Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Maurice Buford, Petitioner v. Laborers' International Union Local 269, et al.

Supreme Court briefDec 17, 2019

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7686

No. 1:16-CV-10218

IN THE SURPEME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DECEMBER TERM, 2019

MAURICE BUFORD, PRO SE

Petitioner

LABORER’S INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 269 AND 4

Respondent

ON PETITTION FOR A WRIT OF CENTIORARI TO THE SURPREME COURT OF

THE UNITED STATES

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,

Decided Before:

Circuit Judges

Frank H. Easterbrook, liana Diamond Rovner, Amy C. Barrett

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Maurice L. Buford

8348 S. Phillips Ave.

Chicago, IL 60617

(312) 788-0210

(773)410-0894

Prepared by and Respectfully

Submitted, Pro Se Petitioner

December 17,2019

CIVIL CASE

INTRODUCTION

TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THE HONORABLE

ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Conies now “Appellant-Petitioner” Maurice L. Buford and through “Pro Se Petitioner”

Buford who Respectfully petitions this most Honorable Supreme Court for Writ of Certiorari

pursuant Rule 13 in the above captioned matter Maurice Buford v. Laborers Local 269 and 4

case No. 19-1266, after a per curium opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the

Seventh Circuit, decision on September 20, 2019 which affirmed the United States District Court

for Northern District of Illinois judgement, issued on January 14,2019 for the reasons of law and

facts listed thereafter. Therefore, Mr. Buford Respectfully moves this most Honorable Court for

rehearing and consider this case with merits briefing, and oral arguments pursuant 28 U.S.C. 1254

this petition is filed within 90 days of the court of appeals decision in this case.

QUESTIONS) PRESENTED

I. Whether Discrimination/Duty of Fair Representation violated by the Labor International

Union 269 under Title VI I42 U.S.C. 2000(e) {Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987)

and section 1981, Harassment and Segregation under 42 U.S.C. 1981 {Jones v. R.R, Donnelly

& Sons Co., 541 U.S. 569 (2004) statute of limitations supersedes the limitations of the

“hybrid” 301/unfair representation under the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) 29

U.S.C. 185

A. Plaintiff-Petitioner “Weingarten Rights” were Violated fey Employer after Denying Him

Representation Under Direct Threat, Duress, Coercion, The Union Participated by Not

...9

Responding.

B. Plaintiff-Petitioner was Wrongfully Terminated Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 2087b{ 1 )The Whistle

blower Protection Act 1989.

C. The Court of Appeals 7th Circuit Incorrectly Affirmed District Court Judgement on Duty

of Fair Representation 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) Title VII Act, Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 160(h).. 16

II. WTiether the district court order that denying the appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C.

1915 violated petitioners 5th, 6ffi, 7“*, and 14th Amendment of his Civil Human Constitutional

Rights, and clarification of procedural dne process of a “Person” that cannot afford

counsel.

III. Whether unofficial “pretextual** papers written statements without the correct times, dates,

locations, or signatures, and wwithout declaration1* under the penalty of perjury under 18

U.S.C. 1621 and 1623. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993) should have been

excepted as admissible “material” evidence to form a conclusion against Buford in this

case.

A. Whether Laborer’s Union Local 269/1WG employee’s “Obstructed ofJustice”, through its

...25

attorney Robert S. Cervone’s Candor...,

IV. Whether the district court allowed Robert S. Cervone and David P. Lichtman to violate

Buford’s “Article 12 and 9th Amendment right to Privacy ” by inviting Timothy Moore (269

Business Agent) and Brin R. Kelsey to be present at Buford’s depositions.

A. Whether attorney Cervone and Kelsey violated a direct court order pursuant

CCP2025.420(b) (12) by inviting Brian R* Kelsey (1WG attorney) to the second session,

and thereafter the district court allowed him the privilege of violating his Candor......... 29

B. Whether the district court violated Buford’s uArticle 5 and 8th Amendment Right to

Freedom offines or unusualpunishment” for his right pursuant to 30(d)(3).

V. Title VII discrimination claims alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c) by a union are

not subject to the requirements and limitations applicable to a claim that a union violated its

,.32

doty of fair representation.......

A. To establish a discrimination claim against the union under Title VII, a plaintiff is not

required to satisfy the requirements for establishing a claim that the union

discriminatorily breached its D.F.R------ ...

B. The available remedies in a Title VII claim against a union are not limited to the remedies

....... 38

available in a duty of fair representation...—

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS

The undersigned Pro Se Petitioner on record certifies that the following listed persons and

entities as described in the fourth sentence of Rule 28 have an interest in the outcome of this case.

These representations are made in order that the Justices of this Honorable Supreme Court may

evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.

Petitioner

Maurice L. Buford

Respondents

Laborer's Internationa! Union 269 and 4

Counsel for Petitioner

Counsel for Respondent

Maurice L. Buford, Pro Se

8348 S. Phillips

Chicago, IL 60617

Telephone: 312-788-0210

Contact: 773-410-0894

Robert S. Cervone

Dowd, Bloch, Bennett & Cervone

8 South Michigan, Ave

Chicago, IL 60603

Telephone: 312-372-1361

Entities with an interest

Persons with an interest

I.W&GInc.

Alfred Arrequin (Owner)

999 Touhy Ave, Suite 450

Des Plaines, IL 60018

Telephone 708-576-8421

Timothy W. Moore...... ..(Business Agent 269 and 4)

Ben Gomez,(LW&G Supv./Lah. Steward 269 and 4)

Jesus Hazier........

.(I.W&G Laborer 269 and 4)

Steve Enis...........

Bob Adamkyke....

.(I. W&G Laborer 269 and 4)

..(I.W&G Laborer 269 and 4)

Juan Stanford.....

.......(I.W&G Superintendent)

Tom Yaeala.........

...... (LW&G/Garth Operator)

Benson McGairy.

Prepared by and Respectfully Submitted,

“Pro Se” Petitioner Maurice L. Buford

tabu: of contents

MOTION TO LEAVE TO PROCEED 1NFORMA PAUPERIS

AFFIDAVIT OR DECLARATIOIN IN SUPPORT OF INDIGENCY

INTRODUTfON AND QUESTION^) PRESENTED

i-ii

INTERESTED PARTIES AND PERSONS

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iv-v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

v-x

STAUTES

x-xii

RULES

xii-xiv

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

CONSITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLED

3-4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

5-6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION

6-39

CONCLUSION

1 of 2

COMPLIANCE DECLARATION OF WRIT

CERTIFCATE OF SERVICE.

APPENPICE EXHIBITS

Note: Appellants Brief previously contained Exhibits #U-#99 the documents are numbered in

increments of eleven, such as....#11, #22, #33. Also, this Writ contains those previous documents,

and additional Exhibits in increments of eleven such as....#012, #023, #034. This Writ contains a

Rule 33 that is sorta hodge podge please don’t penalize me, Buford was a construction worker and

therefore did not know how to do clerical organization at that time. This Writ also contains a Rule

56 which contains Exhibits A-Z and 0 was omitted due to clerical era, also it has Exhibits A2-X2

and 1-4. Some of the Exhibits in this Writ contains Exhibits within exhibits, “Pro Se” Buford

Hopes and Prays that this does not cause any confusion to this most Honorable Supreme Court

and its Honorable Supreme Justices thereto, because with all due respect “Pro Se "Buford have

prepared this Writ of Petition of Certiorari to the best of his knowledge, belief and abilities.

Volume I- Appendix contains Exhibits (#012) - (#288)

Volume 11- Appendix contains Exhibits (#034) Appeal Brief Att. (#11) - (#66)

Volume Ill-Appendix contains Exhibits (#77) - (#99)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGES

CASES

United States v. Ashurov, 726 F. 3d 395 (3rd Cir. 2013)

Steel v. Louisville & N.R.R 323 U.S. 192 (1940)

OakwoodHealthcare Inc., (348 N.L.RJB. 37 (2007)..... ......... ......................

Bowen v. MissouriDep’tofSoc. Servs., 311 F.3d 878,884 (8th Cir, 2002) .....

Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998)

Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton. 524 U.S. 775 (1998)

United States v. Weingarten 713 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 2013)...................

Aguinaga v. United Food Com. Wkrs. 993 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1993)

Green v. Wright (1875-76 LR1 CPD 591)

Hill v. C. Parsons & Co. [1972] 1 Ch 305)

Shockeyv. City ofPortland, 313, Or. 414,424-31, 837 P.2d 505 (1992)

Draper v. Astoria School Dist No, 1C 995 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Or. 1998)

Garcetti v. Ceballlos, 54 U.S. 410 (2006)

Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228,134 S. CL 2369; 189 L Ed. 2d 312 (2014)

Highstone v. Westin Engineering, Inc., No. 98-1548)

Levinski’s Inc. v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 127 F3d. 122 (1st Cir. 1997)

U.S. v. Melendez, Case No. 03-80598)

Grievance ofMorrissey 149 Vt 1,15,538 A.2d 678,686 (1987)

Bennett v. Local Union No. 66, 958 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1992)

Darth v. Collins 411 F.3d 93 L 933 (11th Cir. 2006)

United States v. Ashurov, 726 F. 3d 395 (3rd Cir. 2013).........................

United States v. Saybolt, 577 F.3d 195 (3rd Cir. 2009)....... ..................

Driver v. US. Postal Service, Inc., 328 F.3d 863, 868-69 (6* Cir. 2003

Wells v. Chrysler Group LLC, 891 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2018)..................

Bugs v. International Union Allied Industrial Workers of America, Local 507 AFL-CIO, 674 F.2d

595,598 a.5 (7th Cir. 1982)

Beshears v. Hennessey Indus., Inc., No. 3:12-00087,2012 WL 6093457, at *2 (N.D. Tenn. Dec.

7,2012)

Houtv. City ofMansfield, 550 F. Supp. 2d 701, 727 (ND. Ohio 2008)

EEOC v. Lehi Roller Mills Co., No. 2:08-CV-00591 DN 2014 WL 175987, at *2 (D. Utah May 1,

2014)

(EEOC, v. National NEA, Alaska, 422 F.3rd 840 (9th Circuit 2005)

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987)

Jenkins v. Schluderberg, Etc., Co. 217 Md. 556 (1958)

Baker v. Board ofEduc, 70 N.Y. 2d 314 (N.Y. 1987)....

McDonnell v. Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 792, 802 (1973)

Jones, 617 F.3d at 1278-79

EEOC v. Lehi Roller Mills Co., No. 2:08-CV-QQ591 DN2014 WL 175987, at *2 (D. Utah May 1,

2014)

UA Wv. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 US. 696,86 S. Ct 1107,16 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1966)

.19

Echols v. Chrysler Group., 633 F.2d 722 (6th Cir. 1980)...................................... ............

Pitts v. Frito-Lay, 700 F.2d 330 (6lh Cir. 1983)...................... ..........................................

Smith v. General Corp., 747 F.2d 372 (6th Cir.1984)........................................................

West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35 (1987)

United Parcel Service, Inc., v. William Mitchell,451 U.S. 56,101 S.Ct 1559,67 L. Ed. 2d 732,

(1981) U.S. LEXIS 86.,............................................ ...

Lawson v. Truck Drivers, 698 F2d 250 (6th Cir. 1983)

Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) rev’g 305 F.3d 717 (7* Cir. 2002).... 19

McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106,113 (1983)

Finney v. Lockheed Martin Corp, Case# 13-CV-Q0869-MSK-MYW or BNB, Appeal# 15-1140

(2016)

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, (more) 95 S. Ct 2525; L. Ed. 2d. 562;

(1975 U.S. LEXIS 83).............

........... 20

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)

.... 21

Buie v. Illinois, 333 U S, 640 (1948)

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)

........... 21

Oliver 333 U.S. 257 (1948) .......

Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627,629 (2016) (citation omitted)

See Coleman v. Tollefson, 185 S. Ct. 1759, 1762. (2015) (citation omitted)

Gideon v. Wainwrig, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (citation omitted)

Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (citation omitted)

Turner v. Rogers 564 U.S. 431,131 S. CL 2507 (2011)

Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876)

Wonsan, No. 12-CF-1433.

United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993)

Turney v, Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).

Ihenacor v. Price, ELH-18-3342 (D. Md. Mar. 28,2019)

Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282,189 S.W.2d 284 (Sept 4,1945) Sup. C. Mo. Div. One)

Hubbard v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1754,1764 &n. 15.)

VII

United States v. Ashurov, 726 F. 3d 395 (3rd Cir. 2013)..............

...___... 25

Arthur Andersen LLP y. United States 544 U.S. 696 (2005)

McDonnell v. Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792,802 (1973)

Jones F3d at 1278-79

EEROC v. Lehi Roller Mills Co., No. 2:08-0-00591 DN 2014 WL 175987, at *2 (D. Utah May

1,2014)

....26

Hout V City of Mansfield, 550 F. Supp. 2d 701, (NJD. Ohio 2008)

Finney v. Lockheed Martin Corp, Case# 13-CV-00869-MSK-MYW or BNB, App. 15-1140.. 26

Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 f.3d 1319,1323 (1001 Cir. 1997)

Reeves v. Sanders Pluming Prods., Inc., 503 U. S. 133,148 (2002)

EEOC v. National NEA, Alaska, 422 F.3rd 840 (9th Circuit 2005)

United v. Gaudin, U. S. 506 (1995).....

Texas v. United States of America (April 17,2016)

Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)

People v. Miller, No. 16PDJ, 2017BL208514

Pounder v. Watson, 521 U. S. 982 (1987)...............

...............31

United States v. Allen, 587 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2009)

Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)

NLRB v. Sw. Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929,939 (2017)

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 667 (1987)

Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004)

Vacav. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,181 (1967)

»» *¥#**» •»»«»»»» **»»*■*»*« via

• a*!*****-**

Emswiler v. CSXTransp., Inc., 691 F.3d 782 (6th Cir. 2012) ...

Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177.........___

.33

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554,570-71 (1976)......

vrn

.......... 33

Emswiler, 691 F.3d 793..... .......

Hines, 424 U.S. at 570-71

Goodman v. U.S. at 667.

Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. at 190

Alien v. CSX Tramp., Inc., 325 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2003)

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)

Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967)

Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964)

Gccrity v. APWU Nat 7 Labor Org, 828 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2016)

Cantrell v. Int’l Bhd. ofElec. Workers, Local 2021,32 F.3d 465 (10th Cir. 1994)....

Angel v. United Paperworkers Int 7 Union (PACE) Local 1967,221 F. App'x 393 (6th Cir. 2007)

........ 34

Wilson v. Int 7 Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO, 83

F.3d 747 (6th Cir. 1996)

Kolstadv. Am. Dental Ass % 527 U.S. 526 (1999)

Goodman, 48 U.S. at 667

Green v. Am. Fed. ofTeachers/Ul. Fed. of Teachers Local 604,740 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2014)

Cf. 14 Perm Plaza LLC v. Pvett, 556 U. S. 247 (2009).

Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 4849 .

Reed v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers ofAm.. 569 F.3d 576

(6th Cir. 2009)

Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers ’ Ini 7 Union ofN. Am,, 111 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999)

McDonnell Douglas Carp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)

Gorily v. APWUNat 7 Labor Org, 828 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2016)

VHII

Martinez v. Jnt’I Bhd. of Elec. Workers-IBEW Local Union No. 98,352 F. App’x 737 (3d Cir.

2009)........................... ............................................ ........................ ................ ........................ 36

Green v. Am. Fed. ofTeachers/Hl. Fed. ofTeachers Local 604, 740 F.3d 1104 (7th Cir. 2014)

............................................... ....... .................................................... ..................................passim

Greemladev. CM. Sun-Times, Inc., 112 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 1997)

Supra, at 8-17

Wells v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 559 F. App’x at 512-15 (6th Cir. 2014)

Nitzsche v. Stein, 797 F. Supp. 595 (N.D. Ohio 1992) .

Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 534 (1999)

.38

U.S. v. Henry, 819 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 2017)

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. 1254(1)

42 U.S.C. 2000e

.......5

42U.S.C. 1981

18 U.S.C. 1546 (false statements)

........... 5

28 U.S.C. 1915....... .

42 U.S.C. 2000e

5 U.S.C. 7116 (FLRA)

Statue 1716 (a)(1)

15 U.S.C. 2087(b)(1) (Whistle Blower).

10,11

18 U.S.C. 1324c

5 U.S.C. 7116 (e)(2)(A) (FLRA).

18 U.S.C. 1621 (willfiilly)

18 U.S.C. 1623 (knowingly)

18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d)

.........15

18 U.S.C. 1546.........

18 U.S.C. 286

IS U.S.C. sec. 287

29 U.S.C. 160(b)

5 U.S.C. 7116(b)(1)

29 U.S.C. 160(b)

• t« ** *-«•*•«-•• ***** ***********************

.... 18

42 U.S.C. 2000e 2(c)(3)

42 U.S.C. 1981 Sec. 1981

29 U.S.C. 160(b)

28 U.S.C. 1658

U.S.C. 1991 Sec. 1745

28 U.S.C. 1915.........

.......... 20

28 U.S.C. 1915(a)

28 U.S.C. 1915(d)(e)(l)

28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1)

8 US.C. 1362

... 21

18 US.C. 4241

..... . 21

18 U.S.C. 4247.......

28 U.S.C. 1915

28 US.C. 1915(a)(1)

28 US.C. 1915(e)(1)

28 U.S.C. 1746

22,23

18 US.C. 1621

18 US.C. 1623

28 U.S.C. 1746(1) (Added Pub. L. 94-550, Sec.1(a), Oct 18,1976,90 Stat)

2534.)....................................................... ........................................ ......

1760,28 U.S.C. 1746

. 24

18 U.S.C. 1001

18 U.S.C. 1503

18 U.S.C. 1505

18 U.S.C. 1512

18 U.S.C. 1546

18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2)

18 U.S.C. 1525

.25

132 M.P.C. Penal Code

28,30

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c)

32,33,34,35

32,33

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c)(l)

.......32

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2<c)(2).... .

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(cH3)

_____ 33

42 U.S.C. 2Q00e-2(cXlX3)___

42 U.S.C. 2000e-3

42 U.S.C. 1981a

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2

35,38

........ 36,38

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c)_____

42 U.S.C. 2QQ0e-3(a)

42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c)(l)

42 U.S.C. 2000e-3

29 U. S. C. 185.......... .

.38

42 U.S.C. 1981a(bXl)

42U.S.C. 1981a(a)

RULES

Fed. R. Cert. P. 13.1 .

Fed. R. App. P. 3

Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(0)

Rule 5.6 (a)(c) (CBA) sample steward clause

N.D. ILL. L.R. 56.1(b)(3)..

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)

Fed. R. Civ. P 56.1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.1(a)(3)

Rules 801........... .

...........28

Rules 801(a)(1)(c)

Rules 801(a)(l)(2)

Rules 801(aXl)(c)(A)

Rules 801(d)(l)(B)(i)

Rule 3.3

Rule 3,3(a)(l)(3)

Rule 3.3(a)(3)

Rule 3.3(a)(3)(b)

29,30

CCP2025.420(b)( 12)

Rule 3.4(a)(c)

.31

Fed. R Civ. P. 30 (d)(3)(A)...... .

XIII

REGULATION

Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964

Weingarten Rights

A. 9

1996 Employment Rights Act (c 18) Approach to Employment Protection

1963 Contracts of Employment Act, The First Modem UK Law

49 CFR 1570.5(a) Fraud of international Falsification of Records

... 13

False Statement Accountability Act of 1996, P.L. 104-292, H.R.3166, (Oct. 11,1996)

Penalties of the Document Fraud Act

Title 18 the United States Code., Ch. 73, Sarbanes-Oxley Act

Title 29 the United States Code., Sec. 160(b), Prevention of Unfair Labor Practice

805ILCS 5/12.80 Claims Against Dissolved Corporations

Title VII amended-Civi! Rights Act of 1991 (pub. L. 102-166)(CRA)

False Statement Accountability Act of 1996, P.L. 104-292, H.R.3166, (Oct. II, 1996)

...... 25

Manual at 902 el seq.

740 ILCS 175 Civil Liabilities Illinois False Claims Act......

Title 29 United States Code., Sec. 621 ei seq., Age Discrimination Employment Act..... .........35

XIV

SEE OPINIONS BELOW

1. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) and No. 114

2. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., supra. 424 U.S. 554 (1976)

3. United Parcel Service, Inc., v. William Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56,104 S. Ct. 1559,67 L. Ed. 2d

732, (1981) U.S. LEXIS 86.

4. EEOC v. Lehi Roller Mills Co., No. 2:08-CV4)O591 DN 2014 WL 175987, at *2 (D. Utah

May 1,2014)

5. Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Softs Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) 42 U.S.C. 1981) Indeed, an

employer may file a section 1981 within four years of the violation.

6. Hout v. City of Mansfield, 550 F. Supp. 2d 701, 727 (N.D. Ohio 2008). Therefore, a claim

that the duty of fair representation was breach on account of discrimination, and a claim

of discrimination in failing to fairly represent the employee are essentially the same.

7. Once jurisdiction is established, unions may be held liable for creating or contributing to

a hostile work environment in instances where union officials either directly engage in in

discriminatory behavior, or “fail to file grievance reports” and “conduct fair

investigations’’ in response to harassment claims by union members and employees. Both

local and national unions can be named a defendant in suits bringing harassment claims

(EEOC v. National NEA, Alaska, 422 F.3rd 840 (9th Circuit 2005). This Supreme Court

have “consistently held that unions breech both their duty of fair representation and Title

Vll” when they maintain a policy, whether formal or informal, of "refusing to file

grievable discrimination claims". (Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987).

9. Dartit v. Collins 411 F.3d 931,933 (11th Cir. 2006) The Court has previously held that “the

relief granted under Title VII is against the Employer,’’ not against the individual

employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the act, regardless of whether the

employer is a public company or a private company’’.

10. Reeves v. Sanderson Pluming Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,148 (2000) (“IA) plaintiff’s prima

facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that “the employers asserted

justification is false’’ may permit the trier of to conclude that the employer unlawfully

discriminated against the employee.’*)

11. United States v. Wonson, (1812) (citations omitted)

12. Texas v. United States of America, (April 17, 2016) (citations omitted) The Court has

previously held, authored by Honorable Judge Hansen that.... Fabrications,

misstatements, half-truths, artful omissions, and the failure to correct misstatements

may be acceptable, albeit lamentable, in other aspects in life; but in the courtroom, when

the attorney knows that both the Court and the other side are relying on complete

frankness, such conduct is unacceptable.

13. Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228,134 S. CT. 2369; 189 L Ed. 2nd 312 (2014)

-(!)-

JURIPICTIONAL STATEMENT

“Pro Se” Petitioner Maurice L. Buford petitions from (1) the September 20, 2019 ruling

and opinion of the United States Court ofAppeals for the Seventh Circuit affirming the judgement

memorandum opinion and order that was entered by the Honorable Gary Feinerman for the District

Court for the Northern District of Illinois.

“Pro Se” Petitioner timely filed a writ within 90 days of the date above. This Honorable

Supreme Court of the United States has Jurisdiction over this Petition for Writ of Certiorari for

rehearing under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL ADMENDMENTS AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLED

1st Amendment:

Freedom of (or From) religion. “Freedom of speech”. Freedom to assemble. Freedom to petition

the government.

5th Amendment:

Right to due process, Right to just compensation for the takings.

6th Amendment:

Right to legal counsel, Right to face my accusers. Right to trial by impartial jury.

7th Amendment:

In Suits at common law, where the value shall exceed twenty dollars, the Right to trial by jury in

civil cases shall be preserved, and no Facts found by a jury cannot be reexamined in any other

Court in the United States.

8 th Amendment:

Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

punishments inflicted.

9th Amendment:

This listing of a right in any part of the Constitution does not imply that other unlisted rights do

not exist. Supreme Court decisions have found a handful of important rights that fall under this

“The right to privacy”

Amendment, such as

14th Amendment:

Right to citizenship of any person bom in the United States. Right to equal protection of the

national and state laws. Right to be free of any law that abridges the privileges or immunities of a

citizen. Right to be free of law that deprives a person of life, liberty, or property without due

process.

17th Amendment:

The Supreme Court ruled that the Seventeenth Amendment gives the Right to an additional jury

trial, following the loss of the first jury trial.

UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Declaration Article 3

Everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person.

Declaration Article 6

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Declaration Article 5

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Declaration Article 7

AH are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the

law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration

and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Declaration Article 8

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating

the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Declaration Article 10

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial

tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Declaration Article 12

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or

correspondence, nor attack upon his honor and reputation. Everyone the right to the protection of

the law against such interference or attacks.

Declaration Article 23

(1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions

of work and to protection against unemployment. (2) Everyone, without any discrimination, has

the right to equal pay for equal work. (3) Everyone who works has the right to just and favorable

remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and

supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection. (4) Everyone has the right to join

trade unions for the protection of his interests.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This petition of writ of certiorari initially arises from the Racial Discrimination, pursuant

to 42 (J.S.C. 2000(e) and section 1981 for Harassment, Segregation, and Wrongful Termination

toward Buford by the company called I.W&G Inc, which consisted of..Tom Vacala (I.W&G.

Superintendent) “false incident report”, Mike Direnzio (I.W&G. Safety Manager) “false

statements”, Benson McGarry (i.W&G./Garth Con. Operator) “false police gun report”, Ben

Gomez (I.W&G. Supervisor/269 Union Steward), “false statements/harassment” Steve Enis (269

Laborer) “false statement/ incident report” Jesus Hazier (269 Laborer) "racial slur-dumb ass

fucking nigger/harassment, Juan Stanford (269 Laborer) “false statements/harassment” and Bob

adamkyke (269 Laborer) [harassment], and then back dating over exaggerating “fabricated

pretextual” incidents after the fact, and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1546 (false statements) that they

claimed Buford violated such as..., threatening behavior, physical altercations, safety violations

and poor work performance, See United States v. Ashurov, 726 F. 3d 395 (3rtt Cir. 2013) states:

It is a crime under 18 U.S.C. 1546, to knowingly making a false statement Under oath

a document required by the immigration laws. It is also a Crime “to knowingly

present “any such document” which contains any such false statement”

Buford is a highly decorated and certified skilled laborer of over 19 years and has union steward

knowledge. See Maurice L. Buford's Certificates of Completion and Work Ethnics referral

forms/job search Exhibits (#012)\ol. I, Pg. 1-36. However, these illegal acts of

Discrimination/Duty of Fair Representation occurred through Ben Gomez (269 Union Steward),

“segregation/false statements thereafter, and directly contributing to a hostile environment by

harassment” pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2000(e), under the direction of Timothy Moore (269 Business

Manager) “contributing to a hostile environment after the fact” and by not conducting a fair

investigation or filing Maurice Buford's (269 Laborer) grievance", [Breach of Duty (D.F.R.)

Violation of Title Vll]. See Steel u Louisville & N.R.R (1940), See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171

(1967) and No. 114. See attached thereto Compliance Declaration of Writ (#1).

This petition also arises from the January 14, 2019 ruling from the district court Judge

Gary Feinerman granting Defendant-Appel lee Laborers Local Union 269 and 4 [Respondents]

summary judgment and closing Plaintiff-Appellant Buford's [Petitioners] case due to clerical

errors, oversights, and mistakes, in connection to his rule 56 response, after denying Plaintiff

Buford assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915 which was extremely bias, unfair, and

violations to his “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 3, 7, 8, and 10” and violations

of his “Constitutional 6th, 7th, 17th, and 14th, Amendment Rights. ” Now, before “Pro Se ” Buford

moves forward with this petition he must state an argument of dismay which is, eleven months

before district courts Honorable Gary Feinerman actually closed this case, he threatened to

“dismiss the suit as a sanction” for plaintiff applying the wrong choice of words to express liis

opinion, See District Judge Gary Feinerman Court Order Exhibit (#023)Vol. I, Pg. 37, and with

all due respect to this most Honorable Supreme Court and its Honorable Justices thereto,

Plaintiff-Petitioner Buford was most certainly not trying to under mind the judicial integrity of

these Honorable Federal Courts, it’s just the fact that Plaintiff Buford at that time, felt as if....

“the whole world was against him.”

However, “Pro Se” Buford filed a Motion for Relief pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 60 on

January 23, 2019, which was also denied by the court on January 27, 2019. Appellant Buford filed

a timely Notice of Appeal on Februaiy 12, 2019, an appeal brief on June 4, 2019 See Appellants

Brief Exhibit (#034) which was supplemented by “Pro Se” Buford on June 7, 2019 due to

Omissions, Appellee filed response brief on July 3, 2019 an additional response and arguments

were filed by Appellant on August 16, 2019, and shortly thereafter on September 20, 2019 the

district court's decision was affirmed by the seventh circuit court of appeals. Appellant-Petitioner

Buford strongly believes his claims am “colorful” and that his case has not been assessed properly

in all fairness of the law, and for these reasons...... Article 5, 7Human Rights, 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and

14th Amendment Violations.

Congress has charged this Supreme Court with the responsibility of enforcing federal

prohibitions on employment discrimination, including Tide VII. of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42

U.S.C. 2000e (“Title VII”). The issue in this Writ of Petition of Certiorari is whether Title VII

discrimination claims against unions are subject to the requirements and limitations applicable to

non-Title-VII-based claims that a union breached its duty of fair representation. Because of the

importance of these issues to the effective enforcement of Title VII, petitioner respectfully offers

its views to this most Honorable Supreme Court and its Supreme Justices thereto pursuant Fed.

R. Cert. P. 13.1., and arguments on the next page for grating this writ is as follows.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THIS PETITION

On February 12, 2019 “Pro Se” Buford’s appeal was opened before appellate court Chief

Judge Diane P. Wood and Circuit Judges Frank H. Easterbrook and Michael Y. Scudder, then

thereafter the appellate court Circuit Judges Frank H. Easterbrook, liana Diamond Rovner, and

Amy C. Barrett for the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion/final judgement on September 20,2019,

the court allowed both parties the opportunity to file appeal briefs under Fed. R. App. P. 3 adduce

evidence, and present arguments but also make facts of find. The district court allowed pretextual

paper statements to be used as admissible evidence to form an opinion against Buford [Appellant]

which were totally inconsistent and/or contradictive to official i.W&G. work documents, and the

court of appeals affirmed the actions of the district court in their opinion, which contained

erroneous finds also. In the opinion and after briefing the court stated in a footnote that “we have

agreed decide the case without oral arguments because the briefs and record adequately presents

the facts and legal arguments, and oral arguments would not significantly aid the court”. Fed. R.

App. P. 34(a)(C) “Pro Se” Petitioner Buford does not “concur” with this decision, or statements

that is in the court’s opinion, because the court of appeals order also contains pretextual statements

or an opinion that is to the best of “Pro Se” Buford’s Knowledge and belief is not sufficiently

complete or correct, regarding conflicts in law (Arguments 1 &V) and clarifications of procedural

rulings related to (Arguments II) or undecided (Arguments I.A, ITT, TV) See Appeals Court Final

Judgement Exhibits (#045)Vol. I, Pg. 68-73 and collections to the appeals court order are as

follows:

ARGUMENT

I. Whether Discrimination/Duty of Fair Representation violated by the Labor International

Union 269 under Title VII 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) (Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656

(1987) and section 1981, Harassment and Segregation under 42 U.S.C. 1981 (Jones v. R.R.

Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) statute of limitations supersedes the limitations of

the “hybrid” 301/unfair representation under the Labor Management Relations Act

(LMRA) 29 U.S.C. 185. Pursuant to 160(b) Prevention of Unfair Labor Practice.

During the two weeks and three days after a black construction worker, [Maurice Buford]

started working at i.W&G., Inc., on July 1, 2014 under the direct supervision of Jerry Jankowski

[1. W&G. Foreman] as a demo laborer. Ten days after he started his employment, on July 10, 2014

he was “segregated” on July 10, 2014 from skilled construction work and placed on a belittling

clean-up crew “under the direct supervision of Ben Gomez [269 Labor Steward]” who participated

by giving Buford assignments and work directions, and on occasions Buford worked by himself

away from all the other construction workers, which is the first Two Violations/Breach of Duty,

Conflict of Interest, and malicious discriminatory actions towards Buford by the “Laborers

International Union 269” [Ben Gomez] pursuant to Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title

5 U.S.C. 7116 (FLRA) that occurred, 14th Amendment Violation. See Declaration of Writ, (#2)

Segregation: Title VII is violated where employees who belong to a protected group

“Unions” are segregated by physically isolating them from other employees or from customer

contact.

Unfair Labor Practices: Are actions taken by employers or unions that are illegal

under the National "Labor" Relation Act (NLRA) and other labor laws. Some of these rules

apply to the interactions between the employer and the union; others protect individual

workers from "unfair" treatment by an employer or union. See the statute 5 U.S.C. 7116

(a)(l )-(8), (FLRA) (Added Pub. L. 95-454. title VII 701. Oct. 13, 1978, 92 Stat. 1204.)

Union Representative, Union Steward, or Shop Steward: Ts an employee of an

organization or company “who represents and defends the interests of his/her fellow

employees” but who is also “a labor union official.” As a result, the union steward becomes

“a significant link and conduit of information between the union leadership” and rank-andfile workers.

Collective bargaining agreement sample steward clause 5.6 (a) and (c) states;

(a) The Home [employer] agrees to recognize such Union stewards, duly appointed by

and "acting as agents of the Union", who may receive complaints and process

grievances through the grievance procedure The Union shall provide the Home a

with a written list of such stewards and alternates, if any.

perform his/her work, shall not countermand the order of a supervisor and shall

not interfere with normal operations of home (employer] or any other worker. In

Oakwood Healthcare Inc., (348 N.L.R.B. 37 (2007)

and where Ben Gomez “Union Steward/l.W&G. Supervisor”, company workers and other 269

Laborers "harassed, intimidated, and used “racial slurs-nigger” towards him. See Bowen v.

Missouri Dep’t ofSoc. Servs., 311 F.3d 878, 884 (8th Cir, 2002)

Universal Declaration of Human Rights-Article 5 states: No one shall be subjected to

cruel, inhuman or “degrading treatment” or punishment.

In Faragher and Eilerth, this Supreme Court of the United States established that

employers are vicariously liable for harassment when a tangible employee action is taken. A

tangible employment action is a significant change in employment status, such as "firing,

demotion, and reassignment" (Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Eilerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and

(Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). Even if a tangible employment action is

not taken, unions as employers may still be liable for creating a hostile environment under

Title VII.

EEOC Harassment: The basis of race and/or color violates Tile VII. Ethnic slurs,

racial “jokes” offensive or derogatory comments, or other verbal or physical conduct that

creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment or interferes with the

individual’s performance.

Harassment: becomes "unlawful1' when;

(1) Enduring the offensive conduct prerequisite to continue employment, or

(2) The conduct is so severe or pervasive enough that a reasonable person would

consider the workplace intimidating, hostile, or abusive. Also, if a supervisor's

harassment results in an obvious change in an employee’s salary or status, the

conduct would be considered unlawful workplace harassment.

A. Plaintiff-Petitioner “Weingarten Rights" were Violated by Employee

I.W&G. after Denying Him Representation Under Direct Threat,

Duress, Coercion, and The Union Participated by Not Responding.

On July 16, 2034 Toni Vacata “i.W&G. Superintendent” made it a goal to search the entire

job site for Buford, in order to force him to sign a blank comment section incident report dated a

whole before on July 14, 2014 the alleged physical altercation (pretexts) between Buford and co

worker Juan Stanford “269 laborer” which was only a verbal disagreement about wheelbarrow

placement that could not have possibly occurred until July 15, 2014 (Back Dated and Fabricated)

under direct “Threat, Duress, and Coercion” after request for representation “Union Steward

Gomez” was made by Buford in which Vacala refused him of by stating....

“He’s working (269 Steward Gomez) and if you don’t sign it, you’re going home

today”. After Buford signed it, only just to secure his job. Vacala then stated.... “Now if anybody

says one thing about you, you’re out of here, done” See United States v. Weingarten 713 F.3d

704 (2d Cir. 2013) See attached thereto Compliance Declaration of Writ (#3).

after this incident with his employer, Buford presented this issue to union steward “Gomez” who

failed to respond, represent, or defend Buford’s interest because he was participant in the plot to

get Buford released, which is a violation of his “Duty to Act, Breach of Contract and/or Unfair

Labor Practice” See Aguinaga v. United Food Com. Wkrs. 993 F.2d 1463 (10th Cir. 1993)

Union Steward Job: Is there to make sure the company lives up to your contract. When

there is a problem with management, and you need help. One of the most vital functions of

“Prevent management from intimidating employees/union

a Union Steward is to

members” also....

Duty of Fair Representation: The NLRA requires “all stewards” to fairly and

equitably represent all employees in a bargaining unit without regard to membership,

religion, nationality, age or sex.

Unfair Labor Practice Statute 1716(a)(1) states;

(a) For the purpose of this chapter it shall be an unfair labor practice for an agency;

(1) To interfere with, restrain, or coerce any employee in the exercise by the of any

right under this chapter;

B. Whether Plaintiff-Buford was Wrongfully Terminated Pursuant to 15 U.S.C.

2087(b)(1) The Whistle blower Protection Act 1989.

Then shortly thereafter three days later when “Jesus “Jesse” Hazier 269 laborer referred to Buford

as “dumb ass fucking nigger” on July 17, 2014, and after he reported to Tom Vacala at about 11:30

a.m., then roughly at around 2:00 p.m. Vacala “wrongfully terminated” Buford. See Article 5 and

23 Human Rights and Ist Amendment Violations and, See Employment Rights Act 1996, (c 18)

approach to employment protection. See also, Contracts of Employment Act 1963, for the

first modem UK law on

“the requirement to give reasonable notice before dismissal” See

Green v. Wright (1875-76 LR1 CPD 591 and See also Hill v. C. Parsons & Co. [197211 Ch 305.

Now as “Pro Ac”Buford moves forward with his arguments,

Whistleblowing: Is when an employee reports an employer who is breaking the law to

an external law enforcement agency. Whistleblowing employees are “protected by law from

being fired or mistreated by their employer. Tf they are fired or otherwise mistreated for

whistleblowing, they may file a claim against their (former) employer. See Shockey v. City of

Portland, 313, Or. 414,424-31, 837 P.2d 505 (1992).

See also Draper v. Astoria School Disk No. 1C 995 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Or. 1998). In Draper, the

district court concluded that by providing that “the court shall” actual damages or $250,

whichever is greater,” the “Whistleblower law’s remedies are mandatory,” and applying the

OTCA to whistleblower claims would contradictorily limit the mandatory actual damage

aw'ard to $200,000. See also Whistle blower Protection Act 1989 15 U.S.C. 2087

Now, before “Pro Se” Buford ends this argument about l.W&G. violating the Whistle Blower Act

I will state that, defendants’ laborers union local 269’s attorney Robert S. Cervone by his own

admission in his appellee brief confirmed that the racial slurs towards and reported by Buford was

true in stating ....

“The fact that Buford “made Vacala aware” of the coworker’s (Hazier) “269 laborer”

comment does not constitute evidence that Vacala’s decision (to fire) was racially

motivate”, and it was in reference to Buford’s adverse employment action”. (See

Garcetti v. Ceballos 54 U.S. 410 (2006)

See Cervone’s Response BriefExhibit (#056)Vol. I, Pg. 17-18, Lines 23-28, Let the record reflect

that “Pro Se” Buford “does not concur” because Buford made Vacala aware of Hazier’s racial

slur because it was degrading to him as a “African American Citizen”, and if the reasons or

“Material Evidence” before or after the fact of the termination is “Pretext”, then his termination

was “Racially Motivated and/or Discriminatory”. Article 19 and 23 Violation However, the

10.

fact of the remains, and as a matter of law pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 2087(b)(1) which states....

“An employer “cannot fire” an employee (any person[citizen|) for reporting an illegal

act.” See Job Security 1 below and See also Lane v. Franks 573 U.S. 228, 134 S. CT.

2369; 189 L Ed. 2nd 312 (2014)

“This Court held that “truthful” testimony before a federal Grand Jury is “clearly”

protected speech under the First Amendment.”

Therefore, I,W,G’s Superintendent Tom Vacala “Blatantly Violated Buford’s First

Amendment Right when he terminated him (Buford) for “whistleblowing”, and 269’s Business

Representative Timothy Moore allowed it to happen by conducting his investigation in bad faith,

or by not conducting it at all. Arguing even further, what this case basically boils down to is.... “If

269 Union members/l.W.G. employees are giving reasons that is not the true reasons why

Buford was fired, then “Buford total testimony must be the truth and nothing but the

“Truth”, See attached thereto Compliance Declaration of Writ (#4) and just for the record....,

On or about July 1, 2014 Buford started working as a demo laborer for l.W&G., a

construction company for exactly two weeks and three days. The first (9) days under the direct

supervision of I.W&G’s Forman Jerry Jankowski, and the last (8) days under the illegally

positioned I.W&G’s Supervisor/269 Union Steward Ben Gomez. He and several coworkers

belonged to the Laborers’ International Union Local 269 (a protected group), which had a

contract with I.W&G. The agreement guaranteed that “Employees will not be discriminated

against because of his race.” (which indeed happened to this dumb as fucking nigger for

reporting foul play) but did not require just cause to fire a union member.

Note: With all due respect to the Honorable Justices of this Supreme Court, in the above

blackened statement Buford is being sarcastic, but also “realistic” because the saying on a

construction site is....“Shut up, Be quit, Keep your head down, Shovel moving, Don’t tell the

Truth and

“You won’t get Fired”.

Job Security 1: Only non-union employees that are hired “at will” meaning they can

be fired for no reason, although there are exceptions. Employers “cannot” terminate a

worker for discriminatory reasons such as race, religion, age and the like. Nor can they fire

an “at will” employee for being a “whistleblower”.

Arguing even further, why would l.W&G. claim that they fired Buford under the “at will

clause” then make up reasons showing “just cause” if did not need reasons for firing Buford. See

Highstone v. Westin Engineering, Inc., No. 98-1548 which states....

11.

“an at-will relationship with employer “must be clear” to the employees'1'1

or why did I,W&G., Local Union 269 and 4 go to such extreme, outrages, willful lengths as....

“filing a false police report against Buford “one or two” day after he was terminated.”

“Pro Se” Buford recently visited the Chicago Police Headquarters Record Division on at 3510 S,

Michigan Ave, Chicago, 11 60653 on December 2nd 2019 to investigate this police reports

authenticity and consistency, there was a cited record of the above actions in their legal system in

connection to this alleged (Fraudulent) report against Buford” However, with all due respect to

this most Honorable Supreme Court and its Justices thereto, let me for one moment analyze the

situation, pin point the problems and reveal the unbelievable circumstances to malicious

unwarranted situation....(1) How is that the initial police report that was written by the

reporting officer and dated July -19th, 2014 got docketed a whole day before on July 18,2014

he wrote it, or before the alleged incident was reported to him, or could have actually

occurred, (2) why is it that the police never not one time came to Buford’s residence to

question him about this alleged incident, (3) why is it that this person unbeknownst to Buford

that alleged he got threatened with a gun did not say anything about it until a whole ten days

later, or immediately report it on the day he alleged it occurred to a friend, coworker,

immediate supervisor, superintendent or even “God” for that matter, and/or like he was

instructed to do by the foreman’s every morning during the tool box talks at the job site. (4)

why is it that this conscious comprehensive person that alleges he got threatened by another

person with a gun, continue to come to work side by side with the person that he says did it,

well the solution to this scenario is “a person that was never threatened at all.” This alleged

incident never occurred and “Pro Se” Buford has yet to find out the identity of the person who

alleged this report, because if he did Buford would have been pursued a “Defamation of

Character Suit” against this person. See Timothy Ridiculous Exhibit (J2)Vol. Ill, Pg. 177-182

See Chicago Police Reports “Fraud” Packet Exhibit (#06 7) Vo 1. 1, Pg. 116-120. Article 12

Therefore, this alleged incident with Buford never happened this is just a classic example

of.... “Back dated fabricated Pretextual hearsay” pursuant to 801(a)(1)(c) which has deprived

Buford of his....Life (Career in Construction), Liberty (Just Reputation), and Property (Loss

of Home) by way of ....“Assignation/Defamation of character” See Levinsky’s, Inc. v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 127 F3d. 122 (ls< Cir. 1997) and this “Violates Buford’s Human Rights as

12.

well as his 1st, and 14*. See also 49 CFR 1570.5(a) Fraud of international Falsification of

Records. Because pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1324c this is a direct violation of the ....

Penalties of the Document Fraud Act” and “According to Chapter 73 of

Title 18 the United States Code in connection to the “Sarbanes-Oxley Act

“Anyone who knowingly falsifies “documents to impede, obstruct or influence an

investigation” shall be fined or face a prison sentence of up to 20 years”

See V.S. v. Melendez, Case No. 03-80598

and filling a false police report is a crime and can be charged as a misdemeanor or a felony....This

is an example of speech that is not protected by the First Amendment and is in fact considered....

“a crime in itself.” SeeAtt. Compliance Declaration of Writ Exhibit, (#5)

However, back to the previous Whistleblowing subject matter because, 1W.&G. Inc., was

trying to cover the fact of the “illegal act” that “Jesus Havier” used racial slurs towards another

employee on their premises, and because....

Job Security 2: Workers with union jobs “can only be fired for just cause” and the

misconduct must be serious enough to merit such action. Before an employee can be fired,

he or she can go through a grievance procedure, and if necessary, arbitration.

therefore, I.W&G. fired Buford for and Fm actually tired of repeating the racial comment from

“Hazier”, so with all due respect this most Honorable Supreme Court and its Justices thereto, I’ll

just state... you already know because Buford “never displayed any threatening behavior in

clashes with coworkers”. The only incident that Buford can be accounted for which was “merely

a verbal disagreement about wheelbarrow placement”, between him and Juan Stanford,

which should not have warranted an incident report from Vacala. See Grievance ofMorrissey 149

Vt. 1, 15, 538 A.2d 678,686 (1987) During a quarrel, a coworker and fellow union member called

Buford a racial slur. With all due respect to the Honorable Justices of this Supreme Court, this is

where I must say....

Hold on what a minute because, “Nowhere in any of the documentation pertaining to

this case “factual or Pretextual” does it state that Buford had a “quarrel with a

coworker (Hazier) who called him a racial slur.

Now, let “Pro Se” Buford make this clear and correct for the record....

During one quarrel, a coworker (Hazier) statement is “vicariously Erroneous.” However, a

fellow coworker and union member (Hazier 269) called Buford a racial slur statement is

“judicially correct”. By the Appellate Court’s own admission, they have verified that the

“racial slur actually occurred”. Therefore, this was “direct racial discrimination”, a violation

13.

of Title VII and since they (The'Union) let it go unrepaired by letting Buford be fired instead

of Hazier this makes Local Union 269 and/or I.W&G. liable under contract. See Bennett v.

Local Union No. 66, 958 F.2d 1429 (7th Cir. 1992)See also Compliance Declaration of Writ (#4)

See also Darth v. Collins 411 F.3d 931,933 (11th Cir. 2006) The Court has previously

held that “the relief granted under Title VII is against the Employer, not against the

individual employees whose actions would constitute a violation of the act, regardless of

whether the employer is a public company or a private company”.

and just for the record, and with all due respect to this most Honorable Supreme Court ...“Pro Se”

Buford strongly believe the Appellate Court was literally trying to make the racial slur seem like

an isolated situation so the Union nor the Company could therefore be liable, or apparently, the

appeals court did not assess Buford’s case properly and in all fairness because, that section of their

opinion/order was “pretext in part.” However, to correct the record to last point of this argument

Buford states that Moore and union members at I.W&G. conspired with the company to falsify

(pretextual) reports (after thefact) so that the company could (cover-up the real reason why they)

fired him. (pretextually is omitted) Because the way that the Appellate Court worded this statement

is “also pretext”, Therefore, “Pro Se” Buford objects to everything else in their opinion as

“moot”. See Appellants Additional/Response Arguments Exhibit (#078)\o1.1, Pg. 121-154, if

desired revisit-Appeals Court Final Judgement Exhibit (#045)\ol. I, Pg. 68-73.

However, and arguing even further, why should Buford have to show and/or prove “racial

animus” when “discrimination” which is its own “word”, that stand alone and has its own

definition, while discrimination itself is slapping him right in the face, such as.... on the date of

July 17lh, 2014 while Buford was being terminated, Buford heard Moore coerce and/or solicited

false statements from Steve Enis behind the trailers at the work site. See Article 12 Human Rights

Violation, See attached thereto Compliance Declaration of Writ (#6)

5 U.S.C. 7116 (e)(2)(A) (FLRA) states:

The expression of any personal view, argument, opinion or the making of any

statement which;

(2) corrects the record with respect to any false or misleading statement by

any person, or shall not, if the expression contains no threat or reprisal or force

or promised of benefit or was not made under coercive conditions, and

(A) constitute an unfair labor practice under any provision of this chapter.

14.

Solicitingfalse testimony: A person is guilty of suborning perjury if he/she attempts to

induce a “witness” to give “false testimony under oath in court or other proceeding, and the

“witness” who actually gives “false testimony” which means untrue statements. Testimony

will be false if it is untrue when it was given and known to be untrue by the witness or person

giving it. A “statement” contained within a “document” is “false” if it was untrue when used

and known to be untrue by the person using it. A person who swears to tell the truth but then

lies “undermines the legal system”.

and after the fact of Buford’s malicious unreasonable firing, and him presenting a grievance to his

“so-called union representative” on September 14, 2014, four days later the i.W&G. company

workers and 269 laborers surfaced forged and/or brought forth pretextual documents to “Moore”

in which he docketed on September 18, 2014 to justify Buford’s release. See 18 U.S.C. 1621

(willfully), 1623 (knowingly), and Article 12 Human Rights Violation. Also, and after Buford

was wrongfully terminated a (pretextual) incident report in particular surfaced in connection to

Steve Enis “269 laborer” with two (2) inconsistent dates of July 2, 2014 (Top) and July 3, 2014

(Bottom) that Enis never reported to Jerry Jankowski our immediate supervisor, was not signed

by Buford or, written or signed by Jankowski Buford’s supervisor an “l.W&G. Foreman” that he

work for and with, in zone 4 on his first day of July 1st, 2014, because it never occurred.

Furthermore, Buford could not have been insubordinate to a worker who had no authority over

him. See Rule 56 Response (#77)Val. HI, Pg. 153-237 See internal, Steve Enis (fabricated)

Report Exhibit (Q2)Pg. 216 and it never occurred, (Coerced by Moore and Forged after the fact).

See Rule 56 Response (#77)Vo 1. Ill Pg. 153-237 See internal, Jerry Jankowski transcribed

recording Exhibit (M2)Pg. 184-195 that totally contradicts Enis’s pretextual hearsay. *Hear

official audio CD is enclosed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(d) Exhibit (1:16-CV-1.0218)-1

/Substantial “material” Admissible Evidence/ See United States v. Ashurov, 726 F. 3d 395 (3rd

Cir. 2013) states:

It is a crime under 18 U.S.C. 1546, to knowingly making a false statement under oath

a document required by the immigration laws. It is also a crime “to knowingly present

any such document which contains any such false statement” See also United States v.

Saybolt, 577 F.3d 195 (3rd Cir. 2009) states:

A prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 286 for conspiring to defraud the government by

submitting a false, fraudulent or fictitious claim to the government requires proof that

the defendants conspired to submit a “materially ” false statement. On the other hand,

Section 287 simply outlaws submitting a false claim does not require proof of

materiality.

Conspiracy: a secret plan by a group to do something unlawful or harmful, the action

of plotting.

15.

and with all due respect to most this Honorable Supreme Court and its Justices thereto, Buford

states, the proof is in pudding.

Defamation of Character: Is a false statement communicated to someone else to

damage your reputation and good character, defamation through writing is, “libel”, 1st

Amendment Right.

C. The Court of Appeals 7th Circuit Incorrectly Affirmed District Court Judgement

on Duty of Fair Representation 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 160(b).

However, Buford sought help through Timothy Moore his "local union 269 business agent"

who did not, or conducted his investigate in Bad Faith (Racial Prejudice) or his assertion that he

was fired because of his race and for reporting to the company “Vacala" of being called "a dumb

ass fucking nigger” See Driver v. U.S. Postal Service, Inc., 328 F.3d 863, 868-69 (6th Cir. 2003)

by a co-worker/local union 269 member “Hazier”, See Article 5 Civil Human Rights Violation

and “Moore” apparently did not review Buford's grievance because the scheme of things were

already set, and that’s why he repeatedly refused to file it against the company (I.W&G.) which is

a “Breach of Duty and/or Duty of fair Representation” which is discrimination in itself. See

Articles 7-8 Human Rights, 14th Amendment, Title VII Violations. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.

171, 38, U.S. 203(1967) See Wells v. Chrysler Group LLC, 891 FJd 662 (6,h Cir. 2018)

In Wells, this court adopted the Seventh Circuit test established in Bugs v. International Union

Allied Industrial Workers of America, Local 507 AFL-CIO, 674 F.2d 595, 598 n.5 (7th Cir.

1982), The have held that plaintiffs are required to prove a breach of duty of fair

representation.

Indeed, district courts in this circuit-following the Seventh Circuit’s test in See Bugs v.

International Union Allied Industrial Workers ofAmerica, Local 507 AFL-CIO, 674 F.2d 595,

598 n.5 (7th Cir. 1982)-have required Title VII plaintiffs to prove that a union breached its

duty of fair representation. Beshears v. Hennessey Indus., Inc., No. 3:12-00087, 2012 WL

6093457, at *2 (N.D. Tenn. Dec. 7,2012)

but See Hout v. City ofMansfield, 550 F. Supp. 2d 701,727 (N.D. Ohio 2008). Therefore,

a claim that the duty of fair representation was breach on account of discrimination

and a claim of discrimination in failing to fairly represent the employee are essentially

the same.

Then See also, EEOC v. Lehi Roller Mills Co., No. 2:08-CV-00591 DN 2014 WL 175987, at *2

(D. Utah May 1,2014) See Rule 56 Response to Summary Judgement (#77)Vol. Ill, internal,

(J2)Pg. 177-181 and (K2 insert)Pg. in between 181-182, Tim's transcribed recording Exhibits,

Hear official audio CD is enclosed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2511 (2)(d) Exhibit (1:16-CV-10218)2ISubstantial “material” Admissible EvidenceJ

Breach ofDuty: A violation in the performance of or failure to perform an obligation

created by a promise, duty, or law without excuse or jurisdiction by a fiduciary (as an agent

16.

or corporate office) in carrying the functions of his or her position.

Duty of Fair Representation: It is a violation of 5 U.S.C. 7116 (b)(1) for labor

organization to interfere with, restrain or coerce an employee in the exercise by the employee

of any right under the Statute. (FLRA)

Once jurisdiction is established, unions may be held liable for creating or contributing to a

hostile work environment in instances where union officials either directly engage in in

discriminatory behavior, or “fail to file grievance reports” and “conduct fair investigations

in response to harassment claims by union members and employees. Both local and national

unions can be named a defendant in suits bringing harassment claims {EEOC v. National

NEA, Alaska, 422 F.3,d 840 (9th Circuit 2005). This Supreme Court have consistently held that

unions “breech both their duty of fair representation and Title VII” when they maintain a

policy, whether formal or informal, of “refusing to file grievable discrimination claims”.

(Goodman v. Litkens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987).

Buford after being denied of his Legal Union Rules and/or Rights to an impartial arbitration

obligation, that was violated by “Ben Gomez”(Union Steward) and “Timothy Moore” (Business

Rep.), he sought justice with the “National Labor Relation Board” (NLRB) on September 10,

2014 but to no avail found relief, dismissed on November 13, 2014. See National Labor Relation

Board Complaint/Dispositions Exhibits (#089)Pg. 159-179, Then thereafter Buford filed a

complaint with the “Illinois Department of Human Rights” (IDHR) against 1WG on October

16, 2014 which was dismissed. See Illinois Department of Human Rights LW&G

Complaint/Answer Exhibits (#100)\ol. Ill, Pg. 180-201.

Now before “Pro Se ” Buford moves forward with his arguments I will make assertions

that, on or about August 29, 2017 “Pro Se” Buford requested the fact finding notes prepared by

Nancy Stiles from the IDHR in connection to IWG’s fact finding conference pursuant to Rule 34

in which they declined the request, letter attached thereto exhibit. Therefore, “Pro Se” Buford

pursuant to Rule 45(D)(2)-(4) issued “Subpoena to LD.H.R. for “Fact Finding Notes”prepared

by Nancy Stiles”. However, the Office of Attorney General responded with a “Non-Party

IDHR’s Motion to Quash Subpoena”, when “Pro Se ” Buford finally received an answer to the

subpoena, it was to his surprise and disbelief that IDHR sent a duplicate copy of Barbara J. Hogan

(BJH) final disposition and one paper note form Stiles. See Motion to Quash Packet/Judge Kim’s

Orders thereto Exhibit (#111) Vol. Ill, Pg. 202-230. As i stated before, this is not the person who

investigated Buford’s claim See Att. Compliance Declaration of Writ (#7) and it’s my belief that

this was purposely done because the notes that “Pro Se” Buford: acquired is merely a smidgen of

the documents that Nancy Stiles authored at IWG’s Factfindings, her files resembled an old school

telephone book, (Buford personally reviewed these notes at the IDHR building before subpoena

17.

was served) and there were tons of pretextuai information that she (Stiles) acquired from 269

union steward “Ben Gomez” and other IWG’s employees. See Nancy Stiles Fact Finding Notes

Exhibit (#122)Vol. Ill, Pg. 231-251.

However, Buford filed a “request for review” See Request for Review Motion/Letter

Exhibit (#133)\ol. I, Pg. 252-292 with the “Human Rights Commission” (HRD), who has held

Buford's case/complaint review in limbo for five years to this date of December 2019, However,

Buford also thereafter filed a claim with (IDHR) against the Laborers International Union 269 on

March 12, 2015, See Illinois Department of Human Rights Union Complaint/Dispositions

Exhibit (#144)Vol. I, Pg. 293-326 this case was also held in limbo for ten months See 29 U.S.C.

160(b) and then due to their “lack of jurisdiction” was transferred from the Human Rights

Department to the “Equal Employment Opportunity Commission” on January 20, 2016, so

. Buford could continue his pursuit to relief, and where he received his "Right to Suit" (EEOC)

letter. See Right to Suit Letter Exhibit (#155) Vol. I, Pg. 327-329. Since Buford could not find any

kind of substantial relief at the lower level administrative agencies, he then sued the union in

Federal Court on October 31, 2016, See Discrimination Complaint Exhibit (#166)\ol. TIT, Pg.

33-35 for several legal findings of fact:

(1) The union violated Title Vn Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e2(e)(3), by

supporting segregation, a discriminatory race-based wrongful termination after Buford reported

illegal actions and/or racial slurs from active 269 union members), and breach of its duty of fair

representation for not conducting an impartial investigation, and thereafter not filing his grievance,

See Jenkins v. Schluderberg, Etc., Co. 217 Md. 556 (1958), See also Baker v. Board ofEduc, 70

N.Y. 2d 314 (N.Y. 1987) and any/or every thing else that was violated by them under the section

2000e Code; (2) It violated 42 U.S.C. 1981, section 1981 by directly participating in hostile

employment discrimination, segregation, harassment, that through an active 269 union steward

“Ben Gomez” violated. And finally, coercing and/or directly soliciting “false information from

active 269 union member(s) one in particular such as “Steve Enis”. The district court erroneously

entered summary judgment for the union because Buford did offer substantial “material" evidence

that could support his claims. SeeAtt. Thereto Rule 56 Exhibit (#77) Pretextuai Incident Reports

and 269 Laborer/IWG Worker Statements Compared to Official I.W&G. Documentation,

Exhibits Vol. Ill in which the so-called evidence is undoubtedly inconsistent to "times, dates,

locations, and performance" in connection to Buford at the job site, See McDonnell Douglas Corp

v. Green, 4111J.S. 792,802 (1973) which states:

18.

After an employee has satisfied his burden of establishing prima facie case of discrimination,

the burden of production shifts to the employer “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its termination decision. See Jones, 617 F.3d at 1278-79., which

states: Once the employer has done so, the burden shits back to the employee to show' that

the proffered reason is pretextual.

See also EEOC v. Lehi Roller Mills Co., No. 2:08-CV-00591 BN 2014 WL 175987, at *2 (B.

Utah May 1,2014) and pursuant to the Violation date(s) of July 10,2014 through August 18,2014,

Right to Suit received on August 2, 2016 and date filed then thereafter on October 31, 2016.

Section 10(b) of the NLRA provides a six-month limitation provision for unfair labor practice

suits, but pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 160(b) (1976), The Courts have “declined to apply this time

period” to “duty of fair representation actions”. See first UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383

U.S. 696,86 S. Ct. 1107,16 L. Ed. 2d 192 (1966), Echols v. Chrysler Group., 633 F.2d 722 (6th

Cir. 1980), Pitts v. Frito-Lay, 700 F.2d 330 (6* Cir. 1983), Smith v. General Corp., 747 F.2d 372

(6th Cir.1984), West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35 (1987), United Parcel Service, Inc., v. William

Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 101 S. Ct. 1559, 67 L. Ed. 2d 732, (1981) U.S. LEXIS 86., See also

Lawson v. Truck Brivers, 698 F2d 250 (6th Cir. 1983). However, Illinois State Law' pursuant to

8051LCS 5/12.80 “claims against a dissolved corporation” such as “Laborers’ Union Local 269”

has a 5-year limitation, and furthermore, in Jones v. R.R. Bonnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369

(2004), rev’g 305 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 2002) which was presented with the question of whether

section 1981 hostile work environment, wrongful termination, and failure-to-transfer claims were

governed by Congress’ 4 -year catchall statute of limitations (28 U.S.C 1658), or by the most

analogous state statute of limitations....

This Honorable Court, in its opinion authored by the Honorable Justice Stevens, held

that section 1658 applies to any claim “arising under” an act of Congress which was

enacted after December 1, 1990 - and therefore is governed by section 1658’s 4-year

statute of limitations-if plaintiff’s claim against the defendant was made possible by

apost-1999 enactment.”....42 U.S.C. 1981 Indeed, an employer may file a section 1981pursuanf to 28 U.S.C. 1658....

“within four years of the violation”

Given that the 1991 Civil Rights Act enlarged the category of conduct for which employers could

be liable, the 1991 Act qualified as “an Act of Congress enacted after December 1, 1990” subject

to the “catchall 4-year statute of limitations,” this Honorable Supreme Court’s Unanimous

concluded Therefore, pursuant to the “Cited Record Evidence” above this deems Buford’s claims

under Title VII Civil Rights Act of 1964 - section 1981 timely.

19.

ARGUMENT

II. Whether the district court order that denied the appointment of counsel under 28

U.S.C. 1915 violated plaintiff 5th, 6th, 7th, and 14th Amendment of his Civil Human

Constitutional Rights, and clarification of procedural due process of a “Person” who

cannot afford counsel.

Now, for the sake of reasons for granting this writ and arguing further, "Petitioner" Buford

believes that the district court did improperly limit the record summary judgment and/or violated

his due process Constitutional 28 U.S.C. 1915 because although in opposing summary judgment,

Buford may have violated the district court’s local rules to cite record evidence to support his

response to the defendants’ proposed fact findings. See N.D. ILL. L.R. 56.1(b)(3). Even though

pro se litigants must comply with the court rules, See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106,113

(1983), “Pro Se” Buford’s mistakes were clearly unintentional, inadvertent, clerical errors,

oversights and/or omissions at best pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), and was not to undermine

or abuse the dignity of the court because (1) At that time Buford did not know the meaning (legal

definition) of “cite record evidence” (Buford is leaning as he progresses forward) See

Additional Response/Arguments Exhibit (#078)Vol. I, Pg. 121-154 (2) No attorney would assist

him (Buford) pro bono or otherwise because he could not afford them (3) Buford supplied the

court with material evidence See Rule 56, all internal Exhibits (#77)\<ol. Ill that contradicted

and/or disputed Defendant(s) pretext material evidence to “the best of his “abilities” at that time.

SeeAtt. Finney v. Lockheed Martin Corp, Case# 13-CV-00869-MSK-MYW or BNB, Appeal#

15-1146(2016).

However, “Pro Se” Buford “did not fail to show pretext” behind his termination, and the

fact(s) in light, was not most favorable to Buford” or “liberally construed in this case”, nor did the

district court “apply any type of lenience to thereto”. In all actuality and with all due Respect to

this most Honorable Supreme Court and its Honorable Justices thereto, Buford truly believes

to the best of his knowledge and belief is that the district court’s Honorable Gary Feinerman set

him up to fail because (4) Buford “did not” leave to proceed Pro Se Informa Pauperis pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. 1915(a) “ by choice” like the Foolishness of “faretta” See Faretta v. California, 422

U.S. 806, (more) 95 S. Ct. 2525; L. Ed. 2d. 562; 1975 U.S. LEXIS 83, but Buford’s leave to

proceed was done “by force of the court” because words such as “Discretion, Complexity,

Abilities” and “infancy” allows the district court the convenience of “not honoring” the Rules

and Regulations, of a Person(s) Rights,” that have been set forth by Congress, because the fact

26.

of tlie remains, and as a matter of law.

28 U.S.C. I915(d)(e)(l) states:

(d) The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process and perform all duties in

such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in other cases, and the same remedies shall be

available as are provided for by law in other cases.

(e)(1) The court may request an attorney to represent “Any Person” unable to afford

counsel.

Therefore, the court was bias in denying Buford of his “Right to Counsel” pursuant to

1915(d)(e)(l), an Article 7 Human Right 6th, 8th, and 14th Amendment Violation for the reasons

due to "complexity" and “Buford's abilities”. See District Court Order Exhibit (#11) Vol. II, Pg.

33-35 because there was no way possible for the Honorable “Gary Feinerman” to make a

conscience, comprehensive and/or correct decision, on Buford’s legal capabilities or mental

competency without a formal hearing or evaluation, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 4241 and 4247. See

Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). The district court new for fact this case was complex

from the start, that Buford's legal consciousness was not that of a certified lawyer, and on Buford’s

second request for counsel due die case being in its “infancy”, See District Court Order Exhibit

(#22)Vol. II, Pg. 36-38, although the court new for a fact that Defendants Local Union 269 and 4

would make an appearance, “yet he was still denied “indigent person” (Buford) counsel again.

See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948). Even though the district court denied Buford “Without

Prejudice” on the second request, it was “Highly Prejudice” of the district court to deny him of

his Constitutional Right to effective counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1), thereafter the

defendant(s) 269 and 4’s lead attorney Robert S. Cervone made his appearance. See Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Arguing even further, after the defendant’s attorneys made their initial appearance on

January 4, 2017, See Attorney Appearance/Defenses to Complaint Forms Exhibit (#177)Vo1.1

Pg. 327-329 instead of district court “Appointing Plaintiff Effective Assistance of Counsel

forthwith sua syonte”, which Buford previously requested of the court, on two separate

occasions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1) or Rule 333, See Oliver, 333 US. 257 (1948) Judge

“Gary Feinerman” coerced Buford [Plaintiff-Petitioner] in preparing his own version of a Rule

26.1, by saying to

“go on google and research, it will tell you everything you need to know”

which is an Article 2, 7, 8, 10, 12 Human Rights, 6th, 7th and 14th Amendment Violations. See

District Court Jan. 31st, 2017 Order Exhibit (#188), See Plaintiff's Rule 26 Exhibit (#66)Vol.

II, Pg. 153-237, See Att. Compliance Declaration of Writ Exhibit (#8)

21.

However, the federal in forma pauperis statute pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915, “ensures that

indigent litigants that have meaningful access to the federal courts.” “not the internet” See Bruce

v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016) (citation omitted). Statute section 28 U.S.C. 1915(a)(1)

“■permits an individual to litigate a federal action “informa pauperisand to proceed without

paying otherwise-applicable court fees, “if the individual files an affidavit stating, among other

things, that he or she is unable to prepay fees ‘or give security therefor.’” See Coleman v. Tollefson,

185 S. Ct. 1759, 1762, (2015) (citation omitted). Under section 1915 (d)(e)(l), a court may

appoint “an attorney to represent “[any person]” unable to afford counsel.” See Gideon v.

Waimvrig, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (citation omitted), and Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)

(citation omitted) See also Turner v. Rogers 564 U.S. 431,131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) arguing even

further, “Nowhere in this Rule does it state... “Only Criminal Defendants or Civil Defendants

are guaranteed legal counsel”. Because, If any and/or all person(s) [citizens] born in the United

States are protected by [its] law it was , “Extremely Unconstitutional” for the district court to

deny Buford his rights under rule 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(1), for any reasons other the fact of him “not

being poor in which he should’ve been secured [in] by the law because if

[THE LAW

DEFINES] a “Poor Person as an Indigent”, and an “Indigent Person as Poor”, then therefore

a....

“Poor Plaintiff which is a Person [in a Civil Case! is an Indigent Persons too”

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,

are citizens of the United States and shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property', without due process of law; “nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction

“Equal Protection Of The Laws”.

14th Amendment

Moreover, the 7th Amendment does not apply to the states such as, IL., Ml., etc. See Walker v.

Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876), However, it does apply to the “Federal Courts of the United States”

See Wonson, (1812). 7th and/or IT1' Amendment States....“In Suits at common law, where the

value in controversy exceeds 20 dollars, the risht oftrial by jury shall be preserved. ” The district

court Violated Buford’s 7th Amendment Due Process by grating defendant’s summary judgement.

ARGUMENT

III. Whether unofficial “pretextual” papers written statements without the correct times,

dates, locations, or signatures, and “without declaration” under the penalty' of perjury

under 28 U.S.C. 1746 18 U.S.C. 1621 and 1623. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87

(1993) should have been excepted by the district or appeals court as admissible

“material” evidence to form a conclusion against Buford in this case.

22.

Now arguing even further, for reasons of granting this writ for Petitioner Buford states that

during the discovery process of this case the district court Judge Young B. Kim ordered “Plaintiff’

Buford to “sign Declarations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746 penalty of perjury under “Threat,

Duress, and Coercion of dismissal of this case”, in connection to interrogatories sent to him from

defendant(s) International Laborer’s Union 269 and 4’s attorney Robert S. Cervone, because he

pretextually stated to the courts that “Pro Se” Buford did not respond to his request to produce

which was not true. See Cervone’s Letter/Court Order/Declaration From Cervone Exhibit

(#199)Yo1.1, Pg. 338-345. However, declarations presented by “Pro Se” Buford to Cervone for

defendant’s witnesses to sign were undoubtedly denied by the district courtfs) Magistrate Judge

Young B. Kim. See Sample Declarations to Defendant Wittiness Exhibits (#200)Yol, I, Pg. 346

Note: “Pro Se” Buford was imitating the legal process that was being presented upon him.

Therefore, interrogatories and request to admits with declarations attached pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 1746 in connection to them, should have been signed by defendants’ witnesses and/or

not been denied by the court stating.... “he must find a different discovery method” because

as the ol’ adage goes.... “what’s good for goose, is good for the gander”

Therefore, it is “Pro Se” Buford’s strong knowledge and belief that the district court(s)

Judge Young B. Kim was “totally bias and extremely prejudice” for allowing defendants’

witnesses the privilege of “not signing” plaintiffs declaration to them, See District Court Orders

July 6th ,(#211)Vol I, Pg. 379-380, and Sept 5th, Exhibits (#222)\ol. I, Pg. 381 “Denying

Plaintiff’s Declarations to Witnesses”, which Petitioner strongly believes was a violation of his

due process. See Turney v, Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (lack of impartial trial judge) 14th

Amendment Right Violation. Also, Moore 269 B.A. declaration in defendants Motion for

Summary Judgement was excepted as admissible evidence by the court, however “Buford’s

Declaration” See Rule 56 Appellant Brief Exhibit (#77), Buford’s Declaration (D2) which “was

cited” thereto on (Pg. 8, Line 3) See Actual/Factual Declaration Pg. 158-160 that was omitted

by “Pro Se” Buford due to a clerical error/oversight (merely technical), and was denied by the

district court(s) knowing that Buford had more than just personal knowledge, but had factual

knowledge of what really occurred on the job site because he was there, and by this, Buford

strongly believes his 14th Amendment due process rights were violated here also. Because who

would’ve thought it was a time limit on telling truth, and nothing but the truth. See Turney v. Ohio,

273 U.S. 510 (1927) (lack of impartial trial judge) See also Ihenacor v. Price, ELH-18-3342

(D. Md. Mar. 28,2019).

23.

Declaration or Affidavit states: A declaration/affidavit must be based on the

“declarant’s personal knowledge”. The personal knowledge requirement for a declarant on

summary judgement is minimal; if reasonable persons could differ as to whether the witness

has personal knowledge of the facts stated, the declaration testimony is “admissible.”

U. S. Code 1746(1) states:

Wherever under any law of the United States or under any rule, regulation, order, or

requirement made pursuant to law, any matter is “required or permitted to be

supported, evidence, established, or proved by the sworn declaration”, verification,

certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in writing of the person which is “subscribed

by him, as true under the penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following

form:

I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury under the laws of The United

States of America that foregoing is true and correct. Executed on.... (date) and (signature)

(Added Pub. L. 94-550, Sec.I(a), Oct. 18,1976,90 Stat. 2534.)

Therefore, with all due respect to this most Honorable Supreme Court and Honorable

Justices thereto, the Honorable Gary Feinerman in his “Memorandum Opinion” which he

stated....

....“We are hard-pressed to see how [the] (Buford’s) affidavit could constitute

compliance with [Local] Rule 56.1..... [The] (Buford’s) affidavit in no way

constitutes a concise response to each numbered paragraph in the [Local

Rule 56.1(a)(3)] statements.

See Memorandum Opinion Order Exhibit (#88)Vol. Ill, Pg. 317 of Pgs. 4-5, L. 1-29) This is a

classic example of....”the lower Courts not Liberally Construing in the light most favorable to

Buford, or Appling any type of lenience thereto. Furthermore, to the best of Buford’s Wisdom,

Knowledge, and Understanding of the law is that....“Declarations and/or Affidavits is to prove

the truth period.” Arguing even further, and with all due Respect to the Honorable Supreme

Courts Justices of this Honorable Court, “Pro Se” Buford is also hard-pressed to know how the

District Court formally known as the....“Justice System” could’ve, would’ve, or should’ve

excepted tissue paper statements/documentation without Declaration as “Substantial Evidence”

in this suite, or in any other .... “Court or Legal Proceeding in the United States of America”.

Therefore, the documents submitted by Cervone from Defendants so-called witnesses

without Signature under the penalties of perjury pursuant to 1760 28 U.S.C. 1746 should not have

been, or be allowed, nor is credible or worthy as admission of evidence in this colorful case. See

Sutter v. Easterly, 354 Mo. 282,189 S.W.2d 284 (Sept 4,1945) Sup. C. Mo. Div. One

24.

A. Whether Local Union 269 and IWG employee’s “Obstructed Justice ”, through

its attorney Robert S. Cervone’s “ Violations of Candor Rule 3.3.”

Petitioner Buford now argues that the pretextual documents and statements supplied by

defendant’s local union 269 and 4’s attorney Cervone’s so-called witnesses who has the potential

of not even existing, was clearly a strategic tactic to cover all their illegal actions they had

committed. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1001 this “undermines the integrity and prestigiousness of this

Honorable Supreme Court” and is blatant “Obstruction of Justice” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1503,

1505, 1512 and should be dealt with accordingly pursuant to the law. See Hubbard v. United

States, 115 S. Ct. 1754,1764 & n.15. See also False Statement Accountability Act of 1996, P.L.

104-292, H.R.3166, (Oct. 11, 1996) and See this Manual at 902 et seq.

See United States v. Ashurov, 726 F. 3d 395 (3rd Cir. 2013) states: It is a crime under 18

U.S.C. 1546, to knowingly making a false statement under oath a document required by the

immigration laws. It is also a crime “to knowingly present any such document which contains

any such false statement”

The Supreme Court in Arthur Andersen held that the “nexus” requirement that the

Court found in Aguilar with respect to 18 U.S.C. 1503, which applies to the existing

official proceedings, also applies to 18 U.S.C. 1512 which covers foreseen proceedings.

Therefore, the government must prove that the defendant knew that his actions would

likely affect foreseen proceedings.

And finally, to be clear, it is “not necessary” under 18 U.S.C. 1512 to show that the defendant’s

actions had their intended affect. In an illustrative case in 1997...,

The Sixth Circuit held that “an endeavor to obstruct justice violates the law even

if...the plan is doomed to failure.” It is the president’s attempts to stop grand jury

proceedings that matter, not whether or not he succeeded, or was likely to succeed.

Although the so-called Defendants Witnesses “Pretextual Statements and Documentation did

affect Buford’s legal proceedings, the relevant federal criminal provision-18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2)

Makes it a crime to obstruct “any official proceeding or attempt to do so.” The statute

specifies that “an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at

the time of the offence” See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States 544 U. S. 696 (2005)

Prosecutors bringing charges under 18 U.S.C. 1525 must show that an official

proceeding, such as a grand jury investigation was foreseen, and that the defendant

knew that his actions would likely affect those proceedings.

However, seeing as though Petitioner has thoroughly argued pretext in the previous afore

mentioned arguments, and as not to be so repetitive “Pro Se” Buford states...

25.

Pretexts: May be based on half-truth or develop in context of a misleading fabrication.

Pretexts: Are used to conceal the true purpose or rationale behind actions and words.

Pretexts: Usually describes false reasons that hide the true intentions or motivations

for a “Illegal Action” See McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802 (1973)

After an employee has satisfied his burden of establishing prima facie case of discrimination,

the burden of production shifts to the employer “to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for its termination decision. See Jones, 617 F.3d at 1278-79., which

states: Once the employer has done so, the burden shits back to the employee to show that

the proffered reason is pretextual.

Then See also EEOC v. Lehi Roller Mills Co., No. 2:08-CV-00591 DN 2014 WL 175987, at *2

(D. Utah May 1, 2014)

Therefore, the McDonnell v. Douglas, test “should not apply” See Hout v. City of

Mansfield, 550 F. Supp. 2d 701, 727 (N.D. Ohio 2008) Because once a lie hits the light only the

truth remains. Therefore “Racist and Prejudice” are one in the same, and together these fonn

“Racial Prejudice”, which equals “Discrimination” because;

Racist: Is a person who shows or feels discrimination or prejudice against people of

other races: and

Prejudice: Is harm or injury that results or may result from some action or judgement.

However, See Finney v. Lockheed Martin Corp, Case# 13-CV-00869-MSK-MYW or BNB,

Appeal# 15-1140 (2016) because with all due respect to most Honorable Supreme Court and its

Honorable Supreme Justices thereto, “Pro Se” Buford must state again that he “did not fail to

establish pretext”. Therefore, Buford’s prima facia of racial slurs being used towards him and

Buford being wrongfully terminated in connection with 269 laborers/IWG employees “fabricated,

un-sensible, inconsistent, and contradictable statements/documentation” prima facia

pretextual hearsay such as... threatening behavior, physical altercations, safety violations and

poor work performance, and supervisor placement, for these actions a reasonable factfinder could

rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the “employer did not act for the

asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” See Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 f.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.

1997) (citation omitted); See also Reeves v. Sanderson Pluming Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133,148

(2000)....states;

(“}Aj plaintiff’s prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the

employers asserted justification is “false” may permit the trier of fact to conclude that

the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee.”)

26.

And furthermore, the district courts Honorable Gary Feinerman by his own admission stated in

his own choice of words within his Memorandum Opinion that Material evidence submitted by

269 Laborers/IWG employees was Pretext”, by stating....

“First, that the statements that Moore heard or read are not hearsay because they are

used not for the truth of the matters asserted, rather to show their effect on Moore

during his investigation into Buford’s termination.” See District Court Memorandum

Opinion/Order Exhibit (#88)Yol. Ill, Pg. 325-326 Line. 22-24

uPro Se” Buford does not concur because the statements were present as “the truth”, but 269

laborers/IWG employees didn’t realize that Buford could analyze the situation and reveal the

flaws, (lop holes) Furthermore, Buford does concur with the fact that the false statements and

Documentation was recognized by the court which caused an adverse action in Moore illegally

denying Buford of his Right to duty of fair representation and also, caused him not to conduct a

fair investigation on Buford’s behalf.

Now let us pause for a moment ant think about this....if Ben Gomez the 269 steward that

reports to Moore the 269 Business Rep. about the activities on the job site, and is the person who

is supplying the most pretextual information, wouldn’t be safe to say.... Moore knew the illegal

acts he was committing against Buford. That’s neither here nor there now, because the fact remains

and as a matter of law the statements presented were “Pretext”. Therefore, with all due respect

from “Pro Se” Buford again, what this most Honorable Supreme Court Justices may take into

deep consideration is that several 269 union members, and especially the “fact” that “1A1 Union

steward “Ben Gomez” who is an official agent for the Union” and is required to “Protect

members fBufordl of the Union”, wrote and submitted “false statement/reports” to the Courts

See Gomez Letter Exhibit (#77)\oi. Ill, internal Exhibit (S)Pg. 110-111, Compared to Pro Se

Buford’s Analyses of the letter Pg. 5, Section B2(i) and Work Placement Sheets Exhibit (T)Pg.

112-116, through lead attorney Robert S. Cervone should make them liable for “Discrimination,

Duty of Fair Representation, and Obstruction of Justice”, because “Pro Se” Buford “did not

fail to establish pretext”. See also Defendants Request to Admit Answers Rule 56 (#77) Vol. Ill,

internal Exhibit (G)Pg. 82-83, Request #13-14. Then See also Exhibit (K)Pg. 94 Line 9, and 95

Line 3. (verification of Gomez as supervisor for Buford) there is tons of pretext inside Vol. Ill

and throughout this entire case against Buford. See EEOC v. National NEA, Alaska, 422 at 840

Therefore, the “Laborers International Union of North America”, Timothy W. Moore

“its Business Agent and its Union Steward” Ben Gomez should be “disciplined” for the willful

27.

dishonesty of them making false statements, because “fabrication, hearsay, and Pretextual

evidence is one in the same pursuant 801 federal rules of evidence, and the company with the

unions actions were, which is to the best of “Pro Se” Buford’s knowledge, belief and

understanding is a direct violation of these Rules 801(a)(1)(c), 801(a)(l)(e)(A), 801(d)(l)(B)(i)

and/or 801(c)(!)(2). “Violation of Buford’s 6th and 14th Amendment RightsSee All Forged

Pretextual Document/Statements again If Desired in Exhibit (#77)Vol. ITT, See Federal Rules

ofEvidence 801-803,901 Exhibit (#233), See also United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).

Now as far as Cervone’s role is concerned in connection these circumstances, he submitted

falsified evidence to the courts and pursuant to Penal Code 132 PC this is a violation of See Civil

Liabilities (740 ILCS 175) Illinois False Claims Act, and his actions were also a direct violation

of his candor because pursuant to Magistrate Kim’s statements to “Pro Se” Buford in open court,

Cervone is the person who answers and/or answered all of the questions requested from him by

Buford throughout the entire discovery process, SeeAtL Declaration of Writ (#9) therefore....

Rule 3.3(a)(l)(3) Candor states',

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly;

(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or to correct a false

statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the

lawyer; make a false statement of fact

client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and

the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable

remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.

Now before “Pro Se” Buford ends these arguments about Cervone violating his Candor pursuant

to Rule 3.3 1 will state that, attorney Robert S. Cervone by his own admission in his Response

BriefArg. #4 on page 28, line 10-12 confirms that the “Material Evidence” was “Pretext” by

stating....

....“Local 4 did not introduce those statements to “prove the truth” of matters asserted”

and “the District Court’s rulings are based on well-settled principals”

basically, this statement says attorney Cervone knew his clients were being untruthful from the

beginning, and therefore “Pro Se” Buford does not concur with the statement again because 269

Laborers/TWG employee’s put forth the statements as if they were the truth, in order to cause a

scenario for which they terminated' Buford. (Defamation of Buford’s Character) Attorney

28.

Cervone is the person who actually and knowingly in “Bad Faith” submitted the pretextual

documents to the court which violates Candor Rule 3.3(a)(3), See Texas v. United States of

America, (April 17, 2016) (citations omitted) in the companion order, Judge Hanen made this

blistering statement against the DOJ lawyers whom he found had violated Rule 3.3:

Fabrications, misstatements, half-truths, artful omissions, and the failure to correct

misstatements may be acceptable, albeit lamentable, in other aspects in life; but in the

courtroom, when the attorney Knows that both the Court and the other side are

relying on complete frankness, such conduct is unacceptable.

Let’s view Judge Hanen’s accusations of serious unethical conduct against these lawyers in the

context of the complex issues arising out of this case, because there’s no well-settled principals or

morals behind the District and Appeals Court excepting pretextual statements that adversely

caused a “Civil Human Being (Buford) extreme and unmeasurable loss.” See Tumey v, Ohio, 273

U.S. 510 (1927) (lack of impartial trial judge(s]) See Article 12 Human Rights Violation, and

T', 5th, 6th, 7h, 14th Amendment Violations, See Atf, Compliance Declaration of Writ (#9)

Moreover, and in ending this argument, “Pro Ac” Buford must state that attorney Cervone also

violated his.... “Rules of Professional Conduct pursuant to 3.3(a)(3)(b)”

See Liar, Liar: What Do When Your Client Lies Exhibit. (#244)

See People v. Miller, No. 16PDJ067,2017 BL 208514

ARGUMENT

IV. Whether the district court allowed Robert S. Cervone and David P. Lichtman to

violate Buford’s “Article 12,14thand 9thAmendment right to Privacy” by inviting

Timothy Moore (269 Business Agent) and Brin R. Kelsey to be present at Buford’s

depositions.

A. Whether attorney Cervone and Kelsey violated a direct court order pursuant

CCP2025.420(b)(12) by Cervone inviting Brian R. Kelsey (IWG attorney) to the

second session, and thereafter the district court allowed him the privilege of

violating his Candor.

On June 22, 2017 Plaintiff Buford was ordered by the district court and he reported as

ordered. But unfortunately, Cervone had planned to conduct the depositions in “Bad Faith”,

because upon Buford’s arrival Moore the culprit and ringleader to this malicious misuse and abuse

of authority discriminatory based case, was present. Plaintiff complied with the courts order and

29.

started his depositions, due to irrelevant questioning from Cervone and the unruly facial

expressions from Timothy Moore and his presence alone put Plaintiff-Petitioner in an

“Unreasonably Annoying, Intimidating, and Oppressed situation”. Therefore, pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 (d)(3)(A) Buford terminated his depositions. See Plaintiff’s June 22, 2017

Deposition First Session Exhibit (#33)Vol. IT, Pg. 39-40.

However, Plaintiff “Pro Se” Buford filed a written motion in district court before the

Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim to terminate his depositions permanently, which as usual was

denied and therefore sanctions were requested by defendant’s attorney Cervone and granted

against plaintiff (Buford] for terminating his depositions. See District Magistrate Judge Young B.

Kim See Court Order Exhibits July 12?h, 2017 (#255)V61.1, Pg. 406 and Sept lVh, 2017 (#266)

Applying and Granting Sanctions. Buford then thereafter filed a motion for review in the district

court before the Honorable Garry Feinerman. See District Court Order July 24th, 2017 Exhibit

(#277) which to no surprise was also overruled and denied. See District Honorable Gary

Feinerman Sept. IP1' ,2017 Court Order Exhibit (#288).

Now, on or about September 11, 2017 and October 25, 2017 “Pro Se” Buford and

Defendants Local Union 269 and 4 attorney Cervone appeared in district court before the

Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim. Buford was ordered to finish his depositions and at one of these

appearances [“Pro Se” Buford prefers the latter date of Oct. 25, but not for sure] gave Cervone

strict court instructions and/or standing court order pursuant to CCP 2025.426(b)(12) to “not” let

Timothy Moore or anybody else for that matter attend Buford’s second session of depositions

other than Cervone himself, his assistant attorneys, and the court reporter, See Vol. II, 103/Pg. 167

of Depo’s and as this most Honorable Supreme Court may have already guessed, did not happen.

On or about November 16, 2017 Plaintiff Buford once again reported to depositions as

ordered by the Courts See Depositions Exhibit (#33~2)Vol. II, Pg. 75/Pg. 92 of Depo’s and not to

Buford’s surprise up to his ol’ slick antics again because upon starting his depositions and about

10 to 15 minutes into questioning Buford recognized an unidentified person sitting in the comer

of the conference room taking notes before Buford asked....“who is that?” which was third-party

iWG’s attorney Brian R. Kelsey and he was not supposed to be there pursuant to the Courts Order.

See 77/Pg. 98 of Depo’s Moreover, and make a long argument short, Cervone stated that....“he

requested that he not attend” See Pg. 53/Pg. 4 of Depo’s. Cervone tries to get Kelsey’s confirmation

to the above statement by asking...“Mr. Kelsey can you confirm that?” but Kelsey never confirmed

36.

Cervone’s as this Honorable Supreme Court Justices will notice upon review of transcripts. See

53/Pg. 5 of Depo’s Nor did Cervone at any time try to escort him out the conference room, he

[Cervone] tried to continue conducting Buford’s depositions despite a direct court order as usual.

Buford requested that the Honorable Judge Feinerman be called, See 101/Pg. 158 of

Depo’s but Cervone was reluctant to do so because he knew he was in violation of an order. Buford

stopped his depositions pursuant to 30(d)(3)(A) and was persistent about calling the judge and

eventually the call was made, and Magistrate Judge Kim was reached. See 76/Pg. 97 of Depo’s

Upon Judge Kim finding out the situation in connection with call he told Kelsey to remove himself

because he wasn’t to be there. See 104/Pg. 170 of Depo’s. Wherefore, to the best of “Pro Se”

Buford’s knowledge and belief is that Cervone conducted Buford’s depositions in “Bad faith”

once again, and was a direct violation to Buford’s 9th Amendment “Right to Privacy” because

blatantly violated his Candor in connection to “Judge Kim’s Order” See Pounder v. Watson, 521

U.S. 982 (1987), See also United States v. Allen, 587 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2009). See Att.

Compliance Declaration of Writ (#10) because....,

Rule 3.4(a)(c) candor states: A lawyer shall not;

(a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter,

destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary

value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act; or

open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;

B. Whether the district court “Article 5 and 8th Amendment Right to Freedom offines

or cruel and unusual punishment ” for exercising his right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 30(d)(3)(A).

Now, thereafter on July 12,2017 Magistrate Judge Kim applied a fine $ 1,870 See Exhibit

(#255)\ol. I, Pg. 406 and then on September 1 i, 2017 he ordered Plaintiff Buford to pay $95 under

Threat and Duress of Dismissal if payments were not made to Cervone, See Exhibit (#255)\ol.

I, Pg. 407 for applying the Rules pursuant to 30(d)(3)(A) after being put in an intimidating,

oppressed, unreasonably annoying situation Cervone, Lichtman, Moore, and Kelsey while

attending his depositions which Buford believes was....“cruel and unusual punishment”

See Turney v, Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (lack of impartial trial judgejsj)

31.

ARGUMENT

V. Title VII discrimination claims alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c) by a union are

not subject to the requirements and limitations applicable to a claim that a union violated

its duty of fair representation.

A. To establish a discrimination claim against the union under Title VII, a plaintiff

is not required to satisfy the requirements for establishing a claim that the union

discriminatorily breached its (D.F.R.) Duty of Fair "Representation.

The district court concluded that when a plaintiff sues a union under Title VIT, he must

satisfy an additional burden to prevail; he must establish that the union violated its duty of fair

representation. Order, In so ruling, however, the court failed to account for the overwhelming

body of authority—both statutory and case law—that compels the contrary conclusion. Simply

put, the standards governing duty of fair representation claims do not govern Title VII

discrimination claims against a union. In 2000e-2(c) of Title VII, Congress established a statutory

scheme prohibiting a broad array of discriminatory conduct by unions. The statute makes it

unlawful for a labor organization to “exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to

discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42

U.S.C. 2000e-2(c)(l). The statute further makes it unlawful for a union to “limit, segregate, or

classify its membership or applicants for membership, or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for

employment any individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of

employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely

affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual’s

prohibits unions from “causing] or attempting] to cause an employer to discriminate against an

individual in violation of this section.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c)(2)-(3); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e3 (prohibiting additional forms of discriminatory conduct by both employers and unions).

Notably, in drafting 2000e-2(c), Congress defined discrimination by unions broadly to

encompass a union’s discriminatory conduct toward any individual—not just union members or

members of a particular bargaining unit. Cf NLRB v. Sw. Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 939 (2017)

(recognizing Congress’ use of term “person,” rather than a narrower but “readily available

alternative” term, as indicating broad statutory coverage). Moreover, and of particular importance

here, Title VII does not limit prohibited discriminatory actions to those involving the terms of a

collective bargaining agreement or to the breach of any particular union obligation.

32.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(c)(l)-(3), 2000e-3; Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 667

(1987) (emphasizing that Title VII makes it unlawful for unions to “exclude or to expel from its

membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin” (quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(c)(i)) (emphasis added by court)),

abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004).

In contrast, the cause of action against a union for violating its duty of fair representation

is a distinct protection, narrower than Title VII in its scope of coverage, with different substantive

requirements and more limited remedies. The duty of fair representation doctrine has its origins

in the Supreme Court and the common law. See Vacav. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181 (1967). “Under

the doctrine of fair representation, the union, as an exclusive agent of the employees, is obliged to

‘serve the interests of all its members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise

discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.’” Emswiler v.

CSX Tramp., Inc., 691 F.3d 782, 793 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177). This

doctrine “has stood as a bulwark to prevent arbitrary union conduct against individuals stripped of

traditional forms of redress by the provisions of federal labor law.” Vaca, 386 U.S. at 182. “To

prevail on a claim for breach of duty of fair representation, (the plaintiff} must show that (1) the

action taken by the (union} was contrary to the CBA; and (2) that the action was dishonest, in bad

faith, or discriminatory.” Emswiler, 691 F.3d at 793 (citing Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,

424 U.S. 554,570-71 (1976)).

While the duty of fair representation doctrine complements the protection against union

discrimination Congress provided in Title VII, a duty of fair representation claim is subject to

unique burdens and limitations that do not apply to claims under U.S.C. 2000e-2(c). First, courts

limit duty of fair representation claims to union conduct that contravenes the collective bargaining

agreement. See Emswiler, 691 F.3d at 793 (recognizing that to establish a duty of fair

representation claim, the plaintiff must show that “the action taken by the [union] was contrary to

the CBA”) (citing Hines, 424 U.S. at 570-71). This is necessarily a narrower category of

discriminatory conduct by unions than is covered by Title VII, which contains no such

limitation. See, e.g., Goodman, 482 U.S. at 667 (emphasizing the breadth of union conduct subject

to Title VII protection against discrimination by unions as to include “excluding] or to expel from

its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(c)(1) (emphasis added by court)). The duty of fair representation is also limited to protecting

bargaining unit members only, unlike Title VIFs protection of “any individual” from

33.

discrimination by unions. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 190 (“A breach of the statutory duty of fair

representation occurs only when a union’s conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining

unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.”); Alien v. CSX Tramp., Inc., 325 F.3d 768, 772

(6th Cir. 2003) (observing that a union’s duty of fair representation does not extend to non

members of the bargaining unit).

In addition, courts have indicated that a more rigorous standard of proof applies to duty of

fair representation claims than to Title VIT claims against a union. See Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974) (observing that, since “a breach of the union’s duty of

fair representation may prove difficult to establish,” “it is noteworthy that Congress thought it

necessary to afford the protections of Title VII against unions as well as employers”) (citing 42

U.S.C. 2000e-2(c); Vaca, 386 U.S. 171; Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342, 348-51 (1964));

cf Garity v. APWII Nat’l Labor Org., 828 F.3d 848, 864 (9th Cir. 2016) (observing that the

“plaintiff-friendly pleading standards” under Title VII “make clear that the free hand unions have

in other labor matters does not extend to discrimination suits.... [A] plaintiff may have an easier

path to proving a Title VII. . . claim when she can also show that the union has violated its duty

of fair representation... . [T]he converse is not necessarily true: A plaintiff may still have a Title

Vil. . . claim even if she can’t prove a violation of the labor laws.”). The availability of damages

also substantially differs under each type of claim. Courts have recognized that in a duty of fair

representation suit, recovery of compensatory damages for injuries such as emotional distress is

available “only in exceptional circumstances” and requires an additional showing that the union’s

conduct was both unlawful and “extreme and outrageous.” Cantrell v. Ini 7 Bhd. ofElec. Workers,

Local 2021, 32 F.3d 465, 468-69 (10th Cir. 1994); see also Angel v. United Paperworkers Int’l

Union (PACE) Local 1967, 221 F. App’x 393, 402 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpubl.) (citing Cantrell as

support for the conclusion that “[t]he Union’s conduct in this case is not sufficiently exceptional

or extreme to merit damages for emotional distress”). As for punitive damages, this Court has

held that, “punitive damages are not available against a union for breach of the duty of fair

representation.” Wilson v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen dr Helpers ofAm.,

AFL-CIO, 83 F.3d 747, 754<6th Cir. 1996Xciting Int’l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S.

42, 52 (1979)).

These limited remedies stand in stark contrast to those available for discrimination claims

under Title VII. With the 1991 amendments to Title VII, Congress expressly provided for recovery

of compensatory and punitive damages in suits against unions under § 2000e-2(c).

34.

42 U.S.C. 1983a; see generally Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U S. 526 (1999) (discussing

available damages under Title VII, with particular focus on punitive damages). In so doing,

Congress did not limit the availability of such damages to “exceptional circumstances” of “extreme

and outrageous” conduct. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; Kolstad, 527 U.S. 526.

Because of these differences, the Supreme Court and the appellate courts around the

country have long treated Title VII and duty of fair representation claims as distinct causes of

action, each with its own particular requirements for establishing a violation. See, e.g., Goodman,

482 U.S. at 667 (in upholding Third Circuit’s affirmance of jury finding of union discrimination

under Title VII, noting that court of appeals did not affirm based on a finding of a duty of fair

representation violation, but because “it held' that the Unions had violated [§ 2OO0e-2}”); Garity,

828 F.3d at 858, 864 (stating that “nothing in Title VII suggests that union members must

demonstrate a breach of the union’s contractual duty to provide fair representation before stating

a claim for racial, religious, or gender discrimination under Title VII,” and “[a] plaintiff may still

have a Title Vli . . . claim even if she can’t prove a violation of the labor laws.”); Green v. Am.

Fed. ofTeachers/Ill. Fed. of Teachers Local 604, 740 F.3d 1304,1105-07 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding

that establishing a Title VII discrimination claim against a union does not require showing a

violation of the duty of fair representation). Cf. 14 Venn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U .S. 247 (2009)

(recognizing, in the analogous context of discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., that such discrimination claims exist as remedies “in

addition” to a duty of fair representation claim); Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 48-49 (recognizing

in Title VII employment discrimination suit that “legislative enactments in this area have long

evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies against discrimination,” and

“die legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue

independently his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes. . .

. Title VII was designed to supplement, rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating

to employment discrimination”).

Moreover, both in this Court and elsewhere, a plaintiff may establish a union’s violation

of 2000e-2(c) by resort to the same well-established methods of proofthat have long been available

in Title VII suits against employers. See, e.g., Reed v. Int 'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace &

Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 569 F.3d 576, 579-82 (6th Cir. 2009) (analyzing Title VII

religious accommodation claim against union under same framework applicable in suits against

employers); Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers' hit 7 Union ofN Am., 177 F.3d 394, 402-07 (6th

35.

Cir. 1999) (analyzing Title Vll disparate treatment and disparate impact race discrimination

claims against union under frameworks applicable in suits against employers); Green, 740 F.3d at

1106-07 (recognizing applicability of proof framework provided in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a Title Vll suit against an employer, to Title VII claims against

unions); see also Garity, 828 F.3d at 861-64 (adopting analysis of Green)', Martinez v. Ini’l Bhd.

of Elec. Workers-IBEW Local Union No. 98, 352 F. App’x 737, 740 (3d Cir. 2009) (applying

McDonnell Douglas framework to Title Vl-I claim against union).

In light of the foregoing authority, the district court was incorrect to conclude that a plaintiff

in a Title VII action against a union must satisfy the requirements for, and is subject to the

limitations of, a duty of fair representation claim. In ruling otherwise here, the district court relied

principally on two authorities: the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Buggand this Court’s unpublished

decision in Wells. See Order, R.91, PageID#4210-l 1. However, neither Bugg nor Wells compels

the conclusion the district court reached. As to Bugg, the Seventh Circuit has explicitly repudiated

that decision’s applicability to Title VII suits against unions. That court of appeals has now held

that the duty of fair representation requirements discussed in Bugg (and relied upon in Wells and

by the district court here) play no role in a Title VII claim against a union. See Green, 740 F.3d at

1106. In Green, the Seventh Circuit addressed the district court’s conclusion on summary

judgment that “a union cannot be liable under Title VII unless it fust violates a duty created by

statute or contract,” and that since the plaintiff “failfed] to meet his prirna facie burden to establish

that the Union breached the CBA or owed a duty of fair representation to him, the Court need not

address whether the Union had any discriminatory animus.” 740 F.3d at 1105. The court of

appeals disagreed, stating that “[njeither 2000e~2(c) nor § 2000e-3(a) makes anything turn on the

existence of a statutory or contractual duty violated by the act said to be discriminatory,” and

“[njothing in the text or genesis of Title VII suggests that claims against labor organizations should

be treated differently.” According to the Green court, a contrary approach would render Title Vll

claims of discrimination against unions “either unavailing or unnecessary.” Id. at 1106.

The Seventh Circuit observed that the district court had relied on dictum in Greenslade v.

Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 112 F.3d 853, 866 (7th Cir. 1997), when it applied the Bugg factors to a

Title VII claim against a union. Green, 740 F.3d at 1106. Criticizing that dictum in Greenslade

as having “conflatjed] Title VII with the elements of a hybrid breacb-of-contract/duty-of-fairrepresentation claim against an employer and union under 29 U.S.C. 185,” Green concluded that

“[tjhis approach does not bear any evident relation to Title VII, and we now withdraw the

language.”

36.

The Seventh Circuit further explained that “{wjhen the Supreme Court established the

elements of a prima facie case in [McDonnell Douglas], it did not include any element that

depended on breaking a contract. . .. [W]e . . . are not. authorized to add to that framework in a

way that causes Title VII as administered to include elements missing from Title Vll as

enacted.” Id. at 1106-07. Accordingly, it concluded, “[a] claim against aTabor organization under

2000e-2(c)( 1) or § 2000e-3(a) does not depend on showing that either the employer or the union

violated any state statute or contract. Such a requirement cannot properly be added as part of the

prima facie case.” Id. at 1107. In light of the Seventh Circuit’s repudiation of the application of

Bugg to Title VII suits against unions, the district court’s reliance on Bugg for that premise cannot

stand. Nor does this Court’s unpublished decision in Wells furnish any meaningful support for the

district court’s decision. In Wells, this Court addressed a claim that the plaintiff s union violated

Title Vll when it failed to represent her because of her race and sex. Wells, 559 F. App’x at 51315. The Court observed that “district courts in this circuit—following the Seventh Circuit’s test

in Bugg . . . —have required Title VTI plaintiffs to prove that a union breached its duty of fair

representation.” Wells, 559 F. App’x at 514 (citations omitted). The Court concluded that “a claim

that the duty of fair representation was breached on account of discrimination and a claim of

discrimination in failing to fairly represent the employee are essentially the same,” and that the

union’s alleged conduct would “be both discrimination and a violation of the duty of fair

representation—the difference here is naught.” Id.

In reaching its conclusion, the panel in Wells did not explore in any depth the propriety of

applying the duty of fair representation requirements to a Title VII suit, or the authority recognizing

the distinctions between each type of claim. See Wells, 559 F. App’x at 513-15. Instead, Wells

equated these two distinct legal claims based on its observation that “district courts in this circuit”

have followed Bugg, and on a single citation to an out-of-circuit district court case. Id. at

514. However, as discussed previously, the published decisions of this Court, the Supreme Court,

and other courts of appeals have long treated Title Vll and duty of fair representation

discrimination claims against unions as distinct causes of action with distinct methods of proof

and remedies. See supra, at 8-17. Wells also failed to account for the Seventh Circuit’s rejection

in Green of Bugg’s application to Title VII union suits. See Wells, 559 F. App’x at 513-15.

Accordingly, the Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court revisit the issue of the

inapplicability of the duty of fair representation doctrine to statutory Title VII claims. While these

two types of claims are and have always been distinct, the Green court’s repudiation of McDonnell

37.

and or Bugg’s applicability to Title Vll cases further undermines any basis for treating these

causes of action as indistinguishable.

B. Whether punitive damages are available remedies in a Title VII. claim against a

union are remedies available in a duty of fair representation claim.

In addressing the arguments for compensatory and punitive damages, the district court only

considered the remedies available in a duty of fair representation claim. The court then concluded

that the plaintiffs could not recover compensatory damages absent a showing of “extreme and

outrageous*’ conduct by the union, and that punitive damages are never available as a matter of

law. Order,

In reaching these conclusions, the district courts make no mention of Title VII’s damages

provision, nor of any other authority addressing the damages available under Title VII. Instead,

the court relied solely on briefs, which itself cited only a single district court decision that did not

address the availability of damages under Title Vll. J. Br. at 22 (citing Niizsche v. Stein, 797 F.

Supp. 595, 599 (N.D. Ohio 1992))); see also Niizsche, 797 F. Supp. at 599 (addressing damages

available in duty of fair representation action; making no mention of damages available under Title

VII). However, both the statute and other controlling authority undermine the district court’s

conclusion.

With its 1991 amendment of Title VII, Congress provided compensatory and punitive

damages as available remedies for violations of § 2000e-2(c). See 42 U.S.C. § 198 la(a) (providing

for recovery of compensatory and punitive damages “against a respondent who engaged in

unlawful intentional discrimination . . . prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the acts (42

U.S.C. 2000e-2 or 2000e-3)”). As the Supreme Court recognized in Kolstaci, in section 1981a

“Congress plainly sought to impose two standards of liability—one for establishing a right to

compensatory damages and another, higher standard that a plaintiff must satisfy to qualify for a

punitive award.” 527 U.S. at 534. Thus, while both compensatory and punitive damage awards

require a showing of intentional discrimination, Kols/ad, 527 U.S. at 534, punitive damage awards

additionally require a showing that the violation was committed “with malice or reckless

indifference

the

federally

protected

rights

aggrieved

individual,”

U.S.C. 198 la(b)(I). These are the only limitations on the ability of individuals to receive

compensatory and punitive damages under Title VII.

38.

When interpreting the meaning of a statute, ‘“ftjhe language of the statute is the starting

point for interpretation, and it should also be the ending point if the plain meaning ofthat language

is clear/” U.S. v. Henry, 819 F3d 856.870 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The plain language

of Title VIFs remedial provision shows that Congress did not limit the availability of

compensatory damages to cases of “extreme and outrageous" conduct by the union, and on the

contrary it made punitive damages available in appropriate cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(a);

CONCLUSION

Petitioner Buford was a former Union Steward for local 269 and was aware of the legal

violations that the company l.W&G. Inc. and the Laborers Union Local 269 committed against

him. Due to Discrimination and Breach of Duty of Fair Representation pursuant to Title VII and

Discrimination to Buford by the International Laborer’s Union [Timothy W. Moore]/[Ben Gomez]

and its Local Union 269 members, and the feet of LW&G. management/269 employee's extreme,

malicious, willful misuse and abuse of authority racial discriminatory actions of forging pretextual

information, [falsified police reports] statements, and documentation evidence summitted,

undermined the lower courts judicial integrity, because it was nothing but hot garbage. Therefore,

in closing “Pro Se ” Buford must state feat attorney Cervone’s defense for this case was frivolous

at best from the beginning, because his alleged witness's credibility was compromised by

construction worker.

Wherefore, Petitioner respectfully hopes and prays this Honorable Supreme Court and its

Honorable Justices thereto will see the light through foe darkness of this malicious, willfol

conspiracy, and recognize that Buford's procedural due process and constitutional rights were

indeed violated thereto for foe reasons and record evidence, (facts) of conflicts of law that is

contained in this writ Petitioner Respectfully urges this most Honorable Supreme Court to grant

this Petition for certiorari, and “hold that Title VII discrimination claims against unions are not

subject to foe legal standards applicable to claims that, a union violated its duty of fair

representation”, by reveling the United Slates Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Opinion

affirming the district court decision to dose this colorful case, and require » and just damages

and punishment thereto of defendant witnesses so that Justice for petitioner can be served.

Respectfully Submitted.

39.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.