Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Anthony L. Meads, Petitioner v. Illinois

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APPENDIX

Anthony L. Meads, Petitioner

Appellate Court Decision

E-FILED

11/1/2019 4:17 PM

Carolyn Taft Grosboll

SUPREME COURT CLERK

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NOTICE

FILED

This order was tiled under Supreme

Court Rule 23 and may not be cited

as precedent by any party except in

the limited circumstances allowed

under Rule 23(e)(1).

October 4, 2019

Carla Bender

4,h District Appellate

Court, 1L

2019 IL App (4th) 170229-U

NO. 4-17-0229

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

ANTHONY L. MEADS,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Appeal from

Circuit Court of

Champaign County

No. 12CF1317

Honorable

Thomas J. Difanis,

Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court.

Justices Cavanagh and Harris concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

T! 1

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We\&: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) defendant failed to establish a denial

of his right to a speedy trial, (2) sufficient evidence proved defendant guilty

beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder, (3) the trial court did not

violate Rule 431 (b) in admonishing the jury, and (4) the trial court properly

conducted a preliminary inquiry into defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel.

In October 2016, a jury convicted defendant, Anthony L. Meads, of first degree

murder in the death of Desirae Austin on July 4, 2012. In December 2016, the trial court

sentenced defendant to 45 years’ imprisonment.

13

Defendant appeals, arguing (1) he was denied his right to a speedy trial, (2) the

State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder, (3) the trial

court erred by failing to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), and

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(4) the court failed to conduct a proper preliminary inquiry into defendant’s posttrial claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm.

114

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I. BACKGROUND

In August 2012, the State charged defendant with first degree murder based on

Desirae’s death following the Parkland Community College (Parkland) fireworks display on July

4, 2012. Count I charged defendant with felony murder, alleging he, or one for whose conduct

he was legally responsible, while committing the forcible felony of mob action and armed with a

firearm, knowingly and with the use of force disturbed the public peace by discharging a firearm

in the direction of Johnnie Campbell and Rajon Campbell, thereby causing the death of Desirae

(720 1LCS 5/9-1 (a)(3) (West 2010)). In September 2012, the State added two additional counts

of first degree murder. Count II charged defendant with intentional murder, alleging he, without

lawful justification and with the intent to kill or do great bodily harm to Desirae or another,

discharged a firearm in the direction of Desirae or another, thereby causing Desirae’s death (720

1LCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2010)). Count III charged defendant with reckless murder, alleging he,

without lawful justification, discharged a firearm in the direction of Desirae or another, knowing

the act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm, thereby causing Desirae’s

death (720 ILCS 5/9-l(a)(2) (West 2010)).

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In May 2013, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, and the trial court

subsequently sentenced him to 50 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, this court reversed and

remanded for a new trial, concluding the State presented sufficient evidence upon which a jury

could find defendant guilty of first degree murder, but it engaged in prosecutorial misconduct

that so seriously undermined the fairness of the trial that a new trial was warranted.

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Wate, 2015 IL App (4th) 130802-U. This court’s mandate reversing and remanding for a new

trial issued on May 17, 2016.

A. Pretrial Proceedings

17

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On July 5, 2016, the trial court held the first preliminary hearing following

remand, and an assistant public defender stated, “This is Mr. Rosenbaum’s case. It was reversed

by the Appellate Court recently. He’s not had an opportunity to speak much with his client.

We’re asking for a continuance.” On August 2, 2016, the State requested a continuance. The

court overruled defendant’s objection and set the matter for another pretrial hearing later that

month. On August 30, 2016, defense counsel stated, “Ready for trial.” The State responded,

“Judge, we’re also ready for trial. We’d request trial based on the other obligations Ms. Clark

has and the age of the case. Since it’s 2012, we need to collect those witnesses again. We’d

request trial on October 17th, if possible.” The court set the case for trial on October 17, 2016.

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On October 12, 2016, defense counsel filed a motion to dismiss for a violation of

defendant’s right to a speedy trial. The motion alleged 126 days elapsed between the May 17,

2016, filing of the appellate court’s mandate and the October 17, 2016, trial date, excluding the

time period from July 6, 2016, to August 1,2016, where the defense sought a continuance. The

State argued the only delay attributable to the State was August 2, 2016, to August 30, 2016,

because defense counsel did not object to the October 17, 2016, trial date during the August 30,

2016, pretrial hearing.

110

At the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss, defense counsel argued the

August 30, 2016, hearing “move[d] very fast” and counsel had no opportunity to object to the

trial date. The State argued defense counsel “was fine with an October 17th setting” and never

indicated an invocation of defendant’s speedy-trial rights. The trial court ruled as follows:

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“Well, at the pretrial, the matter was set for a date certain in

this Court’s trial term. The problem for setting it for this week is

that Monday is a Court holiday. We’re dealing with a murder case,

the last time it was tried it took four, four and a half days. There

would be no way that this case could have been tried beginning

Tuesday, the 11th of October. We bring jurors in that morning,

pick a jury that afternoon and then possibly have three days for the

remainder of the trial.

Counsel asked for the date certain. The Court set the 17th

of October for the trial, no objection. Ms. Miller-Jones, things

don’t move that fast in this courtroom. If you were aware of the

problems created by the calendar, that should have been brought to

the Court’s attention. You agreed to the 17th for trial. The motion

to dismiss is denied.”

B. Jury Selection

111

112

On October 17, 2016, defendant’s jury trial commenced. The trial court

impaneled the jury in panels of four and chose three alternates. Prior to swearing the jurors in,

the court said to each panel,

“[T]he four of you understand that the defendant is presumed to be

innocent of the charge against him, that before the defendant can

be convicted, the State must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on

his own behalf, and that if the defendant does not testify, that fact

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cannot be held against him in any way. The four of you

understand those instructions; is that correct?”

The record indicates the jurors answered in the affirmative. The court asked each panel, “And

the four of you will follow those instructions; is that correct?” The jurors again responded in the

affirmative. The court read the same instructions to the alternate jurors, asked if the three

alternates understood the instructions, and asked “And the three of you will follow those

instructions; is that correct?” The alternate jurors answered both questions in the affirmative.

C. Trial

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1. ?\v\Wvp

114

115

Officer Phillip McDonald of the Champaign police department testified he was

dispatched to the 1600 block of Cruising Lane on the evening of July 4, 2012. Upon arrival, a

female ran toward Officer McDonald, screaming for help. A female, later identified as Desirae,

was lying on her back and appeared to be unconscious. Officer McDonald could not detect a

pulse and began to render aid. Fire and medical personnel arrived, and Officer McDonald

attempted to locate eyewitnesses. Officer McDonald approached a large group of people and

asked if anyone knew the victim’s name or had seen what occurred. At that time, no one spoke

up. After the crowd began to disperse, two subjects, later identified as defendant and Treshaun

Jake, approached Officer McDonald. Defendant was upset and told Officer McDonald he

thought the victim was his sister. The description of defendant’s sister did not match the victim

and Officer McDonald advised defendant to get in touch with his sister through a telephone call.

116

Officer McDonald was searching for evidence behind a house when Officer

Marshall Henry requested extra assistance with three subjects held at gunpoint in front of 1607

Cruising Lane. Upon Officer McDonald’s arrival, Officer Henry and Officer Corey Phenicie had

AS

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handcuffed the subjects and were conducting searches. Officer McDonald “assisted Officer

Phenicie in securing and making safe a handgun that he retrieved off of one of the individuals.”

According to Officer McDonald, he secured the .45-caliber Hi-Point semiautomatic handgun by

removing the magazine and a live round in the chamber. Two of the individuals arrested in front

of 1607 Cruising were defendant and Treshaun.

2. \Aa\sVaW

117

118

Officer Marshall Henry, a Champaign Street Crimes Task Force officer, testified

he was called to the intersection of Thornton Drive and Cruising Lane. Officer Henry’s primary

responsibility was to secure the scene and locate witnesses. According to Officer Henry, more

than 50 people were at the scene but none were willing to talk. As Officer Henry walked down

the street by 1607 Cruising, defendant flagged him down. Defendant appeared nervous and

worried about the victim and asked who was shot. Officer Henry testified, “I was unable to

provide him a name at that time. He then asked me if I would—if he would provide me a name

if I would be able to tell him if that was the person that was shot or not, and I said possibly. So

he provided me a name. I don’t recall the name, but he—but then I told him that that was not the

person that was shot.”

119

Officer Henry testified his response seemed to put defendant’s mind at ease.

Defendant walked toward the residence at 1607 Cruising and kicked a metal object in the

driveway. Officer Henry identified the object as a shell casing and observed several more shell

casings in the driveway. Treshaun and Kahindae Jake were in the driveway with defendant, and

Officer Henry ordered all three subjects to put their hands up. Two other officers dealt with

defendant while Officer Henry held the other two subjects at gunpoint. According to Officer

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Henry, nothing was found after searching Treshaun or Kahindae. A search of the residence at

1607 Cruising revealed no firearms or ammunition.

3. Coxev ?Yvemc\e

120

121

Officer Corey Phenicie testified he was riding as a two-man unit with Officer

Henry on July 4, 2012. Officer Phenicie helped establish a perimeter of the crime scene. As

Officer Phenicie sectioned off part of the crime scene on Thornton Drive, he briefly spoke with a

female resident named Tiffany Dishman. According to Officer Phenicie, the officers found shell

casings in the area and “continued to find shell casings to the west, so [they] ended up in front of

1607 Cruising Lane.” Defendant walked from the front of 1607 Cruising down the driveway and

asked Officer Henry about the identity of the victim. Officer Phenicie testified that, as defendant

walked on the driveway, “something consistent with a shell casing was kicked down the

driveway.” That prompted the officers to look around the immediate area where they found

more than one casing and a live round.

122

According to Officer Phenicie, Treshaun and Kahindae were in the driveway with

defendant and the officers ordered the three subjects to put their hands in the air. Officer

Phenicie conducted a weapons pat down of defendant and felt a large bulge in the front right part

of his waistband. Officer Phenicie testified, “Once I felt what was apparent to be a firearm and

which felt consistent with a firearm on the pat-down search, I went to manipulate his shirt, and

Officer Miller, who was on scene yelled, ‘Gun, gun.’ ” At that point. Officer Phenicie tackled

defendant to the ground and handcuffed him. Officer Phenicie testified he removed a black .45caliber Hi-Point semiautomatic pistol from defendant’s waistband and handed the firearm to

Officer McDonald.

123

4. <&\vpu\a\\ou as \o Cause oiY)ea\Jcv

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124

The parties stipulated that Desirae suffered a gunshot wound while standing near

the intersection of Cruising Lane and Thornton Drive. Desirae was transported to the hospital,

where a doctor determined she had sustained a single gunshot wound to the chest, was not

breathing, and had no pulse. Forensic pathologist Amanda Youmans performed the autopsy,

recovered the projectile from Desirae’s back, and confirmed the cause of death was a gunshot

wound to the chest.

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126

5. ’taYmnve CarcvpVreW

Johnnie Campbell testified he attended a fireworks display at Parkland with

family members, including his brother Rajon Campbell. After the fireworks show, Johnnie

walked to his aunt’s house on Thornton Drive. Johnnie testified he was outside his aunt’s home

with his ex-girlfriend Mycharrae Kirkwood, her sister Ryesha Howard, and his cousin Tiffany

Dishman. Johnnie testified, “Me and my girlfriend, we had a, a quick argument, then we kind of

like got back cool, and her sister blew it out of proportion. Me and her got into an argument.”

According to Johnnie, Ryesha tried to hit him, Mycharrae held her back, and then the sisters

walked off.

127

Johnnie walked behind Mycharrae and Ryesha down Cruising Lane but he fell

back a little bit when he saw Mycharrae and Ryesha talking to Phil Myrick and Antwon

Anderson. According to Johnnie, “Mycharrae kind of kept walking. Ryesha was speaking with

them.” Johnnie observed their body language and they appeared “[mjore or less just like ready

to fight.” Ryesha was angry and “talking with her hands.” Johnnie called to Mycharrae, but she

continued walking with her sister. Phil and Antwon told Johnnie they were not going to let him

near Mycharrae. Johnnie walked down to approximately 1605 Cruising Lane because “[t]he

guys were making threats there.”

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128

Johnnie thought there was going to be a fistfight, so he ran to get his brother from

a nearby street. Rajon was down the street, and Johnnie yelled for him. With Rajon and Johnnie

were Eva Troy, Tiffany Dishman, Yasmin Nichols, Desirae, Cortez Ross, Gwannecia Allen,

Delores Tracey, Tameka Troy, and some others. Johnnie estimated there were 10 people out at

the time of the initial altercation, and people were still walking back from the fireworks display

and loitering outside their residences. At the time the shots were fired, Johnnie estimated there

were at least 50 people in the area, but it was dark and he could not make out everyone’s faces.

129

Johnnie was “arguing with the guys” when Rajon walked up and said, “We can

fight but don’t run up on the guy with the gun.” Johnnie testified he also saw Treshaun Jake on

Cruising Lane. According to Johnnie, Phil and Antwon made a telephone call and a few people

ran up with guns. Johnnie also saw a crowd of people come running around the comer. Johnnie

and Rajon intended to fight Phil and Antwon when Treshaun walked past them with a gun in his

hand. Phil, Antwon, and Treshaun stood by a white car in front of 1607 Cruising Lane.

Although Treshaun had a gun, the men talked about fistfighting and not using the gun. Treshaun

put the gun down on the street and Johnnie began walking toward him.

130

Johnnie testified, “1 was about to approach [Treshaun] until I heard someone say,

‘No, we’re not fighting. Pick up the gun.’ ” Treshaun picked up the gun and Johnnie began

walking away when he heard the first shot fired. Johnnie stated, “I kind of kept walking a little,

and then my brother was like, ‘Oh, they’re just shooting in the air, [t]hey’re just shooting in the

air.’ And then I just hear someone say,‘Shoot at them. Shoot at them.’ And then the shot goes

off, and the next thing you know, I just ran behind a car.” Johnnie and Rajon hid behind a black

vehicle parked in the roadway. When the shooting stopped, Johnnie and Rajon ran through

backyards back to their aunt’s house.

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131

According to Johnnie, neither he nor his brother had a firearm. The only firearm

Johnnie saw was Treshaun’s black handgun. Johnnie testified he knew defendant from school

and he did not see defendant during the fight, when he ran up Thornton Drive, or at his aunt’s

house.

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6. Waiyycv CamjpbeW

Rajon Campbell testified he attended the fireworks display at Parkland with his

family. After the fireworks, he and Johnnie went separate ways. Approximately 10 or 15

minutes later, Rajon heard Johnnie calling his name. Rajon ran toward the sound of Johnnie’s

voice and met up with him at the comer of Thornton Drive and Cruising Lane. According to

Rajon, Johnnie was with Mycharrae, her sister, Tiffany, and a few others. Rajon testified, “1 see

[Johnnie] standing there with Mycharrae, and there was like a group of guys standing a couple

feet ahead of him, and like he was walking towards the guys, and I was trying to get to him to

stop him from walking towards the guys.” Johnnie and one of the men were yelling back and

forth and calling each other names. Rajon thought there was going to be a fight and somebody

said they saw a gun. Rajon told Johnnie to come back and not to “run up on” somebody with a

gun.

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According to Rajon, there were five or six people in the group Johnnie was

arguing with and Rajon only recognized Phil. Rajon tried to get Johnnie to return to their aunt’s

house and pulled him away from the group. Rajon heard a shot and stated, “When I turned

around to look and duck down, I seen the gun in the air. So I told [Johnnie] like [‘Jthey’re

shooting in the air, let’s go,[’] you know. And I heard somebody tell them like, ‘Shoot them.

Shoot at them. Shoot at them.’ And that’s when the bullets started coming in our direction.”

Rajon and Johnnie dove behind a truck to avoid the bullets. According to Rajon, the shots came

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from in front of 1607 Cruising Lane. Rajon did not know the person with the gun. Raj on did not

identify defendant as being present during the shooting.

135

When the shooting ceased, Rajon and Johnnie ran in the opposite direction of

their aunt’s house and doubled back through backyards so they would not be followed. As they

ran, Rajon saw Desirae lying on the ground. Rajon later sent his cousin Tiffany and his

girlfriend to check on Desirae.

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Tiffany Dishman testified she attended a fireworks display at Parkland and later

walked back to her home on Thornton Drive. Tiffany and her cousins, Yasmin and Kayla,

walked down Cruising Lane toward Thornton Drive on their way home from the fireworks show.

Tiffany stated that as they approached 1607 Cruising Lane, “There was a few boys out there

shooting or whatever. They were shooting in the air, because at first we thought it was fireworks

because it was the 4th. And my cousin was like hold on, 1 got my brother. Like then we—

fireworks, then gunshots. So as we stopped, we stopped—you know what I'm saying, and they

was like well, let them pass. They let us pass, and we went to my house.”

138

After arriving home, Tiffany heard an argument and went outside to find out what

was happening. Tiffany encountered two women (Mycharrae and Ryesha) and her cousin,

Johnnie. Tiffany spoke with Mycharrae and observed Johnnie arguing with Ryesha. Ryesha

then made her way toward the group of men on Cruising that Tiffany encountered earlier.

According to Tiffany, Ryesha was yelling and “making it like

there was something going

on. ” Tiffany testified she observed a male in the middle of the street with his shirt off and

thought he was going to fight Johnnie. Tiffany identified the shirtless male as Treshaun and

testified he had a gun in his hand.

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139

According to Tiffany, Johnnie asked Treshaun if he was going to shoot and

indicated he thought the two were going to fistfight. Treshaun set the gun down and Johnnie

began to take off his shirt. Tiffany testified, "Before Johnnie could get out of his shirt, he

grabbed the gun and somebody told him shoot that, and he got to shooting.” When the shooting

began, Tiffany ran home and realized Desirae was missing. Tiffany went back outside and found

Desirae lying on the comer of Thornton and Cruising. Tiffany called 911 and began performing

cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Tiffany testified she was with Gwannecia Allen.

140

As Tiffany spoke to the 911 dispatcher, defendant came up holding a long, black

shotgun. Defendant pointed the shotgun in Tiffany’s direction, but he was not threatening her.

Tiffany testified, “He just said, ‘Where those n***s at?’ And then went to the comer of

Thornton and Hedge and he shot—-fired shots.” Defendant fired four or five shots. Tiffany

admitted she did not tell the police officers about seeing defendant that night because no one

asked about what happened after the shooting.

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8. Cr'NMVRec.va. KWetv

Gwannecia Allen testified she attended the fireworks show at Parkland with

Rajon. After the show, the group walked to an address on Hedge Road when they heard Johnnie

screaming Rajon’s name. According to Gwannecia, the group followed Rajon to the comer of

Thornton Drive and Cruising Lane. Gwannecia observed Treshaun and Johnnie arguing and

thought a fight was going to take place. Gwannecia testified that Treshaun had a gun and, “[h]e

aimed it in the crowd, and I heard, ‘Shoot at them n***s,’ or something like that.” Treshaun

fired the gun in Johnnie and Rajon’s direction. Johnnie and Rajon took cover behind a vehicle,

and Gwannecia ran behind a tree.

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143

Before shots were fired, Gwannecia saw Desirae in the intersection and saw her

fall after the shots were fired. Gwannecia went to Desirae and held her head while Tiffany stood

over her on the phone with the police. According to Gwannecia, defendant ran up with a long,

black rifle pointed toward her. Gwannecia testified defendant said, “ ‘Where did those n***s

go[,]’ ” which Gwannecia understood to refer to Johnnie and Rajon. Gwannecia did not respond,

and defendant went to the comer of Hedge Road and Thornton Drive and fired shots in the air.

144

145

9.

Ranece Fondia testified that on July 4, 2012, she lived at 1605 Cruising Lane. As

she returned from the fireworks show with her children, Ranece passed by Treshaun and Antwon

and gave them a bag of fireworks. Approximately 10 minutes later, Ranece heard a commotion.

Ranece testified she went outside and saw Rajon, Johnnie, a couple of females, and a big crowd.

According to Ranece, Antwon and Treshaun were arguing with Johnnie and Rajon. Ranece

heard either Johnnie or Rajon say, “Oh, you shot in the air. You’re a bitch.” Ranece testified

Treshaun did not respond but he pointed the gun in Johnnie and Rajon’s direction and started to

shoot. Ranece ran back into her house until the shooting stopped.

146

Once the shooting ended, Ranece went outside and saw Tiffany on top of a girl

asking someone to dial 911. Ranece walked toward Tiffany and the victim and dialed 911. As

Ranece spoke to the dispatcher, she saw another individual she could not identify approach with

“a pretty big weapon.”

lO.Wv&'ae.W’BecY

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148

Russell Beck, an officer and crime scene technician with the Champaign police

department, testified he was called to the area of Thornton Drive and Cruising Lane. While

collecting evidence, Officer Beck observed suspected blood on the street. Officer Beck

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recovered a projectile from the street and projectiles lodged in the rear end of a vehicle that had

been parked on Cruising Lane during the shooting. Officer Beck recovered various .40-caliber

shell casings lying in the street. Additionally, he recovered a shotgun shell casing from Thornton

Drive. Defendant’s white Buick LeSabre was located at the scene, and Officer Beck recovered a

Remington 870 12-gauge shotgun and shells from the trunk.

11. lVc\!cvvrc fv.M\\\ex\W

149

150

Arthur A. Miller III, an officer and crime scene technician with the Champaign

police department, testified he observed Officer Phenicie dealing with defendant. Officer Miller

observed a bulge in defendant’s waistband and instructed him to lift his shirt. As defendant

lifted his shirt, Officer Miller saw the butt of a black handgun, and Officer Phenicie tackled

defendant, secured him in handcuffs, and retrieved the handgun. Officer Miller then began

processing the scene and recovered multiple spent shell casings in the street and in the driveway

of 1607 Cruising Lane. From the street and driveway of 1607 Cruising Lane, Officer Miller

recovered (1) numerous shell casings and a live round from a 9-millimeter Luger, (2) a spent

shotgun shell stamped Remington 12-gauge, and (3) casings from a .45-caliber weapon.

12.

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152

The parties stipulated that the shotgun, pistol, and casings from the scene failed to

produce any forensically useful latent fingerprints or deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Vickie

Reels, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police, testified as an expert in firearms. Reels

testified she examined seven .40-caliber casings fired from the same weapon and seven 9millimeter casings fired from the same weapon, although the investigation failed to produce

firearms with which to compare the casings. Reels examined two shotgun shell casings fired

from the shotgun recovered from defendant’s vehicle. Finally, Reels determined the .45-caliber

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casings and the .45-caliber projectile recovered from Desirae’s body were fired from the HiPoint pistol found in defendant’s possession at the time of his arrest.

153

13. ^.cfoV> NVorcvs,

154

Detective Robb Morris testified he interviewed defendant as part of his

investigation into the shooting. The State played a portion of the audio- and video-recorded

interview with defendant. During the interview, defendant stated he drove his white Buick

LeSabre to Antwon Anderson’s home at 1607 Cruising Lane and then walked to the Parkland

fireworks display with Antwon, Treshaun, and Darian Jake. The four men returned to Antwon’s

home after the show. Defendant indicated tensions were high between the Gangster Disciples

and Black P. Stones gangs, According to defendant, the Gangster Disciples were near the

intersection of Cruising Lane and Thornton Drive and a gun battle erupted as the Gangster

Disciples were pushing the Black P. Stones out of the neighborhood. Defendant stated he and

Treshaun were affiliated with, but not actual members of, the Gangster Disciples. According to

defendant, he watched the altercation from the porch of 1607 Cruising Lane.

155

During the altercation, defendant claimed a Black P. Stones member known as

“KG” was armed with a shotgun. Defendant further identified two Black P. Stones as “Little

Mark” and “Taz.” According to Detective Morris, defendant was the only person who brought

up those names during the course of 42 interviews he conducted during the investigation.

156

During the interview, defendant claimed he hit KG with a large stick. When KG

dropped the shotgun, defendant picked it up and placed it in the trunk of his vehicle. Defendant

went with the Gangster Disciples to the west of Cruising Lane and when he returned to 1607

Cruising Lane, he discovered a .45-caliber Hi-Point pistol lying in the street. Defendant claimed

he wrapped the pistol in a shirt and hid it by the house. After he hid the pistol, defendant

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claimed he went over to the group gathered in the street to see if he could identify the victim.

Defendant was concerned his sister was the victim, but the police pushed him away.

157

At one point, defendant stated he found the .45-caliber pistol after he encountered

the police officers and the victim in the street. Defendant initially indicated he was with

Treshaun the entire evening. Defendant later stated he was not in constant contact with Treshaun

that night.

158

159

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Following deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty of the offense of first

degree murder. The jury further found the State proved defendant was armed with a firearm.

160

161

D. Posttrial Proceedings

Defendant sent the trial court a letter raising various claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. Defendant alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly

assert his right to a speedy trial. Defendant further alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to

impeach some witnesses whose testimony was inconsistent with their testimony at his

codefendant’s trial. Additionally, defendant claimed ineffective assistance for counsel’s failure

to (1) file a motion to suppress the evidence retrieved from the trunk of his vehicle, (2) object to

the State’s alleged mischaracterization of evidence during opening argument, (3) strike juror

Nos. 127, 140, and 149, whom defendant felt were unfair, and (4) introduce into evidence an

interrogation video made following defendant’s arrest in Vermilion County. Finally, defendant

claimed his counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he asked to sit where he could see the

State’s video presentation during closing argument and counsel told him he could not move.

162

The trial court held a hearing on defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel. The court first addressed defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance related to his right

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to a speedy trial. The court noted trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss based on the speedy trial

violation, which the court heard and denied. The court found no ineffective assistance of counsel

because counsel in fact raised the speedy trial violation.

163

The trial court next turned to defendant’s claim that counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the trunk of

defendant’s vehicle. The court asked counsel if the search was the result of a search warrant.

Defendant repeatedly interrupted trial counsel and the court, but eventually trial counsel stated

the search was based on statements given by defendant to the police. Counsel indicated her

belief that officers requested a search warrant.

164

The trial court found defense counsel’s jury selection was a tactical decision and

was not ineffective assistance of counsel. As to the State’s alleged mischaracterization of the

evidence, the court noted the jury was properly instructed that opening and closing argument are

not evidence. The court further concluded any objection by defense counsel would not have

been sustained. The court then addressed defendant’s claim regarding the Vermilion County

interrogation video. The court asked if someone could tell him what the video was. The State

responded by informing the court the video was not played or referred to during the trial. The

State went on to say, “[Defendant] was officially arrested and held on these charges once he was

found in Vermilion County in a vehicle with Treshaun Jake with another gun. Charges were

pending in Vermilion County were then dismissed. We agreed, pursuant to pretrial motions, that

that would not be listed during this trial, and it was not.” The court began to ask another

question when defendant interrupted to again raise his speedy trial claim. The court concluded it

did not find ineffective assistance of counsel and moved onto defendant’s posttrial motion and

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sentenced defendant to 45 years’ imprisonment. The court entered judgment on the felony­

murder count.

165

This appeal followed.

166

167

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, defendant argues (1) he was denied his right to a speedy trial, (2) the

State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree murder, (3) the trial

court erred by failing to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), and

(4) the court failed to conduct a proper preliminary inquiry into defendant’s posttrial claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to?ecyp\e v. YjotiYcX, 102 Ill. 2d 181,464 N.E.2d 1045

(1984). We address these arguments in turn.

168

169

A. Speedy Trial

Defendant argues this court should reverse his conviction because he was denied

his right to speedy trial. Specifically, defendant contends he was not brought to trial until 125

days after the trial court received this court’s mandate remanding defendant’s case for a new trial

and the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him. Alternatively,

defendant contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to zealously protect

defendant’s right to a speedy trial. We first address whether the trial court properly denied

defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges against him.

170

171

1. Ytet\v&\ oiT)e,ie,wdaTv\.’sNVo\\OTvVo'D'\sTO\s.s

Section 103-5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) provides, in

pertinent part, as follows: “Every person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be

tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she was taken into

custody unless delay is occasioned by the defendant 4*4 . Delay shall be considered to be agreed

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to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or

an oral demand for trial on the record.” 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2016). Following remand

for a new trial, the 120-day period begins to run when the circuit court receives the mandate from

the appellate court.

58 Ill. 2d 53, 57, 317 N.E.2d 28, 30 (1974). A delay

occasioned by the defendant temporarily suspends the 120-day period within which the

defendant shall be tried “and on the day of expiration of the delay the said period shall continue

at the point at which it was suspended.” 725 ILCS 5/103-5(0 (West 2016). A defendant not

tried within the applicable statutory time period must be discharged from custody and the

charges must be dismissed.

223 III. 2d 286, 299, 860 N.E.2d 259, 269

(2006).

1172

The circuit court received this court’s mandate on May 17, 2016. On July 5,

2016, defendant appeared at the first preliminary hearing following remand and requested a

continuance. Defendant asserts this period of 49 days is attributable to the State, which the State

does not dispute. The parties next appeared on August 2, 2016. Defendant concedes the time

between July 5, 2016, and August 2, 2016, was a delay occasioned by him and does not count

toward the 120-day statutory period. On August 2, 2016, the State requested a continuance.

which the court granted over defendant’s objection. Defendant asserts this 28-day period was

attributable to the State. The State apparently concedes this issue. Accordingly, we must

determine whether the “delay” from August 30, 2016, to October 17, 2016, was occasioned by

defendant.

173

On August 30, 2016, defense counsel stated, “Ready for trial.” The State

responded, “Judge, we’re also ready for trial. We’d request trial based on the other obligations

Ms. Clark has and the age of the case. Since it’s 2012, we need to collect those witnesses again.

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We’d request trial on October 17th, if possible.” The court set the case for trial on October 17,

2016.

174

Defendant contends the delay from August 30, 2016, until the date of his trial is

attributable to the State and should count toward the 120-day period within which he should have

been tried: Defendant argues the State requested October 17, 2016, for the trial date because it

was not, in fact, ready to go to trial because of the prosecutor’s other obligations and the need to

line up witnesses. The State argues the time period in question is attributable to defendant

because counsel neither objected to the delay caused by the State’s proposed trial date, nor did

counsel make an oral demand for a speedy trial on the record. We agree with the State.

175

Section 103-5(a) of the Code “places the onus on a defendant to take affirmative

action when he becomes aware that his trial is being delayed.”

380, 391, 860 N.E.2d 323, 331 (2006). In

.Cot&?\\, 223 III. 2d

379 111. App. 3d 153, 161,882

N.E.2d 1225, 1232-33 (2008), at the hearing in question, counsel appeared in court, “stated a

readiness for trial[,] and objected to the delay, but did not specifically ask for trial or use

language that would reference the speedy-trial statute.” The appellate court concluded this was

not sufficient to affirmatively invoke the speedy-trial right. \A. In this case, trial counsel stated a

readiness for trial, but failed to object to a delay or make an affirmative demand for a speedy

trial. \A. at 160 (while no magic words are required to constitute a demand for speedy trial, there

must be some statement requesting a speedy trial and should not be masked in ambiguous

language). “Should a defendant wish to employ section 103-5(a) as a shield against any attempt

to place his trial date outside the 120-day period, he is free to do so. To allow section 103-5(a) to

be used as a sword after the fact, to defeat a conviction, however, would be contrary to our

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holding in [VecypVeN.] Cjoo&£T\[, 189 Ill. 2d 209, 725 N.E.2d 1248 (2000)] and allow defendants

to use a procedural loophole to obstruct justice.” CoxAsW, 223 Ill. 2d at 390.

176

We find counsel failed to make an affirmative oral demand for a speedy trial at

the August 30, 2016, hearing. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly denied the

motion to dismiss the charges against him. As the supreme court noted in CoxteW, to allow

defendant’s motion to dismiss would be to allow defendant to use section 103-5(a) as a sword to

defeat conviction, rather than a shield against an attempt to place his trial date outside the 120day period. We therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

177

2. \neftec\vvft As&V&axice oi CowxvseX

178

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the familiar

framework set forth in^vf\0«\ax\dN.'^asVttw%Xo’n) 466 U.S. 668 (1984). “To prevail on a claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was

deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.”

2013 1L 113688,1 36, 987 N.E.2d 767. The deficient-performance prong requires a defendant to

show that counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional

2017 IL 120649,1 30, 89 N.E.3d 366. The prejudice prong requires a

norms.

showing that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have

been different. \&. A defendant must satisfy both prongs to prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel. \d.

179

Defendant asserts trial counsel’s failure to demand a speedy trial at the August 30,

2016, hearing resulted in an objectively unreasonable performance. Defendant argues the

outcome of the trial would have been different. Defendant asserts a reasonable probability exists

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that the charges would have been dismissed because the State could not secure witnesses for

trial.

180

Assuming,

that (1) the scheduling of defendant’s trial on October 17,

2016, constituted a delay and (2) trial counsel was deficient for failing to object to the delay and

demand a speedy trial, defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. To establish prejudice,

defendant must show that if counsel zealously protected his right to a speedy trial at the August

30, 2016, hearing, the trial would nonetheless have occurred outside the 120-day speedy-trial

period. Only then could defendant bring a meritorious motion to dismiss the charges.

Defendant’s conclusion is speculative. His argument presumes that, had counsel objected to the

delay and demanded a speedy trial, the trial would nonetheless have occurred on October 17,

2016. In our view, the more likely scenario is the State and the court would have adjusted the

scheduling of the trial to comply with the speedy-trial period. Defendant assumes the State

would have been unable to secure the necessary witnesses but for the additional five days gained

by scheduling the trial for October 17, 2016. Given that the court set the trial date approximately

six weeks in advance of the expiration of the speedy-trial window, we conclude it is unlikely the

State would have failed to secure the witnesses in a first degree murder case without the

additional five days. Defendant’s assumptions fail to create the reasonable probability of a

different outcome necessary to establish prejudice. We therefore conclude his ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claim must fail.

181

182

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Defendant next contends the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of first degree murder.

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183

When determining whether sufficient evidence supported a conviction, “our

function is not to retry the defendant.”

\i. S»\ixYve,T\a.rv&, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242, 860 N.E.2d

178, 217 (2006). Instead, we must resolve “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, amy rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)

v. CoWvcvs,,

106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277 (1985) (quoting3ac,V5.0Tv\.NJ'vt,jvtv\a, 443 U.S. 307,

319 (1979)). We allow all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the State. ?ecyp\e.

N.^ea\it\vaxwp, 241 Ill. 2d 1, 8, 944 N.E.2d 319, 323 (2011). It is the province of the finder of

fact to determine the credibility of a witness and the finding is entitled to great weight.

v.

185 Ill. 2d 532, 542, 708 N.E.2d 365, 370 (1999). We reverse only where the evidence is

so unsatisfactory, unreasonable, or improbable that it raises a reasonable doubt as to the

defendant’s guilt.

184

209 Ill. 2d 194, 209, 808 N.E.2d 939, 947 (2004).

The jury in this case found defendant guilty of three counts of first-degree

murder: (1) felony murder (720ILCS 5/9-l(a)(3) (West 2010)), (2) intentional murder (720

ILCS 5/9-1 (a)( 1) (West 2010)), and (3) reckless murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1 (a)(2) (West 2010)).

We begin our analysis with felony murder, as the court entered judgment on count I.

1. T

185

186

'WVwcde.r

Because the parties do not dispute Treshaun fired the shot that killed Desirae, the

question for the jury was whether and, if so, to what extent defendant participated in the mob

action that brought about Desirae’s death.

187

To prove defendant committed mob action as charged, the State had to prove

defendant engaged in “the knowing or reckless use of force or violence disturbing the public

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peace by 2 or more persons acting together and without authority of law.” 720 ILCS 5/251(a)(1) (West 2010).

188

Defendant first argues the State failed to prove that he was “acting together” with

at least one other person. We disagree. During his interview, defendant indicated a gun battle

erupted between members of the Gangster Disciples and Black P. Stones gangs. Defendant

admitted to being “affiliated” with the Gangster Disciples, who were trying to “push” the Black

P. Stones from the neighborhood. Defendant also indicated Treshaun was affiliated with the

Gangster Disciples. Additionally, multiple witnesses testified there were numerous people in the

street yelling at each other and a fight appeared to be imminent. Johnnie and Rajon testified they

ran away from the direction of their aunt’s house and doubled back through backyards to get to

her house. Gwannecia and Tiffany both testified'that while they were in the street with Desirae,

defendant came up, pointed a shotgun in their direction, asked “Where those n***s at,” and

walked in the direction Johnnie and Rajon had run. Although this occurred after the shooting, it

is still probative evidence of defendant acting together with Treshaun. We conclude this is

sufficient evidence that defendant acted together with at least one other person.

189

Defendant next asserts the State failed to prove defendant engaged in the use of

force or violence because the evidence shows only that he discharged a shotgun after the mob

action ended. Defendant also argues the State should be estopped from arguing that defendant

admitted to striking KG with a stick before the shooting occurred because it argued defendant’s

story was “outrageous.” Defendant asserts, without citation to authority, that the mob action

ended after Treshaun shot Desirae. We are not convinced this is the case, particularly in light of

defendant’s statements that the Gangster Disciples were pushing the Black P. Stones out of the

neighborhood and his continued pursuit of Johnnie and Rajon. Nonetheless, the evidence is

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sufficient to support a finding that defendant engaged in the use of force during the altercation.

In his statement to police, defendant admitted to being present during the fight. Defendant

claimed he merely observed and defended himself. Defendant claimed he armed himself with a

stick that he used to disarm KG and he recounted “pushing” the rival gang members out of the

area. This admission placed defendant at the scene and engaging in an act of violence that

disturbed the public peace. Defendant argues the evidence shows he panicked and merely

reacted to a rival gang member when he grabbed and swung the stick. However, the jury was

entitled to accept or reject portions of defendant’s statement as it saw fit.

1! 90

Defendant also argues the State should be judicially estopped from arguing

defendant’s admission to swinging a stick at KG is sufficient to support a conviction because in

closing argument the State asserted this story was outrageous. However, no matter the State’s

characterization of the evidence, we must determine whether the underlying evidence was

sufficient to support a jury's finding of guilt. As noted above, the jury was free to accept and

reject portions of defendant’s statement as it saw fit. Perhaps, based on the evidence that

defendant was clearly present both before and after the altercation and defendant’s later wielding

of the shotgun, the jury concluded he lied to officers about the stick. A jury could reasonably

infer defendant actually wielded the shotgun during the mob action and told officers it was a

stick to avoid a weapons possession charge. The State’s characterization of the evidence during

closing argument does not change the evidence actually heard by the jury, and we must examine

the evidence actually heard to determine whether it was sufficient to support a finding of guilt.

In this case, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendant engaged

in the use of force.

191

2. \TV\erY\krttt\ otA \kec,V\es>s> ViutvitT

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H 92

Defendant asserts the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty

verdicts for intentional and reckless murder.

H 93

As noted above, the parties do not dispute that Treshaun fired the shot that killed

Desirae. Accordingly, we must consider whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding

of guilt on an accountability theory.

H 94

“A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another if ‘either before or

during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate [such]

. commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning

or commission of the offense.

1

2012 IL App (1st) 103687, K 23, 983 N.E.2d 8

(quoting 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 2010)),

“Words of agreement are not necessary to establish a common

purpose to commit a crime. The common design can be inferred

from the circumstances surrounding the perpetration of the

unlawful conduct. [Citation.] Proof that defendant was present

during the perpetration of the offense, that he maintained a close

affiliation with his companions after the commission of the crime,

and that he failed to report the crime are all factors that the trier of

fact may consider in determining the defendant’s legal

accountability. [Citation.] Defendant’s flight from the scene may

also be considered in determining whether defendant is

accountable. [Citation.] Evidence that defendant voluntarily

attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts with knowledge of

its design also supports an inference that he shared the common

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purpose and will sustain his conviction for an offense committed

by another.” ’?eo<$\eN.'Ta'j\<yc, 164 Ill. 2d 131, 141, 646 N.E.2d

567, 571 (1995).

A defendant’s mere presence at the scene is insufficient to prove accountability.

n.

NT\W\s, 2013 IL App (1st) 110233, 1 79, 997 N.E.2d 947. However, presence at the scene does

constitute circumstantial evidence which may tend to prove a defendant’s guilt. \A.

195

After viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude

there was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s conviction of intentional or reckless murder

on an accountability theory. The evidence established defendant associated with Treshaun

immediately before and immediately after the shooting. Additionally, defendant had the

handgun Treshaun used in the shooting in his waistband at the time of his arrest. Defendant

further failed to report the shooting. Defendant also told police he and Treshaun were affiliated

with the Gangster Disciples and engaged in a gun battle with the Black P. Stones to “push” the

rival gang out of the neighborhood. Although the State presented no evidence of an express

agreement between Treshaun and defendant to engage in an altercation, the group arming

themselves with firearms provides sufficient circumstantial evidence to support defendant’s

conviction for intentional and reckless murder.

C. Rule 431(b)

196

197

Defendant next contends the trial court committed reversible error by failing to

ask whether the jurors understood and accepted the legal principles set forth in Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). Defendant failed to raise this issue before the trial court,

thus rendering the issue forfeited.

239 Ill. 2d 452, 460, 942 N.E.2d 1235, 1240

(2011). However, we may consider a forfeited claim where the defendant demonstrates a plain

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error occurred. Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). To prevail under the plain-error doctrine,

a defendant must first demonstrate a clear or obvious error occurred.

.Y\aXWNsY\, 225

Ill. 2d 551, 565, 870 N.E.2d 403, 411 (2007). If an error occurred, we will only reverse where

(1) “the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice

against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error” or (2) the “error is so serious

that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial

process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” \&. at 565.

198

Defendant contends the trial court violated Rule 431(b) by asking the jurors if

they understood and would follow each legal principle, rather than asking if the jurors

understood and accepted the legal principles. Defendant also asserts the court erred by

commingling all four principles into one question. In considering whether the court committed a

clear and obvious error with respect to its compliance with Rule 431 (b), our review is

.fceJtanaap, 2014 IL 117094,141, 23 N.E.3d 325.

199

Under Rule 431(b),

“The court shall ask each potential juror, individually or in

a group, whether that juror understands and accepts the following

principles: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent of the

charge(s) against him or her; (2) that before a defendant can be

convicted the State must prove the defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant is not required to offer any

evidence on his or her own behalf; and (4) that if a defendant does

not testify it cannot be held against him or her; however, no

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inquiry of a prospective juror shall be made into the defendant's

decision not to testify when the defendant objects.

The court's method of inquiry shall provide each juror an

opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the

principles set out in this section.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July I,

2012).

1100

We first consider whether the trial court erred by asking about the four principles

in compound form. In this case, the trial court asked each panel of jurors the following question:

“[T]he four of you understand that the defendant is presumed to be

innocent of the charge against him, that before the defendant can

be convicted, the State must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the defendant is not required to offer any evidence on

his own behalf, and that if the defendant does not testify, that fact

cannot be held against him in any way. The four of you

understand those instructions; is that correct?”

The record indicates the jurors answered in the affirmative. The court then asked each panel,

“And the four of you will follow those instructions; is that correct?” The jurors again responded

in the affirmative.

1101

In?eo^\.m\YvvVi, 399 III. App. 3d 1191,927 N.E.2d 1265 (2010), this court

considered whether the trial court violated Rule 431(b). We note this case involves the same

trial court judge who presided over'vN'\\\\nte1 and the language used to question the jurors in

NT\Vfcv\te was identical to the language used in this case. This court held the trial court did not

violate Rule 431(b) by asking the jurors if they understood the four principles in compound form

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and if they would follow the four principles. \<i. at 1196-97. This court concluded the plain

language of Rule 431(b) does not require separate questions of the jurors about each individual

principle. \&. “Nor does the rule require separate, individual answers from each juror.” \A. at

1197.

11 102

Defendant relies onY«op\&\.Thomps.av\, 238 Ill,2d 598, 939 N.E.2d 403 (2010),

in support of his argument. InTcvorcvp^yn, the supreme court found the trial court failed to

comply with Rule 431(b), noting it entirely failed to address one of the four principles and did

not ask the jurors if they both understood and accepted another principle. TYvompscrtv, 238 Ill. 2d

at 607. The supreme court pointed out that Rule 431(b) requires the trial court to “address each

of the enumerated principles” and to determine whether the jurors understood and accepted each

of the principles. \&. In so holding, the supreme court noted the committee comments to the rule

“emphasize that trial courts may not simply give ‘a broad statement of the applicable law

followed by a general question concerning the juror’s willingness to follow the law.’ ” \A.

(quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), Committee Comments). The court further held

the rule required a specific question and response process, but the questioning may be performed

individually or in groups so long as there was an opportunity for a response from each juror. \A.

1103

Nothing in TVvotwpSiOtv requires the circuit court to address each principle

individually. Rather, TYvompscm was concerned with the court’s failure to address one principle

entirely and to determine the jurors’ acceptance of another principle. Moreover, the plain

language of Rule 431(b) contains no requirement that the court must recite each principle

separately when determining the jurors’ understanding and acceptance of the principles.

1104

We are not persuaded by defendant’s reliance on two First District cases—Ye,op\e

\.NVcCoVvn%, 2011 IL App (1st) 081805, 957 N.E.2d 1194, andYeo^\e\,O'0NKvan, 2019 IL App

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(1st) 150823. First, to the extent these cases interpret

as requiring a trial court to

question jurors about each principle individually, we disagree for the reasons discussed above.

Second, these cases are clearly distinguishable from this case. SeeMcCcmos, 2011IL App (1st)

081805, H 36 (“[T]he trial court failed to abide by the mandatory question and response process

required by Rule 431 (b). In contravention of Rule 431 (b). the trial court merely provided the

prospective jurors with a broad statement of legal principles interspersed with commentary on

courtroom procedure and the trial schedule, and then concluded with a general question about the

potential jurors’ willingness to follow the law.”); OvVvrcva.w, 2019 IL App (1st) 150823, 1 65 (“The

court failed to ask if the jury understood principles one and four or if it accepted principle two.”).

1105

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the court did not err by asking about the

four principles in compound form. Accordingly, we now consider whether the court erred by

asking the jurors if they would “follow” the principles, rather than asking the jurors if they

“accepted” the principles.

1 106

In its brief, the State asserts, “The question whether the jury would ‘follow’ the

instructions is admittedly not sufficient to establish that they ‘accepted’ the principles.” We

disagree. In?e,a^\ev.\f\\rcvvft%\.ow, 2013 IL 112938,1 30, 983 N.E.2d 1015, the trial court did

not ask the jurors if they understood and accepted the principle that they could not hold it against

defendant if he did not testify. The trial court asked the jurors if anyone disagreed with the

remaining three principles. \&. 128. The trial court also failed to ask the jurors if they

understood the remaining three principles. \&. The supreme court concluded error clearly

occurred, noting that “[wjhile it may be arguable that the court’s asking for disagreement, and

getting none, is equivalent to juror ac.ce’pVatvee of the principles, the trial court’s failure to ask

jurors if they

the four Rule 431(b) principles is error in and of itself. Moreover, the

/V3\

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trial court did not even inquire regarding the jury’s understanding and acceptance of the principle

that defendant’s failure to testify could not be held against him.” (Emphases in original.) \&.

132.

1107

In'fteXVmp, 2014 IL 117094,144, the trial court asked only whether the jurors

disagreed with, had any quarrel with, or accepted the four principles. The court failed to ask if

the jurors understood the principles. The supreme court again found error, stating as follows:

“Here, the trial court did not explicitly ask the potential jurors

whether they accepted the principles; rather the court asked if they

had any disagreement or quarrel with the principles. As we noted

inNN’Amw^Vaw, it may be arguable that asking jurors whether they

disagreed with the Rule 431(b) principles is tantamount to asking

them whether they accepted those principles. However, the trial

court’s failure to ask whether the jurors understood the principles

constitutes error alone.” \&. 46.

1108

Defendant also relies on?eo\>\e\.'S>\e.Ne,Tvs, 2018 IL App (4th) 160138, 115

. N.E.2d 1207. In 'SAevecvs, “the court never asked whether the jurors understood the State’s

burden to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or the fact that defendant was hot

required to present evidence on his own behalf, and thus the court committed error.” \&. 126.

1109

Unlike ^

'SeWxva.v, and Stevews,, the trial court here asked the jurors if

they understood all four principles and if they would follow all four principles. The supreme

court acknowledged that a court asking for disagreement would arguably be equivalent to juror

acceptance of the principles, but ultimately concluded the failure to ask if jurors understood the

principles was clear error. Here, the court did ask about jurors’ understanding of the principles.

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The court went on to ask whether the jurors would follow the principles, which is far closer to

asking if the jurors accepted the principles than asking if they disagreed with the principles.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines the verb “follow” as “To conform to or comply with; to accept.

as authority.” (Emphasis added.) Black’s Law Dictionary 672 (8th ed. 2004). Here, the trial

court asked the jurors if they would follow the principles, which, by definition, asked the jurors

if they would accept the principles as authority. Indeed, this court has previously assumed the

language was sufficient to comply with the requirement that jurors be asked if they accepted the

principles. SeeN4‘\WVi\Xe, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 1197 (concluding the trial court complied with Rule

■ 431 (b) when it asked jurors if they understood and would follow the four principles).

Accordingly, we conclude no error occurred here. ¥\afcawsY\, 225 111. 2d at 565 (the first step in

plain-error analysis is to determine whether error occurred). Even so, before leaving this issue,

we wish to encourage the use of best practices when conducting \o\\ dvcc.

1 no

Although this court finds the trial court’s admonishments and coverage of

the 'LeYvc principles are not violative of Rule 431 (b) or the applicable case law, we believe it

better practice for the court to actually inquire of the jurors rather than instruct them. By asking

whether they understand and accept the principles, as opposed to stating so in an affirmative

manner and then eliciting a response with a leading question, the court’s question would seem

less suggestive and more properly inquisitive. Such an inquiry adheres to Rule 431 andZeka in

ensuring each juror receives an opportunity to respond to specific questions concerning the

principles.

D. YaawVeX Inquiry

1111

1112

“The issue of whether the circuit court properly conducted a preliminary

inquiry presents a legal question that we review <ie. ao\o.” ?eop\e'Mo\Yj, 2014 IL 117142,

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U 28, 25 N.E.2d 1127. Under YjaxiksX and its progeny, when a defendant raises a

posttrial

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, new counsel is not automatically appointed. \&. ^[29.

Rather, the trial court should first examine the factual basis of the defendant’s claims.

\AoQte, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 77-78, 797 N.E.2d 631, 637 (2003). “If the trial court determines that the

claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new

counsel and may deny the \ko

motion. However, if the allegations show possible neglect of

the case, new counsel should be appointed.” \&. at 78. Newly appointed counsel would

represent the defendant at the hearing on the

se claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. \A. “The [newly] appointed counsel can independently evaluate the defendant’s claim

and would avoid the conflict of interest that trial counsel would experience if trial counsel had to

justify his or her actions contrary to defendant’s position.” \&.

1113

The supreme court has repeatedly recognized “the goal of any YoraaVaX proceeding

is to facilitate the trial court’s full consideration of a defendant’s ’pro

claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel and thereby potentially limit issues on appeal.” Jo\Y$, 2014 IL 117142,

129. The concern for reviewing courts is whether the trial court’s inquiry into the defendant’s

se allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was adequate. NVoote, 207 Ill. 2d at

78. During the preliminary inquiry, “some interchange between the trial court and trial counsel

regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation is

permissible and usually necessary ***.” \&. A trial court’s brief discussion with the defendant

may be sufficient. \A. A trial court may base its Yj;otlYs\ decision on its knowledge of defense

counsel’s performance at trial and the insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face.

Yeo^Xa v.TaXefraa, 2011 IL App (1st) 100689,122, 960 N.E.2d 27.

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1114

Defendant argues the trial court conducted an inadequate preliminary inquiry into

his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to specifically inquire into every single

allegation. Defendant also argues the trial court erred by ruling on the merits of his ineffective

assistance of counsel claims rather than determining whether it was possible defense counsel

neglected his case. In support of his argument, defendant relies on?eo^\e \ .YkcxY&vs,, 2018 IL

App (4th) 170605, 119 N.E.2d 52. In

this court noted, “the function of the YvtOTiV.e.X

hearing remains simply to decide whether to appoint counsel—its ‘narrow purpose’ [citation]—

and not to reach the merits of the ineffective assistance claims.” \&. 1 52. However, this court

determined there were four primary ways in which a court may conclude that an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim lacks merit so that the court need not appoint new counsel to pursue

the claim. \<1. 1 65. “Those four primary ways are when the court determines that the

defendant’s ineffective assistance claim is (1) conclusory, (2) misleading, (3) legally immaterial,

or (4) pertaining solely to an issue of trial strategy.” \&. A misleading claim lacks merit where

the record clearly contradicts or rebuts the substance of the allegations, showing the claim of

ineffective assistance is unsupported. Yd. 1 70. Mfc acknowledged that claims related solely

to matters of trial strategy generally do not fall within the definition of ineffective assistance of

counsel. Yd. 1 75. However,noted some claims related to trial strategy could amount to

ineffective assistance if counsel’s actions were objectively unreasonable. Yd. 1 76.

1115

We conclude the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into defendant’s claims

and did not improperly rule on the merits of his claims. The court began by addressing

defendant’s allegations related to His right to a speedy trial and found the allegations meritless

because the court had previously ruled on the claim at the hearing on the motion to dismiss the

charges. As discussed above, we agree with this conclusion. We further find this claim fits

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within WoMvs’s four primary ways a trial court may conclude an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim lacks merit so that the court need not appoint new counsel. The record contradicts

defendant’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the alleged speedy trial

violation. The record shows counsel filed a motion to dismiss the charges based on the alleged

speedy trial violation.

11 116

The trial court also addressed defendant’s allegation that counsel was deficient for

failing to file a motion to suppress. The court appropriately asked defense counsel about this

allegation and counsel informed the court the officers sought a search warrant based on

defendant’s statements. The court also found defendant’s allegations regarding jury selection

and counsel’s failure to object to the State’s alleged mischaracterization of evidence were tactical

decisions that did not form the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant’s

complaints about juror Nos. 140 and 149 are also misleading where the record shows there were

no juror Nos. 140 or 149. Moreover, defendant’s claims about juror Nos. 127, 140, and 149

pertain to counsel’s conduct during\ovc &vce that is generally not subject to ^\x\cV\arA review.

237 Ill. 2d 154, 215-16, 934 N.E.2d 435, 469 (2010).

1117

Finally, the trial court addressed defendant’s allegation that counsel failed to

introduce the Vermilion County interrogation video. The court asked what that video was, and

the State informed the court it was an interrogation video following defendant’s arrest “in

Vermilion County in a vehicle with Treshaun Jake with another gun.” The court began to ask

another question when defendant interrupted to again raise his speedy-trial claim. While the

State may not take an adversarial role against a pro se defendant during the preliminary

inquiry, we conclude the State’s participation here was

mmvrcvvs,. SeeloW^, 2014 IL 117142,

138. The State took no position on defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The

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State merely informed the court what the referenced video was and did not even speak to the

contents of the video itself. Moreover, the defendant interrupted to again raise his speedy-trial

claim, effectively abandoning his allegation regarding the Vermilion County interrogation video.

1118

We conclude the trial court adequately addressed defendant’s claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel and found them either meritless because the court previously

ruled on the claim or to be matters pertaining to trial strategy. The court gave defendant the

opportunity to raise his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, and defendant repeatedly

returned to his speedy-trial claim: It was not unreasonable for the court to conclude defendant

abandoned his other allegations. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court conducted an adequate

preliminary inquiry into defendant’s claims ofineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly,

we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

III. CONCLUSION

1119

1120

For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

1121

Affirmed.

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>

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS

SUPREME COURT BUILDING

200 East Capitol Avenue

SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62701-1721

(217)782-2035

FIRST DISTRICT OFFICE

160 North LaSalle Street, 20th Floor

Chicago, IL 60601-3103

(312) 793-1332

TDD: (312)793-6185

January 29, 2020

In re:

People State of Illinois/respondent, v. Anthony L. Meads,

petitioner. Leave to appeal, Appellate Court, Fourth District.

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The Supreme Court today DENIED the Petition for Leave to Appeal in the above

entitled cause.

The mandate of this Court will issue to the Appellate Court on 03/04/2020.

Very truly yours,

dM

Clerk of the Supreme Court

6-I