Reply Brief — Juan Ramon Pineda-Fernandez, Petitioner v. United States

No. 19-7753

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 2019

JUAN RAMON PINEDA-FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PETITIONER’S REPLY TO THE BRIEF FOR THE

UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

MAUREEN SCOTT F RANCO

Federal Public Defender

KRISTIN M. KIMMELMAN

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Western District of Texas

727 E. César E. Chávez Blvd., B-207

San Antonio, Texas 78206

(210) 472-6700

(210) 472-4454 (Fax)

Counsel of Record for Petitioner

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................... iii

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................1

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES ..............................................3

I. The immigration court lacked authority to remove Pineda

because an agency cannot ignore a statutory jurisdictional

requirement. .........................................................................3

II. This Court’s precedents teach that § 1326(d) cannot

prevent a noncitizen from collaterally attacking a

jurisdictionally-void removal order used to deprive him of

liberty in a criminal proceeding...........................................6

III. These issues merit consideration, and Pineda’s case is a

suitable vehicle. ....................................................................7

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................8

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Banuelos v. Barr,

953 F.3d 1176 (10th Cir. 2020) .................................................... 4

Bowles v. Russell,

551 U.S. 205 (2007) ...................................................................... 5

City of Arlington v. F.C.C.,

569 U.S. 290 (2013) ...................................................................... 5

Estep v. United States,

327 U.S. 114 (1946) .............................................................. 1, 6, 7

Garcia-Romo v. Barr,

940 F.3d 192 (6th Cir. 2019) ........................................................ 4

Guadalupe v. Attorney Gen. United States,

951 F.3d 161 (3d Cir. 2020) ......................................................... 4

Lopez v. Barr,

925 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 2019),

reh’g en banc granted, 948 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2020) .................. 4

Matters of Mendoza-Hernandez & Capula-Cortes,

27 I. & N. Dec. 520 (BIA 2019) .................................................... 5

Pereira v. Sessions,

138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) ...................................................... 1, 3, 4, 6

Rehaif v. United States,

139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) .................................................................. 7

United States v. Cotton,

535 U.S. 625 (2002) ...................................................................... 5

United States v. Mendoza-Lopez,

481 U.S. 828 (1987) ...................................................................... 6

iv

United States v. Rehaif,

888 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2018),

rev’d and remanded, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019) ............................... 7

Yanez-Pena v. Barr,

952 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2020),

petition for certiorari pending, No. 19-1208 ............................... 4

Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 922(g) ............................................................................ 7

8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) ........................................................................ 5

8 U.S.C. § 1228(b) ............................................................................ 5

8 U.S.C. § 1229 ................................................................................. 3

8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1) ................................................................ 4, 5, 6

8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) ............................................................... 3

8 U.S.C. § 1326 ................................................................................. 1

8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) .................................................................... 1, 2, 6

Regulations

8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a)........................................................................ 5

8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b)........................................................................ 3

Other Authority

Immigration and Naturalization Service and EOIR, Proposed

Rules, Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed.

Reg. 444-01, 1997 WL 1514 (Jan. 3, 1997) ................................. 3

1

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Juan Ramon Pineda-Fernandez asks this Court to

consider important questions regarding lower courts’ adherence to

this Court’s precedents in matters that affect the separation of

powers and the lives of countless noncitizen defendants charged

with illegally reentering the United States. Pineda was removed

years ago based on a notice to appear that failed to comply with

the statutory requirement to have a hearing time. He collaterally

attacked that prior removal order in his criminal proceeding. The

district court denied that motion to dismiss and sentenced him to

seven months’ imprisonment. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.

Pineda argues that, given the statutory framework and Pereira

v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), the notice to appear—complete

with hearing time—is a jurisdictional requirement for removal

proceedings. The putative notice to appear issued to him lacked

the required hearing time and rendered his removal proceeding

void. He further argues that prohibiting him from challenging the

immigration court’s jurisdiction unless he can meet the collateral

attack requirements of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) is inconsistent with this

Court’s decision in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946). Ultimately, restricting the collateral attack of removal orders in this

way renders § 1326 unconstitutional.

2

The government opposes certiorari because it believes the regulatory definition of a notice to appear trumps the statutory one,

the statutory requirements can be met by service of multiple documents, and the notice to appear has no jurisdictional import. 1 The

government also claims Pineda cannot collaterally attack his removal order because he fails to meet the requirements of § 1326(d).

Finally, the government argues Pineda’s case is a poor vehicle because the court below did not address the constitutionality of §

1326(d). he would not satisfy § 1326(d)’s other requirements and

no individual question is outcome-determinative.

Pineda replies.

1 The government refers to and incorporates arguments made in its

brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari in Mora-Galindo v.

United States, No. 19-7410 (referred to hereinafter as “Mora-Galindo

BIO”).

3

ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. The immigration court lacked authority to remove

Pineda because an agency cannot ignore a statutory

jurisdictional requirement.

The government argues that Pineda’s removal was proper because the notice to appear complied with the regulatory requirements, he received the information required by the statute through

the notice to appear and later notice of hearing, and neither the

notice to appear nor its contents has jurisdictional significance.

BIO 2–3. It avoids the separation of powers and Pereira problems

by focusing on the regulations instead of 8 U.S.C. § 1229. BIO 2–

3; Mora-Galindo BIO 11–14.

But the statute, not regulations, controls the definition of a notice to appear. Congress was clear that the notice to appear must

include a hearing time. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i). Even the agency

initially understood this requirement. Immigration and Naturalization Service and EOIR, Proposed Rules, Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens, 62 Fed. Reg. 444-01, 449, 1997 WL 1514

(Jan. 3, 1997). The agency overstepped by creating an exception—

that the hearing time need be included only “where practicable”—

and then using that exception for nearly every notice to appear

filed thereafter. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.18(b); see Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at

2110. This Court should address such agency defiance of Congress,

4

particularly when the circuits’ decisions and reasoning are so fractured. See Pet. 8–11.

The government alternatively argues that Pineda received the

statutorily-required notice to appear through two documents: the

notice to appear and the notice of hearing. BIO 2; Mora-Galindo

BIO 12–13. Two circuit courts have rejected this argument in the

stop-time rule context. Banuelos v. Barr, 953 F.3d 1176, 1180–84

(10th Cir. 2020); Guadalupe v. Att’y Gen. United States, 951 F.3d

161, 164–66 (3d Cir. 2020). 2 As the Third Circuit explained, Pereira “establishes a bright-line rule”: a notice to appear “shall contain all the information set out in section 1229(a)(1).” Guadalupe,

951 F.3d at 164. The two-step process conflicts with the statutory

language, congressional intent, and Pereira. Banuelos, 953 F.3d at

1180–84. Two other circuits and the Board of Immigration Appeals

side with the government. Yanez-Pena v. Barr, 952 F.3d 239, 246

(5th Cir. 2020), petition for certiorari pending, No. 19-1208; Garcia-Romo v. Barr, 940 F.3d 192, 204 (6th Cir. 2019); Matters of

2 The Ninth Circuit initially held the notice of hearing could not com-

plete or cure a notice to appear lacking a hearing time, but the court

granted rehearing en banc and is deciding the issue on the briefs. See

Lopez v. Barr, 925 F.3d 396, 399 (9th Cir. 2019), reh’g en banc

granted, 948 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2020); Lopez v. Barr, No. 15-72406 (9th

Cir.) (docket).

5

Mendoza-Hernandez & Capula-Cortes, 27 I. & N. Dec. 520, 535

(BIA 2019). The courts need guidance.

The

government

does

not

squarely

address

whether

§ 1229(a)(1) imposes a jurisdictional requirement, instead arguing

the regulation requiring a notice to appear be filed with the immigration court is a claim-processing rule. BIO 2–3; Mora-Galindo

BIO 13–14 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a)). But the issue here is the

jurisdictional import of § 1229(a)(1), which requires service of the

notice to appear. That service defines the class of cases over which

immigration judges can preside. See Pet. 5–6. By defining the class

subject to the immigration judge’s authority, § 1229(a)(1) is a jurisdictional requirement. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213

(2007); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). Immigration judges cannot remove noncitizens not served a § 1229(a)(1)

notice to appear. Those noncitizens can be removed through other

procedures 3 or are not removed. Thus, the notice to appear is an

important limit on immigration judges’ authority. Courts must

“tak[e] seriously, and apply[ ] rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits on agencies’ authority.” City of Arlington v. F.C.C., 569 U.S.

290, 307 (2013).

3 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1), 1228(b).

6

Given the important role of § 1229(a)(1), and this Court’s determination in Pereira that a notice to appear must have the hearing time or it is not a notice to appear, a defective notice to appear

does not give an immigration judge authority to remove a noncitizen.

II. This Court’s precedents teach that § 1326(d) cannot

prevent a noncitizen from collaterally attacking a

jurisdictionally-void removal order used to deprive him

of liberty in a criminal proceeding.

The government argues Pineda cannot challenge his jurisdictionally-deficient putative removal order because he did not satisfy

the § 1326(d) criteria for collateral attack. BIO 4; Mora-Galindo

BIO 21–24. Contrary to the government’s assertion, § 1326(d) does

not track the constitutional requirements recognized in United

States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987). See Mora-Galindo

BIO 23. In Mendoza-Lopez, the Court held the noncitizen petitioners must be able to collaterally attack if they were deprived of judicial review. 481 U.S. at 840. The Court said nothing about requiring administrative exhaustion. Id. at 830–42.

But the Court recognized in Estep v. United States the importance of reviewing the jurisdictional basis for administrative

decisions before using them to impose criminal penalties. 327 U.S.

114, 121 (1946) (doubting Congress intended criminal sanctions to

7

apply to administrative orders “no matter how flagrantly [the

agencies] violated the rules and regulations which define their jurisdiction”). That Estep had administratively exhausted his claim

does not import exhaustion as a requirement for challenging the

immigration court’s jurisdiction here. Prohibiting such review does

not comport with due process. See id. at 122 (rejecting that jail

should result “for not obeying an unlawful order of an administrative agency”).

III. These issues merit consideration, and Pineda’s case is a

suitable vehicle.

Pineda’s case is a suitable vehicle to consider these important

issues. It is true no circuit has ruled for Pineda’s notice-to-appear

argument. See BIO 3. But that has not stopped this Court from

granting certiorari and correcting the lower courts before. See, e.g.,

Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019) (requiring the

government to prove the defendant “knew he had the relevant status when he possessed” the firearm for a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) conviction). 4 And if the Court addressed the notice-to-appear issue in a

non-criminal context and reversed the circuit courts, it would

4 Before this Court stepped in, “no court of appeals ha[d] required

proof of the defendant’s knowledge of his prohibited status under any

subsection of § 922(g).” United States v. Rehaif, 888 F.3d 1138, 1145

(11th Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).

8

likely need to address the implication of its ruling in the illegal

reentry context. Pineda’s case allows the Court to do both simultaneously.

CONCLUSION

FOR THESE REASONS, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should

be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

MAUREEN SCOTT FRANCO

Federal Public Defender

Western District of Texas

727 E. César E. Chávez Blvd., B-207

San Antonio, Texas 78206

Tel.: (210) 472-6700

Fax: (210) 472-4454

s/ Kristin M. Kimmelman

KRISTIN M. KIMMELMAN

Assistant Federal Public Defender

Counsel of Record for Petitioner

DATED: June 4, 2020