Amicus Curiae Brief — Billy Daniel Raulerson, Jr., Petitioner v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison

No. 19-941

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BILLY DANIEL RAULERSON, JR.,

Petitioner,

v.

WARDEN,

Respondent.

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eleventh Circuit

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------BRIEF OF THE SOUTHERN CENTER FOR

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RODERICK &

SOLANGE MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER AS

AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

---------------------------------♦--------------------------------AMIR H. ALI

THE RODERICK & SOLANGE

MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER

777 6th Street NW

11th Floor

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 869-3434

amir.ali@macarthurjustice.org

MICHAEL ADMIRAND

Counsel of Record

PATRICK MULVANEY

PRINCETON HYNES

SOUTHERN CENTER FOR

HUMAN RIGHTS

60 Walton Street NW

Atlanta, GA 30303

(404) 688-1202

madmirand@schr.org

================================================================================================================

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................

ii

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .........................

1

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF

ARGUMENT.....................................................

2

ARGUMENT ........................................................

4

I.

II.

III.

There Has Never Been a Finding of Intellectual Disability in a Trial Involving Intentional Murder in Georgia .....................

6

Georgia’s Standard Is Inconsistent With

the State’s Treatment of Intellectual Disability Claims in Every Other Context .....

7

Despite Evidence That Georgia Has Executed an Individual With Intellectual

Disability, State Officials Have Consistently Opposed Changes to the Standard

of Proof ...................................................... 10

CONCLUSION..................................................... 14

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) ....................11

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)............... passim

Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015) ....................2

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996) ....................3

Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) ................. 2, 10, 14

Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255 (2003) ........................ 7, 9, 12

Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011) ...... 12

Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017) ............... 2, 8, 10

Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019) ...........................2

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) ..........................7

Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F.3d 987 (11th Cir.

2019) ...................................................................... 6, 7

RULES

Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 160-4-7-.05(e) ............................9

S. Ct. Rule 37.2(a) .........................................................1

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Application for Intellectual/Developmental

Disabilities Services, Georgia Dept. of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities, available at https://dbhdd.georgia.gov/

be-compassionate/how-do-i-apply-dd-services

(last visited Feb. 24, 2020) ........................................8

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Associated Press, Georgia to Bar Executions

of Retarded Killers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1988,

available at https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/

12/us/georgia-to-bar-executions-of-retardedkillers.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) .............. 5, 10

Associated Press, Retarded Man, 33, Electrocuted

as Plea to High Court Is Rejected, N.Y. Times,

June 25, 1986, available at https://www.

nytimes.com/1986/06/25/us/retarded-man-33electrocuted-as-plea-to-high-court-is-rejected.

html (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) ...............................4

Bill Rankin, Legal Threshold for Proving Mental

Disability Challenged, Atlanta J.-Const., Mar.

22, 2011 ...................................................................12

Bill Rankin, Mentally Retarded Inmate Fights to

Live, Atlanta J.-Const., Feb. 16, 2011 .....................12

Bill Rankin, Retarded Inmates Still Must Prove

It; Court Upholds High Bar for Avoiding Execution, Atlanta J.-Const., Oct. 7, 2003 ....................12

H.B. 768, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga.

2018) ........................................................................13

Jeanne Cummings, Ban on Execution of Retarded Kept Intact; Bill to Let Juries Decide

Dies 34–22 in the Senate, Atlanta J.-Const.,

Feb. 27, 1990 ............................................................11

Jeanne Cummings, The 1990 Legislative Session

Bill Could Reverse Execution Ban on Retarded, Atlanta J.-Const., Feb. 8, 1990 ...................10

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Joseph B. Frazier, Too Retarded to Die for

Crimes? Laws Say No, Los Angeles Times,

Apr. 17, 1988 ..............................................................9

Kate Brumback, Georgia Reviews Burden of Proof

for Mentally Disabled Death Row Defendants,

Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 19, 2013,

available at https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/

Latest-News-Wires/2013/1019/Georgia-reviewsburden-of-proof-for-mentally-disabled-deathrow-defendants (last visited Feb. 14, 2020)............13

Lauren A. Ricciardelli & Kevin M. Ayres, The

Standard of Proof of Intellectual Disability in

Georgia: The Execution of Warren Lee Hill, 27

J. Disability Pol’y Stud. 158 (2016) ...........................6

Lauren S. Lucas, An Empirical Assessment of

Georgia’s Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard

to Determine Intellectual Disability in Capital

Cases, 33 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 553 (2017) .....................6

1

INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1

The Southern Center for Human Rights (SCHR) is

a nonprofit law office based in Atlanta, Georgia. For the

past forty-four years, SCHR has represented people

facing the death penalty in the southern United States.

In the 1980s, SCHR’s advocacy contributed to Georgia

becoming the first state in the nation to prohibit the

practice of executing people with intellectual disability.

This Court later held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304

(2002), that the execution of people with intellectual

disability violates the Eighth Amendment. Despite those

developments, people with intellectual disability are

still being sentenced to death and executed in Georgia

because the state employs an insurmountable standard

of proof for intellectual disability determinations.

The Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center

(MJC) is a nonprofit organization founded by the family of J. Roderick MacArthur to advocate for civil rights

and for a fair and humane criminal justice system.

MJC has represented clients facing myriad civil rights

injustices, including issues concerning the death penalty, the rights of the indigent in the criminal justice

system, and the treatment of incarcerated people. MJC

has had substantial practical experience litigating the

1

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in

part, and no entity or person other than amici made a monetary

contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of

this brief. Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 37.2(a), counsel of record

for all parties received timely notice of amici’s intent to file this

brief at least 10 days prior to its due date. The parties do not oppose the filing of this brief.

2

issue of intellectual disability under Atkins in states

with the death penalty.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Georgia’s statutory protection against the execution of people with intellectual disability dates back to

the 1980s, long before this Court defined the protection

mandated by the federal Constitution in Atkins. As enacted in 1988, the law limited the exemption to capital

defendants who could prove their intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt. Despite the passage of

nearly two decades since Atkins and multiple decisions

of this Court implementing Atkins,2 the Georgia legislature has never revised its limited statutory protections in light of what the Constitution requires.

Georgia is thus the only state that requires defendants

to prove their intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, protection against the execution

of people with intellectual disability exists only in theory in the state. In fact, there has never been a finding

of intellectual disability at trial in a case of intentional

murder.

Despite having intellectual disability, Petitioner

Billy Raulerson was sentenced to death because of

2

See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014); Brumfield v. Cain,

135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015); Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017);

Moore v. Texas, 139 S. Ct. 666 (2019); id. at 672 (Roberts, C.J.,

concurring).

3

Georgia’s unique standard of proof. At his capital trial,

he sought to establish that he was intellectually disabled, and the state court required him to do so beyond

a reasonable doubt. Like every other Georgia defendant in this situation, he fell short. He now asks this

Court to address whether Georgia’s “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard contravenes clearly established

federal law in light of Atkins, which bars the execution

of people with intellectual disability, and Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348 (1996), which governs the standards of proof for constitutional rights.

This brief offers additional context for Raulerson’s

petition for certiorari by providing an “on the ground”

view of how Georgia’s standard of proof continues to

undermine the purpose of Atkins. Three points warrant emphasis.

First, for thirty-two years, the prohibition against

the execution of defendants with intellectual disability

has existed only in theory in Georgia. No one in Georgia

has ever established intellectual disability in a trial involving intentional murder. This fact starkly demonstrates that Georgia’s unique standard of proof has

undermined the constitutional command of Atkins.

Second, Georgia does not impose this standard on

intellectual disability claimants in any other context.

In fact, the Georgia Legislature implemented this

standard out of a desire to limit the availability of intellectual disability claims in capital cases. Thus, the

standard is not only an outlier in comparison to other

4

death penalty states; it is also an outlier in comparison

to Georgia’s own practices in other contexts.

Third, despite concrete examples of Georgia cases

in which the standard of proof has unquestionably been

the difference between an execution and an Atkins exclusion, Georgia prosecutors and legislators have consistently opposed changes to the standard. State

officials have maintained the standard for thirty years

and, as recently as 2018, rejected an effort to change it.

Unless this Court intervenes, Georgia will continue to

execute people with intellectual disability.

In short, the practical effects of Georgia’s unique

standard of proof strongly support certiorari review in

this case.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

ARGUMENT

In 1986, Georgia executed Jerome Bowden, a man

with a full-scale IQ of 65. In his last words from the

electric chair, Bowden thanked the prison for taking

good care of him.3 State officials faced widespread criticism for the execution. Two years later, the Georgia

Legislature passed a law that prohibited the death

penalty for intellectually disabled defendants but

3

Associated Press, Retarded Man, 33, Electrocuted as Plea

to High Court Is Rejected, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1986, at A16,

available at https://www.nytimes.com/1986/06/25/us/retardedman-33-electrocuted-as-plea-to-high-court-is-rejected.html (last

visited Feb. 24, 2020).

5

required the defendant to prove his intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt.4

In the years that followed, other states also passed

laws exempting defendants with intellectual disability

from the death penalty. Each and every one of them

rejected Georgia’s onerous standard of proof. Georgia

thus has been—and remains—the only state in the

country that requires a defendant with intellectual

disability to face execution unless he proves his disability beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thirty-two years of experience have proven that

Georgia’s standard is insurmountable. No one has satisfied the standard at trial in a case involving intentional murder, and as a result, the law has not

prevented the execution of defendants with intellectual disability. This lack of protection presents a constitutional violation now that Atkins prohibits the

execution of defendants with intellectual disability.

4

Associated Press, Georgia to Bar Executions of Retarded

Killers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1988, at A26, available at https://

www.nytimes.com/1988/04/12/us/georgia-to-bar-executions-ofretarded-killers.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2020); see also Atkins,

536 U.S. at 313–14 (noting that “the public reaction to the execution of a mentally retarded murderer in Georgia apparently led to

the enactment of the first state statute prohibiting such executions”).

6

I.

There Has Never Been a Finding of Intellectual Disability in a Trial Involving Intentional Murder in Georgia.

Dissenting from the Eleventh Circuit decision below, Judge Jordan observed that the standard of proof

“plays a critical role in our adversarial system because

it often drives the result.”5 That observation rings particularly true in this context. In the thirty-two years

since Georgia enacted its intellectual disability law,

not a single capital defendant “has successfully obtained a jury verdict of [guilty but mentally retarded]

in a case of intentional murder. . . .”6

The only explanation for why Georgia has not had

any successful Atkins claims at trial is that it is the

only state that requires defendants to prove intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlike

every other state, Georgia demands that jurors determine intellectual disability “with a level of certainty

that mental health experts simply cannot provide.”7 By

5

Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F.3d 987, 1012–13 (11th Cir.

2019) (Jordan, J., dissenting).

6

Lauren S. Lucas, An Empirical Assessment of Georgia’s Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard to Determine Intellectual Disability in Capital Cases, 33 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 553, 582 (2017); see

also Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 1017 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (noting

that, in an evidentiary hearing below, the State “did not provide

any cases where a defendant met that standard”) (emphasis in

original).

7

Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 1018 (Jordan, J., dissenting); see

also Lauren A. Ricciardelli & Kevin M. Ayres, The Standard of

Proof of Intellectual Disability in Georgia: The Execution of Warren

Lee Hill, 27 J. Disability Pol’y Stud. 158, 165 (2016) (criticizing

Georgia’s procedures because the “standard of proof for diagnosis

7

requiring more of jurors than what medical experts

can offer, Georgia’s standard has failed to “afford capital defendants a meaningful opportunity to prove intellectual disability.”8

In Atkins, this Court tasked the states with “developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of sentences.”9

However, as Judge Jordan recognized in his dissent,

those “ ‘state procedures must be adequate to protect’

the Eighth Amendment prohibition against the execution of the intellectually disabled.”10 Thirty-two years

of unsuccessful claims of intellectual disability demonstrate that Georgia’s statute is insufficient to enforce

this prohibition.

II.

Georgia’s Standard Is Inconsistent With

the State’s Treatment of Intellectual Disability Claims in Every Other Context.

The Georgia Supreme Court has upheld the

“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard because it reflects “the General Assembly’s chosen definition of

what degree of mental impairment qualifies as mentally retarded under Georgia law. . . .”11 However,

requires something other than what a qualified expert in that

field can provide”).

8

Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 1018 (Jordan, J., dissenting).

9

Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317 (citation omitted).

10

Raulerson, 928 F.3d at 1012 (Jordan, J., dissenting) (quoting Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966))

11

Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255, 262 (2003).

8

Georgia does not treat intellectual disability claims in

a similar manner in any other context. This Court has

recognized that it is constitutionally suspect for a state

to single out capital defendants’ intellectual disability

claims in this manner. For instance, this Court viewed

Texas’s use of the Briseno factors with suspicion in part

because those factors were inconsistent with “Texas’

own practices in other contexts.”12 This Court then

faulted Texas for “appl[ying] current medical standards for diagnosing intellectual disability in other contexts, yet cling[ing] to superseded standards when an

individual’s life is at stake.”13

The same is true in Georgia. The state demands

an unattainable level of certainty for making intellectual disability determinations only when an individual’s life is at stake. For example, an individual is

eligible for disability services in Georgia if she receives

a diagnosis of intellectual disability before she turns

18 and is eligible for Medicaid disability support.14 This

diagnosis need only be made to a clinical standard—

that is, to a reasonable degree of medical or scientific

certainty. Georgia adopts a similar standard when considering whether to place a child in special education;

a child is eligible if a “comprehensive evaluation indicates deficits in both intellectual functioning and

12

Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1052 (2017)

Id.

14

Application for Intellectual/Developmental Disabilities Services, Georgia Dept. of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities, available at https://dbhdd.georgia.gov/be-compassionate/

how-do-i-apply-dd-services (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).

13

9

adaptive behavior.”15 As above, that determination

adopts clinical standards, not a “beyond a reasonable

doubt” standard. Thus, Georgia has imposed an insurmountable standard for proving intellectual disability

in the criminal context; yet it does not apply that

standard in any other context within the state.

This discrepancy is intentional. The Georgia Legislature specifically implemented the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard to minimize the ability of

capital defendants to raise this defense.16 The Legislature first debated the bill in 1987. However, it quickly

shelved the proposal after then-Attorney General Michael Bowers voiced concerns that it would “virtually

end executions in Georgia.”17 The Legislature considered the bill again the following year and ultimately

passed it, but with the reasonable doubt burden in

place. Then-Fulton County District Attorney Lewis

Slaton, who participated in the legislative debate over

the law, explained prosecutors’ overarching concern

with the exemption: “What we’ve always been concerned about is that we are leery of changing the law

15

Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 160-4-7-.05(e).

See Hill, 277 Ga. at 262 (noting that the Georgia Legislature chose to “limi[t] the exemption to those whose mental deficiencies are significant enough to be provable beyond a reasonable

doubt”).

17

Joseph B. Frazier, Too Retarded to Die for Crimes? Laws

Say No, Los Angeles Times, Apr. 17, 1988.

16

10

because it means that every person on death row can

now raise another ground.”18

From its inception, Georgia’s standard of proof has

narrowed the class of eligible capital defendants to a

nullity. Thus, “[b]y design and in operation,” Georgia’s

statute has “ ‘creat[ed] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.”19

Nevertheless, as discussed below, it is clear that state

officials will not change the standard of proof.

III. Despite Evidence That Georgia Has Executed an Individual With Intellectual Disability, State Officials Have Consistently

Opposed Changes to the Standard of Proof.

Time and again, Georgia legislators and prosecutors have demonstrated their commitment to imposing

an unattainable standard of proof for intellectual disability claims in the criminal context. Just two years

after the law’s passage, Georgia legislators introduced

a bill that would have effectively reversed the exemption, but the bill was never passed.20 More recently, in

18

Associated Press, Georgia to Bar Executions of Retarded

Killers, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1988, at A26, available at https://

www.nytimes.com/1988/04/12/us/georgia-to-bar-executions-ofretarded-killers.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).

19

Moore, 137 S. Ct. at 1051 (quoting Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S.

701, 704 (2014)).

20

Jeanne Cummings, The 1990 Legislative Session Bill

Could Reverse Execution Ban on Retarded, Atlanta J.-Const., Feb.

8, 1990, at C3 (noting that the bill “would allow jurors to sentence

a mentally retarded person to the electric chair if they decide the

defendant knew what he did was wrong, and understood that the

11

the years since this Court’s decision in Atkins, state officials have repeatedly opposed changes to the statute

both in court and in the Legislature—even when confronted with the possibility of executing an individual

with intellectual disability.

The Legislature’s continued refusal to revisit its

pre-Atkins statute following Warren Hill’s case is particularly illustrative. Prior to Atkins, Hill alleged that

he was intellectually disabled and therefore exempt

from the death penalty under Georgia’s statute. However, the state habeas court denied relief because Hill

could not prove his intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt.21 After Atkins was decided, Hill moved

for reconsideration of this finding. The habeas court

made two important conclusions. First, it held that Atkins rendered Georgia’s standard of proof unconstitutional because “the State has created an extremely

high likelihood of erroneously executing mentally retarded defendants by placing ‘almost the entire risk of

error’ upon the defendant.”22 Second, it found that

act carries serious consequences”). Despite significant support

from Attorney General Bowers, the state Senate rejected the bill.

See Jeanne Cummings, Ban on Execution of Retarded Kept Intact;

Bill to Let Juries Decide Dies 34–22 in the Senate, Atlanta J.Const., Feb. 27, 1990, at B3.

21

Hill v. Head, No. 94-V-216 Order at 3–4 (Ga. Super. Ct.

Butts Cty. May 13, 2002).

22

Hill v. Head, No. 94-V-216 Order on Petitioner’s Motion for

Reconsideration of Denial of Habeas Relief at 8 (Ga. Super. Ct.

Butts Cty. Nov. 19, 2002) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.

418, 423–24 (1979)).

12

under a preponderance standard, Hill was intellectually disabled.23

Georgia prosecutors appealed both rulings to the

Georgia Supreme Court, which reversed the lower

court’s order and reinstated Hill’s death sentence.24

The majority concluded that Georgia’s onerous standard did not create a special risk of wrongful execution,

and therefore, Atkins did not compel a lower standard

of proof for intellectual disability determinations.25

The court also found that Hill could not prove his disability beyond a reasonable doubt.26

Nearly a decade later, Hill pursued relief in the

Eleventh Circuit. Although Hill obtained relief before

a three-judge panel of the appeals court, the en banc

court upheld Georgia’s standard of proof.27

After Hill’s execution was stayed on other grounds,

there was a further legislative effort to change the

standard of proof. State legislators convened an “informational session” regarding Georgia’s standard of

proof—as State Representative Rick Golick stated,

23

Id. at 9.

Head v. Hill, 277 Ga. 255 (2003); see also Bill Rankin, Retarded Inmates Still Must Prove It; Court Upholds High Bar for

Avoiding Execution, Atlanta J.-Const., Oct. 7, 2003, at B1.

25

Hill, 277 Ga. at 262.

26

Id. at 262–63.

27

Hill v. Humphrey, 662 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2011); see also

Bill Rankin, Mentally Retarded Inmate Fights to Live, Atlanta J.Const., Feb. 16, 2011, at B1; Bill Rankin, Legal Threshold for

Proving Mental Disability Challenged, Atlanta J.-Const., Mar. 22,

2011, at B2.

24

13

“When you’re an outlier, you really ought not to stick

your head in the sand.”28 However, legislators emphasized that the meeting would not necessarily result in

changes to the law. No such changes occurred, and less

than two years later, Hill was executed—even though

he proved his intellectual disability by a preponderance of the evidence and thus would have been ineligible for the death penalty across the state line in

Alabama.

The standard was the difference in Petitioner

Raulerson’s case as well. Nevertheless, Georgia prosecutors have consistently opposed Raulerson’s challenges to the standard of proof. Moreover, as recently

as 2018, Georgia legislators defeated a proposal that

would have changed the standard.29 It is therefore

abundantly clear that Georgia will not change the

standard on its own; only this Court can bring Georgia

in line with the rest of the country.

This Court should do so. As Raulerson explains

in his petition, this case presents a fully-developed

factual record that no other case has had. As part of

that record, there is evidence regarding Georgia’s

treatment of intellectual disability claims, both before

28

Kate Brumback, Georgia Reviews Burden of Proof for Mentally Disabled Death Row Defendants, Christian Science Monitor,

Oct. 19, 2013, available at https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/LatestNews-Wires/2013/1019/Georgia-reviews-burden-of-proof-for-mentallydisabled-death-row-defendants (last visited Feb. 14, 2020).

29

H.B. 768, 154th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2018), available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display/2017

2018/HB/768 (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).

14

and since the Court’s decision in Atkins. This evidence

underscores the reason why the Court “did not give the

States unfettered discretion to define the full scope of

the constitutional protection”:

If the States were to have complete autonomy

to define intellectual disability as they

wished, the Court’s decision in Atkins could

become a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection of human dignity would not

become a reality.30

Intellectually disabled defendants in Georgia have

been and will be executed. That unconstitutional practice will continue unless this Court intervenes.

---------------------------------♦---------------------------------

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant

the petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

AMIR H. ALI

THE RODERICK & SOLANGE

MACARTHUR JUSTICE CENTER

777 6th Street NW

11th Floor

Washington, DC 20001

(202) 869-3434

amir.ali@macarthurjustice.org

30

Hall, 572 U.S. at 719, 720–21.

MICHAEL ADMIRAND

Counsel of Record

PATRICK MULVANEY

PRINCETON HYNES

SOUTHERN CENTER FOR

HUMAN RIGHTS

60 Walton Street NW

Atlanta, GA 30303

(404) 688-1202

madmirand@schr.org