Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Mallory Jones, et al., Petitioners v. Ramone Lamkin, Individually and in His Official Capacity as Marshal of the Civil and Magistrate Court of Richmond County, Georgia, et al.

Iu The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

¢

MALLORY J ONES and TROY A. MOSES,

Petitioners,

VS.

RAMONE LAMKIN, individually and in his official

capacity as Marshal of the Civil and Magistrate Court of

Richmond County, Georgia and AUGUSTA, GEORGIA,

Respondents.

.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eleventh Circuit

?

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

0d

JOHN B. LONG, Esq.

TUCKER LONG, P.C.

P.O. Box 2426

Augusta, GA 30908

(706) 722-0771

jlong@tuckerlong.com

COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964

WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM

QUESTION PRESENTED

In determining whether or not the exception to

First Amendment protections for public employees as

set forth by this Court in Elrod v. Burns, 427 US. 347

(1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) applies,

should the lower courts make their determination

based upon the actual work performed by the employee; or should the lower courts make the determination as to whether or not the employee was a

policymaker or confidential employee by looking at the

written job descriptions set forth in statutes or policies

(i.e., the “categorical approach” or “alter ego” theory)?

il

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners are Mallory Jones and Troy A. Moses.

Respondents are Ramone Lamkin, in his individual

and official capacity as Marshal of the Civil Court of

Richmond County, Georgia, and Augusta, Georgia.

RELATED CASES

Jones v. Lamkin, CV 117-008, United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, 2018

Westlaw 9538939 (S.D. Ga. 2018).

Jones v. Lamkin, 2019 Westlaw 3183635 (11th Cir.

2019).

McCaffrey v. Chapman, 2019 WL 1523044 (4th Cir.

2019) (cert. denied).

lil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented .......ccccccccccessesecsccceeeecscueessees i

Parties to the Proceedings .............cccescesecesceeeeeeees ii

Related Case ......ccccccccsssscccssccsesecescceeceeeceeeceneeeeees li

Table of Contents ........cccccccccsesccsscceeseeeseeeseseseeeees iii

Table of AUthOrities ..........cccccccccccsecceeecesceaeeeeeeeeaes V

Opinions Below .........cccccceccccseccessccseceaeeeaeceeesceuecees 1

Jurisdictional Statement ...........ccccccseccsesesseeeseeeees 1

Constitutional Provisions Involved ..................008 1

Statutory ProvisSiONs .............ccccsccsccsccsecscceseneceecees 2

Statement of the Case ........cccccccecccsseccceeseeneeeeeeeees 3

Reasons to Grant this Petition ...............cccccseeceees 6

CONCLUSION. ......cecccsccccseececneseccaeecesccaeseeesseeesaesceaaeees 13

APPENDIX

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit, Opinion, July 16, 2019... ee App. 1

United States District Court for the Southern

District of Georgia, Order, September 24,

QOL8 ...eeccccsssccccccenssscccceeceeesseeeeesseseeeceessueeseeseues App. 15

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh

Circuit, Order Denying Petition for Rehearing, September 5, 2019.0... ccccceeeeeaeeseaes App. 35

Georgia Laws, No. 882 .......ccccceecccccccssecesssseeeeeeees App. 37

lv

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

Page

Affidavit, Steve Smith, March 21, 2018............ App. 40

Affidavit, Steve Smith, May 25, 2018 ............... App. 45

Personnel Policy & Procedures Manual, Au-

PUSTA, GOOLLIA ......ccccccccccccssseecceesssssaessseeeeeeeees App. 51

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170 (8d Cir. 1999).............66 10

Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) ........ ee passim

Brett v. Jefferson County, Ga., 128 F.8d 1429

(1th Cir, 1997)... ccccccessesssscsccssseeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeenaaaaas 10

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 188 (1988) uu... cess 12

DiRuzza v. County of Tehama, 206 F.3d 1804

(Oth Cir. 2000)... cccccccccssssssssseeeccesseesssssseeccesseneeeeeees 8

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) ......... 6, 7, 8,10, 11

Ezell v. Wynn, 802 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2015)............ 11

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)..............00608 12

Hunt v. County of Orange, 672 F.3d 606 (9th Cir.

QOD) ...eececcccccccccccccceeeeeeeaeeseeeeceeesesaeseeeeeeeeesseageseeesees 8

Hobler v. Brueher, 325 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 2008)......... 8

Horton v. Taylor, 767 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1985)............. 9

Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.

1999) occ ccccccceccccccsssseeccceusecesueeccceenececueeceeeaaecesaeceseneess 9

Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1997)......... 7

Jones v. Lamkin, 2018 Westlaw 9538939 (S.D.

Gea. 2018) occ ccccceeeeeeeecsssssseseseeeeeeeeeseeeeseeeaaaags 5,6

Jones v. Lamkin, 2019 Westlaw 3183635 (11th

Cir. 2019) .oecccccccccsccssscssssssssssecceeceseeesseeeeeceeesseaaeeseeeeees 6

Jordan v. Ector County, 516 F.3d 290 (5th Cir.

AU] Os) re 10

vl

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

McCaffrey v. Chapman, 2019 WL 1523044 (4th

Cir. 2019) ..eccccccccccctsscetstsessssssssesessssssssssessessssseessseeees il

McCaffrey v. Chapman, 921 F.3d 159 (4th Cir.

2019) v..eeccccssesssssssssssssssssseecceceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeaesaaas 7

Monks v. Marlinga, 923 F.2d 423 (6th Cir. 1991)....... 11

O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake,

518 US. 712 (1996) ve cccccceessesseetsessssseeeeeeeseneees 12

Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High School Dist.

205, Will County, Illinois, 391 U.S. 568 (1968) ....7, 12

Regan v. Boogertman, 984 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.

L998) ...eceeccssccccccccccssssssecceceasaesseeeseeccceeeesesaucaeaeeseeeeeeas 11

Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62

(L990) ....cecceessssssssssssscssssseeeceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeseeeeesaaaaas 11

Stough v. Gallagher, 967 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir.

1S): )) 11

Tomezak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633 (7th

Cir, 1985) oo... ccccccccccccccseeeseseeeeeesesasaesassesssesseeeeeeseeaees 11

Underwood v. Harkins, 698 F.3d 1835 (11th Cir.

7A Oh 2) eee 7

Valdizan v. Rivera-Hernandez, 445 F.3d 63 (1st

Cir, 2001) 0... ccecccccesssscccceessccccaescceceeasenssseeceesueaeeessaas 11

Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879 (5th Cir. 1995).......... 10

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Vil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

STATUTES

1974 Ga. Laws § 2410, ef SQ. .o.ccccccccccccsssssccceeeeeaeseseesees 3

1999 Ga. Laws § 3508.0... ccccccccccsscccseceecceccsseeeeuceseneuees 3

28 ULS.C. § T2541) ccc ccccccsssesssssssssseeesssesssseseeeceeeeeees 1

AD USC. § 1988 coecccccccccccctctsttssssssssssssssssssssseeseceeeeeees 2

O.C.G.A. § 15-10-1000, ef SOQ. .....ccccccccesesccccseeecesaaeeseeeeees 3

RULES

Supreme Court Rule 13.1.0... cccccenseeceseeeeeeeeeens 1

OTHER

126 Harvard Law Review 2181... cccceccscescesesseens 7

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

The Eleventh Circuit decision is printed at 2019

WL 31836385 and is reprinted in Appendix Pet. 1. The

District Court opinion granting summary judgment to

Lamkin and Augusta is at 2018 WL 9538989 and reprinted at Appendix Pet. 15.

+

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the

decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals by

virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). On July 16, 2019, the

Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the grant

of summary judgment to Respondents. On September

5, 2019, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied

the petition for rehearing filed by Petitioners. Pursuant to Rule 13.1 of the Rules of this Court, this petition

is being filed within ninety (90) days of September 5,

2019.

@

v

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

US. Const. amend. I:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free

exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of

speech, or of the press; or the right of the

2

people peaceably to assemble, and to petition

the Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1:

All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,

are citizens of the United States and of the

State wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge

the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any State deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.

5d

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

42 U.S.C. § 1983:

Every person, who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

proceeding for redress...

@

Vv

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The office of Marshal of the Civil and Magistrate

Court of Richmond County was created by Special Act

of the Georgia General Assembly. The Civil and Magistrate Court assumed the duties of the justices of the

peace and constables. See 1974 Ga. Laws § 2410, et seq.

Originally, Chief Marshal (then called the Sheriff of

the Civil Court) was appointed by the Chief Judge of

the Civil Court. The Chief Marshal and his deputies

served at the pleasure of the Chief Judge of the Civil

Court. In 1999, the position of Marshal became an

elected position. 1999 Ga. Laws § 3508. The Marshal’s

Office enforces ordinances, handles dispossessory

cases, and serves papers in small claims cases. In Georgia, deputy marshals are certified law enforcement officers and have arrest powers. Petitioners Jones and

Moses worked under their elected Marshal (then Marshal Smith). Petitioners’ salaries were paid by Respondent Augusta, Georgia.

The Marshal’s position is governed by General

Law relating to the Magistrate Court, O.C.G.A. § 15-

10-100, et seg., as well as the Special Act creating the

Magistrate Court. The position of Marshal is therefore

akin to a constable of the previous Justice of the Peace

courts. Currently, there are more than one hundred

(100) deputy marshals who work in the Richmond

County Marshal’s Office and whose employment is affected by the lower courts’ decisions.

Petitioners Jones and Moses were deputy marshals serving under the then-Marshal Steve Smith. In

4

2016, Smith ran for re-election as Marshal. Lamkin

ran as Smith’s opponent. Both Jones and Moses openly

supported Smith in his bid for re-election. On his own

time, Moses supported Smith to the fullest, wore Smith

campaign shirts, posted photographs on social media

with Smith, and the like. Jones, also on his own time,

made social media postings describing things that

Smith had done for Jones over the years. Throughout

the election campaign, neither Moses nor Jones in any

way made derogatory comments or “bashed” Lamkin.

Lamkin was elected on May 24, 2016 but did not take

office until January 1, 2017. Respondent Augusta,

Georgia has a written policy that allows its employees,

with the exception of its administrator, to participate

in partisan politics on their own time. (Appendix Pet.

51). Despite that policy, the court ruled that Petitioners

Jones and Moses could still be terminated for exercising First Amendment rights based on the fact that under the 1974 Special Act they were the alter egos of the

Marshal.

In the Summer of 2016, prior to taking office, Lamkin spoke with one of the City of Augusta attorneys

about the legality of terminating Jones and Moses. In

late October or early November of 2016, Lamkin then

had a conversation with his then-supervisor, the Sheriff of Richmond County. Lamkin told the Sheriff that

upon assuming the position of Marshal Lamkin could

not keep Jones and Moses, because he could not trust

them as a result of their loyalty to and support of

Smith. The Sheriff, who is both a constitutional officer

under the Georgia Constitution and the chief law enforcement officer in Augusta, Richmond County, told

5

Lamkin that Lamkin could not terminate Jones and

Moses because of their political participation. Despite

receiving that advice from the Sheriff, on December 6,

2016 Lamkin informed Jones and Moses by letter that

they would be terminated effective January 1, 2017.

The District Court found that there was no genuine

dispute of material fact as to the reason for Lamkin’s

terminating Jones and Moses finding that Lamkin terminated Jones and Moses because of their support of

Smith. Jones v. Lamkin, 2018 Westlaw 9538939 (S.D.

Ga. 2018).

Respondents Lamkin and Augusta both moved for

summary judgment contending that, because the Special Act creating the Office of Marshal made deputy

marshals the alter egos of the Marshal, Jones and Moses were not entitled to First Amendment protection.

Former Marshal Smith opined that neither Jones nor

Moses held any policymaking position. (R67). The District Court held that in the Eleventh Circuit no factual

inquiry was required where the subordinate under the

law creating the office of Marshal has the same duties

and is the alter ego of Lamkin. The District Court concluded that Lamkin did not violate their First Amendment rights when terminating Jones and Moses and

granted summary judgment to Lamkin and Augusta.

The District Court and the Eleventh Circuit Court

of Appeals have applied what is termed the “categorical” or “alter ego” approach in deciding political patronage dismissal cases where the court decides, as a matter

of law, the question of whether or not the dismissed

employee was a “policymaker” or was a “confidential

6

employee.” In those cases, these courts look to the statutory or written duties of the dismissed employee, as

opposed to the actual duties and position held by the

dismissed employee. Using the categorical approach,

the District Court granted summary judgment to Respondents. Jones v. Lamkin, 2018 Westlaw 9538939

(S.D. Ga. 2018).

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the grant of summary judgment to Respondents,

reiterated the fact that in the Eleventh Circuit the

“categorical” approach was to be used. Jones v. Lamkin,

2019 Westlaw 3183635 (11th Cir. 2019). That methodology of deciding political patronage cases under the

Elrod-Branti exception to the First Amendment is the

methodology generally utilized throughout the Eleventh Circuit, even though there is nothing in this

Court’s opinion in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976)

or Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) where this

Court has held that methodology should be used to decide these types of cases.

,

v

REASONS TO GRANT THIS PETITION

Under Rule 10 of the Rules of this Court, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has entered a decision which is in conflict with

decisions of various other United States Courts of Appeals on this same issue. There is no question but that

there is a division in the circuits as to how the lower

courts are to handle partisan employee dismissal. This

division among the circuits has led to employees’ First

7

Amendment protections being based upon in which

part of the country that government employee is employed.

This Court recently had before it a Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari in the case of McCaffrey v. Chapman,

Case No. 19-842. In that case, the Fourth Circuit Court

of Appeals applied the alter ego theory and short circuited any Elrod-Branti factual analysis required by

this Court. McCaffrey involved a dispute between a

sheriff and a deputy under Virginia law. The facts and

law in the case at hand are substantially different. The

adoption of the alter ego methodology or the categorical approach, 1.e., looking only at the duties of the employee imposed by law or written policy, as opposed to

the actual duties performed by that employee to determine whether or not the exceptions to the First

Amendment protections created by this Court in Elrod

v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) and Branti v. Finkel, 445

U.S. 507 (1980), has been criticized by a number of the

judges in the Fourth Circuit in Jenkins v. Medford, 119

F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1997) and McCaffrey v. Chapman,

921 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2019). In the Eleventh Circuit,

this approach was criticized in the dissent Underwood

v. Harkins, 698 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2012) and in a note

in the Harvard Law Review at 126 Harvard Law Review 2181 where the author concluded:

“Courts in the political candidacy context

whether under Elrod-Branti or Pickering,

should evaluate critically the government’s

loyalty interests based on the employee’s actual job requirement when balancing them

8

against the steep costs to the employee and

the public’s First Amendment interests.”

Despite that criticism, the alter ego or categorical approach is being used in a number of circuits, whereas

a number of other circuits look at the actual duties being performed by the employee in order to determine if

that employee is or is not entitled to First Amendment

protection.

In contrast to the Eleventh and Fourth Circuits,

the Ninth Circuit, in a case involving a newly elected

sheriff who fired a deputy who had supported the losing candidate, held that in order to determine whether

or not the exception to First Amendment protections

created by the Elrod-Branti analysis are applicable,

one must look at the duties that the employee actually

performs on a day-to-day basis. In that case, California

law, just like Georgia law, gives deputy sheriffs the

same statutory authority as the Sheriff. In DiRuzza v.

County of Tehama, 206 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 2000), the

District Court, relying upon the California statutes,

held that a deputy sheriff could be fired without violating his First Amendment rights under the Elrod-

Branti analysis. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed.

In that case, the Court focused on the actual, not the

possible duties of the individual employee to determine

whether political loyalty was appropriate for the effective performance of her job. The Ninth Circuit has consistently applied DiRuzza subsequent to that date. See

Hunt v. County of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 613 (9th Cir.

2012); Hobler v. Brueher, 325 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir.

2003).

9

In the Tenth Circuit, the courts looked at both the

inherent powers of the position and the actual duties

performed. Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.8d 1247, 1253

(10th Cir. 1999). In that case, deputy sheriffs and other

employees claimed a violation of their First Amendment rights after they were fired for supporting a losing candidate. The Tenth Circuit considered the job

that the plaintiffs actually performed as evidenced by

the record. There, the plaintiffs’ duties involved routine police work. The court concluded that there was no

compelling political loyalty to arrest a thief, no partisan way to serve a Summons, or to stop a speeding motorist. The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed the

District Court’s grant of summary judgment for the defendants and remanded the case for trial.

In the Eighth Circuit, the courts have likewise focused on the actual duties performed and have rejected

the alter ego test. In Horton v. Taylor, '767 F.2d 471, 475

(8th Cir. 1985), the District Court upheld the patronage dismissal of five (5) road grade operators by the

newly elected county judge. The District Court relied

heavily on the perception of political realities of small

rural Arkansas counties and on the so-called “alter ego

theory” that both the Fourth Circuit and the Eleventh

Circuit have adopted. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed and explained that the Branti test is a functional test focusing on the actual duties performed by

employees. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals therefore focused its analysis on the plaintiffs’ actual responsibilities which involved the manipulation of

10

heavy machinery over unpaved rural roads, not a written job description.

The Third Circuit has likewise focused on the actual duties of the employee. In Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d

170 (8d Cir. 1999), the Third Circuit considered the actual duties which the employee performed, not the

written job description. In that case, the Director of the

Bureau of Vehicle Management claimed that he was

dismissed for political reasons. The court explained

that the inquiry into the employee’s duties is a “fact

specific one” looking at what the employee’s job actually entails.

Some Fifth Circuit cases look to the factual issues

and do not decide these type cases based upon the alter

ego theory. Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170 (8d Cir. 1999).

In Jordan v. Ector County, 516 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 2008),

the Fifth Circuit pointed out that deputy clerks have

the power as clerks, but held that it was a factual issue

as to whether or not the Elrod-Branti exception was

applicable. See also, Vojvodich v. Lopez, 48 F.3d 879

(5th Cir. 1995).

Even in the Eleventh Circuit, there has been a

case in which deputy sheriffs who were fired because

of the political support were allowed to recover because

they were improperly terminated. Brett v. Jefferson

County, Ga., 123 F.8d 1429 (11th Cir. 1997) ultimately

resulted in a jury verdict in favor of the dismissed deputies. There are also cases where summary judgment

has granted the dismissal of First Amendment claims.

11

Ezell v. Wynn, 802 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2015); Stough v.

Gallagher, 967 F.2d 15238 (11th Cir. 1992).

In contrast, the Third, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and

Tenth Circuits looked at the powers of a given office as

opposed to the function performed by a particular employee in Valdizan v. Rivera-Hernandez, 445 F.3d 638

(Ist Cir. 2001). The Second Circuit in Regan v.

Boogertman, 984 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1993) looked at not

what the employee actually did, but what the law gave

her authority to do to determine if First Amendment

protections applied. The Sixth Circuit applied this

same test in Monks v. Marlinga, 923 F.2d 423 (6th Cir.

1991). The Seventh Circuit also considered the formal

job description, not the actual duties in denying First

Amendment protections. Tomczak v. City of Chicago,

765 F.2d 633 (7th Cir. 1985).

As a result of this divergence in the circuits, Justice Scalia in dissenting in Rutan v. Republican Party

of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62 (1990) at 111-112 cited cases in

his notes which involved similar, if not almost identical

factual situations in which cases were decided differently. The dismissal of employees for exercising First

Amendment rights should be the exception, not the

rule. The spoils system has changed from 1828 and

the construction of the Elrod-Branti exception has

made it so that the exception now overrides First

Amendment protections in some circuits, but not in

others, so that all classifications of employees can be

fired for exercising their First Amendment rights and

denied relief.

12

This Court, in its decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,

547 U.S. 410 (2006), cast doubt on the approach taken

by both the Eleventh Circuit and the Fourth Circuit.

In Garcetti, this Court rejected the suggestion that employers can restrict employees’ rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions. Therefore, this Court

established that the proper inquiry is a practical one.

The reason for that decision is quite obvious in that

formal descriptions bear little resemblance to the actual duties an employee can be expected to perform.

In Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High School Dist.

205, Will County, Illinois, 391 U.S. 5638 (1968), this

Court held that public employees may not constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights that they would otherwise enjoy as

citizens. However, in some circuits that rule is not in

practice being followed. Under Pickering and its prodigy, this Court applied a balancing test to determine

whether the First Amendment required a government

employer to tolerate actions which he reasonably believes would disrupt the office, undermine his authority or destroy close working relationships. See Connick

v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1988).

In O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake,

518 U.S. 712 (1996), this Court recognized the inappropriateness of relying on legislative labels when extending Elrod-Branti’s prohibition against politically

motivated dismissals of employees to cover independent

contractors hired by the government. This Court reasoned that drawing a distinction between employees and

independent contractors would invite manipulation by

13

governments which could avoid constitutional liabilities simply by attaching different labels to particular

jobs. In none of the cases decided by this Court has this

Court ever approved of an alter ego methodology or

categorical approach to support or approve the termination of a government employee because of the exercise of his or her First Amendment rights. This Court

should grant this Petition for Certiorari, reject the alter ego or categorical approach adopted by certain circuits, and require that throughout the country an

employee’s right to exercise his First Amendment

rights in a political context is the same, that is, the limitation as to a true “policymaker,” such as those who

are second or third in the chain of command, not as to

all deputy marshals as the Eleventh Circuit has in essence held.

yy

Vv

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should grant

this Petition for Writ of Certiorari and hold that the

limited exception to First Amendment protections is

truly limited.

This 4th day of December, 2019.

JOHN B. Lona, Esq.

TUCKER LONG, P.C.

P.O. Box 2426

Augusta, GA 30903

(706) 722-0771

jlong@tuckerlong.com