Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Molly Ann Mahany, Petitioner v. City of Buffalo Police Department, et al.

-6690

FILED

SEP 14 2019

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATE'Sre"f court

u.s.

Molly Ann Mahany,

Petitioner, pro se,

v.

i. City of Buffalo Police Department, State of New York; &

ii. Erie County District Attorney’s Office, State of New York,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Molly Mahany

Ms. Maeve E. Huggins, Esq.

Petitioner, pro se

City of Buffalo Department of Law

PO Box 7

1112 City Hall, Buffalo, NY 14202

Sardinia, NY 14134

Phone: 716-851-4317 / Fax: 716-851-4105

Phone: 716-598-4161

Email: mhuggins@citv-buffalo.com

Email: mollvmahanv@hotmail.com

Counsel for Respondent

Ms. Michelle Parker, Esq.

Erie County Department of Law

95 Franklin Street #1634

Buffalo, NY 14202

Phone: 716-858-2209

Email: p arkerm@erie. gov

RECEIVED

Counsel for Respondei it NOV 1 9 2019

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT. U.S.

I. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Question 1:

In a Section 1983 false-evidence claim, which involves the creation, use, and

continued dissemination of fabricated evidence and upon which false accusations

were &/or are based, does the statute of limitations begin to run upon the favorable

termination of the ensuing proceedings, as recently held in McDonough v. Smith,

No. 18-485, 588 U. S.

(2019), or from when the falsely accused “knew or should

have known” of the of that falsified, as held herein by the Second Circuit Court of

Appeals (Appendix A3), particularly:

i-)

where the main harms thereby caused were not the long term deprivations of

physical liberty, as they were in McDonough v. Smith, supra, &/or where the

violations resulted in harms that were primarily “interests other than the interest

in freedom from physical restraint.” Albright v. Oliver. 510 U.S. 266, 283 (1994);

&/or

ii.)

when whether a given resolution, if any, in false-evidence Section 1983

claims should be considered a “favorable termination,” as initially established in

Heck v, Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477 (1994), where the primary causal harms are not

liberty deprivations, is presently uncertain, undetermined, and warrants redress

and clarification by the U. S. Supreme Court. McDonough v. Smith, n. 2, supra-,

&/or

i

iii.)

when the falsely accused has consistently been denied all access to that

which was falsified &/or its’ contents, in ostensible regards to herself, and, as such,

she has no first-hand knowledge of that upon which said false accusations were

based, i.e. she has only occasionally and inadvertently overheard bits and pieces

thereof from various third parties, etc., rendering it impossible for her to defend

such; &/or

iv.)

where the long term dissemination of said false evidence is so egregious as to

shock the conscience, given that the Respondents’ only purpose was &/or is to cause

harm unrelated to any legitimate legal purpose, thereby violating the Petitioner’s

Substantive Due Process Rights, et al., as established by County of Sacramento v.

Lewis. 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998), Rochin v. California. 342 U.S. 165 (1952); &/or

v.)

as the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, as well as the United States

District Court, Western District of New York, have entered decisions &/or

sanctioned such (Appendix A & Appendix B), that “so far departfed] from the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,” i.e. rewarding the criminals

herein, i.e. the Respondents, and further victimizing the actual crime victim, i.e. the

Petitioner, that it “califs] for an exercise of this Court’s Supervisory Power,”

pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 10 (a).

li

Question 2:

Should the United States Supreme Court grant Writ of Certiorari to said

Petitioner, and review the false-evidence Section 1983 matter herein:

i.) in order to clarify whether a particular “resolution” should be considered a

“favorable termination,” as initially established in Heck v. Humphrey, supra; &

ii.) in order to determine the proper standards when there essentially is no

such “termination,” favorable or otherwise, as here; &

iii.) in order to establish a clear and determined exception to the “favorable

termination” requirement, established by Heck v. Humphrey, supra, i.e. to establish

a lawful exception for Section 1983 Plaintiffs/Petitioners who have diligently sought

out and actively pursued such “favorable termination,” but was thwarted from

obtaining such due to the Respondent’s ongoing frauds, crimes &/or other

illegalities, as here, so as not to deprive said Section 1983 Plaintiffs/Petitioners

access to Federal Court relief, also as here.

m

Question 3:

Should equitable tolling, i.e. a person is not required to sue within the

statutory period if he cannot, under the circumstances, be reasonably expected to do

so, Dixon v. United States. 548 U.S. 1 (2006), be applied in a long term falseevidence and official misconduct Section 1983 claim, where the Respondents

routinely utilized the fabricated evidence, which they entered into law enforcement

databases as if accurate, genuine, & legitimate, against the Petitioner herein, who

qualifies for the protections afforded by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),

42 U. S. Code §12111, et seq, specifically Title II, and which the Respondents so did

for the purposes of beating or riding out the statute of limitations on said Section

1983 claim. EQUITY WILL NOT SUFFER A WRONG WITHOUT A REMEDY.

John Norton Pomeroy, L.L.D., “A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence,” Volume I.,

SECTION X., § 423.

IV

II. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s):

I.

Questions Presented

1 - iv

II.

Table of Contents

v

III.

Index to Appendices

vi

IV.

Table of Authorities

vn - ix

V.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

1

VI.

Opinions

2

VII.

Jurisdiction

2

VIII. Constitutional Provisions

3-4

IX.

Statutory Provisions, Treatises, and Articles

4-5

X.

Statement of the Case

5-20

XI.

Reasons for Granting the Writ

20-21

XII.

Conclusion

21- 22

v

III. INDEX TO APPENDICES

Appendix A

A1-A12

Second Circuit Court of Appeals

Summary & Motion Orders

Appendix B

B1-B18

U.S. District Court Decision & Order

& Magistrate’s Report, Recommendation, & Order

Appendix C

Cl

Certificate of Service

Appendix D

D1-D16

Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis

& Supporting Affidavits

vi

IV. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s):

Cases:

Albright v. Oliver. 510 U.S. 266, 283 (1994)

i

County of Sacramento v. Lewis. 523 U.S. 833 (1998)

li

Dixon v. United States. 548 U.S. 1 (2006)

IV

Heck v. Humphrey. 512 U.S. 477 (1994)

passim

McDonough v. Smith. No. 18-485, 588 U.S.

Rochin v. California. 342 U.S. 165 (1952)

(2019)

passim

n

Statutes:

28 U.S. Code §1254

2,4

28 U.S. Code §1738A

4,8

42 U.S. Code §1983

passim

vn

Page(s):

42 U. S. Code §12111, et seq, Title II

iv, 4, 6

Supreme Court Rule 10(a)

li.

Supreme Court Rule 10(c)

1

Constitutional Provisions:

First Amendment

3

Fourth Amendment

3

Fifth Amendment

3

Sixth Amendment

3,4

Fourteenth Amendment

4

Treatises & Articles:

iv, 4

A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence

John Norton Pomeroy, L.L.D., Volume I, Section X., § 423

vm

Page(s):

iv, 8

The Treaty on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction

Hague Convention (October 25, 1980): Established legal rights and

procedures for children who have been wrongfully removed.

The language of which has been incorporated by reference into

most child abduction statutes. “Children who are wrongfully removed

... are to be promptly returned.”

“Ensuring Equality in the Criminal Justice System for

People with Disabilities,” ADA.gov, DOJ, Civil Rights

Division, Americans with Disabilities Act - Title II Regulations:

Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State &

Local Government Services. Department of Justice,

September 15, 2010.

IX

I

v, 6

No.:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Molly Ann Mahany,

Petitioner, pro se,

v.

i. City of Buffalo Police Department, State of New York; &

ii. Erie County District Attorney’s Office, State of New York,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

V. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Molly Ann Mahany, Petitioner, pro se., most respectfully petitions the United

States Supreme Court for grant of a Writ of Certiorari, in order to review the

determination of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, docketed as # 18-1483

(Appendix A1 - A12), as, in so doing, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals “has

decided an important question of federal law that has not been, but should be,

settled by this Court” and “has decided an important federal question in a way that

conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court,” most recently in McDonough v.

Smith. No. 18-485, 588 U. S.

(2019), in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 10

(c).

1

VI. OPINIONS

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals rendered a Summary Order and

Judgment, which was entered on June 20, 2019. A copy of said Summary Order and

Judgment is submitted herewith. (Appendix A1 - A12).

This Section 1983 matter was initially filed in the United States District

Court, Western District of New York, and indexed as # 14-cv-693. A copy of the

Magistrate’s Report & Recommendation as well as the Opinion & Order of the

District Court, entered on April 16, 2018, is submitted herewith. (Appendix B1 —

B18).

VII. JURISDICTION

The Petitioner, Molly A. Mahany, pro se, hereinafter “the Petitioner,”

respectfully invokes the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, in

accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1254, having timely filed this Petition for Writ of

Certiorari, and as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has issued a final judgment

on an important question of federal law that has not been, but need be, settled by this

Court, as said final judgment is in conflict with decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court

on the same important matter, as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has sanctioned

a decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial

proceedings that it warrants the exercise of this Court’s Supervisory Power, etc.,

there are compelling reasons for grant of the Writ of Certiorari most respectfully

prayed for herein.

2

VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

i-)

U.S. Constitution - 1st Amendment:

The First Amendment (Amendment I) to the United States Constitution

prevents the government from making laws that restrict the establishment

of religion, that prohibit the free exercise of religion, or that abridge the

freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, the right to peaceably assemble,

or the right to petition the government for redress of grievances.

Source: First Amendment to the United States Constitution - httos://en. Wikipedia, ora

ii.)

U.S. Constitution - 4th Amendment:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized.

Source: Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution - httos://en. wikioedia. ora

iii.)

U.S. Constitution - 5th Amendment:

The Fifth Amendment requires that felonies be tried only upon indictment

by a grand jury. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides the right of defendants

to be tried only once for the same offense. The self-incrimination clause

provides various protections against self-incrimination, including the right of

an individual to not serve as a witness in a criminal case in which they are

the defendant.

The Supreme Court furthered the protections of this amendment through the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Source: Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution - httpsj/en. wikioedia. ora

iv.)

U.S. Constitution — 6th Amendment:

The Sixth Amendment (Amendment VI) to the United States Constitution

requires that criminal defendants be given notice of the nature and cause of

accusations. The Amendment’s Confrontation Clause gives criminal

defendants the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, while the

Compulsory Process Clause gives criminal defendants the right to call their

3

own witnesses and, in some cases, compel witnesses to testify. The Assistance

of Counsel Clause grants criminal defendants the right to be assisted by

counsel.

Source: Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution - httos://en. wikiDedia.org

v.)

U.S. Constitution - 14th Amendment:

The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment (Amendment XIV) to the

United States Constitution contains several clauses, including the

Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due

Process Clause, i.e. “[n]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,

or property without due process of law.” This amendment limits the

actions of all state and local officials, including those acting on behalf of such.

Source: Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution - httos://en. Wikipedia, ora

IX. STATUTORY PROVISIONS, TREATISES, & ARTCLES

i-)

28 U.S. Code § 1254 — Courts of appeals; certiorari; certified questions: Cases

in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the

following methods: (1) by writ of certiorari granted upon petition of any party

to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree.

ii.)

28 U.S. Code §1738A - Full faith and credit given to child custody

determinations: (g) a court of a state shall not exercise jurisdiction in any

proceeding for a custody or visitation determination commenced during the

pendency of a proceeding in a court of another state.

iii.)

42 U.S. Code § 1983 - Civil action for deprivation of rights: Every person who,

under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State

or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, & immunities secured by

the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.

iv.)

42 U. S. Code §12111, et seq, Title II - Title II of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (ADA) protects people with disabilities from discrimination in

State and local government services, programs, & activities, including law

enforcement agencies, justice system entities, & corrections agencies. .

v.)

A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence, John Norton Pomeroy, L.L.D., Volume I,

Section X., § 423: EQUITY WILL NOT SUFFER A WRONG WITHOUT

REMEDY: Ubi jus ibi remedium — wherever a legal right has been infringed,

a remedy will be given.

4

vi.)

“Ensuring Equality in the Criminal Justice System for People with

Disabilities,” ADA.gov, DOJ, Civil Rights Division, Americans with

Disabilities Act - Title II Regulations: Nondiscrimination on the Basis of

Disability in State & Local Government Services. Department of Justice,

X. STATEMENT OF CASE

This is a Section 1983 false-evidence claim, pursuant to 42 U.S. Code §1983,

involving the Respondents’ creation and continued long term dissemination of false

evidence, which were used in a number of actions, proceedings, & other such

judicial procedures as well as entered into law enforcement databases, thereby

causing and continuing to still cause repeated and as yet unremedied violations of

the Petitioner’s Constitutional Rights and ongoing deprivations her Federal

Entitlements, etc..

The primary issues herein are:

i.)

when does the statute of limitations begin to run in a Section

1983 false evidence claim; &

ii.)

what constitutes a “favorable termination,” as established by

Heck v Humphries, supra, in a Section 1983 false evidence claim; &

iii.) what if a Section 1983 false evidence Petitioner never achieves

such “favorable termination,” despite her overly diligent efforts to

procure such and given the Respondent’s long term and routine acts to

thwart her procurement thereof; &

iv.) when does the statute of limitations begin to run in a Section

1983 false evidence claim when the Respondents’ deliberate ongoing

unlawful acts “shock the conscience;” &

v. )

should equity avail prospective relief: &

5

vi.) does blaming and relentlessly punishing a crime victim, via

shifting all accountability for what are a municipalities’ own crimes

and illicit acts alone, by way of the long term dissemination of said

false evidence and even though her victimization had well been

established, toll the statute of limitations in a Section 1983 claim and

would justice be served by not so doing.

The Court, in McDonough v. Smith, supra, another Section 1983 false

evidence claim out of the Second Circuit, held that the statute of limitations began

to run when the criminal proceedings against him terminated in his favor. The

Second Circuit used the same case &/or standard to determine said accrual period

in both McDonough and herein.

This case presents the U.S. Supreme Court with an opportunity to

prospectively clarify the Heck “favorable termination” requirement, which would

afford all seeking federal relief under a Section 1983 false evidence claim access to

such, which said Petitioner has consistently been denied.

Moreover, at some point this Court need determine whether the whether the

Heck “favorable termination” requirement applies across the board or whether

there need be a lawful exception for Section 1983 Petitioners who have diligently

and rigorously pursued such “favorable termination,” as did the Petitioner herein.

Here, although the Petitioner diligently and rigorously pursued such

“favorable termination,” every single day for 18 years, she was unable to procure

such due to said false evidence.

6

Although the Federal Courts are divided, the statute of limitation for Section

1983 false evidence claims primarily runs from when it is “favorably terminated,” as

the matter herein was never terminated at all, and, as such, the statute of

limitations has yet to accrue, but will begin to accrue when she procures some truth

and any accountability, etc., as it is then “favorably terminated,” pursuant to Heck.

supra.

The main resultant and ongoing harms, caused by the Respondent’s falsified

evidence, include the deprivation of the Petitioner’s interests in real property, i.e.

she was deprived of her proprietary interests in two houses, the seizure of such

were further prohibited by a Permanent Order of Protection and several Court

Orders.

As a result of said false evidence, the Petitioner was not only deprived, and

continues to still be deprived, of various pecuniary interests and other monetary

resources, i.e. someone cashed in the Petitioner’s Whole Life Insurance Policy, for

which she has no recourse, and someone was receiving and spending the

Petitioner’s military retirement benefits, including her share of a sizeable lump sum

award, for well over a dozen years, as to which she also had no recourse, and during

which time the Petitioner was often, if not usually, thereby indigent and homeless.

7

The primary ongoing resultant harms further include the deprivation of the

Petitioner’s personal property interests, including well over $ 300,000.00 in

personal property, as well as he majority of her mail for 14 years, all of her ID, her

diplomas, thousands of photographs, jewelry, heirlooms, etc., and her well

maintained vehicle, which was outright stolen after first being repeatedly

vandalized, then repaired at the Petitioner’s expense, for which she had no

available means of legal redress.

As an example of the ongoing use of the false evidence herein, in &/or around

2012, the Petitioner contacted the New York State DMV to see if her vehicle, above,

which was stolen 12 years earlier although titled in solely her own name, was still

being driven.

The woman at the DMV was upset with the Petitioner, stating that said

Petitioner should not have a car on the road, impermissibly being driven by an as

yet unidentified car thief, when said vehicle was still titled in the Petitioner’s name.

In response thereto, the Petitioner told said DMV employee that she has

repeatedly reported the theft of her vehicle to various police departments and

district attorney’s offices, including both Respondents, to the Virginia Beach Police

Department, to the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City of Virginia Beach, to the

New York State Troopers, to the Virginia Troopers, to the Erie County Sheriffs

Department, to the James City County Sheriffs Department, to the New York State

8

Office of the Inspector General, to the Inspector General for the Commonwealth of

Virginia, to the New York State Attorney General, to the Virginia Attorney General,

to the United States Attorney General, to the Buffalo Field Office of the FBI, to the

Norfolk Field Office of the FBI, to the Head of the Criminal Division of the FBI, who

accurately summarized the inner workings of the corruption herein, at the FBI

Headquarters in Washington, D.C., all of which went without even an offer of

assistance, much less any actual law enforcement or just resolve.

Hearing this, the DMV representative had no further advice. As the

Petitioner said, “I’m just one, wholly discredited person.”

About a year prior thereto, i.e. in &/or around 2011, the Petitioner also

attempted to file said Section 1983 Claim, based on the false evidence herein, in the

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, having managed to obtain a

ride thereto.

The Petitioner consulted with a representative of said District Court, who

was a smaller woman, who had longer dark hair, and whose name began with a “J.”

The representative, above, told the Petitioner that she would have to file such

Section 1983 claim in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York,

which the Petitioner could not afford to do.

The Petitioner initially returned to the Commonwealth of Virginia sometime

in 2003.

9

She did so for the ultimate purposes of re-inhabiting her Virginia Beach

residence, given that two of her treating physicians advised her that it was not safe

for the Petitioner to physically be in the Buffalo, New York area, and as it was her

children’s home state, and, as such, the Petitioner had to be physically present in

said Commonwealth, in order to have her children returned to her legal Sole

Custodianship, pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 1728A, or the PKPA et al..

Moreover, pursuant to the language of the Treaty at the Hague Convention,

October 25, 1980, which initially established legal rights and procedures for

wrongfully removed children, “[c]hildren who are wrongfully removed must be

promptly returned,” as herein.

Once back in said Commonwealth, the false evidence continued to be

disseminated as needed. Thus, the Petitioner continued to occasionally be evicted,

continued to often either be denied employment or soon terminated therefrom, and

continued to be denied access to the courts, to legal aid, to warrant cards, to notice

of actions and proceedings, to crime victim’s advocacy, to police protection &/or

assistance, etc..

The Petitioner could not go to the Buffalo, New York area, in order to file a

Section 1983 claim any earlier than she actually did, as, after she returned to

Virginia, she lacked the money to so do. The theft of the Petitioner’s vehicle

rendered “trips” further untenable.

10

During the summer of 2006, the Petitioner had a serious work accident with

injuries. The Petitioner was initially receiving medical attention for such via

Worker’s Compensation. The Petitioner’s Worker’s Compensation claim was, via

further disseminating that which was falsified, then abruptly and inexplicably

terminated, subsequent to which she had chronic elbow pain for years.

Ultimately, said abuser abducted the Petitioner’s children in violation of a

Permanent Order of Protection, a Compliance Court Order prohibiting such, as well

as the Petitioner’s initial child custody determination, which gives said Petitioner

legal Sole Custodianship.

He did so while charges of Endangering the Welfare [of said children] were

pending against him, which he could never have illegally committed without the use

of the false evidence herein.

In this case, said abductor/abuser was, in actual fact, a narcissistic, truthchallenged, family annihilator, with violent tendencies and a personality disorder.

These health problems did not fully manifest themselves until he retired from

active duty military service.

The Petitioner was aware of the abductor/abuser’s mental issues, as well as

his threats to kill her children and his actual and escalating infliction of harm upon

them.

11

It was, and still is, very difficult for the Petitioner to function typically once

she had been rendered without her houses, without her livelihood, without her

profession, without her clothing, including her own shoes, without her reputation,

without her personal property, including her car, without her financial security,

without her medical insurance, and without her fiiends, some of which she had

known for almost 40 years, all of which the Petitioner would still have but, for the

false evidence herein.

The Petitioner has further been diagnosed as having severe ADHD &

Dyslexia, which makes everything more difficult, but much more so after her

medical insurance was fraudulently cancelled, based on said false evidence, i.e. said

fake evidence erroneously asserts that the Plaintiff has Munchausen’s Syndrome, or

that she routinely seeks medical attention for non-existent medical conditions in

order to get attention.

To note, the Petitioner only learned of the “Munchausen’s Syndrome” false

contention upon reading the Recommendation, Judgment, and Order of the District

Court for the Western District of New York, in August of 2018.

The Petitioner, having never received notice of any such actions and

proceedings to which she was a party, despite routine attempts to obtain such via

inquiry, having been denied access to pretty much every Court from which she could

12

have sought relief, having been denied all access to the court files involved herein,

having been denied warrant cards for the ongoing commission of crimes, and having

never had her subpoenas complied with, which, if they had been, may have

favorably resolved this matter shortly after its onset, still has no first-hand

knowledge of the contents of that falsified by the Respondents herein.

That is, the Petitioner believed that she may have witnessed the Respondents

illegally making up something, one of whom even made threats along those lines,

but she has never known or been made aware of what was actually fabricated in

alleged regards to herself, having consistently been denied all access to such

information.

The Petitioner has only overheard bits and pieces of that which was actually

falsified by said Respondents. The Petitioner, having been denied access to the false

evidence itself, remains unaware of the specifics of that fabricated, which renders

defending such falsehoods impossible.

Although it is difficult to function typically when you are abruptly rendered

homeless, indigent, possession-less, profession-less, and without access to courts,

police protection, notice of actions and proceedings, legal advocacy, proper medical

attention, transportation, and any remaining credibility, usually while hungry, cold,

alone, sick, under-dressed, and traumatized, but it is almost impossible to do so

13

when you are the overly conscientious Mother of relatively young children and you

are all too aware that your children are in constant, prospectively lethal danger, for

a continuous and uninterrupted twelve year period, with no available means of legal

redress therefore.

Other resultant and continuing harms, derived via the false evidence herein,

includes the deprivation of the Petitioner’s business, which she, alone, had

established in one of the houses that had illegally been seized, and which was

remarkably successful at the time of its seizure.

Being rendered homeless and without her means of livelihood, due to said

false evidence, the Petitioner ultimately could not pay her professional fees or afford

her Continuing Legal Education courses, thereby suspending her professional

license.

Not only could the Petitioner no longer practice law, which was ultimately a

result of the false evidence, but its ongoing widespread dissemination made it

difficult for her to obtain any employment, much less maintain it, subsequent to

said fabrication.

Before said falsification, the Petitioner had dozens of friends, a solid

reputation, numerous accomplishments, and professional standing.

14

Since the fabrication of said false evidence, and continuing to present, the

Petitioner is generally considered to be an isolated pariah and cautionary tale.

Everyday subsequent to the creation of the false evidence herein, the

Petitioner has made some effort to attempt to remedy this tragedy, even though she

is not accountable for its making.

She often spent her last few dollars on copies, postage, and phone cards in

lieu of food.

Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Petitioner

waited too long to file this false evidence Section 1983 claim, in actual fact, the

Respondents effectively beat or ran out the statutory period by continuing to

disseminate the false evidence herein.

As such, the decision of said Court of Appeals encourages the continued

victimization of a Plaintiff &/or Petitioner, by the Defendants &/or Respondents, in

similar false evidence Section 1983 claims, in order to beat out the applicable

statutes of limitations, as here, and thereby escaping accountability.

As she was denied access to her own court files, as she was denied notice of

the actions and proceedings to which she was a party, and given that everything

that she had subpoenaed was never availed her, the Petitioner’s knowledge as to

certain matters remains quite limited, which makes it difficult to fight back,

particularly when further deprived of access to courts.

15

The Petitioner went to the Erie county Family Court in late 2013 & in early

2014, so as to have them acknowledge her legal Sole Custodianship, which they

already did immediately prior to the fabrication of said false evidence. Said court

ultimately informed the Petitioner that she would have to go along with &/or

otherwise regurgitate that which was maliciously and incorrectly asserted in said

false evidence, which would constitute perjury.

As she was never availed access to that fabricated, the Petitioner still had no

first-hand knowledge of the false evidence &/or its contents, and, as such, she could

not have perjured herself, as advised, even if she were inclined to do so.

Moreover, in &/or around January 2018, exactly concurrent with the

commencement of motion filing in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of

New York, on this Section 1983 claim, indexed as 14-cv-693 therein, someone with

access to law enforcement databases as well as knowledge of the Petitioner’s

learning disabilities again entered false evidence into said databases, so that she

could not obtain the medication needed for the proper treatment of her learning

disabilities, i.e. so as to allow her to do close work, in this case legal writing in the

absence of resources, for the ensuing 6 month period.

The Petitioner and her children are crime victims.

16

j

Thus, an exception to the Heck “favorable termination” requirement need

now be established.

The Petitioner is a crime victim who filed this Section 1983 false evidence

claim honestly, equitably, and with clean hands as well as good intentions.

Everything the Petitioner does is an attempt to procure the one thing that

she and her family have needed since said false evidence was initially fabricated,

but were always unable to procure because said evidence was falsified.

In fifing all documents herein, the Petitioner is seeking some measure of the

truth, some acknowledgment of said crimes, et al., and a degree of accountability,

however minor, for their ongoing commission.

The Petitioner and her family need this to obtain some resolution. Only then

can the crime victims make attempts towards healing as well as efforts to move on,

to which one cannot affix a monetary value.

Additionally, since the Respondents’ creation of said false evidence, the

Petitioner, alone, has borne the entire burden of attempting to “fix” or “correct” the

widespread damage caused by their frauds, which she has done day-in-day-out

without relief, remedy, or recompense, since their fabrication.

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As the Respondents caused, and remain accountable for, the ongoing hurts,

harms, injuries, damages, and other detriments herein, which are egregious and

irreparable, perhaps it is their turn to take over damage control.

To further note, the Petitioner is presently in need of, and legally entitled to,

the immediate relief that she requested via filing the motion to Show Cause in said

Second Circuit i.e. access to and the exclusive use of her houses, her vehicles, her

furniture, her washers and dryers, her health insurance, her shoes, her Professional

License, her livelihood, etc..

In this case, the Respondents instigated the criminal proceeds against the

Petitioner, with an improper purpose and no probable cause. In fact, the Petitioner

had a Professional Nanny, not only to ensure her children’s safety, to promote their

sense of stability, and to provide said children a heightened quality of life, but also

to ward off any prospective false accusations in regards to the Petitioner’s ostensible

ability to mother, which is actually exceptional and exemplary.

Moreover, the Respondents intended to cause harm to the Petitioner,

previously a financially self-sufficient and exemplary Mother of four thriving

children, and threatened to cause her such harms in person on approximately 8

occasions.

The Respondents’ purpose was to create false-evidenee, then broadly

propagate it as well as verify it falsely under oath, to ensure the Petitioner’s

continuing harm, which has neither a legitimate nor a legal purpose.

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The Petitioner is now, and always has been, the sole true owner of the very few

pieces of stolen personal property that she asked to be returned, via said motion,

above.

The pieces of stolen personal property in issue, although the Respondents

would not allow the Petitioner to make a police report or obtain warrant cards in

regards thereto, constitute a mere fraction of the stolen property of which she, alone,

remains exclusively entitled to use, possess, transfer, convey, destroy, etc..

As the Respondents’ use of false evidence, against said Petitioner, had &/or

has no legitimate purposes and was designed to cause ongoing harms, which it did

&/or does, it is so egregious as to “shock the conscience,” thereby violating her 14th

Amendment Substantive Due Process Rights as well.

XI. REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Petitioner respectfully invokes the jurisdiction of the United States

Supreme Court, having timely filed this Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and as the

Second Circuit Court of Appeals has issued a final judgment on an important question

of federal law that has not been, but need be, settled by this Court, as said final

judgment is in conflict with decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court on the same

important matter, as the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has sanctioned a decision

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that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,

here via effectively rewarding the actual criminals, that it warrants the exercise of

this Court’s Supervisory Power, etc., there are compelling reasons for grant of the

Writ of Certiorari most respectfully prayed for herein.

XII. CONCLUSION

The Petitioners Section 1983 claim is not only meritorious, but timely, as the

standard applicable hereto is not when she learned of the false evidence herein, or

should have learned of such, which she never did, but when this matter was

“favorably terminated.”

Due to the long term and continuing commission of frauds, crimes, &/or other

illegalities by the Respondents herein, this matter has yet to be terminated,

favorably or otherwise. Regardless of the Petitioner’s every ongoing, due, and

diligent human effort to so do, this matter has yet to be resolved.

Although she is only an innocent crime victim, this matter has yet to be

terminated, favorably or otherwise, due to the ongoing commission of false evidence

and Section 1983 violations by the Respondents, above.

Moreover, even if the standard applicable hereto was, hypothetically, when

the Petitioner “knew or should have known” of that fraudulently falsified and put

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forth as ostensible evidence, as was held by the Second Circuit, the Petitioner may

have surmised or guessed that the Respondent’s conduct was fishy, but she was

never availed any first hand access to the actual false accusations &/or the falsified

evidence itself, despite her repeated, due, and diligent efforts to procure such.

Thus, what the Petitioner really “knows” of the evidence falsified by the

Respondents, is, in actual fact, nothing. Her awareness thereof is mere conjecture.

For the reasons stated herein, in order to make efforts towards healing and

moving forward, for the purposes of preserving the integrity of our judicial system,

and in the interest of equity, justice, and the law, the Petitioner most respectfully

now prays for relief in the form of issuance of Writ of Certiorari.

Dated: November 7, 2019

I Respectfully Ask For This:

Mc^^^^fiany, Pet^ionej^pro

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Molly Mahany

Ms. Maeve E. Huggins, Esq.

Petitioner, pro se

City of Buffalo Department of Law

PO Box 7

1112 City Hall, Buffalo, NY 14202

Sardinia, NY 14134

Phone: 716-851-4317 / Fax: 716-851-4105

Phone: 716-598-4161

Email: mhuggfins@citv-buffalo.com

Counsel for Respondent

Email: mollvmahanv@hotmail.com

Ms. Michelle Parker, Esq.

Erie County Department of Law

95 Franklin Street #1634

Buffalo, NY 14202

Phone: 716-858-2209

Email: parkerm@erie.gov

Counsel for Respondent

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