Amicus Curiae Brief — National Association for Gun Rights, Inc., Petitioner v. Jeff Mangan, in His Official Capacity as the Commissioner of Political Practices for the State of Montana, et al.

Supreme Court briefJan 15, 2020

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No. 19-767

In the Supreme Court of the United

States

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR GUN RIGHTS, INC.,

Petitioner,

JEFF MANGAN, in his official capacity as Montana’s

Commissioner of Political Practices,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

INSTITUTE FOR FREE SPEECH

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

Allen Dickerson

Counsel of Record

Parker Douglas

Zac Morgan

Institute for Free Speech

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 301-3300

adickerson@ifs.org

Counsel for Amicus Curiae

LEGAL PRINTERS LLC ! Washington, DC ! 202-747-2400 ! legalprinters.com

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the First Amendment permits imposing

burdensome political committee regulations upon

groups that do not engage in any express advocacy for

or against the nomination or election of a candidate.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ....................................... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................ ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................... iii

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ............................1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .....................................2

ARGUMENT ...............................................................3

Certiorari Ought to Be Granted to Preserve

Buckley’s Major Purpose Requirement. ...............3

II. The Major Purpose Requirement Serves as an

Important Constitutional Check on State

Intrusions Upon Free Political Expression..........8

CONCLUSION ..........................................................15

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.

Bennett,

564 U.S. 721 (2011) ............................................... 4

Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1 (1976) ........................................ passim

Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

558 U.S. 310 (2010) ..................... 10, 11, 12, 13,14

Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan,

697 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2012) ................................ 6

Coal. for Secular Gov’t v. Williams,

815 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2016) ............................. 6

Corsi v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,

571 U.S. 826 (2013) .............................................. 8

Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc.,

551 U.S. 449 (2007) ............................................... 5

Garrison v. La.,

379 U.S. 64 (1964) ................................................. 3

Indep. Inst. v. Buescher,

558 U.S. 1024 (2009) ............................................ 8

Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

479 U.S. 238 (1986) ............................................... 2

McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

572 U.S. 185 (2014) ............................................... 4

Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson,

692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012) ..................... 6, 11, 14

NAACP v. Ala.,

357 U.S. 449 (1958) ............................................... 5

NAACP v. Button,

371 U.S 415 (1963) ............................................... 9

Nat’l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. McKee,

649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011) .................................. 6

N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,

376 U.S. 254 (1964) ............................................... 4

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,

490 U.S. 477 (1989) .............................................. 6

Sampson v. Buescher,

625 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2010) ............................ 7

United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment,

469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972) ............................... 7

Van Hollen v. Fed. Election Comm’n,

811 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ............................... 7

Vt. Right to Life, Inc. v. Sorrell,

758 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2014) ................................. 6

Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland,

751 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2014) .............................. 14

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND

REGULATIONS

U.S. Const. amend. I ......................................... passim

11 C.F.R. § 100.22(a) .................................................. 5

11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) .................................................. 5

Fed. Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) ........................................... 9

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 130.011(7)(a) ................................... 8

Mont. Code Ann. § 13-1-101(16) ................................ 8

Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-201 ..................................... 9

Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-226 ..................................... 9

Mont. Code Ann. § 13-37-229(1) ................................ 9

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

The Institute for Free Speech (“Institute”) is a

nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that works to

defend the rights to free speech, assembly, press, and

petition. Over the last decade, the Institute has

represented individuals and civil society groups in

cases at the intersection of political regulation and

First Amendment liberties. These efforts have

included challenges to campaign finance regulations

at all levels of government and have given the

Institute substantial experience wrestling with the

various standards announced by this Court and the

federal courts of appeal. 1

1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, Amicus Curiae states that this brief

was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for any party,

and no person or entity other than Amicus and its counsel made

a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of this

brief. In accordance with this Court’s Rule 37.2, all parties were

timely notified of Amicus’s intent to file this brief, and they have

provided their consent.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The First Amendment represents our society’s

decision to shelter speech, association, and matters of

conscience from unnecessary governmental intrusion

and censure. Because the last fifty years have seen a

dramatic increase in regulation of core political speech

pursuant to various campaign finance laws, this

Court’s precedents in that area have been central to

the development of First Amendment jurisprudence.

This Court has recognized the fundamental

tension inherent in campaign finance regulation.

While governments may have an interest in capturing

potentially corrupting activity and informing voters

about the financial constituencies standing behind a

given candidate, they must act without sweeping civil

society into a bureaucratic world of standards,

restrictions, and permissions. This Court has already

weighed that balance and ruled in Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam), that only groups with

the “major purpose” of electoral advocacy may be

regulated as political committees. That prescription

has been ignored, in this case and elsewhere.

“Speech concerning public affairs is more than

self-expression; it is the essence of self government[,]”

Garrison v. La., 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964), and

heightened constitutional protections apply to such

expressions regardless of whether the speaker is an

individual or a group, Citizens United v. Fed. Election

Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 343 (2010). Buckley’s rule

shields civil society from overregulation, and this

Court has repeatedly held that political committee

regulations can place undue burdens on community

groups focused on issue advocacy. E.g. Mass. Citizens

for Life, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 479 U.S. 238,

254 (1986) (“MCFL”) (“Detailed recordkeeping and

disclosure obligations, along with the duty to appoint

a treasurer and custodian of records, impose

administrative costs that many small entities may be

unable to bear.”). Such regulations threaten to

decrease public debate among grass roots civil society

groups and the general public. Id. at 255 (“[I]t would

not be surprising if at least some groups decided that

the contemplated political activity was simply not

worth it.”).

The decision below abandons the major purpose

test that this Court explicitly crafted to protect

vibrant public discourse. The Ninth Circuit’s error

jeopardizes civil discourse interests, and without this

Court’s correction and clarification this problem will

undoubtedly worsen. The Petition should be granted.

ARGUMENT

Certiorari Ought to Be Granted to Preserve

Buckley’s Major Purpose Requirement.

Petitioner succinctly summarizes the severe

circuit fracture caused by the Ninth Circuit’s decision,

which exacerbates a distinct disharmony among

states and circuit courts of appeal regarding the

possible regulation of core political speech. Pet. 2-3;

13-20. Petitioner also succinctly describes how

Montana imposes political committee (“PAC”)

reporting requirements on groups that do not engage

in any express advocacy. Id. at 7-8. Amicus will not

repeat those observations. Rather, Amicus writes to

provide reasons why this Court should again clarify

Buckley’s major purpose test in order to protect the

constitutional speech rights that test was designed to

foster and shelter.

Because “those who govern should be the last

people to help to decide who should govern,”

McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185,

192 (2014) (emphasis omitted), this Court has strictly

limited the tools available to governments wishing to

regulate the participation of Americans in political

discourse. These rules preserve our “profound

national commitment to the principle that debate on

public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270

(1964). One of these limits on government power is the

“major purpose test” that the Ninth Circuit’s decision

eviscerates.

That rule comes from Buckley, this Court’s

“seminal campaign finance case.” Ariz. Free Enter.

Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721,

757 (2011) (Kagan, J. dissenting). There, this Court

narrowly construed a federal statute that imposed

PAC status—which consisted of contribution limits

together with registration, reporting, and donor

disclosure requirements—on civil society groups. This

Court held that such regulations were constitutionally

impermissible unless the group was “under the

control of a candidate or the major purpose of [the

group] … [was] the nomination or election of a

candidate.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.

This rule, designed to save an otherwise

overbroad statute from invalidation under the First

Amendment, ensures that the registration and

disclosure burdens of PAC status fall only upon

unambiguously political organizations, those which

are “by definition, campaign related.” Buckley, 424

U.S. at 79; MCFL, 479 U.S. at 265 (O’Connor, J.,

concurring) (“In Buckley, the Court was concerned not

only with the chilling effect of reporting and disclosure

requirements on an organization’s contributors, but

also the potential burden of disclosure requirements

on a group’s own speech.”) (internal citations omitted).

Consequently, the “major purpose” requirement is

a crucial limit on the state’s capacity to regulate civil

society and, at the federal level, thanks to Buckley and

its progeny, it works to protect issue speakers from

the thicket of registration, regulation, filing

requirements, contribution limits, and disclosure

mandates. See NAACP v. Ala., 357 U.S. 449, 466

(1958) (First Amendment protects “the right” of all

Americans “to pursue their lawful private interests

privately and to associate freely with others in so

doing”).

It also is a clear and simple test: if an organization

spends more than 50 percent of its expenditures on

speech which either expressly advocates an outcome

in electoral contests for public office, Buckley, 424 U.S.

at 44 n. 52, 2 or is the functional equivalent of such

speech, 3 the government may impose “a more

2 “[C]ommunications containing express words of advocacy

of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your

ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”

See also 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(a).

3 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (“[I]f the ad is susceptible of no

reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or

against a specific candidate.”); Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis.

Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469-70 (2007); see also MCFL,

479 U.S. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

formalized organizational form,” MCFL, 479 U.S. at

266 (O’Connor, J., concurring), including the regular

filing of disclosure reports. Otherwise, it may not.

Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson,

692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012) (“MCCL”) (en banc)

(striking down campaign finance law that imposed

repeated disclosure requirements for making a single

election related communication); Coal. for Secular

Gov’t v. Williams, 815 F.3d 1267 (10th Cir. 2016)

(striking down PAC requirements, including regular

filing of disclosure reports, for group spending less

than $3,500 on express advocacy).

Nevertheless, circuit courts of appeal have

increasingly refused to apply the Buckley major

purpose standard, failing to comply with “past judicial

efforts to ensure laws imposing PAC status and

accompanying burdens are limited in their reach.”

MCCL, 692 F.3d at 872. Despite this Court’s

instruction that appellate courts should “leav[e] this

Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions,”

Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,

490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989), the First, Second, Seventh,

and Ninth Circuits “have concluded that the major

purpose test is not a constitutional requirement.” Vt.

Right to Life, Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 135 (2d Cir.

2014); accord Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan,

697 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2012); Nat’l Org. for Marriage,

Inc. v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011). As

Petitioner notes, the present case is now the most

drastic departure from Buckley’s precedent, as it

essentially eliminates the major purpose test entirely.

Pet. 2-3; 13-20.

Without review here, the major purpose test risks

becoming a dead letter nationwide—as it now is in the

Ninth Circuit—allowing uneven state regulation of

core political speech in different areas of our country.

And without the protection of Buckley’s standard,

many organizations, including grassroots groups

lacking counsel or sophisticated internal procedures,

will be thrust into a regulatory structure aimed at

groups specifically built for high dollar electioneering.

See United States v. Nat’l Comm. for Impeachment,

469 F.2d 1135, 1142 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding that it

would be “abhorrent” to regulate “every little

Audubon Society chapter” as a PAC); cf. Citizens

United, 558 U.S. at 324 (“The First Amendment does

not permit laws that force speakers to retain a

campaign finance attorney … or seek declaratory

rulings before discussing … salient political issues.”).

Because many small groups will have failed to

invite prosecution and substantial civil and even

criminal penalties. See Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d

1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[O]ppos[ing] annexation,

Plaintiffs,” “purchased and distributed No Annexation

signs .... On July 3, 2006, Putnam, with Hopkins as

her attorney, filed a complaint with the Secretary of

State alleging that Plaintiffs had violated the

campaign

finance

law….”).

Others

will

unquestionably choose to stay silent. Van Hollen v.

Fed. Election Comm’n, 811 F.3d 486, 488 (D.C. Cir.

2016) (campaign finance regulation “chills speech”).

Such regulation is what Petitioner faces here.

This Court ought to grant the writ, both to restore

the integrity of its own precedents and to resolve the

circuit fracture broadened by the Ninth Circuit.

II. The Major Purpose Requirement Serves as

an Important Constitutional Check on State

Intrusions Upon Free Political Expression.

This Court’s decision not to intervene and

preserve the Buckley major purpose test in earlier

cases, e.g., Corsi v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 571 U.S.

826 (2013); Indep. Inst. v. Buescher, 558 U.S. 1024

(2009), has allowed the present case to turn a fracture

in a cornerstone precedent into a fissure, leaving core

political speech on a precarious precipice.

As a result, government intrusion on core political

speech grows. In addition to the circuit disharmony

already noted, many States seem to have taken this

Court’s silence as an invitation to do away with the

major purpose requirement and impose PAC status

upon the expenditure of an arbitrary, and often low,

dollar figure. See, e.g., Mo. Rev. Stat. § 130.011(7)(a)

(threshold for PAC registration and reporting is

receiving contributions or making expenditures

totaling more than $500 during a calendar year, or

receiving contributions totaling more than $250

during a calendar year from a single contributor). The

same is true in the present case, as Montana’s

statutory scheme would impose PAC-like status—

including repeated filings and organizational

structure requirements—on issue-advocacy groups

spending

mere

$250

electioneering

communications, which include pamphlets or books

that merely reference a candidate or political party,

within 85 days of a primary or general election. See

Mont. Code Ann. § 13-1-101(16) (defining

“electioneering communication”); id. § 13-1-101(31)(d)

(group expenditure of more than $250 requires

registration as a political committee); id. § 13-37-201

(organization statement filing requirement); id. § 1337-201 (organizational treasurer and treasurer

activities requirement); id. § 13-37-226 (periodic

reports requirement); id. § 13-37-229(1) (contributor

identity disclosure requirement); see also Pet. 7-10.

This intrusion on core political speech is now allowed,

under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, even as applied to

groups that do not conduct any express advocacy.

While this Court has, as discussed supra, held

that the government may regulate speech about

candidates, public officials, and the issues of the day,

it has demanded that such regulations be narrowly

tailored to vindicate especially crucial governmental

interests. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S 415, 438 (1963)

(“Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an

area so closely touching our most precious freedoms.”).

Laws that impose PAC status, with its attendant

registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements

are subject to—at minimum—exacting scrutiny, and

“cannot be justified by a mere showing of some

legitimate governmental interest.” Buckley, 424 U.S.

at 64. In short, “[i]n the First Amendment context, fit

matters.” McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 218.

Buckley

directly

addressed

the

proper

constitutional fit and memorably declared that

substantial segments of civil society should be

unregulated or minimally regulated. There, the Court

confronted the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971

(“FECA”)—86 Stat. 3—which imposed a $1,000-peryear expenditure threshold (in 1976 dollars), rather

than Montana’s $250 threshold—for each two-year

electoral cycle. See FECA § 431(d); Buckley, 424 U.S.

at 79 n.105 (quoting same). Despite its higher

monetary trigger, FECA would thus have turned

many civil society groups into organizations that

could speak only upon the condition of registering and

publicly disclosing sensitive data concerning their

financial supporters.

To prevent the meritless regulation of wide

swaths of First Amendment activity, this Court

substantially narrowed FECA’s reach to ensure a

constitutional fit between a given regulation and an

identifiable state interest. Buckley interpreted the

relevant definition of “expenditure” to reach only

communications containing “express words of

advocacy,” such as “Smith for Congress” or “vote for”

Smith. 424 U.S. at 80 n. 108. It further held that “[t]o

fulfill the purposes of the Act, [PACs] need only

encompass organizations that are under the control of

a candidate or the major purpose of which is the

nomination or election of a candidate.” Id. at 79

(emphasis provided). This holding ensured that

invasive and burdensome government regulation

reached only those activities that were, “by definition,

campaign related.” Id.

Subsequent decisions of this Court have expanded

the type of speech that must be disclosed by

organizations that are not PACs to include one-time

reports concerning speech close in time to an election,

Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-367 (upholding

disclosure

and

disclaimer

requirements

for

corporations

making

“electioneering

communications”), but this Court has not permitted

PAC status to be imposed beyond the bounds

announced in Buckley. Accordingly, Buckley and its

progeny have protected a large segment of civil society

groups, and individuals, from federal regulation, even

though the Court undoubtedly knew that groups

engaging in limited amounts of express advocacy

would not have to register with the government

beyond reporting specific expenditures, nor would

they be required to disclose their donor lists.

This commitment to a vibrant political sphere, one

in which the citizens monitor their representatives, is

also seen in the differences between the required

disclosures and regulatory burdens the Buckley and

Citizens United Courts allowed, respectively, for PACs

and for independent speech. See MCCL, 692 F.3d at

872 (noting “past judicial efforts [by the Supreme

Court and other courts] to ensure laws imposing PAC

status and accompanying burdens are limited in their

reach”). The Court, in Buckley and since, has allowed

disclosures from groups making independent

expenditures, but these regulations must reflect “a

substantial relation between the disclosure

requirement

and

sufficiently

important

governmental interest.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at

366-367 (quotations omitted).

Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner is neither

under the control of a candidate, nor does it have the

major purpose of nominating or electing any

particular would-be politician. Yet the Ninth Circuit

requires Petitioners and those similarly situated in

Montana to shoulder the exact types of burdens that

Buckley held could not be imposed on a non-PAC

entity.

Compared to Montana’s PAC-like burdens placed

on entities that may not engage in any express

advocacy, noted supra, the statute that the Buckley

Court upheld regarding independent expenditure

reports—Section 434(e)—required higher spending on

expenditures to trigger disclosure requirements and

imposed far fewer regulatory burdens. See Buckley,

424 U.S. at 74-82. In addressing groups making

incidental independent expenditures, this Court

expressly worried that these groups could be lumped

together with PACs and saddled with the more

onerous PAC regulations. For groups “engaged purely

in issue discussion,” as well as groups—such as

Petitioner—still further removed from electoral

politics, the Court concluded that “the purposes” of

political regulation “may be too remote.” Id. at 79-80.

Accordingly, the Court defined “expenditure”

narrowly, only as “spending that is unambiguously

related to the campaign of a particular federal

candidate.” Id. at 80. 4 That is, the expansion of

regulation beyond candidates and PACs was “not

fatal,” because it was “narrowly limited.” Id. at 81.

The law did “not seek the contribution list of any

association. Instead, it require[d only] direct

disclosure of what [the] group . . . spen[t].” Id. at 75.

Similarly, in Citizens United, this Court held that

limited reporting and registration, well short of PAC

status, could apply to speech that was not express

advocacy, but was instead “pejorative” toward the

presidential candidacy of then-Senator Hillary

Clinton. 558 U.S. at 320, 325. Yet the Court did not

allow the government to impose PAC-style regulatory

burdens, and in fact contrasted the disclosure at issue

4 Such spending included “communications that expressly

advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.

with PAC status. Id. at 369. Consequently,

government may require that a person file a

disclosure statement “identify[ing] the person making

the expenditure, the amount of the expenditure, the

election to which the communication was directed,

and the names of certain contributors.” Id. at 366. In

Citizens United the Court did not approve anything

beyond the filing of a single report. Unlike Montana’s

law here, FECA did not demand either continuing

reporting or the organization of a committee,

committee termination, appointment of officers,

repeat filings, or disclosures of funds or contributors

unrelated to the expenditures at issue. Id.

As noted supra, Montana law imposes much

greater regulation than the Buckley Court permitted

only for candidates and PACs. And it does so based on

a significantly lower expenditure threshold and,

under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, without the

requirement of the major purpose test. But these

burdens—detailed

record-keeping

both

contributions and expenditures, including the names

and addresses of those making contributions and the

date and amount of contribution (and occupation and

principal place of business for those making larger

contributions); and continued filing requirements,

including name, address, and occupation information

for all contributors and the amount and date of their

contributions—may only be imposed upon speakers

with the major purpose of express advocacy. Buckley,

424 U.S. at 63-64, 79.

Buckley narrowed the government’s ability to

impose PAC-style burdens even though the disclosure

of donors to other groups might arguably serve some

state information interest. Forgetting this point,

Montana imposes these same burdens on entities

which do not meet the major purpose test. The Ninth

Circuit’s interpretation-through-evisceration of the

major purpose test forces any individual or group to

choose between becoming a PAC (or shouldering PAClike burdens under another name) and not engaging

in even the most incidental electoral speech. As a

result, the Ninth Circuit has unconstitutionally

increased the level of burden upon independent

speakers that the First Amendment permits. See, e.g.,

Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 83637 (7th Cir. 2014) (holding that “it’s a mistake to read

Citizens United as giving the government a green

light to impose political-committee status on every

person or group that makes a communication about a

political issue that also refers to a candidate”); MCCL,

692 F.3d at 872, 876-77 (invalidating a law that

“substantially extended the reach of PAC-like

regulation to all associations”).

Our Republic was founded on the belief that the

public should monitor the government, that ideas

should be expressed and tested, and that this is the

preferred and only means of advancing the general

welfare and avoiding the danger of seething silence.

Reviewing the regulation of core political speech, this

Court has balanced our commitment to a vibrant civil

sphere and a free republic against the public’s need to

better understand a candidate’s constituency before

going to the polls. This case would permit the Court to

affirm the continued viability of its precedents and to

announce that mere independent speech may not

alone trigger PAC-like regulatory burdens.

Moreover, this case provides a clean vehicle doing

so. The Ninth Circuit has not advanced a reasonable

interpretation of Buckley’s major purpose test; it has

flatly eliminated it. Faced with such erasure, and the

consequent incongruent regulatory framework, this

Court can clarify and harmonize the patchwork of

different standards that has evolved around our

country subsequent to Buckley, while providing

needed certainty for those engaged in core political

speech.

CONCLUSION

This Court should provide Petitioner with a writ.

Respectfully submitted,