Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Adam Scott, Petitioner v. United States

NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

ADAM SCOTT,

v.

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Rene L. Valladares

Federal Public Defender

Amy B. Cleary*

Ellesse Henderson

Assistant Federal Public Defenders

Office of the Federal Public Defender

411 E. Bonneville, Ste. 100

Las Vegas, Nevada 89101

(702) 388-6577

Amy_Cleary@fd.org

*Counsel for Petitioner

May 29, 2020

Question Presented for Review

At least five federal appellate courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have

determined the use of a dangerous weapon automatically transforms assault into a

crime of violence. Does applying this automatic rule ignore or misinterpret this

Court’s caselaw, given the variety of items that are classified as dangerous weapons

and the variety of ways those weapons can be used?

ii

Table of Contents

Question Presented for Review ..................................................................................... ii

Table of Contents ............................................................................................................ i

Table of Authorities ....................................................................................................... ii

Petition for Certiorari .................................................................................................... 1

Related Proceedings and Orders Below ........................................................................ 1

Jurisdictional Statement ............................................................................................... 1

Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions ...................................................... 1

Statement of the Case ................................................................................................... 2

A.

Scott pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and was sentenced

to ten years’ imprisonment. ..................................................................... 3

B.

This Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague “residual

clauses” in various federal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). ........ 3

C.

Despite this Court’s decisions in Johnson and Davis, the district

court denied Scott’s motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and

the Ninth Circuit denied Scott a certificate of appealability. ................ 4

Reasons for Granting the Writ ...................................................................................... 5

A.

B.

Automatically classifying armed assaults as crimes of violence

conflicts with this Court’s precedent concerning violent, physical

force. .......................................................................................................... 5

1.

Simple assault is not a crime of violence under this Court’s

caselaw. .......................................................................................... 6

2.

Adding as an element the use of a dangerous weapon does

not automatically transform assault into a crime of violence. .... 9

This case presents an important federal question because of the

serious implications for federal defendants. ......................................... 11

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 13

Appendix

i

Table of Authorities

Federal Cases

Brundage v. United States,

365 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1966) ............................................................................... 11

Johnson v. United States,

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) ......................................................................................... 2, 3

Johnson v. United States,

559 U.S. 133 (2010) ......................................................................................... 6, 7, 8

Manners v. United States,

947 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2020) ................................................................................... 5

McLaughlin v. United States,

476 U.S. 16, 17–18 & n.3 (1986) ........................................................................... 10

Stokeling v. United States,

139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) ........................................................................................... 6, 8

United States v. Alsondo,

486 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1973) .................................................................................. 7

United States v. Anderson,

190 F. Supp. 589 (D. Md. 1961) ...................................................................... 10, 11

United States v. Bravebull,

896 F.3d 897 (8th Cir.) .......................................................................................... 11

United States v. Bryant,

949 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 2020) ............................................................................... 5, 9

United States v. Burris,

912 F.3d 386 (6th Cir.) (en banc) .................................................................... 5, 8, 9

United States v. Chipps,

410 F.3d 438 (8th Cir. 2005) ................................................................................... 6

United States v. Corbitt,

675 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1982) ................................................................................... 7

United States v. Davis,

139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) ......................................................................................... 2, 4

United States v. Dominguez-Maroyoqui,

748 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2014) ............................................................................... 7, 9

ii

United States v. Farlee,

757 F.3d 810 (8th Cir. 2014) ................................................................................. 11

United States v. Fernandez,

837 F.2d 1031 (11th Cir. 1988) ............................................................................... 7

United States v. Frizzi,

491 F.2d 1231 (1st Cir. 1974) ................................................................................. 7

United States v. Gibson,

896 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1990) ................................................................................. 11

United States v. Gobert,

943 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2019) ........................................................................... 4, 5, 9

United States v. Guilbert,

692 F.2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1982) ................................................................... 6, 10, 11

United States v. Harris,

853 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2017) ............................................................................... 5, 9

United States v. Herron,

539 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................. 10

United States v. Hightower,

512 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1975) ..................................................................................... 7

United States v. Hollow,

747 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1984) ........................................................................... 10, 11

United States v. Johnson,

324 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1963) ................................................................................. 11

United States v. Johnson,

911 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................... 9

United States v. Jones,

914 F.3d 893 (4th Cir. 2019) ............................................................................... 7, 9

United States v. Lewellyn,

481 F.3d 695 (9th Cir. 2007) ................................................................................... 6

United States v. Loman,

551 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1977) ................................................................................. 11

United States v. Martinez,

762 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2014) ............................................................................... 7, 9

iii

United States v. Mayo,

901 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2018) .................................................................................... 8

United States v. Middleton,

883 F.3d 485 (4th Cir. 2018) ................................................................................... 8

United States v. Mills,

835 F.2d 1262 (8th Cir. 1987) ............................................................................... 11

United States v. Moore,

846 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir. 1988) ................................................................... 10, 11, 12

United States v. Riggins,

40 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1994) ................................................................................. 11

United States v. Sommerstedt,

752 F.2d 1494 (9th Cir.) .......................................................................................... 7

United States v. Steele,

550 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 2008) ................................................................................. 11

United States v. Sturgis,

48 F.3d 784 (4th Cir. 1995) ............................................................................. 10, 12

United States v. Swallow,

891 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2018) ............................................................................... 11

United States v. Taylor,

843 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2016) ........................................................................... 5, 9

United States v. Verwiebe,

874 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2017) ................................................................................. 11

United States v. Whindleton,

797 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2015) ............................................................................... 5, 9

Welch v. United States,

136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) ............................................................................................. 3

Federal Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 113 ............................................................................................... passim

18 U.S.C. § 924 ............................................................................................... passim

18 U.S.C. § 1365 ................................................................................................ 8, 10

18 U.S.C. § 1951 .................................................................................................... 12

iv

28 U.S.C. § 1254 ...................................................................................................... 1

28 U.S.C. § 2255 .................................................................................................. 1, 4

United States Sentencing Guidelines

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 .................................................................................................... 10

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4 ...................................................................................................... 3

v

Petition for Certiorari

Petitioner Adam Scott respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review

the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Petitioner asks this Court to grant certiorari, vacate the Ninth Circuit’s denial of a

certificate of appealability, and remand for further proceedings.

Related Proceedings and Orders Below

The order denying Scott’s motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the U.S.

District Court for the District of Nevada and the order denying appellate relief in

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals are attached in the Appendix: United States v.

Scott, No. 3:12-cr-00051-RCJ-VPC, 2017 WL 58577 (D. Nev. Jan. 4, 2017); United

States v. Scott, No. 17-15106 (9th Cir. March 2, 2020).

Jurisdictional Statement

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals entered its final order in Petitioners’

cases on March 2, 2020. See Appendix. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(a). This petition is timely per Supreme Court Rule 13.3.

Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or

otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or

indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the

land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual

service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any

person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in

jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any

criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be

1

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process

of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,

without just compensation.

Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 924(c)(3) defines “crime of

violence” as:

For purposes of this subsection, the term “crime of

violence” means an offense that is a felony and –

(A)

has as an element the use, attempted use, or

threatened use of physical force against the person or

property of another, or

(B)

that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that

physical force against the person or property of another

may be used in the course of committing the offense.

Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 113, entitled “[a]ssaults within

maritime and territorial jurisdiction,” criminalizes the following offense:

Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial

jurisdiction of the United States, is guilty of an assault

shall be punished as follows:

...

(3)

Assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do

bodily harm, by a fine under this title or

imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both.

Statement of the Case

Petitioner Adam Scott is currently serving a ten-year prison sentence,

imposed without the benefit of this Court’s decisions in Johnson v. United States,

135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), and United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). These

decisions dramatically limited which offenses qualify as crimes of violence under 18

U.S.C. § 924(c). As a result, Scott is serving a federal prison sentence despite no

longer meeting the elements of the charge underlying his conviction.

2

A.

Scott pled guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and was sentenced to

ten years’ imprisonment.

On April 3, 2013, Scott pled guilty to use of a firearm in relation to a crime of

violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). ECF No. 23. The plea agreement specified

the crime of violence as assault with a dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C.

§ 113(a)(3). But the agreement did not identify whether the assault charge was a

crime of violence under the “elements clause” or the “residual clause” of § 924(c)(3).

Nor did the presentence report (PSR) identify the purportedly applicable § 924(c)

clause, instead simply calculating Scott’s guidelines sentence as ten years’

imprisonment, the statutory minimum. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(b).

Three months later, the district court adopted the PSR’s recommendation and

sentenced Scott to ten years of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and

fifty hours of community service. ECF Nos. 29, 30. Scott did not appeal. He

remains incarcerated in Lompoc, California, with a projected release date of June

13, 2025.

B.

This Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague “residual clauses”

in various federal statutes, including 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

More than two years after Scott was convicted and sentenced, this Court

invalidated as unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the Armed Career

Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).

The following year, this Court held Johnson announced a new substantive rule

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review. Welch v. United States, 136 S.

Ct. 1257 (2016). Then, in United States v. Davis, this Court held the residual

3

clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process

Clause. United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019).

C.

Despite this Court’s decisions in Johnson and Davis , the district court

denied Scott’s motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and the Ninth

Circuit denied Scott a certificate of appealability.

Based on Johnson, Scott filed a motion to vacate his conviction and sentence

in 2015, arguing federal assault under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) no longer qualifies as a

crime of violence. ECF Nos. 32, 33. The district court denied the motion. See

Appendix. The use of a dangerous weapon, the district court reasoned, categorically

renders assault a crime of violence. Id. The district court additionally denied Scott

a certificate of appealability.

Scott timely requested a certificate of appealability from the Ninth Circuit.

While that request was pending, the Ninth Circuit decided in United States v.

Gobert, 943 F.3d 878 (9th Cir. 2019), that federal assault under 18 U.S.C.

§ 113(a)(3) remains a crime of violence despite Johnson and Davis. Like the district

court, the Ninth Circuit reasoned “a defendant charged with ‘assault with a deadly

or a dangerous weapon, must have always threatened the use of physical force.’” Id.

at 881 (quoting United States v. Juvenile Female, 566 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir.

2009)). A short time later, the Ninth Circuit denied Scott’s request for a certificate

of appealability. See Appendix.

4

Reasons for Granting the Writ

At least five federal appellate courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have

created a rule—branded the “deadly weapon rule” by the Sixth Circuit, see Manners

v. United States, 947 F.3d 377, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Burris, 912

F.3d 386, 405 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 90 (2019)—categorically

classifying assaults as crimes of violence if committed using a dangerous or deadly

weapon. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 949 F.3d 168, 180 (4th Cir. 2020);

Gobert, 943 F.3d at 881-82; United States v. Harris, 853 F.3d 318, 321-22 (6th Cir.

2017); United States v. Taylor, 843 F.3d 1215, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 2016); United

States v. Whindleton, 797 F.3d 105, 113-14 (1st Cir. 2015). Because this rule

conflicts with this Court’s crime-of-violence jurisprudence and creates confusion

within the criminal justice system, this Court should grant Scott’s petition for writ

of certiorari. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10(c) (compelling reasons exist to grant review in

cases where “a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of

federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an

important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decisions of this

Court”).

A.

Automatically classifying armed assaults as crimes of violence conflicts

with this Court’s precedent concerning violent, physical force.

In order to qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), an

offense must have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of

physical force against the person or property of another.” In 2010, this Court

explained the “physical force” required under an equivalent statute “means violent

5

force—that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person.”

Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). Nine years later, this Court

reiterated the modifier “physical” in § 924(c)(3)(A) “plainly refers to force exerted by

and through concrete bodies—distinguishing physical force, from, for example,

intellectual force or emotional force.” Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544,

552-54 (2019). Simple assault, like the simple battery statute this Court addressed

in Johnson, generally does not meet this definition. By creating and applying a

categorical rule that a dangerous or deadly weapon automatically transforms simple

assault into a crime of violence, federal appellate courts are ignoring and

misinterpreting this Court’s precedent, an error justifying grant of Scott’s petition

for writ of certiorari. See U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 10(c).

1.

Simple assault is not a crime of violence under this Court’s

caselaw.

The federal assault statute does not define “assault.” See generally 18 U.S.C.

§ 113. But courts generally incorporate the common law definition of undefined

statutory terms. See United States v. Guilbert, 692 F.2d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir.

1982); see also United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 448 (8th Cir. 2005). At

common law, assault could be committed in either of two ways: (1) by attempting to

commit a battery, or (2) by committing “an act that puts another in reasonable

apprehension of immediate bodily harm.” Guilbert, 692 F.2d at 1343; see United

States v. Lewellyn, 481 F.3d 695, 697 (9th Cir. 2007). Neither means of committing

assault involves the violent, physical force this Court’s precedent requires.

6

Turning first to attempted battery, the offense requires no more force than

the battery statute this Court considered in 2010—de minimus force that might

include spitting or an unwanted tap on the shoulder. See Johnson, 559 U.S. at 14041; United States v. Sommerstedt, 752 F.2d 1494, 1496-97 (9th Cir.), amended, 760

F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1985); see also United States v. Fernandez, 837 F.2d 1031, 1035

(11th Cir. 1988) (chasing and “bump[ing] into”); United States v. Corbitt, 675 F.2d

626, 628 (4th Cir. 1982) (a push); United States v. Hightower, 512 F.2d 60, 61 (5th

Cir. 1975) (grabbing and tugging jacket); United States v. Frizzi, 491 F.2d 1231,

1232 (1st Cir. 1974) (spitting); United States v. Alsondo, 486 F.2d 1339, 1345 (2d

Cir. 1973) (“menacingly” lifting hand and a shove), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.

United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975). Attempted battery, then, is no more

violent than completed battery, and it does not satisfy this Court’s requirements for

a crime of violence. See Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140-44; United States v. Jones, 914

F.3d 893, 903 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Martinez, 762 F.3d 127, 137 (1st Cir.

2014); United States v. Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d 918, 921 (9th Cir. 2014).

The second way of committing assault—committing “an act that puts another

in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm”—also does not constitute a

crime of violence since “bodily harm” does not necessarily mean physical harm

caused by physical, violent force. The federal assault statute does not define “bodily

harm,” instead only defining the more serious terms “substantial bodily injury” and

“serious bodily injury.” A separate federal criminal statute, however, does define

“bodily injury” as:

7

(A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfigurement;

(B) physical pain;

(C) illness;

(D) impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ,

or mental facility; or

(E) any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary.

18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(4).

The requirement there only be “bodily injury,” as opposed to “substantial

bodily injury” or “serious bodily injury,” means all that is required is de minimis

injury. A defendant can cause de minimis injury without using violent force. And

courts routinely conclude statutes are overbroad for purposes of crime-of-violence

analysis despite elements involving bodily injury or harm. See, e.g., United States

v. Mayo, 901 F.3d 218, 227 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Mayo argues, and we must agree, that

physical force and bodily injury are not the same thing, at least not as interpreted

by Pennsylvania courts.” (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets

omitted)); United States v. Middleton, 883 F.3d 485, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (explaining

a defendant could cause injury without necessarily using violent force).

In addition, this Court has made clear that mental injuries are not included

in “physical force.” This Court instead requires “physical force” to be “capable of

causing physical pain or injury to another person.” Johnson, 559 U.S. at 140; see id.

at 138 (“The adjective ‘physical’ is clear in meaning . . . distinguishing physical force

from, for example, intellectual force or emotional force.”); see also Stokeling, 139

S. Ct. at 552; Burris, 912 F.3d at 397-400. Thus, an element requiring that a victim

8

be put in fear of injury, either physical or mental, does not necessarily require the

intentional use of violent, physical force.

2.

Adding as an element the use of a dangerous weapon does not

automatically transform assault into a crime of violence.

Despite acknowledging in other cases that unarmed assaults are generally

not crimes of violence, Jones, 914 F.3d at 903; Burris, 912 F.3d at 397-400;

Martinez, 762 F.3d at 137; United States v. Johnson, 911 F.3d 1062, 1072-73 (10th

Cir. 2018); Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d at 921, at least five appellate courts

have concluded the use of a weapon categorically alters this analysis, automatically

making the offenses crimes of violence. See Bryant, 949 F.3d at 180; Gobert, 943

F.3d at 881-82; Harris, 853 F.3d at 321-22; Taylor, 843 F.3d at 1223-24;

Whindleton, 797 F.3d at 113-14.

This automatic rule ignores a crucial aspect of federal armed assault under

18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3): the statute can include almost any kind of object as a

dangerous weapon, and that object can be used in near-limitless ways. The statute

does not define “dangerous weapon,” but the United States Sentencing Guidelines

do:

“Dangerous weapon” means (i) an instrument capable of

inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or (ii) an object

that is not an instrument capable of inflicting death or

serious bodily injury but (I) closely resembles such an

instrument; or (II) the defendant used the object in a

manner that created the impression that the object was

such an instrument (e.g. a defendant wrapped a hand in a

towel during a bank robbery to create the appearance of a

gun).

9

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(E). Courts hold that nontraditional weapons, unloaded guns, and

even fake guns meet this definition. See McLaughlin v. United States, 476 U.S. 16,

17–18 & n.3 (1986); United States v. Sturgis, 48 F.3d 784, 787-88 (4th Cir. 1995);

United States v. Moore, 846 F.2d 1163, 1166 (8th Cir. 1988); see also Guilbert, 692

F.2d at 1343 (“[T]he term ‘dangerous weapon’ is not restricted to such obviously

dangerous weapons as guns, knives, and the like, but can include virtually any

object given appropriate circumstances.”). And an object can be dangerous because

of its potential to cause illness or mental injury, not only its potential to cause

physical wounds. See 18 U.S.C. § 1365(h)(3) (including in definition of “serious

bodily injury” “protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member,

organ, or mental faculty” (emphasis added)); Sturgis, 48 F.3d at 788-89 (suggesting

that inmate with AIDS could commit assault with a dangerous weapon by biting

prison guard because of potential to transmit deadly disease); Moore, 846 F.2d at

1166-67 (concluding that “‘serious infection’ is a form of “serious bodily harm,’” and,

as a result, teeth can constitute a “deadly and dangerous weapon”). In fact, a

defendant need not even make contact with another person to be guilty of federal

armed assault. See United States v. Herron, 539 F.3d 881, 886 (8th Cir. 2008);

United States v. Anderson, 190 F. Supp. 589, 591 (D. Md. 1961). And in cases with

contact, it is unnecessary for the contact to be made with the actual weapon.

See United States v. Hollow, 747 F.2d 481, 482 (8th Cir. 1984).

Under this broad definition of “dangerous weapon,” courts have held the

following objects to satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3): teeth, see Sturgis, 48 F.3d at 788;

10

Moore, 846 F.2d at 1166-67; a belt, see United States v. Riggins, 40 F.3d 1055, 1057

(9th Cir. 1994); a metal chair and a plastic chair, see United States v. Johnson, 324

F.2d 264, 266 (4th Cir. 1963); a car, see United States v. Gibson, 896 F.2d 206, 20910 (6th Cir. 1990); a broken beer bottle and a pool stick, see Guilbert, 692 F.2d at

1343; a walking stick, see United States v. Loman, 551 F.2d 164, 169 (7th Cir.

1977); and shoes, see United States v. Swallow, 891 F.3d 1203, 1205 (9th Cir. 2018);

United States v. Bravebull, 896 F.3d 897, 899 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 287

(2018); United States v. Farlee, 757 F.3d 810, 815 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v.

Steele, 550 F.3d 693, 699 (8th Cir. 2008); Riggins, 40 F.3d at 1057. And a person

could “use” one of these dangerous weapons by simply holding the object while also

pushing someone, see Hollow, 747 F.2d at 482, waving or pointing the object,

see United States v. Verwiebe, 874 F.3d 258, 260 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v.

Mills, 835 F.2d 1262, 1263 (8th Cir. 1987); Brundage v. United States, 365 F.2d 616,

619 (10th Cir. 1966), or throwing the object and striking an automobile, Anderson,

190 F. Supp. at 591.

Consequently, through automatic application of the “deadly weapon rule,”

defendants are convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) for a variety of crimes that do

not constitute crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), regardless of the nature

of the weapon or the manner of its use.

B.

This case presents an important federal question because of the serious

implications for federal defendants.

A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) for discharging a firearm

during a crime of violence carries a mandatory consecutive punishment of ten years’

11

imprisonment. But it is not at all clear to criminal defendants, the government, or

courts what type of conduct qualifies as a crime of violence. If crimes of violence

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) do include federal armed assault, then courts and the

government are interpreting this assault statute too broadly, to include nonviolent

conduct.

For example, courts hold defendants are guilty of assault with a dangerous

weapon when they use teeth and saliva capable of transmitting infection or other

illness. See Sturgis, 48 F.3d at 788-89; Moore, 846 F.2d at 1166-67. Crucially,

these cases depend not on the damage done by a bite wound, but on the damage

done microscopically by the potential to spread a deadly disease. See Sturgis, 48

F.3d at 788-89; Moore, 846 F.2d at 1166-67. Thus, a defendant simply placing his or

her mouth on a prison guard is sufficient, regardless of any force used to “bite.” And

it is easy to imagine other scenarios with equal or greater potential than a bite

wound to spread disease, but that involve even less force such as throwing bodily

fluids infected with a disease or intentionally coughing while infected with a virus.

See United States v. Curry, No. 8:20-mj-01367-AAS, ECF No. 1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7,

2020) (criminal complaint alleging “biological weapons hoax” and including affidavit

of belief that “COVID-19 virus satisfies the ‘biological agent’ definition in Title 18 of

United States Code”); United States v. Barela, No. 3:20-mj-70470-MAG, ECF No. 1

(N.D. Ca. Apr. 21, 2020) (criminal complaint alleging Hobbs Act robbery under 18

U.S.C. § 1951 accomplished using intentional coughing); Memorandum from Deputy

Attorney General Jeffrey A. Rosen for All Heads of Law Enforcement Components,

12

Heads of Litigating Divisions, and United States Attorneys (March 24, 2020),

available at https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000171-128a-d911-aff1-becb9b530000

(advising DOJ officials that “coronavirus appears to meet the statutory definition of

a ‘biological agent,’” and that, consequently, threats to spread the disease could

“potentially implicate the Nation’s terrorism-related statutes”). Without this

Court’s intervention, defendants will continue facing both an overbroad reading of

federal armed assault and an overbroad reading of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).

Scott’s case provides an opportunity for this Court to clarify its precedent as

it applies to federal armed assaults and crimes of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

This Court should therefore grant his petition for writ of certiorari. See S. Sup. Ct.

R. 10(c).

Conclusion

This case presents a question of exceptional importance for defendants facing

mandatory consecutive sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The Ninth Circuit has

joined at least three other circuits in ignoring this Court’s crime-of-violence

jurisprudence to create an automatic, categorical rule transforming non-violent

offenses into crimes of violence without force. For the reasons set forth herein, Scott

requests this Court grant this petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

RENE VALLADARES

Federal Public Defender

Amy B. Cleary

AMY B. CLEARY

Assistant Federal Public Defender

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