
MADISON, Detached Memoranda, Ca. 31 January 1820,
in THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, RETIREMENT SERIES,
4 MARCH 1817—31 JANUARY 1820, 600–27 (David B.
Mattern et al. eds., 2009). He did so because it stood as
“the great barrier [against] usurpations on the rights
of conscience.” Id.
To open up Maine’s school funding scheme to religiously-segregated schools would imperil, not protect,
religious liberty. The Petitioners argue otherwise because they have failed to correctly identify who possesses that right. The religious liberty at issue here
does not lie with Christian parents or religious schools,
for they remain free to operate and attend private religious schools absent government aid. The rights jeopardized in this case lie with every Maine citizen and
taxpayer.
A state’s taxing power is inherently coercive.
When that power is used directly, or even indirectly, to
benefit religious education, it violates the rights of conscience of all citizens. As James Madison put it:
The Religion then of every man must be left
to the conviction and conscience of every man;
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and it is the right of every man to exercise it
as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable right. It is unalienable,
because the opinions of men, depending only
on the evidence contemplated by their own
minds cannot follow the dictates of other
men. . . .”).
8 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance
against Religious Assessments, [ca. 20 June] 1785, in
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 10 MARCH 1784—28
MARCH 1786, 295–306 (Robert A. Rutland & William
M. E. Rachal eds., 1973) (hereinafter “MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance”). To employ a state’s taxing
power in such a manner is to permit the very tyranny
that Jefferson and Madison sought to restrain with the
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom. That is the evil
that Section 2951(2) seeks to avoid: state encroachment on the right of citizens not to subsidize a religion
that is not their own. If this Court accepts the Petitioners’ invitation to abandon this basic principle of religious freedom, we will have reached a disastrous
moment in American history: the era of governmentcompelled tithing.
Reflecting on the legislative history of Section
2951(2), the First Circuit recognized three important
state interests advanced by excluding religious schools
from receiving taxpayer money meant to fund the provision of secular education to Maine students. “These
reasons include Maine’s interests in concentrating limited state funds on its goal of providing secular education, avoiding entanglement, and allaying concerns
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about accountability that undoubtedly would accompany state oversight of parochial schools’ curricula and
policies (especially those pertaining to admission, religious tolerance, and participation in religious activities).” Eulitt v. Maine Dept. of Educ., 386 F.3d 344, 356
(1st Cir. 2004).
This brief first discusses another much more fundamental and essential state interest protected by the
statute: protecting the religious freedom of its taxpayers by ensuring that they will not be compelled to fund
religious education. The brief then highlights the additional state interest in avoiding the government oversight of private religious schools that would be needed
were those schools receiving state funds. Finally, the
brief addresses how the erosion of the state’s interest
in funding secular education would be more than just
a byproduct of eliminating Section 2951(2), for that result is a desirable goal unto itself for many in the
“school choice” movement.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
ARGUMENT
I.
The Founders wrote the First Amendment
to ensure that taxpayers are not compelled
to subsidize a religion that is not their
own.
The legitimate purpose behind Section 2951(2)’s
prohibition on public funding to private religious
schools (the “no aid” principle) is the same fundamental purpose embodied in the First Amendment’s
6
religion clauses: to protect religious freedom. Failing to
enforce this “no aid” requirement would erode religious
liberty.
A. The “no aid” principle—that the government must not subsidize religious
teaching or worship—is fundamental
to the U.S. Constitution.
The Founders of the United States expressly wrote
the “no aid” principle into the First Amendment to prevent the government from using tax money to benefit
any particular religion. Religious worship, religious education, and maintaining places of worship should be
the result of free and voluntary support given by believers in that sect of the religion. James Madison, the
Father of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution, explained this purpose well in his condemnation of a
three-penny tax to support Christian preachers and
churches: “The Religion then of every man must be left
to the conviction and conscience of every man,” not the
taxing power of the state. MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance, supra.
Religious duty, including financial support of religion, is a personal duty over which governments can
have no jurisdiction. “It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he
believes to be acceptable to him,” as Madison put it.
Id. American governments simply do not have the
power to tax citizens to fund churches and religious
education. Alexander Hamilton explained this in The
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Federalist No. 69: referring to the president, he wrote
that the government “has no particle of spiritual jurisdiction.” This principle is vital to ensure true religious
freedom.
The compulsory support of a religion that is not
one’s own is anathema to American principles. Religious liberty cannot exist when the government can
force citizens to donate to a sect that promises them,
for example, eternal damnation and torture for exercising that freedom of religion. The Virginia Statute for
Religious Freedom also recognized that compelled government support to one’s own religion is a violation of
one’s rights of conscience: “[E]ven the forcing him to
support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of
giving his contributions to the particular pastor whose
morals he would make his pattern.” 2 THOMAS JEFFERSON, 82. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 18
June 1779, in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 545–
53 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). Thus, striking down “no
aid” clauses, or statutes like Maine’s Section 2951(2)
that embody the “no aid” principle, would jeopardize
the religious freedom of every United States citizen,
including religious adherents.
It is not just direct taxes that violate religious liberty but employing the taxing power in any manner to
fund sectarian education. Daniel Carroll, a Catholic
representative to the Constitutional Convention from
Maryland, put it best during the congressional debates
on the First Amendment when he said that “the rights
of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy,
8
will little bear the gentlest touch of the governmental
hand.” 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 729–31 (1789). The government hand at issue here is not the one refusing to slip
cash to Christian schools, but the hand reaching into
every citizen’s pocket to extract that cash—and it’s not
particularly gentle.
The Founders determined that the government
could not subsidize religion and the Supreme Court reaffirmed that principle when it first applied the Establishment Clause to the states. In Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing Township, the Court wrote, “The
‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this. . . . No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice
religion. . . .” 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (emphasis
added). The Court ruled just one year later that allowing religious instructors from various denominations
into public schools violated the Establishment Clause.
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, 333 U.S.
203 (1948). The Court expressly relied upon Everson
and the use of taxpayer money, saying, “This is beyond
all question a utilization of the tax-established and
tax-supported public school system to aid religious
groups to spread their faith.” Id. at 210. The school system argued in McCollum that the program was permissible because the First Amendment “was intended
to forbid only government preference of one religion
over another, not an impartial governmental assistance of all religions.” Id. at 211. The Court soundly
9
rejected this argument and found that rather than
“manifest[ing] a governmental hostility to religion,”
the First Amendment protected religious free exercise
by erecting “a wall between Church and State which
must be kept high and impregnable.” Id. 211–12.
The Supreme Court later reiterated a strong commitment to the religious liberty principles in Everson,
including the prohibition on giving public aid to religion. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 216–17 (1963) (discussing the majority and
dissenting opinions in Everson); Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488, 493 (1961) (recalling that the Court was
“urged to repudiate” the principles in Everson in the
McCollum case and noting it “declined to do this, but
instead strongly reaffirmed what had been said in
Everson . . . ”). The Court’s lengthy discussions of the
meaning and purposes of the First Amendment’s religion clauses in these cases focus on separating religion and government—to the benefit of both. The
Court could not have more resoundingly rejected the
argument now advanced by the Petitioners, that the
religion clauses actually require taxpayers to fund religion. That notion is completely foreign to the Constitution.
Our nation, our Founders, and the Justices of the
Supreme Court have always understood that religious
liberty flourishes when government does not tax citizens to aid religion. It is no surprise then that many
U.S. states have clarified the protection for religious
liberty by statute or through state constitutional “no
aid” provisions. The additions of “no aid” provisions to
10
a state’s school funding scheme are consistent with
this fundamental truth, learned over the course of our
nation’s history. Each state’s interest in protecting its
citizens’ religious liberty by maintaining a strict separation between religious education and state funding
could not be higher.
B. The “no aid” principle dates to America’s
founding and was uniformly accepted
after years of experience.
Though opponents to the separation of state and
church recently have used revisionist history in an attempt to rewrite state-church relations, the federal
government’s early history of embracing state-church
separation has been well-established and acknowledged by the Supreme Court for half a century at least.
“[F]or the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment the ‘establishment’ of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.” Walz
v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)
(emphasis added).
The history of the states is more varied, each
adopting disestablishment principles at different times
and to varying degrees. New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Maryland, North Carolina, and Virginia began disestablishment in the year of American independence,
1776. Other states took longer to realize the severe
problems with sponsoring or financially supporting
religion, disestablishing up through the 1830s. See
11
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer,
137 S. Ct. 2012, 2032–36 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). But regardless of the timeline, in the case of disestablishment, America’s “laboratories of democracy”
yielded remarkably consistent results. Looking to the
federal model, every state ultimately codified this
self-evident truth: there is no freedom of religion
without a government that is free from religion. States
that funded churches via established religions changed
course. “Every state establishment saw laws passed to
raise public funds and direct them toward houses of
worship and ministers. And as the States all disestablished, one by one, they all undid those laws.” Id.
This history is crucial to the issue now before this
Court. These states experienced religious establishments and after lengthy and careful debates decided
to stop taxing citizens to support religion because doing so violated the civil rights and religious liberty of
those citizens. The states learned this hard lesson
over decades of living in a pluralistic America, which
has only become more diverse nearly two centuries
later. Maine’s Section 2951(2) is a recognition of this
well-established history, within the specific context of
a school funding scheme.
This history seems distant today but was the result of centuries—millennia—of oppression by religion
embedded in the government. Thanks to the constitutional principle of separation between state and
church, Americans have been spared that oppressive
experience. And some, as a result, have become complacent. We are, in some sense, victims of the successful
12
American experiment in keeping state and church separate. Many Americans lack a basic understanding
of how these provisions protect religious freedom.
That has led some, including the well-meaning parents in this case, to question whether the provisions
are still valuable. They are. This Court ought not to
rule against them when they have served this country
so well in protecting religious liberty.
Several amici who filed in support of the Petitioners in this case submit lengthy, tangential historical accounts of anti-Catholic bigotry in a variety of
contexts in an attempt to cloud the unimpeachable intent behind Maine’s “no aid” law. EdChoice, for instance, points to anti-Catholic bigotry in the mid1800s, brought to light during a dispute over which bible to read in public schools in Ellsworth, Maine. See
Br. for EdChoice & Maine Pol’y Inst. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 9–16. But rather than applauding Maine’s decision to disentangle public education from religious indoctrination, EdChoice instead
suggests that Maine’s current school choice program is
tainted by anti-Catholic bigotry that supposedly existed more than a century prior to its adoption. None
of these historical accounts draws a direct connection
between alleged anti-Catholic bigotry and Maine’s
present program. Moreover, none of these historical
accounts even attempts to address the racial discrimination that fueled the modern wave of private schools
and the voucher schemes that now support them, in the
wake of desegregation. See, e.g., Chris Ford, Stephenie
Johnson, and Lisette Partelow, “The Racists Origins of
13
Private School Vouchers,” Center for American Progress
(July 12, 2017), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/
content/uploads/2017/07/12184850/VoucherSegregationbrief2.pdf; Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another
Country: Mississippi and the Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton Univ. Press, 2021); David Nevin &
Robert E. Bills, The Schools That Fear Built: Segregationist Academies in the South (1976). Indeed, it is
curious to make the argument that a foundational
constitutional principle should be undone due to a
fabricated discriminatory history in a brief supporting
voucher schemes, when voucher programs are themselves born of bigotry and segregation.
Upholding Maine’s modern school-funding scheme,
complete with its “no aid” provision, will not communicate an anti-Christian message. But striking Section
2951(2) from Maine’s program would have immediate,
disastrous results, including compromising the religious freedom of every State citizen. Minority religious
and nonreligious citizens would be immediately coerced into subsidizing religious education with which
they fundamentally disagree. That result would be, as
Thomas Jefferson wrote, “sinful and tyrannical.” The
rights of the state’s Christian taxpayers—the majority
religion—would be similarly infringed, as Jefferson
noted in that same document. 2 THOMAS JEFFERSON, 82.
A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 18 June
1779, in THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 545–53
(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950). Finally, if they begin receiving state funding, religious schools will likely be subjected to the state regulation that must necessarily
14
follow—although they may well fight in court for the
special privilege of receiving state funding without the
concomitant oversight, in which case it will be the students who suffer most.
II.
The “no aid” principle avoids government
entanglement with religious education and
the government oversight that must necessarily be coupled with state funding.
Granting religious schools a right to access the
public purse will inevitably lead to government regulation of religious schools. It must. Where public money
goes, public accountability must follow. State governments have generally had a “hands-off ” approach to religious institutions, including private religious schools,
which are largely unregulated by state education agencies. That will have to change if private schools receive
public money.
The special concerns over state separation and intervention in religion were highlighted by Supreme
Court Justice Robert Jackson, a titan of the Court
whose exemplary dissent in Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) is widely considered one of history’s
greatest dissents for its condemnation of America’s
WWII internment camps for citizens of Japanese ancestry. In a less famous though similarly powerful dissent, he explained how the Constitution protects
religious freedom—he wrote that the First Amendment “take[s] every form of propagation of religion out
of the realm of things which could directly or indirectly
15
be made public business and thereby be supported in
whole or in part at taxpayers’ expense.” Everson, 330
U.S. at 26–27 (Jackson, J., dissenting). He further
noted, “That is a difference which the Constitution sets
up between religion and almost every other subject
matter of legislation, a difference which goes to the very
root of religious freedom. . . .” Id. (emphasis added).
Justice Jackson also highlighted the paramount
rationale underlying the religious freedom protections
in the First Amendment:
This freedom was first in the Bill of Rights because it was first in the forefathers’ minds;
it was set forth in absolute terms, and its
strength is its rigidity. It was intended not
only to keep the states’ hands out of religion,
but to keep religion’s hands off the state, and
above all, to keep bitter religious controversy
out of public life by denying to every denomination any advantage from getting control of
public policy or the public purse.
Id. (emphasis added).
State-church separation gives religion significant
benefits—preventing courts from adjudicating church
ministerial disputes, for instance. See, e.g., HosannaTabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C.,
565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012) (holding that state resolution
of a ministerial dispute violated the Free Exercise and
Establishment clauses). Attached to these benefits are
relatively few conditions, but one of those few is, most
importantly, that taxpayers will not fund religion. By
seeking an end to Section 2951(2), Petitioners seek to
16
augment the benefits religious institutions receive under the separation of state and church while eliminating the essential conditions. The Petitioners want to
have their cake—which they think Maine taxpayers
must buy—and eat it too. But if they are successful,
this will lead to additional state oversight and control
of religious schools.
When public money flows to private schools, however indirect the route, regulation is necessary and
sensible because the unregulated flow of funds to unaccountable organizations guarantees abuse. Not surprisingly, the country’s longest-lived private voucher
program is bloated with such abuse. In Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, over a ten-year period, more than $139 million in taxpayer funds went to voucher schools that
were kicked out of the program for failing to meet basic
requirements. Molly Beck, State paid $139 million to
schools terminated from voucher program since 2004,
WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL (Oct. 12, 2014), available at
https://bit.ly/2NlL9zI.
The abuse is startling. One school run by a
preacher, LifeSkills Academy, collected more than
$200,000 in state subsidies for the 2012–13 academic
year before closing abruptly “in the dead of night” in
December, leaving seventy students without a school
to attend. Erin Richards, Milwaukee voucher school
LifeSkills Academy closes ‘in the dead of the night,
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Jan. 14, 2014), available
at https://bit.ly/2oAnm5b. State records documented
alarming conditions, including allegations that the
school falsified records of National School Lunch
17
Program meals, served expired food, served “Ramen
noodles with hot sauce and a cup of water for lunch,”
and “cut” whole milk with water. See Amicus Curiae
FFRF’s Letter to the Florida Department of Education
(Jan. 30, 2014), available at https://bit.ly/2Nghnwv.; see
id. at Ex. 10, available at https://bit.ly/2JL4wQv. A former employee charged that the preacher falsified state
records and believed he would get away with it because, “Can’t nothing touch him but God.” Id. Over its
six years, LifeSkills collected more than $2.3 million in
public money before shutting down and leaving families of students scrambling to find a new school. The
preacher fled to a gated community in Florida, where
he opened LifeSkills Academy II. Erin Richards, Leaders of closed Milwaukee voucher school are now in Florida, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Jan. 15, 2014),
available at https://bit.ly/32nQT0m.
Alex’s Academic of Excellence—“Academic” is indeed how this school spelled its name—raked in more
than $3.5 million in taxpayer funds over five years before closing. Evicted for code violations from two locations, the school ended up in a storefront. According to
reports, “children departed through the back entrance
on Thursday afternoon and stood beside a trash receptacle overflowing with refuse—including the box
spring for a bed—while they waited for buses to arrive.” Sarah Carr, Who cleans up problem choice
schools?, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL (Sept. 15,
2003), https://goo.gl/zoCc45. The principal saw employees smoking marijuana in school and saw a staffer
with a bag of crack cocaine. The school’s founder and
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CEO was a convicted rapist who received a thirty-year
prison term and served nine years. Id.
There are plenty of other examples from Milwaukee alone. Some private schools receiving voucher
money failed to provide textbooks to students. Erin
Richards, Former Employees Cast Doubt on Voucher
School’s Operations, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL
(Dec. 15, 2014), available at https://bit.ly/2n7I9Nf.
Others taught subjects from fundamentalist Christian
textbooks that claimed things like “a belief in Darwinian evolution” was a cause of World War II and that
through spirituals, “slaves developed the patience to
wait on the Lord and discovered that the truest freedom is freedom from the bondage of sin.” Frances
Paterson, Building a Conservative Base: Teaching
History and Civics in Voucher-Supported Schools, 82
THE PHI DELTA KAPPAN, 150, 151–52 (2000), www.
jstor.org/stable/20439835.
While public schools have elected school boards,
there is little-to-no public oversight of private schools
receiving public money. The citizens who subsidize the
schools end up with no say in even minimal academic
or safety regulations. The solution to these problems
is inevitable if private religious schools receive public
funding: accountability through government oversight.
Religious schools will resist any attempt by the
state to hold them to the standards that apply to public
schools, including, concerningly, the requirements in
the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) that schools
receiving state funding not discriminate in hiring
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decisions based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of the American Center for Law and Justice
to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, Doc. No.
00117498984 at 5 (Oct. 7, 2019) (“Any requirements
that condemned as ‘discrimination’ a religious school’s
adherence to its mission integrity, and in particular to
religious doctrines on sexuality and human nature,
would essentially put the religious school to the choice
of changing its doctrines or disqualifying itself from
otherwise available public benefits.”). Citizens should
not have to condone such discriminatory hiring practices through taxpayer subsidies.
If religious schools continue to insist on a constitutional right to dip into the public purse, and if this
Court should agree, state-church relations will be altered in fundamental ways for which nobody is prepared. Ultimately, accepting public money will open
private schools to public oversight. And while that
oversight can be accomplished without entangling the
government in religious practice, the necessity of such
regulation will invite entanglement. Keeping religious
schools out of the public treasury allows them to remain free from government regulation and public accountability—another way that the “no aid” statutes
fosters religious freedom.
---------------------------------♦---------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
The religious liberty interest that is primarily
threatened in this case lies not with the Petitioners,
but with Maine taxpayers, and it dates back to America’s founding. The principle that the state must not
fund religious instruction at taxpayer expense is
among our most fundamental and essential rights.
Over our long history, there has never been any indication that religious liberty protections actually require the government to financially support religion.
The cost of revisiting that principle now will be felt by
every citizen in the state.
This Court should not undo the Maine Legislature’s decision not to subsidize sectarian education.
Neither the parents seeking public money, nor the religious schools, have a right to taxpayer funds, directly
or indirectly. The State’s decision is the only path consistent with fundamental principles of religious liberty.
The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PATRICK ELLIOTT
Counsel of Record
SAMUEL T. GROVER
FREEDOM FROM RELIGION
FOUNDATION, INC.
P. O. Box 750
Madison, WI 53701
(608) 256-8900
pelliott@ffrf.org
Counsel for Amici Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.