Opposition Brief — Socorro Susan Caro, Petitioner v. California

No. 19-7649

lht tq.e §upr.em.e C!tourt of tq.e lltnit.eb §tat.es

SOCORRO SUSAN CARO,

Petitioner,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

XAVIER BECERRA

Attorney General of California

MICHAEL J. MONGAN

Solicitor General

LANCE E. WINTERS

Chief Assistant Attorney General

JAMES WILLIAM BILDERBACK II

Senior Assistant Attorney General

SAMUEL P. SIEGEL

Deputy Solicitor General

DANAM.ALI*

Deputy Attorney General

CHUNGL.MAR

Deputy Attorney General

300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702

Los Angeles, CA 90013

Telephone: (213) 269-6067

Fax: (916) 731-2122

Dana.Ali@doj .ca.gov

*Counsel of Record

1

CAPITAL CASE

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Constitution requires that a California jury that has already

found unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

committed an offense whose special characteristics render the crime eligible

for the death penalty must also, in order to render a verdict of death,

unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that specific aggravating factors

exist and that they outweigh mitigating factors.

11

DIRECTLY RELATED PROCEEDINGS

California Supreme Court:

People v. Caro, No. 8106274, judgment entered June 13, 2019

(this case below).

In re Caro on Habeas Corpus, No. 8256290 (pending).

Ventura County Superior Court:

People v. Caro, No. CR47813, judgment entered April 5, 2002

(this case below).

111

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

STATEMENT ..................... ......... ....... ..................................... .... ... .. ............... 1

ARGUMENT ............................. ........ ............ ..... ............ ..... ................ ............. 2

CONCLUSION ............ ....... ......... ... ............... .... .. .................................. .. .... .. 10

IV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Apprendi v. New Jersey

530 U.S. 466 (2000) .... .... ...................... ... ........ .. ...... ... ............ .. ........... ... ........ 5

Becerrada v. California

No. 17-5287, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 242 (20 17) ........................................... 3

Bell v. California

No. 19-5394, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 294 (2019) .... ....... ................................ 3

Blachsher v. California

No. 11-7741, cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1209 (2012) ................ ......................... .. 3

Boyce v. California

No. 14-7581, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1428 (20 15) ........... .... ............ .............. 3

Bramit u. California

No. 09-6735, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 103 1 (2009) ....... .............................. .... .. 3

Broohs u. California

No. 17-6237, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 5 16 (2017) ............ .......... ..... ................ 3

Case u. California

No. 18-7457, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1342 (20 19) .. ................. .. .. .................. 3

Cooli u. California

No. 07 -5690, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 976 (2007) .. .. .... ........................... .. ........ 3

Cunningham v. California

No. 15-7177, cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 989 (20 16) .. .. ............ ........... ..... .. .... ...... 3

DeBose u. California

No. 14-66 17, cert. denied, 574 U.S. 105 1 (20 14) .... .. ................. .................... 3

Ersliine v. California

No. 19-6235, cert. denied, 140 S . Ct. 602 (20 19) ............................. ........ .. .... 3

Go,nez u. California

No. 18 -9698, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 120 (20 19) .... .. ............................. ........ 3

Harrison v. California

No. 05-5232, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 890 (2005) .. .. .................... .. ...... ............. 3

V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

Henriquez u. California

No. 18-5375, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 261 (20 18) .................. .............. .... ....... 3

Huggins u. California

No. 06 -6060, cert. denied, 549 U.S . 998 (2006) ............................................. 3

Hurst u. Florida

136 S . Ct. 6 16 (20 16) ...... .. ................ ................... ... ... .... .......... .... ....... ....... ..... 6

Jaclwon u. California

No. 16-7744, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1440 (20 17) .............. ..... ..................... _. 3

Johnson u. California

No. 15-7509, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1206 (20 16) ............. ......... .... .. ............. 3

Jones u. United States

526 U.S. 227 (1999) ...... ............ .... .. ................... ........... .. ............. .. ........... ..... . 7

Kansas u. Carr

136 S. Ct. 633 (2016) ....... ........................ ........ .............. ... ...................... 7, 8, 9

Landry u. California

No. 16-900 1, cert. denied , 138 S. Ct. 79 (20 17) ............................... ............ .. 3

Lucas u. California

No. 14-9137, cert. denied, 135 S . Ct. 2384 (20 15) .. ............. ...... ............ ..... .. . 3

M endez u. California

No. 19-5933, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 471 (20 19) ......................... ... .......... ..... 3

Michel u. California

No. 16-7840, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2214 (2017) ......... ............. ............... .... 3

Morgan u. California

No. 07-9024, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1286 (2008) ............... ........................ .... 3

Penunuri u. California

No. 18-6262, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 644 (20 18) ........... ... ...................... ...... . 3

People u. Brown

46 Cal. 3d 432 (1988) ................ .... ......... .. ............ ... ............ .. ......................... 8

People u. Gonzales

52 Cal. 4th 254 (201 1) ....................... ... .......... ................................................ 5

Vl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(con tinued )

Page

People u. Moon

37 Cal. 4th 1 (2005) ............ .. ..... ............. ....... .. .................. ........... ...... .. ........ .. 7

People u. Prince

40 Cal. 4th 1179 (2007) ....... ............... ..... ........ ..... .............................. ..... ....... 5

People u. Romero

62 Cal. 4th 1 (2015) .......... ................. .... .. ....... .................. .... .. ....... ................. 5

Prieto u. California

No. 03 -6422, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1008 (2003) .. ... ......... .......................... ... 3

Rangel u. California

No. 16-59 12, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 623 (20 17) ............... .. .......... ......... ....... 3

Rauf v. State

145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016) ... ................. ........ ........... ......... ......... ................... 8, 9

Ring v. Arizona

536 U .S. 584 (2002) ................... .... ... ...... .. ................ ........ .. ... .............. ..... .. 5, 6

Smith u. California

No. 03-6862, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1163 (2004) ......... .............. .......... .......... 3

Taylor u. California

No . 10-6299, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 10 13 (2010) .......... ......... ...... .................. 3

Thompson u. California

No. 17-5069, cert. denied, 138 S . Ct. 201 (2017) ..... ..... ...... .................... ....... 3

Tuilaepa u. California

512 U.S. 967 (1994) ....... ....... ......... ..... ............. ... .......... ............ ................. ..... 6

Wall u. California

No. 17-9525, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 187 (2018) ........... ................. ............... 3

Woodward u. Alabama

134 S. Ct. 405 (20 13) ...... ........................ .... .... ................................... .... ... 9, 10

Zant u. Stephens

462 U.S. 862 (1983) .... .. .. ... .............................. ....... .. ...... ..... ........... ............... . 7

Vll

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

STATUTES

Cal. Penal Code § 187(a) ......... .... .............. .... ................................. ........ : ............ 1

Cal. Penal Code § 190(a) ..... ..... ........ ........................................ ......... .... .............. 4

Cal. Penal Code §§ 190.1 - 190.9 .... .. '. ...... ..... ....................................................... 3

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 .......................................................... ..... ......... .. ............. 1

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a) ............ .. .................................................... ............ 4, 6

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a)(3) ..................................................... ........... ...... ........ 1

Cal. Penal Code§ 190.3 .. ..... ......... ......... ............... .. ..................... .. ...... ........ 4, 5, 9

Cal. Penal Code§ 190.4 ............................ ...................................... ...... ............... 4

Cal. Penal Code § 190.4(a), (b) ...... ...... ....... .... .......... .. .................... ............ ......... 4

Del. Code Title 11, § 4209(c)(3), (d)(l) ................................................................ 9

Fla. Stat.§ 921.141(3) .................... .. ..... .............................................................. 6

Fla. Stat.§ 921.141(5) ...................................... ... .................................... ............ 6

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U. S. Const. amend. V ............................................................ ....... ...................... 2

U. S. Const. amend. VI ....... ................................ ............................................. 2, 5

U. S. Const. amend. XIV ..... .. ........................... ............................................... 2, 5

1

STATEMENT

1. In November 1999, petitioner Socorro Caro shot and killed three of her

children following an argument with her husband.

Pet. App. B 3-6. After

shooting the victims, Caro shot herself in the head (she ultimately survived).

Id. at 5-7.

2. The State charged Caro with, among other things, three counts of firstdegree murder and alleged as a special circumstance that Caro committed

multiple murders. Pet. App. B 3; 1 CT 73-75; see Cal. Penal Code §§ 187(a),

190.2(a)(3). 1 At the guilt phase of the trial, the jury convicted Caro as charged

and found the special circumstance allegation true beyond a reasonable doubt,

thereby qualifying her for the deat h penalty. Pet. App. B 13; 10 CT 1902-1908;

see Cal. Penal Code§ 190.2.

At the penalty phase of the trial, the trial court instructed the jurors that,

in deciding whether Caro should be punished by death or life in prison without

parole, they were to "consider, take into account and be guided by the

applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances"; that the

"weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances does not mean a mere

mechanical counting of factors on each side of an imaginary scale"; that they

were "free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem

appropriate to each and all of the various factors"; and that to "return a

CT refers to the superior court clerk's transcript. RT refers to the superior

court reporter's transcript.

1

2

judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating

circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating

circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole." 65 RT

12590-12591; 11 CT 2227-2228. The jury returned a verdict of death, and the

trial court sentenced Caro to death on each murder count. Pet. App. B 15; 11

CT 2241, 2243.

3.

On direct appeal, the California Supreme Court affirmed Caro's

conviction and death sentence. Pet. App. B 3. As relevant here, the court

rejected Caro's claim that California's capital sentencing scheme is

unconstitutional because the jury is not required, before reaching a death

verdict, to find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance

exists, that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances,

and that death is the appropriate penalty. Id. at 89-91.

ARGUMENT

1. Caro argues that California's death penalty system violated her right

to due process guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and her

right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, because state law

does not require the penalty-phase jury to unanimously find beyond a

reasonable d_oubt that an aggravating factor exists and that the factors in

aggravation outweigh the factors in mitigation. Pet. 8-17. This Court has

3

repeatedly denied review in cases presenting the same or similar questions,

and there is no reason for a different result here. 2

a. A California death sentence depends on a two-stage process prescribed

by California Penal Code Sections 190.1 through 190.9. The first stage, the

guilt phase, involves determining whether the defendant committed firstdegree murder. That crime carries three potential penalties under California

law: a prison term of 25 years to life with the possibility of parole, a prison

See, e.g., Ershine v. California, No . 19-6235, cert. denied, 140 S . Ct. 602

(2019); Mendez v. California, No. 19-5933, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 471 (2019);

Bell v. California, No. 19-5394, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 294 (2019); Gomez v.

California, No. 18-9698, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 120 (2019); Case v. California,

No . 18-7457, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1342 (2019); Penunuri v. California, No.

18-6262, cert. denied , 139 S. Ct. 644 (2018); Henriquez v. California, No.

18-5375, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 261 (2018); Wall v. California, No. 17-9525,

cert. denied, 139 S . Ct. 187 (2018); Broohs v. California, No. 17-6237, cert.

denied, 138 S. Ct. 516 (2017); Becerrada v. California, No. 17-5287, cert. denied,

138 S. Ct. 242 (2017); Thompson v. California, No. 17-5069, cert. denied, 138

S. Ct. 201 (2017); Landry v. California, No. 16-9001, cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 79 ·

(2017); Michel v. California, No. 16-7840, cert. denied , 137 S. Ct. 2214 (2017);

Jachson v. California, No. 16-7744, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1440 (2017); Rangel

v. California, No. 16-5912, cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 623 (2017); Johnson v.

California, No. 15-7509, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1206 (2016); Cunningham v.

California, No. 15-7177, cert denied, 136 S. Ct. 989 (2016); Lucas v. California,

No. 14-9137, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2384 (2015); Boyce v. California, No.

14-7581, cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1428 (2015); DeBose v. California, No. 14-6617,

cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1051 (2014); Blaclwher v. California, No. 11-7741, cert.

denied, 565 U .S . 1209 (2012); Taylor v. California, No. 10-6299, cert. denied,

562 U .S . 1013 (2010); Bramit v. California, No. 09-6735, cert. denied, 558 U.S.

1031 (2009); Morgan v. California, No. 07-9024, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1286

(2008); Cooli v. California, No. 07-5690, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 976 (2007);

Huggins v. California, No. 06-6060, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 998 (2006); Harrison

v. California, No. 05-5232, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 890 (2005); Smith v.

California, No. 03 -6862, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1163 (2004); Prieto v. California,

No. 03-6422, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1008 (2003).

2

4

term of life without the possibility of parole, or death. Cal. Penal Code§ 190(a).

The default sentence is a prison term of 25 years to life. The penalties of death

or life without parole may be imposed only if one or more statutorily

enumerated special circumstances "has been found under Section 190.4 to be

,.,

true."

Cal. Penal Code § 190.2(a).

A defendant is entitled to a jury

determination of such a special circumstance, and the jury's finding of a special

circumstance must be made unanimou~ly and beyond a reasonable doubt. Cal.

Penal Code§ 190.4(a), (b). During the guilt phase of Caro's trial, the jury found

her guilty of three counts of first-degree murder, and it found the multiplemurder special circumstance to be true. Pet. App. B 13; 10 CT 1900. The jury's

findings were unanimous, and made under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt

standard. 9 CT 1840, 1852-1853, 1856-1857.

The second stage of California's death penalty trial process, the penalty

phase, proceeds under California Penal Code Section 190.3.

During the

penalty phase, the jury hears evidence which it is allowed to consider "as to

any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence, including but

not limited to" certain specified topics .

Cal. Penal Code § 190.3.

"In

determining the penalty," the jury must "take into account any" of a list of

specified factors "if relevant"-including "[a]ny .. . circumstance which

extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the

crime." Id . With the exception of prior unadjudicated violent criminal activity

and prior felony convictions, the jury need not agree unanimously on the

5

existence of a particular aggravating circumstance, or find the existence of

such a circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Romero, 62 Cal.

4th 1, 56 (2015); People v. Gonzales, 52 Cal. 4th 254, 328 (2011). If the jury

"conclude s that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating

circumstances," then it "shall impose a sentence of death." Cal. Penal Code §

190.3.

If it "determines that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the

aggravating circumstances," then it "shall impose a sentence of confinement in

state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole." Id .

b.

Caro contends that the Constitution does not permit h er to be

sentenced to death unless the jury during the penalty phase unanimously

found beyond a reasonable doubt that a particular aggravating factor existed

and that the aggravating circumstances outweighed those in mitigation. Pet.

8-17. That is incorrect. Caro primarily relies (Pet. 6, 8-11) on the Sixth and

Fourteenth Amendment rule that, "[i]f a State makes an increase in a

defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that

fact-no m atter how the State labels it-must be found, by a jury beyond a

r easonable doubt." Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) (applying rule to

Arizona death penalty); see also Apprendi v. New J ersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490

(2000). But under California law, once a jury finds unanimously and beyond a

reasonable doubt that a defendant has committed first-degree murder with a

special circumstance, the maximum potential penalty prescribed by statute is

d eath. See People v. Prince, 40 Cal. 4th 1179, 1297-1 298 (2007); see generally

6

Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 975 (1994) (a California defendant

becomes "eligible for the death penalty when the jury finds him guilty of firstdegree murder and finds one of the § 190.2 . special circumstances true").

Imposing that

maximum

penalty on

a

defendant once these

jury

determinations have been made unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt

thus does not violate the Constitution.

In arguing to the contrary, Caro relies on Hurst v. Florida, 136 S . Ct. 616,

619-622 (2016). Pet. 6, 9-15. Under the Florida system considered in Hurst,

after a jury verdict of first-degree murder, a convicted defendant was not

"eligible for death," 136 S. Ct. at 622, unless the judge further determined that

an enumerated "aggravating circumstanceD exist[ed]," Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3).

The judge was thus tasked with making the "'findings upon which the sentence

of death [was] based,"' 136 S. Ct. at 622 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 921.141(3))determinations that were essentially questions of fact, see Fla. Stat. §

921.141(5) (listing aggravating circumstances, such as whether the crime was

committed with a purpose of pecuniary gain). This Court held that Florida's

system thus suffered from the same constitutional flaw that Arizona's had in

Ring: "The maximum punishment" a defendant could receive without judgemade findings "was life in prison without parole," and the judge "increased"

that punishment "based on [the judge's] own factfinding. " 136 S. Ct. at 621.

In California, however, a defendant is eligible for a death sentence only

after the jury finds true at least one of the special circumstances in California

7

Penal Code Section 190.2(a). That determination, which the jury must agree

on unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, is part of how California

fulfills the "constitutionally necessary function" of "circumscrib[ing] the class

of persons eligible for the death penalty." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878

(1983).

The jury's subsequent consideration of aggravating and mitigating

factors at the penalty phase fulfills a different function: that of providing an

"individualized determination ... at the selection stage" of who among the

eligible defendants deserves the death penalty. Zant, 462 U.S. at 879; see

People v. Moon, 37 Cal. 4th 1, 40 (2005) ("The p enalty jury's principal task is

the moral endeavor of deciding whether the death sentence should be imposed

on a defendant who has already been determined to be 'death eligible' as a

result of the findings and verdict reached at the guilt phase.").

Such a

determination involves a choice between a greater or lesser authorized

penalty-not any increase in the maximum potential penalty. See Jones v.

United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999).

Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633 (2016), effectively forecloses Caro's

argument that determinations concerning the existence of aggravating or

mitigating factors at the penalty-selection phase must be made beyond a

reasonable doubt.

Pet. 6-17.

As Carr reasoned, it is possible to apply a

standard of proof to the "eligibility phase" of a capital sentencing proceeding,

"because that is a purely factual determination." Id. at 642. In contrast, it is

8

doubtful whether it would even be "possible to apply a standard of proof to the

mitigating-factor determination (the so-called 'selection phase' of a capitalsentencing proceeding)," because "[w]hether mitigation exists .. . is largely a

judgment call (or perhaps a value call): what one juror might consider

mitigating another might not." Id.; see, e.g., People u. Brown, 46 Cal. 3d 432,

456 (1988) (California's sentencing factor regarding "[t]he age of the defendant

at the time of the crime" may be either a mitigating or an aggravating factor

in the same case: the defendant may argue for age-based mitigation, and the

prosecutor may argue for aggravation because the defendant was "old enough

to know better").

Carr likewise forecloses Caro's argument that the jury's final weighing of

aggravating versus mitigating factors should proceed under the beyond-areasonable-doubt standard. P et. 8-17. In Carr, this Court observed that "the

ultimate question of whether mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating

circumstances is mostly a question of mercy," and "[i] t would mean nothing ...

to tell the jury that the defendants must deserve mercy beyond a reasonable

doubt." 136 S. Ct. at 642. That reasoning leaves no room for Caro's argument

that s uch an instruction is required under the Constitution.

c. Caro points to the Delaware Supreme Court's fractured decision in

Rauf u. State, 145 A.3d 430 (Del. 2016), as reason for this Court to consider

whether the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard should apply at California's ·

selection stage. Pet. 13-15. R au,fs various opinions hold that a determination

9

as to the relative weight of aggravating and mitigating factors in the

application of Delaware's death penalty must be made beyond a reasonable

doubt. See 145 A.3d at 434 (per curiam); id. at 481-482 (Strine, J., concurring);

id. at 487 (Holland, J., concurring); but see id. at 487 (Valihura, J., dissenting).

The rationale of those opinions is not clear, and they fail to cite or discuss this

Court's reasoning on the issue in Carr. In any event, the most notable feature

of the Delaware law invalidated in Rauf was that the jury's choice between a

life sentence and death was completely advisory: the judge could impose a

sentence of death even if all jurors recommended against it, as long as the jury

had unanimously found the existence of a single aggravating factor. See Del.

Code tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3), (d)(l); Rauf, 145 A.3d at 457 (Strine, J., concurring)

(under Delaware law the judge "has the final say in deciding whether a capital

defendant is sentenced to death and need not give any particular weight to the

jury's view"). Under California law, the death penalty may be imposed only if

the jury has unanimously voted for death. See Cal. Penal Code § 190.3. It is

by no means clear from the opinions in Rauf that the Delaware Supreme Court

would have reached the same result if it had been analyzing California's quite

different statute.3

3 Similar shortcomings undercut Caro's reliance on the opinion dissenting from

the denial of certiorari in Woodward u. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405, 410-411

(2013). Pet. 13-14. The statute at issue in Woodward allowed a judge to impose

the death penalty even where the jurors voted against it. See Woodward, 134

S. Ct. at 406, 410-412 (jury's decision as to whether the defendant should be

10

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

XAVIER BECERRA

Attorney General of California

MICHAEL J. MONGAN

Solicitor General

LANCE E. WINTERS

Chief Assistant Attorney General

JAMES WILLIAM BILDERBACK II

Senior Assistant Attorney General

SAMUEL P. SIEGEL

Deputy Solicitor General

CHUNGL.MAR

Deputy Attorney General

Deputy Attorney General

*Counsel of R ecord

Dated:

March 12, 2020

executed was merely an "advisory verdict"). The Woodward dissent suggests

that a trial judge's view should not replace that of the jury-not that the death

penalty may not be imposed without the jury finding .beyond a reasonable

doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. Id. at 410-411.