Amicus Curiae Brief — City of Austin, Texas, Petitioner v. Reagan National Advertising of Austin, LLC, et al.

No. 20-1029

In the Supreme Court of the United States

____________________

CITY OF AUSTIN, TEXAS,

Petitioner,

v.

REAGAN NATIONAL ADVERTISING

OF AUSTIN, INC., ET AL.

Respondents.

____________________

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_______________________________________________________________________________

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE FLORIDA,

ARKANSAS, CALIFORNIA, CONNECTICUT,

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, ILLINOIS, IOWA,

MAINE, MARYLAND, MASSACHUSETTS,

MICHIGAN, MINNESOTA, MISSISSIPPI,

NEVADA, NEW JERSEY, NEW YORK, OHIO,

OREGON, PENNSYLVANIA, SOUTH DAKOTA,

VERMONT, AND WASHINGTON IN SUPPORT

OF PETITIONER

_______________________________________________________________________________

DAVID M. COSTELLO

Assistant Solicitor General

Office of the Florida

Attorney General

PL-01, The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(850) 414-3300

henry.whitaker@

myfloridalegal.com

ASHLEY MOODY

Attorney General

HENRY C. WHITAKER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

DANIEL W. BELL

Chief Deputy

Solicitor General

KEVIN A. GOLEMBIEWSKI

Deputy Solicitor General

Counsel for Amicus Curiae the State of Florida

(Additional counsel with signature block)

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES....................................... ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ................................1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....................................1

ARGUMENT ...............................................................3

I.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT

PETITIONER’S ORDINANCE IS CONTENT-BASED

UNDER REED. .....................................................3

A. Laws like petitioner’s are content-neutral. 3

B. The Fifth Circuit’s decision threatens

thousands of state and local sign laws. ......6

C. The “officials must read it” test would inject

uncertainty into many areas of regulation

beyond signage. ......................................... 12

II.

EVEN IF PETITIONER’S ORDINANCE IS CONTENTBASED, THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN

INVALIDATING THE ORDINANCE ON ITS FACE. .... 19

CONCLUSION .......................................................... 22

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta,

141 S. Ct. 2373 (2021)............................................ 21

Barr v. Am. Assoc. of Pol. Consultants,

140 S. Ct. 2335 (2020)........................................ 3, 21

Bd. of Trustees v. Fox,

492 U.S. 469 (1989) ................................................ 20

Boos v. Barry,

485 U.S. 312 (1988) ..................................................4

Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.,

472 U.S. 491 (1985) ................................................ 20

City of Ladue v. Gilleo,

512 U.S. 43 (1994) ....................................................6

Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence,

468 U.S. 288 (1984) ..................................................4

Hav-A-Tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson,

5 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1941) ...........................................6

Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,

453 U.S. 490 (1981) ..................................................6

Murphy v. Westport,

40 A.2d 177 (Conn. 1944) ........................................7

Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra,

138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018)............................................ 13

Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan,

564 U.S. 117 (2011) ..................................................5

Packingham v. North Carolina,

137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017)............................................ 17

Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Vill. of Hempstead,

19 N.Y.S.2d 374 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940) .....................7

PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins,

447 U.S. 74 (1980) .................................................. 15

iii

Reagan Nat’l Advert. v. City of Austin,

972 F.3d 696 (5th Cir. 2020).......................... passim

Reed v. Town of Gilbert,

576 U.S. 155 (2015) ........................................ 1, 3, 10

United States v. Alvarez,

567 U.S. 709 (2012) ................................................ 17

United States v. Stevens,

559 U.S. 460 (2010) ................................................ 19

Veneklase v. City of Fargo,

248 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2001).................................. 13

Ward v. Rock Against Racism,

491 U.S. 781 (1989) ..................................................4

Wisconsin v. Mitchell,

508 U.S. 476 (1993) ................................................ 14

STATUTES

11 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52.3-4 ................................... 16

18 U.S.C. § 709 .......................................................... 18

225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 440/3.17 ......................................7

225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 440/3.18 ......................................7

225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 440/4.03 ......................................7

225 Ill. Comp. Stat. 440/4.04 ......................................7

3 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 459-503-A ..................................... 11

50 U.S.C § 3513 ......................................................... 18

51 U.S.C. § 20141 ...................................................... 18

66 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2902 ............................................ 15

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/16-40 ...................................... 16

730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/3 ......................................... 12

775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-102 ...................................... 14

Ala. Code § 23-1-273 ....................................................7

Ala. Code § 37-8-200 .................................................. 11

Ala. Code § 8-6-171.................................................... 16

Alaska Stat. § 11.46.570 ........................................... 15

Alaska Stat. § 18.80.240 ........................................... 14

iv

Alaska Stat. § 19.25.105 .............................................7

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2907.02............................ 17

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-7902...................................7

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-6561................................. 17

Ark. Code Ann. § 23-42-309 ...................................... 16

Ark. Code Ann. § 27-50-310 ...................................... 18

Ark. Code Ann. § 27-74-302 ........................................7

Ark. Code Ann. § 4-99-302 ........................................ 18

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 5272 .....................................7

Cal. Penal Code § 148.1............................................. 17

Cal. Penal Code § 502................................................ 16

Cal. Penal Code § 530................................................ 15

Cal. Penal Code § 538d ............................................. 18

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-8-110 ........................................ 17

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-278d .............................. 15

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-130 .............................. 15

D.C. Code § 22-933.01 ............................................... 16

Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 854 ..................................... 15

Del. Code Ann. tit. 17, § 1121 .....................................7

Fla. Stat. § 316.72 ..................................................... 18

Fla. Stat. § 479.015 .....................................................6

Fla. Stat. § 479.11 ..................................................... 10

Fla. Stat. § 479.16 ......................................... 3, 7, 9, 21

Fla. Stat. § 496.415 ............................................... 2, 17

Fla. Stat. § 760.01 ..................................................... 14

Fla. Stat. § 767.04 ..................................................... 11

Fla. Stat. § 784.048 ................................................... 16

Fla. Stat. § 790.163 ................................................... 17

Fla. Stat. § 812.0195 ................................................. 16

Fla. Stat. § 843.085 ................................................... 18

Fla. Stat. § 943.0435 ................................................. 12

Ga. Code Ann. § 32-6-72..............................................7

Ga. Code Ann. § 40-8-116.......................................... 18

Ga. Code Ann. § 43-17-12 .......................................... 17

v

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 264-72 .............................................7

Haw. Rev. Stat. § 467B-9 .......................................... 17

Idaho Code Ann. § 40-1910A.......................................7

Idaho Code Ann. § 40-1911 ................................... 7, 11

Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5 ............................................. 15

Ind. Code § 8-23-20-7 ..................................................7

Iowa Code § 306B.1 .....................................................9

Iowa Code § 708.11 .................................................... 16

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 68-2233 ...........................................7

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1512 ........................................... 10

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 177.830 .....................................9

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:40.2 .................................... 16

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:1166 ................................... 15

La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 48:461.2 .............................. 7, 11

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 68, § 28 .................................... 17

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93D, § 2 .....................................7

Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 8-801........................... 16

Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 3-502 ......................... 18

Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-304 ........................ 14

Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 8-701 .................................7

Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 8-744 .................................7

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 354 ................................... 15

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 23, § 1903 .......................................7

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 23, § 1908 .......................................7

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 23, § 1914 .......................................7

Mich. Comp. Laws § 252.302 ......................................7

Mich. Comp. Laws § 252.313 ......................................7

Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.615 .................................... 10

Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.293 .................................... 17

Minn. Stat. § 173.08 ....................................................7

Minn. Stat. § 219.29 .................................................. 11

Minn. Stat. § 363A.08 ............................................... 14

Miss. Code Ann. § 49-23-5...........................................7

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.040 ........................................... 14

vi

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 226.520 ........................................... 11

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 575.090 ........................................... 17

Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23-504 .................................... 12

Mont. Code Ann. § 61-8-210 ...................................... 10

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 131F-20 ......................................... 17

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-129 ...........................................7

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.7 ........................................ 12

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-277.4A ...................................... 13

N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-11-0 ...................................... 17

N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-31-07.1 ................................. 16

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 238:24 .....................................7

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651-B:4-a .............................. 12

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 27:5-11 .............................................7

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 39:4-183.22a .................................. 11

N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2.1 .......................................... 18

N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 ................................................ 14

N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 399-yy .................................... 15

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-358 ............................................ 16

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-218 ..............................................7

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 54-619 ............................................ 11

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,127 ......................................... 10

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.575 .......................................... 16

Nev. Rev. Stat. § 410.320 ............................................7

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2913.49 ............................. 2, 15

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.02 ................................. 14

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4511.16 ................................. 10

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5516.01 ...................................9

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 935.18................................... 11

Okla. Stat. tit. 4, § 45 ................................................ 11

Okla. Stat. tit. 69, § 1273 ............................................7

Okla. Stat. tit. 69, § 1274 ............................................7

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 165.800 ................................... 15

Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 419B.016 ................................. 17

S.C. Code Ann. § 57-25-140............................. 7, 10, 11

vii

S.D. Codified Laws § 20-13-10 .................................. 14

S.D. Codified Laws § 31-29-63 ....................................7

S.D. Codified Laws § 37-30-17 .................................. 17

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315 .................................... 16

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-203 .................................... 12

Tenn. Code Ann. § 54-21-102 ......................................9

Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 304.151 .................... 18

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.051 ............................. 12

Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 391.001 ..............................9

Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-504 .........................................7

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-111 ....................................... 16

Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-109 ....................................... 13

Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-419 .......................................... 13

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 488 .........................................7

Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 493 .........................................7

W. Va. Code § 17-22-4 ............................................... 10

W. Va. Code § 29-19-13 ....................................... 17, 18

W. Va. Code § 61-6-25 ............................................... 17

Wash. Rev. Code § 47.42.040 ......................................8

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.110.................................... 16

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.90.070.................................... 16

Wis. Stat. § 202.16 ............................................... 17, 18

Wis. Stat. § 217.12..................................................... 18

Wis. Stat. § 945.06..................................................... 15

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-10-104 .......................................8

ORDINANCES

City of Nashua, N.H., Code § 190-94 ........................ 10

Hillsborough Cty., Fla., Code § 7.03.00 .................... 15

Jacksonville, Fla., Code § 656.1302 .......................... 15

Jacksonville, Fla., Code § 656.1307 .......................... 15

Leon Cty., Fla., Code § 10-9.101 ............................... 10

Leon Cty., Fla., Code § 10-9.201 ............................... 13

Leon Cty., Fla., Code § 10-9.301 ............................... 10

viii

Los Angeles, Cal., Code § 14.4.2 ............................... 10

Los Angeles, Cal., Code § 14.4.4 ............................... 10

Miami, Fla., Code § 33.94 ......................................... 15

Miami, Fla., Code § 33.95 ......................................... 14

New Orleans, La., Code art. 24.8 .............................. 10

New Orleans, La., Code art. 26.6 .............................. 10

Newport, Ky., Code § 15.9 ......................................... 13

Ocala, Fla., Code § 110-6........................................... 16

Orange Cty., Fla., Code § 31.5-13 ............................. 16

Orange Cty., Fla., Code § 31.5-5 ......................... 15, 16

Orange Cty., Fla., Code § 31.5-76 ............................. 15

Phila., Pa., Code § 9-1106 ......................................... 19

Phoenix, Ariz., Code § 705 ........................................ 13

Providence, R.I., Code § 16-13.1 ............................... 18

Provo, Utah, Code § 14.38.020 .................................. 10

San Diego, Cal., Code § 142.1210 ............................. 10

San Jose, Cal., Code § 10.09.010 .............................. 18

St. Petersburg, Fla., Code § 16.40.120.4 .................. 10

St. Petersburg, Fla., Code § 16.40.120.6.7 ............... 10

Tampa, Fla., Code § 12-61 ........................................ 19

Tampa, Fla., Code § 27-43 ........................................ 10

Town of Barrington, R.I., Code § 138-2 .................... 18

OTHER AUTHORITIES

250 R.I. Code R. 100-00-1.30..................................... 10

33 Miss. Admin. Code Pt. 209, R. 1.1 ....................... 11

43 Tex. Adm. Code § 22.15 ........................................ 10

Ala. R. Prof’l Cond. 1.6 .............................................. 13

Alaska Admin. Code tit. 17, § 20.005 ....................... 10

D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, § 108.6 ................................ 10

Del. Lawyers’ R. Prof’l Cond. 1.6 .............................. 14

ix

Distracted Driving, Centers for Disease Control and

Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/transportation

safety/distracted_driving/index.html ......................6

Fla. Bar. R. 4-1.6 ....................................................... 13

Ga. R. Prof’l Cond. 1.6 ............................................... 14

Mass. R. Prof’l Cond. 1.6 ........................................... 14

Mont. Admin. R. 18.6.240 ......................................... 11

N.C. R. Prof’l Cond. 1.6 ............................................. 14

N.J. Admin. Code § 19:66-5.7.................................... 10

Nev. R. Prof’l Cond. 1.6 ............................................. 14

Okla. Admin. Code 120:10-15-9 ................................ 10

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

This case involves the question whether it violates

the First Amendment for states to regulate signs that

advertise off-premises activities differently from those

that advertise on-premises activities. The decision

below concluded that it does. Amici States believe that

this decision, if upheld, could raise questions about

the constitutionality of a range of state and local

regulations designed to protect the health and safety

of the citizenry that have never been thought to be,

and are not in fact, unconstitutional. Amici States

have a significant interest in defending the validity of

laws that protect their residents, as well as in

ensuring the proper interpretation and application of

the First Amendment.1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Billboards and similar signs are, by design,

distracting to motorists. For decades, nearly all 50

states (and numerous political subdivisions) have

addressed the risks that they pose to traffic safety by

distinguishing between “on-premises” and “offpremises” signs. The former are located on the

premises of the business that they advertise (e.g., “Eat

Here”), and the latter are located elsewhere (e.g.,

“Waffle House One Mile Ahead”).

Restrictions on off-premises signs promote traffic

safety while leaving business owners substantial

leeway to advertise. According to the Fifth Circuit,

however, they violate the First Amendment. Pointing

to Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), the

1 This brief is filed under Supreme Court Rule 37.4 and does

not require Rule 37.6 disclosures or consent of the parties.

2

Fifth Circuit held that a sign regulation is contentbased and therefore subject to strict scrutiny if

“officials [must] examine” speech to determine

whether the sign is on- or off-premises. Reagan Nat’l

Advert. v. City of Austin, 972 F.3d 696, 706 (5th Cir.

2020). But Reed adopted no such rule; it provided only

that laws are content-based if they “target speech

based on its communicative content.” 576 U.S. at 163.

Off-premises sign regulations do not do that—even if

they use words as evidence of where a sign (and

associated business) is located. It is not content-based

to use words as a proxy for the relative locations of a

sign and a business associated with it. The location of

the sign and business is a matter that is wholly nonexpressive.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision not only calls into

question countless routine traffic laws, but also

conflicts with the constitutional treatment of

timeworn laws in a range of areas that have never

been thought constitutionally suspect simply because

they use words as a proxy for non-expressive activity.

Identity-theft laws, for example, require officials to

examine speech to assess whether a suspect is

“holding [himself] out to be [an]other person.” See,

e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2913.49(B). Officials must

likewise examine speech to enforce laws prohibiting

solicitors from misrepresenting that “[an]other person

or organization sponsors or endorses” their efforts.

See,

e.g.,

Fla.

Stat.

§ 496.415(3).

Even

antidiscrimination claims often turn on the

defendant’s speech as evidence of discriminatory

intent.

3

If using words as evidence of the non-expressive

elements of such laws is not content-based regulation,

neither is using words as a proxy for whether a sign is

on- or off-premises. The Fifth Circuit erred in holding

otherwise.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ERRED BY CONCLUDING

THAT PETITIONER’S ORDINANCE IS CONTENTBASED UNDER REED.

A. Laws like petitioner’s are content-neutral.

Since Reed, this Court has reaffirmed precedents

reflecting that a law is not content-based simply

because it has an incidental effect on some speakers

or messages. See Barr v. Am. Assoc. of Pol.

Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2347 (2020) (plurality

op.) (explaining that “the First Amendment does not

prevent restrictions directed at commerce or conduct

from imposing incidental burdens on speech”

(quotations omitted)). Consistent with those

precedents, Reed held that a law is content-based only

if it “target[s] speech based on its communicative

content.” 576 U.S. at 163. And off-premises laws do

not target communicative content, even if they

incidentally burden it.

Florida law, for example, generally requires a

permit for signs located along state highways, but

there is an exemption for signs “on the premises” of an

“establishment” that they advertise. Fla. Stat.

§ 479.16(1). In other words, Florida exempts onpremises advertising from its general permitting

scheme for signs. So a “Waffle House” sign along

Interstate 75 may be erected on Waffle House

4

premises without a permit, but a permit would be

required to erect the same sign off-premises.

Such an off-premises law may limit signs that

“direct persons to any location not on th[e] site,” see

Reagan Nat’l Advert., 972 F.3d at 704, but it does not

target signs because of that message. The law

regulates based on location, not speech; any effect on

“off-premises” speech is at most incidental, as no topic

or message is singled out for differential treatment.

See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 320 (1988) (a

“regulation[] that appl[ies] to a particular category of

speech because the regulatory targets happen to be

associated with that type of speech” is not contentbased).

Off-premises laws do not target a sign based on its

communicative content simply because officials must

examine the sign to determine whether it is offpremises. This Court has consistently held that

“[e]xpression, whether oral or written or symbolized

by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or

manner restrictions.” Clark v. Cmty. for Creative NonViolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). This Court’s cases

do not establish a categorical rule that such

restrictions cannot use words as a means to effectuate

regulation without triggering strict scrutiny. To the

contrary, the Court has recognized that a regulation

can be a content-neutral time, place, or manner

restriction on speech even if effectuating it requires

review of expression. See Ward v. Rock Against

Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790–92 (1989) (holding contentneutral a sound-amplification ordinance that required

monitoring of music—“one of the oldest forms of

human expression”).

5

Even when core political speech is at issue, words

can be used to effectuate a reasonable time, place, or

manner restriction on speech. A legislator, for

example, may be prohibited from “advocating” the

passage or failure of legislation during a legislative

debate if conflict-of-interest laws would prevent him

from voting on the legislation. See Nev. Comm’n on

Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 121–23 (2011). That

is true even if the only way to figure out whether the

“advocacy” in question is prohibited is by reading or

hearing it (and even if such review is more than

“cursory,” Reagan Nat’l Advert., 972 F.3d at 705–06).

The legislator’s words are reviewed solely because

they are evidence of whether he is engaging in

advocacy of the prohibited kind (during a legislative

debate regarding a matter on which he may not vote).

Here, a sign’s text is likewise used solely as

evidence of the location of the sign and associated

business. Text directing motorists to a highway exit

five miles away is evidence that the sign is offpremises, while “Eat Here” is evidence that the sign is

on-premises.

The “officials must read it” test thus

inappropriately subjects innocuous, unimpeachably

reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to

exacting scrutiny. Reed did not adopt such a test, and

this Court should reject respondents’ invitation to

subject unobjectionable forms of government

regulation to close constitutional scrutiny.

6

B. The Fifth Circuit’s decision threatens

thousands of state and local sign laws.

Billboards and similar signs “are real and

substantial hazards to traffic safety”; they “are

intended to, and undoubtedly do, divert a driver’s

attention from the roadway.” Metromedia, Inc. v. City

of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508–09 (1981) (quotations

omitted).2 Accordingly, “[w]hile signs are a form of

expression protected by the Free Speech Clause, they

pose distinctive problems that are subject to” states’

“police powers.” See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S.

43, 48 (1994).

In regulating billboards, state and local

governments must balance safety concerns against

the interests of both those who wish to advertise on

signs and those who own land along roadways. They

must also consider a variety of community interests,

including promoting economic development and

protecting visual aesthetics. See, e.g., Fla. Stat.

§ 479.015 (“declar[ing]” that “[t]he control of signs” is

“necessary . . . to attract visitors to [Florida] by

conserving the natural beauty of the state”).

For the past century—since the rise of the

automobile in America—states and local governments

have balanced those interests by regulating the time,

place, and manner in which signs may be displayed.

See, e.g., Hav-A-Tampa Cigar Co. v. Johnson, 5 So. 2d

433, 437 (Fla. 1941) (upholding Florida’s ban on

In 2018 alone, around 400,000 people “were injured in

crashes involving a distracted driver.” Distracted Driving,

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (Aug. 9, 2021),

https://www.cdc.gov/transportationsafety/distracted_driving/ind

ex.html.

2

7

billboards “[w]ithin fifteen feet of the outside

boundary of a public highway”); Murphy v. Westport,

40 A.2d 177, 178 (Conn. 1944) (considering a town’s

ban on all outdoor advertising signs other than onpremises signs); Preferred Tires, Inc. v. Vill. of

Hempstead, 19 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1940)

(upholding a town’s total billboard ban). Some

common examples of regulations include laws

requiring permits for off-premises signs; laws barring

signs that could be confused with traffic-control

devices, such as stop signs; and laws imposing time

restrictions on event signs.

The Fifth Circuit’s decision would imperil such

regulations, jeopardizing innumerable longstanding

and carefully crafted regulatory regimes.

1. For starters, many states have laws like

petitioner’s that distinguish between on- and offpremises signs based on the words used on the signs.3

3 See Ala. Code § 23-1-273(4); Alaska Stat. § 19.25.105(a)(2);

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-7902; Ark. Code Ann. § 27-74-302; Cal.

Bus. & Prof. Code § 5272(a); Del. Code Ann. tit. 17, § 1121; Fla.

Stat. § 479.16(1); Ga. Code Ann. § 32-6-72(3); Haw. Rev. Stat.

§ 264-72(3); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 40-1910A, 40-1911; 225 Ill.

Comp. Stat. 440/3.17, 3.18, 4.03, 4.04; Ind. Code § 8-23-20-7(3);

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 68-2233; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 48:461.2; Me.

Rev. Stat. tit. 23, §§ 1903(8), 1908, 1914; Md. Code Ann., Transp.

§§ 8-701, 8-744; Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93D, § 2; Mich. Comp. Laws

§§ 252.302(y), 252.313; Minn. Stat. § 173.08, subd. 1(3); Miss.

Code Ann. § 49-23-5(1)(c); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 39-218; Nev. Rev.

Stat. § 410.320(3); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 238:24; N.J. Stat. Ann.

§ 27:5-11(a)(1)(c); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 136-129; Okla. Stat. tit. 69,

§§ 1273(h), 1274(b); S.C. Code Ann. § 57-25-140(A)(6); S.D.

Codified Laws § 31-29-63; Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-504(2)(c); Vt.

Stat. Ann. tit. 10, §§ 488, 493; Va. Code Ann. § 33.2-1217(B);

8

So do numerous cities.4 And the laws are integral to

sign regulation; off-premises restrictions are a

straightforward and effective way for states and cities

to limit the number of signs dotting a highway

without singling out specific industries, groups,

activities, topics, or viewpoints. Under such laws, a

sign’s location, not its message, is what matters, and

the laws are easy to enforce: officials need only read a

proposed or existing sign to determine whether it is

located on-premises.

The First Amendment does not require states and

localities to resort to less effective means of regulating

on-premises and off-premises signs. Respondents

have argued that the Fifth Circuit’s decision leaves

states free to regulate signs that display only

commercial speech. Br. in Opp. at 11–12. That is cold

comfort, however, for it would hamper state and local

governments

from

regulating

unsightly

noncommercial signage that might otherwise

dominate their landscapes and highways.

Perversely, a holding that the First Amendment

forbids governments from using words to regulate offpremises signs is likely to lead to more, rather than

Wash. Rev. Code § 47.42.040(3); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-10104(a)(iii).

4 See, e.g., Leon Cty., Fla., Code §§ 10-9.101, 10-9.301; Los

Angeles, Cal., Code §§ 14.4.2, 14.4.4(B)(11); City of Nashua,

N.H., Code § 190-94(B)(6), (19); New Orleans, La., Code arts.

24.8(L), 26.6; Provo, Utah, Code § 14.38.020; San Diego, Cal.,

Code § 142.1210(a)(1); Tampa, Fla., Code § 27-43; St. Petersburg,

Fla., Code §§ 16.40.120.4, 16.40.120.6.7; Chamber of Com.

Amicus Br. 9, City of Austin v. Reagan Nat’l Advert., No. 20-1029

(U.S. Mar. 1, 2021) (in Texas alone, around 350 cities and towns

“distinguish between on- and off-premise signage”).

9

less, intrusive regulation. Tennessee and some other

states, for instance, have reacted to court decisions

striking down the traditional on-premises/offpremises distinction by using revenue-generation,

along with the location of a sign, as a proxy for

whether the sign advertises an off-premises location,

rather than using the straightforward means of

whether the words on the sign direct the reader to an

on- or off-premises location. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 5421-102(17); Iowa Code § 306B.1; Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.

§ 177.830(5); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5516.01; Tex.

Transp. Code Ann. § 391.001(1-a). Under these

workarounds to the Fifth Circuit’s holding, a sign that

is on the premises of an establishment is defined as

an “on-premises” sign unless it separately generates

revenue for the establishment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 5421-102(17)(B). But revenue-generation is both more

intrusive and more difficult to detect and enforce than

simply consulting what the sign says.

In Florida, for example, nine inspectors of the

Florida Department of Transportation monitor

compliance with the state’s off-premises law. They do

so by, among other things, patrolling when signs

change; if a landowner without a permit for his sign

changes the sign, the inspectors read the sign to

determine whether it is still an on-premises sign. But

under a revenue-generation law, Florida’s inspectors

could enforce the law only by investigating

landowners’ financial arrangements.5 The result

would be more intrusive regulation, not less.

5 Under Florida law, an otherwise on-premises sign requires

a permit if “the owner of the establishment receives rental

income.” Fla. Stat. § 479.16(1). The point, however, is that it

10

2. The Fifth Circuit’s decision also threatens other

traditional forms of sign regulation that rely on words

as evidence of regulated activities.

First, laws “imposing time restrictions on signs

advertising a one-time event” would be at risk. Reed,

576 U.S. at 175 (Alito, J., concurring). States and

cities across the country have had such laws for

decades. See, e.g., Alaska Admin. Code tit. 17,

§ 20.005(a); N.J. Admin. Code § 19:66-5.7(g)(14); Okla.

Admin. Code 120:10-15-9(a); Or. Admin. R. 350-0810074(1)(a)(L)(v); 250 R.I. Code R. 100-00-1.30(A)(7)(g);

S.C. Code Ann. § 57-25-140(A)(9); 43 Tex. Adm. Code

§ 22.15(d)(7); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, § 108.6; Leon

Cty., Fla., Code § 10-9.201(b)(3); Newport, Ky., Code

§ 15.9; Phoenix, Ariz., Code § 705(B)(2)(i). Yet under

the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the laws might well be

constitutionally suspect because they regulate both

commercial and noncommercial signs and require

officials to review the text of a sign to determine

whether it advertises a one-time event.

Second, laws barring signs that “use[] the word

‘stop’ or ‘danger’” or that “present[] or impl[y] the

need” for “stopping or the existence of danger” would

be imperiled, as officials cannot determine whether

such laws apply without examining a sign’s text. Fla.

Stat. § 479.11(6); see also, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 81512; Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.615(a); Mont. Code

Ann. § 61-8-210; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,127(1); Ohio

Rev. Code Ann. § 4511.16; Va. Code Ann. § 33.21216(3); W. Va. Code § 17-22-4(2); Miami, Fla., Code

would be difficult to administer the scheme if revenue-generation

were the principal means of distinguishing between on- and offpremises signage.

11

§ 33.95(h); cf. Ala. Code § 37-8-200(a) (prohibiting

signs that resemble “railroad crossing sign[s]”); Minn.

Stat. § 219.29, subd. 2 (same).

Third, reviewing a sign’s text is necessary to

determine whether various laws regulating

neighborhood signs apply. For example, numerous

states have laws requiring owners of a “vicious[]” dog

to post a sign on their property that says “Bad Dog” or

that otherwise warns the community about the dog.

See Fla. Stat. § 767.04; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 54-619(2);

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 935.18(C)(1); Okla. Stat. tit. 4,

§ 45(B)(1); 3 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 459-503-A(a.1).

The list goes on: countless other sign laws likewise

require officials to review text, including those that

distinguish between seasonal and non-seasonal signs,

directional and non-directional signs, construction

and non-construction signs, trespassing and nontrespassing signs, and so on. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 48:461.2(A)(7) (distinguishing seasonal signs);

33 Miss. Admin. Code Pt. 209, R. 1.1(ii) (same); S.C.

Code Ann. § 57-25-140(A)(9) (same); Miami, Fla., Code

§ 33.94(j) (same); Idaho Code Ann. § 40-1911(1)

(directional signs); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 226.520(1) (same);

Jacksonville, Fla., Code § 656.1302(e) (same); Orange

Cty., Fla., Code §§ 31.5-5, 31.5-76 (same); N.J. Stat.

Ann. § 39:4-183.22a (construction signs); Mont.

Admin. R. 18.6.240(4)(a) (same); Hillsborough Cty.,

Fla., Code § 7.03.00(E)(4)(c) (same); Jacksonville, Fla.,

Code § 656.1307 (same); Orange Cty., Fla., Code

§ 31.5-5 (same); Miami, Fla., Code § 33-94(p) (“no

trespassing” signs); Ocala, Fla., Code § 110-6(2)

(same); Orange Cty., Fla., Code § 31.5-13(8) (same).

12

It is unclear how these manifold forms of sign

regulation could proceed without attaching

significance to the words employed on the face of such

signs.

C. The “officials must read it” test would

inject uncertainty into many areas of

regulation beyond signage.

The “officials must read it” test would both raise

questions about a variety of state regulations beyond

sign laws and inject discord into this Court’s First

Amendment jurisprudence. Many forms of state

regulation use text or speech as a proxy for, or as

evidence of, non-expressive activity. Speech, for

example, is often used as evidence of fraud,

discrimination, and identity theft. Such laws are not,

and have never been considered, constitutionally

suspect. Yet off-premises sign regulation amounts to

no more than using speech as evidence of location—a

matter that is likewise non-expressive. Amici States

submit that in both instances, states may use speech

or text as a proxy for non-expressive activity without

triggering close constitutional scrutiny.

Sex-Offender Laws. For example, in Florida and

several other states, sex offenders must report all of

their internet identifiers (e.g., email addresses, socialmedia accounts, and online-chat names) to law

enforcement officials; if they fail to do so, they are

subject to prosecution for failing to properly report as

a sex offender. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(2)(a), (b);

730 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/3; Mont. Code Ann. § 46-23504(3); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 651-B:4-a; N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 14-208.7(b)(7); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39203(a)(7); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 62.051(c)(7).

13

Consequently, law enforcement officials must read

text—an offender’s list of identifiers—in carrying out

their enforcement duties.

Zoning Laws. Many zoning laws that prohibit

activities in particular locations pose the same

problem because officials must review speech to

determine whether a person is engaged in the activity.

A number of cities and states, for example, ban

picketing at a person’s home “for the purpose of

persuading” the person, thus requiring officials to

review the speech of those gathered outside a home to

determine whether they are violating the law.

Veneklase v. City of Fargo, 248 F.3d 738, 746, 749 (8th

Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per curiam) (upholding Fargo’s

ban); see id. at 749 (Arnold, J., dissenting)

(disagreeing that the law is constitutional but not

disputing that it is “content neutral”); see also N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 14-277.4A; Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-109;

Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-419; Providence, R.I., Code § 1613.1; San Jose, Cal., Code § 10.09.010; Town of

Barrington, R.I., Code § 138-2.

Confidentiality

Laws.

This Court has

recognized that “[s]tates may regulate professional

conduct, even though that conduct incidentally

involves speech.” Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life

Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2372 (2018).

Such regulation, however, often requires review of

speech as a proxy for that conduct. In dozens of states,

for instance, an attorney may not disclose confidential

attorney-client communications unless he “reasonably

believes” that disclosure is necessary “to prevent a

death or substantial bodily harm.” E.g., Fla. Bar. R. 41.6(b); Ala. R. Prof’l Cond. 1.6(b); Del. Lawyers’ R.

14

Prof’l Cond. 1.6(b)(1); Ga. R. Prof’l Cond. 1.6(b)(1);

Mass. R. Prof’l Cond. 1.6(b); Nev. R. Prof’l Cond.

1.6(b); N.C. R. Prof’l Cond. 1.6(b). Enforcement thus

hinges on review of particular communications to

determine whether they are confidential and, if so,

whether the exception applies.

Antidiscrimination Laws. Antidiscrimination

claims often turn on the defendant’s speech as

evidence of discriminatory intent.6 Relevant questions

may include “who is the speaker and what is the

speaker saying,” which in the Fifth Circuit’s view are

“hallmarks of a content-based inquiry.” Reagan Nat’l

Advert., 972 F.3d at 706. But the use of words as

evidence of discriminatory intent does not give rise to

a First Amendment defense. See, e.g., Wisconsin v.

Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993). If examination of

words as evidence of discriminatory conduct does not

give rise to close First Amendment scrutiny, neither

should the use of words to determine the location of a

sign and an associated business.

Common-Carrier Laws. Officials also must

often examine text or speech in applying laws

regulating common carriers (e.g., telephone

companies, public utilities, and railroads). Several

states require telephone companies to discontinue a

person’s services when he is using them “for the

purpose of transmitting or receiving gambling

6 Nearly every state and many cities have antidiscrimination

laws. See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 18.80.240; Fla. Stat. § 760.01; 775

Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3-102; Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 20-304;

Minn. Stat. § 363A.08; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.040; S.D. Codified

Laws § 20-13-10; N.Y. Exec. Law § 296; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.

§ 4112.02; Phila., Pa., Code § 9-1106; Tampa, Fla., Code § 12-61.

15

information.” E.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45:1166(C);

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53-278d(b); Wis. Stat.

§ 945.06; see also 66 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 2902. Enforcing

those laws thus requires officials to review a person’s

speech over the telephone to determine whether he is

using it for gambling.

The same is true for a variety of other commoncarrier laws. In California, for instance, public

shopping centers must permit “speech and

petitioning,” PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447

U.S. 74, 78 (1980) (quotations omitted), which might

require courts to review speech to determine if a

shopping center has properly excluded a person from

its premises. And New York requires telephone

companies to accommodate victims of domestic

violence by “us[ing] a modified or alternative name

for” their phonebook listing. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law

§ 399-yy(1). Officials must therefore review the text of

a phonebook listing to determine whether a company

has accommodated a particular victim.

Speech-Related Criminal Laws. Numerous

state criminal laws require officials to review speech.

Identity-theft laws, which prohibit “holding [oneself]

out to be [an]other person,” can often be applied only

after reviewing a person’s representations about his

identity. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2913.49(B); see also,

e.g., Alaska Stat. § 11.46.570(a); Cal. Penal Code

§ 530; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-130(a)(1); Del.

Code Ann. tit. 11, § 854(a); Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3.5(a);

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 354(2)(a); Or. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 165.800(1).

Cybercrime laws, such as laws prohibiting selling

stolen property on the internet and laws prohibiting

16

“spoofing,” often require review of a person’s online

activity,

including

social-media

posts,

data

transmissions, and messages. See Fla. Stat.

§ 812.0195 (prohibiting selling stolen property on the

internet); 11 R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-52.3-4 (same); 720

Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/16-40 (same); Wash. Rev. Code

§ 9A.90.070 (prohibiting “spoofing,” which is

“initiat[ing] the transmission, display, or receipt of

the identifying information of another organization

. . . for the purpose of gaining unauthorized access to

. . . a data network”); Cal. Penal Code § 502(c)(9)

(similar).

Laws against financial exploitation of “a

vulnerable adult,” which prohibit using “deception” to

secure funds from a victim, require examination of a

person’s statements to the victim. D.C. Code § 22933.01(2); see also, e.g., Ala. Code § 8-6-171(5); Ark.

Code Ann. § 23-42-309(a)(2); Md. Code Ann., Crim.

Law § 8-801(b)(2); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-358; N.D. Cent.

Code § 12.1-31-07.1(1); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5111(9)(a).

Stalking laws, which prohibit “repeated or

continuing harassment . . . that would cause a

reasonable person to feel terrorized,” require analysis

of, for example, potentially harassing text messages,

emails, and voicemails to determine whether they

would cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-315(a)(4); see also, e.g., Fla.

Stat. § 784.048(2); Iowa Code § 708.11(2); La. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 14:40.2(A); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.575(1);

Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.46.110(1).

And false-reporting laws, which prohibit lying

about, among other things, child abuse or the

17

presence of a bomb, require officials to review a

person’s statements to authorities. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 13-2907.02; Cal. Penal Code § 148.1; Colo.

Rev. Stat. § 18-8-110; Fla. Stat. § 790.163; Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 575.090; N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-11-03; Or. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 419B.016; W. Va. Code § 61-6-25(a).

Some or all of these laws could be viewed as

targeting conduct or speech that is unprotected.

“Specific criminal acts are not protected speech even

if speech is the means for their commission.”

Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1737

(2017); but cf. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709,

718 (2012) (plurality op.) (observing that the First

Amendment sometimes protects false statements that

have been made a crime). But just as speech may be

used as a proxy for conduct that is criminal, so too may

speech be used as evidence of, or as a proxy for, the

location of a sign and the business that it advertises—

matters that are likewise non-expressive.

Solicitation Laws. Many solicitation laws also

require officials to review text or speech. Dozens of

states prohibit solicitors from misrepresenting that

they are collecting funds for charitable purposes. See,

e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-6561(A)(3); Fla. Stat.

§ 496.415(7); Ga. Code Ann. § 43-17-12(d)(3); Haw.

Rev. Stat. § 467B-9(c); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 68,

§ 28(b); Mich. Comp. Laws § 400.293(1)(a); N.C. Gen.

Stat. § 131F-20(9); W. Va. Code § 29-19-13(b); Wis.

Stat. § 202.16(d). Similarly, many states prohibit

solicitors from misrepresenting that “[an]other person

sponsors or endorses” their efforts. Fla. Stat.

§ 496.415(3); see also, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 446561(4); S.D. Codified Laws § 37-30-17(4); W. Va.

18

Code § 29-19-13(d); Wis. Stat. § 202.16(e). And other

states prohibit “transmitting a telephone solicitation

by any method” that “cause[s] to be displayed a

fictitious . . . name or telephone number on” a person’s

“caller identification service.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 499-302(b); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 304.151. All

three types of laws require officials to review words—

either the text of a solicitor’s materials or the text

appearing on a caller identification service—to decide

if a solicitor has broken the law.

Impersonation Laws. Finally, an array of laws

banning wrongful impersonation require review of

offending speech. Many states prohibit placing titles

like “sheriff” or “police” on items to “mislead” another

that the wearer is in fact a public official. E.g., Fla.

Stat. § 843.085; Cal. Penal Code § 538d; Md. Code

Ann., Pub. Safety § 3-502(c). Other laws forbid a

vehicle bearing the words “school bus” from doing

anything other than transporting children to school or

related activities. Ark. Code Ann. § 27-50-310; Fla.

Stat. § 316.72; Ga. Code Ann. § 40-8-116. And still

others outlaw wrongfully implying that one is

associated with a state agency or branch of

government. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2.1; Wis. Stat.

§ 217.12.7 For each restriction, officials must review

7 Federal law prohibits the wrongful impersonation of federal

entities as well. See 18 U.S.C. § 709 (prohibiting unauthorized

use of words like “FBI,” “Secret Service,” and “United States

Mint”); 51 U.S.C. § 20141 (similar for NASA); 50 U.S.C § 3513

(similar for CIA).

19

text to determine whether a person is engaged in

impersonation.

II.

EVEN

IF

PETITIONER’S

ORDINANCE

IS

CONTENT-BASED, THE FIFTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN

INVALIDATING THE ORDINANCE ON ITS FACE.

After concluding that petitioner’s ordinance is

content-based, the Fifth Circuit applied strict scrutiny

and declared the ordinance facially invalid. See

Reagan Nat’l Advert., 972 F.3d at 710. But even if the

ordinance is content-based, that was a mistake.

Respondents are advertising companies who sought

permits for off-premises signs that display not only

noncommercial speech but also commercial speech.

See Pet. Br. 47; Pet. App’x 23a, 52a n.11; Ex. J, Dkt.

36-4; Dkt. 36-6, 36-7. Before invalidating the

ordinance in all applications, the Fifth Circuit should

have considered whether the law is valid to the extent

it regulates the content of respondents’ commercial

speech.

Instead, the Fifth Circuit applied strict scrutiny to

the entire ordinance, in all of its applications, because

it governs “both commercial and noncommercial

messages.” Reagan Nat’l Advert., 972 F.3d at 709.

That misstates the rule for declaring a law facially

invalid under the First Amendment, which turns on

whether (1) “no set of circumstances exists under

which [the law] would be valid,” or (2) the law is overly

broad, meaning “a substantial number of its

applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation

to [its] plainly legitimate sweep.” United States v.

Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quotations

omitted).

20

Here, neither test is satisfied. There is little

question that the on-premises/off-premises distinction

drawn by the ordinance, even if content-based, is

constitutional to the extent it applies to commercial

speech. Indeed, respondents urged denial of certiorari

in this case on the ground that state and local

governments could “adjust[]” to the Fifth Circuit’s

decision by revising their sign laws to “apply only to

commercial speech.” Br. in Opp. at 11–12. There can

equally be little dispute that the ordinance regulates

commercial speech in a great number of its

applications and so is not substantially overbroad, let

alone unconstitutional in all or substantially all of its

applications. See Pet. Br. 47 (“Respondents have

never disputed that, even though their billboards

display some noncommercial speech, they mostly

display commercial speech.”).

Moreover, this Court has held that it is generally

inappropriate to invoke the overbreadth doctrine

“before it is determined that the statute would be

valid as applied.” Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,

485 (1989). Where, as here, parties challenge a

purportedly “overbroad statute” and have engaged in

both “protected and unprotected” conduct, there is “no

want of a proper party to challenge the statute” and

so the “statute may forthwith be declared invalid to

the extent that it reaches too far, but otherwise left

intact.” Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.

491, 504 (1985). Thus, even if the ordinance is contentbased, the Fifth Circuit should have held that it is

constitutional as it applies to respondents’ commercial

speech, and unconstitutional as it applies to their

noncommercial speech, rather than invalidating it

across the board.

21

The Fifth Circuit’s remedial error compounds the

practical problems that its mistaken content-based

holding creates. Its decision would restrict the

authority of states and localities to apply off-premises

laws even to signage containing solely commercial

speech—even though such applications of the laws

would be constitutional, and even if such laws are

constitutional in the great bulk of their applications.

This concern is not hypothetical. Florida’s offpremises law, for example, applies on its face to both

commercial and noncommercial speech, Fla. Stat.

§ 479.16(1), but we understand that the Florida

Department of Transportation generally does not

enforce the permitting requirement against

noncommercial signage. Under this Court’s settled

overbreadth doctrine, then, there would be no basis

for invalidating Florida’s law on its face even if it were

content-based, contra the Fifth Circuit.

Several Justices of this Court have expressed

concerns about the soundness of the overbreadth

doctrine even in its current form.8 The doctrine tends

to “short circuit the democratic process by interfering

with the work of [state and local governments] more

than necessary.” See Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2365

(Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment in part and

8 See Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373,

2390 (2021) (Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing “doubts about

the . . . application of [the] overbreadth doctrine” because it

allows courts to strike a law even if the law is constitutional as

applied to the plaintiff (quotations omitted)); Tr. of Oral Arg. at

39, United States v. Williams, No. 06-694, 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008)

(Kennedy, J.) (same); id. at 40 (Roberts, C.J.) (same); accord id.

at 43–44 (Scalia, J.) (“[T]he whole doctrine of overbreadth rests

upon dictum, doesn’t it?”).

22

dissenting in part) (quotations omitted). The Court, of

course, need not broadly revisit that doctrine in this

case. But it certainly should not sanction the Fifth

Circuit’s decision and create a new incarnation of the

doctrine amounting to overbreadth on steroids.

CONCLUSION

The Fifth Circuit’s judgment should be reversed.

23

Respectfully submitted,

ASHLEY MOODY

Attorney General of Florida

HENRY C. WHITAKER

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

DANIEL W. BELL

Chief Deputy Solicitor

General

KEVIN A. GOLEMBIEWSKI

Deputy Solicitor General

DAVID M. COSTELLO

Assistant Solicitor General

Office of the

Attorney General

The Capitol – PL-01

Tallahassee, FL 32399

Phone: (850) 414-3300

henry.whitaker@

myfloridalegal.com

August 20, 2021

Counsel for Amicus Curiae the State of Florida

(Counsel for other amici listed below)

24

Additional Counsel

LESLIE RUTLEDGE

Attorney General

of Arkansas

DANA NESSEL

Attorney General

of Michigan

ROB BONTA

Attorney General

of California

KEITH ELLISON

Attorney General

of Minnesota

WILLIAM TONG

Attorney General

of Connecticut

LYNN FITCH

Attorney General

of Mississippi

KARL A. RACINE

Attorney General

of District of Columbia

AARON D. FORD

Attorney General

of Nevada

KWAME RAOUL

Attorney General

of Illinois

ANDREW J. BRUCK

Acting Attorney General

of New Jersey

THOMAS J. MILLER

Attorney General

of Iowa

LETITIA JAMES

Attorney General

of New York

AARON M. FREY

Attorney General

of Maine

DAVE YOST

Attorney General

of Ohio

BRIAN E. FROSH

Attorney General

of Maryland

ELLEN F. ROSENBLUM

Attorney General

of Oregon

MAURA HEALEY

Attorney General

of Massachusetts

JOSH SHAPIRO

Attorney General

of Pennsylvania

25

JASON R. RAVNSBORG

Attorney General

of South Dakota

THOMAS J. DONOVAN, JR.

Attorney General

of Vermont

ROBERT W. FERGUSON

Attorney General

of Washington