Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Allan Leslie Sinanan, Jr., Petitioner v. Pennsylvania

Supreme Court briefJan 16, 2020

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51

IN THE

SUPREME COURT’ OF THE UNITED STATES

Allan Leslie Sinanan Jr. (Pro-Se) Petitioner

Vs.

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Respondent(s)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

\

FILED

JAN 1 6 2020

The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Direct Appeal)

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARj

Brief for Petitioner

Joint Appendix

PARTIES:

ALLAN LESLIE SINANAN JR.

#JY-2380

S.C.I. Albion

10745 Route 18

Albion, Pa. 16475-0001

KATHARINE R. KURNAS

Northampton County District Attorney's Office

669 Washingtbri Street '

Easton, Pa. 18042

- *« •*£.-

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1) The crux of this Writ of Certiorari is whether Law Enforcement

Authorities'

engaged

in

circumvent

Petitioner's

tactics

and

procedures

Constitutional

designed *to»

protected

rights

guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment against unlawful search and

seizure, and whether the State Court determination represented a

decision that is contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established Federal Law?

2)

The

last

issue

whether

the

State's

presented

for

determination

this

in

Writ

this

of

matter

Certiorari

represents

is

a

decision that will permit Law Enforcement Authorities to embark

on policy and procedure that will routinely violate a citizen's

\

Fourth Amendment right?

(1 of 36)

THE TABLE OF CONTENTS

THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

LIST OF PARTIES

2

'CITATIONS OF THE OFFICIAL OPINIONS AND ORDERS..**.

:

3

EXHIBIT APPENDIX

4

JURISDICTION

5

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

7

BACKGROUND HISTORY OF CASE

8

ARGUMENT

13

CONCLUSION

32

PROOF OF SERVICE

35

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH WORD COUNT

36

(i)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASE:

UNITED STATES CASE LAW

Adams V. Williams, «-40’7 U.S. 143 (1972).................................

22

Aguilar V. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)................................

14

Alabama V, White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990)............. ..................... ......... 23,24

Beck V. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).........................................

14,15,22,30

Brinegar V. U.S., 338 U.S. 160 (1949)...................................

32

Coolidge V. New Hampshire, 403 U.S., at 469-471 (1971)

29

Draper V. U.S. , 358 U.S. 307 (1959)..................... .................

23

Dunaway V.- New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)............................

29

Illinois V. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983)... 13,14,15,21,22,23,24,32

Illinois V. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)..........

25

Johnson V. U.S. , 333 U.S. 10 (1948).......................... ..

21

Ker V. State of California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963)....

13,15

Splnelli V. U.S., 393 U.S. 410 (1969)........................

14

Terry V. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)..................... ...............

25,28,32

U.S. V. Brown, 448 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2006)..............

26

U.S, V. Campbell, 920 F.2d 793 (U.S. App. 1991)...

14

U.S. V. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948)............. .....................

21,29

U.S. V. Fixen, 780 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1986)......

24

U.S. V. Gilbert, 45 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir. 1995).........

24

U.S. V. Johnson, 427 F.3d 1053 (U.S. App. 2005)...

29

U.S. V. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)..............................

27,30

.......... U.S.'V. «Tlle¥~ 925 F. 2d' 695 {'4th cir. 1991). .:.V.

U.S. V. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164 (U.S. App. 2002)..

15,25,29

U.S. V. Washington, 387 F.3d 1060 (U.S. App. 2004)

29

(ii)

(Cont.) TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

CASES:

UNITED STATES CASE LAW

«.

U.S. V. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)........ : . .

13

Wong Sun V. U.S., 371 U.S. 471 (1963).........

26

COMMONWEALTH CASE LAW

Commonwealth V. Eazer, 312 A.2d 398 (Pa. 1973)...

30

Commonwealth V. Gray, 503 A.2d 921 (1985)..............

14,32

Commonwealth V. Melendez, 676 A.2d 226 (Pa. 1996)

30

PENNSYLVANIA CRIMES CODE RULES

234 Rule 513. (Requirements for Issuance of Arrest Warrants.)

234 Rule 519. (Arrest Without Warrant.)

PENNSYLVANIA STATE STATUTES

18

§ 7512 §§ A

35

§ 780-113 §§ A16

35

§ 780-113 §§ A30

35

§ 780-113 §§ A32

WHARTON"S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (10th Ed.)

SECTION 36, PAGES 74, 75

"In

those

cases where

the offense is past,

the rule is

different and an officer may not apprehend the offender without a

warrant, except in outrageous crimes of the felony type. In the

cases of such crimes, however, it is -the duty of the officers to

•*>*

l^ih“1Smidiat ely''a ft er"“no FId¥~”th£~ *^TsuTF'bT"1:Ke""^eFsQn',t:Karg’€a;'‘’K""''''''''

with

the

offense,

provided

only

reasonable grounds of suspicion."

(iii)

that

there

be

at

the

time

LIST OF PARTIES

All parties that do not appear in the caption of the case on

the cover page. A list of all parties to the proceeding in the

court

whose

judgment

is

the

sfrbj'fect

of

this

follows:

HONORABLE JACQUELINE M. TASCHNER

Magistrate District Judge (Pa. Commonwealth)

Palmer Township

3 Weller Place

Easton, Pa. 18045 v

HONORABLE JUDGE EMIL GIORDANO

Northampton County Courthouse (Pa. Commonwealth)

669 Washington Street

Easton, Pa. 18042

HONORABLE PRESIDENT JUDGE STEPHEN G. BARATTA

Northampton County Courthouse (Pa. Commonwealth)

669 Washington Street

Easton, Pa. 18042

MICHAEL J. THOMPSON

Assistant District Attorney (Pa. Commonwealth)

Northampton County District Attorney's Office

669 Washington Street

Easton, Pa. 18042

-

JOHN MICHAEL MORGANELLI

‘District "Attorney * (’Pa. Commonwealth) •

Northampton County District Attorney's Office

669 Washington Street

Easton, Pa. 18042

(2 of 36)

petition

is

as

CITATIONS OF THE OFFICIAL OPINIONS AND ORDERS

Court of Common Pleas

A cdpy'of the Honorable Judge Emil Giordano's Opinion, ‘dated July

APPENDIX A

26, 2017

A copy

of

the

Honorable

President Judge Stephen G.

Baratta's

APPENDIX B

Opinion, dated January 29, 2018

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

A copy of the LETTER showing a discrepancy in the Formatting of

the

Suppression

Hearing

Transcript,

dated

May

31,

APPENDIX C

2018

A copy of the Memorandum Opinion Affirming Trial Sentence by the

Superior

of

Court

Pennsylvania,

dated

January

APPENDIX D

2019

A

copy

23,

of

Superior

the

ORDER

Court

denying

of

request

for

Pennsylvania,

reargument

dated

by

April

the

11,

APPENDIX E

2019

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

A

copy

of

the

informing that,

letter

to

the

Supreme

Court

of

Pennsylvania

the Commonwealth Court will not be submitting a

substantive answer to Petioner's Petition for Allowance of Appeal

APPENDIX F

(Docket No. 305 MAL 2019, dated May 17, 2019

A copy of

the ORDER by Supreme Court Pennsylvania denying the

Petition

for

Allowance

of

Appeal,

dated

January

7,

“APPENDIX G

;^2020.7'.T

(3 of 36)

EXHIBIT APPENDIX

Commitment into the custody of Northampton County Prison,

start

APPENDIX H

date November 4, 2016 at 3;50pm

Application for Search Warrant and Authorization, issued November

4, 2016 at 11:20am

APPENDIX I

Police'Criminal Complaint filed November 4, 2016.

APPENDIX J

Police Criminal Complaint filed December 27, 2016

APPENDIX K

1925(b) Concise Statement filed March 9, 2018....

APPENDIX L

A copy

of

the ORDER to amend 1925(b)

Statement dated May 21,

APPENDIX M

2018

A

copy

of

amended

1925(b)

Statement

filed

May

24,

APPENDIX N

2018

(4 of 36)

JURISDICTION

[ ] For cases from federal courts:

The date on which the United States Court ofAppealsjdecided my case

was ;___________ -_________

[ ] No petition for rehearing was timely filed in my case.

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was denied by the United States Court of

, and a copy of the

Appeals on the following date:___________ _

order denying rehearing appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

(date)

to and including______ .

(date) on__.

in Application No. __ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1254(1).

[yf^For cases from state courts:

The date on which the highest state court decided my case was 1/7/2020

A copy of that decision appears at Appendix__G___

[ ] A timely petition for rehearing was thereafter denied on the following date:

_______ ____________!_, and a copy of the order denying rehearing

appears at Appendix

[ ] An extension of time to file the petition for a writ of certiorari was granted

(date) in

(date) on

to and including__ :_

Application No.__ A

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a).

•fit* r.»

(5 of 36)

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The United States Constitution Amendment 4- Provides; The right of

the people to be‘;sebure in their persons,

houses,

papers,

and

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

The Pennsylvania Constitution Article 1, Section 8 Provides: The

people

shall

be

secure

in

their

possessions

from

warrant

search any place or

shall

to

unreasonable

issue without describing

without

probable

cause

persons,

searches

and

houses

papers

seizures,

to seize any person or

them as

supported

by

nearly as

oath

or

may

and

and

no

things

be,

nor

affirmation

subscribed to by the affiant.

Under both Federal and State provisions, people are to be secure

in their persons against unreasonable searches and seizures.

(6 of 36)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The

instant

Criminal

trial:

matter

Informations,

Docket No's,

before

the

Court

involves

two

(2)

which were consolidated for purposes of

CP-48-CR-OOO43O1-2016■ and CP-48-CR-0000169-

2017. A Preliminary Hearing was held on December 27, 2016, before

Magisterial District Judge Jacqueline M. Taschner for Docket No.

4301-2016, which was bound over to Common Pleas Court for Formal

Arraignment held

Charges

being

Hearing

(Docket

for March 2,

filed

on

No.

2017.

December

169-2017).

This

27,

This

was

followed by New

2016 at

same Preliminary

was

followed by

a

second

Preliminary Hearing on January 18, 2017, held before Magisterial

District Judge Jacqueline M.

Taschner for Docket No.

169-2017,

which was bound over to Common Pleas Court for Formal Arraignment

held for March 30, 2017.

A Habeas Corpus and Suppression Hearing was held on June 14,

2017,

both

Criminal

Informations

were

consolidated

for

that

Hearing.

Both

Trial

held

Criminal

on

Informations

September

5,

were

2017

consolidated

through

for

September

a

8,

Jury

2017.

Petitioner was sentenced on September 22, 2017, to a total term

of

11

to

President

22

years,

Judge

Courthouse. . This

commencing

Stephen

was

G.

followed

on

November

Baratta

by

a

Post

4,

2016,

by Hon.

Northampton

County

Sentence

Motion

(in

Arrest of Judgment) filed on September 27, 2017.

No'tice'of Appeal to the Superior Court o'f Pennsylvania was""

filed on February 15, 2018, from the ORDER entered on January 29,

2018 by Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County. On January

(7 of 36)

23,

2019,

the

Superior

Court

of

Pennsylvania

the

affirmed,

judgment of sentence entered in the Northampton County Court of

Common Pleas. Request for reargument was filed on February 12,

- 2619 y - wrt h'-thd Superior Court of Pennsylvania, for decision dated

January

23,

2019.

On

April

11,

2019

the

Superior

Court

of

Pennsylvania denied the request for reargument.

A Petition for Allocatur was filed on May 9, 2019 with the

Supreme

Court

of

Pennsylvania

Docket

305

No*

MAL

2019.

The

Petition for Allowance of Appeal was denied on January 7, 2020,

by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

BACKGROUND HISTORY OF CASE

Petitioner was arrested and taken into custody on November

4, 2016 for:

Docket No.

4301-2016,

Filed on November 4,

Township Police Department,

charging

2016 by the Palmer

the Petitioner with three

(3) counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to

Deliver (F) 35 § 780-113 §§ A30; three (3) counts of Possession

of a Controlled Substance (M) 35 § 780-113 §§ A16; and three (3)

counts of Criminal Use of a Communication Facility (F3) 18 § 7512

§§ A.

It is alleged by Vasa Faasuamalie, Task Force Officer with

the

Drug

arrest

Enforcement Adminstration Agency

and

at

the

time of

Detective at the Palmer Township Police Department, he

received- ihf bffridtxbir^in JOner"2016p" from A Cetifidetit i^r-*“

(who

has

been

allowed

to

stay

anonymous

protests)

that

the Petitioner was

(8 of 36)

agaisnt

all

trafficking cocaine

legal

in

the

area. Thereafter, Vasa Faasuamalie alleged that in July 2016, the

Palmer Township Police Department conducted a traffic stop on a

Daniel Skodocek, based on their belief that Mr. Skodocek had just

purchased drugs from Petitioner^ It is said.by Vasa Faasuamalie

that, in return for Mr. Skodocek's cooperation, Mr. Skodocek was

promised

not

possession,

month

of

to

be

criminally

recovered during

July

2016;

if,

charged,

this

/

Mr.

for

alleged

Skodocek

the

drugs

traffic

stop

agreed

to

in his

in

work

the

as

a

Confidential Source for Vasa Faasuamalie against the Petitioner.

Thereafter,

on

these

three

(3)

separate

occasions,

Mr.

Skodocek worked for Vasa Faasuamalie as this Confidential Source,

on

a

mission

Faasuamalie:

to

engage

the

(1) On August 3,

Petitioner

2016,

for

Detective

Vasa

it is alleged by Dt. Vasa

Faasuamalie that, Mr. Skodocek told him that, he obtained cocaine

from Petitioner inside a K-Mart, that, was in exchanged for pre­

recorded U.S. currency. It is said that Mr. Skodocek arrived at

this

K-Mart

in his

own vehicle by himself.

(2) On August 17,

2016,

it is alleged by Dt. Vasa Faasuamalie that, Mr.

Skodocek

told him that, he again, obtained cocaine from Petitioner, this

time at

the Palmer Township Center,

that was

in exchanged for

pre-recorded U.S. currency. It is said that Mr. Skodocek arrived

at this Palmer Township Center in his own vehicle by himself. (3)

On August 31, 2016 the last alleged interaction, it is alleged by

Dt. Vasa Faasuamalie that, Mr. Skodocek told him that, once more,

he obtained cocaine from Petitioner inside a K-Mart, tnat was m

exchanged

for pre-recorded U.S.

currency.

It is

said

that Mr.

Skodocek arrived at this K-Mart in his own vehicle by himself.

(9 of 36)

Following

these

three

(3)

alleged

sales,

without

any

continued criminal activity up to or about November 4, 2016, over

sixty

(60)

days

after

the

alleged

FaaSuafnalie

along

with,

members

of

third

the

DEA,

sale.

Dt.

Vasa

Palmer

“Township

Police Department, Wilson Borough Police Department, and the Drug

Task

Force,

surveillance

18042,

without

at

an

arrest

8:00am at

914

warrant,

South

were

25th Street,

conducting

Easton,

Pa.

to seize the Petitioner at his residence, solely for the

alleged

drug

sales

from

the

month

of

August

2016.

Officers

observed the Petitioner exit his residence for work at 8:30am.

Dt.

Vasa

Faasuamalie

approached

the

Petitioner,

while

the

Petitioner was standing at the trunk of his vehicle placing his

tool bag in the trunk.

office,

Dt. Faasuamalie announced his title and

at the same time grabbed the Petitioner,

the Petitioner

then informed

that he was being detained on pending charges.

Petitioner complied and was

transported to the Palmer Township

Police Station for the arrest process. Officer's remained on the

scene

at

the Petitoner's

residence,

while Dt.

Faasuamalie was

transporting the Petitioner to a holding cell for arrest, and to

obtain

a

search warrant

to

search the Petitoner's

without Petitioner being present.

properties

(Due to no criminal complaint

filed before the arrest, the first record of arrest is within the

subsequent Search Warrant Application on page #10, Filed November

4, 2016.)

~

^'TO^0|iHfrT5Ke‘"^arciri?arr^rV^plicaTIdh'^arTststi?cr Dfi rff®

report

by Vasa

Faasuamalie

that

Petitioner had drugs

on his

person when he was stripped searched at the police station, with

(10. of 36)

no proof, documentation, and or exhibit. Subsequent to the search

of Petitioner's properties, Dt. Vasa Faasuamalie filed a Police

Criminal Complaint dated November 4, 2016. See, (Police Criminal

Complaint 11-4- 2016.)

On December 27, 2016, fifty-three (53) days after the arrest

and

search

Hearing

of

for

Faasuamalie

reckless

the

properties,

at

the

the

three

(3)

alleged

files

a

second

Police

for

the truth,

disregard

end

drug

of

the

sales,

Criminal

Preliminary

Officer

Vasa

Complaint

with

alleging for the first time

ever, that Petitioner was on November 4, 2016, observed throwing

a large duffle bag of drugs, that was allegedly found outside the

apartment complex,

Search

Warrant

Inventory

that was introduced in the inventory of the

oh

November

Sheet, dated

2016.

4,

November

4,

See,

2016);

(Search

Warrant

Also

See,

(Police

filed

by

Dt.

Vasa

found

on

the

stem

from

the

Criminal Complaint dated December 27, 2016).

This

admission

of

false

information

Faasuamalie,

along

with

the

Petitioner's

person

at

Police

the

alleged

drugs

Station,

all

arrest made on November 4, 2016. Dt. Vasa Faasuamalie used that

arrest

to circumvent

the Petitioner's

Constitutional

protected

rights,

to obtain a Search Warrant for Petitioner's properties,

and when he did not find what he was looking for he panicked, by

putting on the Search Warrant Inventory sheet that a Black Jacket

with drugs was sitting on a chair outside door of apartment. When

he talked to

the A.D.A and realized there was no consir uct!ve

possession he filed the second Criminal Complaint With a better

story for a constructive possession charge. Why do I say this?

(11 of 36)

On

November

Officer

s

Vasa

4,

day

Faasuamalie

probable

cause,

* affidavit

for

the

Officer

of

filed

subsequent

Petitioner had drugs

Station,

2016,

arrest

two

to

and property

different

search,

Affidavits

Petitioner's

arrest:

[l]

Search

Warrant

which

on his

person,

when moved

to

used

information

Vasa

Faasuamalie

Alleged

that

for

that

the

A

the

Police

to

validate the Search Warrant; and [2] A affidavit for the Criminal

Complaint to justify the arrest itself, which was filed after the

search

of

Complaint,

Petitioner's

properties.

Affidavit

Probable

of

paragraph 15, File November 4,

See,

Cause

(Police

Continuation,

Criminal

page

5

2016 even though Vasa forgot to

number the pages its still page 5 paragraph 15.)

No where, on either of those two Affidavit does Officer Vasa

Faasuamalie mention or even hint at a bag or jacket being thrown

on the day of arrest.

Due to the New Charges filed because of

the new Criminal

Complaint I was charged with:

Docket No.

169-2017,

filed on December 27,

2016 by the Palmer

Township Police Department charged the Petitioner with five (5)

counts

of Possession

of a Controlled Substance with Intent

to

Deliver (F) 35 § 780-113 §§ A30; five (5) counts of Possession of

a Controlled Substance (M) 35 § 780-113 §§ A16; one (1) count of

Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (M) 35 § 780-113 §§ A32.

This is where (Docket No. 169-2017) I got 11 to 22 years,

Troin‘'soma‘'raM6m'*'cfia'fge'‘^Vn‘Wificer\^asa',T:aasuamal‘xe‘*2fiHn:'1B‘'ge'C'''1'

his way, because I didn't want to work for him. Now I fight, for

my life.

(12 of 36)

ARGUMENT

1) The crux of this Writ of Certiorari is whether Law Enforcement

Authorities

engaged

in

tactics

circumvent

Petitioner's

and

procedures

ConstitutionaT

designed

protected

to

rights

guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment against unlawful search and

seizure, and whether the State Court determination represented a

decision that is contrary to or an unreasonable application of

clearly established Federal Law?

The instant case is complex because the Commonwealth Courts

/

'

failed to properly administer the totality of the circumstances

test,

for

determining

probable

cause

in

462

U.S.

213

present

any

controlling

informants.

Illinois

V.

Gates,

Commonwealth

Courts

will

not

actions

involving

(1983).

The

legal

priniciples to the facts bearing upon Appellant's constitutional

claims. Therefore, I call for an exercise of power of supervision

of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Here

is

why,

in

this

case

a

warrantless

arrest

was

that

was

r

initiated,

and

a

warrantless

search

Warrantless

searchs

are presumed unreasonable- under

Amendment,

unless

the

established

and .well-delineated

search

falls

made

within

exception.

at

time.

the Fourth

a. specifically

Ker

V.

State

of

t - i-u...

California, 374 U.S.

23 (1963). One established exception is a

warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. U.S. V. Watson,

423

U.S.

411

(1976).

Therefore,

the

(13 of 36)

initial

inquiry

in

the

. . -»...

instant case must be whether the warrantless arrest of Appellant

was lawful.

In

order

to

be

constitutionally

valid

under

the

4th

Amendment to the United States Constitution, a warrantless arrest

must be supported by probable cause. Beck V. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89

(1964).

first

Where probable cause

instance,

any

to arrest does

evidence

seized

in

a

not

exist

search

in

the

incident

to

arrest must be suppressed. U.S. V. Campbell, 920 F.2d 793 (U.S.

App.

1991).

It

probable

cause

totality

of

is

well

exists

settled

to

that

justify

the circumstances

a

in

determining

warrantless

must be considered..

whether

arrest,

the

Illinois V.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

The totality of the circumstances test finds its roots in

the opinion of

the United States Supreme Court in Illinois V.

Gates,

213 (1983).

462 U.S.

In Gates,

the Court abandoned the

more stringent test for probable cause, previously established in

Aguilar V. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli V. U.S., 393

U.S. 410 (1969). The Aguilar-Spinelli test was a rigid two-prong

analysis

requiring

a finding of both reliability and basis of

knowledge as two separate prongs. In Gates, the Court concluded

that

in

determining

the

existence

of

probable, cause

a

more

flexible approach was desirable.

In

adhered

Commonwealth V.

to

the

Gates

Gray,

totality

503 A.2d 921

of

the

(1985),

circumstances

this court

test

for

.. -----^tfeterrminlhg^probable cause^tfndeir titer "4th Amehdmerrrr“Tff ■‘add±tibffy;

however,

the court held that Article 1, § 8 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution is satisfied by the Gates test and embraced it as a

(14 of 36)

matter of Pennsylvania constitutional law.

Under the totality of the circumstances test, probable cause

exists

where

the

facts

and circumstances within

knowledge lare

sufficient

caution

belief

in

the

to

that

warrant

an

a

person

offense

has

the

officer's

of

reasonable

been

or

is

being

committed. Ker V. State of California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Mere

suspicion is not a substitute for probable cause. Beck V. Ohio,

379

U.S.

89

(1964).

The

totality

of

the

circumstances

test

dictates that we consider all the relevant facts, when deciding

whether the warrantless arrest was justified by probable cause.

U.S. V. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164 (U.S. App. 2002). Where, as here,

the officers

actions

resulted from information gleaned from a

Confidential

Source,

in determining whether

there was probable

cause, the Confidential Source's veracity, reliability and basis

of knowledge must be assessed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233, 103 S.Ct.

at 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d. at 545.

In the case sub judice,

Superior

Court,

concluded that,

"The

trial

relying

on

the last reviewing court,

the Pa.

the

Court,

opinion

of

the

Trial

"Appellant's issues merit no relief". Moreover,

court

opinions

comprehensively

dicuss

and properly

dispose of the questions presented. Therefore, we have no need to

restate them".

In the instant case,

assertion

of

Officer

Vasa

the lower courts relied on the bare

Faasuamalie

that

the

Confidential

*~* SbOTed^jyftrVldda^^dtiSiill^'rhTb'fmhtldiT^by'^gta ting,'*th;g~ Cctffiddtiriarl

Source "related that the narcotic transaction was with SINANAN".

See, (Criminal Complaint-Affidavit of Probable Cause, Date Filed

November 4, 2016); See Also, (Preliminary Hearing 12-27-2016 N/T

(15 of 36)

"Dt. Vasa Faasuamalie", pages 20 through 21). Although Officer

Vasa Faasuamalie claimed that there was corroborating VIDEO and

CELL PHONE evidence,

an

exchange

of

there is no record of criminal activity or

drugs

betweerp-

the

Confidential

Source

and

Appellant on VIDEO, nor is there any evidence of any talk about a

drug sale or the set up of a drug sale by CELL PHONE. It is well

settled

that

that

this

Confidential

Source has never been somebody

this TASK FORCE has used in the past.

See,

(Preliminary

Hearing 12-27-2016 N/T "Dt. Vasa Faasuamalie", page 21, lines 1517). Through this investigation on these three (3) dates August

3,

2016,

August

17,

2016,

and

August

31,

2016

that

are

in

question, NO Officer approached or ever came in direct contact

with

Appellant.

Officers

for

paraphernalia,

Therefore,

whether

or

Appellant

Appellant

was

would

NEVER

checked

have

had

by

drugs,

the alleged pre-recorded money on him.

See,

(Preliminary Hearing 12-27-2016 N/T "Dt. Vasa Faasuamalie", page

21, lines 4-14). In other words

there is a blanket assertion by

the police officers as to the Confidential Source's veracity and

reliability with no objective facts lending credibility to the

assertion. For it is well settled in this case that the officers

did

not

see

or

observe

Source and Appellant.

an

See,

exchange

between

the

Confidential

(Preliminary Hearing 12-27-2016 N/T

"Dt. Vasa Faasaumalie", page 20, lines 7-10). They maintain that

they

only

observed

the

Confidential

Source

meeting

with

the

"'^•^““AppeTTShTrr"1 Mbrbovdif p'thgTe^wr-'NO'' ^reSt^ma'def ^ih ~thtr^nTQn-ttt‘ -ofAugust 2016.

The last reviewing court, the Pa. Superior Court memorandum

(16 of 36)

•=-: -• * ..-v

opinion,

in the case sub judice, created there own narrative by

implying,

"officers

observed

Appellant

sell

confidential informant during each controlled buy",

cocaine

to

therefore,

V

insinuating corroboration was established for probable cause. It

is well settled that this is not the case.

Due

to

numerous

discrepancies

in

facts

presented

in

the

Trial Court's opinion and the Pa. Superior Court, relying on the

opinion of the Trial Court, I believe it necessary to reproduce

the pertinent portions of Officer's testimony.

(l). Preliminary

Hearing,

December

27,

2016,

N/T

"Dt.

Vasa

Faasuamalie", pages 19 through 22:

Q) Is there video surveillance and would it be available at the

Common Pleas ievel?

A) Yes.

Q) And you did maintain that there was somebody that did surveil

the C.S. when he was in the store, correct?

A) That's correct.

THE COURT: And will that person be available to testify in the

future?

DETECTIVE FAASUAMALIE: Yes.

BY MR. DRISCOLE:

Q) And they maintain that they saw the exchange between the C.S.

and Mr. Sinanan, is that correct?

A) They maintain that they observed Mr. Sinanan meeting with the

rt.it

‘C.'ST.

Q) At that time, on the dates between August 1st and August 3rd,

an arrest was not made on Mr. Sinanan, is that correct?

(17 of 36)

Jij.fei.sr

A) That's correct.

Q) So there would not be any evidence that he had any prerecorded

money on him at that time, is that correct?

A) Say that again, please*.

*

Q) There's no evidence that Mr.

Sinanan had prerecorded money,

correct, direct evidence?

A) No, no

not unless we arrested him at that time.

I couldn't

answer that question.

Q) And the same goes

for the August 17th and

the August 31st

controlled buy, Mr. Sinanan was not arrested at those times, is

that correct?

A) That's correct.

Q) Through this investigation on these three dates that are in

question,

no

Officers

ever

came

in

direct

contact

with

Mr.

Sinanan, is that correct?

A) That's correct.

Q) So Mr. Sinanan was never checked himself for whether he would

have had drugs, paraphernalia, or prerecorded money on him?

A) Not in each of those incidences, no.

Q)

So

any

direct

communication

with

Mr.

Sinanan

was

by

the

confidential informant, correct?

A) Correct.

Q) And

is

this confidential informant somebody

that

this Task

via

telephone

Force has used in the past?

'“^wy^NoT"..

Q)

Now,

all

three

purchases

were

conversation, is that correct?

(18 of 36)

set

up

A) That's correct.

Q) And it was using the same number?

A) Correct.

' Q) Were you able to verify whether that number was in fact Mr.

• Sinanan's number?

A) Yes, and I also have that cell phone.

Q) And during those conversations, were you able to listen to see

whether or not there was any talk about a sale or the set up of a

sale?

A) It depended on the conversation at the time, the conversation

was going on. There were text messages, too, I believe.

Q) And that phone would be available to us through the discovery

process, and any of those text messages?

A) Correct.

(2)

Suppression

Hearing,

June

14,

2017,

N/T

"Dt.

Vasa

Faasuamalie", page 92 lines 10-21 and page 94 lines 1-16:

Q)

Okay.

At

the

time

of

Mr.

Sinanan's

arrest,

you

seized

a

telephone from him, I believe, correct?

A) Correct.

Q) And in all the confidential source arranged purchases, there

was .a

phone

number,

484-425-9526;

was

it

the

same

phone

you

seized from him?

A) It was the same number that was utilized by the informant.

-

'.ZT'.

‘

■-

.11.

3i

*:

if...

A) But I believe the hardware was different.

NOTEWORTHY: No cell phone evidence was ever produced in this case

outside

of

a

phone

number

(no

text

(19 of 36)

messages

or

recorded

text

messages

from

the

Confidential

Source's

phone

showing

Appellant's phone number or recorded conversations).

page 94 lines 1-16

Q) Okay. Is there’-any video surveillance or video record of any

of the confidential buys that we talked about previously here?

A) There is store surveillance.

Q) Okay. Based on the location where the transaction occurred?

A) Correct.

Q) And you have that in your possession?

A) Yes.

Q) Can you clearly identify Mr. Sinanan as one of the individuals

involved in the transaction?

A)

I can clearly identify Mr.

Sinanan entering

the store. And

during the same time frame, we were conducting surveillance on

the exterior of the store.

COMPARE: This After Discovered Evidence Filed When Discovered,

(3) Forfeiture Hearing, March 13, [2017](correct date is [2018]),

N/T "Dt. Brent Lear", pages 48 through 49:

Q) So, what I'm saying is from your recollection of what happened

on

this video

was

there any criminal

activity

taped

on

this

video that gives it substance other than contact between the two

individuals?

A) No.

.

; . -- <r.

t

- *'Q)- So;

there’^was no Wrmllial^^activrty- ‘&¥ich hb"1hand,“T6'*lTAntr?i-'No ^

drugs on this video, right? I'm asking. I'm trying to make that

clear.

(20 of 36)

A) There were no hand to hands on the video.

Q) So, the video was basically just used for contact? The purpose

of it was to show contact between the two individuals?

A) To show that you guys met, correct. *Q) Right. So that's it. And then, also, I remember from testimony

that you said that you were also brought into the store and you

was there to witness it physically with you?

You're the only one that was in the store when this occurred

on these two different occasions as far as the store, correct?

A) Correct.

Q) Okay. Now, when you were there did you see anything as far as

illegal

contact

or hand

to hand or drugs being passed off or

anything like that? Since we don't have the video to prove any of

that. Did you see it?

A) I did not.

NOTEWORTHY:

In determining the existence of probable cause the .

Courts may only concern themselves with what

reason

to believe

at

which

took place

over

the

time

sixty

the officers had

of

the

arrest without warrant,

(60)

days

after alleged criminal

activity in the instant case. Johnson V. U.S, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).

As the Court said in U.S. V. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581 (1948), "a search

is not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or

bad when it starts and does not change character from what is dug

up subsequently", (emphasis added).

L.Ed.2d at 545 - I do not believe that an assertion by a police

officer as to an informant's reliability with no objective facts

(21 of 36)

to substantiate his assertion, is sufficient to support a finding

of probable cause.

Moreover,

the

sufficient*- basis

hearsay

of

in

this

knowledge

to

case

does

support

not

disclose

the police

a

officer's

belief that a crime had been or was being committed at the time

of the warrantless arrest over sixty (60) days later. The only

assertion that the Confidential Source made relevant to his basis

of

knowledge

was

that,

"the

narcotics

transaction

was

with

Appellant", which was only alleged in the month of August 2016.

However,

given

the

dearth

statement

is

likewise

of

specifics

insufficient

to

on

form

this

the

point

basis

this

for

a

warrantless arrest on November 4, 2016.

There was no

assertion

that

this

Confidential

Source had

provided information leading to any prior narcotics arrest. Which

goes

against

the

totality

of

the

circumstances

test

for

determining probable cause under the U.S. 4th Amend, and Pa. Art.

1, § 8 constitutions. Illinois V. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

not

Based on the above,

the Confidential Source's hearsay did

provide

officers

the

police

with

sufficient

facts

and

circumstances to warrant the inference that an offense had been

or was being committed at

the

time of

the warrantless arrest.

Beck V. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964). Where the reliability of the

informant is not established,

surrounding

the

hearsay

then the facts and circumstances

must

provide

sufficient

indicia

of

TenaM'Urty—_______

Williams,

407

U.S.

143

(1972).

The

instant

case

provided

a

situation where the police needed to "further investigate" before

(22 of 36)

arresting

the

Appellant,

as

the

hearsay

lacked

indicia

of

reliability. Since the totality of circumstances test is not met

by

the Confidential

Source's hearsay,

standing alone,

we will

examine whether there was sufficient corroboration of the hearsay

by the police to establish probable cause.

Corroboration

independent

of

an

L.Ed.2d

at

550.

sufficient

tip with

103

76

provide

informant's

reliability to an otherwise unreliable tip. Gates, at 241,

2334,

can

of

of

at

work

details

indicia

S.Ct.

police

the

Police

officers

making

a

warrantless arrest may rely on an informant's hearsay even where

they

do

not

personally

observe

the

activity,

so

long

as

the

informant's hearsay is reasonably corroborated by other matters

within the officer's knowledge. Id. at 242, 103 S.Ct. at 2334, 76

L.Ed.2d at 550; Alabama V. White, 496 U.S.

325 (1990).

In the

classic corroboration case, Draper V. U.S., 358 U.S. 307 (1959),

an

informant

named

Hereford

supplied

police

officers

with

information that Draper would be arriving on a train from Denver

on either the morning of December 8th or 9th with drugs in his

possession.

Draper,

at

309,

79

S.Ct.

at

331.

Hereford

also

provided the police with a physical description of Draper. The

Court held that when the police "had personally verified every

facet of the information given to him by Hereford" except for the

fact whether Draper actually possessed drugs, they could presume

the only uncorroborated fact-that Draper was carrying drugs would

the corroboration of every facet of the information supplied by

the informant gave the officer 'reasonable grounds

Since the time of Draper and Gates

(23 of 36)

to arrest.

the Court has expanded

upon what it intended by "corroboration of detailed and accurate

predictions" first introduced in Gates. See, U.S. V. Gilbert, 45

F.3d 1163,

1167 (7th Cir. 1995); U.S. V. Miller, 925 F.2d 695,

699-700 (4th Cir. 1991); and U.S. V. Fixen, 780 F.2d- 1434, 1438

(9th

Cir.

hearsay,

1986).

it

is

When

police

important

are

that

relying

on

an

informant's

the hearsay provide

information

that demonstrates "inside information" a special familiarity with

the defendant's affairs.

White at 332,

L.Ed.2d

at

tip provides

inside

police

corroboration

this

information

310.

If

the

of

inside

110 S.Ct.

at 2417,

110

information,

then

can

impart

additional reliability to the hearsay. White at 331, 110 S.Ct. at

2416, 110 L.Ed.2d at 309; Gates, at 245-246, 103 S.Ct. at 23352336,

76 L.Ed.2d at 551-552. If the facts that are supplied by

the hearsay are no more than those easily obtained, then the fact

that

the police corroborated them is of no moment.

where

the

special

facts

provide

familiarity

inside

with

a

information,

defendant's

It is only

which represent

affairs

that

a

police

corroboration of the information imparts indicia of reliability

to

the hearsay

police

to

support a

corroboration

of

an

finding of

probable

cause.

Thus >

informant's

hearsay

enhances

the

indicia of reliability and thereby strengthens the determination

that the facts and circumstances surrounding the hearsay warrant

a finding of probable cause.

The police officers in the instant case did not assert that

either prior to his arrest in August 2016 or at the time of his

arrest

on

November

4,

2016.

Nor

(24 of 36)

do

they

assert

that

they

personally observed any drug transactions in the month of August

2016 or any other suspicious circumstances that if taken together

■with the Confidential Source's hearsay might constitute probable

for an arrest without warrant on November 4, 2016. In sum,

cause

the record is devoid of facts that would support a finding that

Source's

Confidential

the

corroborated

by

other

unsubstantiated

evidence

gathered

by

hearsay

the

was

arresting

officers.

2)

The

last

issue

presented

for

whether

the

State's

determination

this

in

Writ

this

of

Certiorari

matter

is

represent

a

decision that will permit Law Enforcement Authorities to embark

on policy and procedure that will routinely violate a citizen's

Fourth Amendment right?

The

Fourth

Amendment

prohibits

unreasonable

searches

and

seizures, U.S. Const, amend. IV. Generally, for a seizure to be

reasonable under

Z''-

the Fourth Amendment,

it

must be

effectuated

with a warrant based on probable cause. U.S. V. Robertson, 305

F.3d 164,

167 (3rd Cir.

2002). However, under the exception to

the warrant requirement established in Terry V. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,

88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), "an officer may, consistent

with the Fourth Amendment,

when

the

officer has

conduct a brief,

a reasonable,

investigatory stop

articulable

suspicion

that

Wfmrnia*T' ’§■£‘€1 vi“ty"~lr “fff86t^'"^lTrir!bT§^VT~^agdlb^"J 52^8^‘.•S,.-“iff ;

123,

120

obtained

S.Ct.

673,

pursuant

to

145

an

L.Ed.2d

570

investigatory

(25 of 36)

(2000).

stop

"Any

(also

evidence

known

as

a

'Terry

Stop'

or

a

'Stop

exception must be

and

Frisk')

suppressed as

that does not meet

fruit of

the poisonous

this

tree."

U.S. V. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2006)(citing Wong Sun

* V.

U.S.,

371

U.S.

471,

487-88,

83

S.Ct.

407,* 9 L.Ed.2d

441

(1963).

In Wharton's Criminal Procedure (lOth Ed.) section 36, pages

74, 75, we find the following pertinent language: "In those cases

where the offense is past, the rule is different and an officer

may

not

apprehend

outrageous

crimes,

the

offender

crimes

of

the

however,

it

is

without

felony

the

a warrant,

type.

In

the

of

the

officers

duty

except

cases

in

of

such

to

begin

immediately after notice the pursuit of the person charged with

the offense, provided only that there be at the time reasonable

grounds of suspicion."

In the instant case the determination was made by a police

officer

cause

determination by a police .officer making a warrantless

arrest

the

a

"\

probable

lacks

performing

procedural

warrantless

safeguard

arrest.

that

a

A

neutral

and

detached

magistrate can impart to any determination of probable cause. The

totality of the circumstances standard is the same whether used

for

determining

the

existence

of

probable

cause

for

a

magistrate's issuance of a search warrant or a police officer's

determination

Nonetheless,

that

a

warrantless

arrest

is

justified.

any

analysis

of

the

relevant

circumstances

more

reliable

safeguard

against

improper

searches

hurried

judgment

of

enforcement

a

a

law

(26 of 36)

than

officer engaged

in

must

the

the

often competitive

enterprise of

ferreting out crime."

U. S.

V.

Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

In

the

instant

case,

police

arrived

at

the

Petitioner's

residence, over sixty (60) day's after they received the hearsay,

only to find that the Petitioner was leaving his residence for

work (JOB).

was

not

Furthermore,

engaged

in

any

at the time of the arrest,

criminal

activity,

and

Petitioner

there

was

no

alleged criminal activity continued up to or about that time.

Due to misrepresented facts from day of arrest on November

4,

2016.

I

believe

it

necessary

to

reproduce

the

pertinent

portions of DEA Special Agent Robertjohn Wohlbach's testimony.

Suppression Hearing 6-14-2017 N/T "Robertjohn Wohlbach DEA", page

45 lines 20-25 with page 46 lines 1-20; and page 64 lines 2-10:

page 45 lines 20-25 with page 46 lines 1-20

Q) Okay.

Let's go back to

the date in question.

What was

the

operation for the day at Mr. Sinanan's residence?

A) The day he was arrested?

Q) Yes.

A) That was November 4th, 2017. Basically, the operation was to

sit on his house, wait to see him, he comes out or comes home or

whatever; and just approach him. We didn't have an arrest warrant

or search warrant at the time.

A) The plan was -- what Task Force Officer Faasuamalie likes to

do, he didn't charge him with anything. So no arrest warrant, but

(27 of 36)

always gives them an opportunity to meet up with him and see if

he is willing to cooperate and see where that person is getting

try to work out the chain and try to figure out where

their

that person is getting it from.

K..

So he figured we would just approach him and see if he wants

I wasn't there for that

to cooperate. And Vasa approached him;

conversation, but he didn't want to cooperate.

Q) Okay. Just for the record, this is after the three controlled

purchases; is that correct?

A) That's correct.

page 64 lines 2-10

Q) Why did you pick November 4th? Did you go to arrest him? Was

there surveillance on the 3rd, and on the 2nd, on the 1st? What

was the purpose?

A)

No,

not

that

I

remember.

I just

think Task Force Officer

Faasamalie picked that day, and hopefully, we would see him Mr.

Sinanan.

Q) Did you have any tip from anybody?

A) That day, no.

Therefore,

taking

steps

the

to

propriety

seize

of

Officer

Petitioner

on

Vasa

November

Faasuamalie's

4,

2016,

was

unconstitutional, because any refusal to cooperate without more

does

not

furnish

the minimal

level of

objective justification

reea¥^^br^^aeTenfTbn"'bF'~Wrzufrrc"tefl:y^T:'w0trror^3,912,^'ir:'S,:^'r°

(1968). When an arrest is so timed that it is no more than an

attempt

to circumvent

the warrant requirement,

(28 of 36)

the courts have

held

the

subsequent

Washington,

arrest

or

search

387 F.3d 1060 (U.S.

App.

unlawful.

2004)

See,

U. S.

V.

or Coolidge V. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S., at 469-471 (1971).

In th’e Instant case Petitioner was sacrificed by officers on

\

'November 4,

Petitioner

before

2016,

is

they

based on a hunch or a gut feeling that

dirty by arresting and

legally had grounds

searching

to do

so.

the

the Petitioner

These officers feel

that the result of the search will justify the police activity.

U.S. V.

Johnson,

427 F.3d 1053

(U.S. App.

2005). However,

the

courts have made it quite clear that a bad arrest or a bad search

cannot be salvaged or corrected by what the officer recovers from

the

suspect.

Petitioner

without

U.S.

was

V.

DiRe,

transported

probable cause or

332

U.S.

581

involuntarily

the

limited

(1948).

to

a

Therefore,

police

intrusion of

station

reasonable

suspicion to link Petitioner with criminal activity on November

4, 2016. Dunaway V. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).

Where

informant's

police

are

acting

solely

on

hearsay

and

the

veracity

and

the

basis

of

an

reliability

of

the

informant is not established by objective facts, it is essential

that the hearsay provide adequate indication that the informant

has actual knowledge that criminal conduct is occurring or has

occurred at

the

time

the warrantless

arrest

is made.

U.S.

V.

Robertson, 305 F.3d 164 (U.S. App. 2002).

Moreover,

the totality of the circumstances standard is the

“^~raW'im‘etTrer“We^‘‘ifS^deTerm^hX^r'rxITrrhcT^6T'T^6^1-”^''‘cSU§e^for

a

magistrate's

issuance

of

a

search warrant

or

a

police

officer's determination that a warrantless arrest is justified.

(29 of 36)

U.S. V. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

In

the

case

Supreme

Court

report

to

of

held

Commonwealth

that,

"The

the magistrate was

V.

Eazer,

criminal

act

fewo'-months old,

the

in

Pennsylvania

the

officer's

and thus was too

remote in time to provide the requisite existing probable cause

necessary

for

presence

of

the

issuance

evidence

of

of

a

search warrant.

criminal

activity

at

Further

the

some prior time

would not support a finding of probable cause as of the date the

warrant was issued unless

it also had shown that the criminal

activity continued up to or about that time." Com. V. Eazer, 312

A.2d 398 (Pa. 1973).

In the case of Commonwealth V. Melendez,

1

:

Supreme Court held that,

warrantless

seizures

permissible.

The

;

the Pennsylvania

;

"There are two circumstances

of

a

person

are

in which

constitutionally

first is where police have probable cause

to

believe that a crime is being or is about to be committed. The

second is that a limited seizure may be effected where there is a

reasonable

police

belief

Therefore,

unless

police

that

have

criminal

specific

activity

and

is

afoot.

articulable

facts

which lead them to suspect criminal activity, they may not stop

and search any person without a warrant." Com. V. Melendez, 676

A.2d 226

(Pa.

police have

1996).

In the case of a warrantless arrest,

the burden of demonstrating its validity.

the

Beck V.

Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).

corroboration

reliability

to

to

impart

the

additional

Confidential

indicia

Source's

(30 of 36)

of

veracity

hearsay,

the

and

police

officers did not have probable cause to believe that a crime had

been committed or was being committed at the time of Petitioner's

arrest on November 4, 2016. The Trial Court made no findings of

fadts* in

the

instant

conclusory statement:

case.

The

trial

Judge

simply made

a

"The record and testimony established at

trial clearly established that probable cause existed to support

the Defendant's warrantless arrest." The Court of Appeals merely

concluded, "Appelant's issues merit no relief."

Those,

then,

who

controvert

the

principle,

that

the

Constitution is to be considered, in Court, as a paramount law,

are

reduced

close

their

[passed

by

to

the

eyes

necessity

on. the

Congress].

of

maintaining

Constitution,

This

doctrine

and

that

see

Courts must

only

the

law

the

very

rather

than

would

subvert

making

law

foundation of all written Constitutions.

When

that

happens,

the

Court

representing the law.

(31 of 36)

is

CONCLUSION

In the instant case the arrest here was illegal, pursuant .to

the

totality

of

the

circumstances

inquiry

the

under

Fourth

Amendment of the United "States Constitution established by Gates

and

adopted

applicable

Article

by

the ' Commonwealth

to

the

question

§

8

of

1,

the

of

Court

in

Gray,

illegality

of

the arrest

under

as

being

Pennsylvania

is

Constitution

equally

previously held that the Gates test is consistent with Article 1,

§ 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. See, Gray, 509 Pa. at 488,

503 A.2d at 921.

Accordingly, the warrantless arrest in the instant case was

not supported by probable cause.

If. we were to hold otherwise,

such a

finding would wreak havoc on

Fourth

Amendment

was

created

searches' and seizures.

to

protect

Ohio,

Terry V.

the Fourth Amendment.

against

392 U.S.

The

unreasonable

1,

9,

88 S.Ct.

1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). A finding of probable cause in the

instant

case,

would amount

to

a

finding

of

probable

cause

to

arrest any person on the street by the mere assertion of a police

officer

that

a

confidential

source

told

him

this

particular

individual was dealing drugs and that the confidential source was

reliable.

This

type

of

unsubstantiated

seizure was

the

exact

result that the probable cause standard was intended to avoid.

Brinegar V. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879

(1949).

"These

long

prevailing

standards

seek

to

safeguard

citizens

from rash and unreasonable Interferences with privacy

and from unfounded charges of crime." Brinegar, at 176, 69 S.Ct.

1302

(emphasis added).

We cannot

condone arrests

(32 of 36)

based

solely

upon

the bald assertions by an

informant not proved reliable,

without any consideration of whether there is a fair probability

that the person arrested actually committed or was in the process

^

*

of committing a crime.

If,

instead

of

arresting

the

Petitioner

in

error,

the

officer had presented all the facts within his knowledge and all

the

information

issue

a

at

warrant

hand. to

of

a

arrest

magistrate,

for

the

magistrate would hold the Petitioner

crime before another

tribunal;

no magistrate would

Petitioner

in error

in

error;

no

to answer for a

no. grand jury would indite;

no

court would submit the case to a jury; and, if the officer were

sued

for

false

imprisonment,

no court would instruct

that

the

arrest was justified, assuming all the foregoing testimony to be

true.

If

we

are

correct

in

these conclusions,

and we

see no

•\

escape from them,

the

alleged

the arrest was without authority of law, and

property

wrongfully

seized was

concluded

that

not

admissible

in

Commonwealth has

not

evidence.

Moreover,

having

the

established probable cause for the arrest, we must conclude that

the evidence

seized as a result of

the warrantless

search of

Petitioner incident to his arrest must be suppressed.

For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Sinanan respectfully request

this Honorable Court to reverse and remand the above-captioned

case with instructions to the trial court to grant Mr. Sinanan's

*■ .-a. 'ij' — - cs sat

j

suppression^ motion

alternative,

Honorable

Mr.

Court

or"

to' vacate

Sinanan

grant

any

his'~ convict ions1. "“Iri ~ tHe

respectfully

requests

other

that

relief

(33 of 36)

law

that

and

this

justice

require.

Respectfully Submitted,

•k

Allan Leslie Sinanan Jr. (Pro-Se)

Si

DATE:

attire of Petitioner

1/15/2020

FILE COPY

v

r.v'c

\

(34 of 36)

•— •- - -

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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