Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Carl St. Preux, Petitioner v. United States

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

CARL St. PREUX,

Petitioner,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

James T. Skuthan

Acting Federal Defender

Rosemary Cakmis

Senior Litigator, Chief, Appellate Division

Stephen J. Langs, Counsel of Record

Research and Writing Attorney

Florida Bar 0137227; S. Ct. Bar 242621

Federal Defender’s Office

201 South Orange Avenue, Suite 300

Orlando, Florida 32801

Phone (407) 648-6338; Fax (407) 648-6095

email stephen_langs@fd.org

QUESTION PRESENTED

Carl St. Preux is serving a mandatory life sentence for a federal drug

conspiracy conviction. He was found guilty after jury trial in 2007. Because Mr. St.

Preux, ostensibly, already suffered from two prior Florida state drug convictions,

one from 1995 and a second from 1998, the government filed its obligatory notice

(its information), pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851(e), seeking that mandatory life

sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). The sentencing court said that in light of

the 5-year-limitations period at § 851(e), Mr. St. Preux was prevented from

collaterally challenging his prior state convictions to ameliorate his sentencing

exposure. In short, Mr. St. Preux was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence

because of his two prior state drug convictions (which were outside and older than

the 5-year-limitations period at § 851(e)).

Following his federal sentencing proceedings in 2007, Mr. St. Preux went

back to Florida state court and had one of his prior state convictions invalidated --

the putative 1998 conviction was vacated, set aside, dismissed, and found void ab

initio. Once his 1998 conviction was abolished, Mr. St. Preux then filed his federal

post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in 2011 asking the district court to

re-sentence him without the 1998 conviction, meaning, Mr. St. Preux would not be

exposed to a mandatory life sentence. The district court said Mr. St. Preux couldn’t

do that because, still, the 5-year-limitations period at § 851(e) not only applied

during his federal sentencing proceedings in 2007, it also applied during

post-conviction § 2255 matters in 2011 to prevent any relief for Mr. St. Preux. The

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed (§ 851(e) applies not only in federal

sentencing proceedings, it also applies during § 2255 post-conviction matters) and

affirmed the dismissal of Mr. St. Preux’s 2255 motion.

As such, the question presented here is whether 21 U.S.C. § 851(e), which

clearly applies at and during federal sentencing proceedings, usurps and supplants

relief under federal habeas corpus and also applies at and during § 2255

post-conviction proceedings — asked differently, whether Mr. St. Preux is

procedurally (as well as substantively) barred from seeking re-sentencing in federal

court based on the statute of limitations in 21 U.S.C. § 851(e) even after

successfully challenging one of his prior state convictions. See, eg,

Arreola-Castillo v. United States, 889 F.3d 378, 384 (7" Cir. 2018) (asking and

deciding whether a “district court erred by holding that § 851(e) bars an individual

from reopening his federal sentence under § 2255 when the state convictions that

enhanced the sentence have since been vacated”).

This question has been answered differently by the courts below and there

remains a circuit split as to whether the 5-year-limitations period at 21 U.S.C. §

851(e) does or does not apply in habeas corpus and post-conviction proceedings

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

ii

List of Parties

Petitioner, Carl St. Preux, was the defendant as well as the petitioner in the

district court and the appellant in the court of appeals. Respondent, the United

States of America, was the plaintiff in the district court and the appellee in the

court of appeals.

List of Proceedings

Mr. St. Preux’s original criminal matter was resolved in the district court for

the Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division, Case No. 5:06-cr-29. He was found

guilty after jury trial for one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

more than 5 kilograms of powder cocaine on January 26, 2007. He was sentenced

to mandatory life in prison on June 21, 2007. Following his direct criminal appeal

to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Mr. St. Preux’s conviction and sentence

were affirmed in a decision and unpublished opinion, United States v. Dorsey, et

al., 414 F. App’x 206 (11% Cir. 2011).

Mr. St. Preux then filed his original motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the

district court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division, on Aprii 8, 2011, in Civil

Case No. 5:11-cv-187. This motion was dismissed on August 28, 2012. On appeal,

the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in St, Preux v. United States, 539 F. App’x 946 (11%

Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (St. Preux J, and this Court denied certiorari on June 30,

2014. 573 U.S. 949 (2014).

iil

Finally, Mr. St. Preux filed the motion at issue in the case-at-bar in the

district court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division, on March 10, 2017.

However, rather than filing the motion in the former § 2255 case in Case No.

5:11-cv-187, the clerk of court opened a new case and assigned Mr. St. Preux’s

motion, which he labeled a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion, under

Civil Case No. 5:17-cv-96. The district court dismissed Mr. St. Preux’s ostensible

Rule 60(b) motion as an impermissible “second or successive” § 2255 motion in an

order entered on March 29, 2017. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the

district court and affirmed this dismissal in a decision and unpublished opinion, Sz.

Preux v. United States, 800 F. App’x 731 (11 Cir. 2020) (St Preux ID). Mr. St.

Preux’s petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc were denied on March 24,

2020, and the mandate was issued on April 1, 2020.

This petition for a writ of certiorari follows.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented ..........ccccccsscescsssseeseesssenseneseesceaceatvecesenanacnevsonensensecseesseaecaesnenatearens i

List of Parties 0... ceeceesscsesesseesecnecserasceesesasesescasesesaeensereceraseressassseessesesseesenseees iti

List of Proceedings... ececcessenccsseescneesceseenececeneenseeneseesnecseeresseasnessteeteesaterseesieenes iii

Table of Contents ..0.....:ccccccccsesceecceseeceseeeeeecesseeecsavsneesaseseseesceseenssesaesessesersegenseoatteateaee v

Table of Authorities 0.0.0... cescesseeseesceceerceecesceecensestereceeenaseeeseesseaenecssnecstseeeeeeseerseeees vi

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.... ccc cececssetcesesercersseeeseneeseenseeneesnscsenstteeaeeeetarens 1

Opinion Below 00.0... cesesecesesseersterersserensensserscaesevsssacseeseesessesensassesesssssesenasensessasens 1

JUPISGICTION oe eeeteeeeeeeeneseerscscsesssecacaesesesecsenssaesessesesesneassorsseseersessaseseeseceseereeneets i

Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions ......... successes sneseereessecnseneees 2

Trtro duction ........eceeeeceeseeeceeceneesececeeseecenesacesenerseeseseseesesaneneeresesersaseesteessnsseesceedaseeseeenee 3

Whether 21 U.S.C. § 851 (e) supplants and usurps § 2255 such that it

precludes habeas review for federal drug defendants .......ccccceccccccccces 3

Statement of the Case... seccsccnseressersecensrersecserscsassesssescsesevessensasseeeveaseesnsvenseenenes 6

Reasons for Granting the Writ 0.0... ccc cessecteneenesscesetereecnseeesenseerecseasseerensrsenseaeeaes 11

Mr. St. Preux’s petition should be granted to resolve an express

circuit split, to address and answer an undeniably important national

legal question arising under federal drug sentencing matters, and to

cure a manifest injustice for Mr. St. Preux’s erroneous life sentence.

This Court should intervene and grant C€rtiOVr ar 0... ccccstet teeters rete il

COnclision........eccscceeeeeseeseessenceeseeeeecseeseesecaseessnesaresseneeseerersreressedetssenenersnsgerseeneses 27

Decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 0... cic eeeeeeseererees Appendix

Table of Authorities

Federal Cases Page(s)

* Arreola-Castillo v. United States, 889 F.3d 378 (7" Cir. 2018) c.scceseees passim

Boyd y. United States, T54 F.3d 1298 (11 Cir. 2014) cecccscccssssessecseeseseesstsseeeees 15

* Clay v. United States, -- F. Supp.2d --,

2009 WL 1657095 (N.D. Ga. June 11, 2009) eee eeetensteeereeeeees passim

* Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994) oe eeccseseeererseeteeeneeees 15, 17, 21

* Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001) oe eieeesese eer eeereeerees 15, 17, 21

INS vy. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) veessssessssssssssssesssessssssssssesesersesssssssseeseseessesseseee 12

Johnson v. United States, 340 F.3d 1219 (11% Cir, 2003) w..ceceececcsesseeeseesesteeneeees 22

* Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005) o.eeeseseseseseeserereeeeeeres 15,17, 21

Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363 (11! Cir, 2003) c.ccccessesessesessesesssecsssseeseseeaeess 15

St. Preux v. United States,

539 F. App’x 946 (11 Cir. 2013) (St Preux P?) ceccccssesesesesesseseeseees passim

St. Preux v. United States,

800 F. App'x 731 (11 Cir. 2020) (“St Preur IP’) escesssssesssssessesseseeeneens passim

* Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856 (11" Cir, 2011) coececeseseeteseeeeeen 15, 17

United States v. Carswell, 773 F. App'x 591 (11% Cir. 2019) ooceccccseceeseeteeeees 20

Vi

Table of Authorities — cont’d

Federal Cases Page(s)

United States v. Dorsey, 414 F. App'x 206 (11" Cir. 2011) ciccecccssescsestescereseans iii

United States v. Gabriel, 599 F. App'x 407 (2™ Cir, 2015) ccccecceeeecteesseees 4,12

* United States v. McChristian, 47 F.3d 1499 (9 Cir. 1995) ese 4,12,17

United States v. Roberson, 684 F. Supp. 2d 179 (D. Mass. 2010) oes 3,5

United States v. Sanders, 909 F.3d 895 (7 Cir, 2018) ceecsccccsssssessesssstesseesessereeees 19

United States v. Valentine. -F. App’x --,

2020 WL 2849942 (11 Cir. June 2, 2020) eeecececcescesesesteeesteeeeseens 14, 15, 16

* Vizcaino v. United States, 981 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2013)... 3,5, 12, 13, 21

Federal Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 924 i cscesceresecsenseneseeeraseenersesensseaesessensssesaseererssesenenavaetesssseesevatens 21

21 US.C. § B41 i ceeseesssensenensesaeneesaeseenessesseetevsaeenessersseensesesenenseesevareass passim

ZL USC. § 850 ie ceccneseseeeesessneseenerstssseerssessssscnusesesseseaenesererersasasesneneasaes passim

28 USC. § 1254 ie ceeeeesecseesseetecseneesenesenseacesessesavesenesarsessesssassesesesnesarseressnssesaee 1

28 US.C. § 2255 ieee ecceeenereereceeereteceeeeesecssereseecsesesesseansesesssensersesesees passim

Vii

Table of Authorities — cont’d

Other Page(s)

Cordray, Richard, The Philosophy of Certiorari:

Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection,

82 Wash. U. L. Rev. 389 (2004) cecessssssssssssssssssesssessecssesssssssssssssssssssvssssssessen 25

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 iccssssessessensecseserseecsecsesecnesenesnenarsesevseeseessenesesseeeseseeeasess passim

S. Ct. Rule 10 ic cescsessscsesseesecnsssecsnsessenenecssssesseeagenssearerereesrereraeeess 24, 25, 26

USS. Const. amend. Vives cccescesessesceeessenesevecsesecseneraceeseesserseneeseeevsseessensvesensneneraes 2

Vii

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Petitioner, Carl St. Preux, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to

review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

in this case. He comes to the Court after the district court dismissed his Rule 60(b)

motion as an improper “second or successive” § 2255 motion and the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that order.

OPINION BELOW

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision and opinion, which was not published, is

provided in the Appendix. It can also be found at Carl St. Preux vy. United States,

800 F. App’x 731 (11 Cir. Jan. 23, 2020) (unpublished). The court’s order

denying a petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was entered on March 24,

2020, with the mandate having been issued on April 1, 2020. See Appendix.

JURISDICTION

The Eleventh Circuit issued its unpublished panel opinion on January 23,

2020. See Appendix. An order denying a petition for rehearing and rehearing en

banc was entered on March 24, 2020, see Appendix; and, the court’s mandate was

issued on April 1, 2020. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. §

1254(1) (“[c]ases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court

... [bly writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or

criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree”).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous

crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in

cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual

service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject

for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall

be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor

be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

shall private property be taken for public use, without just

compensation.

A person in 2007, like Mr. St. Preux, who was convicted of conspiring to

possess with intent to distribute more than 5 kilograms of powder cocaine in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 was ordinarily subject to a mandatory

minimum penalty of at least 10 years’ imprisonment and a maximum exposure of up

to life. However, if such defendant had “two or more prior convictions for a felony

drug offense,” that defendant “shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of life

imprisonment.” 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2007).

But, per 21 U.S.C. § 851(a), “No person who stands convicted of an offense

under this part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more

prior convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United

States attorney files an information with the court (and serves a copy of such

information on the person or counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous

convictions to be relied upon.”

Moreover, under section 851(e):

No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part may

challenge the validity of any prior conviction alleged under this section

which occurred more than five years before the date of the information

alleging such prior conviction.

21 U.S.C. § 851(e) (2007).

INTRODUCTION

Whether 21 U.S.C. § 851(e) supplants and usurps § 2255 such that it precludes

habeas review for federal drug defendants

Mr. St. Preux’s case brings a circuit split to this Court’s attention; indeed,

the district courts themselves, for that matter, fall on both sides of the equation

when deciding the question presented.' The question impacts and affects any

federal drug defendant subjected to enhanced penalties pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§

841(b)(1) and 851. Specifically, this case asks whether the 5-year

statute-of-limitations under 21 U.S.C. § 851(e) usurps and supplants habeas corpus

relief, without any authority, consent, or blessing from Congress, such that a

federal inmate who successfully challenges and invalidates a prior state conviction

cannot then later come back into federal court for re-sentencing, pursuant to 28

US.C. § 2255. See, e.g., Clay v. United States, — F. Supp.2d --, 2009 WL 1657095

(N.D. Ga. June 11, 2009) (in which the court held that a defendant was entitled to

1 Cf, e.g., Vizcaino v. United States, 981 F. Supp.2d 104 (D.Mass. Nov. 8, 2013)

(section 851(e) does not apply in or during section 2255 proceedings), with United

States v. Roberson, 684 F.Supp.2d 179 (D.Mass. Feb. 16, 2010) (section 851(e) does

apply in section 2255 matters).

re-sentencing under § 2255 based on the invalidation of a prior state court

conviction that was over five years old at the time an information was filed against

him). In the underlying decision and opinion from the Eleventh Circuit Court of

Appeals, the appellate court said, “‘[ujnder the plain language of [§ 851(e)], St.

Preux’s challenge to the use of his 1998 state conviction as a basis for his federal

sentencing enhancement is foreclosed by’ the statute’s five-year time limitation.”

St. Preux v. United States, 800 F. App’x 731, 733 (11® Cir. 2020) (quoting St.

Preux v. United States, 539 F. App’x 946, 947 (11" Cir. 2013)). It did so in the

context of section 2255 post-conviction proceedings.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals expressly disagrees with the Eleventh,

noting “[ojnly the Eleventh Circuit ... has reached the opposite conclusion.”

Arreola-Castillo v. United States, 889 F.3d 378, 388 (7" Cir. 2018). In

Arreola-Castillo, the court there expressly said, “Section 851(e) does not apply to a

§ 2255 petition to reopen a federal sentence based on the vacatur of enhancing

state convictions.” /d. at 384. The Seventh also discussed how “two of our sister

circuits have adopted this interpretation of §851(e),” including the Ninth Circuit as

well as the Second Circuit. Arreola-Castillo, 889 F.3d at 388 (citing United States

vy. McChristian, 47 F.3d 1499 (9% Cir. 1995), and United States v. Gabriel, 599 F.

App’x 407 (2" Cir. 2015) (unpublished)); ef Clay v. United States, -- F. Supp.2d

~-, 2009 WL 1657095 (N.D. Ga. June 11, 2009) (asking “whether a defendant

whose federal sentence was enhanced under §§ 841/851 may bring a § 2255

motion to seek resentencing based on the invalidation of his prior state conviction

used to enhance his federal sentence” and finding “that there is nothing in §§ 841

or 851 which” limits the court’s authority under § 2255 to grant relief), Vizcaino v.

United States, 981 F. Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. Nov. 8, 2013) (deciding whether the

Controlled Substances Act and § 851 supplant habeas corpus and provide the

exclusive forum for challenging prior convictions and concluding “that the better

reading of § 851 is that the prohibition on raising ‘challenges’ that were over five

years old only restricts defendants from raising such challenges within the federal

sentencing forum” and not in the arena of § 2255 petitions), with United States v.

Roberson, 684 F. Supp.2d 179 (D. Mass. 2010) (although noting § 851 “does not

expressly say that its procedures are ‘exclusive[,]’” the district court concluded

“that § 851 provides the exclusive means of challenging a prior conviction that

could be used to enhance a federal drug sentence,” whether at the original

sentencing proceeding or a subsequent habeas corpus or § 2255 petition).

For purposes of this petition, Mr. St. Preux comes to the Court with a

distinct and narrow legal question — it’s Mr. St. Preux’s good faith position that his

certainly merits this institution’s time, effort, and energy. The facts are clean, the

record is tight, and the legal posture is clearly framed over these past 13 years. The

answer to the question presented (which is either a yes or no answer) has national

impact and intimately plays in the daily function of our nation’s criminal courts,

prosecutions, and investigations. It also comments beyond doubt the significance

of habeas corpus, what we pursue in the aspiration of due process, and when we

should address the ideals of reaching justice. If Mr. St. Preux were sentenced

today, he would not be subject to a mandatory life sentence — he is, in other words,

presently serving an unconstitutional sentence. This Court should grant Mr. St.

Preux’s petition.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As taken from the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished opinion below, Mr. St.

Preux “was found guilty in 2007 of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack

cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, and his sentence was

enhanced, through 21 U.S.C. § 851(e), based on two prior felony drug convictions,

one from March 1995 and one from November 1998.” St Preux v. United States,

800 F. App’x 731, 733 (11" Cir. 2020) (St. Preux IN; see also Appendix. Mr. St.

Preux was handed a mandatory life sentence. The court recounts, “In 2011, St.

Preux filed a motion in the district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing, among

other things, that ‘he should be re-sentenced because [his 1998] predicate state

conviction[,| which was used to enhance his federal sentence to a mandatory term

of life imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. 851[,] has now been dismissed by the state

court.’ Sf. Preux v. United States, 539 F. App’x 946, 947 (11" Cir. 2013)

(unpublished) (St Preux JD.’ The district court rejected this claim,” St Preux, 800

F. App’x at 733, and said “that a defendant cannot challenge a predicate conviction

used to enhance his sentence under § 851 if that conviction is more than five years

old.” Id. On appeal from the dismissal of his 2011 § 2255 petition, the Eleventh

Circuit affirmed, “holding that ‘[uJnder the plain language of [§ 851(e)], St.

Preux’s challenge to the use of his 1998 state conviction as a basis for a federal

sentencing enhancement is foreclosed by’ the statute’s five-year time limitation.”

Id. (quoting St. Preux I, 539 F. App’x at 948).

Perhaps said differently, then, Mr. St. Preux was convicted of drug

conspiracy in 2007. In light of his two previous state drug convictions from 1995

and 1998, he was handed a mandatory life sentence, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§

841(b)(1)(A) and 8512 Following his federal sentence, Mr. St. Preux went back to

2 For the Reader’s benefit, the traffic of Mr. St. Preux’s case includes an appeal

from the original dismissal of his section 2255 action in 2011 — this was decided in

an unpublished opinion at St. Preux v. United States, 539 F. App’x 946 (11% Cir.

2013). For purposes of this petition, this will be known as St. Preux I.

The underlying unpublished opinion from which this petition flows was decided

at St. Preux v. United States, 800 F. App’x 731, 733 (11% Cir. 2020). This will be

known as St. Preux I for citation purposes herein.

3 Again, the versions of the sentencing statutes Mr. St. Preux was punished in

2007 said, in pertinent part:

If any person commits a violation of this subparagraph [§ 841(a)] ...

after two or more prior convictions for a felony drug offense have

become final, such person shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of

7

state court and was successful at having his 1998 conviction vacated, set aside,

dismissed, and declared void ab initio. Subsequently, in 2011, he filed a motion

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 asking the district court to re-open his criminal

proceedings and re-sentence him without the mandatory life penalty. The district

court said no, it couldn’t, because under 21 U.S.C. § 851(e), a defendant is not

allowed to collaterally challenge a prior conviction that is older than the 5-year

statute-of-limitations. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(e) (2007) ([nlo person who stands

convicted of an offense under this part may challenge the validity of any prior

conviction alleged under this section which occurred more than five years before

the date of the information alleging such prior conviction”). Because Mr. St. Preux

life imprisonment without release and fined in accordance with the

preceding sentence.

21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2007).

And, under section 851(a), “No person who stands convicted of an offense under

this part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior

convictions, unless before trial, ... the United States attorney files an information

with the court ... stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon.” 21

U.S.C. § 851(a)(1) (2007).

Conversely, “No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part may

challenge the validity of any prior conviction alleged under this section which

occurred more than five years before the date of the information alleging such prior

conviction.” 21 U.S.C. § 851(e) (2007).

was prohibited from challenging any putative conviction older than 2001,‘ the

district court said it couldn’t even entertain the merits argument that he

successfully abolished the conviction from 1998 - he was stuck with his

mandatory life sentence; there was no habeas relief available to Mr. St. Preux

(unlike for someone sentenced as an Armed Career Criminal or as a Career

Offender under the Sentencing Guidelines).

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court and affirmed

the dismissal of Mr. St. Preux’s § 2255 motion filed in 2011. See St. Preux v.

United States, 539 F. App’x 946 (11" Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (St. Preux J).

Then, in 2017, Mr. St. Preux filed a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)

motion asking the district court to re-visit his § 2255 petition on the ground that the

court mistakenly applied the 5-year limitations period at 21 U.S.C. § 851(e) to

prevent his process from going forward — it was a procedural error.’ The district

court said that this was an effort at filing a “second or successive” § 2255 motion

and, without any appropriate jurisdiction to hear the motion, it dismissed Mr. St.

Preux’s action as inappropriate and improvident. See Order, Doc. 2 (March 29,

4 The government filed its information against Mr. St. Preux in the original

criminal case, 5:06-cr-29-JA-PRL, at Doc. 179 on December 12, 2006.

5 Similarly, when Mr. St. Preux filed his Rule 60(b) motion in 2017, for some

reason, the clerk did not file it with Mr. St. Preux’s original § 2255 matter in Case

No. 5:11-cv-187; rather, the clerk opened another event and assigned it Case No.

5:17-cv-96.

2017), Case No. 5:17-cv-96 (M.D.Fla., Ocala Division) (Hodges, D.J.).

Appealing this ruling led to the Eleventh Circuit’s agreement with the

district court, again, and its conclusion “that St. Preux’s motion ... was a

successive § 2255 motion.” St. Preux v. United States, 800 F. App’x 731, 733 (11%

Cir. 2020) (St. Preux ID). “St. Preux’s motion makes clear that he is disputing the

district court’s application of § 851(e) to enhance his sentence,” the appellate court

found, “which was whether §851(e), as a legal matter, applied to his habeas

proceeding.” Jd. at 734. In that Mr. St. Preux “was not entitled to habeas relief,”

the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s order dismissing Mr. St. Preux’s

Rule 60(b) motion as a “second or successive” § 2255 petition “because, based on

the time limits provided in § 851(e) itself [ ], [Mr. St. Preux] could not use § 851 to

challenge his 1998 conviction.” fd. “Thus,” the Eleventh Circuit held, “the district

court did not err in dismissing St. Preux’s motion for lack of jurisdiction.” Jd.

Mr. St. Preux petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc but was

denied relief in an order entered by the appellate court on March 24, 2020. See

Appendix. The court’s mandate was issued on April 1, 2020.

i0

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Mr. St. Preux’s petition should be granted to resolve an express

circuit split, to address and answer an undeniably important

national legal question arising under federal drug sentencing

matters, and to cure a manifest injustice for Mr. St. Preux’s

erroneous life sentence. This Court should intervene and grant

certiorari.

The Court should grant review to resolve a circuit split as well as answer a

decidedly significant legal question concerning federal drug sentencing. A fortiori,

Mr. St. Preux is serving a mandatory life sentence grounded on a prior conviction

that does not exist. If Mr. St. Preux were sentenced today, he would not be subject

to a mandatory life sentence under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 851. Were the Court to

hear this case, it could cure a manifest injustice for Mr. St. Preux.

If the Eleventh Circuit’s legal interpretation in this case is allowed to stand,

then any federal drug defendant facing an 851 information has only one means and

chance — and only one — to try and collaterally challenge any prior conviction used.

against him or her at sentencing. And that only includes prior convictions that are

within the 5-year statute-of-limitations period and excludes anything older than

that. This chance, then, is designated for the time of sentencing. So, the Eleventh

Circuit says that any federal drug defendant sentenced under the provisions of 21

ULS.C. §§ 841(b) and 851 may not pursue habeas relief and may never pursue

post-conviction remedies under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 when trying to collaterally

11

challenge a prior conviction used to enhance a sentence. Congress certainly does

not say this anywhere between §§841 and 851.

This simply cannot be the state of the law. The Second,® Seventh,’ and

Ninth Circuits* agree with Mr. St. Preux’s position (and disagree with the

Eleventh),’ but, in the best exercise of brevity, Mr. St. Preux would greatly lift

from Chief District Judge Patti B. Saris in her memorandum and order, Vizcaino v.

United States, 981 F. Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 2013). In Vizeaino, Chief Judge Saris

observed:

Under the government’s reading of section 851, the statute

would curtail petitioner’s ability to bring habeas motions based on

successful challenges in state courts to convictions which are

time-barred by § 851(e). Such an interpretation would implicate the

longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to

repeal habeas jurisdiction, which the Supreme Court emphasized in

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 289 (2001). Implications from statutory

text or legislative history are not sufficient to repeal habeas

jurisdiction; instead, Congress must articulate specific and

unambiguous statutory directives to effect a repeal. Given this

framework, the Court must find that the provisions in § 851 were

clearly intended to repeal habeas relief under § 2255.

6 See United States v. Gabriel, 599 F. App’x 407 (2"4 Cir. 2015) (unpublished).

7 See Arreola-Castillo v. United States, 889 F.3d 378 (7° Cir. 2018).

8 See United States v. MeChristian, 47 F.3d 1499 (9% Cir. 1995).

9 See St. Preux v. United States, 539 F. App’x 946'(11" Cir. 2013) (unpublished)

(St. Preux I); see also St. Preux vy. United States, 800 F. App’x 731 (11% Cir. 2020)

(unpublished) (St. Preux ID).

12

The Plain language of the statute of limitations indisputably

prohibits defendants from challenging convictions outside the five

year period at the federal sentencing hearing.

The government asserts that the plain language of [21 U.S.C. §

851(e)] bars defendants from ever raising challenges to these [prior]

convictions, including challenges brought in state court and later

raised in a § 2255 petition.

This Court concludes that the better reading of § 851 is that the

prohibition on raising “challenges” that were over five years old only

restricts defendants from raising such challenges within the federal

sentencing forum. ... Congress reasonably limits the use of the federal

forum to challenge old, time-barred convictions. However, there is no

clear statement that such challenges could not be launched in state

court and then used as a basis for a federal habeas motion... .

Vizcaino, 981 F. Supp.2d at 108-110 (cleaned up). Judge Saris also noted, “In Clay

v. United States, No. 2:00-CR-0008-RWS-JRS-1, 2009 WL 1657095 (N.D. Ga.

June 11, 2009), the court held that a defendant was entitled to resentencing under §

2255 based on the invalidation of his prior state court conviction that was over five

years old at the time an information was filed against him.” Vizcaino, 981 F.

Supp.2d at 108.

The Seventh Circuit agrees with Mr. St. Preux, unlike the Eleventh. When

addressing the question presented here, the Seventh Circuit in Arreola-Castillo v.

United States, 889 F.3d 378 (7" Cir. 2018), framed the issue as whether the district

court erred “by holding that § 851(e) bars an individual from reopening his federal

sentence under § 2255 when the state convictions that enhanced the sentence have

13

since been vacated.” /d. at 384. Hinging its answer to the question posed “on

whether [the inmate’s] habeas petition challenges the validity of any prior

conviction,” the Seventh acknowledged that the action there was not “challenging

the validity of those [prior] convictions, but rather their very existence.” Jd. at 385.

Thus, “[c]ritically,” the Seventh found, “although §851(e) bars an individual from

challenging the validity of any prior conviction that is more than five years old, it

in no way limits an individual’s ability to deny that such a conviction exists. 21

US.C. § 851 (e).” Id. at 385.

“Finally,” the Seventh emphasized, “it is important to note that § 851(e)

does not speak of the ability to file a case attacking a prior conviction.” Jd. at 387.

“Tt would be extraordinary for a federal statute to forbid a person from going to

state court and properly filing an action that the state court is prepared to entertain.

At the very least, one would expect a clear statement from Congress that such a

profound interference with the state-court system was contemplated. Nothing in §

851(e) comes close to a clear statement permitting the federal courts, in effect, to

enjoin someone from filing a motion for relief in state court.” Arreola-Castillo,

889 F.3d at 387,

The Eleventh Circuit even said as much in a more recent case, United States

y. Valentine, - F. App’x --, 2020 WL 2849942 (11" Cir. June 2, 2020)

(unpublished). “A prisoner in federal custody [like Mr. St. Preux] may file a

14

motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence by asserting ‘that the sentence

was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that

the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence

was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to

collateral attack.’ 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Typically,” the Eleventh notes, “collateral

attacks on the validity of a federal conviction or sentence must be brought under 28

U.S.C. § 2255. Sawyer v. Holder, 326 F.3d 1363, 1365 (11" Cir. 2003).”

Valentine, 2020 WL 2849942, at *1.

In other words, “a collateral challenge to an § 851 enhancement is

cognizable through a § 2255 motion.” Jd. at *2 (footnote omitted). Indeed, the

Eleventh Circuit knows that:

In Robert Johnson vy. United States, the Supreme Court held that a

federal prisoner who had ‘received a career offender enhancement

could challenge the enhancement in a § 2255 motion after a prior state

conviction underlying the enhancement was vacated by the state court.

544 USS. 295, 304-305. The Supreme Court further held that the state

court’s vacatur was a new “fact” within the meaning of § 2255(f)(4)

that triggered a renewed one-year limitations period to file a § 2255

motion. Jd. at 305-308. ... We have also recognized post-judgment

challenges to an §851 enhancement as cognizable through a § 2255

motion. See Boyd v. United States, 754 F.3d 1298, 1301-1302 (11°

Cir. 2014); Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 863-8674 (11% Cir.

2011).

Valentine, 2020 WL 2849942, at *2; see also Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485,

497 (1994) (an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) case), and Daniels v. United

States, 532 U.S. 374, 382 (2001) (ACCA), which explain that only after an

15

underlying conviction is successfully challenged may a defendant seek relief in

federal courts via § 2255.

But still, the Eleventh Circuit found in Mr. St. Preux’s case that even though

he “filed his initial habeas petition within AEDPA’s statute of limitations, so the

district court was able to reach the merits of his habeas claim that his sentence

should not have been enhanced through § 851(e), and determined that St. Preux

was not entitled to habeas relief because, based on the time limits provided in §

851(e) itself (and not AEDPA), he could not use § 851 to challenge his 1998

conviction.” St Preux I, 800 F. App’x at 734 (see Appendix). The court below

said it again in the more recent Valentine case. See Valentine, 2020 WL 2849942,

at *3 (finding that even if petitioner’s underlying conviction was vacated, he still

was not entitled to 2255 relief because Ҥ 851 prohibits challenges to prior

convictions entered more than five years before the” government’s filing of an

§851 information).

The Eleventh Circuit’s application of the 5-year limitations period at 21

U.S.C. § 851(e) to bar an inmate from re-opening his or her federal sentence after

having successfully vacated a prior state conviction used to enhance his or her

sentence cuts against the generally accepted jurisprudence on this point as well as

this Court’s governing precedence. “Assuming he has acted with due diligence,”

the Eleventh recognizes, “‘a defendant given a sentence enhanced for a prior

16

conviction is entitled to a reduction if the earlier conviction is vacated.’ Johnson,

544 U.S. at 303.” Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 864 (11" Cir. 2011).

“Together,” the Eleventh Circuit goes on to say, this Court’s decisions and

opinions in “Custis, Daniels, and Johnson establish that the time for challenging a

federal sentence based on a faulty state conviction is only after that conviction has

been vacated.” Stewart, 646 F.3d at 864; Arreola-Castillo, 889 F.3d at 390 (stating

that “section 851 does not preclude habeas review” and observing that “the

Supreme Court has consistently held in other statutory contexts that an individual

may move to reopen a federal sentence based on the state court’s vacatur of a prior

conviction that enhanced the sentence”); see also United States v. McChristian, 47

F.3d 1499 (9" Cir. 1995) (“a careful reading of the statute convinces us that

§851(e)’s purpose was to exclude from federal court only collateral challenges to

convictions and not reports of successful collateral challenges completed in state

court”).

Now, it is certainly not lost on Mr. St. Preux that he comes to this Court on

the dismissal of a putative Rule 60(b) motion because it was thought to be an

improper “second or successive” 2255 motion.’ The point of his Rule 60(b)

10 The appellate court below summarized Mr. St. Preux’s case thusly:

Carl St. Preux appeals the district court’s denial of his motion, which he

argues is a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion, instead of a

second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 255 motion for which he had not

17

motion, however, was an effort at pointing out to the courts below the procedural

error in denying him relief after the state court successfully vacated his prior 1998

conviction. Mr. St. Preux is the victim of the lower courts’ misapplication of the

5-year statute-of-limitations at 21 U.S.C. § 85l(e) that prevents him from

re-opening the original sentencing hearing from 2007 such that he might be

correctly sentenced.

For this Court’s participation, it has not said expressly, implicitly, or

otherwise that the specific statute at question, namely § 851(e), applies in the

course of a § 2255 action,'! whether procedurally or substantively, or should be

read categorically to undermine the constitutional remedies afforded by habeas

obtained permission. On appeal, St. Preux says that his motion was a

proper Rule 60(b) motion because it did not attack the merits of the

district court’s earlier decision, but rather, argued that the court

procedurally erred by apply 21 U.S.C. § 851(e)’s statute of limitations

and declining to consider the merits of his claim.

St. Preux v. United States, 800 F. App’x 731, 732 (11% Cir. 2020) (St. Preux ID; see

Appendix.

1 Jn Arreola-Castillo v. United States, 889 F.3d 378 (7® Cir. 2018), the defendant

there, just like Mr. St. Preux, received a mandatory life sentence for a federal drug

offense because he had two prior felony drug convictions. 889 F.3d at 381. Subsequent

to his federal conviction, the New Mexico state court vacated the underlying state

felony drug convictions. See id. At issue was whether § 851(e), “which prohibits an

individual from challenging the validity of a prior conviction that is more than five

years old at the time the government seeks the recidivism enhancement,” time-barred

his challenge. See id. The Seventh Circuit held there was no statute-of- limitations

concern because the defendant was “not challenging the validity of his prior

convictions, but rather their very existence.” See id. So it is with Mr. St. Preux.

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corpus. See Clay v. United States, -- F.Supp.2d --, 2009 WL 1657095, at * 4

(N.D.Ga. June 11, 2009) (“[T]Jhere is no published or unpublished opinion

addressing the precise issue raised herein; i.c., whether a defendant whose federal

sentence was enhanced under §§ 841/851 may bring a § 2255 motion to seek

resentencing based on the invalidation of his prior state conviction used to enhance

his federal sentence”). Mr. St. Preux submits that it should go without argument or

debate that, just as Judge Story wrote in Clay, we all agree, generally, the rule is:

““oursuant to federal habeas corpus, a district court may reopen and reduce a

federal sentence, once a federal defendant has, in state court, successfully attacked

a prior state conviction, previously used in enhancing the federal sentence’

pursuant to the [Armed Career Criminal Act (or the ACCA)].” Clay, 2009 WL

1657095, at *4 (quoting Walker, 198 F.3d at 813),”

Why should this not be the case in a matter involving a sentence enhanced

by §§ 841 and 851? The magistrate in this case answered the question in its report

and recommendation by reasoning, “if [Mr. St. Preux] could not challenge his

November 1998 conviction at sentencing because it was time barred by 851(e),

then he should not be permitted to make the argument in his § 2255 petition with a

2 See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 909 F.3d 895, 902-903 (7" Cir, 2018) (“True, a

defendant given a sentence enhanced for a prior conviction is entitled to a reduction if

the earlier conviction is vacated. This is not controversial. When a state court vacates a

prior conviction, it, in effect, nullifies that conviction; it is as if that conviction no

longer exists.”).

19

different result.” (Civ.11 at Doc. 46, page 5 (the magistrate judge did not cite to

any authority in support of this declaration)). But, no matter how viewed, the

court’s answer reflects the use of § 851(e) as a procedural shield to prevent any

review of Mr. St. Preux’s claim on the merits — and that is the question raised by

Mr. St. Preux in his Rule 60(b) motion from below, i.e., can § 851(e) be used in

such a way during the course of a 2255 action to deflect any chance at ruling on the

merits of a prisoner’s substantive claim, that he no longer suffers from a qualifying

predicate prior conviction?

Hence, Mr. St. Preux’s Rule 60(b) motion was not attacking the merits of the

district court’s prior decision, it was attacking a procedural defect in the resolution

of his § 2255 motion, 1.e., the improper application of a statute-of-limitations. See

United States v. Carswell, 773 F. App’x 591, 592-593 (11" Cir. 2019) (“[a] Rule

60(b) motion for relief from judgment on a § 2255 motion is a second or

successive § 2255 motion if it seeks to add a new ground for relief or attacks the

district court’s prior resolution of a claim on the merits, but not when it attacks a

defect in the integrity of the § 2255 proceedings”) (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at

533 (movant’s Rule 60(b) motion alleging “that the federal courts misapplied the

federal statute of limitations” was permissible and true Rule 60(b) motion, not a

“second or successive” 2255 application)). Why would we ever distinguish or treat

differently the relief afforded a federal criminal defendant sentenced as a Career

20

Offender, an Armed Career Criminal, or under § 851 for purposes of collateral

challenges brought by § 2255?!5 Judge Story said in Clay that he “agrees [ ] there

is nothing in §§ 841 and 851 which ‘limits this Court’s authority and responsibility

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (or 28 U.S.C. § 2254, for that matter) and related Supreme

Court precedent to grant relief in these circumstances.’” Clay, 2009 WL 1657095,

at *4 (quoting Pettiford v. United States, No. 94-12626, 1995 WL 464920, at *9

(D.Mass. July 20, 1995)).

To be sure, Judge Story observed, ““To afford a petitioner no relief, when he

has been sentenced to an enhanced period based on prior state convictions that

were obtained in violation of the United States constitution, is arguably itself a

constitutional violation.” Jd. (quoting Pettiford, 1995 WL 464920, at *10). In

other words, “the better reading of § 851 is that the prohibition on raising

‘challenges’ that were over five years old only restricts defendants from raising

such challenges within the federal sentencing forum.” Vizcaino, 981 F.Supp.2d at

109. Consequently, § 851(e)’s 5-year-limitations period should not apply in a §

2255 arena to prevent a movant from asking for re-sentencing after having

13 As noted in Clay, the § 2255 movant there “argues that he is entitled to

resentencing based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Custis v. United States, 511

U.S. 485 (1994), Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374 (2001), and Johnson v.

United States, 544 U.S. 295 (2005). Movant maintains that, although these cases

concerned sentence enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 924(e), while his sentence was enhanced pursuant to §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) and 851,

the rationale of these cases applies to his case because the statutory enhancements

are similar.” Clay, 2009 WL 1657095, at *2 (alterations to internal citations).

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