Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Barbara Nina Davis, Petitioner v. MTGLQ Investors, L.P.

No-_____

In the Supreme Court of the United States

BARBARA NINA DAVIS,

v.

Petitioner,

MTGLQ INVESTORS, LP,

Respondent.

On Writ of Certiorari to the District Court of Appeal

for the State of Florida, Fourth District

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JOHN J. ANASTASIO

Counsel of Record

Suite 203

3601 South East Ocean

Blvd. Stuart, Florida 34996

(772) 286-3336

ESERVICE@PSLLAW.NET

Counsel for Petitioner

Dated November 27, 2019

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

INTRODUCTION

This is a residential foreclosure case,

concerning the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform

Mortgage, used for tens of millions of mortgages.

This mortgage requires the lender give the

homeowner a default notice, prior to filing suit,

giving the homeowner, a consumer due process

right of notice and an opportunity to cure the

default. Under the mortgage, service of the notice is

deemed given the homeowner, either when sent

first class mail, or when actually received, if sent by

other means.

At trial the lender’s evidence showed, that

the lender did not give the homeowner the default

notice by first class mail. Instead, the lender sent

the notice only once, by certified mail return receipt

requested. The notice sent by certified mail return

receipt requested was never claimed by the

homeowner. The default notice was never received

by the homeowner.

QUESTION

Whether under the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac

Uniform Mortgage, a notice given by certified mail

return receipt requested is a means other than first

class mail, thus requiring actual delivery.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner-homeowner Barbara Nina Davis

was the defendant in the Circuit Court proceedings,

appellee in the District Court of Appeals

proceedings, and petitioner in the Florida Supreme

Court proceedings.

Respondent-lender MTGLQ Investors, LP

was the plaintiff in the Circuit Court proceedings,

appellant in the District Court of Appeals

proceedings, and respondent in the Florida

Supreme Court proceedings.

RELATED CASES

MTGLQ Investors, LP v. Barbara Nina Davis, No.

43-2010-CA-301, Circuit Court of the 19th Judicial

Circuit Martin County, Florida. Judgment entered

February 26, 2018.

MTGLQ Investors, LP v. Barbara Nina Davis, No.

4D18-1618, District Court of Appeal for the Fourth

District, Florida. Judgment entered March 20, 2019

Barbara Nina Davis MTGLQ Investors, LP, No.

SC19-1020, Florida Supreme Court. Judgment

entered August 30, 2019.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ...................................... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ....................... ii

RELATED CASES .................................................. ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................... v

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI ......... 1

OPINIONS BELOW ............................................... 1

JURISDICTION ..................................................... 1

STATUTES

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED..................................... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................... 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ..... 6

A.

Introduction. ................................................. 6

B.

This court has previously distinguished

between first-class mail and certified mail

return receipt requested, on due process notice

grounds. ................................................................... 7

C.

A functional analysis comparing firstclass mail to certified mail return receipt

requested demonstrates there is a difference........ 9

D.

Because first-class mail and certified

mail

return

receipt

requested

are

fundamentally different, the public perception

and common usage also distinguishes both

categories of mail, not physical standards made

by the Mailing Standards of the United States

Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual. ................ 11

iv

CONCLUSION ..................................................... 12

APPENDIX

District Court of Appeal Opinion ......................... 1a

District Court of Appeal Order Denying

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc ..................... 7a

Supreme Court of Florida Order Denying

Discretionary Jurisdiction .................................... 8a

Certified Mail Return Receipt Record ................. 9a

v

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Clark v. Willard, 393 U.S. 112, 117-19 (1934)....... 2

Davis v. MTGLQ Inv'rs, LP, 2019 Fla. LEXIS

1543 (August 30, 2019) ....................................... 1

Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 126 (2006)............ 7

Ming Kuo Yang v. City of Wyo., 793 F.3d 599,

603 (6th Cir. 2015) .............................................. 8

MTGLQ Inv'rs, L.P. v. Davis, 270 So. 3d 392

(Fla. 4th DCA 2019) ............................................ 1

Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304, 307 (1893) ............. 12

Raley v. Phio, 360 U.S. 423, 436-37 (1959) ............ 2

Constitution

Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 of the United

States Constitution ............................................. 2

Statutes

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) ................................................. 1

Regulations

39 C.F.R. 111......................................................... 10

Domestic Mail Manual 3.1.1 ................................ 10

Domestic Mail Manual 3.2.2 ................................ 10

Domestic Mail Manual 1.1.1 ................................ 10

1

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Barbara Nina Davis petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the District

Court of Appeal for the State of Florida, Fourth

District in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The District Court of Appeal for the State of

Florida, Fourth District’s opinion is reported at

MTGLQ Inv'rs, L.P. v. Davis, 270 So. 3d 392 (Fla.

4th DCA 2019) and reproduced at App. 1-6. The

Fourth District’s denial of petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration and rehearing en banc is

reproduced at App. 7. The Florida Supreme Court’s

order denying discretionary review is reported at

Davis v. MTGLQ Inv'rs, LP, 2019 Fla. LEXIS 1543

(August 30, 2019) is reproduced at App. 8.

JURISDICTION

The District Court of Appeal for the State of

Florida, Fourth District entered judgment on

March 20, 2019. App. 1-6. The court denied a timely

petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc on

May 17, 2019. App. 7. The Florida Supreme Court

denied a timely filed petition for discretionary

review on August 30, 2019. App. 8.

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257(a), as a federal question concerning United

States mail, which was actually passed upon by the

highest state court. Raley v. Phio, 360 U.S. 423,

2

436-37 (1959). It is a final decision for jurisdiction

purposes, because it conclusively disposes of the

federal question, distinct from the foreclosure

action. Clark v. Willard, 393 U.S. 112, 117-19

(1934).

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case does not involve interpretation of

statutory or constitutional provisions

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 of the United

States Constitution, known as the Postal Clause or

the Postal Power, empowers Congress, "To

establish Post Offices and Post Roads". While not

mandated, Congress has established the United

States Postal Service. The Postal Service has

established categories of mail delivery.

This case revolves around the question: Is

there a difference between service of a required

mortgage pre-suit default notice, by United States

Postal Service category of first-class mail, and

United States Postal Service category of certified

mail return receipt requested?

At issue is the interpretation of the notice

language in the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform

Mortgage, used for tens of millions of mortgages in

the United States.

3

Section 15 of the mortgage (Record p. 943944), requires the lender give the homeowner a

default notice, prior to filing suit. Under the

mortgage, service of the notice is deemed given,

either when sent first class mail, or when actually

received, if sent by other means.

The exact language of Section 15 in part

states:

Any notice to Borrower in connection

with this Security Instrument shall be

deemed to have been given to

Borrower when mailed by first class

mail or when actually delivered to

Borrower's notice address if sent by

other means….

Any notice in connection with this

Security Instrument shall not he

deemed to have been given to Lender

until actually received by Lender.

At trial the lender introduced as Exhibit 6,

the default letter, also commonly called an

acceleration letter or breach letter. (Record p. 907908) And, the lender introduced a certified mail

return receipt record, (Record p. 909-910, App. 9)

reflecting that the notice was never claimed by the

homeowner. Thus, default notice was never

received by the homeowner.

4

The record is devoid of any attempt made by

the lender to resend the default notice.

The trial judge posed the following question

during trial, “Well how did the borrower cure the

default if they don’t get a default [notice]?” (Trial

Transcript p. 77, Line 23-24) This reflected a

concern about Section 20 of the mortgage, App. 6a

footnote 1) which twice refers to notice and an

opportunity to cure or take corrective action.

The trial judge then went on to find (Trial

Transcript p 79 line 19-20) that, “I'm don't think

first class is the same thing as certified mail.” The

court went on to conclude in regard to first class

mail and certified mail return receipt requested

that, “they're not the same thing.” (Trial Transcript

p 78 line 19-20) Also noting that, “One comes with

certified mail comes with a little green return card

to show that it was actually received.” (Trial

Transcript p. 79, Lines 1-3) The court concluded

that, “but for the fact that if it would have been sent

by regular mail, it would be left in the mailbox and

the person would've been presumed to have

received that once it was left in the mailbox.”

After making that determination, the trial

judge granted the homeowner’s motion for an

involuntary dismissal. (Trial Transcript p. 88, Line

14-15)

The import of this notice requirement is that

5

under the second paragraph of Section 20 (Record

p. 945) and Section 22 (Record p. 946) of the

mortgage, no judicial action, (in this case a

foreclosure action) by the lender can commence

until 30 days after the homeowner is given a notice

of default, which among other things, must specify

the default, and the date at least 30 day later, on

which the default must be cured.

The failure to comply with the condition

precedent of the lender giving the homeowner a

default letter, resulted in the dismissal of the

action. (Trial Transcript p. 90, Line 12-14)

The lender appealed and the Fourth District

reversed the trial court. (App. 1-6)

The Fourth District relied upon the concept

that certified mail return receipt requested was

only first-class mail with an “add-on”. “USPS

website shows that certified mail is simply

enhanced first-class mail…. This indicates that

certified mail is basically a service that can be

added-on to first-class mail.” (App. 4)

The District Court held that because

certified mail return receipt requested was first

class mail, the never received default notice was

given to the homeowner under the language of the

mortgage. (App. 4)

6

The Court in its opinion (App. 1-6) ignored a

functional analysis of what occurs with certified

mail return receipt requested. And, an analysis of

the perception of the consumer and intent of a party

to the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage.

The user perception of a mortgagor,

consumer, or American society in general is

different for certified mail return receipt requested,

than it is for first-class mail, because of the

functional difference between them. In a society

where more and more people are working, or not

waiting at home for mail, or any other packages,

certified mail return receipt requested is really

different and not in line with the past decade of

American consumer behavior and perception.

The homeowner petitioned for discretionary

review by the Florida Supreme Court, which was

denied in a per curiam decision on August 30, 2019.

(App. 7)

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

A.

Introduction.

The District Court of Appeals for the Fourth

District has decided the homeowner’s case below on

an important question of federal law, concerning

the effect of U.S. mail classification, that has not

been directly decided, but should be settled by this

court.

7

The notice language of the mortgage at issue

is contained in tens of millions of Fannie

Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgages throughout

the United States. The statistics on the prevalence

of such mortgages are both well known to the

public, and readily ascertained from Freddie Mac’s

website www.freddiemac.com, and Fannie Mae’s

website. www.fanniemae.com.

B.

This court has previously distinguished

between first-class mail and certified mail

return receipt requested, on due process

notice grounds.

This court held in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S.

220, 126 (2006), in the context of a tax sale,

(analogous to a foreclosure) when the mailed notice

of a tax sale is an unclaimed certified return receipt

requested mail, additional reasonable steps, if

practical, should be taken to attempt to provide

notice before taking action.

In Jones Id. 547 U.S. at 18-19, this court

observed that, “We do not think that a person who

actually desired to inform a real property owner of

an impending tax sale of a home he owns would do

nothing when a certified letter sent to the owner is

returned unclaimed.” Otherwise, the homeowner is

“no better off than if the notice had never been

sent.” Id. at 20.

8

Even Ming Kuo Yang v. City of Wyo., 793

F.3d 599, 603 (6th Cir. 2015), cited by the District

Court of Appeals below, held that, “unclaimed

certified mail represents a first attempt at notice.

One must take "additional reasonable steps" to

notify the interested party.” And that, “posting

notice or sending it by regular mail generally will

do the trick”. Id.

Procedural due process was the basis for

Jones, Id., and Ming, Id., in distinguishing between

first class mail and certified mail return receipt

requested mail for notice purposes.

Had the default notice simply been certified

mail, rather than certified mail return receipt

requested, it would have arrived in the

homeowner’s mailbox. And, the lender would have

had a record of delivery. Use of the receipt service

frustrated the purpose of the notice under Section

20 of the mortgage, (App. 1a footnote 1) which was

to provide an “opportunity to take corrective

action.”

Notice for private parties in a contractual

setting has parallel support for a reasonable

attempt if certified return receipt requested mail is

unclaimed. This can be found in the common law

doctrine of the covenant of good faith and fair

dealing. And, is codified in the Uniform

Commercial Code § 1-304 and Section 671.203

Florida Statutes. “Every contract or duty within the

9

Uniform Commercial Code imposes an obligation of

good faith in its performance and enforcement.” (As

a security instrument, the mortgage comes within

the provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform

Commercial Code).

The homeowner is suggesting nothing other

than, the reasonable step of sending out a default

notice by regular mail, so that it actually gets to the

homeowner. Contrast this with the lender seeking

$1,094.00 for drive by property inspections, (Record

p. 499) demonstrating that when a lender wants to

make contact, it does so.

Distinguishing between first-class mail and

certified

mail

return

receipt

requested,

accomplishes the purpose and intent of notice in

Section 20 of the mortgage of the, “Notice… and

opportunity to cure” and “opportunity to take

corrective action.” (App. Footnote 1)

C.

A functional analysis comparing firstclass mail to certified mail return receipt

requested demonstrates there is a difference.

The Court in its opinion (App. 1-6) ignored a

functional analysis of what occurs with certified

mail return receipt requested.

Functionally first-class mail travels as

follows: (1) sender places the mail in a mailbox. (2)

10

The mail is placed in the mailbox of the recipient.

There is no intermediate step as far as users of the

postal system are concerned. You do not need to

take any further step, or even be present for firstclass mail. Mailing Standards of the United States

Postal Service Domestic Mail Manual 1.1.1

“Without a contrary order, the mail is delivered as

addressed.”

Certified mail return receipt requested

travels differently. It does not travel from the

mailbox the sender placed the letter, to the mailbox

of the recipient. It leaves the mailbox the sender

places the mail into, but never reaches the

recipient’s mailbox. Instead, it is either handed to

the recipient, if they are physically present. Or, a

little card, not the mail itself, is placed in the

recipient’s mailbox. In contrast, “Certified Mail

Restricted Delivery permits a mailer to direct

delivery only to the addressee”. Id. 3.2.2.

Certified mail alone, without a receipt, would

have accomplished proof of sending of the notice.

“Certified Mail provides the sender with a mailing

receipt and, upon request, electronic verification

that an article was delivered or that a delivery

attempt was made.” Domestic Mail Manual 3.1.1.

The physical process and the practice effect

of each of the categories of mail under the Domestic

Mail Manual under 39 C.F.R. 111 is fundamentally

different in both handling and physical delivery.

11

D.

Because first-class mail and certified

mail

return

receipt

requested

are

fundamentally

different,

the

public

perception

and

common

usage

also

distinguishes both categories of mail, not

physical standards made by the Mailing

Standards of the United States Postal Service

Domestic Mail Manual.

An analysis of consumer perception, and

intent of a party to the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac

Uniform Mortgage, also factors into such analysis.

The user perception of a mortgagor,

consumer, or American society in general is

different for certified mail return receipt requested,

than it is for first-class mail. There is a functional

difference between them. In a society where more

and more people are working, or not waiting at

home for mail, or any other packages, certified mail

return receipt requested is really different, and not

in line with the past decade of American consumer

behavior and perception.

As reflected by the trial judge’s findings,

there is a perception that people view first-class

mail different from certified mail return receipt

requested.

This court

has

previously

ruled,

that

12

common knowledge can form the basis for

interpretation of language. In Nix v. Hedden, 149

U.S. 304, 307 (1893), this court considered in a tax

context, whether a tomato was a fruit or a

vegetable. The Court conceded that a tomato was

botanically a fruit. However, because in commerce

and common parlance it was conserved a vegetable,

for purposes of taxation it was a vegetable.

So too here. While, the United States Postal

Service may consider certified mail return receipt

requested just an “add-on” service, business and

the public do not treat them the same. Thus,

certified mail return receipt requested is a means

other than first-class mail.

CONCLUSION

To consider a default notice given by

unclaimed certified mail return receipt requested

the same as first class mail, is to make the

homeowner, “no better off than if the notice had

never been sent.” And, to void the consumer due

process right, under contract, common law, and

statue to notice and an opportunity to cure or

correct.

This Court should grant the Petition for Writ

of Certiorari.

In the alternative, this Court should

summarily reverse the Fourth District’s decision.

13

And, hold that United States Postal Service

certified mail return receipt requested, is a means

other than first-class mail.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN J. ANASTASIO

Counsel of Record

Suite 203

3601 South East Ocean Boulevard

Stuart, Florida 34996

(772) 286-3336

eservice@psllaw.net

1a

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE

OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT

No. 4 D18-1618

[March 20, 2019]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Nineteenth

Judicial Circuit, Martin County; William L. Roby,

Judge; L.T. Case No. 1000030lCAAXMX.

PER CURIAM.

MTGLQ Investors, L.P. ("the Bank") appeals

a final judgment dismissing its foreclosure

complaint, entered in favor of Barbara Nina Davis

("the Homeowner"). We agree with the Bank that

the trial court erred in finding that it failed to

substantially comply with conditions precedent to

bringing a foreclosure suit. We reverse and remand

for further proceedings.

The mortgage contract at issue requires

notice of default before a foreclosure action may be

brought 1 and further provides in paragraph 15 that

"[a]ny notice to Borrower in connection with this

Security Instrument shall be deemed to have been

given to Borrower when mailed by first class that

"[a]ny notice to Borrower in connection with this

Security Instrument shall be deemed to have been

given to Borrower when mailed by first class mail

or when actually delivered to Borrower's notice

address if sent by other means." The lender sent a

default notice to the Homeowner in December 2009.

The letter indicates that it was sent via certified

mail with a return receipt requested. The

2a

corresponding return receipt indicates the letter

was sent via first-class mail with return receipt

requested and was returned to the lender as

"unclaimed" and "unable to forward."

The Bank brought a complaint for

foreclosure in February 2010. The Homeowner

asserted in her responsive pleading that the Bank

did not serve and she did not receive a presuit

notice "that was either served by regular mail or

actually received if delivered by other means,

including but not limited to certified mail, certified

mail return receipt requested .... "

At trial, the Bank admitted a copy of the

default notice along with the postmark indicating

"First-Class Mail" and the return receipt indicating

that the letter was returned to the sender and

unclaimed by the intended recipient. At the close of

evidence, the Homeowner moved to dismiss the

action for the Bank's failure to comply with presuit

notice requirements. Specifically, she contended

that the notice was sent by certified mail, not first

class mail and therefore, the Bank had to prove

actual delivery, which it did not. The Bank

responded that certified mail is a type of first class

mail, and that the evidence reflected the letter was

designated first class mail.

The trial court stated that it did not believe

certified mail was the same thing as first class mail

and it found that because the letter was returned

as undelivered, the Bank did not establish

compliance with the condition of presuit notice of

default. The trial court dismissed the case.

3a

We hold that the trial court erred in

dismissing the case based on failure to satisfy the

presuit notice requirement. The return receipt

indicates on its face that the default notice was sent

by first class mail. Thus, under paragraph 15 of the

mortgage, the notice was "deemed to have been

given to Borrower."

An opinion of the Ohio Court of Appeals

contains similar facts and is instructive. In Ocwen

Loan Servicing, LLC v. Malish, 109 N.E.3d 659, 668

(Ohio Ct. App. 2018), the mortgage contract

contained the same language that is contained in

the subject mortgage's paragraph 15, relied on by

the Homeowner. The letter was sent via certified

mail and was unclaimed. Id. The court declined to

find that the conditions precedent were not

satisfied merely because the notice was sent via

certified mail and reasoned:

(T]he evidence here shows that

certified mail is first-class mail. The

Malishes'

tracking-information

printout they submitted from the

USPS website shows that certified

mail is simply enhanced first-class

mail. Under the heading "Postal

Product" is stated "First-Class Mail."

And beside this under the heading

"Features" is stated "Certified Mail. "

This indicates that certified mail is

basically a service that can be addedon to first-class mail It stands to

reason that a sender purchases this

4a

service if the sender wants to ensure

that the first-class mail gets to the

recipient. Therefore, because Ocwen

sent the notice of default to the

Malishes by first-class mail, the notice

must be "deemed to have been given"

when it was sent on August 14, 2015.

Id. at 668-69; see also Md. State Bd. of Nursing v.

Sesay, 121 A.3d 140, 144 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.

2015) ("Certified mail ... is an extra service that a

mail sender may, by paying extra, add to first-class

mail."); Ming Kuo Yang v. City of Wyoming, 31 F.

Supp. 3d 925, 932 n. 6 (W.D. Mich. 2014), aff'd,

Ming Kuo Yang v. City of Wyoming, 793 F.3d 599

(6th Cir. 2015) (noting that "[a]ccording to the

United States Postal Service, certified mail is an

extra service option that may be combined with

first class or priority mail. www.usps.com" and

holding that "[t]here is nothing in the Ordinance

[permitting notice by first class service] to suggest

that combining first-class mail with the added

certified mail service does not satisfy the

Ordinance's requirement that notice be sent by

first-class mail").

The Homeowner argues that the use of the

word "deemed" in paragraph 15 is ambiguous. But

our courts have held that such language is not

ambiguous. In Best Meridian Insurance Co. v.

Tuaty, 752 So. 2d 733, 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), the

court addressed a similar provision that stated, "All

notices or reports .. . will be deemed delivered to the

persons entitled to notices or reports when we mail

5a

them." The Third District concluded:

Under this type of notice provision,

notice to the insured is deemed to be

complete upon mailing, even if the

insured does not actually receive the

notice. See Service Fire Ins. Co. v.

Markey, 83 So. 2d 855, 856 (Fla. 1955);

Bradley v. Assocs. Discount Corp., 58

So. 2d 857, 859 (Fla. 1952); Burgos v.

Independent Fire Ins. Co., 371 So. 2d

539, 541 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); Allstate

Ins. Co. v. Dougherty, 197 So. 2d 563,

566 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Aetna Cas. &

Sur. Co. v. Simpson, 128 So. 2d 420,

424 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961). The insurer

need only establish that the required

notices were actually mailed. The

insurer need not establish that the

insured actually received the notice.

Because the evidence in the instant case

showed that the default notice was mailed via first

class mail and there is nothing in the mortgage to

suggest that adding a return receipt defeats first

class mail status, the default notice "shall be

deemed to have been given to Borrower when

mailed" pursuant to the terms of the mortgage.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing the

case based on its determination that the Bank

failed to comply with conditions precedent to

bringing suit.

Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

GERBER, C.J., CIKLIN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

6a

1 Paragraph 20 provides in relevant part:

Neither Borrower nor Lender may

commence, join, or be joined to any

judicial action ... that arises from ...

this Security Instrument or that

alleges that the other party has

breached any provision of, or any duty

owed by reason of, this Security

Instrument, until such Borrower or

Lender has notified the other party

(with such notice given in compliance

with the requirements of section 15) of

such alleged breach and afforded the

other party hereto a reasonable period

after the giving of such notice to take

corrective action. ... The notice of

acceleration and opportunity to cure

given to Borrower pursuant to section

22 and the notice of acceleration given

to Borrower pursuant to Section 18

shall be deemed to satisfy the notice

and opportunity to take corrective

action provisions of this Section 20.

7a

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE

OF FLORIDA FOURTH DISTRICT

No. 4 D18-1618

[Ma, 17, 2019]

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

ORDERED that the appellant's April 4, 2019

motion for rehearing en banc is denied.

Further,

ORDERED that the appellant’s April 4, 2019

motion for rehearing is denied. Further,

ORDERED that the appellant’s April 5, 2019

“amended motion for certification- of district

court decision of great public importance” is denied.

s/ Lonn Weissblum

LONN WEISSBLUM, Clerk

District

Court

of Appeal

State of Florida

(SEAL)

8a

Supreme Court of Florida

FRIDAY, AUGUST 30, 2019

CASE NO.: SC19-1020

Lower Tribunal No(s).:

4D18-1618;

432010CA000301

This cause having heretofore been submitted

to the Court on jurisdictional briefs and portions of

the record deemed necessary to reflect jurisdiction

under Article V, Section 3(b), Florida Constitution,

and the Court having determined that it should

decline to accept jurisdiction, it is ordered that the

petition for review is denied.

No motion for rehearing will be entertained

by the Court. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(d)(2).

POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, LUCK, and

MUÑIZ, JJ., concur.

A True Copy

Test:

Supreme Court of the

s. John A. Tomasino

State of Florida

John A. Tomasino

(SEAL)

Supreme court clerk

Certified Mail Return Receipt Record

9a

CERTIFIED MAIL RETURN RECEIPT

RECORD